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The interview of T ~~(b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4a)~~ HARC CHIEF opened at 2105 Zulu, 16 August 2011.

PERSONS PRESENT

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR: SME-INTEL

INTERVIEWEE: T ~~(b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4a)~~ HARC CHIEF

COURT REPORTER: CR

Derived from:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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**SME-INTEL:** I'm [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] the intel lead for the investigation team. I'm here to investigate the circumstances surrounding the downing of the CH47 in the Wardak Province, Afghanistan, on 6 August 2011. Brigadier General Colt has been assigned as the investigating officer in this case, and was appointed by General James M. Mattis, U.S. CENTCOM McDill Air Force Base, Florida.

His findings as to the appropriate action will be included in the report to General James M. Mattis.

Before we begin the interview, please review and sign the privacy act statement, which you have. And also, too, I'm going to ask you to stand and raise your right hand.

*The witness did as directed and was duly sworn.*

Questions by [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]:

Q. For the record, please state your name, rank and duty position.

A. My name is [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)], United States Air Force. I'm currently sitting as the Task Force [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] HARC Chief. And currently assigned to Fort Bragg JSOC within the JSOC Intelligence Brigade.

Q. Okay. [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] just to start with the scope of the

[redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c]

A. Yeah. As far as -- I will start off with targeting the individual. We will start there. For going after Objective Lefty Grove to here, what we are looking at here is a Taliban commander in Wardak Province, within Tangi Valley. He had possibly taken over for Objective Dunlap who is Din Mohammad who was EKIA a couple months

earlier.

Going after Lefty Grove; one of the things from the

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c on [Objective] Lefty Grove was light as compared to some of the other targets that we go after.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q. You said on Objective Lefty Grove that he was associated with another individual that was EKIA'd --

A. Correct.

Q. -- do you know when that individual was EKIA'd?

A. Not off the top of my head. I think it was April [2011]. But I can go back and check.

Q. And I'd recall from what objective he was EKIA.

A. I don't remember.

Q. Okay. All right. The next piece is in and around the day of the target itself there, or even a couple weeks prior, was there any (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c reporting that --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- they had what was available, what was known and also his highlighting to his source --

A. Okay.

Q. -- the relevancy of the sources that were provided in that [area]--

A. Exactly. Okay. From my perspective, I've been an RTC (Regional Task Controller) at this point in time for about three months. So I had a fairly, I would say, decent working knowledge of the target set.

The big thing about Tangi Valley was that we used to have Combat Outpost (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c in there. So we used

to have a COP. That COP was, by the time I got here, we had removed our forces from that. So we kind of knew that there was definitely an adversary presence in the Tangi Valley. It wasn't one of those areas that was free of Taliban. We had multiple reports that Taliban was active in that area, obviously, as we were going after targets in that area.

The HUMAN INTELLIGENCE picture that I have as of late July 11, this comes out of our [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6), they are based out of [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6), but run sources that do have access to Tangi Valley. The source that continuously reports on the Tangi Valley, we were getting the majority of our [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c


As the coalition forces were conducting that operation, Taliban forces actually attacked that helicopter with small arms. They started the attack. I think it was mostly -- mostly, it looked like small caliber weapons. The helicopter fired back, and basically killed the insurgents who were attacking the helicopter.

So again, just noting that there was some type of threat in that valley from the Taliban perspective.

Q.

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

A.



(b)(1)1.4a

Q.

A.

Q. Okay. Is there any other reporting during that time period?


A. No. That's probably the closest that I have within that 30-day window.

Q. Okay. Now, let's go even further back and, kind of, describe what the threat to aircraft or even coalition forces was in the Tangi Valley. Give us a snap shot of that up to the last six months or so.

A. Exactly. The last six months or you want to go 90 days?

Q. About 90 days. If you have got anything more past that, we will see where we are at?

A.



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q. Okay.

A. And that actually puts some truth to this. It says Din Mohammad, so we are just talking about Din Mohammad, who is objective Dunlap, was killed on 6 June [2011] in Tangi Valley, Sayyidabad District by coalition forces after he was trying to attack coalition force helicopters in the Tangi Valley. So that's what we had coming out at that IIR.

Q. Does it highlight -- through your research, does it say what objective he was actually killed on?

A. I don't have that. Again, I can go back and take a look at which objective that was.

Q. So 6 June [2011], Dim Mohammad is killed. Dim Mohammad is assessed to be who?

A. Dim Mohammad is supposed to be Objective Dunlap.

Q. What's the significant in the Tangi Valley?

A. He's the Taliban commander. So he's the guy within that AO.

Q. So he's being assessed as the Taliban senior leader?

A. Yes -- Uh-hmm.

Q. Okay. Anything else from that report?

A. Not from that reporting, no. That was 9 June [2011].

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Again, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c goes through within that assessment to say that, you know, this is a continuing threat within the Tangi Valley, but they assess it as a moderate threat.

Q. Okay.

A. The next piece of reporting that I have that fits within that timeframe comes from May 11 [2011] and it late May [2011]. There's no date on this. But it's an (b)(3), (b)(6) and that is going -- (b)(3), (b)(6) so it's a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c report. It's very brief. Again, it's out of Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. And it says something to the effect that over 100 Taliban plan to travel from (b)(3), (b)(6) Province through Tangi Valley to possibly shoot down the coalition force aircraft.

Q. So the threat migrating through --  
A. Correct.

Q. -- [inaudible] going into Tangi Valley --  
A. From (b)(3), (b)(6) into Tangi Valley.

Q. And when do we think that COR (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c closed? Was it April?

A. I think that's it. Again, it's before my time. So as I knew about it, you know, there was always, Hey, we pulled out of Tangi, and that's definitely the area.

Q. When did you arrive here?  
A. I arrived here 2 May.

Q. Okay.  
A. And that's the last piece I have for that piece of May reporting. We can go back a little bit further now into April.

Q. Sure.  
A.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

And he states in that meeting there -- this is on 25 April -- that in general, the Taliban are very comfortable in the Tangi Valley, and don't fear daytime air strikes or coalition force raids. However, there

is fear regarding helicopter raids especially at night because the Taliban's communication system is hampered after 1800 typically when most of the cell phone networks are still down.

Q. So 1800 local?

A. Correct.

Q. And the cell phone coverages --

A. It goes down typically. You will see that's very commonly throughout Afghanistan.

And then they stated at night, in the area other Taliban are dependent on radios. Their communication with radios is not nearly as effective as it is during the day when they are using cell phones.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

He also said that Taliban fighters have access to small arms, so PKM, AK47, RPGs possibly some sniper rifles. The heaviest type of weaponry that within the Tangi Valley is 82 millimeter rockets.

Q. 82 millimeter rockets or mortars?

A. He states that they are rockets. We would call them mortars.

Q. Okay.

A. In addition, he talks a little bit in the same reporting about early warning networks. He said that typically the Taliban used watchmen or guards at the local bazarres [markets] and at cell phone towers where they can climb up and get a better view of the area. But that was the majority that he talked about as far as early warning network.

Q. Okay. Go through the next one. Continue on.

A. Okay. In April, we have another IIR that talks about the Tangi Valley something I think I can reference, a

possible helicopter shoot down.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c •

It talks a little bit about the early warning system throughout the Tangi Valley, and how it varies from small, little village enclave to small little village enclave. It says that typically in every Bizarre, there's probably one or two Taliban security guards who are posted at all times to include during night.

They watch the local area, and the roads for coalition forces. And will use cell phones when they can to communicate information back and forth between Taliban members.

Again, same as the other source stated, they will post Taliban members on guard towers, positions where they can view -- see the valley, have good sight, good overwatch.

Q. Can you put this in the scope of the timeline -- you said this report was in April [2011] of when?

A. April 2011.

Q. April what?

A. Oh, the date?

Q. Yeah.

A. The date is 10 April [2011].

Q.

A.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

That finishes out April reporting that I have regarding anything that can be taken for use with the current situation. I will go a little bit further back now to March 11 [2011]. And this is reporting that came out of (b)(3), (b)(6) it's their March wrap up for SIGACT (Significant Activities) reporting. This reporting covers the dates from 18 to 31 March [2011].

Q. Team (b)(3), (b)(6) is with who? Is that the TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c asset or --

A. No. I think that's an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) asset.

Q. So ISAF or Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)?

A. I'm not sure. I would have to go back and take a look.

Q. Okay. Just curious if it's a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c If it's not TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c it's --

A. This is not TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q. But this is just prior to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c being unoccupied?

A. Um-hmm.

And this just talks about reporting. It's a quick little blurb. It says "Reporting indicates that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, also known as Objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, was possibly involved in a recent surface-to-air attack against the task force attack helo during an extract in Tangi Valley.

Q. Does that specifically correlate to an operation that we've done?

A. No, it does not. My assessment would be that would be that would be a battle space. But I don't have the background on this reporting.

Q. Okay.

A. The next piece of reporting that I have would be, again, in March [2011]. This is going to be around 20 March; it's an IIR. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. And this is a quick blurb about an attack possibly going to take place during the day. It says "Unknown as to the exact attack date, but the primary target being any type of helicopters that land in COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c."

Q. So indication there is intent to -- measured intent to engage?

A. Correct -- at COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q. Okay.

A. And as far as overall (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c reporting, the last piece that I will take about -- and I went back

and I also, kind of, searched to see if I could find the names for those responsible. I could talk about those just real quick.

Prior to, one of the only pieces of reporting that I have is on 6 and 7 March 2011]. This comes from -- again, from our (b)(3), (b)(6) team (b)(3), (b)(6). (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, who we spoke earlier. And he just talks on that day about some reflections on the IED (Improvised Explosive Device) attack that happened on 28 February [2011] in the vicinity of COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c resulting in the death of two U.S. Soldiers.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, a Taliban commander. He says within the valley, he's and IED (Improvised Explosive Device), IDF (Indirect Fire) and DF (Direct Fire) attack commander. And he said that Mullah Mohebullah who was one of the suspects that we killed after -- that we thought was responsible for the helicopter downing. He was actually responsible for part of that attack. He was part of it.

Q. And that takes us back all the way back approximately 180 --

A. Exactly.

Q. Okay. And if we could get a copy of that.

A. I have already got you guys one.

Q. Okay. As well as a singular product that you put together. Understanding, too, that the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c it may just be a general area, not necessary specifically, that's where the events, kind of, occurred.

A. And you want this on power point. I would guess, probably one slide per entry if I could do it geo-location and a significant reporting?

Q. Yes. And if you can do an overview of where it was at, and we can dive into it. So just a general overview, then each report --

A. Perfect.

Q. And just have the IIR number --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- or in patent of what (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is in it -- Task Force

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

A. So just one slide, or do you want multiple?

Q. If you can do one slide --

A. Yes.

Q. -- that's fantastic. If you need multiple, then not an issue. As long as it's legible, readable and it's not too cluttered.

A. Busy?

Q. Yeah. If it's not too busy, we will be good to go. So we would be great with that.

Okay. So we talked about right now -- kind of follow-up, we talked about in around the target date itself, nothing really specific about the target. We talked about 180 from the target to the left; that it gives us indications of talking about the intent to attack. But it also gives us some reflections for the task force based on the target, the individuals' intents. And also, too, is a manner in which they are going to conduct attacks --

A. Uh-hmm.

Q. And also, too, is the impacts on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

A. Correct.

Q. And then also is the weapons systems that are possibly the weapons systems that are possibly in there as well as outline how the early warning networks conducted observations.

A. Uh-hmm.

Q. Now, we can going to focus on is the post-strike, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c related to post-strike, and kind of focus on, too, is how did it lead us to the individual responsible for the RPG shooting.

A. Okay. The post-strike information -- and I can go

back and pull this. I didn't bring that in right now. But I want to say the strike happened on the 5<sup>th</sup> [August]. And I think the 6<sup>th</sup> [August], we started to get some reporting on who was actually responsible for the shoot down.

On the 7th, I think we had IIRs that came in from Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). Two of those that were reporting that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c were the two that were responsible for the tual downing of the CH47. There was also some (b)(3), (b)(6) reporting, again, from our collection platform that alluded to the same names possibly being involved.

That morning as that came in, I -- like I do every morning -- I sit and I talk with (b)(3), (b)(6), the senior analyst from (b)(3), (b)(6). And (b)(3), (b)(6) and I kind of came up, and he was like, Hey, I have got voice that's talking about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. And I said, Hey, I have got (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

And we started to work that intel piece there. And by -- I can't remember the exact time, but some time that morning, we were able to get some pretty good

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q. Okay. And I've got a question now. And that's good roll-up there. But, kind of, describe to me, how are the targets vetted? Is a coordination with some type of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c --

A. Um-hmm.

Q. -- individual -- I'm sorry. I used the wrong term, not target. How are the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c sources vetted across RC East? Can you describe for me the process for that. So that there's --

A. Like an RC East source?

Q. Yes.

A. The RC East source as far as I know, are graded on a scale. So the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c team that's working with them will start their meetings, and actually grade that source and say, Hey, we think this guy is solid, maybe he's the middle of the road or maybe he's poor. And that's a little bit different than how we do this Sierra 37.

Q. But how then, too, is that synchronized with CJSOTF A, CJTF and (b)(3), (b)(6) teams? How do they de-conflict sources -- they realize that they are not working the same source --

A. Oh, okay. I understand --

Q.  
A.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q. Okay. Is there any formal meeting where you sit down and vett it up to the channels as well?

A. As far as sitting down with each one of those players?

Q. What does the play that United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), ISAF Joint Command (IJC), ISAF have in this effort to corroborate -- basically, provide oversight and management of the human intelligence sources in Afghanistan? Do you have any --

A. That, I will have to get back to you. I'm not sure what it is.


Q. The kind of question I'm asking here is, if CJSOTF has got an IIR that says same things that (b)(3), (b)(6) is reporting, how do we know they are not to the same source, or not coming the same area or region? We have collaborating stories -- it sounds like it matches the

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c .

A. Right.

Q. The only reason I ask it -- to put into the context though is how do we know that our sources are de-conflicted. You need to walk me through that process.

A.



Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q.

A. Okay.

Q.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

A.

Q. Correct.

A. Okay. I understand.

Q. Trying to put that into context, that there is a process to look that. And then if there ever is that situation where it comes up where you realize you are working the same source by who different task forces, how does that get resolved as far as de-confliction of that individual?

A.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Q.

on the last 180 day reporting, and then post-strike. Just do a quick summary of that.

A. And show how we got to the target?

Q. Correct. And what you might highlight, too, is the signals intelligence (SIGINT) piece and when that came in exactly.

A. Yes.

Q. My understanding of it now is to build the picture of how that was led up to this. It was signals intelligence & human intelligence together --

A. Um-hmm.

Q.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

A.

**SME-INTEL:** If afterwards, you feel there's something that you missed or if there's a gap or something you want to share, or you find something that may be relevant to the investigation, please come forward and provide it to us. We can put you back on the record for it.

If we have any questions, each night we will do a roll-up of where we are --

**HARC CHIEF:** Okay.

**SME-INTEL:** So more IIRs may come out and re-engage with you and whatever individuals we've already interviewed. But we will let you know if we need to do that.

I appreciate the work that you are doing here and the support, and then also the support that you guys have provided us as well -- this investigation team.

**HARC CHIEF:** If you have any other questions, please let me know.

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*The inquiry closed at 2136 Zulu, 16 August 2011.*

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