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The re-interview of TF (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c (CDR & S3) occurred on 20 August 2011 via video teleconference.

**PERSONS PRESENT**

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG J. Colt, US Army

DEPUTY INV TM LEAD: IO-DEP

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**IO-DEP:** Good Evening gentlemen

**TF** (b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(1), (b)(4) **S3:** Good evening Sir (b)(3), (b)(6) here and (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6).

**IO-DEP:** You've got (b)(3), (b)(6) and Brigadier General Colt here. Before I pass it off to the boss I just want to say I appreciate you working us in. I know this is sort of short notice; we just got a couple of points we wanted to clear up after reviewing some of the material from your TOC as were are going through the different exhibits. So with that I will pass it off to General Colt.

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**BG Colt:** I really, ---only two quick questions here for this evening. One that surprised me last night was the ---as we were reviewing the JOC LOG was that--- the entry of the sighting at two strobes on the - what appeared to be IR strobes on the objective; can you talk to the source of that entry?

**TF** (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c **S3:** Yes sir, looking at the TOC log here, I assume you have a copy of (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c entry number 24 at 0339 local with the possible two survivors southwest of the crash site and the IR strobes. I received a phone call from (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c CHOPS a few minutes prior to that entry stating that they had reason to believe there were two IR strobes southwest of the crash site and they didn't know if they were survivors or strobes that somehow activated in that area. And the action taken is that I called up (b)(3),(b)(6) on the radio on FM, asked them to look at the location southwest of the crash site. That is probably the conversation that was captured on the gun tape that you reviewed as well, and they were unable to confirm or deny any survivors based on the heat of the Extortion 17 fire that was burning for the 64s optics, and they also transitioned to goggles, and they were unable to observe any strobes or any personnel due to the light from that fire whiting out their goggles. At 0412 local in our log, the (b)(3),(b)(6) Team called that they were at the site, and at 0415, they reported on the fires net that there were no survivors at the crash site. I did some homework on where that report came from, that was passed via S-voip to me and I was told tonight that (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c S-2 had monitored (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c from a predator that was overhead that had observed possible two strobes southwest of the site and that the S-2 at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c had relayed that inside the TOC at which time they made a phone call to me.

**BG Colt:** Okay, I appreciate very much that comprehensive explanation. Would you by chance know if one bravo ever in their confirmation of no survivors make any comment or reference to strobe lights activated on any of the bodies they found?

**TF** (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c **S3:** Sir, I didn't receive any communication from one bravo th (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c indicated any strobes that were either going off or not going off. I know sort of cursory information, but we did receive reports from the AWT and the pathfinder via (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c,

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that there was multiple secondary's going over from the aircraft during that fire.

**BG Colt:** [inaudible] that is generally our assessment as well. One other question I have for you this evening was, after the event occurred or after the entire flight was complete and the (b)(3), (b)(6) element returned, did you do a (b)(3), (b)(6) AAR between the AWT and the (b)(3), (b)(6) element? As overall mission wrap, and if so, what lessons were learned or documented from that AAR please?

**TF14a, (b)(1) CDR:** Hey sir, when the crews got back, obviously the

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and we were basically debriefing them when they came in and then we debriefed the AH crews separately when they came in afterwards, but there was no

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c  
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

**BG Colt:** Okay, but since the event have either of you conducted any kind of formal internal Task Force AAR over?

**TF14a, (b)(1) S3:** Yes sir, since then we have gotten together with the planners and the crews and gone over informal AAR as far as anything that we might have done better, anything we could have looked at again and things of that nature, but it was informal, it took a few days before we finally got everything done and I mean, the Pathfinders were out for four more days, so it was an ongoing operation for quite some time sir.

**BG Colt:** Sure, just one last follow up to that, was there any written output from that; again we are interested in just collecting data points for the purpose of potential and inclusion of---is it worthy of consideration as our best practice or would be promulgated anywhere else over?

**TF14a, (b)(1) S3:** Yes sir, we took a few notes; it wasn't a formal note captured on a computer or anything. We could probably dig

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those up and then push those up to you if you want to get those off the written notes that we have.

**BG Colt:** Okay, thank you. One last question in a different direction, because LZ selection got so much attention both from leaders and in a process; can you describe or tell me did route planning ever get that same level of leader examination or consideration please?

**TF** (b)(1) **S3:** Yes sir, the route structure as we discussed while you were down here is that at down at our level as far as the route that was actually taken in and the entire packet is sent up to brigade so they can look at it up there. They have essentially the whole briefing pack with the HLZ cards, routes, all the information is putting out in the briefing so they have access to all the information as well.

**BG Colt:** Okay, I take it that the--- that second brief, that second piece because that was not part of the original AMB, so I'm not sure whether we have seen that product. I have clearly seen the bread crumb chart that was the BFT drop, but I'm not sure where----I've ever seen a preplanned route, if you have one I would like to see it. The other thing is our discussion with the (b)(3), (b)(6) elements kind of sounds like they did not plan one over?

**TF** (b)(1) **S3:** There was not a paper product with a route on it specifically. The crews were told when the non-standard HLZ cards were brought out and the paper products were brought out to the aircraft, as well as over the radio, that the ground elements did not wish them to come in from the east, so they were asked to come in from the northwest essentially, which is why they flew over to Airborne [Valley] and came back and around that route, and then were briefed on the possible threats in the area along the detainee valley obviously.

**BG Colt:** Okay, I appreciate that, I really don't at this point have any additional questions and I wish that we would be able to engage you in a more comprehensive discussion at one time. Quite frankly this comes as we began to cross reference a number of different testimonies here---that's what we're

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beginning to find the seams and gaps that we are doing follow ups on now. I really appreciate your time thank you.

**TE**   **S3**: Roger sir, not a problem sir, anytime.

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