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The interview of the 10th CAB [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] opened at 1508 Zulu, 16 August 2011 at FOB [redacted (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c]

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD:	BG J. Colt, US Army
DEPUTY INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD:	IO-DEP
LEGAL ADVISOR:	LA
GROUND FORCE ARMY ADVISOR:	SME-GFA
INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR:	SME-INTEL
CAB CH-47 ADVISOR:	SME-CH47
NGB REPRESENTATIVE:	SME-NGB
MH-47 ADVISOR:	SME-CH47
ASDAT ADVISOR	SME-ASDAT
COURT REPORTER:	CR

Derived from: Task Force [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c]

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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All witnesses relevant to the investigation were duly sworn.

BG Colt: Our responsibility here is to find facts, not fault, all right? That's what we're out to do. Last night, our discussions with (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1) and (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1) were very insightful into process. So what we would like to begin with, and I recognize that we didn't afford you the opportunity for a command brief type thing. But what we would like to do is get you to discuss for us, please, and explain process and, kind of, optempo in a contextual setting before we, sort of, narrow down to this particular mission. Because we, certainly in our previous conversation also, understand that op tempo here, and the greater contextual -- what the demands are on this task force well exceed that just of this particular mission. But it does have an influence on the resources available, allocation or apportionment, all right. So that's kind of what we would like to get you to talk to us about.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. Sir, I'll go ahead and start off with that, and then I will ask some of the staff on the end over there.

These microphones are not active. I just put down. If you guys want to put them down so it looks like you've got a flower in the middle of table or something like that, that's blocking your

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view, you can just set them on the other side.

Sir, the S-2 is actually upstairs. I have both my S-2 and assistant, those two are upstairs. So if you want to speak here for a bit first, I can bring them down, and have them come down here and join us, or we can just leave them upstairs. It's your call.

We understood that that was going to be a separate interview. That's why we left them upstairs.

BG Colt: That's what we will do.

Court reporter: Gentlemen, if possible, because there's a lot of people in there, just one time before you speak on the record, can you just say your name. That way, I'll have an accurate account of who is actually speaking.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): My name is (b)(3), (b)(6). I'm the Aviation

(b)(3), (b)(6). Sir, as we talk about the overall context and the big picture for the fight here, the aviation brigade in RC East is a traditional regular combat engaged brigade with a full MTOE of the United States. In addition to that, we have a battalion task force that is tasked organized with us from RC North.

The brigade and all of those aviation assets are tasked organized at each one of the COPs and FOBs. We have five main FOBs that

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we operate out of. So four of those are my task force headquarters. One of them is a task force that, right now, is from 1st Air CAV Brigade from (b)(6) (sic) brigade. Prior to that it was with Gambler that came out of, (b)(6) brigade (sic). In addition to those assets, we have almost another battalion's worth of National Guard or reserve component assets that are mobilized and here in support of the mission. One of them is a CAC Command and Control UH-60 company. We have a company and a half, a total of (b)(3), (b)(6) CH-47 Deltas that come from two different locations. And then we also have a MEDEVAC team -- a three - ship MEDEVAC team that's on the ground. When you add all of that up, it's turned into nearly three companies of additional flying assets that are part of the brigade, almost another battalion's worth. So total it's a regular aviation brigade. No augmentation with regard to planning or capacity at the brigade level. But with two additional battalions - worth of assets. One [inaudible] to battalion headquarters, two battalions worth of assets that are tasked organized with us.

The op-tempo across the brigade supports seven coalition brigades here on the ground at RC East. That is five US and two coalition with the French and with the Polish. The French and

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the Polish have aviation detachments that support the French. The French has a French aviation detachment that supports the Polish. The Polish have a Polish aviation detachment that supports them.

Neither one of those detachments are self-sufficient, so they rely on Task Force (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c to provide support, particularly when it comes to lift support of CH-47s as well. When we look at the other forces that we support, obviously, Task Force (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c and their operations, which take place every night across the brigade.

We support CJ SOTF here. So all of the -- quite a few of the ODA missions are with the Afghan commandos. We provide lift support for those and southeast. And that's, pretty much, most of the forces that we normally provide support for.

And, of course, Afghans. And the Afghan National Security Force itself that we also provide for as well. Anything from gun escort for their MIs to actually doing a resupply for ANSF Forces. So the mission load here is very, very significant for the size of the force that we have.

BG Colt: Uh-hmm.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) The op -tempo is extremely high across the fleet. It is quite mind boggling that we have as big a brigade

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as we do and we still run out of assets. But with all of the conventional force assets that we support, in particular, the five U. S. brigades and their op -tempo and the partnership work that they do with the Afghans, that simply is a question of demand that is not met with the conventional force assets that we have with regard to our CHs.

BG Colt: How would you characterize the trend of op -tempo right now, trending up, down, remaining relatively the same, perceptively increasing or weight?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I would say it was actually higher last year. And I would say that one of the changes that we've seen with CJTF-1 when CJTF switched with CJTF-11, out is that we actually did see a -- I would say in the grand scheme of things, a slightly reduced op-tempo in comparison to what we had seen with CJTF-11. It had to do with different op -plans, different techniques that had to do with different BCTs in the battle space.

When we arrived, we had three air assault brigades that were on the ground. We had (b)(3), (b)(6) (ph).

(b)(3), (b)(6), he just ripped out. They were the last ones to rip out.

The op -tempo for different types of brigades ties itself very directly to what the -- or the type of brigade that are out there,

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they are attached to the fight, how they are partnering with the Afghans, all of that plays into the optempo of that particular brigade as well as, of course, is the oplans and the campaign plan by CJTF. So we actually have seen from a conventional force perspective what I consider to be a slight decrease in comparison to what we saw with CJTF-11.

However, capacity continues to grow with the Afghans. We continue to increase our focus on partnership with the Afghans. And so, in a general sense, there are more assets available out there.

We set CJ SOTF for the summer piece. The ISAF soft piece is one that has hardly -- when we were here with CJTF-11, they did not receive hardly any support. It was very rare that we flew a mission for them because we simply did not have the assets. So there are always at least one asset that's out there that is almost getting very minimal lift support that they would prefer. So when anything else goes down, their missions will automatically come up on the table because now we have assets available.

And then, of course, you toss in the rip process which takes place which relies heavily on the CH-47 support. Every time a brigade rips out, we now shift. And we have a lot of movement, as you

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look at the outlying COPs and FOBs, with CH47s to move those troops in and out of the main FOB, in and out of Salerno --

BG Colt: Currahee the most recent --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Currahee and Black hawk being the most recent.

And we are still actually flying, even though that rip is complete, Black hawk is in control of the fight. We are still flying Blackhawk rip as we move equipment, in particular, around and they continue to get their mission set.

Around the corner right now, the Polish will be ripping out, and

(b)(3), (b)(6)

will be ripping out. Those will be taking place almost the same time as the aviation brigade TOA as we look in the September/October timeframe. So the optempo is certainly -- I mean, it's just reality. It is a very, very fast optempo as you look across the board.

Big picture context, I think it is fairly safe to say that as you look in -- everyone knows it, everyone talks about it, and everybody acknowledges that it is definitely in knowledge with the leadership that aviation is one of the leading factors that we have in this fight, and all of Afghanistan. This is not an RC East solo question. This also applies to RC South. In my opinion, as well with RC North. I think that would be fairly clearly illustrated by those commanders as well.

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BG Colt: Do you have a written op-order from ISAF or anybody above you that codifies what the priorities of user are-- priority support?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I believe there was at one point in time, a prioritization that was written. I don't know that it currently exists. I agree. (b)(3), (b)(6) do you recall if we have that?

10TH CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I don't think so, sir. I haven't seen anything.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) came on board as the 3, sir, only about a month. So some of the institutional knowledge as a 3 we have, he's definitely going to be working for it. Do you guys recall if we have that?

Negative response by all members.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I don't. I want to say that we received some guidance at the CJTF level where it came to mission prioritization. But one thing to understand is that on the CH-47 side, CH-47s are GS across all of RC East. Some of my assets are DS, my attack assets, my UH assets, my scout assets are DS to specific battle space owners. CH-47s are not.

BG Colt: Has it always been that way?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) It's been that way since arrived, sir.

BG Colt: Was it that way with your predecessor?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I believe so. But I'm not 100 percent sure.

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I think with 3d CAB it was when it came to CHs. And there was-- that has constantly been a debate. Now, it was a debate last year.

I think 3d CAB -- and I think (b)(3),(b)(6) was the one who, kind of, consolidated into the GS role. In fact, I'm almost certain that it was 3d CAB that that transition took place. I think prior to that, most things were DS'd out to the battle space owner. But it became a question with the efficiency of the use of the CH47 as we built more combat power into this theater. Because, of course, we brought in Currahee which was the 7th Brigade. And as that combat power came up, they realized they did not have the ability to focus those assets where they wanted to.

BG Colt: Just a follow-up point of clarification. When you say, during in a GS role, they are still decentralized and positioned with these outlying battalion task forces, and they run an AMR process against the demands of those aircraft that are located there, or are they apportioned at the brigade level, and directed to them.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): They are apportioned at the division level, and then further tasked to us to provide support.

BG Colt: And what mission cycle is that?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): It varies, sir. Generally, it is a 24-hour

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mission.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) There is a daily synchronization that is taking places at the CJTF level that the 3 can talk about a little more. But as missions change on a day-to-day basis, that determination of who is going to get CH-47 tomorrow for this operation or that operation that is the decided at the division level. And that takes place every single day, sir.

One thing that does not include are the (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c assets. What we have DS to (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c is set aside and is DS to (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c that is the only-- the DS CH-47s, they have to have packages that we have. Those half packaged just for (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c are DS to those missions. That is a mission set that is protected, and that is what are expected to be there [sic].

All other CH47s what I'm referring to, sir, when I say "GS". So if Bronco wants to do an assault, they don't they don't have-- they have to go to the division and say, I would like a pair of CHs. And they are probably the CHs that are sitting right there at that same FOB that he is. And his DS battalion headquarters is the aviation battalion task force headquarters, will be the aviation C2 cell for that. And for the most part, it will be his CHs that are flying. He may receive two CHs from Task Force (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c that come, and fall under that aviation

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task force in order to support Bronco in that assault.

BG Colt: That's clear.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. That kind of dynamic happens everyday in the allocation of those assets happen everyday at the CJTF level with the exception, again, of the (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c assets which are protected for that mission.

BG Colt: Can you describe the task organization, and the assets provided to (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c then?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. We have a half package that is at Sharana, down at Blackhawks AO. So there is a pair of CHs that will be dedicated against them. We do not set aside specific crews for that if that's where you are going with the question on the task organization.

We set aside the mission set. So there will be a pair of CHs that will be ready to fly at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c and task force attack understands that they will have the aviation C2 piece for that half mission for (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c on any given night. There's one at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c and there's one at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c as a current mission set is now.

That has changed depending on where the (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c requirement has been over the course of the year that we have been here. There was a period of time when we had a half package that was up at Jalalabad. And a lot of that depended on where we had the task

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force assets -- Task Force (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c assets placed on the battle field. So we find ourselves working with (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c to determine where the best place is to put it.

So bottom line is: A (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c. Currently as we sit right now, and a (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c In addition to that, we fly the AWT support for though three half packages, plus we also provide AWT support for (b)(3), (b)(6) when they go in, and they fly the half missions. That takes place out at -- one of those is out of (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c one of them is out at Jeff. And I think that's it, just those two right there.

BG Colt: Do each of the outlying battalion task forces maintain a QRF?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. They each maintain a QRF in direct support to the battle space owner that they work for.

BG Colt: Okay. And is the composition the same in each?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) For the QRF itself? Normally, it would be in an attack team that is for each one. Here, you would, pretty much, argue here at Bagram, it's really two -- it's kind of the (b)(3), (b)(6) teams day and night.

Out at every other task force, they AH-64s that are DS to the battle space owner. And one of their tasks is to be the aerial QRF, and AH-64. So that's at the DS level for the battle space

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owner.

At the division level, we maintain a day and a night Apache QRF team here on Bagram. Plus, we maintain a day and a night UH-60 QRF team out at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c which are co-located with the Pathfinders. And that is for CJTF wide. UH-60s, along with Pathfinders at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c to respond across the entire CJTF AO for any kind of responses we need for [inaudible] and lift support, we pull the Pathfinders in to the --

BG Colt: Is the brigade commander and the S-3 that trigger, decision makers for launch all the Pathfinder QRF missions?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) It's actually CJTF, sir.

BG Colt: Okay.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Pathfinders are a CJTF asset.

BG Colt: Okay.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) As well as the Apache day team and night team here, and UH day team and UH night team is down at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c Those assets are the decision-maker at CJTF.

BG Colt: Okay.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) We will start planning as soon as it looks like some concern come down, sir. The aviation task forces all track it. As soon as it looks like the QRF is going to be employed, they will start the planning. But the release authority is up

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at CJTF working with Chops, saying, Hey, the planning is done; we're ready to go; we're waiting for the release word. And then they will give the release word, and we are usually off the ground pretty quickly.

BG Colt: Okay. Are all the (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4b) mission planning cycles -- they are all generated from lower to higher?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): When you say lower or higher, sir, do you mean for the company --

BG Colt: Right. From a battalion task force, they notify you that they have a mission that they are going to plan to prepare for.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Correct.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I was out at Jalalabad, and we had a half out there for a while. The way it usually works is we will send our planners over to team JBAD. And the team JBAD guys out, will bring us their releasable CONOPs, they say, this is where we want to go; this is where the HLZs that we want to use are.

At that point, it's a give and take. We know what our standard is in the brigade. And so we will come up with a compromise between where they want to be, and where we need our HLZs to be. At that point, once we have the framework of a plan, we will generate the CONOP with the intelligence that we generally

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receive from the higher side that Team JBAD has. They will send it to the aviation battalion, where the aviation battalion's S-3 will review it. If the battalion commander is physically there, he will review it. If not, I will always my -- you know, get a hold of my boss on (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c and give him a quick brief on it if it was available.

Then we will send it up here to the battle captain. The battle captain downloads it, prints it off. He makes a whole lot of notes that he sees based off past guidance that we've received from (b)(3),(b)(6); hands it off to myself as the 3. I'll review the entire CONOP to see if there are any other additional notes that we need to make before we take it upstairs for either (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) to review. And they are the final approval authority for it, sir. So it's been through a lot of eyes at that point generally.

10th CAB (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, to answer your question regarding the lower level, yes. It usually goes from the battalion task force. A notification is made, and then we are given the AMCM product once they have finalized that with the ground element.

BG Colt: Okay. Is there anything codified in writing about planning timelines and planning risk authority or mission authority when operating with (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c?

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10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): First, from our level, sir, we have put out guidance -- I've put out guidance about the planning timeline when it comes to working with (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c specific. As well as with our general leaders. Three hours is the minimum amount of time that we set aside; that is the absolute minimum. And that is guidelines that have come out because we had -- it was kind of loose out there before.

Other types of unit differ from longer time lines. But what we have established with (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c is that habitual working relationship at the battalion level with that team that comes on the ground at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c. They have that direct contact, and partly due to the nature of the fact that we have that habitual relationship. We work through that discussion process. We have set a three-hour minimum timeline for us to be able to plan the mission that's for (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c specifically. That is something I put out. We put that out in writing --

BG Colt: Do we have that on the share drive?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): We put that out in a FRAGO. And we put that out also to the units that we're working with. We also had guidelines that went out to the conventional units and to the ISAF because all of their planning timelines are different. The only one that is that compressed is with (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c because of the

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nature of that particular mission and that particular fight. And I'm sure we've got that product somewhere. Am I missing something on that? I'm not sure if it came out on the CJTF side or any other side. I don't that there has.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I don't remember -- I will have to go back and research the IJC order that quantifies our relationship and our requirements. But I don't believe that it is in that document.

I do believe that we have put out a FRAGO from 10th CAB to our subordinate units that quantify the time limit for the (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c planning cycle, and it is three hours.

BG Colt: Was that your guidance, or is that something that (b)(3), (b)(6) or somebody before you all utilized?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) The guys that were here before us had compressed it, and got it down to that type of a timeline. And from the time we arrived, we took over that mission cycle in terms of the way it was working. You were not part of that initially because it was up at JBAD. You good didn't get the handover. Am I missing anything on that? As I recall, I'm not sure exactly when 3d CAB started or got to that level. But they were certainly at the level of the three-hour notification and mission execution time cycle by the time we got on board. We learned, and we took

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some of their planning ideas, systems and then, of course, we continued to adapt through the course of this year to arrive at where we are now. But that was certainly the starting point for us.

BG Colt: How about other assistance that the brigade staff or the battalion and lower collaborate on and in the development of the three-hour timeline? Can you talk about that at all? And sharing of intel products, for instance.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. There is sharing of information. And it is generally at the task force and at the company level. I don't know specifically if our S-2 here at the brigade level shares information readily with Task Force (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4c. But I don't think that happens. It is more located at the lower level. Having said that, there is information sharing, but it is not codified in a FRAGO or in an SOP anywhere that that is supposed to occur.

BG Colt: Okay.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, at the task for level, there's a lot of that information sharing. My S-2 would basically live over there at the Team JBAD compound. So in terms of direct coordination there when they are building the products, there was a lot of that going on. The only information we would really

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get from up here at higher headquarters would be our topo team would do a lot of work for HLZ selection and that type of stuff. The actual intel on enemy threat was RS2 working directly with the Team JBAD side.

BG Colt: Okay.

IO-DEP: So for the crews dedicated to (b)(1),4a,(b)(1),4c did you get any guidance from ISAF or, Hey, this is what these guys have to do, and this is the capability? I know you've got a 2, 2 and 2 right, for each half? Two AHs, two UHs and two CHs.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Two and two. There's a CH and AH.

IO-DEP: And so there wasn't any FRAGO or anything saying, Hey, you need to train them up to this standard, you need to do these things or --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Not to my knowledge, negative. We have a requirement to provide support, and it was defined as two CHs and two AHs. And that was, to my knowledge, unless I'm missing something, that was the extent of the guidance and the order.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, there are a few products out there that I will look for that include specific units such as the B 1/171 Hawaiian National Guard which is directed to provide support for a specific purpose, which was direct support to (b)(1),4a,(b)(1),4c. And I can't tell you what specifically was in that type of order.

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But I will look to see if there's mention of that. I don't remember that it was in there delineating that.

IO-DEP: Okay. Thanks. I appreciate that.

Next question is -- so to make sure I understand. The aircraft -- or the CH is DS to (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c The crews are not. So the crews, I mean, do you have a pool of crews and whoever is available supports that mission -- I mean, I'm not trying to say there is no crew selection process. I understand there is. But if you could talk me through that.

10th CAB (b)(3),(b)(6): The -- and, (b)(3),(b)(6) you can add in, also, from your side as to what you saw down at the task force. The task force commanders select which individuals out of their populations are going to fly the (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c missions; that is the first step in the criteria that I would lay out. And that is something that is done based off of, clearly, crew experience, the experience they brought into this fight, what they see for how these guys are flying now in terms of their aptitude and their abilities. Understanding that it is a constantly changing dynamic because we constantly have changes that are off-cycle in the RIPTOA process.

As you look across RC East, I have got two and a half companies of CH-47s. I have got my company, which are Foxes. And then

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I've got a company of Delta models from one location, and then another half a company of Delta models for a third location. All three of them are on different timelines.

BG Colt: And that half company is separated between you and

(b)(3), (b)(6) (sic) BCT?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): That's correct, sir. Right now, it's Colorado and Nebraska. They just switched out with Hawaii. Hawaii arrived when we arrived. It ripped in back in about October or November of last year.

BG Colt: And when they did that, did they rip knowing that six airframes each were in each task force?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): When they arrived, it was not clear when that unit was activated that they were going to come here and be separated like that. They were activated against the RFF [Request for Forces] to provide additional support for (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c which is what (b)(3), (b)(6) had mentioned. That was the genesis of the ark the -- not the motivation -- but the reason behind that RFF that brought in that second CH company.

BG Colt: (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c op -tempo was the requirement to generate the additional RFF?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): That's correct, sir. And that's what the requirement was against. So we have three different timelines

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for the three different CH units. When we initially arrived -- of course, you understand everything we are at now is a result of evolution all the time.

When we initially arrived, I had CH-47 Foxes on three locations. Keep in mind, we have 5 FOBs. I had CH-47 Foxes on three locations. And I had Delta models on three locations. The third location for the Foxes was right here at Bagram. We reduced that footprint, and we put the Foxes on two locations because we found that logistically, we simply were not able to support who we needed to support by having them splitting to three --

BG Colt: Bottom lines?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Bottom line and, to a certain extent, eight memoirs, sir, became a question of ready to launch, ready to -- what you needed to have on the ramp. You know, if you want to have four on the ramp, you can be definitely sure you're going to have two everyday on a mission. If you need three to make two everywhere you are, you're going to find yourself failing on missions --

BG Colt: Were those QRFs, or where those SBES?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): All those were ours, sir. The unit we replaced -- we were the first ones to have this issues when it

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came with Foxes -- I shouldn't say the first ones. (b)(6)

had the same issue. Because (b)(6) was here with Foxes that he brought and Delta models.

He ripped out with (b)(6) and 3d CAB. They were pure. (b)(6)

had not done the Fox model fill. (b)(6) had the luxury of having a pure fleet of Delta models, which adds a tremendous amount of flexibility to what you have in this fight.

We go back now to Foxes and Deltas and, oh, by the way, we pick up the additional six CH-47s. And so it made sense for us to split into -- essentially you had five half companies of CH-47s, a total of two and a half companies. You have five locations. The wave ended up falling out. Logistically, it made sense to put the Foxes on two locations, and the Delta models on three. Essentially, about a half of company --

BG Colt: I absolutely understand.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): -- [inaudible] if that makes sense.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, there were other considerations that were tactical and accidental that we looked at, and the rationale for putting those --

BG Colt: Can you talk to some of those, please.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, the other considerations were clearly the terrain, the enemy threat and the requirements. So we looked

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at those different aspects for consideration as well when considering where to put the Fox model aircraft.

I think the thing that really put us over the edge was the sustainment of those aircraft, and the logistical [inaudible] of continuing the sustainment of those aircraft at two locations, was much easier than putting them at three locations.

BG Colt: When got an extra company and a half of their D models, what logistics do you get to sustain D model pure fleets?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Pretty much -- I mean, we've got the -- well, they come in different packages, sir. That's not an easy question to answer. By the order, I don't think the order specified anything outside of those assets. In other words --

BG Colt: You didn't get any AVUM augmentees?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I will have to verify that, sir. But I don't think that they came with --

BG Colt: Let me rephrase: Did you get any AVUM or AVIM augmentees for that additional --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Did we get them is a different question, sir. What was tasked, if I recall by the order, and we have to verify this with the order, there was no additional maintenance. However, these units will come with and they will activate with different levels of maintenance support that they see the need

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themselves.

For example, we have a company from Washington/Oregon that was the full company we had when we got here. They ripped out with Kansas. When Kansas came onboard, Kansas brought a significant amount of support with them. It was a far more robust package than Washington/Oregon had before them. So it was the same RFF, one company for one company. But one came in with much more --

BG Colt: Have you been, in any manner, constrained by force gap?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir, absolutely. We are locked into -- we are. But the RFFs for these additions may not be. We, as 10th CAB, that's what we have walked in with a force gap. Certainly our RFFs are not necessarily under the same force cap if they were here, for example, with half a company against the (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4 mission, they didn't have the same requirement.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) The authorizations for those RFFs are delineated in the original RFF for those companies. But there's flexibility, and the National Guard units tend to take advantage of some of that flexibility. And they come in with different packages like the Colonel mentioned, you know, additional 15Us for the Chinooks and things like that.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, when we got -- versus the last crew, they

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came in, and we did a lot of [inaudible] things like that. Now, the Washington/Oregon guys, they had fuel handlers. They had some door gunners, things like that. So it's very different to support, other than the actual crews, very different than the support that comes with them on the outside. Of course, I appreciate that we get all those guys in the reserve national guard asset. But --

BG Colt: Have any National Guard units that came to you come with a greater than 1.5 crew ratio? Meaning, they sent more crew than they did --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I don't think so, sir. I will have to verify that. But I don't believe so. We will check on that, and give you the actual answer. But we will give you the actual -- we have the actual crew charts and what they brought, sir.

IO-DEP: (b)(3), (b)(6) can I continue on that thread with how -- you said the battalion task force commander selects a certain pool of crews who are E. glasses off or you're approved to fly (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1) 1.4e --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Going back to where I initially digressed, and went down a different path for a minute. I was talking about the different timelines. Because you have a constantly changing -- first of all, two of our locations are prime locations that we've had since we arrived for flying the (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1) 1.4e missions,

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that's [redacted].

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

From the day we arrived, we've had a half package at each one of those locations. That has been enduring. That has not changed at all. Both of those locations are pure Delta models. We have no Foxes there. It goes back to what [redacted] had raised earlier when he talked about why we decided where to place the Fox models where we did. A large part of that had to deal with terrain and the threat.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

The KONAR, we clearly identified as needed to have Fox models. So right there, boom, that's one slice of the Fox model piece that you have.

IO-DEP: And why did you --

10th CAB [redacted]: We felt that because of both, the terrain challenges and the enemy challenges that we saw out there in KONAR. Based off of what our predecessors had seen here before us, we did not see putting the reserve component units up into the KONAR in the optempo which a pinnacle approaches that we have to deal with on a regular basis up there in KONAR. It's not from a risk mitigation perspective.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

BG Colt: As a crew training perspective, not an airframe --

10th CAB [redacted]: Yes, sir. Absolutely. Because Delta models have flown in KONAR obviously and the -- it's not like the KONARs

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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only have Fox models. We are very understanding of the fact that, Sure Delta models could fly up there.

But we felt that from the question of both aircraft capability and the enhance risk mitigation opportunities and capability you have with the Fox model, it made sense to put the fox model up into the KONAR. I still feel extremely comfortable with that decision. I will not change that at all today. We find that is and continues to be one of our most challenging environments in which to fly.

So we've had Delta models at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c where

we fly the (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c every night. The long answer to your question,

(b)(3), (b)(6), when you talk about the crew selection, the task force

commanders there clearly had to access the crews that they had,

decide which were the ones that they wanted to fly the (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

mission. And they focus on flying those crews.

They tend to keep a pretty consistent base of crews. It's the

two crews that are dedicated that, Hey, you two guys are the only

ones that are flying (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c mission, no, they are deeper than that.

And, obviously, we set ourselves up for failure if we have to

rely on just two crews. Because, nothing else, they are going

to take leave. Never mind the guy who is going to walk outside

and eat some bad food, and he's going to have food poisoning for

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a day. He's going to be out on his ass. We obviously have a depth beyond that.

And each one of those locations, I would say, they probably maintain about four or five crews that they can interchange in to fly the (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c) missions --

IO-DEP: So it not the full --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): It's definitely not the full gambit. They don't just throw anyone at that mission at all. And it was a very deliberate thought process on who they are putting against those (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c) crews. That is very much the case.

With that said, there is constantly a requirement to train and to improve, and get ready for the next set because the National Guard units are here for about an eight-month effective mission set. You will switch out guys on each one of those locations. To mitigate that risk, we have split an offset on each one of the locations.

While I say I have got a half a company at each location, is not a pure half company. In other words, Hawaii had half a company here. I did not take one FOB and say, Hawaii, that's your FOB, you have half a company. I split Hawaii crews amongst two FOBs. And I split a company from, what used to be Washington/Oregon is now Kansas, on to the same two FOBs.

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Why? So that I offset the rips of those units. If I had all of Hawaii on one FOB, and they handle the (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1) mission up until X day, they leave the next day a new --

BG Colt: Right. And you get all brand new people.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) -- there's an entirely new set of brand new folks. And so you have no continuity of support. You have no experience base. And what you find yourself dealing with, I think, is that operational tactical risk that goes up significantly. Because now, you have an entirely new, fresh set of crews. And even if they have some experienced individual aviators there, that transition, I think the risk goes way up. So the way we have mitigated that is to offset. So on FOB (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4c), they may have a number of crews from Kansas, and a number of crews from Colorado/Nebraska. Kansas was there first. They were trained up. And now, Colorado/Nebraska came in and we continue to move forward. We will take the strength out of both of those. But as we start getting to the end of Kansas, when they get ready to leave, the expectation will be is that Colorado/Nebraska crews that are there, they will own the (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1) mission by the time Kansas leaves. A new unit comes in, and they are not necessarily right on with (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4c) But they might have one or two individuals or three individuals that are particularly strong aviators that can put

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in very quickly. But for the most part, that new unit that comes in, as you go through that rip process, go through that transition process, the unit that's been there is the one they have it. That is the way we have mitigated that risk when it comes executing the (b)(1), (1.4a), (b)(1) mission on those two FOBs in particular. And that has been the case we've dealt with now. Both of those units have ripped since we have been on the ground.

SME-JSOAC: What about your dedicated planner with (b)(1), (1.4a), (b)(1), (24c) Do you have an embedded planner that stays with them.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) The units -- I'll let -- (b)(6) can talk about that a little bit more.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) When I was at JBAD, sir, what we would have is we would have two planners that were the primary planners that would be over there. We had an aviator, and then we had an S-2 planner. And once we picked up that mission set, that was their purpose in life, was to be that planner. Short of them going on leave, they are always going to be that planner, that way they had that relationship established, and they knew the personnel, and they knew how to plan within there. They would do all the planning, whether or not they went on the mission. The aviator over there was also one of the Team (b)(1), (1.4a), (b)(1), (1.4c) crews, and he might plan the mission out, hand off the plan to

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the S-2 to continue it while he goes out and flies the mission. So often it was the who's now the company commander out there, one of the more experienced aviators. And he would go out, and he would AMC the mission that he just completed the plan on.

SME-JSOAC: So that face is constant?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): And I think you will find that's the case with

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

as well with Task Force (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

They will maintain

their set planners. They build that relationship, and that is their primary job.

IO-DEP: What's your process for when you get these detachments? How do you bring them in on your TACSOP, you know, and make sure that they are in compliance with the crew [inaudible] and all of those?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) We have a -- and I will, again, ask (b)(3), (b)(6) to go ahead and plug if you have anything to add here. Most of his crews were not -- he's hardly had any task crews out in six years, so he doesn't necessarily have the first-hand experience with this.

The short answer is the battalion task force level. We have had this discussion. We have a consolidated brigade TACSOP that all

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the battalions operate off of. And when the units come in, the expectation is that they train them, and they get them up to speed on that TACSOP. Definitely the crew endurance policy and the crew -- things like the crew rescue, crew endurance policy, something that is maintained and monitored at the battalion level. But in the execution down at the team level or at the company level, expectations that they are read in with that TACSOP. But I can't answer your question on how each battalion task force is doing it.

IO-DEP: But it's the battalion commander's responsibility to make sure that he trains up his elements.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Absolutely. Is it possible we could get a digital copy of your TACSOP.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I think it was actually on the disk.

IO-DEP: It might have been.

BG Colt: Does that address AMC designation too?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Does it address the AMC program? If that's what you're asking, no, sir, it doesn't. It does address the responsibilities.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6): Each of the battalion task forces is responsible for training their own AMCs, you know, in accordance

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with the TACSOP. But it's done at the local level, rather than the consolidated brigade level TACSOP or AMC program.

BG Colt: How about element versus mission AMC?

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6): Not sure what you mean, sir.

BG Colt: If you put out an AWT in an assault element, is there an overall AMC for the mission?

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, there is. What we will do is you will have serial commander; for example, tonight I was supposed to fly with AWT. I was the CH-47 serial commander, but the overall mission AMC, was a captain who was one of the AWT PICs; and that's, pretty much, how we do that.

BG Colt: Okay.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): That's also delineated, sir, on our risk assessment portions, and also almost always covered during the CONOP.

IO-DEP: (b)(3), (b)(6), now, I just want to make sure the mission for LEFTY GROVE, was that approved at the battalion level?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): By me.

IO-DEP: Did you have any concerns over that mission? Was it consistent with any other missions in that AOR? Was there anything that we haven't asked you that spiked on that mission in your mind?

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10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) It was consistent with other missions in that AOR. There was -- any time we went into the Tangi, the Tangi was definitely an area of concern. There was no doubt about that. We have a number of areas that are high threat areas across our AOR that we watch, and that we have a greater amount of concern over.

Tangi is certainly one of them. CHALK district up into the KONAR, certainly the Pash River Valley and going up further north from there. LSA and particular off of the Tegab (ph) Valley, each one of these are areas, which we will automatically have a great deal of concern about because of the demonstrated SAFIRE threat that exists in each one of those locations.

That said, was this one-- anything in particular left outside of that general higher threat concern entering? No. There was -- I didn't have anything that I could think of in the intel that specifically raised it to a higher than normal level for the Tangi. In other words, in comparison to any other operation we've done in the Tangi, it was on par with anything else that we've done here.

IO-DEP: Okay.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Nothing specific that popped out that said, hey, this was a different level of the Tangi than usual, if that

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makes sense.

IO-DEP: Yeah. I just want to know if there was anything out of the ordinary, anything that made, you know, your hairs on your back of your neck stand up, or to pay special attention to this or just -- I mean if it was consistent with the standard missions that you were seeing from (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4c)

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I have asked both the 3 and the DBC to make any comments as well because all of us had a chance to look at that operation that night. But at the end of it all, the approval authority was at my level.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I would say when I looked at the operation, I did recognize it was Tangi. I did recognize the target that we were going after as a high level target. And that was the only thing that really stood out to me at that point in time was that he was a high level insurgent area. And, you know, aside from that, I didn't see anything else that was significant about it.

IO-DEP: When you received the CONOP from the battalion task force up here for review and approval, did they include any demographics on the crew like this was -- you know, time, crew mix, experience levels or anything like that? Is that held at the battalion?

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10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) We have the -- the ERAW comes up with every CONOP -- the risk assessment worksheet -- electronically because we have it all -- it's all computer-based now with what we're doing.

The ERAW comes up. It identifies, certainly our level -- it identifies the AMC -- PC, AMC, our total hour level -- total goggle hours or NVG hours on the aircraft. We have an annotation if it is a crew that is under 25 hours in the AOR, which is shown on that CONOP or on the ERAW itself. And so it does not show how much time the crew has flown with together. That is not listed or defined on the ERAW.

IO-DEP: You said that this one reached your level for approval. Was that because of a certain thing on the risk assessment? Was it because (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4e --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) All of the hasty (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4e ops come up --

IO-DEP: Okay. All the (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4e ops --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) -- it's either myself or the (b)(3), (b)(6) that will approve it up here at the brigade level. But everything single (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4e op comes up to my level.

BG Colt: Yeah. Just for clarification, you made that distinction as far as hasty. Are there more deliberate ones that you have them unfold more methodically than this particular one

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did?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): With regard to --

BG Colt: (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sometimes we get a little bit more lead time on it. But that's not too often, sir.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I think I had twenty-four hours notice once the whole time we had the mission down here. That was about it, sir.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, if I may, every single night we go through the same, what I call "our hasty drill," and to put things in context for you, it generally starts about 1800 Zulu. And it goes probably three to five hours after that. And that's the time period when we received these from the unit, from the task force, and we review them. And we either approve, disapprove or make changes as needed and modify the mission.

But every night it's a drill, if you will, for the chain of command here and the staff to go through it. So we usually receive anywhere between, you know, one and, I would say, we have gone as high as maybe 12 in a night, something like that --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Not just for (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): No. Across the board. So generally, I will for (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c it probably around four to six, somewhere around there.

BG Colt: Right. For reference, I understand you support

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six of their task force elements. That particular night of this mission, they had 11 missions going on in (b)(1.4a),(b)(1)1,4c So contextually, there's a rack and a stack within the overall complexity or the overall value that their doing and I recognize that, all right? Do you recall when the mission came up here originally, right? Did they plan for IRF sequel, if you will?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I don't think so, sir.

BG Colt: Objective LEFTY was originally planned for an infil, a deliberate target talk out and an exfil. That's what it was planned for; is that correct?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) That's correct, sir.

BG Colt: Okay. And then at some point in this particular mission, can you just describe how Objective LEFTY then, you know, unfolded. After the initial infil, there was another discussion. How did that one go?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I think that it was myself and the 3. You can go ahead and talk from your perspective.]

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, I was informed by my CHOPS that there were multiple people starting to gather around Objective LEFTY, and they needed to put the immediate reaction force in. They were going to put the reaction force in on a four and a half k offset.

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The force was already on the helicopters, and they just needed authorization to be able to do the infil.

So we quickly went over, pulled the topo up -- the topographical map up to make sure that the landing conditions would be suitable. I came up here quickly and briefed the boss because they were already airborne at this point. I believe, sir, I think you called the commander to discuss it with him as well.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): That's correct.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) That was the immediacy of it. The report we got was people were gathering, troops were in contact on the ground. The flight was already airborne at this point, and just needed authorization to go in at a four and a half Kilometer offset.

Other than that piece right there, that's about the best intel that we got. But based on the severity of the situation, that's when we brought up to the boss, and I think he called directly to try to get more information.

BG Colt: Would you characterization the sequel sort of nature of objective lefty and then the subsequent infil as something that has happened routinely or recurringly?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) No, sir.

BG Colt: No?

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10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) No, sir. That has not been the routine.

IO-DEP: So employment of the IRF [inaudible] is not a normal --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) We have -- I can --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I can think of possibly --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) It has not happened, sir. I would have to go back and check. But I cannot think of many times.

BG Colt: There are plenty of circumstances -- wouldn't you -- help me (b)(3), (b)(6) in the question how I can say this. Have there been a number of missions where you have approved an IRF infil or prior as part of the original mission brief? Because if a commander maintains an IRF capability, it's fairly logical to assume, right, that it's an -- it is a sequel that could occur -- a contingency -- a likely contingency to plan for. And then if that's the case, do you give parameters to which the IRF can be employed by the battalion task force commander without them having to come back to you?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, from my perspective as we have been in supporting (b)(3), (b)(6) I cannot recall us being asked to employ an IRF. If we have, it's been very, very rare. I've got to go back and look. It's certainly been the exception from a planning perspective --

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BG Colt: (b)(3),(b)(6) can take that one and look at that. How many times, for instance, have you flexed on a second turn, or done something that was causal or not reactive, I guess, than initial conditions on the target.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): We will get you that answer, sir. Again, as I'm thinking right now, I can't really think of any off the top of my head. That doesn't mean --

BG Colt: I mean, in other cases you may have done based on the limited number of assets, a two-turn infil, right? A deliberate two-turn infil --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

BG Colt: -- to put in both tiers of elements that were going in?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. And in particular -- and this was before (b)(3), (b)(6) came up as the 3, I would say that there was at least one or two operations. It may have been right around the time we transitioned with (b)(3),(b)(6). There was one or two operations in Kosovo where we had multiple targets in the same location where we did multiple turns. And that was a deliberate operation with multiple turns in.

Usually it is one turn in 60 pax or less infil, execute the mission and then exfil. Very rarely, to answer your question on the

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planning piece, sir, very, very rarely have we had a plan in-place that we have been asked to lay out for an IRF. That is not something that is a normal. I can tell you that for the whole year, that is not something that we have normally planned on.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I can think of -- the RFFs, sir, I can't think of any. I know there's been times that we've -- that -- usually the brown air guys or possibly ourselves, if we're doing it, will put in the battle space owner's troops afterwards to do the consequence management piece. And they may go in when there are still actions still not on the objective, but associated with the objective going on. But their primary purpose would be the consequence management after an operation. I can't think of any RFF in the middle of an operation that we've infilled.

SME-JSOAC: (b)(3), (b)(6) for the employment of the IRF, what's the process then for LZ selections? Is that retained at the task force level or does (b)(1.4a, (b)(1) push you proposed HLZs --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I couldn't answer that, sir, in this case. I know that with everything we did when I was worked with Team (b)(1.4a, (b)(1), 4c sir, they would make a request to our planner. Our planner would look at it knowing (b)(3), (b)(6) guidance, and say, well, this is the adjustment I think we need to have. And then they would send it to me.

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In this case, four and a half kilometer offset was a big mitigator that, okay, we don't really understand what's happening up there, but we know there's a lot of activity. This is a four and a half kilometer offset. The aircraft is already airborne. We did the check, and saw there were no galats within 300 meters -- or not very many galats was in 300 meters. And they were out past 250 meters, and then brought up to (b)(3),(b)(6) for approval.

So we did do a deliberate thought process with it. But the immediacy of it, we didn't delve as much as we needed to into the threat at that location.

SME-MH47: Sir, was there a misunderstanding at this level about what the intent of IRF was? Was there a thought process here that the ground force was in distress or --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Not for me -- not at the decision level with me because I got on the phone and talked to (b)(3),(b)(6) who was the battalion task force commander there.

My staff brought up they HLZs, and they gave me the general context of it. I got on the phone and called the battalion task force commander. I asked them, what do you understand about what's happening there on the battle field. And the impression that he gave me was that they had contact at the objective; that there were squirters moving off to the west and north; and, that

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we wanted to place in, essentially, a blocking force about four kilometers away at this HLZ.

IO-DEP: For the squirter control?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): For the squirters. And that was my clear picture as we talked about it. And we talked about what the -- we talked about the HLZ, the HLZ selection, the squirter and the contact that was there at the objective. I looked at it from the big picture on that regard, and then I went on ahead gave them the approval for use of those HLZs for the insertion.

SME-GFA: Just for clarification, the four and a half kilometer offset. Is that four and a half k from objective LEFTY GROVE, right, sir?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Four or four and a half k from the objective. Not from the infil points. The infil locations were actually even further away because they were to the south and east. Exfil was about 600 meters south and east. And infil was about a 1,000 meters if I recall -- 1,200 meters east/south east from the objective.

IO-DEP: (b)(3), (b)(6), the ground force commander made the decision, I think, in consultation with the air mission commander about putting all of the sof operators on one aircraft.

Can you provide us with your -- one, is that a normal TTP; and,

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what are your thoughts about that? Were you informed of that or --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I don't recall being informed that they were going to go on one aircraft before they went. Had they raised that to me, I probably would have told them, if that's what the ground force operator wants, I was okay with it. I would not have fought that. I wasn't informed of that. At least I don't recall.

Do you recall if that came up?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) No, sir. And the numbers we had were different initially. What had approved for was --

BG Colt: Seventeen.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) -- seventeen personnel. And they didn't say if that was [inaudible] or not --

IO-DEP: And that was during the infil to be clear of the initial assault force on the objective --

BG Colt: Forty-seven was always the first infil. And the second one was going to be 17. And then it went to 32. And then, ultimately, it was 38 including crew. So it was going to be 32 on the ground.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. That is -- now, that you have sparked my memory, 17 is what I recall. And then I recall at

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some point either before or during the infil, someone told me that they felt 17 wasn't enough, so they were going to bump it up to 30. And I think that was the last number I was tracking. But in either case, the power management considerations are -- one of the key things I look for, obviously, is the power management consideration as well as the tactical risk and the accidental risk. From my perspective as the aviator side of this piece, clearly, one aircraft to me is better than two. That's half the numbers of landings; that's half the number of targets in the sky; that's half the number possible brown-outs and possible hard landings and breaking landing gear.

So from an aviation perspective, I'm comfortable with going in with one. And as long as the power management is not the issue, which is the one I would come back if I see an issue there, that's where I would start to push back, and talk to the commander about, hey, whether we have the power in the aircraft to take all of them in one load. I had no concerns about that for this particular location and going into the Tangi at this time of the night with a CH47.

We were comfortable with the power margins on it. So while I was tracking 17 when I initially approved it, had they come up to me and said, Well, I want to do 30, I would -- I'm pretty --

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IO-DEP: As long as it was supported by the power available in aircraft, you didn't have an issue.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Absolutely.

BG Colt: Can you describe for me "seats plus"? Isn't that a policy here.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. The policy at the brigade level is that we keep it at 30, and everyone is in a seat and they have got a seat belt on. Unless there is specific permission that is required outside of that. That the policy that I have.

BG Colt: Okay.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): And what they did brief for the seats plus, sir, when they briefed it, it was going to be seats plus. Everybody in a seat was going to be buckled in. And those not in a seat were going to be D'clipped to the bottom of the aircraft. So if there was anything, they would be secure at their location.

IO-DEP: Okay. Another question: On this particular op, my understanding is it went into a flight -- it was a flight of two. At about the three-minute out point, CHALK 2 went into holding, and lead proceeded in, single ship.

Is that a normal TTP, I mean, to keep one airplane airborne while the other one goes in?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): If you're on -- each task force does it a little

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bit differently, sir. I know that my experience out in Jalalabad, that's what we would do frequently. But that's also based on the terrain that we have out there. Because it doesn't allow, in most cases, for two aircraft to land simultaneously. So that's just how we operate. I would have to defer to those guys back there about their local TTPs with that.

BG Colt: Another one would be: What was the tactical task given to CHALK 2? Because you didn't carry pax.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. The primary purpose for CHALK 2 in this case would have been escort and escort CHALK 1 because AWT was already out there. So now, we've got AWF, we have an aircraft flying single ship from (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c to the target. At a minimum, obviously, we don't put them out there single ship for cross-country or moving across the terrain. So at a minimum, they would have been out there to escort.

BG Colt: Would you say it was a normal TTP given the four kilometer offset to have the AWT on-site 10-minutes prior?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, are you asking is the 10 minutes prior a normal TTP as far as clearing an HLZ is concerned and securing it?

BG Colt: Particularly, given the fact that you had another deliberate operation already going four kilometers south in the

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same valley.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. I would say being there at some point in time whether it's 10 minutes or 5 minutes prior is fairly typical TTP. Ten minutes is our general rule. Five minutes to clear; and five minutes fudge factor in there to remain on station, and continue to observe.

Given the fact that the other part of this was ongoing, in close proximity -- depending on how you look at it, some distance away, I would say, yes, it was still fairly common.

BG Colt: Has it been a normal TTP to ask for sparkle one minute prior?

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Either a sparkle or a burn. I get a burn on the LZ from (b)(3), (b)(6) at least another -- I had flown right by that on a different that night in the valley. And I saw a burn going on the LZ. I'm not sure which part of the operation it was. I think it was the initial infil. And you could clearly see on the night, the C130 is flying around, and that whole LZ is lit up.

So that is absolutely normal. If we don't have a burn or sparkle, if we don't have any of those types of assets, we will put IR rockets out from our Apaches or scouts over the LZ, so we can actually see the land, and have a better view of the actual LZ

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when we're going in.

BG Colt: And it sounded like in one of the statements that that was what was planned.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6): They were using it. I saw it as I was -- like I said, I was on another mission --

BG Colt: No. I'm talking about the IR illum.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6): I'm not aware of that.

BG Colt: Okay. Anybody else?

SME-MH47: I'm just curious, sir, the rejoin plan. If aircraft -- I mean, how do they do that? I mean, the lead aircraft would have had to retrace his inbound and gone back out and rejoined his play mate. Do they de-conflict by altitude? Do they turn on their pink lights? How do they rejoin?

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6): I think that would be on the mission depending on how they came out on the briefing for that. We have a specific -- we have a rejoin plan in the SOP. But for that particular mission, I don't know how they briefed that.

BG Colt: It sounds like the egress plan was to the southeast directly back right to (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c So we will have to ask them tomorrow.

SME-CH47: Sir, I have a quick question. When you were briefed the IRF portion, did you get briefed the routing that

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the aircraft was going to take? It was already up in the air, but did you get, actually, briefed that or any intel that went along with that piece?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) I did not. I don't think I got that level of detail on that brief. I'm pretty comfortable with the planning capacity at the battalion task force level when it comes to the en route portion. The battalion task forces are usually, and I expect in this case, it was nothing different. They are usually smart about the en route portions of the routes going in and out. When we get the full CONOP, I always have the routes that are in there. Very, very rarely have I ever had any issues with the routes that my task forces have laid out to get in and out of a target or objective area.

But on this particular case, I did not receive that as part of that briefing.

SME-NGB: Sir, back to Colorado and Nebraska. When they came and completed the RIPTOA in addition to the robust maintenance package that they had, were they fully equipped and prepared otherwise as far as equipment, NVG sets, things like that.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) When I spoke about the robust maintenance package, I was speaking specifically about Kansas. As far as

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Colorado and Nebraska, I don't recall that Colorado/Nebraska had any particularly strong maintenance package or robust package that came along with it. I would have to check with my expert.

(b)(3), (b)(6), do you recall?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): They did not, sir. They came with minimal again, maybe one or two fuel handlers, and a couple of extra door gunners, but that was it. It's the Kansas guys that came in with a detachment, a D Company minus probably 25 -- I can get the numbers but about 25 soldiers, again, SHOPS guys, avionics guys --

BG Colt: Did they SPE the airplanes from Kansas to these other guys? The aircraft stayed?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Just crews and maintainers swamped.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): It mostly stayed, sir. We have had aircraft losses. We have had different aircraft that were transitioned here. Most of the aircraft stayed when crews swapped. But I want to say -- I can't remember the details between Colorado/Nebraska.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Did we traditionally wholesale, swap airplanes out and things like that? To be honest with you, sir, no, we did not.

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BG Colt: Well, for a RIPTOA of the D models specifically. I didn't know whether they brought additional airframes when they TOA'd or they just --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): They didn't bring in any airplanes.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Bravo 2135, sir, did not bring any airframes. It was, I think originally 52 personnel, and then it changed. And was, I believe, a total of 61 personnel that came in.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): That was a half company with Hawaii.

BG Colt: Any discerns with the difference of maintenance and readiness between the two units?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. The reason I can't say that there is a discernable difference because we do, I guess, what we call mix those units together. They're blended units.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Whenever it comes down to like aircraft maintenance and things like that, knowledge of the aircraft, they are actually very good at it. That's kind of, you know, the bread and butter of what they do back home. They are pretty good when it comes to that. I can't speak much for the other stuff. But I can again, about the --

BG Colt: The thought process though of not leaving an empty nest at least to a RIPTOA where you wind up with completely new guys. It also guarantees cutting down the ownership and

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maintenance processes so that you don't have a discernable dip after TOA, or somebody doesn't go out the door leaving somebody with, you know, a depleted bank and a situation. And now the guy is trying to start up building his reputation from a hole. So I think that's all thoughtful.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, we have wrestled with that question. Speaking personally, I'm a big person when it comes to teamwork and building a team. And it is not lost on me at all, as I have this discussion with the incoming unit, with the task force commanders. The whole concept of breaking an organization and split them up, and you lose that synergy that comes along with it.

That is the downside, you know, we recognize that. I personally recognize that very clearly. But I also recognize that continuity and that the op-tempo and the demands of this flight require a certain level of knowledge that if you turn around, and you take all the players off of this FOB and put a whole bunch of new ones there, you are taking an operational risk for missions there for one to two months. That could be extremely --

BG Colt: You know a commentary, because of the dissimilarity between F and the active component D, really, the only guys that can bear this burden of that, having a mixed team are reserve

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component guys rights now. We wouldn't do that to ourselves. We wouldn't take home a genius unit, break it apart, and apply it to another F model unit probably, right?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, I'm not sure if I would agree with that. Because we've done, pretty much, what we've done with the AH64s here as well. We have -- I have a pair on three FOBs. Each FOB has a pair or AWT that was dedicated against the IRF package. And they are offset from the rest of the AWTs. I will give you an example -- actually it's at four FOBs.

At (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c my task force (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c is there, and he's got an Apache company, Bravo from 4th Company was with for the whole fight. When we arrived, there were four Apache aviators and two aircraft that belonged to RC North that had originally landed there because they were part of the RFF to provide support for (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c So those crews were there.

The rest of the battalion task force ripped out; ripped in with my guys. And I had two Apache crews that were there who provided a tremendous amount of transitional risk mitigation for the rest of new Apache crews that were on the ground.

Because what could I do with those guys at that point? What you could do is you can take that experienced PZ, fly him with that junior PI over here, and go out and execute a mission. And take

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that junior PI and put him with the experienced PC with my guy coming. In you going to automatically have that infusion of area knowledge that comes into the mix.

Tremendous risk mitigators, and something that the guys found very, very powerful. And that happened at Jalalabad, at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c, and at (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c. That is something the offset of the aviation units coming through here, I think, gives us the ability to do that. And the only way you get around that is you accept if you want the same op-tempo or you either accept an increased risk. Or you conversely decrease the op-tempo. Which becomes, obviously, a question that has to be deal between us as the supporting unit, a risk unit with the customer on the ground, which is all CJTF, all the BCTs, (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c and everyone else.

And that's the other answer is, Hey, we just did an aviation rip, let's take a decrease in our op-tempo for three weeks or a month, while we get everybody really spun up on the --

BG Colt: Right.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): -- [inaudible] and get back up. That's the trade off --

BG Colt: Sure. I can see that.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): -- absolutely what we struggle with. So going back to when you pointed about the Fox [inaudible] essentially,

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we do that right now with Longbow Package. I have got six crews that are all over this battle space that are not with their own organization.

We feel in on that. We decided to keep that. We're going to do with 82d CAB. When (b)(3), (b)(6) (ph) comes in he's going to have that two, two and two on the AH64s. And he may reorganize and consolidate that company again, and structure things so it's a little bit different. But I feel very strongly that that is a powerful --

BG Colt: [inaudible] techniques that we do that with, even in the right/seat, left/seat as far as that?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. It's almost like an extended left/seat, right seat. But it does come with a cost of TACSOP, knowing the crews, commander has these two crews on the ground that he's got to get to know, and understand what their strengths and weaknesses are, so he can make the proper decision for risk mitigation.

There is no perfect answer. There's an upside and downside in taking that choice. And that's where I have sat in terms of setting that approach here RC East. We thought about pulling those attributes back together. We thought about taking that half a company of Hawaii and put them on one spot, so he's got

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this Hawaii half company.

But in this operational environment, I think of that as -- my personal judgment of that is taking an increased risk in terms of the operation.

BG Colt: Okay. That's valid.

SME-JSOAC: What are your two 47 Fox locations would have been down there?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c. The two are extreme. In (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c, they fly a half mission down in (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c for (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c

SME-NGB: Sir, just one last question: The reserve component guys, are they coming in fully RL1 qualified, day/night NVG? Are there any training issues when they get here, or -- and, I guess, equipment shortages. Are that are equipment shortages that are significant?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Let me ask ESP to go ahead and talk about the training readiness.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6): This is kind of a prickly subject for us. But for the most part, they bring crews in who are day/night NVG RL1 on paper. However, if you look at the numbers they have as far as experience level, goggles, the killer for us -- I don't want to use that term lightly. But the worse part here is the fact they have very limited NVG experience.

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You might have a guy who's a 4,000 hour SP, with 200 hours of goggles. We have a 10,000 hour pilot with 100 hours of goggles. That's not doing us any favors here in theater when it comes to -- if you fly goggles, you can do anything. If you can do day, you can't necessarily do goggles.

So to answer your question, yes. On paper, they are, for most part, where they belong, where they need to be on RL1 NVG. But in the reality, when it comes to mission execution in this theater, a lot of their aviators are not at that level to be able to do that.

As far as equipment goes, I haven't seen as shortages. They come with the same equipment as everybody else. We did have one small issue. The unit from Kansas did not deploy with their HUDs, their Heads-up Devices for their goggles. They had to get sent back and forward because we require all of our aviators to use those regardless of airframe, whether a 58D, obviously, the Apaches do it. But on 60s and 64s, it's a requirement to fly with HUD on all missions. And if you don't have it, then the battalion task force has to approve that mission.

SME-NGB: You know it was that because they don't train with it --

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6): They don't train with it. We've had

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experiences with -- whether it was from Hawaii, or whether it was Washington/Oregon or whether it was from Kansas, and I can't speak to the Nebraska/Colorado piece because I was off on one of my trips to another unit when they came through here, whether they were qualified.

Not hardly any of them have used it. Most of them have never used it. But what we found out is when we forced them to use it, they don't want to fly without it. It becomes kind of a force multiplier. They like the situational awareness that it brings. So it's not being trained at the home stations.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): Now, with that said on the aggregate of training, we also recognize that within that organization, while they all come up and they all say, We are day/night RL1 NVG, the reality is that not all are there; however, there are always some. There are quite a few of them that have in been here on deployments before. I want to say, when we were here with Washington and Oregon, that unit had been in this theater with this brigade back in 2006 with the Falcon Brigade. And they still had a number of aviators that had combat experience from that.

So every unit that comes in here has a certain capacity of individuals who have deployed and have pretty decent experience. They might need to shake the rust off a little bit, but they have

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been out here and been in the fight before.

But on paper, it says "100 percent," and it's not. So what we find ourselves going back to your question on crew selection, that's where the task force commander has to dig in, understand the individual capacities, and then put them on the proper mission.

As (b)(3), (b)(6) has mentioned, we have an aviator that has 10,000 total hours, but he was a daytime -- we keep him on daytime only missions. He's a great American. I'm confident that he is. I'm confident he's got great skills. But he's got 100 hours of goggle time. He will not be flying goggle missions any time soon.

So we have to get into that level of knowledge on the individuals that come. And there are some individuals who come with a tremendous amount of skill. But it's not on paper what you think it is on paper, or what he thinks it is on paper when we receive it [sic]. And that's gotta be something that clearly recognized.

IO-DEP: The skill set or experience level of the pilot and co-pilot. Do you know that handy?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

IO-DEP: I just want for your opinion, if you think that's

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consistent -- basically, the PC is very low experience; however, it looks like there's potentially some risk mitigation by a very, very experienced co-pilot on this particular mission.

I want to determine if this is getting at the core of what you are discussing --

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes.

IO-DEP: -- about on paper versus -- or in qualifications or currency versus proficiency.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) This particular aircraft, the pilot in command was a (b)(3), (b)(6), three years out of flight school, 672 hours of total time, 99 hours of combat time, 588 CH-47 Delta time. 156 hours of goggle time, and only 46 hours of TC time. He was, essentially, a brand new PZ appointment within the last 30 days or so. He was our reserve guy, Bravo 7158, and he was paired up with a (b)(3), (b)(6) Bravo 2/135, who was a CH47 Delta Fox SPIE; total time 4,600 hours, 719 combat time, 30 hours in danger. All his combat in the danger time were in CH47, and he had deployed OIF in 2006.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6): He had his goggle experience on there?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6) It's 700 hours.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6): Okay. He's a high time -- I would say that

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was a high-time goggle PC for what we are getting in the guard. Most of our guard PICs with 3 to 4,000 hours have

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2 to 300 hours of goggles, maybe ten percent of the time. He's a little bit different on the high-side.

I have flown with [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] on a few missions before when I was down at Task Force [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c]. The way I understand it, he was relatively new to the Team [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] on [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] mission, because when they ripped in, the Hawaii guys, Bravo 1/171, still had that mission, and they were mostly doing it. Now, he was the replacement for that as they ripped out.

I found [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] to be a very competent aviator for his hour level. I had no questions with what he did. But from what I saw, these hours, they speak typically of that grade experience level. And through the [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] side, it's actually lower.

We have got guys with, you know -- show up with 50 or 60 hours of goggle time in theater, and then try not to put them on goggle missions unless FOB to FOB type of, you know, support type stuff until they build some time. Does that answer your question, sir?

IO-DEP: Yeah. Very much so. Thank you. That was very helpful.

10th CAB [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] It was not necessarily common at all to have a PC at that hour level come back to a little more fidelity on it. But as you mentioned, one of the keepers [inaudible] was who he was flying with --

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BG Colt: Sure.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): -- it was (b)(3), (b)(6), clearly, a very experienced aviator. And while he was new to the theater and to the mission, the intent was that he was rapidly going to become one of the PCs that was going to be flying with Team (b)(3), (b)(6). So, again, Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) had flown a number of Team (b)(3), (b)(6) missions already, understood the planning cycle [inaudible]. And that's why they had the two of them together -- paired together both of them are mitigating the cockpit experience perspective, as well as having to hand this mission off fairly quickly to -- and getting (b)(3), (b)(6) into the mix as a high-time SP that would be flying in the mission set.

BDE (b)(3), (b)(6): Correction, sir, (b)(3), (b)(6) has the ERAW for the actual mission up there. It shows (b)(3), (b)(6) had just over 4,300 and 1,400 hours of goggles, which is pretty typical with what you see for an active duty (b)(3), (b)(6) at this point in time.]

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I knew the S-3 down there, (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) He just couldn't speak enough about (b)(3), (b)(6) before this happened. Every time he talked about (b)(3), (b)(6), he was impressed with him. He spoke really high of (b)(3), (b)(6) and his abilities down there.

Unknown Speaker: Sir, I personally flew in the jump seat

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with (b)(3), (b)(6) as one of the crew members onboard the aircraft on a mission probably three to four weeks prior to this. I was very impressed by his maturity and his skill in the cockpit.

IO-DEP: Thanks for your help.

BG Colt: Anybody else.

SME-GFA: Sir, the three hour planning cycle begins with the target on the ground -- the grid on the ground. Is that where that begins?

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): I'm sure if I can define that clearly. That's at three hours from notice, but I'm not sure we specified that.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): We recognize it, and we would get the release for a CONOP from (b)(3), (b)(6). At that point is when we say, Okay, now you have told us what the mission is, now the time.

10th CAB (b)(3), (b)(6): If I may, a couple questions that you asked me before, I will give you this order, and I can get it to in digits as well. This is the IJC order dated 30 November 2010. Which basically specifies some of the command and control relationships with regards to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a and our conventional forces. It also lays out the three-hour planning time constraint for us. It also covers the other question you asked about, the crews. It does not specify the 1.5 crew ratio. It just says, "associated crews" in the order.

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So it does lay those things out very clearly as a direct support relationship, as a three-hour planning time constraint. And that the number of aircraft and associated crews at specific locations. You are welcome to that. It's kind of marked up a little bit.

IO-DEP: Thanks. I haven't read it yet, but I was told about it.

BG Colt: Anybody else?

Negative response by all members.

BG Colt: I appreciate your time tremendously.

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