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The interview of the (b)(3), (b)(6) crew opened at 1603 Zulu, 18 August 2011, at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD:	BG J. Colt, US Army
LEGAL ADVISOR:	LA
TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR:	(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR, USAF
GROUND FORCE ARMY ADVISOR	SME-GFA
MH-47 ADVISOR	SME-MH47
CAB 47 ADVISOR:	SME-CH47
NGB REPRESENTATIVE:	SME-NGB
ASDAT ADVISOR	ASDAT
COURT REPORTER:	CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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All witnesses relevant to the investigation were sworn.

BG Colt: Okay. Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6), if we could start with you, please.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Yes, sir. (b)(3), (b)(6) I go by (b)(3), (b)(6) I'm the Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c standardization instructor pilot. I was also the CH47 AMC on the night of the incident.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Bravo Company, 7/158th. I was PC of the aircraft on August 6th.

Ramp: (b)(3), (b)(6) Bravo Company, 7/158th. At the time, CEO on the ramp position.

Left Door: (b)(3), (b)(6) Bravo Company, 7/158th, and I was on the left door gun on (b)(3), (b)(6).

Right Door: (b)(3), (b)(6) Bravo Company, 2/135th Nebraska, flight engineer in the right door position.

BG Colt: Okay. Can you tell us how many Team (b)(3), (b)(6) missions you have done up to this point approximately.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Yes, sir. That was my first one that night.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** A handful, sir. I would have to go back to get --

BG Colt: How long have you been on a mission doing this particular --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** About four to six weeks.

BG Colt: Four to six weeks?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Okay. Doing about two missions ever three days or so?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** For a while, it was every third day.

Ramp: Roughly, the same amount, sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I think I've been doing it for about two weeks. And I've done about four to eight missions, something like that.

Right Door: It was my second (b)(3), (b)(6) mission.

BG Colt: Okay. Can you talk us through the planning process either you've utilized or seen in conjunction with (b)(3), (b)(6) missions.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Typically, sir, we send one of our (b)(3), (b)(6) pilots down to the planning cell, and they assist the (b)(3), (b)(6) planners with finding LZs. Then we send it back, what we think is a suitable LZ, we send it back to the battalion, and they work what they do [sic], and then send it up to the brigade to get topographic imagery and send it back. And we get approved through (b)(3), (b)(6)

BG Colt: How closely is what you're doing here replicate what you did in your mobilization preparation?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Not at all, sir.

BG Colt: How is it different?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We never picked LZs before. Actually, that's -- I would say, that's an advantage having this on this mission planning. We get to find the LZ. We pick the LZ that we think is most suitable for us, instead of someone else picking it for us. But we actually like that part a lot better.

BG Colt: Any other thoughts about the way mission preparation goes relative to how you prepare to come here and join the task force?

Ramp: No, sir.

BG Colt: Okay. So the day that you got this particular mission, okay, can you talk us through that timeline.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: It was approximately 1830. Mr. **(b)(3), (b)(6)** and I, we got a call from the **(b)(3), (b)(6)** planners. They said they are ready for us to come down. He and I we went down. They said it was his first mission, so I show him what we do on the planning side. Went down and started working with planners, picked some LZs, discussed options going into the area and where we might exfil from. And I got the grids, and sent them up; they got approved. We came back and got ready for our brief.

BG Colt: Had you been in this geographical area before?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I have not.

BG Colt: Obviously not. Have you been in this area before?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Yes, sir. This is actually my third rotation to Afghanistan. I've flown, extensively on RC East, all three rotations.

BG Colt: Okay. But not in some time?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Excuse me, sir?

BG Colt: When was the last time?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** The last time prior to this rotation, sir?

BG Colt: Yes.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** OEF-07 -- '06/'07.

BG Colt: Okay. Anybody else fly in this area before?

Left Door: I flew in RC South and a little bit of RC East back in --

BG Colt: How about in the Wardak Province before into this Tangi Valley Area.

Ramp: The night we -- the night prior it was just south through Tangi, so right at the opening of the valley.

BG Colt: Okay. Anybody else for mission planning specifically?

SME-MH47: Did y'all routinely do walk-throughs with the ground force? Did they ever come out and do statics in the aircraft?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** We did several static loads, especially with

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their MATH (ph) package, they brought their equipment over, showed our guys how to load it, unload it. They discussed on multiple occasions, how to load the aircraft passenger-wise, and make sure they leave the correct seats open for our guys in the back.

SME-MH47: When they load a dog, is it in the kennel?

Ramp: No.

SME-MH47: Was it muzzled?

Ramp: No.

SME-MH47: Did y'all get bit much?

Ramp: It was actually pretty cool.

BG Colt: Can you describe for me the seats out, seats plus policy and how that applies to your missions.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We have only done it one time, sir. And it was on request from **(b)(3), (b)(6)**.

BG Colt: What was ACL that night, do you know?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I don't know.

BG Colt: Okay.

(b)(3), (b)(6): During the planning, did you discuss any alternate HLZs, or **(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c** HLZs? Do you routinely discuss that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We did. We had several LZs that night. And at the beginning, they were real concerned about crossing the river.

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It was the information they got on the valley was the slope to the river was real steep -- like nine foot embankments. They didn't want to have to cross those.

And they had intelligence that the bridges were wired. So they didn't want to cross any bridges either. That's why they went on the north side of the river for the landing.

BG Colt: Incidentally, when we are talking about mission planning, let's make sure that we are talking about mission planning inclusive, not just the last portion of the mission, all right? We're taking it from the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a infil on, okay.

SME-CH47: Let me ask a few questions: Crew selection and qualifications from the get, you were the pilot in command. And, Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6), you were the air mission commander --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** That's correct.

SME-CH47: Now, was there a reason why you weren't the pilot in command?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** It was just my first (b)(3), (b)(6) mission. That's the only reason as far as I know. He was the pilot in command; I was selected as AMC.

SME-CH47: Now, on this mission planning process, at 1830 you get a call, and you go -- somebody goes down to the planning cell, and I assume that's where the TACOPS officer, Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) is doing

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the planning; is that right?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: No. He plans in this building, sir --

SME-CH47: Oh, he plans over here? Okay.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: -- and we call him over the phone and pass the grids.

SME-CH47: So you get the details of the mission from the supported unit, and you pass it to him. And he assists in planning routes and HLZs and things of that nature?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: He usually -- he works on the mission briefing package, and gives the LZ and PZ approvals.

SME-CH47: Now, who is the person that's selecting routes and flight routing and that sort of thing?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: That night, it was **(b)(3), (b)(6)** (ph) --

SME-CH47: **(b)(3), (b)(6)** -- flight lead then? Okay.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yeah. He was our --

(b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Just to clarify for the planning purposes, the crews go down there, they get the grids, they talk to **(b)(3), (b)(6)**, you know, the supported element, whoever it happens to be that night, pass the grids. Mr. **(b)(3), (b)(6)** then produces the two packets, the briefing for the AMB, and the packet that we have to send up to brigade --

SME-CH47: Understood.

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TF [redacted] CDR: -- so that's what he does.

SME-CH47: So the CONOP package is the AMB brief?

TF [redacted] CDR: Essentially. Right. And when he gets that for planning purposes that's when the 3 and I look at LZs, PZs and we shoot it up.

BG Colt: Right. And there were, to my knowledge and recollection again, no alternate PZs -- or LZs, designated for this mission. Do you recall any being briefed? I mean, there's certainly no packet products or knee board cards that reflect alternates from the AMB, true?

[redacted] PC: We had alternate [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Was it [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c?

[redacted] FLT AMC: [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, that's correct.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-CH47: So once you came back up, now do you go on [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and you do it in falcon view when you put the package together?

[redacted] PC: That's being done simultaneously with the flight lead, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) that night. He was on the AMPS planning the route as we passed him, and got the approval for the LZs and PZs.

SME-CH47: Okay. So he gets it all -- the routing plan -- do you have a map that you carry as part of a knee board packet that

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goes to the aircraft? Is there a map that goes with it?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** We do, sir.

SME-CH47: And do you still have the one for that night that y'all had?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I don't know.

SME-CH47: Don't have them. Or how about the knee board packet? Can you reproduce it electronically.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I can probably get pretty close, sir.

SME-CH47: What I mean by that is do you save those in a folder?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Yes, sir.

SME-CH47: So you could reprint all of that. It would be nice if we could get all of that to help understand how the planning went. With regard to performance planning -- and I saw the numbers in the CONOP of 39,700, I think, for 24 pax on your aircraft. And I agree with that. It looks exactly right. Now, I don't want to jump ahead, but with regard to the later flight, the add-on, if you will, the IRF portion, there were nine more pax aboard that aircraft to bring it up to 33 pax, plus the crew.

So that brings it up to around 42 and some change. Does that sound right to y'all? And was the performance planning card

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regenerated for that, or was that just, sort of, off the top of your head, or how did that go down?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I don't know if there was one printed, sir. But I do know on our (b)(1)1.4a -- most of them anyway -- have the (b)(1)1.4a program onboard. So you can do it digitally. And we also have our tab data booklets that we have had.

SME-CH47: All right. Do you know whether or not (b)(3), (b)(6) did that, or was that discussed over the radio at all?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I can't confirm that, sir. I don't know if he planned that or not, sir.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** The one thing that we can't -- I mean, no one can tell you whether or not he did that it night. But all lift aircraft use (b)(1)1.4a every time they go in and out of any PZ, LZ or anything like that. It's one of our SOPs, brigade-wide. But we really enforce it at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

SME-CH47: I have a question about the routes. What we see in the CONOP route is different from what we see on the bread crumb analysis that came back to us. Was there a switch or a change in the routing -- for going to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c for instance, the primary route to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that you flew?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I don't recall any changes.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I don't either.

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SME-CH47: Well, when we get done, sir, if we can show them what we've got, and get an understanding of what that was. The route selection, now did -- y'all discuss that in a crew brief after you did the AMB? You did a crew brief with (b)(3), (b)(6) team. Now, were all the crew members present for all of that -- everybody?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** They were.

SME-CH47: And the route that you selected from RP to LZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c what criteria did you use to make that selection? In other words, when lead came in, I think the landing direction was 020. As opposed to flying down the valley. You, kind of, came in perpendicular to the valley and -- was that threat related, tactics related approach to the LZ?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** It was, I would say, the combination of both, sir. The winds were predominately out of the north that night. Without knowing the true condition of the LZ, we tried to make our approaches so we have (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Additionally, we preach to our guys all the time not to (b)(1)1.4a. We try to avoid it as much as possible.

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SME-CH47: Did you get an actual hard time from the LZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to be at [sic]? Was that 1830 Zulu as a hard time, or was that an event-driven kind of thing? How did that come about?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** During our planning process -- during -- while lead does the route, they will pass up the times it takes for pick-up here at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to where we pick up our BSO, the battle space owner, and then to the LZ. And that gets incorporated into the brief.

BG Colt: Would you characterize the planning time that night to be the norm, or more compressed than normal?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** It was pretty average, sir.

SME-CH47: Now, when you get the LZ points and the route points, and you send them back to the unit, and maybe the flight lead is working on the (b)(1)1.4a computer and then putting it together, at what point is the S-2 information passed to them?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Once the route is completed, we will call the S-2 and they come and vet the route.

SME-CH47: Okay. And is that -- or are there any threats marked on the map at all when you print the map out, so that you are aware of where things are -- of potential hostile acts?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Most of the time, sir. I can't say all the time.

SME-CH47: Was it that night?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC**: I believe so.

SME-CH47: You had the threat on the map?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC**: Yes, sir.

SME-CH47: So when you reprint the map from the folder you that you save it in, it should have that on there maybe, or is that something that is penned in?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC**: No. We don't save the entire map. We save the route. So any changes to our threats or attack range or ROZ's, when we reprint the map, all those changes will be on there. So we don't save the maps, sir.

SME-CH47: Now, when you got your threat brief, what was your opinion -- or what was your gut feeling about the mission that night as far as threat? No different than any other night? No big deal? No concern -- or little concern?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC**: Not really sir. There was a little concern there where a couple SAFIRES previous to that, and on previous (b)(3), (b)(6) mission even.

BG Colt: If anybody else feels differently, feel free to speak up. Again, this is not intended to insinuate anything other than to determine the facts of what actually was planned versus what got executed; that's what we're interested in, okay?
The witnesses nodded indicating an affirmative response.

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I didn't personally have any issue with the threat. We had a couple of -- when the S-2 slide came up, we had a couple historic POO sites for SAFIRE, probably more to, I guess, the north/northwest of where we were going into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. And it didn't really cause me any concerns as the AMC.

SME-CH47: Both aircraft use (b)(1)1.4a.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **EXT FLT AMC:** Correct.

SME-CH47: How about HUD? Do you use HUD on goggles --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Every time.

BG Colt: As you flew down the route in this particular case, the Apaches at some point, they had already been out in front of you on the first infil, right? Did they burn the first LZ for you as well, the (b)(3), (b)(6) element, or the AC? Anybody sparkle or burn their LZ?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Yes, sir.

BG Colt: They did? And you picked that up at what range?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** We could see that from a mile and a half at least.

BG Colt: A mile and a half? And as you approached (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c the very first time, did you also officially detect people running out of the LZ, or get that back from the AHs?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I don't think so.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I don't recall. I don't recall anyone running

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off the LZ, or being informed of it.

BG Colt: Okay. At any rate, the first landing went in there, wasn't terribly dusty. I understand. Can you describe the landing actions on, and the return back to the FOB.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I recall there being some grass. Sometimes we call it "getting grassed out," as opposed to browned out. It was more of a recently cultivated field, sir. And we had a little bit of grass that blew up, kind of, washed out the goggles a little bit with reflected light. And that was about it, really. It was a pretty easy landing compared with some of the stuff we do.

BG Colt: Any issues with the ramp? The ramp goes down, pax unload --

Ramp: No. The ramp usually goes down -- as soon as the aircraft is at a complete stop, is when our crew members lowers the ramp.

BG Colt: In this particular case, ramp down, pax offload --

Ramp: Yes, sir. As soon as the last man is off the ramp, the ramp goes back up. And then we call "ready in the back," and we'll take off.

BG Colt: Okay. Do you make an up call before you guys depart?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Yes, sir.

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BG Colt: And then lead departs, and you depart as a flight, not one ready?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:**

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-MH47: So if -- you're saying it's wherever you are ready, you depart? So CHALK 2, if his ramp is up first, he's clear to depart?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PC: We have done that on several occasions, sir.

SME-MH47: And then, where do you rejoin the flight? Is that a SOP? Or is it just something common?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PC: It's what we brief.

SME-MH47: What do you brief?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PC: We will go to the start point after the drop off, and meet up there. If lead takes off first, they would turn their

(b)(1)1.4a

But CHALK 2 always has

(b)(1)1.4a

So just for situational awareness, so we can

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

SME-MH47: Is he holding at that waypoint or is he slow?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PC:

(b)(1)1.4a

but it's however we brief it for that night.

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SME-MH47: Whose SOP do y'all fall under? Do you bring one with you, or do you fall underneath?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We fall underneath 10th CAB.

SME-MH47: Did they have a rejoin procedure in that SOP?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I would have to look, sir. I just know that we brief every night as our mission. That's what we -- the similar brief that we fell on when we started this mission set, we've kind of continued what our predecessors had done.

SME-CH47: Going back to the planning, was there any briefed plan or any conversation about the IRF portion at all? Was that ever a contingency that was discussed whatsoever? And had it ever been prior in any of your experiences with this particular mission?

(b)(3), (b)(6) FLT AMC: This particular night we did not. The reaction force was not addressed at all. And that was my first mission. I don't know about previous.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I hadn't done one before.

SME-MH47: Before the **(b)(3), (b)(6)** mission, how many -- I understand to integrate into -- to get to the **(b)(3), (b)(6)** mission set, you fly GS missions; is that correct?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes.

SME-MH47: Is that the SOP that generally y'all had followed?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Absolutely. At approximately 120ish hours on GS before I came to Logar.

SME-MH47: And each mission for GS is, what, a five-hours mission?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I would say that's a little above average.

SME-MH47: So do you feel you're confident that you were comfortable when you went on the (b)(3), (b)(6) mission?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I was, sir.

SME-CH47: What was your planned route speed -- en route speed to infil?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** We plan our (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

BG Colt: Can you talk me through after you did the initial infil at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and then -- I haven't seen any kind of routing -- planned routing anyway -- back to the FOB. I take it you just came back direct, or were you following way points, or did you reverse the infil course or --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I know we had a start point. And I believe that from the start point, it was direct back to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Okay.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** As I recall, it was the high ground to the north

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of Tangi Valley up over that way, stay clear of the (b)(1)1.4a zone.

BG Colt: And then direct back here. You came back in, did not get gas, and went to REDCON 2, correct?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** For the ones I've been doing, we get gas. Yes, sir, we refill again.

SME-CH47: During your statement that you made earlier, said you had burned down (b)(1)1.4a whenever y'all took off. So that's why I'm --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Right. We came back, got fuel, went back to parking. We stood on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. And then as I recall, we went back out to (b)(1)1.4a, and we were at 100 percent flight for quite a while. And that's why I estimated we burned down about (b)(1)1.4a pounds prior to take off.

SME-CH47: Fair enough.

BG Colt: Okay. Can you talk us through some of, sort of, the radio traffic as you began to generate the IRF mission? What is your recollection of how that got prepared?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Well, sir, Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the primary planner for (b)(3), (b)(6) that particular night. The first thing I recall him saying was they had some squirters that had squirted out of the main objective. And that they were going to try to put in the reaction force to contain those squirters.

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So that's kind of how it all started off. And then we just heard some back and forth -- talked about products. I know Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) created some products, and gave them to CHALK 1. They came across the radio asking -- they just wanted one aircraft to go in. I was AMC that decided just for no particular reason just that CHALK 1 was CHALK 1, so they would take them. So we agreed to that, and then --

BG Colt: Did you also have the products, or were they only delivered to CHALK 1?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I received my product, sir.

BG Colt: You were absolutely following lead blind at that point?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I wouldn't say blind, sir. We were going to follow them out, and they were just going to hold at the RP basically. So we didn't have a particular route, so we were just going to stay clear of any known threats when we proceeded up there. So that was the intent.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** (b)(3), (b)(6) and I did a map recon on our (b)(1)1.4a and discussed our route of flight, and where we were going to hold and what the plan was prior to take off.

BG Colt: So it was more intent? There was not a time where you were aware that they came out with preplanned ACPs that you're

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going to put in the (b)(1)1.4a and fly around to the northeast and make this infil?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** No, sir. There was no route planned or anything like that. But we did discuss how we were going to go in -- he and I, over the radio --

BG Colt: Okay. It's very, very important that -- did you feel that this was rushed to a point where you needed to slow it down?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Not really, sir. We had plenty of time. We had -- how long? 45 minutes or so sitting in (b)(3), (b)(6) waiting on --

BG Colt: Shut down?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** No. Ready to fly. We were waiting on the pax to show up.

BG Colt: Okay. At no time did you ever shut down in (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Not in (b)(3), (b)(6) sir.

BG Colt: Okay. But before that -- I'm trying to get this straight in my head. You went to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c You came back here. You did get gas. You shut down, but you were on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
The witness nodded indicating an affirmative response.

BG Colt: And that's when the radio traffic between Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6)

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and yourself started. And then at some point when it was determined that was going to be a one-ship infil, again, in your statement you said you decided that.

Is that literally what happened? Who decided that we were going to use a single ship and why?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) actually came across, sir, and said they wanted one ship only. So that was directed, as far as I know, from the TOC. And we just decided to have them take the passengers because they were CHALK 1.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-MH47: Did the crew members-- did you ever -- were you briefed on the plan? Did you understand everything that was going on in the discussion as far as the IRF?

Right Door: Yes, sir. We all, pretty much, stay up on COMMs. The radios, from what I remember, you couldn't always hear both sides for some reason. But we heard most of it, what they were asking for. Originally it was 17 people, and they wanted one aircraft because they didn't want to spook anymore, and have them run even further or whatever.

They wanted us to go to the other side. Which is why they went where they were going. I think that's why it was one aircraft originally because it was a 17-person team, not a bigger team.

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And when it went bigger, we just left it the same. They could still do it.

Like I said, they wanted one aircraft to minimize the noise and stuff going in there since they tried to capture the squirts or whatever.

All of us, we were there. We heard most of the same traffic that they heard.

SME-MH47: I understand that the HLZ diagrams were brought out to the aircrew while y'all were waiting for the 64s to refuel before they went out. Did y'all get a copy of the HLZ diagram?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** We did not.

SME-MH47: So it only went to the lead aircraft?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Correct.

SME-MH47: What's y'all's regular -- I mean, if that lead aircraft PLs en route, what do y'all do? What's y'all's SOP?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I specifically briefed that night if CHALK 1 goes down then CHALK 2 follows them, makes sure they are safe. If CHALK 2 goes down, CHALK 1 follows two down, makes sure they are safe. Basically set up a security perimeter over the aircraft. And the senior-most person becomes the on-scene commander.

We have an on-scene commander's checklist that we keep in our

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cockpit at all times. And we start running that through the TOC.

SME-MH47: If the aircraft -- say for instance, PL'd or the battle space owner when you land into that air field there -- say, for instance, lead landed in there, would you have cross-loaded, and taken the ground force and continue the mission, or would you have aborted it?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Are you saying when we're (b)(3), (b)(6), if one of the aircraft had broken right there --

SME-MH47: No. Say, for instance, you departed, and you were flying that circular route to the north coming into the valley, you had no pax on-board. You didn't have the IRF. You are basically an escort for the lead.

For instance, they had a CHIP light on an engine, and they wanted to land, would you have landed -- as the AMC, would you have cross-loaded and taken the IRF and continue the mission?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I would not have. I would have called back and aborted the mission.

SME-MH47: Why?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Basically because we -- the requirement in our task force is to have two aircraft. So if we're down to one, we're not going to send a launch out and fly into that area. We are going to make sure we have an escort. So I would not make

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that decision.

SME-MH47: But the plan was for you to hold at the mouth of the -- and which you did. You held at the mouth, and lost sight of your other aircraft. What was your purpose at that time?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Just to wait for them to come out, so we could escort them back.

SME-MH47: So they would have reversed and flown back through the green zone again to get to you and rejoin?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I can't say that. I don't know what route they would have taken. I would assume that they would have come back to the north of the high ground and link up with us.

SME-MH47: And reverse route?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I don't think they would reverse route. They would come out due north, and then link up with us that way.

SME-MH47: So it wasn't discussed how the rejoin procedure would have occurred, how you would have rejoined that flight. As the Air Mission Commander, you were holding at the mouth up near where the battle space owner -- their FOB is, right? And then you entered into the --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** That's not correct, sir. We were holding to the northeast along the ridgeline. So it was northeast of the reaction force.

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SME-MH47: Okay. We would like to sit down and look on a map and see that. I was just curious as to how you all would effected a rejoin without having lead fly back up through the green zone.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: They were supposed to cross that ridgeline back to the north. And we were going to rejoin and fly back at that point.

BG Colt: What we understand is at the best of your recollection based on the bread crumb as well, kind of, confirms that the green route appears to be the infil route. Where do you drop off and hold? And you are holding in left-hand turns or --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes.

BG Colt: You want to draw it on there.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Right over this ridgeline.

(b)(3), (b)(6) FLT AMC: So the question about reversing the route, they would not have done that. They should have come directly out and proceed up and joined up with us. They would not reverse route in my opinion.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: There's a small ridgeline right through here. And they were supposed to come back up. They were supposed to land 090 at the LZ, and then come back up to the north where we would rejoin them.

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SME-MH47: Okay. That's ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c~~ Here's the opening right here, the breadcrumb, they came in here, and entered the green zone and flew down.

BG Colt: They are holding here.

SME-MH47: Right. So they continued on around.

BG Colt: And you lost sight of them right here?

~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~ **PC:** I don't recall this route of flight to be honest with you, sir. That's not how I remember it.

BG Colt: Okay. You want to grab the breadcrumb.

SME-MH47: It's right here, sir.

BG Colt: This is literally, the last entries of him coming around inbound. And the other one we have reflects this is what he did, right, coming around the horn?

Here, that's the one we have been looking at.

So based on what you described to me so far, you took off, and you flew the route. And you dropped off in the vicinity of this location right here.

He continues around, and you would have -- at this point, you are ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~ feet AGL.

~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~ **PC:** We were at ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~ holding.

BG Colt: MSL?

The witness nodded indicating an affirmative response.

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BG Colt: Okay. And he continues, and you lost sight of him, I take it after he crossed the ridgeline?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I must have been mistaken that night, sir. Because what we had discussed is there's a smaller ridgeline right through here that comes down through this valley, cross, make a quick turn to 090. And then come back out and meet with us here. I know that's what we had discussed.

BG Colt: Okay. And roughly though, flying out there -- roughly -- again, I'm not doing all the MSL/AGL conversions. But roughly, you took off from here, joined, you know, coming off of -- would you call it a holding area again?

(b)(3), (b)(6) FLT AMC: **(b)(3), (b)(6)**, sir.

BG Colt: **(b)(1)1.4a** knots ground speed, **(b)(1)1.4a** feet AGL. How many rotor disks were you flying apart? Lose? Close? Extended? What was briefed?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Combat cruise. So it's **(b)(1)1.4a**

(b)(1)1.4a But no closer than **(b)(1)1.4a**

BG Colt: Okay. And at that point, you get up to that point, you drop off and right holding, and he continues or you enter holding. I got it.

And your actions at that point are -- what are you hearing on the radio at this point as AMC?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** As AMC, sir, I heard them do the six-minute. I heard the three-minute call in the LZ brief. I do not recall the one-minute brief -- or the one-minute call from CHALK 1.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I do.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** He says he remembers it. I don't remember hearing that call. I don't know if I was on the radio or something at the time.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** The reason we picked the place that we did to hold, sir, was that was our three-minute mark. So we were three minutes from the LZ at that point, from what (b)(3), (b)(6) and I had discussed during our map recon.

SME-MH47: Right. That's along the MSR run back the plots.

BG Colt: But that's not where they held, right?

SME-MH47: No, sir.

BG Colt: Okay. About the six-minute mark is where you dropped off then?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** We called "three minutes" when we started to hold.

BG Colt: Okay. At any rate, you are in holding. You hear that the aircraft has gone down, and your then your actions are?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Actually, sir, the radios were eerily silent. I was just kind of monitoring, I believe, the right gun. We're in left orbits. We have the right gunner calling that the Apache

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was engaging targets on the ground. And at that point, again, the radios were quiet as I recall.

And then we waited for a while. We just continued our orbits just waiting. We had sight of the Apaches. They were about four miles away. And at that point I elected to move -- I was on the controls -- to move down a little bit closer to the high ground to the north of the Tangi Valley to see if we could see anything, and also if they needed us to come in and assist.

And at that point, all I heard was "crash site" something about -- the Apaches were talking about something in relation to the crash site. So at that point, we were all, like, shocked because we realized they were down.

And we orbited there probably another four or five orbits. And then I called the TOC and said, "What do you want us to do." At that point, they had said -- "they" being the Apaches said -- I believe [redacted] was designated as the on-scene commander --

BG Colt: Correct.

[redacted] **FLT AMC:** -- and so we stayed waiting to see if they wanted us to go in to assist, to try to extract any wounded or anything like that. At that point, I believe [redacted] told us to return back to FOB [redacted] REDCON 3.

BG Colt: Okay. You came back in, shut down and came inside?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Yes, sir, that's correct.

BG Colt: Okay.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Just jump in if I am missing anything.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** We got approved for a single ship return.

SME-CH47: I would like to ask you about the 38 pax on your single aircraft. Under CONOP, you have a box that checks seats out, seats plus. And, of course, it wasn't checked because this was an add-on. It wasn't part of the original mission. Are you familiar with the approval process for seats out and seats plus?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** My understanding is that the (b)(3), (b)(6) teams have a prepositioned waiver for seats outs and seats plus. But it has to be individually approved by the admiral that's in charge. So that will all get channeled through our chain of command. I don't --

SME-CH47: So your assumption was that all of that got approved?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** They weren't seats plus, sir.

SME-CH47: They didn't all have a seat, did they?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Yes, sir.

SME-CH47: You have 38 seats in the aircraft?

BG Colt: No. They have seating for 32. The gunners and the

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ramp guy, obviously, are not occupying a seat, and not required to based on monkey harness restraint.

In this particular case, when they loaded pax, it's my understanding that the 33rd pack was the dog handler. And that was not clear to them until they loaded.

Ramp: That is correct, sir.

SME-CH47: Did you have somebody in the jump seat? Troop commander's seat, or do you know whether they had some --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I have no idea, sir.

(b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(7)(C) CDR: They have done that in the past in the jump seat. They have had somebody there to maximize personnel.

ASDAT: How about anybody on the ramp, not seat-belted? Did you have anybody on the ramp.

Right Door: For the **(b)(3), (b)(6)** set, we have not been running the ramp gun. They are usually close. So by the time we get out there -- it's like being in a seat when you land, so we are not hanging out on the ramp.

So I'm pretty sure he would have been up closer to a seat, or on the edge of the -- a seat in the aircraft. There wouldn't have been a ramp because there's nothing there. There wasn't a gun mounted back there. So he had no reason to be back there. He would have been in the cabin.

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ASDAT: Is it uncommon to have anybody from Team (b)(3), (b)(6) on the ramp during infil?

Right Door: There's nobody ever back there.

(b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(6) **CDR:** That's one of the things we discussed during the meet and greet is, again, our constraints and limitations. And that's one of them.

SME-NGB: As the AMC, were you aware they were in a seats-plus status, or were you assuming that they were just full --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I was not tracking the seats-plus status at all.

BG Colt: At any time during the mission as AMC, did you get any radio traffic from either the AH's, or any of the (b)(1), (b)(4a) platforms talking about conditions of LZs, or any other intelligence being passed?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** The only thing I remember, sir, is the actual LZ brief that the AH64s provide in standard format. I don't remember any other (b)(1), (b)(4a) or (b)(3), (b)(6) or any of those guys giving us any other kind of threat updates.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-GFA: What point do you guys lower the ramp? Once you touch down?

Right Door: Once the aircraft has stopped. With the dusty landing, sometimes it [inaudible]. So once it stops, then the

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ramp goes down.

SME-MH47: Does the PC call that, or do you do it on your own?

Ramp: We announce it as soon as the aircraft comes to a complete stop.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Once they call "aircraft stable".

SME-CH47: Can you tell me what -- typically, the position of the gunners are on RP inbound. Are they standing up, manning the guns in the doors?

Ramp: Yes.

Right Door: Left and right gunners have to be standing because the dust is normally a bigger threat. So we're trying to get the aircraft in a safe place with the dust landing. So you can't do it from sitting down. So we are calling the altitude and the dust clouds and everything so we are usually standing up in the windows to make sure we don't tear [inaudible] to try to get it landed safely.

SME-CH47: Any discussion prior to taking off about the landing direction in HL (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a as opposed to the 020 when you did earlier into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c -- based off the winds out of the north.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** The only thing that I recall was, again, Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) when he gave us the warning order, we are going to be taking the (b)(1)1.4a was that they wanted this -- wanted flight lead or whoever

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is taking the passengers, to land to the southeast, approach from the northwest. And that was because the squirters were coming out to the west from the primary objective.

BG Colt: I'm sorry. Say that one more time.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** The only thing I remember Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) saying is that the supported unit had requested that we land to the southeast, approaching from the northwest, so that we wouldn't overfly the objective, obviously.

And then that would probably be better off to contain the squirters. So we put them in a left quartering or cross-wind condition.

BG Colt: You were not aware any time that the squirters were stationery, occupying or located at a common building?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I wasn't aware of that, sir.

Ramp: No, sir.

SME-MH47: When you all got in-country and started this mission set, did y'all ever or do any unit collective training? Did you ever do brownout landings in the local area that weren't on mission set?

Ramp: Part of our -- in order for us to fly missions, we have do our CCTs prior to being able to fly mission; that includes brownouts and pinnacle landings for both the front-seaters and

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back-seaters.

(b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(7)(C) **CDR:** That is a lesson we learned the hard way when we first got here. Our predecessors had us doing brownouts right out here off the HLZ, which it didn't even -- it didn't brown anything out. So we had to go out, and every crew that comes in here goes through serious brownout conditions to make sure daytime, nighttime, zero illum in order to get to that, that training.

SME-MH47: Do you all feel comfortable with your level of training?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** As comfortable as you can call any brownout total zero illum, yes, sir.

BG Colt: Just briefly for me, did all four of you mob together same site, same time?

Ramp: It was just the three of us.

BG Colt: What was your FAC and RL level when you activated to go to mobilization station and start prepping for this particular mission?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I was RL1 day/night/NVG --

BG Colt: PC?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Negative, sir.

BG Colt: When did you make PC?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I made PC here about 50 hours in-country.

Ramp: Okay. I was RL1 day/night/NVG CE, roughly -- a little over 400 hours total. And about 300 of that was goggles.

Left Door: I started out as an RL3 door gunner, but I had previous experience. So I had to do some flights with an FI before I got signed off. But I was an RL1 by the time I got here.

Right Door: I'm with (b)(3), (b)(6) a couple months after these guys. I'm the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a So I was RL1, doing NVG.

SME-MH47: Did the other crew do the same mob? Were they on the same timeline as y'all?

Right Door: (b)(3), (b)(6) mob'd with myself and 2/135th --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** And we had (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) and

(b)(3), (b)(6) with our mob.

SME-MH47: Okay. Can I associate a date to what month and year that was.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** March of this year.

SME-MH47: I'm sorry?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** March.

SME-MH47: March of '11. And where was that conducted?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Fort Hood, Texas.

SME-MH47: Where y'all went and collectively did your

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training?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Were those aircraft configured the same way these are?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Yes, sir.

BG Colt: But you didn't bring any of them?

Ramp: Yeah, we did. 218 and 219. Our aircraft we brought --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** But we weren't flying them that night though.

SME-MH47: Let me flush out the macro timelines of what y'all did. So March 11, you did the MOAB in Fort Hood. How long did that take?

Ramp: Our last training day was prior to Memorial Day weekend. So I would say roughly --

BG Colt: Maybe June the 1st of this year?

SME-MH47: So 1 June, you were complete?

Ramp: I'm sorry. I misspoke. We had a four-day -- it was roughly May 1st is when our training was complete.

SME-MH47: You were complete training?

Ramp: Right.

SME-MH47: And then y'all went back to the house for leave and things like that --

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Ramp: We just had a four-day pass. And during that four-day pass, our ADVON was already en route here.

SME-MH47: Okay. So when did y'all basically start flying into country?

Left Door: I got here the 10th of May, and made it to FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b probably like the 12th or 13th of May.

SME-MH47: And the event crew also came in May?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b CDR: Except for the 2.

Right Door: The (b)(3), (b)(6) over their timeline. The timeline we are on here now is (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) 7/135th timeline if you want, sir.

SME-MH47: So y'all basically -- both (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) got into country in May or June timeframe?

Right Door: Sir, we didn't get here until towards the end of July.

BG Colt: Go ahead and layout your timeline there.

Right Door: The (b)(3), (b)(6) we moved from our states like 29 May, went to (b)(3), (b)(6). The last flights to (b)(3), (b)(6) were 30 June, and we did our pass and our loading, and a week delayed for airplanes, and then slowly trickled done here. I think I made it to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b on 26 July or something like that.

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SME-MH47: And you finished your training, and became a mission crew some time in --

Right Door: It was like 4 or 5 August.

SME-MH47: 4 or 5 August, you actually went operational?

Right Door: Yes, sir. Being the (b)(1) to my CCT, and help do the rest of our guys in the back, and then went to missions.

SME-MH47: Okay. And we have that timeline, sir, 4, 5 on the event crew; that matches up.

BG Colt: Anybody else got any questions?

SME-NGB: Most of my questions, I, kind of, wanted to focus a little bit on the pre-mob process, and training aspects of it. So I didn't want to inject that while we were still focused on the --

BG Colt: Okay. I have got one more then: From your crew station and your experience having preformed the (b)(3), (b)(6) mission, do you think that you were adequately planned and briefed going into the second phase, or the sequel of this mission?

PC: I think I was adequately briefed, sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I felt comfortable with it, sir. We had all the information we needed.

Ramp: Yeah. I felt comfortable as well. The two chawks talked amongst each other on what the plan was going to be. And

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I was comfortable with what we had decided as a flight.

Left Door: I felt comfortable. I, kind of, knew what our plan was. We were just escort and everything. But I felt comfortable with what we were doing.

Right Door: Sir, I felt comfortable with the plan. There was a lot of talk about direction and LZ, and it sounded like it was -- just like the one I done the night before; fly in, drop them off, and get out.

(b)(3), (b)(6): When you guys broke and you went into holding pattern, did CHALK 1 change his lighting?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Other than all lights off?

BG Colt: All lights off?

PC: No. He was up (b)(1)1.4a, sir.

BG Colt: Okay. And do you brief an IR position two --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Yes, sir.

BG Colt: -- strobe something?

PC: NVG plus two, DIM plus two.

(b)(3), (b)(6): So now when you guys broke, and when he was going to come back and you were going to rejoin, was there any discussion when he had come up with his IR anti-collision lights? Were they just going to use yours?

PC: More than likely, they would have turned on their -- once

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we separate, they turn on their IR upper anti-collision.

BG Colt: Did you see it on?

PC: I did not, sir.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-CH47: Could I -- I would like to discuss certain documents we talked earlier about knee board packets. But we would like to get the 365 series from aircraft 175 and the CCT class -- not the classes themselves, but the rosters, and the makeup of the class, not -- I don't want power points. But if you just tell me what's taught. And reading file...your new information folder -- or quarterly folder, let me get one of your reading file folders that has all the memorandums and all that stuff. I'm not interested in regulations and things, but the memorandums and stuff.

PC: We have that all on digits. Would you just like for me to print off --

SME-CH47: Or burn it on a disk. That would suit me just fine.

PC: Okay. No problem.

SME-CH47: And your IATF, we would like to take a look at that -- or if you can make a copy of it, either way.

SME-NGB: You are Bravo 7/158?

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Right Door: No, sir. I'm 2/135.

SME-NGB: Can you explain the relationship between Bravo 7/158 and Bravo 2/135?

Right Door: Yes, sir. When we showed up, we knew when we left Hood we were going to three different places. The Commander and First Sergeant of 2/135 went to Kandahar, and then a lieutenant and, I think, 40 of us, half maintenance, half crew came here and the other lieutenant and 20 of them went to Salerno. When we came here, [(b)(3), (b)(6)] was going to remain the commander of our group, and we were just, kind of, meld and create one team with the [(b)(3), (b)(6)] Reserve Guard -- or the guys that works pretty well.

SME-NGB: So --

BG Colt: You are basically two platoons, if you will. At one time, you had eight aircraft, now you have seven; is that it?

SME-NGB: [(b)(3), (b)(6)], you're a guardsman?

Right Door: Yes, sir.

SME-NGB: [(b)(3), (b)(6)]?

Right Door: I'm [(b)(3), (b)(6)] sir.

SME-NGB: There's a detachment, [(b)(3), (b)(6)]

[(b)(3), (b)(6)], correct?

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Right Door: They're at (b)(3), (b)(6) Air Force Base. And it's, essentially, half and half. They have six aircraft. And they got in six from (b)(3), (b)(6) or --

SME-NGB: Where at in (b)(3), (b)(6) are they stationed?

Right Door: (b)(3), (b)(6).

SME-NGB: And then, where is Bravo 7/158? Is that New Century?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** The New Century, sir.

SME-NGB: What's at (b)(3), (b)(6) (ph)?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** (b)(3), (b)(6) is the little -- larger town it's right next to.

SME-NGB: Okay. So, essentially, New Century is the --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Yes, sir.

SME-NGB: Okay. Can you explain for both organizations, where are you in the ARFORGEN cycle planned for this rotation? Can you speak to that? Do you know about that? And then can you tell me when you got you alert notification prior to mobilization notification?

Right Door: I can't for us, sir. We knew well in advance, I think we traded with Florida or something somehow to come to Afghanistan instead of Iraq in a different timeframe. I remember something about that.

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But we knew probably a year out, I would think, and started the preparation. We did AT with Colorado -- actually, we knew at least a year out because we did AT with Colorado to do some flight training. And then the next year, we did AT for the green training.

BG Colt: Did you bring in airframes?

Right Door: No, sir. All of our airframes were turned into the States.

BG Colt: Okay. And when you broke camp there in the mob, getting ready to deploy, you knew right then that the company was going to be split --

Right Door: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: -- or did you find that out once you got here.

Right Door: No. We had everything, kind of, planned out to -- and we've been talking to Washington/Oregon and some other people and the RCs. So I'm not sure what the -- we, kind of, had a list of who's going where to try to make it as easy as possible getting structures and everything we needed in each location. So we had it split out prior to.

SME-NGB: When you say you came together and started training throughout the course of the past year, you are just talking about the two guard elements, right?

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Right Door: Yes, sir.

SME-NGB: Two platoons?

SME-NGB: As far as Bravo 7/158, how far in advance did you all know that you were going to be here?

Ramp: Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I, we had a pretty good idea. He and I were in Iraq at the time when we were told that this unit was set to deploy. So that would be, what, May --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** It was May 10.

SME-NGB: Okay. So may of last year. So you were --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Iraq.

SME-NGB: -- Iraq at that time?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** That's correct, sir.

SME-NGB: Okay. When did you get back to the States following OIF?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** The second week of September.

SME-NGB: So from September through March, can you talk me through what you did coming off of OIF, and then in preparation for this deployment.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I was on leave until 1 November -- terminal leave from active duty. And then starting in November, I came back to the unit and started flying again.

I have been doing training since through that whole time.

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SME-NGB: And I know we've got, kind of two organizations here, how did you individually feel from a unit standpoint? Were you resourced and prepared for this known mission -- or at least this rotation cycle? Did you have the resources? And were you able to get the training you needed to in order to fly and prepare or RL progress, get all the personnel PC statuses that you needed to, things like that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I would say for the most part. We had a few late-comers that struggled getting with progression.

SME-NGB: As a result of folks in flight school?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: That's correct, sir.

BG Colt: Can you address, how is the Honduras and Korea -- are those individual augmentees?

(b)(1) TF, (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4c CDR: Yes, sir. We've got one from Honduras, and two or three from Korea. One pilot and one crew chief.

BG Colt: You have to grade them in the same --

(b)(1) TF, (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4c CDR: Absolutely. They fall under **(b)(3), (b)(6)** He is the detachment commander.

SME-NGB: So as far as the two organizations, they didn't come together until you got here to Task force **(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4c** --

Right Door: Yes, sir.

SME-NGB: -- and started integrating? Okay. You, pretty

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much, have your timeline at Fort Hood. Did you know specifically that you were going to be doing this mission, supporting these kind of missions here? Or were you planning a different type of mission during the course of the last year as you were preparing for deployment?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: We prepared for all types of missions. We did a couple of planning in air assault-type missions at Fort Hood. Generally, I know the people in our unit from their last rotation here in Afghanistan that they were expecting a lot more general support types of mission I believe.

We did train to do air assaults.

SME-NGB: Were you -- did you have in mind that you would be direct support to special operations type support?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Not until we got here, sir.

SME-MH47: Were you surprised?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: No.

SME-MH47: It didn't surprise you in the least?

SME-NGB: When you were first assigned to this particular mission, did you feel at that point that the training you had done leading up to this had prepared you for supporting these types of missions? Did you understand the level of mission planning, short notice type stuff? I mean, what was the mission

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planning cycles that you were used to training in? For example, when you were in Iraq, and then as you went to the training cycle, and had the mob station and prior to that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: In Iraq, the planning process was a lot different than it was here. The AMRs would come directly to the company, and we would plan any AMR or air assault that way. Here, the AMRs are planned here at the task force.

SME-NGB: And as you integrated, I know there was a fairly deliberate integration process once you got here at the task force level. Do you feel like you went through the crawl/walk/run process to get yourself to the point where you could go perform as an AMC flight lead, and essentially be signed off on team **(b)(3), (b)(6)** type missions?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Absolutely. **(b)(3), (b)(6)** and I flew several air assaults on the GS sets before we came to **(b)(3), (b)(6)**.

SME-NGB: As far as the crew mixing here, did you see any significant issues as far as -- tell me how the, essentially, the guard guys and reserve guys started mixing together, that integration process. Can you talk to that a little bit?

Right Door: Starting day one, we meet and greet started rolling through the FIs first [inaudible] and then from Hawaii, did CCTs. I was MH crew. There was always a mixed bird, and

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we just worked with them.

I know for the enlisted crew, we went out to their aircraft, and talked about their system, (b)(3), (b)(6) and the GS, how to set them up, what they expect. We just talked about it, briefed it and it worked --

SME-NGB: Just a purely basic crew coordination standpoint, any significant differences, you know regarding basic coordination principles, aircraft systems?

Right Door: There were a couple just minor things from what we see in (b)(3), (b)(6). And what they did -- I brought it up -- (b)(3), (b)(6) and I talked about it. We made sure we knew what was going to see as a group here. And it was fairly easy. Nothing major --

SME-NGB: So you feel the standardization process was successful, and you've work those things out eventually?

Right Door: Yes, sir. It was very easy. No big changes.

SME-NGB: And what about from the SOP standpoint? Obviously, we've got several different organizations even within the same organization of different States. So we have a plethora of SOPs from, essentially, you know, what your doing in OIF, to what you're doing back in the States, garrison versus tactical SOPs. And then here, integrating into two task forces, how did you

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overcome -- I guess, essentially, how did you -- what was the integration process? And how did you get smart on the new SOPs for operating here with Team (b)(3), (b)(6) and Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Our stands had the 10th CAB SOP all through our training at (b)(3), (b)(6).

SME-NGB: Okay. So you were able to look at the SOP far enough ahead of time at both stations, and started working towards that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Our stands had it, and passed it down to the rest of the pilots and crew on how to do things.

BG Colt: Is that the same for (b)(3), (b)(6)?

Right Door: I don't remember a 10th CAB SOP while we were planning at (b)(3), (b)(6). But, you know, (b)(3), (b)(6) worked together. We were fairly close, so we were all on the same SOP. We shared it back and forth.

(b)(3), (b)(6) was actually -- produced all the same between the two States.

SME-NGB: So any significant differences from the time -- from what you saw when you started training [sic] at the mob station to when you got here, any significant differences that you had to get spun up on, or was it just a matter of, essentially, going out and starting to do the mission to solidify,

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you know, the process?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I don't remember any big changes at all, sir, coming in. We integrated and started going.

SME-MH47: I've got a question for the crew members. I understand there are three crew members in the back of the aircraft, correct?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: Yes, sir.

SME-MH47: All right. So you have two up front, left and right. And you on a 60D? What type of weapons are you using?

Right Door: 240s.

SME-MH47: You have 240s up there. And then on the ramp, I understand it was a stinger; is that correct?

Ramp: We do not fly with the stinger mount.

SME-MH47: You do not fly with the stingers.

Ramp: It gets in the way of the **(b)(3), (b)(6)** Teams getting on and off.

SME-MH47: So that third crew member, he's -- what's his -- he's on a ramp, or is he on the -- he's on the ramp at the maintenance panel?

Ramp: Right. The last one-man troop seat, that's his designated seat.

SME-MH47: Okay. So he's right there. And do you fly with

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that bubble window in, or do you remove it?

Ramp: The bubble windows are installed.

SME-MH47: All right. So during the landing, he's basically blind back there? Is he assisting the aircraft to land, or is he just --

Ramp: Typically, the guy in the back will assist either side if he feels that he needs to.

SME-MH47: So you will stick your head in the bubble and then try to look out?

Ramp: Roger.

SME-MH47: Do you have fidelity with the ground? Are you calling that with the pilots?

Ramp: No. The guy at the right gun is calling the aircraft down.

SME-MH47: The right forward gun is calling the aircraft down?

Right Door: Yes, sir.

SME-MH47: And doing surveillance with the gun system?

Right Door: Yes, sir, as best you can. You can see way more from the door than you can a bubble window. It's a lot easier to call the aircraft height and everything. So it's always been done from the right door.

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SME-MH47: Do you give dust or observation calls to the pilot? How does that work?

Right Door: We usually brief the left gunner will call the cloud forward. And the right gun will call the altitude to the aircraft, so it's less time tied, and you can pick up and hear everything.

Left Door: Normally, sometimes the guy in the back -- because normally, as we're coming in for a short final, I'll have my head sticking out front, so I can get a snapshot of the LZ. And then I'll be scanning. I would normally hear them say "dust cloud forming at the ramp". At that time I already know that it's coming.

So then as I'm starting to scan, I can see it mid-cabin, and I will call "dust cloud in the cabin," and it's all simultaneously while he's calling it down. Then I'll call "dust cloud, cabin door, dust cloud coming under the nose," just to give them the three seconds they are about ready to lose sight of the ground so they know.

SME-MH47: Okay. And generally, on your approaches, where do you want to be when he calls "mid cabin"? Where in your mind is the pilot -- where do you want to plant the aircraft in a heavy dust environment?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** On the ground as quickly as possible.

SME-MH47: So you are trying to beat the dust to the ground?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** In an ideal situation, I want to land before the dust cloud envelops the cockpit, but that doesn't always happen.

BG Colt: That's right.

SME-MH47: What's your touchdown speed?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** It depends on the type of landing we're going to do, sir, and the terrain.

SME-MH47: So it can vary from five knots to ten knots with the ground roll --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** From zero. And if it's a wide-open LZ, I would land at a 20.

SME-MH47: Twenty knots ground speed?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** That's correct, sir.

SME-MH47: Say for instance in a -- when it's a confined area of landing, can you talk to me how that would go. As you are coming in, let's say for instance, a green zone, you were told you are doing 70 knots ground speed basically. So you're running around 70 knots ground speed. At what point, at a one-minute call, what altitude and air speed would you normally be?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** It varies on the type of terrain we're flying over.

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SME-MH47: It's a green zone. It's terraced. So you're going to have to come down basically.

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: The lower the better. But you want to have a nice approach angle into a terraced area. You want a short ground run. You want a steeper approach.

SME-MH47: Okay. So where are you in altitude?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: 100 to 200 feet --

BG Colt: Can I tell you here, too, the line of questioning here, really, is going to directly help us build a model of simulation of the profile that they are flying. And that's really why we're very interested in this.

By SOP, when you are flying out at CHALK 2, going into these types of places is helping us back off the intel, the LZ and do basically a decent angle and air speed control so that we can get to that point, all right? That's kind of the context that we're asking this.

So try to visualize going through the approach, so then we can try to get the parameters close, all right?

Right Door: With **(b)(3), (b)(6)** all the training that we did, because we were both from FOB **(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c** so the Double Eagle and everything -- he's a HAATS instructor. So we used a lot of techniques from HAATS. I'm sure Mr. Carter would have been right

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at the forward edge of the shutter steeper than a normal approach, and would have been trying for a zero ground run. Just -- after your touch, just as the cloud goes in front of the aircraft, then you just lower the nose, is what we did a lot in Double Eagle training for this environment.

SME-MH47: So -- but RP inbound you are generally how high off the trees would you generally fly? 200 feet? 300 feet? Looking for the HLZ. So when you're a pilot, you are looking at your (b)(1)1.4a looking to zero out your right to your point that you want -- point in space. When you are searching, what altitude and air speed are you generally doing that terminal area?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** One, in the inbound -- RP inbound, you want to be 200 foot or below for me.

BG Colt: Is that pretty consistent for the way Mr. Carter flew?

Right Door: I would think so. I don't -- altitude's at a one-minute is one --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **TF** (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** Now, do you guys know who was on the controls?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) **TF** (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** He was definitely on the controls?

BG Colt: How do you know that?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I was talking with (b)(3), (b)(6) is on the radios. So if you are on the radios, you are not on the controls.

SME-NGB: (b)(3), (b)(6), how long have you been an AMC?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I have been at 10th CAB for 10 years in October. So I've been an AMC the entire time.

SME-NGB: And that's based upon your unit AMC training program?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Well, I think if you think back to the last commander's guide prior to the 4.11, I don't think it had a very specific way of training AMCs. We now have a very specific way of doing it. So I've, kind of, grown up and been the guy that teaches all that stuff. Myself or TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c commander has to give the academics. Then he gives the final left and right limits AMC brief. So I kind of grew in into just by default. I haven't been at (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) so long.

SME-NGB: Was there any -- is there any difference in the certification requirement for being an AMC with 10th CAB versus once you integrate with Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or task force here. Are there any additional training requirements or certifications for AMC?

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** We run all of our personnel through about 30-slide, slide show. That's the academics myself or the LTC have to give, and that's by SOP. And then, of course, if I give the academics, then he still has to take them aside, and give them his command philosophy and left and right limits as far as what he expects from his AMCs.

SME-NGB: And is there a proficiency requirement, you know, oral or flight demonstrated proficiency for that additional --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** There is not.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **TF 4a, (b)(7)(D) CDR:** That's determined before the person is even proposed as an AMC.

SME-NGB: Depending on their level of experience --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **TF 4a, (b)(7)(D) CDR:** Exactly -- experience, maturity --

SME-NGB: -- previous AMC and all that --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I would say that we do, kind of, a refresher-type deal. We are pretty good at doing academics here. So any time the Colonel gives an AMC brief, we try to do it during our pilots' brief, so they all get to hear the law of repetition. If he changes something in his way of thinking that wants to be updated, then it's all put out at that time.

SME-NGB: Okay. And then, kind of, a little bit more about SOP stuff. What's the rejoin procedure in the SOP? For example,

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in this case, here you all separated at the RP, obviously, there's going to have to be an in-flight rejoin procedure executed. So what would have been the procedure for that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** For a CH47, I'm not sure. I would have to go back and review it. Being this is my first (b)(3), (b)(6) mission, and the fact that it was -- we did separate for the (b)(1)1.4a type deal, I would have to review that, and make sure that I was aware of it because --

SME-CH47: Was it briefed -- for the (b)(1)1.4a portion, did you brief that part to each other?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I don't recall that we think. I don't think we did.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** We've talked about it.

SME-NGB: You've already spoke to the issue about external lighting. What about internal lighting? What's the SOP say versus how you execute that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I'm not sure that there is an SOP --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I don't think it's addressed. I'm not sure what the question is though.

SME-NGB: Well, what I'm getting at is about HUD use. Do you fly with the HUD.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Absolutely. It is completely mandatory.

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(b)(1), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G), (b)(7)(H) **CDR:** The only one that authorize somebody not flying with a HUD is myself. And the only time I have ever authorized it if it is from FOB to FOB, and then it's just one. The PC has to have a HUD.

SME-NGB: Okay. Very good, sir, I understand. And so with use of a HUD, what would your normal cockpit lighting configuration be on an infil like this?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** The eyebrow lights would be on --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** And it's personal preference to the pilots up front, sir.

SME-NGB: Okay. On this particular mission, what was your cockpit lighting or use of eyebrow lights or anything like that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Halfway -- mid -- mid-range on the dials.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** Yeah.

SME-NGB: I know you might have to speculate a little bit, and I apologize for that, but do you know what CHALK 1's cockpit lighting configuration lighting was?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I have no idea, sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **AMC:** No idea.

SME-MH47: Do you have a CAS requirement? Do you require AWT or AC-130 overhead?

The witness nodded indicating an affirmative response.

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TF (b)(1).4a, (b)(7).E **CDR:** Yeah. My requirement -- and this is during the meet and greet, no exfil or infil will happen without AWT. And a couple teams have asked, because of other requirements that happened in the past, whether an AC-130 could cover them and we don't. An AWT has to be there for infil and exfil.

SME-MH47: And then (b)(1).4a

TF (b)(1).4a, (b)(7).E **CDR:** (b)(1).4a is primarily on the teams. It is not one of our requirements. If it is available, and it's not a TS asset, we have it up in the TOC, so that we can monitor it as well. But more often than not, it's TS and TOC is not cleared for that. So we can't get a hold of that.

SME-MH47: What's weather restriction? Do y'all have like any kind of (b)(1).4a -- we don't -- I didn't see your SOP.

TF (b)(1).4a, (b)(7).E **CDR:** Roger. It's a (b)(1).4a

(b)(1).4a

requirements.

SME-NGB: I just have one more question about lighting. Use of supplemental lighting devices, is that addressed in your SOP? Finger lights, lip lights, things like that -- flashlights --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** I don't recall.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** We have a supplemental lighting section in our SOP. We do.

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SME-NGB: And what type of supplement lighting devices, do you all normally fly with?

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: I just use a finger light, sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6) FLT AMC: I have a vest mounted NVG compatible light that's both white, and NVG compatible light that I fly with.

BG Colt: Any idea what **(b)(3), (b)(6)** flew with or **(b)(3), (b)(6)**

Left Door: I think **(b)(3), (b)(6)** had a finger light --

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: A yellow --

SME-NGB: -- a lip light?

(b)(3), (b)(6) FLT AMC: I don't think **(b)(3), (b)(6)** had a lip light. I believe he had a finger light.

SME-CH47: Okay. I've got three quick ones: **(b)(3), (b)(6)**, what MDS is he qualified?

(b)(3), (b)(6) FLT AMC: UH-60.

SME-CH47: Okay. Is he a pilot in command?

(b)(3), (b)(6) FLT AMC: He is.

SME-CH47: Your D-Model aircraft, are they configured with

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6) PC: They are, yes.

SME-CH47: And they have **(b)(1)1.4a**, and how about the cabin configuration -- typical? How do you configure the cabin as far as all the equipment that you have back there that you carry with

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you?

Right Door: The cabin is -- mostly, the seats down.

(b)(1)1.4a

BG Colt: Have any one of your door gunners shot since you have been here?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Yes, sir.

SME-MH47: Did y'all test fire on the way out?

Left Door: Not all the time. Not on this mission we didn't.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a **TF [redacted] CDR:** The problem we have here is during (b)(1)1.4a, you can't see the targets. We have a range that we put together when we got here, just right off the FOB. During (b)(1)1.4a and during (b)(1)1.4a, all the guys go out and shoot.

My standing guidance is: If you've got a short mission, being

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five hours or less, you go shoot [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] out there. And what I tell them all the time, "You only get better at shooting, by shooting." So that's what we do.

Now, with them -- the [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] set flying at night, in a good part of that time being [redacted (b)(1)1.4a], you can't clear the range out there. And they have a bunch of galats that popped up in the meantime. So it makes that more difficult to --

BG Colt: Is there any restriction in test firing in remote terrain.

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] CDR: We had a restriction that just came into play since we've been having contact the BSO, Battle Space Owner, had an order to conduct test fires. So a little bit more restrictive, but not entirely.

SME-CH47: And then the last question I have, sir, is probably for you more than these guys. On a given night, how many Chinooks from the task force launch?

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] CDR: Well, we have [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] Chinooks every night. We have the [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] that are [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] and [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] that are [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]. So they will launch, generally, about [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] based on acquiring targets. And the [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] set launches just about every single night. Very rarely do they not lunch. We have had a couple occasions.

BG Colt: One carrying out two missions, correct?

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TF [redacted] CDR: It's two separate missions.

BG Colt: [redacted] Chinooks doing GS --

TF [redacted] CDR: No. I'm sorry. [redacted] Chinooks doing GS; [redacted] Chinooks doing [redacted]. We did, until fairly recently, have [redacted] Chinooks. And then it was [redacted] [redacted].

SME-CH47: Are the GS missions predominately ring route type of stuff and resupply?

TF [redacted] CDR: We have never done ring route here. We did it in OEF-VII when we were here, and they had a couple when we first got here. They have gotten rid of them. Because they are GS, we find ourselves flying in support of -- well we have done every single task force out here.

When we had the second GS set down here, that was used predominately for deliberates. And when [redacted] got here, we were doing probably a deliberate every other night, whether it was [redacted] or any of the these other task forces. And then the other was doing GS. But sometimes we were actually doing two deliberates with those GS assets.

SME-CH47: Do you launch anything in the daytime, or predominately everything flies at night?

TF [redacted] CDR: No. I told all the conventional forces and our [redacted] brothers that we don't fly during the day. We have made

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exceptions. The only exception to that would have been in support of (b)(3), (b)(6) because their missions have gone long. It starts getting light around 4:30ish, right around there, depending on the time of year. But now lately. And sometimes the mission will go long. They understand that. And what they will do is they will go off to an offset.

My basic requirement is (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a But again, in the case of (b)(3), (b)(6) it's usually exfil.

And that's only happened a couple of times.

SME-MH47: What is your ASE? Which aircraft is that?

CMWS --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** APR39 and CMWS.

Court Reporter: What is that word you said again, sir? I'm sorry.

SME-MH47: (b)(1)1.4a .

BG Colt: Which stands for? (b)(1)1.4a .

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** (b)(1)1.4a

SME-MH47: And then what's your radio spread? You've got one FM --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** One (b)(1)1.4a one (b)(1)1.4a and a (b)(1)1.4a .

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** We also have high freq, but we don't have the

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base station set up here because of the antenna requirements.

SME-CH47: Is your (b)(1)1.4a secure? Do you have (b)(1)1.4a for that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** No.

SME-MH47: Uniform security level?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** We have the frequency --

SME-CH47: (b)(1)1.4a is the only secured --

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** -- we have frequency hop capability on Uniform.

SME-MH47: Well the (b)(1)1.4a is secure, right?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **PC:** Yes, sir.

SME-MH47: That's all I have, sir.

ASDAT: I'm going to go back and revisit a little bit of training. I want to start with (b)(3), (b)(6).

(b)(3), (b)(6), when you were at the mob cite or here in the unit have part of your left side door gunner and responsibilities and duties, what is the primary reference that you utilized in the training program for threat identification?

Left Door: I mean, we go through the classes of threats and stuff. I mean, most of mine has been past experience. A lot of it is just, know, fall on the S-2 slides and going through standards that are talking about other people that have been flying. Which kind of fall in those tactics.

ASDAT: Okay. So let's jump up one more level then.

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(b)(3), (b)(6) do you have a program that you are using for training for your door gunners?

Right Door: Yes, sir. We -- like (b)(1)1.4a or more like (b)(1)1.4a threat stuff?

ASDAT: There you go. That's what I'm kind of getting to. So you (b)(1)1.4a (ph). Now, what about any other thing that might be a little newer than that? We haven't shot (b)(1)1.4a for a long time. Okay. How about (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a, is anybody aware of what that acronym or that program is?
Negative response by all members.

ASDAT: Okay. (b)(3), (b)(6), are you aware of that program at all?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **FLT AMC:** I am not.

ASDAT: Through Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) we will get some more training for that. And, sir, that will help you out during the pilots briefs. That will give you some meat to the threats that folks see.

(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** That would be great. The things that we predominately hit around here are the things that we expect to see here (b)(1)1.4a (ph), you know (b)(1)1.4a, you know, the types of things that you are going to see more often than not around here.

ASDAT: Absolutely, sir. And it's going to be the weapons signature, not a (b)(1)1.4a sitting on a tripod or sitting [inaudible]

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technical. It's going to be that weapons system that we have to face in the air while it's flight. And that's the things that we want to show you.

64 Crews, we sent a series of videos to them. They were each aware of the (b)(1)1.4a program. They understood it as (b)(1)1.4a. And a lot of people do understand that program uses a different acronym for it.

We have stripped the names out of the videos and we were able to provide them in a series of videos in which they picked out what they thought the piece of ordinance was that interacted with Extortion 17.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: Yeah, great.

BG Colt: Good. Anybody else?

SME-CH47: One last question, sir. For any of you to speak up, has there been any issues or challenges regarding integration of crews with the guard active force together as far as crew coordination, negative habit transfers, any of those kinds of issues? Terminology differences?

Negative response by all members.

Right Door: What I noticed in the back is very minor. And we worked it out the this flight when I flew the first CCT, you know, debrief. And basically got everybody on the same page.

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It was very minor terminology basically. Nothing major at all.

TF 1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Hey, **(b)(3), (b)(6)** why don't you address the issue that we had with **(b)(3), (b)(6)** and these guys, just so they can hear it from your perspective. I addressed it a little yesterday.

(b)(3), (b)(6) FLT AMC: Well, when we got here last October, we took over as Task Force Headquarters. We integrated the **(b)(3), (b)(6)** National guard folks into our program. I believe Task Force **(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c** is very open and receptive to bringing people in, make them part of the team or the family, if you will.

(b)(3), (b)(6) didn't necessarily want to do that. I'm not going to shoot arrows at previous task forces, but they were -- as long as basically the Chinook company was over and they went and flew, that's all the task force seemed to care about. They didn't try to integrate them.

I'm a career UH-60 guy with about 4200 hours. I have a little less than 300 in the Chinook now. I went over there when these guys came in -- let me back up for a second. I went over and offered, you know -- I said I would like to progress with you guys, not only am I the task force commander's eyes and ears on standardization, but I thought it would be nice to be able to

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help them out with the resets. We fly the living crap -- the only way I know how to put it -- out of our Chinook folks. So I went over to offer my services. They didn't really want to integrate to well with that. Finally, through a series of events, I finally got progressed with those guys. And then when these guys came, being the [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] National Guard, much more team players wanted to integrate with the task force well, wanted me to go fly with them and help them out, so I did. And so that's kind of the differences between the two units.

Bit as far as integration, these guys have been fantastic. They came in, they're team players. We work well together.

1F 4a. (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Having said that since you weren't here yesterday, from my perspective, I really believe that's part of the leadership that was involved then. Because they had some phenomenal pilots and crew chiefs in that unit as well that did the [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] missions and did them very well.

But there was a distinct difference between that group and everybody else that's followed with them.

SME-CH47: How much support are you getting from brigade level standards? Specifically, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] he's a 47 guy --

(b)(3), (b)(6) FLT AMC: Yes, sir. He did a lot of my progression.

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SME-CH47: Is he coming down a lot and helping out and --

(b)(7) F.4a, (b)(7) CDR: He's been down here five or six times, something

like that, and has assisted greatly with not only progressions, in fact, he progressed **(b)(3), (b)(6)** here, and gave him his PC ride because it was just taking too long with **(b)(3), (b)(6)**.

And I prompted him. I said, "**(b)(3), (b)(6)** I need you to come down here, there's two guys that we have here on staff. **(b)(3), (b)(6)** (ph) has half his time 360 hours of goggle time, and was in the same boat." They didn't want to progress him.

So **(b)(3), (b)(6)** came down, got them both up. And has helped us with other issues too when we had a couple issues with one of their IPs, and then he would come down several times just to fly with **(b)(3), (b)(6)** and everybody else. Integrates very well.

SME-CH47: You didn't have a Hawaii guard with your task force here, did you?

(b)(7) F.4a, (b)(7) CDR: We did.

SME-CH47: How were they in comparison?

(b)(7) F.4a, (b)(7) CDR: Phenomenal. And, you know, you can talk to the

(b)(3), (b)(6) guys too because **(b)(3), (b)(6)** really didn't need them that much. But absolutely fantastic group.

SME-CH47: That's all I've, sir.

BG Colt: Anybody else?

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Negative response by all members.

BG Colt: Thank you for your time. I really appreciate it.

The investigation closed at 1742, 18 August 2011.

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