

The interview of the Pathfinder Commander, Platoon Leader, and Platoon Sergeant opened at 1835 Zulu, 18 August 2011, at FOB (b)(1)(4a), (b)(1)(4c)

**PERSONS PRESENT**

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD:	BG Jeffrey N. Colt, US Army
MH-47 SME	SME-MH-47
GROUND FORCE A SME:	SME-GFA
INTELLIGENCE SME:	SME-INTEL
ASDAT SME:	ASDAT3; ASDAT4
LEGAL ADVISOR:	LA
COURT REPORTER:	CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**BG COLT:** Can you step us through sort of the sequence of events that occurred leading to your infill and actions on the objective or actions at the crash site.

**PF PLT LDR:** Sir thanks Sir, I believe it was 0200 am on the fifth.

**PF CDR:** It's on the timeline there.

**PF PLT LDR:** So 0243 we were alerted that there was a FALLEN ANGEL and that time we moved to the TOC where we'll be informed on all the information that we have at that time. We'll get imager freeze call signs units stuff like that, then from there PF PSG and I would actually go out and load the birds and wait for the launch to go I guess.

**BG COLT:** Who actually does and clears LZ selection at that point for you? Who plans it?

**PF CDR:** The battalion selects the LZ sometimes there's an approval process to brigade but as far as I know, my headquarters approves my LZs is ~~PF CDR~~ and his planners.

**PF PLT LDR:** So after that sir, we loaded the birds and we moved to what we called east gravel, we were staging at red communication one waiting for the launch authorization. At that time we were

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listening to AWT talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) on men on ground as they were maneuvering from their objective up to the crash site. Then it was at 0400am, when we went wheels up and proceeded to the crash site which is about a little over 10-minute flight, just a little over 10 minutes.

**BG COLT:** Was that BMNT then? Was getting light by then?

**PF PLT LDR:** Just when we touched down and LZ was just starting to get light sir, so we were still moving period of limited visibility. I think it was 560 meters from our LZ to the crash site just would have been to the southeast, we moved parallel in the Wadi up to the khalat the Lima Bravo element was already on scene, I think they beat us about 30 minutes. So they had from there I talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) was the GFC at the time. Establish security with them we took security on the north end of the Wadi, they took it on the south and also had an OP set up on the high ground to the Southwest of the crash site.

**BG COLT:** Did you have any situational awareness of other fire support or ISR platforms that were overhead at that time?

**PF PLT LDR:** Roger that sir, we were in communication with AWT, they were monitoring our frequency, we were talking to them as we were infilling they were also talking to the (b)(3), (b)(6) element on the ground kind of liaison for us cause we didn't have direct FM while we were moving there, it was kind of de-conflicting you know we do some prep set kind of thing as we move on to the crash site sir.

**BG COLT:** Do you know that the AC [130] was still overhead too?

**PF CDR:** I knew we had more assets at that time I didn't know it was AC but talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) he let me know that the AC was on station some other ISR platforms and things of that nature and as we were flying in we heard AWT reporting over (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) the different air assets and different fire missions in the area sir.

**SME-GFA:** Who actually makes the decision to commit you guys is that you (b)(3), (b)(6)?

**PF (a), (b) CDR:** As soon as we had FALLEN ANGEL DUST ONE anyone of those types' events, they automatically get called; it's a battle drill for us. I determine whether or not to send them right out to aircraft and generally as soon as we get call sign frequency for the guy on the ground, if that is a fact the case, we send him straight out to the aircraft and start getting loaded up. Ultimately it's

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the brigade commander and then the division commander that decides they have the authorization to launch. Division considers them a division asset, but we do everything to prep the launch sequence so as soon as we get the word we are not starting from scratch then it's literally just pulling power and executing.

**SME-GFA:** So you dropped down to (b)(3), (b)(6) for tactical freq., MBITRs is that what you use?

**PF CDR:** Negative sir, once we linked up with them we never established FM communication before getting to the crash site with them, and from there we just co-located our two CP's their RTO and my RTO.

**-GFA:** Once you guys hit the ground how did you talk to (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6).

**PF CDR:** Through AWT, sir.

**SME-GFA:** So relaying.

**PF PLT LDR:** Roger that.

**SME-GFA:** Did you already have--- did you work with them at all previously as far as establishing link up procedures or anything like that.

**PF CDR:** No sir.

**SME-GFA:** Any issues once you got on the ground working with those guys?

**PF PLT LDR:** None Sir.

**SME-GFA:** As I understand on the ground (b)(3), (b)(6) was in charge?

**PF CDR:** Roger that sir.

**SME-GFA:** You guys were in support of those guys?

**SME-GFA:** You guys stayed on the ground for four days total?

**PF PLT LDR:** Yes.

**PF CDR:** I don't want to speak out of turn here or above my pay grade, it is something that we have discussed before and it has been raised up to the divisional level. Unfortunately, there has been

quite a bit of downed aircraft event, one thing that we've seen consistently is a---there's not a common FALLEN ANGEL net established. My opinion for these types of events there should be a common ground frequency net where the ground troop talk to and common air to ground net that's published in a division FRAGO that we reaches all units. So everyone knows what frequency they need to switch to when things happen. From what I have seen historically there has been multiple players on the ground and it take as little while to get them talking. Luckily our AWT was on station synchronizing this, acting as a fire wall, but we have been in situations where there's been multiple players and just took too long to get everyone talking.

**SME-MH47:** Did you---you said you all got alerted for the FALLEN ANGEL did you go and talk to the S-2 to get a brief for the situation on the ground?

**PF CDR:** Sir, that part of the common battle drill, we come in and pull 1 over 50,000 maps we pull up blown up imagery, we get call signs and frequencies fires coverage, ISR overhead. As much of that that is available at that time. At a certain point in time I sent the platoon that is launching out to the aircraft and the TOC continues to feed them information over FM into the aircraft. So when they were launching we were already aware there was Specter [AC 130] overhead and we were passing the freqs to get Specter their frequency.

**SME-MH47:** You have an understanding the entire events of the night as far as the squirters and the enemy killed.

**PF CDR:** What we knew at point sir was that there was an element that went in for a raid, QRF was launched and unfortunately there was an accident. We collected the pertinent information which was the freq.s and call signs and like the commander said we sent the guys to the bird with that.

**SME-INTEL:** Do you use that data that you receive the current (b)(3), (b)(6) and threat data to plan your routes?

**PF CDR:** We don't actually plan aircraft routes.

**SME-INTEL:** No not aircraft, your ground movement.

**PF CDR:** What we did is we knew the most probably LZ insertion point and the guy on the ground picked the best route to move from the LZ to the aircraft. There wasn't enough time sir, to actually plan the ground route fully on a map before we launch we got in the

aircraft to do it on the fly essentially.

**TF** <sup>(b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(1)</sup> **CDR:** usually what we do we call Pathfinders in it's usually the company commander and First Sergeant some time a Platoon Leader or Platoon Sergeant would pop up and we will show them that's why we have two big screen TV's, one is S-2 dedicated strictly. And we pull up the crash site, we pull up the LZ and we say here's where you are going to have to go and the S-2 will pop up what is the threat in the area is the first question we always ask whether it air or ground, show us where the threat is, what's happen what the last SAFIREs, things like that.

**BG COLT:** Were you talking at that point with the <sup>(b)(3), (b)(6)</sup> TOC here, so that you had situational awareness they were letting <sup>(b)(3), (b)(6)</sup> <sup>(b)(3), (b)(6)</sup> know they were already in route?

**TF** <sup>(b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(1)</sup> **CDR:** Yea, I talked to <sup>(b)(3), (b)(6)</sup> myself, he and I were on the phone and as I think I mentioned yesterday, a little reluctant to send them in immediately because we were trying to figure out the situation on the ground, but then we said we were going to launch them, so they knew they were enroute.

**SME-GFA:** Just curious when you guys go in same policy applies the AWTs escort in or are they still focused on the ground

**TF** <sup>(b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(1)</sup> **CDR:** No, no same thing applies. When they came in AWTs were—in fact what I had done for that because of what had just happened I specified to the AWT to come and trail right behind them so when they did pop up on the left and right they would be there and one would stack higher to get a larger overview.

**SME-MH47:** And they did pre-assault fires into that HLZ?

**TF** <sup>(b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(1)</sup> **CDR:** Roger, this time they did. Again for what we talked about earlier put a few rounds down in the field make people duck their heads and I spoke specifically to the crews that were doing it, one of them which was <sup>(b)(3), (b)(6)</sup> our company SIP, we told him look we are coming in here we are doing it fast, deliberately, controlled, and putting him down and getting them out.

**BG COLT:** The 60's shot? The 60's shot?

**TF** <sup>(b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(1)</sup> **CDR:** No, no AWT yes sir.

**SME-GFA:** Who is controlling those fires?

**TF** <sup>(b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(1)</sup> **CDR:** The AWT suppressive? They are talking to the JTAC,

JTAC---

**SME-GFA:** (b)(3), (b)(6) still controlling those?

**PF PLT LDR:** Now when you say controlling, they informing that element that they are going to conduct that suppressive have fire in support of the infil.

**SME-GFA:** So the recommendation would be a common FALLEN ANGEL net so you guys, it only make sense to have direct comms with the ground forces already there, and not have to go through AWT. Not sure what the best net for that is...

**PF PLT LDR:** Again what we do before we launch them out is we make sure they have comms with AWT that's on station and if there is a ground element that they have that before they take off, those are the two big ones. They have been on the ground before by themselves and which taken a little bit longer is the get the stack all talking on the same net and that's created, not issues, but it has taken more time than it would have if everybody comes in on station knowing that ahead of time. But usually when we had some of these FALLEN ANGELS everybody comes to that particular site and it may take a minute before everyone is talking on the same net. And end up going air to air or guard to figure out what freq. to come up on.

**PF PLT LDR:** Typically what happens just like the time for a FALLEN ANGEL is AWT will be the first on scene and then (b)(3), (b)(6) will beat us there because they are closer and they have different launch criteria. Then we'll come usually it will be close between us and the BSO for reaching that area. Most of the time we will be the first ones there and always bring everyone into our platoon freq. and same with the aircraft, so if there was actually a common freq. that would be really helpful.

**BG COLT:** Anybody else?

**ASDAT4:** Once you are on the ground sir and you were integrated into that group did your guys do any of the reduction of the aircraft in preparation for the movement out of there?

**PF PLT LDR:** None of our guys - we carry thermite and demo, but by the time we actually were able to recover the hero's there were enough elements on the ground, the Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6) EOD that we actually didn't lay any demo---site Bravo on the forward transmission rotor assembly, we did try our thermite at the time, but it was ineffective. That was the only thing we actually used

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our assets to try and reduce with thermite on site.

**ASDAT4:** So if you guys didn't take part in the recovery of the aircraft, pieces and parts, did your guys, how far out did you push and sweep the area around the crash site.

**PF PSG:** When we got there we linked up with Team (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4c and (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4c [PL and PSG], they had more than enough people to actually conduct the sweeps so initially since they were the ground force commanders at the time they initially just wanted us to provide security to the north just south to the village all the way to the east where the bridge was at. So our whole mission at that time j became to provide security for the left over element for Team (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4c to actually conduct the sweeps and assist them in any way we can with moving the hero's or picking up pieces and everything, but initially their the one who conducted the sweeps on site.

**BG COLT:** Can you address to what degree the rain storm there impacted the integrity of that crash site?

**PF PLT LDR:** Roger that sir, the aircraft was in three main pieces when we arrived, it was the fuselage down in the Wadi and then up to the northwest was the forward transmission rotor assembly and maybe 100 meters directly north up on the hill was the rear rotor transmission cowling all that. And it was---there was significant amount of damage from the fire to the fuselage but it was all intact and it was all there. And the after the flood sir, it was pushed down to just past the bridge which was 150 to 200-meters down the river sir.

**PF CDR:** I think luckily the ground forces were able to recover the hero's out of the Wadi before the rain storm came obviously. One important thing to know about our tools is that we carry Jaws of Life and combination tools and K-12 rescue saws. These tools are meant to rip into the outer skin of aircraft and at most maybe cut the hinges off MRAPS to get people out of them or pilots out of an aircraft, but the welders that came from the BSO are really the enabling element that allowed the more dense parts of the aircraft to be taken apart, like the transmission assembly. When I got down, when I linked up with the Pathfinders they were trying to cut pieces with the K-12 saw, but the truth is the fact is, a K-12 saw isn't effective on a gear box out of the rear of an aircraft. The welders did that - they cut it apart.

(b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) **CDR:** It's designed for extraction, extraction personal not disassembly of the whole aircraft, but until they got there, that what we had.

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**SME-MH47:** Did you take any photograph or sketch anything?

**PF CDR:** They were co-located with (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c), and (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c) was snapping all the photos and we were confident they got everything. We received photos back here too so the answer is no.

**ASDSAT3:** No photos were taken by you guys.

**PF PSG:** Negative sir, they were all taken by (b)(3), (b)(6) team (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c) when they were sending up the reports the first day they were taking care of all that.

**BG COLT:** Any local engagements after you were on the ground there, as far as people coming out of the village there, coming down trying to encroach on the site?

**PF PSG:** Honestly, they pretty much kept their distance. Team (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c) engaged a couple of guys - forward observers some guys watching us with radios and everything, but honestly just local nationals walking up and seeing what was going on, negative, sir

**IE:** The first day they stayed inside, we didn't see anybody. I'd say by about the end of the first day, they knew what we were all about what we were there for, and that's about when life kind of picked back up somewhat as usual. The last three days up in the village, I guess it would be the (b)(3), (b)(6) element was just off route Georgia, on the northwest side there and they kind of took over a little compound on that part of the village and other than that they kept to themselves. They didn't -- We didn't have any issues. At least from our part of the northern line up there to the Qalat we didn't have any issues with people trying to come down.

**IO:** Any TTP or issues with regarding area resupply, speed balls, or anything like that? You were there quite a long time actually.

**PF PLT LDR:** Yes, sir. The CDS drops are what made it possible. The aerial -- typically what we've done in the past is speed balls from Task Force (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c), but the surface to air threats didn't allow for that so the CDS drops -- I don't know how many we had total. It must have been close to five or six.

**PF CDR:** Five or six, CDS drops, sir from the MC-130 and luckily we were co-located with the tier one guys, because that's how we got that stuff pushed to us. It was literally -- at one point Task Force (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c) was saying they were good on water and my guys were calling

back saying they were about to go black, so literally the chain of command here --

~~TF~~<sup>(b)(1)</sup> ~~4a, (b)(1)~~ CDR: We had to call up --

**PF CDR:** -- called up lieutenant colonel -- I forget her name that works the Task Force ~~(b)(1), 4a, (b)(1), 4c~~ up in Bagram and she helped us. She turned back on the MC-130s to get us resupplied. But, if we weren't co-located with them there could have existed a point before the ground convoy made it down to resupply them where they would have been black on water, so luckily [inaudible].

~~TF~~<sup>(b)(1)</sup> ~~4a, (b)(1)~~ CDR: Yeah, those drops were instrumental in keeping everybody resupplied without having both aircraft and speedballs coming in low and exposing themselves.

**PF PLT LDR:** I guess, sir, one TTP that would be kind of vital -- I don't know if -- I'm sure it's not common knowledge for everybody since it didn't get done. We have one CDS drop then another being a lost load, and that was -- they dropped in right after night fall and there was no -- typically they put like IR chem-lights or IR strobe on it, and they pushed if out we couldn't find it. ISR, couldn't find it, AWT, no one could find it, so maybe it'll publish that as a TTP for any, you know, CDS drop IR chem-lights or strobes on the actual pallet.

**BG COLT:** Show me a sign [laughing].

**ASDAT4:** Sir, if you were in the Helo, when they were trying to make the decision; how did the process go on what to recover as far as parts and pieces from the aircraft to send back to BAF?

**PF PLT LDR:** After the fire, we called back and asked -- or asked if there was anything in particular sensitive item wise that we should try to recover. I know they had a number of C-cells, things like that. The only thing that was actually recoverable was one of the Advanced Threat Infrared Counter Measure (ATIRCM) systems, if I butchered the acronym...

**ASDAT4:** I'm talking about large parts and pieces of the actual aircraft --

**PF PLT LDR:** Okay.

**ASDAT4:** -- not individual personal affects or anything that the crew might have carried.

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**IO:** That's what he was described. ATIRCM. That's part of the aircraft.

**CRT RPT:** How do you spell that, please; if you know how?

**BG COLT:** A-T-I-R-C-R-M; right?

**IE:** Right.

**CRT RPT:** Thank you.

**ASDAT3:** How about a play book for the [inaudible], the maintenance recorders in the aircraft, by different airframe were those locations are so in the event you find a few slides you've got some pretty significant damage, you guys know a focal point on the aircraft what to get and what's classified, what's going to help us paint the picture? Do you guys have a book like that? Was that fed to you?

**PF CDR:** We actually do have a standardized list with pictures for a CH-47 with the radar detection, ATIRCM, everything in the radio suite in the back, and how to get it out. What we have spoken with ~~(b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(7)(D)~~ CDR about before is pushing up a standardized list for every single air frame. And I tell you, one recommendation is, at some point the decision was made that no piece of the aircraft would be left behind. We have gone on missions where we're instructed to pull specific pieces out of aircraft, leave them and JDAM. On this mission, not a trace would be left behind. I would recommend, at that point that decision is made it needs to be in the battle drills to bring welders up on alert because you're going to need them to cut the more dense pieces of the aircraft and that was kind of something that just worked together like different leaders getting the --

**BG COLT:** We do need to talk VADRs though, because it's critical. This one didn't have one.

**ASDAT3:** Elements of the BSO did all the cutting on the aircraft with the torches? Or was it a combination?

**PF PLT LDR:** It was actually 94<sup>th</sup> BSB from here at ~~(b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(4c)~~ was the actual welders.

**PF CDR:** And the CSAR guys were helping them out, were right there cutting with them. But the tools came from the BSO.

~~(b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1)~~ **CDR:** Yeah, we don't have the welding capabilities.

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**ASDSAT3:** Yeah, I understand, sir. Did you happen to notice if those guys were writing down the components that they were cutting as they were cutting or were they just [inaudible] --

**PF PLT LDR:** No, sir. It was pretty much expedient method to reduce the aircraft.

**ASDSAT3:** Roger. Okay.

**PF (b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(7)(C) CDR:** A lot of those -- a good bit of what was taken out of there had to be carried out in stretchers by people so it had to be cut down into small enough sizes, and once the determination was made that everything would come out, it wasn't so much as take this piece or that piece. With the fire and everything else, it was cut into small manageable pieces; bring it up to where the vehicles were so we could take it out.

**ASDSAT3:** Yeah, I understand. We just -- I have got some focal points on the aircraft that I'm trying to separate out between weapons, effects, and the torch. Sometimes they look very close to each other in certain locations.

**PF CDR:** In the Pathfinders, we go through each aircraft with the pilots pretty well in our pre-deployment train-up. We go through shut down procedures for every type of airframe, but a standardized play book for each aircraft and what's important with pictures on it, would be beneficial to us. We wouldn't turn it away.

**ASDSAT3:** I will get with (b)(3), (b)(6) and help you guys deal with that a little bit.

Did you happen to go and look at the components in the larger of three piles that were we looked at where we had a few selections at the time of your arrival as well as the rotar heads looking for any type or small weapons effects? Is that part of your SOP when you get there or your standard battle drill?

**PF CDR:** Usually, our initial battle drill is to get on the site and do a site sweep. We're looking for UXOs, sensitive items that may have been thrown, but it sounds like in this situation you guys were brought in by the ground force commander to pull security initially, so he can speak exactly what they did on the ground. But, as far as an SOP, yes.

**PF (b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(7)(C) CDR:** If you're looking for an SOP type answer --

**ASDSAT3:** Not an SOP; it's really more of the informal priorities of work. I know you've got to set up security; you've got to get through certain things before you can actually start dealing with the wreckage.

**PF (b)(1)(4a), (b)(1)(4c) CDR:** Yeah, their number one mission in theater is PR, personnel recovery, and everything else falls after that. Now, by the time they got out there, we'd already gotten word, unfortunately, that it didn't look like there were any survivors, so they were there to assist the Rangers in securing the site and making sure that we could recover what we could.

**ASDSAT3:** Okay. Moving the components -- You guys didn't deal with any of the moving of the components?

**PF PSG:** Negative, that was all handled from the welders cutting it and Task Force (b)(1)(4a), (b)(1)(4c) carrying it out on stretchers and to the vehicles.

**PF PLT LDR:** We were providing the manpower and the stretchers and moving everything up from the Wadi up to the vehicles.

**ASDAT3:** Does anybody brief the follow-on forces that come in behind you on what to look for on that site?

**PF PLT LDR:** Sir, in this case the first night we went -- we looked for the flight recorder, but because the way the fire had burned down we were told to look for the flight recorder -- I think this is actually the only time we hadn't been successful in recovering that -- by the cockpit near the pilot seat on the left hand side and we got as much as we could, but it was still smoldering at that point. And then, after the flood came in, we looked again and we also -- we briefed the human remains team and the downed aircraft assessment team as well as everyone else who was working on the stretchers to look for the flight recorder in any of the wreckage, but to my knowledge no one -- we had a couple, I guess, false alarms, but we could never actually find the actual flight recorder.

**ASDSAT3:** Going into the site, did you guys know that -- I heard the word accident thrown out there, if this was a shoot down or if it was an accident? Did you know the difference or were you briefed the difference?

**PF CDR:** I think I called it an event, if I said accident, I misspoke. We knew that it had been engaged.

**ASDSAT3:** Does that drive you in your decision process at all on how you're going to handle the wreckage? Threat weapons effects involved, non-threat weapons effects involved?

**PF CDR:** Absolutely, it does drive the decision making process.

**ASDSAT3:** How were you going to handle it differently?

**PF CDR:** Well, one, if the aircraft goes down for something, unfortunately, we have seen before such as rotor droop, power-margin errors, mechanical errors, my immediate thought process goes to enemy threat, there's less of an enemy threat they're in. In this instance -- in this case we knew there was an enemy threat there.

**BG COLT:** I think the point he's driving at is, are you looking for any kind of forensic evidence of an ordnance that was shot to confirm or deny the specific threat capability in the area and the answer is probably "no".

**PF CDR:** I would say nothing like CID, sir.

**BG COLT:** Right. That's what they are.

**PF CDR:** Yeah. No, nothing more than a [inaudible] --.

**BG COLT:** Nothing CSI of aircraft shoot down.

**PF CDR:** Excuse me -- nothing more than a layman's inspection.

**PF CDR:** We never trained that, again, because their main mission is PR, you know, and then extraction type stuff. Once that's done then their job is really to secure the site so that you guys or someone else can come in and make that -- whether it's DART or anybody else.

**BG COLT:** Right. The only thing is -- a thought process here is, maybe if you had opportunity for some exposure to the different things that they've observed it might be something you just put into your scan and you're able to put in a SITREP or something like that. If we can't be afforded any additional people on the ground; right? Some cases we're just going to blow up it in place and move on.

**ASDSAT3:** And that's exactly where I'm going. I understand there were certain components found in the forward rotary-head area that were components from the aft rotary-head that had weapons effects to them. As we are picking up our pieces, are the folks

that are policing up the wreckage if nothing is going to be left on the battlefield; are folks looking for identification marks, and things like that that would be a little indicative of threat effects? That's not an easy thing to do, don't get me wrong. I don't expect battle space owner at the lowest level to be able to do that, but you guys possibly. And I want to be able to put an Air Force Captain to work a little bit more training you guys on how to do some of that and get your books set up [inaudible].

**BG COLT:** Anybody else?

**SME-MH47:** Were you ever able to talk directly to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c element once you got on the ground?

**PF PLT LDR:** (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c being their JTAC?

**BG COLT:** Right.

**PF PLT LDR:** Roger, as soon as we linked up with them my RTO, my FO, I'm sorry --

**SME-MH47:** No, you got out of the (b)(3), (b)(6). The (b)(3), (b)(6) was the 60.

**PF PLT LDR:** Correct.

**SME-MH47:** When you got off that aircraft and the aircraft departed, who'd you talk to? The AWT?

**PF PLT LDR:** Roger.

**SME-MH47:** And then the AWT relayed.

**PF PLT LDR:** [Indicated an affirmative response.]

**SME-MH47:** So, once you started your foot movement, were you ever able to talk directly or tried to?

**PF PLT LDR:** Negative.

**SME-MH47:** Okay. There was a (b)(3), (b)(6) ment overhead that was concerned because he couldn't talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) and there was some comms issues there. I guess that's a take-away then, and that was a phone call. (b)(3), (b)(6), he was bringing up the fact there might have been fratricide potential in this. So, that was the only thing I was just asking.

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**SME-GFA:** I guess with the comms kit guys carry right now you have the ability to talk to the ground force -- to the TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ground forces?

**PF PLT LDR:** We should [inaudible]

**PF CDR:** Sir, we do (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, we do it all.

**PF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR:** For deconfliction purposes, for what you're getting at too is the AWT, because the AWT is talking to the stack and that's when they're on the ground their primary mission is to get a hold of the AWT to cover not only them, but also for deconfliction.

**BG COLT:** Right; fills are there same, though?

**TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR:** Roger.

**BG COLT:** Anybody else?

**PF CDR:** Was it already discussed about the fresh 240 brass they found on the site?

**BG COLT:** No. Please.

**PF CDR:** When I arrived, there was some of our Soldiers digging up fresh 240 brass that they said had -- they were essentially the second people on the scene, beside Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and they said to me very proudly that the 240 brass was from the Chinook, and it proves our guys went down shooting. I don't know if that means anything to you guys, but --

**BG COLT:** Is that out of your own guys?

**PF CDR:** Yes, sir.

**PF PLT LDR:** That was [inaudible] in the orchard up by site Charlie found a few shells of freshly fired brass.

**BG COLT:** Did they bring them with him?

**PF PLT LDR:** I know they brought out one. They gave it to the Golf Commander, CPT --

**PF CDR:** He gave it to the Chinook Company Commander; one piece of freshly fired brass, 240.

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**BG COLT:** Okay.

**ASDSAT3:** Any other weapons' components policed up on the battlefield?

**PF PLT LDR:** We recovered all three 240H's from the aircrafts. Is that what you are referring to?

**ASDSAT3:** No [inaudible]. Keep talking. Anything else? Did you find anything else?

**PF PSG:** Just the personal weapons that the heroes were carrying in the birds. We found those scattered right there on the ground where the main compartment of the bird was at. We collected it up near the crash site thinking that nobody would come in. Once the rain and the flash flood came in, we had to go searching the Wadi looking for the pieces that had floated down with the current.

**ASDSAT3:** Roger. What about potentially friendly ordinance that was on the platform? Were there Afghani's on board. Did you happen to find any PGs associated with the remains of the aircraft? Expelling charge, dunnage, anything like that? Anything that was prepackaged that maybe the charges may be been removed and you had to put back together and thrown?

**PF PLT LDR:** There was one small box that had things that hadn't cooked off in the crash. Some blocks of C4, smoke grenades, frag-grenades, things of that nature and they were using -- EOD was trying to reduce the aircrafts with controlled detonations. I know that ordinance was blown up as part of one of those explosions. I can't remember exactly what was in the box, but I would say the vast majority of it ended up cooking off in the wreckage.

**ASDSAT3:** Did anybody -- Or did you hear of anybody finding the tail boom section at all?. We have a picture with a grid location of tail feathers of a PG system that was found at the location. Have you heard anything about that? Any of your folks taking pictures?

**PF PSG:** Actually, I think that was one of the times that we consolidated away whenever they were doing a controlled-det and it was Team (b) (1), (b) (7) (C) that found some fins from the RPGs or something in one of the gardens near the village and they took it up in a zip lock bag and took pictures of it.

**ASDSAT3:** And you said that was Team (b) (1), (b) (7) (C) 1.4c

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**PF PLT LDR:** Roger, sir.

**PF PSG:** But that would be the second --

**BG COLT:** 3D?

**PF PLT LDR:** Roger, 3D, sir. That was the element. I can't remember the SGT's name, but they dated the whole TSE exploitation, put it all in a zip lock bag, that kind of thing; so it should be out there somewhere.

**ASDSAT3:** Okay, so that was policed up? You think it's stuck in a bag?

**PF PSG:** Roger. He collected the notes.

**PF PLT LDR:** They took photos, compass readings --

**PF PSG:** They even got the ten digit grid where they found the [inaudible].

**SME-INTEL:** Did you guys actually see the unit police it up and put it in a bag?

**PF PSG:** Yes, I was right down the western side of the wall. The wall was about chest-high, whenever we consolidated them when they were doing the controlled-det and he located it and he did the whole thing and put it in a zip lock bag and took it with him.

**BG COLT:** Anybody else? I need you guys to run those to ground, the shell casing and the fins.

**[Background conversation]:** It's probably with the rest of the SSE.

**BG COLT:** I think that's it. We just want you to know how much we appreciate what you did. Thanks.

[The interview concluded.]

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