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interview of TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR, TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c U3, TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c U3 TF
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c SEA opened at 2045 Zulu, 19 August 2011, at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD:	BG Jeffrey N. Colt, US Army
GROUND FORCE ARMY ADVISOR	SME-GFA
GROUND FORCE NAVY 1 SME	SME-GFRN1
GROUND FORCE NAVY 2 SME	SME-GFRN2
COURT REPORTER:	CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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SME-GFA: If you could, gentlemen, just state your names for the record to get it on the machine here.

TF [redacted] **CDR:** I'm the [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] **TF** [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **CDR.**

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **J3:** [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] **TF** [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **J3**

TF [redacted] **SEA:** [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] **TF** [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **SEA.**

TM [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **J3:** [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] Team [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **J3.**

SME-GFA: My intent was to, kind of, drill in on the actual -- when you started considering employing the IRF, just talking about these as far as the planning process, course of action development, which you can my talk a little bit about too. And then, you know, my intent was to talk a little bit about the recovery efforts and all that just to make sure we go over all that ground.

So we have talked extensively yesterday with the red platoon about their LEFTY GROVE operations. So I'm not sure at exact what point you saw the squirters leave. I think it was during their infil; that seems to be the, kind of, logical point to pick-up the IRF planning process. So whoever could kick-off with that at that point, we can go ahead and jump in with questions.

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **CDR:** Yeah. I will tell that story. So we tracked the different groups of squirters. But there was one that

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congregated in that area. We figured out that was two clicks away from the objective area. And we were just starting to clear the objective and assess that 1 Bravo could not make it to go interdict those guys. And so we talked about who was it, potentially jackpot. Likely, at a minimum, the fighters associated with that network. We what thought what they might do. And one thing that they might do is they might move up on that finger. You can't see it on that graphic real well. But where they were clumped was a finger of, kind of, an open terrain that goes out, but there's a lot SIGACTs on that hill. So potentially, they would move up and set up that position over the valley.

And we felt pretty confident if they did that -- if they were armed, we could engage them. If they weren't we would have to maneuver on them, or they would just stay in that clump of trees. Either way, we assessed one way to get them was to insert a force to maneuver on those -- we started out with two. Now, anywhere between 8 and 13 were assessed to be MAMS in that grove.

SME-GFA: So they were still moving at this point?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4**CDR:** They are static at this point.

SME-GFA: But not inside the compound?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4**CDR:** Not inside the compound.

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SECRET

BG Colt: Did you see all that via (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Did any of the FMVs reflect a group that was that large? Where did the number begin to build from 2 to 8 to 13, and I have heard as big as 20?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** We got it mostly from the reports that come into the MIRC chat. We are not able to just -- the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c feeds aren't good enough. We don't get all the feeds to actually see individuals.

But it was -- as I remember the report, two originated and were picking up others as they were moving along the northwest.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Closer than when it came on the AC 130 about numbers. I never heard over 13. 8 to 13 was kind of, like, the flex number.

SME-GFA: That's the figure you are talking about right there?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yeah. Exactly. They were at that base of that.

SME-GFA: This is, I mean, approximately what time did they go, I guess, static at that finger?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** I don't remember what time we inserted. So I would say about an hour before they inserted.

SME-GFA: So 2100 Zulu, the squirters --

BG Colt: They went in at 2209.

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SME-GFA: -- entered the compound.

BG Colt: The aircraft that went down, went down at 2209.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** So around 2100 is when --

SME-GFA: Yeah. I mean, the special story board it says 2100 Zulu is when they stopped, entered the compound in the vicinity of grid..

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** There were multiple groups of squirts. There was a naming convention with them. It was 280 --

BG Colt: 280 Alpha --

SME-GFA: 280 Alpha and Bravo. I think there was a 1 Charlie, seven squirts or something like that. So IRF is watching this the whole time. They are starting to spin up --

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** So with every discussion we would say, like, Okay, so who do we think it is. I've seen the target enemy that got away. We really just kind of talked the idea of inserting the element to maneuver on them -- the enemy that got away.

BG Colt: No (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c at all at the time?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** In correlation -- in fact, it's (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c dry at around 1430 to 1500 Zulu because the towers had shut down. We didn't expect any, but we didn't get any.

SME-GFA: What are you -- just historical (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c collect, kind

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of, what you guys see up here?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** We haven't done much (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c collect at all. In fact --

SME-GFA: Do you guys get (b)(3), (b)(6) much?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Rarely.

SME-GFA: That was just a flex line you guys requested that day?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** We did. We asked for a lot, and we got a lot. So it was by exception to get (b)(3), (b)(6).

SME-GFA: Okay.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** So, really, the planning started with a small interdiction team. And then as we looked at the best tactical exfiles, they were really working on the planning, Okay, we understand where we have got to go, and come up with a good tactical plan to interdict the squirters. And then what makes the most sense for the tactical exfil. And that started with a 17-man element was the first chalk load. And then it turned into, Hey, the best bet is for us to be our independent maneuver element. We will move through wherever they go. If they go inside compounds, you know, we can do a call-out. So we had the full complement of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and then a plan to exfil later in the next day to remain over a day -- to be

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prepared to remain over a day. That was the expectation of their exfil.

SME-GFA: Okay. So the original option was an en route interdiction, so-to-speak, 17 pax roughly, and as they [inaudible] they go static, and that's when you go into the assault?

TF (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4c) **CDR:** No. They were static, and it was just whether we were going to do a 17-man element. The way I remember it, they were crunching the numbers that if they go small, they may be able to exfil completely with the 1 Bravo element. They go interdict the squirts, link up to 1 Bravo, move to exfil. And the 2 chalk loads exfil.

SME-GFA: I guess the 17 pax option was prior to squirts going static at a compound.

TF (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4c) **CDR:** All the planning was after they went static, not in the compound -- static in that treeline in a finger, but south of it. It was like at the base. It was a pretty big, wooded area. You could see a -- it was like a tower.

SME-GFA: I think that's what (b)(3), (b)(6) was looking at.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

nodded indicating an affirmative response.

SME-GFA: Okay. The COA to send -- to basically re-mission 1 Bravo from where they are at, and go get the guys was never,

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...not a good option, correct, based on distance?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** We assessed as they are not tactical feasible, they are moving too fast. And so I kept them as their priority was their objective.

SME-GFA: Okay. Historically just from the enemy COA standpoint, is your experience up here is, you are getting jackpots on the squirter? Does that make sense?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yes. We haven't had a lot of jackpots in this area because we're doing a lot of NAI clearance. Only in one area have I found where the squirter have been, like, farmers and stuff. And it's definitely not in this area. It's way up in northern Laghman.

We felt confident that those were -- if not the jackpot, it was clearly those associates that we had flushed out of the 10 series on infil.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** We did get jackpot on a squirter last night in Nangarhar.

SME-GFA: All right. Continue on.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** So once we had that tactical plan, there was some planning going on with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c element. So we are C2'ing the operations. And the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c were engaged in the discussion. And they delegated out planning.

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And, really, the next piece I remember was waiting for [sic] was HLZ approval for [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c], which historically has been our biggest limitation, to flex to an NAI.

SME-GFA: Are we at the point where they are static at the compound and wanted a compound assault?

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] CDR: Yes. We were -- I'm tracking that there was 18 to 13 in that wooded area. I know the story board had -- but just, you know, what I was tracking, in that wooded area there was 8 to 13.

I knew some squirters had gone into compounds. But we were tracking 8 to 13 in that wooded area.

SME-GFA: Maybe. I'm a little confused. The IRF mission was to go and assault the compound or the wooded area?

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] CDR: The wooded area, 8 to 13, just to maneuver on those guys that were there.

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] SEA: It was more to go interdict the squirters, and be prepared to go to a compound --

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] CDR: We would pursue them there to do a call-out. That's why we had the whole [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] and we had an interpreter.

SME-GFA: Okay. For some reason I was tracking you are in the compound at this point, and that's where the assault is going to take place.

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** So then the decision came. So LZ was approved.

We looked at our timeline, is when we really got to the discussion of, Hey, does it make sense; do we have enough time to do this while the sun is still down. And we assessed, yes. And we planned to be prepared to do a daylight exfil.

They worked the Fires coordination with their Uniform. And we did one last huddle, and talked everybody -- the 3, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Think some team leaders were in there by then, and to get approval for the insert.

SME-GFA: Were air planners in there during that planning?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** No. I don't know where they -- were the planners in here in the planning area?

TM(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** I think they were still back at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

We initially first started setting up, the planner I was working with that night was (b)(6), (b)(3) and just gave him the heads up that we were discussing, [inaudible] IRF, QRF. I think that's where he initiated the process of just getting it approved, figuring out, you know, what HLZs are around there that we will work with.

But, really, I was just a part of that initial process being the recce element. I got on the horn with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and started working the issues.

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SECRET

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** I mean, and that's how we worked a mission last night. In fact, we changed the exfil HLZ, and it was the same way. We want to push the exfil HLZ out west because we have got an engagement on infil, and we worked it, kind of, the same way, call-out, they keep action on it, the grid for HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We are good.

SME-GFA: Normal deliberate op planning process, the pilots come over here or wherever, and just -- does (b)(3), (b)(6) come over, or he stays back at the aircraft?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** He usually stays back in the planning area, and two pilots would come over. It's usually, you know, two or three of the same guys that are very accustomed coming over here and working the HLZs. We have sniper elements for the rangers --

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** It's accurate to say that they found -- the HLZ they found was preplanned from before. So --

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** The one --

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** -- probably didn't go through the full cycle. They looked in the area found it solid. I mean, I was surprised it actually happened because the troop was in there planning, you know, under the contingency that they found an HLZ, which was, generally speaking, slim. That's, gonna kind of, of happen. When they popped up, it was actually really surprising because

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they had looked there before.

SME-GFA: I guess other infil courses of action, they look in and do an offset, just walk in [inaudible] --

TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J2:** Actually. I wasn't in the middle of the conversation as far as how they were doing the HLZ planning.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Now, when you look in that area there isn't much that is close by.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Their exfil which is on the other HLZ, I think, to get them in there, it was four kilometers over the ridgeline, which they were going to use to get out during the daylight. Because once you go over that ridgeline you are pretty low-risk. That would be the only one to get into besides this one.

SME-GFA: 4k is the closest.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Correct. 4k over the ridge.

Court reporter: Gentlemen, I'm sorry. I just need you guys to speak up a little bit more please. I'm trying to capture this. Thank you.

SME-GFA: At this point, 1 Bravo had been on the ground, I'm tracking, three-plus hours, you know, the bird is overhead and all that. How did that kind of affect the risk assessment process here.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** So they [1/B] came in from the south. We were

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guarded about coming in from the same direction where we had infilled, patrolled and had made contact. So it was a deliberate decision to look to the opposite side of where the squirters were. We were coming in from the west. So we saw that as the enemy focused more towards our call -- by now, we were -- you know, the target had developed. They knew we were had an engagement, and we assessed the enemy actually would likely be looking towards -- if they are going to make an engagement, looking towards our 1 Bravo element. So that this newer element will be coming from the opposite direction -- the opposite side of where they are currently engaged.

SME-GFA: How far was (b)(1)1.4a from --

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was 700 meters to the west of where the squirters were. And the objective was two kilometers to the east of where the squirter location was.

SME-GFA: What is the actual (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CONOP approving process for a follow-on target? Do you know what they fall under?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yes. So as far as commitment, the QRF got -- I see that as, my decision to commit the QRF on a pre-planned op, knowing that this wasn't exactly a QRF situation, meaning, like, they were not in a fight that -- they weren't coming to the aide of the ground element who were, you know, maneuver on --

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SECRET

You know, I made a phone call to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Commander. I told him what we were thinking about. I said we will do some planning. And then I called him back when we decided to go in.

SME-GFA: Any concerns coming back from him?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** I don't remember the discussion exactly.

What I talked through was -- my intent was to maneuver on these guys and then get away, or we've got the opportunity to maneuver on these guys, I assessed they were bad guys. And I didn't lay out the risk that I knew, you know, in the valley to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Commander.

SME-GFA: When is the last time you did an op in this valley?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Kind of, in that green zone, was just the day before. But in the valley, it was about two weeks before when we did a long offset, a dry hole, very near where, actually, the squirters were. We had -- and I'll have to -- I can get the date --

SME-GFA: That was the one that was, kind of, south of the green zone there? It's outside of the --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** The day before was south of the green zone. Two weeks before was just north of the green zone, about where the squirters were. And we infilled from the north on a long offset, got there, dry hole on the south person, very uneventful

SECRET

SECRET

[sic].

BG Colt: How did you exfil from that one?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** It was an offset infil and exfil.

SME-GFA: So what was the exfil plan for this follow-on?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** There's an LZ -- I don't know exactly where it is. It's outside of the green zone to the southeast. They were going to foot patrol out.

So their exfil -- for this squirter team, they were planning on doing a daylight exfil out around here.

The LEFTY GROVE exfil was in the green zone.

BG Colt: Is there some reason, for instance, you guys wouldn't consider going back to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c the exfil?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Remind me of which one that was.

BG Colt: That's where 1 Bravo was going to go out --

SME-GFA: It's roughly down in here, 600 meters, I believe from LEFTY GROVE.

BG Colt: Did you ever consider -- and again, just securing (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c until after-actions on with the squirter element, and then doing one exfil? I mean, we could have picked it up in one lift at that point.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Well, if they had finished early, we might have considered that. We expected this just to go longer because they

SECRET

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brought the whole force. And so their plan was exfil them, exfil 1 Bravo out of [REDACTED] and then they would just keep patrolling out and not stay static. That was their initial thought.

Did I get that about right?

TE [REDACTED] J3: Yeah. The assumption was 1 Bravo would stay on their timeline, exfil there at night. But them going in at 2200 was going to be daylight exfil for sure. So they didn't want to go anywhere in the green zone, daylight.

SME-GFA: You are talking probably a daylight move from squirter location, down to the southern HLZ by the follow-on force.

TE [REDACTED] CDR: Yeah.

SME-GFA: You said the other operation you did, you infilled from the north -- 4k to the north, correct?

TE [REDACTED] CDR: We did. Those LZs were, you know, expired. And I think it might have been -- I don't remember if it was the MATH or not, but it might have been 15 clicks out.

SME-GFA: So there wasn't --

TE [REDACTED] CDR: This was current. This LZ was current for --

SME-GFA: So it was --

TE [REDACTED] CDR: -- what we just planned.

SME-GFA: How long does it take to get an HLZ approved by --

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SECRET

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **J3:** At least three hours, but sometimes days.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **CDR:** HLZ approval process is our limitation challenge.

SME-GFA: And that's the 1st CAB guys -- 10th CAB?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **CDR:** Um-hmm. We were able to pull down, like, wide hour imagery, like real high-def. imagery and go through and -- my understanding is they were using like a 15-meter imagery up there to approve or disapprove the LZs.

But we understood that that's the process. So we would submit a bunch and prioritize which ones to seek for approval because they wouldn't approve, like, our whole list of antenna LZs around target.

SME-GFA: Okay. Do you think it's because they don't have good imagery or --

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **CDR:** Well, I mean, because it's a, you know -- it's a stove pipe. Every night, the Colonel has got to approve something; they've got to plan and brief.

So the more options we look for in HLZs, the slower the process. And then we -- you know, so we have to straighten the balance of being able to spend time on the ground, not infilling too late and having an HLZ.

SME-GFA: Okay. For the infil, did you guys consider, I

SECRET

SECRET

guess, containment or even pre-assault fires? There was some talk yesterday about somebody talking about pre-assault fires to support that infil. Did you guys think about that?

TF [redacted] **CDR:** We didn't talk about that at all. We had a lot overhead. We didn't talk about any pre-assault fires.

SME-GFA: Just -- I'm backing up a little bit. From the TF [redacted] perspective, how do you break it down, Team [redacted] Team [redacted] mission sets?

TF [redacted] **CDR:** We don't at TF [redacted] I delegate it to Team [redacted] Team [redacted]

TM [redacted] **J2:** Typically it would just be the Lieutenant Commander would make the call -- either earlier in the day where a lot of our targets tended to be. I can mention that [redacted] of fidelity, tended to drop off around 1430 or 1500 Zulu, and then proceed to an [redacted] that, you know, stop my multiple compounds and return to the, you know, 3, 4, 5 and NAI clearances and what not.

So [redacted] mentioned the other day, a lot of our ops are actually 2 [redacted] and 1 Bravo going out together as a large force to be able to support, you know, clearing multiple NAIs.

This particular one, I think, it was just a call earlier in the day where [redacted] would say, Hey, if this target pans

SECRET

SECRET

out, 1 Bravo, you guys have it. And that was our, you know, team leader meeting when we came in earlier on in the day 1300 Zulu. We didn't even have a final target yet.

SME-GFA: So not based on LEFTY GROVE as a red target. It was --

TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J2:** There weren't assigned targets to either team. It was just more of a -- I don't know -- just a call on (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) part.

SME-GFA: Once the helo is down, if you would just, kind of, walk me through the recovery effort portion.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** The JOC went into the, you know, CSAR contingency, everyone is in the JOC. But everyone down on the floor -- our initial assessment was to figure out what aircraft went down, and then to find out if it was the aircraft with the passengers on it, and if it went down before or after infil. So that took us about -- it probably wasn't all that long. It was probably about 10 minutes.

BG Colt: Could you monitor the AHs from here on the Fires net?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** I'm not -- our Fires guy might have been monitoring them. I'm not sure.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** He was the first -- our Fires guy is the first

SECRET

SECRET

one that told us that, you know, you've got an Angel down. When we saw it, I just remember saying -- we seen the big burn, it looks like a helo is down. And then he called it. They made the radio call -- or it was on -- I think it was with that Fires network or if it's the TAC SAT, one of those two.

BG Colt: What was your SA on what your sensors were looking at, at like H minus 3? What was the AC looking at?

TF (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c) **J3:** A treeline of squirters, in that general area.

BG Colt: Okay. And what was (b)(3), (b)(6) looking at?

TF (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c) **J3:** I don't recall.

BG Colt: What was (b)(3), (b)(6) looking at?

TF (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c) **J3:** One of on them was still on 1 Bravo's target. I don't remember which one was which. So we had the 1 Bravo coverage; we had the squirter coverage. I think another one was panning around, which included looking at the HLZ, but it focused on it for the landing necessarily.

TF (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c) **SEA:** I remember the -- I don't remember which platform it was it, but it was scanning the HLZ area because I was, kind of, keying in on that where I could find location. And I was seeing no movement. And it was on that area when the helo -- I think a little bit to the east of that, is when the helo went down. But I did not see the helo get hit.

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BG Colt: What do you think the AWT's primary tasking purpose was at H hour?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Escorting the helos.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yeah. Escort the helos for a safe infil.

BG Colt: Okay. When we left the AHs -- I'm just going to give you the feedback. The AH guys they really thought that their primary task was continuing to monitor these guys in the vicinity of 280 Alpha and Bravo. That's where their focus was. And as far as the amount of attention that they paid to HLZ (b)(1)1.4a and the infill route, it was a secondary task to them. So all I'm trying to do is paint a picture for you. But I think that there were at least three sensors in the AWT who were focused on this same event, meaning, the threat, the squirter group and nothing else. That's my SA.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** I don't know -- I wouldn't be sure why they would do that because we didn't yet have our blue JTAC on the ground. But the CCT wasn't there yet to direct to do that. But it might have just been their gut instinct -- that was the biggest threat to go there, but I don't think they were directed to do that.

SME-GFA: Correct me if I'm wrong, sir. But that's what he indicated was exactly that, that he sensed his biggest threat

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from the 13 dudes in the wood-line, and that's what I remember hearing.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **SEA:** I don't know what their priorities were. I remember that the helos were delayed -- 47s delayed taking off. I remember specifically being told this because they were waiting on AWT to refuel.

And the reason was it was SOP for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c for AWT to cover the infil, you know, when the troops were going in. So in my mind, I went, Okay, we have AWT to cover the infil. And that is what I thought they were thinking.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yeah. They can't even take off, off the FOB here without an escort at night. We have asked for a waiver before, but it was -- you know, this wasn't one we really considered a waiver for.

SME-GFA: Yeah. I mean, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c commander said it's their policy that AWT cover infils and exfils.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **SEA:** But I did not talk to them directly. But that was what I was told, and that (b)(3), (b)(6) was overhead covering the infil also.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** I guess the one UAV I do remember -- I don't remember which one it was -- it was looking at that tower in that area where the squirters were.

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We were trying to figure out, like, Hey, call the OCG [Afghan Advisors to (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4c) JOC], like, what could that tower be. I don't think we got a --

TE (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4c) J3: We did get an answer, yeah. It was for hanging whatever crop or orchard or whatever it was, they dry the food out there.

SME-GFA: All right.

BG Colt: I think the AC had to have at least one sensor on the HLZ because they had -- you know, they confirmed he was burning it.

TE (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4c) SEA: Sir, I specifically remember going and I'm pointing with this green, XO was there. I go, "That's the HLZ," he said, yes. And they were scanning the area. And I was like, it looks pretty quiet. We got the three-minute call, and then they were just -- six minutes later, I was going, What's up with the infil, did they go in already.

SME-GFA: I know we were told the AC 130 cleared the HLZ at some point. But I don't know if they kept a sensor on it or not. I think it's in the sensor plan.

TE (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4c) CDR: I'm not sure if they can burn without the sensors on what they are burning. We can ask that from (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

when we get back.

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SME-GFA: At what point does -- do you remission 1 Bravo to start moving?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** It was soon after we knew that there was a crash, and once we got COMMs with them. They were finishing up SSE. So they had their split element. One element doing SSE. And I think about five kilometers west. And they you had -- they were cleaning up the target. They had already gone follow -- two follow-on targets.

I left and looked in the JOC log for the exact time, but it was -- when they came up on COMMS, once we realized it was a crash, they said, Hey, your mission is to go secure the crash site. And they asked, you know, What do we do with the detainees. We said release, it's the end of that mission -- task is the crash site [sic].

BG Colt: Did the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TOC have any capacity to C2 their own op at that point?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** I had not given them any -- I haven't delegated any of that C2 in there. So I have not manned them to C2 any operations.

BG Colt: Okay.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** They are target development op center.

BG Colt: Okay.

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SME-GFA: So Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is out of your C2; and Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is out of your C2 and they are both out --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: We C2, you know, vehicle movements for the HAT teams. C2 is here at TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-GFA: The -- did you -- for the TF Pathfinders response and all that, did they call over to you to inform you of that or vice versa?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Well, I mean, this is at, you know, like -- you know, the phones are obviously just ringing off the hook. And we are trying to figure it out. I've talked with (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) I'm uncomfortable putting another aircraft in there. My initial assessment is that it just burned in, and there are no survivors.

I didn't want to assume risk to go save somebody because I don't think anyone was there to save. So that was the discussion and thought process that we had. And (b)(3), (b)(6) called. And, you know, we talked about the pros and cons. And I knew that we were running against the sun coming up. So if we were going to insert them, now is the time to insert them.

And considering that they were Blackhawks, that there was a ground element moving there, we came to the agreement, and I approved and inserted the Pathfinder Team knowing they were going

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to lash up with our element and 1 Bravo still being the ground commander.

SME-GFA: I was a little confused earlier. Who's decision is that commit those guys? I mean, who's --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: I took it as my decision. That's my battle space. Those aren't my forces. I hadn't requested them. He was offering them, and then I said, yes.

BG Colt: Release of the Pathfinder element was a CJTF 10 commander authority. He could tell them to go release him to the employment of C2 node. In that particular case, I get the impression that (b)(3), (b)(6) thought that he was providing you an asset, and it was a mutual agreement. But, ultimately, yours to make whether they were going to infil them or not.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: That's how I understood it. We didn't say it in those words, but that's how I understood it. And I'm confident. If I said, No, I don't want to put them down, that he would have supported. It would have been --

SME-GFA: This is you talking to --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: This is me talking to (b)(3), (b)(6)

BG Colt: And at no time did (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c weigh in on that?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Well, I was really talking to (b)(3), (b)(6)

and talking (b)(3), (b)(6) (ph). I sought his counsel and,

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kind of, talked to my decision-making and make sure I wasn't missing anything, any blind spots.

BG Colt: What we do need to do is ensure -- to see if there was any CJTF 10 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c discussion, I think.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J3: (b)(3), (b)(6) called directly here, and I think you were on the phone with somebody else. But he said that it was our decision, or he's laying it in our hands -- (b)(3), (b)(6) hands. So he just backed that decision up.

SME-GFA: Okay. So the Pathfinders go in. 1 Bravo has already secured the crash site --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Yeah. They hadn't secured the crash site, but they were close. And so they had gotten to a point where they weren't even near the HLZ. So they kept on, and made sure that they weren't going to land on 1 Bravo, which we confirmed later 1 Bravo was --

BG Colt: Which is an interesting question. Do you know that (b)(3), (b)(6) authorized them to fire containment fires on infil?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: No, sir.

BG Colt: And they did.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Sir, I didn't know that.

BG Colt: Okay.

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** So we had two options with the force on the ground: We were going to tell them to stand fast, or we were going to --

SME-GFA: I'm sorry to break in. I mean, that's why I asked that question about clearing the fires and all that stuff. But normally it wouldn't come back -- I mean, correct me if I'm wrong, but --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** When say that. You know, I don't remember having that discussion.

BG Colt: What I believe, they required in order to shoot anything on the ground at that point was: They had to have talked to --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** (b)(3), (b)(6).

BG Colt: -- (b)(3), (b)(6), and have the JTAC clear them to just ensure that there was no way they could frag one of their own guys shooting it. And they claimed he did.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** We do de-conflict -- I was, all the time, de-conflicting where 1 Bravo getting ready for their HLZ. So I mean, while I did not hear that they did that, but the distance was -- I mean, there was a little over 500 meters -- 600 meters away.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yeah. I guess if (b)(3), (b)(6) --

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TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1) **CDR:** If (b)(3), (b)(6) knew, then we were good.

SME-GFA: Yeah. I understand (b)(3), (b)(6) was the guy on the ground clearing those fires. That's what I understood from --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **CDR:** They were doing a lot of fires.

SME-GFA: All right. I guess --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **CDR:** Yeah --

SME-GFA: -- it just kind of brings up questions
[inaudible] --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **CDR:** -- and [inaudible] with (b)(3), (b)(6) there. AWT talks to (b)(3), (b)(6) and says they're going to do pre-assault fires. He clears them hot; that's good business practice to me.

SME-GFA: Yeah.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **CDR:** Okay. So then, yeah, next is -- so they move to secure the site. I think we got an initial report where they called six friendly KIA. Soon after, the (b)(3), (b)(6) element links up with them. And we were just getting, like, little reports on -- the crash site is secure.

There was a very intense fire. They were talking about they can't get close to get a sense of what's going on down there because the fire is so intense. We had an updated number of, I think, up to eight or nine that they found from the KIA. And then it's, really -- we go through some hours. They are

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securing the site, or just expanding, getting in better secure positions and letting the fire die down. And in that time, we are working with (b)(3), (b)(6) to establish a ground line of communications for a recovery op.

We knew early on -- this was just a discussion with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) that an air exfil wasn't going to be our primary plan. And so they started to piece together a ground element. And we knew it was going to take a while because they had to do the, you know, ground clearance control.

That was, you know, from sun-up -- you know, 0100 Zulu until about 1000 Zulu when it was mostly just getting a periodic update, a sense of how secure the area was, and updates on that route clearance patrol. And that's when (b)(3), (b)(6) and I were working out the details of, you know, from 80 to 85 grid lines; that's my battle space.

He's moving from the east to the west. And then, you know, we were talking every 20 or 30 minutes just as the plan started coming together of who was coming in, what they were bringing.

SME-GFA: What's your discussions with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a at this point whenever they were doing some resupply missions and stuff like that?

TE(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a **CDR:** Yeah. Early on, it was, you know, how are we

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going to work these logistics. And we got guidance early that the mission was going to be to recover every scrap out of there. They were working a lot on, I think, you know, their 3 and 2 challenge, keeping Fires and [redacted] assets overhead. Really, my discussions were primarily that ground line of communications, when the turnover will be to, you know, their lead effort. And then working out the plans of, you know, what we were going to continue to support.

You know, we just had the resources to do those air drops. So we spent a lot energy on that air resupply, like the batteries we needed, and we started looking at, you know, what we were going to do that period of darkness.

SME-GFA: So my understanding was when, like, I think, it was [redacted] shows up, the recovery effort is technically turned over to him?

TE [redacted] CDR: Yeah. And, you know, the main focus was to recover all the Eagles. And then, so, you know, we probably went through, you know, 30 plans on how that was going to transpire.

TE [redacted] J3: And, sir, I would say the recovery wasn't really turned over to him until they returned the second time. When 1 Bravo was on the ground, they showed up and took the Eagles off and left.

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1 Bravo stayed. We pulled them out with (b)(3), (b)(6), and Pathfinders had remained. And then the next day when (b)(3), (b)(6) showed up again to stay, really, that's when it, sort of, became, like, Okay, this is a BSO operation, and (b)(3), (b)(6), I would say, really handed the site over to them.

SME-GFA: When (b)(3), (b)(6) showed up, exfilled the remains, what did they leave on the ground? Security up on the high ground or --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b J3: They had the OPs up. But, like, on the crash site, the whole convoy went back.

SME-GFA: But they left some guys on ground?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b J3: No. They had Pathfinders at 1 Bravo. And then they OPs setting up by the time, and starting to be set up along the ridgelines, but --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b CDR: It was, kind of, whoever was inside the MRAP --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b J3: Yeah -- back --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b CDR: -- stayed. Like, whoever was in the passenger compartment, I should say. And they had to stay because those were now where all the Eagles were. It wasn't too many. So that was part of our discussion. It was like, Hey, can they stay there -- Can the platoon stay out there, we just need the security.

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BG Colt: Who was the source provider for [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]? Who owned those guys? You did?

TF [redacted (1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] CDR: Yeah. So we had the discussion, and the 3 was working it -- [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] was working it mostly. But do we extend 1 Bravo, or do we develop a plan to insert another force, and how are we going to do that --

BG Colt: Ultimately, you are using an ARSOA airplane that you owned from [redacted (1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] brought [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] in. They foot march into a relief in-place. 1 Bravo foot-marches out to a PZ, and then is back hauled to here?

TF [redacted (1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] CDR: Yes, sir, exactly. Going back to the day. So 1 Bravo is on the deck. It's three hours into daylight. And the discussions we're having a lot is could there be any survivors. So [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] actually came up with this analysis of where they think it was shot down, and then the flight path into the crash site. And so you go back into this area, where could have -- someone -- on impact, someone was thrown from the aircraft, then we could search the ground area. So we actually gave the coordinates and everything to 1 Bravo for a task to do a sweep.

BG Colt: He does his own reconnaissance and finds nothing

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new, correct?

TE (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1) **CDR:** He did do that. And this was before (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) had gotten there. So they were, kind of, still in the security mode. But then they came back, and said they had accountability of 38 Eagles.

And then, you know, we went back later, and was just, kind of, like, said how did you get that. I mean, it was, kind of, like, these uncomfortable conversations on the radio. But I will say a big thing on my mind was that I was worried we would never find everybody. Like, I wouldn't be able to go to the notification process at home, and confirm that all 38 had been killed.

But he was confident. And the discussion came back, it was 38 torsos. It really, kind of, you know -- in later discussions it was, kind of, at least C-spines.

A piece that I missed was ARSOA package with CSAR and the

(b)(3), (b)(6) -- the (b)(3), (b)(6) came out of Sharana. So around the same time we were debating about putting in the CSAR element -- excuse me -- the Pathfinder element, we also have an additional ground force with our CSAR element. And we considered infilling them in green zone.

By then, the sun started coming up, then we started to look at an offset and, ultimately, elected not to put more forces on the

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ground. We didn't know how long we were going to be there, and didn't know -- just the more forces we committed in there, the more forces, we were going to have to get out there, there more cycles of helos to get them out.

BG Colt: How did those guys ultimately get there -- the green EOD guys and the CSAR guys?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** So, I guess, you know, around 0400 Zulu or so -- probably earlier than that. We actually sent the package back to Sharana. You know, it was 15-minute flight. They would go back and reset, and be ready to --

BG Colt: Which package?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** This is ARSOA, (b)(3), (b)(6) and the CSAR package that's based out of Sharana --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CSAR stayed, but --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Right. The CSAR stayed. They are --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** EOD was --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** -- Summit CSAR element stayed just in Sharana. They all pushed up to here after the crash.

SME-GFA: So the (b)(3), (b)(6) and Sharana actually got in the aircraft, and were burning the infil?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yeah. They were in the TOC doing planning with the 3.

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SME-GFA: Oh, they came here?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

nodded indicating an affirmative response.

SME-GFA: This is what time? 0400-ish?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** No. This was, you know --

TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J2:** They were here probably about midnight Zulu, maybe a little bit after.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Yeah. Within a few hours of --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** So they were in the mix as we were considering infilling the Pathfinder element.

SME-GFA: So this is -- I mean, 1 Bravo had just arrived at the crash site?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Yeah.

BG Colt: Who owns those guys?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** It's Task Force Central, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Okay. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c pushed them to you? Did you ask for them, or they just showed up there?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** We asked for the CSAR package, and they came along as a security force for them. And then what we did to insert the CSAR right away, they end up going back -- we knew we could call them back. It's a 15-minute flight. And then, obviously, we ended up putting them in with (b)(3), (b)(6), the CSAR package. And they picked up the (b)(3), (b)(6) also in Sharana.

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BG Colt: And when did they do that? The night of the 6th?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J3: The next night, yes, sir.

SME-GFA: So the (b)(3), (b)(6) went in with (b)(3), (b)(6)?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Yeah. It was a pretty complicated air movement around. J3 was jockeying because we knew we needed expertise to help break up the helicopter for recovery. So that's where we got the (b)(3), (b)(6) coming out of Sharana to meet up here. But we had weather challenges, so they got diverted and then delayed. Ultimately, he made -- the EOD guy made it here to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c by a C130. That was the secondary plan. We struggled with weather getting 47s from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c FO here as well. And, ultimately, the ARSOA package that was based out at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c flew here to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c went to COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to recover all the Eagles, bring them back here to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c And then load up the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) platoon, which they had brought here earlier. The (b)(3), (b)(6) got off, went and picked up the remains. They came back, then (b)(3), (b)(6) got on, plus the EOD guy that had been flown in fixed-wing, from Sharana, plus the CSAR team, which was here from the night before, all got on. And did an offset infill to the crash site, and then -- just like you said.

BG Colt: Night of the 6th, they foot march in. They relieve 1 Bravo. 1 Bravo walks out, and they pick em up and bring

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him back?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yes, sir.

SME-GFA: (b)(3), (b)(6) stays on the ground until mission complete?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** They got extended twice. So it was supposed to be 24-hour mission, and it turned into 72 hours.

SME-GFA: At the end of the day, the guy is saying, hey, we are done here, was (b)(3), (b)(6)

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yes, it was.

BG Colt: How did all of those pax get out ultimately?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **US3:** To get (b)(3), (b)(6) CSAR, EOD and all 20 Pathfinders, ARSOA, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c came back down, did two turns that same HLZ and loaded everybody up, and then returned to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c with (b)(3), (b)(6).

SME-GFA: Again, backing up. The entire assault force on one helo, does that raise any red flags?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Actually, we didn't know about it. It makes sense to us. When we hear afterwards that they could only cycle in one helicopter to HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c at the time. It's a common practice for us, and I suspect others to reduce exposure to the helicopters by only one going into that same LZ --

SME-GFA: Yeah. I'm not making any -- just, kind of, the reasons behind it --

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TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yes, sir. After the crash, they were trying to figure out who was on the helo. And we actually sent a, you know, bus out to the EXTORTION that came back and then here at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c just to confirm them.

SME-GFA: What actual product -- did any product go to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c prior to those guys wheels-up?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** (b)(3), (b)(6) had the chalk load, and then he had held it. I didn't ask for it. And then when it went it down, I got it right away. But the one thing that wasn't clear about which EXTORTION they were actually on was that -- I knew they were all on one helo, but it wasn't clear if it was (b)(3), (b)(6). Obviously, we didn't see to get which one they got on. So there's a little bit of confusion there.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yeah. The radio calls always say EXTORTION (b)(3), (b)(6) that support us. It's 17 I think because --

BG Colt: It is (b)(3), (b)(6) 17 went down. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the wingman. And that's a function of the ACO, and the way their tail numbers align with the squawks that they have to do. So it's dedicated to -- but based on the airframes, they were physically flying, that's what gave them their --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** I see.

SME-GFA: Anything else, sir?

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BG Colt: It sounds to me like [redacted] pretty much, was the deciding factor on a single-ship infil. If this headquarters never knew it -- I shouldn't say that. The discussion was between [redacted] and probably the troop commander.

TF [redacted] CDR: We have learned to operate, you know, in the limitations of the approval process, special operations, our tasks in the process for a lot of the LZ stuff becomes challenging. I would say it took us a solid three weeks to figure out, you know, how to plan, how to prioritize, you know, how early to set our DPs. So a lot of those discussions were happening between the troop commander and the lead planner.

And knowing that the lead planner, and we understand, didn't make a lot of decisions. He packaged it up, set up for 0-5s and 0-6s in Bagram to approve or disapprove. Once they get that, then the clock starts on how much time they need to brief their pilots.

SME-GFA: What's your comfort level of flying with these guys? Is there any friction points, or issues that come to mind besides just the normal three-hour timeline, and trying to get out the door quickly and they can't do it still?

TF [redacted] CDR: I would say, you know, we train in everything always with ARSOA. So comfort level is low because they don't

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fly like ARSOA -- They don't plan like ARSOA. They don't land like ARSOA. They will either, you know, kind of, do a runway landing. Or if it's a different crew that trains different areas, they will do the pinnacle landing. So we are starting to understand different crews landed differently and needed different set ups for exfils and pick-ups.

TE(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **SEA:** It was a popular topic of discussion.

TE(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** It's tough. I mean, and I gave them guidance to make it work. And they were making it work. But it limited our effectiveness. It made our options and our tactical flexibility [sic].

Our agility was clearly limited by our air platform infil -- where we could go. How quickly we could get there. So when I talk about it, I briefed the boss and he knew it that, Hey, we're missing the enemy sometimes because we just can't get there. We can't adapt fast enough.

We will see what we think is the target, then a vehicle follow and move, and we just can't get an LZ approved there. And then instead of -- and it usually became my decision whether to infil real late and then, you know, we are going to accelerate our escalation of force. And then we start taking risk there. And often, I wouldn't go in preplanned to have a compressed

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time-line where we have to compress our escalation of force and, you know, risk something happening or the thing could blow back.

SME-GFA: Did you see the same crews for your missions for the most part?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Actually, I would say there's solidly, at least four different crews that I know of --

TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J2:** We don't have the same full crews for some others that were here. Maybe a week prior to this mission, the Hawaii crew, I think, ripped out. And I believe it was the Colorado crew came in. So there was at least one new crew. But other than that --

SME-GFA: As far as the pilot showing up for your planning, meetings, same guys?

TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J2:** Typically the guys that came over here for planning were the same --

SME-GFA: They were the guys flying for you on that mission, correct, for the most part?

TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J2:** I don't know for this particular night, the pilots that came over that night. I don't know the answer to that.

SME-GFA: Who's is it -- as far as ARSOA asset allocation, is it (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that says Thunder Package was at Jalalabad or was that

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you?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** No, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-GFA: What's that based on? Terrain?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** I'm not sure --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Maintenance package that were --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** -- yeah. I mean, it's the trail of tears when you ask -- because there's some things that we want as far as, okay, if you are going give us direct support and ARSOA, where it gets positioned is just like the J3 said it. They've got to accommodate what the CAB can provide. And a lot of it has to do with the models and their compatible logistics packages, maintenance packages and stuff like that.

SME-GFA: That's a brown maintenance package at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** It is. They move that --

SME-GFA: They don't tack it to the --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** -- the route can move them back and forth. But I mean, I would recommend asking JSOAD. They are intimately familiar. We are going through it right now.

SME-GFA: I'm just curious because they moved the thunder package from north down to Sharana as we rolled in last year. I still don't really understand the reasons behind that.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yeah. We got our input. We explained the

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costs of, you know, and that's what we're going through right now.

SME-GFA: Is there a different target set down at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c as far as SI dropping in and sending them, you know --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: It is a different target set -- I mean, different terrain. Both places, you know, we're going -- at least for Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, you are going to have more opportunities to get after the enemy with ARSOA than you have with direct support.

You know, we wanted just a background. Big Apple had a G-model in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c when -- before when they had ARSOA in direct support here. But they just couldn't support keeping Big Apple and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and keeping ARSOA here just because of the logistics footprint of it.

I don't understand the shuffle, but people are well-aware of the decision. They talk about it. it was very deliberate -- I think they nash over what the --

SME-GFA: Yeah. I mean, I understand. There's only so many people around you.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: But the bottom line is their comfort level is low. If we don't train with conventional helos, we learn to plan with conventional helos here. They brief us in on the process.

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It's very different than any SOF process that we've been in. Because it's not a SOF process. It's conventional planning to a SOF mission. I think we figured it out pretty well for our timelines.

SME-GFA: Are they flexible at all on the end part or to help move improve the processes, or is it --

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** I would say kind of help us to change the process. You know, a planner to planner, you know, a great American just like everyone in this room is willing to ask for a lot of things. But, you know, clearly the brief I got over at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was, you know, an apology upfront for the process we have to go through -- Now, here's what we've got to do, and here's let's backward plan on how to get you out the door in time with the constraints of the planning process.

I don't know enough about the conventional air to question the process too much. I always, you know, kind of stole the phrase, but it was good pushing the envelope on the planning timeline or whatnot. You know, any time they came up with a redline, I wasn't willing to cross the redline because I just didn't know what it was. There's probably a reason there was a redline.

SME-GFA: Yeah. I'm sure there is. It sounds like our experience up north. I mean, they are -- like you said great

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Americans and whatnot, but we couldn't get out the door that fast.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Any other comments on that?

SME-GFA: It sounds very similar to my experience. We got -- pretty much, had the same crews every night, which was good. You know, they would show up at Tm (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c at 1300 Zulu, and they would stay there out there all night long. So it was a good relationship. And we were co-located with the CAB commander. So he was 200 meters from my JOC. So I could walk over and talk to him very easily. So it was good. Totally different.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** I understand the Delta Model is the least capable model compared to, like, the Golf Model.

BG Colt: As far as power and performance more capable for picking things up, more restricted as far as radios, no rover feed, that's the real difference. It has more capacity to lift. It's lighter, same engine, but --

SME-GFA: That's it, sir.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **SEA:** I would say the normal concerns about flying with them was there. I think we've had on every op over here. But there was really no undue stress or concern outside of what we normally do in this operation.

0-1 [TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR]** and I discussed it. He called me up, you know,

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and told me what was going on. And I talked about it, and we both agreed that, you know, it was not unfeasible. It was nothing, I would -- you know, crazy or way out of the ordinary. And, you know, we were comfortable with it.

I, you know -- like I said, I tried to watch the HLZ area as much as I thought I was, and wasn't seeing anything. As always, I'm concerned about the, you know, the infils and extracts with these guys and watching them, and have gone on some of them. But I wasn't -- there was no feeling at any time that, Hey, we are stepping way out the box here.

SME-GFA: Have you employed IRF often, or it's --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** No we haven't. I can't think -- we talked a couple times about it, like, briefly we talked about it. We had movers up high. It was just too late ---

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c target but --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yep. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c target --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** -- just BLUE IRF again --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** -- SIMRON (ph). We talked about their --

BG Colt: Would you say that you approached the IRF infil more from a deliberate standpoint than they did knowing that the operators that were going to go execute it and the C2 node were all located here, and in their particular case, from air

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perspective, you had continuity of the planner. But all the other participants were out operating.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yes.

BG Colt: It became -- I don't want say in-extremis, but it became a compressed event for them based on them being in continuous execution. Is that the way you characterize it?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yes, sir. It was -- they were back here so they were static. But were fraggged with a new HLZ, you have to talk about it face-to-face --

BG Colt: And never left the aircraft?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** They did not come back here, right? I never saw them.

TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J2:** Pilots were never here --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yeah. I think they were out there at level 2.

BG Colt: And the assault (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c were they already at the aircraft, and just the leadership joined them when they were ready to ultimately leave?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** No. Everybody was here.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** It really wasn't by definition an IRF where, you know, bam, they are airborne right away --

BG Colt: No. I'm with it.

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TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **03:** -- yeah. And we haven't had that ability, really, with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c as we do with ARSOA, you can find a Black HLZ, put an IRF in wherever the squirts go. But it's always more deliberate with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

So they [the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] weren't even jocked up in the back. They were just standing by to see what happen. They got the kit on as things developed.

SME-GFA: Anything else?

BG Colt: I haven't got anything else right now.

SME-GFA: I appreciate it.

The investigation closed at 2153 Zulu, 19 August 2011.

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