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The interview of the TF (b)(3), (b)(6) opened at 1605 Zulu, 17 August 2011, at FOB (b)(3), (b)(6)

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG J. Colt, US Army

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR: SME-INTEL

COURT REPORTER: CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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[TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2 was sworn in]

SME-INTEL: What we would like to start with is an overview of the threat assessment and an overview of the threat picture you saw that night itself [inaudible] Define why LEFTY GROVE was important to the network in the Tangi Valley, what was his level of importance and how did we come to target him there?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Objective LEFTY GROVE (Qari Thahir) was one of those targets that we talked about before. He was kind of handed to us as part of the Tangi Valley network of guys associated with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c crowd, previously associated with the Dunlap crowd, which as you pointed out sir was killed on June 5th by (b)(3), (b)(6) squadron as they were going after (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Precise date of the event?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Objective Dunlap?

BG Colt: Yes, on what date?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: He was killed on the fifth of June [2011].

BG Colt: June.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yes sir.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: A little bit before we got here, Objective Dunlap E came about as (b)(3), (b)(6) SQUADRON [Squadron Nickname] was going after Objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c who was a senior mover and shaker [within the Tangi Valley network] in that part of Saiyedd Abbad. So Objective LEFTY GROVE fit in that overall [Tangi Valley] network, he's part of that---part of the C2 [command and control] of the cells that operate in Sayyidabad specifically in the Tangi Valley. His historic pattern of life puts him right in the vicinity of where we went in on Objective LEFTY GROVE the night of the fifth morning of sixth of August [2011]. So the conversation in the Intelligence circle is after [Objective] Dunlap's gets killed who kinds of step into the leadership void. There's no solid evidence that says, yeah, Objective LEFTY GROVE was the guy, but kind of piecing together all of the different reporting streams that we see in between (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. You can make a reasonable assessment that [Objective] LEFTY GROVE,

if he didn't take over that role specifically by name, then now you're are the guy, you will have to take over for [Objective] Dunlap, which we will very rarely see by name replacements. He certainly moved up and took the reins coordinating what was left of [Objective] Dunlap cell. Between him and another objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [inaudible] and another objective of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that we have talked about. Those are kind of the main movers and shakers in that part of our AO [area of operation]. So that's kind of how we got on to him. Couple of night prior, leaving on the fourth, we went after Objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ourselves not Tangy Valley it was little bit to the south in the Baraki Barak district. We ended up killing Objective Lengen [inaudible] who was also associated with this target right here [reference to OBJ Lefty Grove]. We were all kind of on the right trail on the fourth [ref. 04 August 2011] between [Objective] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and the remnants of Objective Dunlap's network etc. We were in the right area, we were watching the right signature, so we thought we had a pretty good bead if not on [Objective] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c then [Objective] LEFTY GROVE or some of the other folks that were part of the network. So that kind of drove us to, hey let's take a good hard look between the fourth [4th of August] and the fifth [5th of August], let's take a good hard look at [Objective] LEFTY GROVE and see if we can't start really having some positive effects on that network. We had already killed one guy and [Objective] DUNLAP was killed a couple of month prior, and let's start trying to take it to that network.

BG Colt: You said he was killed on the fourth [ref. 4th of August 2011].

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yes, sir. Objective LENGEN was killed on the fourth of August. So that was kind of what brought us to hey, why [Objective] LEFTY GROVE, again it was part of the targeting methodology trying to put pressure on that network [reference Tangi Valley Taliban network] specifically.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-INTEL: From a network stand point, [Objective] LEFTY GROVE will he or do you think he can lead you to anything or who's his superiors were, so to speak?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: His superiors are back at Pakistan as best we understand sir.

SME-INTEL: Shadow governor types.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Right, he's high enough in the food chain [network] where his call activity [signals intelligence] suggests that he is talking to the real movers and shakers that are across the border [in Pakistan] and just kind of as a side, after the attack on EXTORTION 17, there were a couple of indications that LEFTY GROVE had been promoted and received some type of increase in stature because of that attack. That kind of further validates his level as moving up the chain.

BG Colt: How do you know this?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: From SIGINT [Signals Intelligence] sir. Just guys talking about it after the event if it is OK to talk at the TSCI level, we listen to guys' conversations.

SME-INTEL: No, no TS/SCI (Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information), if we can discuss the network and how it is bad at the Secret level

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I apologize.

SME-INTEL: If he's raised in status that's good.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yeah, we have SIGINT [Signals Intelligence] indication that he has raised his status as a result of EXTORTION 17 attack.

We need to talk at the level of fidelity that the target audience really wants to know.

SME-INTEL: The other piece with me is we want to highlight who would be shadow Governor of Wardak and his control or his interaction with this Tangy Valley group [and] where (Objective (b)(1)1.4a) is currently resides right now what is your assessment of that.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: The shadow Governor of Wardak is an objective (b)(1)1.4a.

BG Colt: Say that again.

IO: Objective (b)(1)1.4a a much cooler name than what he deserves. Sir, he hangs out in Pakistan pretty regularly, he has been in Chark district, Wardak sporadically over the past couple weeks that we have been out here. His level of

leadership; his level of C2 [Command and Control] expands across the all of Wardak [Province] that's why he's the shadow Governor there [in Wardak]. He has a direct role to ensure that all the different Taliban cells under his purview are carrying out the grand scheme of the Taliban Shuras.

SME-INTEL: How does he link back into Pakistan? Is he linked back into what shura? Is he funneled back into the Quetta Shura?.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yes, sir. Quetta Shura.

SME-INTEL: [inaudible] what then is his association based on geographic with Haqqani network networks?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: When we see [Objective] (b)(1)1.4a comes back into Wardak [Province] we see him hang out in (b)(1)1.4a [area] primarily which is where the Haqqani [Network] safe haven is. So there is a lot of assessed association there. The interesting piece is when [Objective] (b)(1)1.4a comes back into country, we know, I've gotta get passed the classification, we have good indications of via multiple [intelligence] source when he comes back into the country we know he's back and our ability to collect when he's back in town [intelligence reporting] drops off the table if that makes sense. He is very OPSEC [operational security] savvy, he expands his OPSEC savviness to entire districts around him when he moves in and out of the area, so that is kind of how we know he is around.

SME-INTEL: So he [Objective] (b)(1)1.4a does move through Tangi valley.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I'm not tracking that specifically sir.

SME-INTEL: He controls what? --

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: He is the shadow government for Wardak. He controls Taliban activities [inaudible] to include Tangy Valley, which is also a couple of leaps of logic there, but those guys [the Taliban] are set in motion for a reason, that's why they are here.

IO (b)(3), (b)(6): So there is an established relationship between Taliban, Haqqani, shadow governments in the [area of operation] Tangi area?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Correct.

SME-INTEL: Anybody have any specific questions.

SME-GFA: The target specifically **its historical** bed down location?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: It hard to say if it was actual BDL (bed down location) that we went after that night, his SI pattern of life strongly suggested that he [Objective LEFTY GROVE] was in that village at some point.

SME-GFA: At some point that day?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Correct, the last---the last SI indication that we had him [Objective LEFTY GROVE] at the ten series was 1420ish Zulu that day. And it has kind of goes to targeting the Wardak [network] in Logar, the Taliban guys are smart enough to know that at certain times they need to stop doing what they are doing that we can see and hear and they start altering their pattern of life to complicate our targeting efforts. So that's kind of what we saw on the night of the fifth [ref. 05 August 2011]. We had the key grid and the 1400 Zulu timeframe from Objective LEFTY GROVE at the ten series buildings [reference CONOP Ground Reference Grid (GRG)]. Subsequent to that his SI (signals-communications) drops off then we watch two movers from the ten series go north, **northeast** to what we think is a mosque; kind of lock that place down **IMINT** (Imagery Intelligence...ref to **ISR Full Motion Video feed**) wise. **From there typical starburst down the Mosque all kinds of guys get out prayer time is over,** what we did see however was two PAX transit back down to the ten series followed closely by three or four other guys that came down and kind of hung out by the front gate and they also went into the building. So at that point we were confident if it wasn't that guy the picture is not going to get much better than that. So that's what kind of drew up the trigger conversation and the start the planning process.

BG Colt: I'm sorry say again the time that occurred?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: The P-grid [ref. signals intelligence term; 'possible grid' based on signal telemetry] was sir, about the 1420z timeframe. So from the intelligence perspective, we kind of **wait** with baited breath as we do most nights to make sure nothing moves off that compound or things don't come back in or the (b)(1)14a, (b)(1)14c doesn't travel all over the place

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so as we are trying to lock down that compound from an intelligence perspective, we saw the movers that worries us, see a starburst out of the Mosque that worries us even more. The fact that we had PAX return to the ten series kind of re-instills the fact that there's a reasonably good chance that [Objective] LEFTY GROVE actually came back to that village.

BG Colt: I'm probably missing this, but this is 2000 Zulu a period of darkness before correct?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: No, sir. This is 1400 Zulu that day [ref. 05 August 2011].

BG Colt: 1400Z that day.

SME-INTEL: Reference the mosque itself, [is it] contained within this compound?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: The mosque if, I believe [it the 80 or the 90 series I believe it was the 80 series building. The compound is just to the north.

BG Colt: Okay.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Again, that's kind of what we see on the target out here. Guys walk on, SI (Signals Intelligence) drops, guys walk, motos [ref. motorcycles] or PAX (ref..personnel) whatever, starburst out. It becomes a kind of shell game ISR [ref. ISR platforms over the target area] wise trying to make sure we are keeping tabs on the guys who we think are the TIs [targeted individuals].

SME-GFA: Is this the first time the assault force had gone after Objective LEFTY GROVE?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yes, sir. This was Objective LEFTY GROVE 1.

SME-INTEL: Any indications or correlation now with HUMINT [human intelligence reports] as well as the SI [signals intelligence] for the day, with FMV (full motion video) in the event in the significant pieces that also related to the targeted area on that day [inaudible].

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: We are not tracking HUMINT [human intelligence]. HUMINT in Tangy Valley is difficult because the Taliban have the valley pretty much locked down, so getting placement and access [~critical component for human

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intelligence] becomes problematic.

IO: Anymore questions.

BG Colt: Any other significant operations conducted in the battle space since you've been here by 4/10th Mountain Division that were complimentary in nature or anything? Have you tried to use the general purpose force (GPF) in order to stimulate any of these things?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: The only thing I'm tracking; I want to make sure, is in Charkh District a few weeks ago [inaudible] back a few weeks. The big conversation was to try to do something during the day, because these guys are smart enough to know that if their SI (communications) drops off by 1500 / 1600Z every day, that they are going to be pretty safe because they understand that's how we [coalition forces] target [enemy networks]. So the conversation becomes as we're tracking all throughout the day on SI [signals intelligence] and watching them with IMINT to try to take a swing [ref. 'to conduct an operation'] at them during the day. They report themselves that they know that are safe, so we're trying to disrupt that [ability]. So, the general purpose force (GPF) conversation came in with trying to rope in some of the ODA [ref. Operational Detachment-Alpha; 12 member special forces team assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan] guys maybe some of their commando teams to where we go hit an objective at night ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~, we leave, everybody [in place] and all the bad guys go back to feeling good and happy, but we've also infilled an ODA (Operational Detachment-Alpha) or a group of commandos on over-watch position to try to then pick up some kind of signature as the ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~ up and these guys are back to their normal POL (pattern of life) because they know the 'bearded guys with green eyes are gone for the night (ref. Taliban use to refer to special operations forces). So, we've had those kinds of conversations. I'll have to check back with the Ops [operations] guys to figure out where that conversation has gone, but we had that conversation when we went into the Charkh District a few weeks ago. The BSO (Battle Space Owner) was doing a deliberate clearance of Charkh District; Operation Dagger Fiery (ref. Operational name of the conventional mission), again, it was a couple of weeks ago. So, the complimentary pieces in place for us was to kind of put those pieces in place to try to clear out some of the main bad guys in advanced with the BSO (Battle Space Owner) coming in with all of his choice of his people.

BG Colt: And looking at that district on here, where relative in Charkh is that?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yes, from Charkh District, it's the Argon Valley, which is approximately right through here. That is kind of the black hole for the Haqqani and Taliban through the entire province of Wardak. A lot of our [enemy] senior leaders -- we think a lot of the senior level Haqqani guys are hanging out within Wardak; the example I just gave with Dagger Fiery is more a Haqqani specific conversation but we had tried to expand that to places in Sayyidabad [District, Wardak Province] and places in Logar [Province] as well. Maybe we could work more of a conventional angle during the day, and we also have had an SI (signals intelligence) imminent on targets in the Logar and Wardak [Provinces] for that matter and have passed that target gate off to the BSO (Battle Space Owner) and said objective so-and-so is here right now and they'll go out and they'll roll that guy up [in order to action the target]. It's happened twice since we've been here. So, again, they action daytime [targets] which is part of a based on piece of what we're trying to do.

BG Colt: Anybody else?

SME-MH47: In the last 30 days, sir, of looking at Tangy Valley, along with your SIGACTs (signals intelligence), how many did you have [within the Tangi Valley area]?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yeah, so SIGACTs (significant activities) are all over this place. I can pull up the slide, just give me a second. (Reference CONOP Brief) So, it's pretty representative of SIGACTs (significant activities). Each of those red blocks there's either direct fire, indirect fire, or some type of IED (improvised explosive device) was found in the clearance setup. So, yeah, not safe places to go rolling in through if you don't know what you're doing.

BG Colt: Who's your reporting source against those SIGACTS (significant activities)?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: This is an all source compilation, sir. This graphic is produced by the NGA [ref. National Geospatial Agency] folks up in TF (b)(3), (b)(6), but the data stored behind that is everything from BSO (Battle Space Owner)

SITREPs (situation reports) related to stuff that we encounter on objectives so it's -- again, it's a huge repository of our significant events, our significant acts across the battle space. This is just one of the standard planning products that we pull up; and each one of these dots on here has meta (ref...specific information related to the event to include date, time, specific information, unit, etc.) data behind it that says, "what happened, when was it, who was involved," all that kind of stuff. So, if we need to drill down to the level of granularity where we can pick apart any single one of those, we can. This is more for the commanders SA. [situational awareness]. A lot of red is not good, so to make sure everybody is tracking through that specific program.

SME-GFA: What time window does this product cover?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I think, I have to go back and double check, but it goes back at least to 2009. I have a replica data stored on my servers here that goes back to at least 2009, so it's for the past couple of years' worth of data [reported in Afghanistan/Regional Command-East].

GFN2: So, what's your understanding for why they pulled out of [COP Tangi] and your assessment of the southeast?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I'm not tracking that, sir. I don't know.

IO: [inaudible]

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: That was back in, I think April [circa 2011] time frame.

SME-GFA: So there is no constant friendly force present in this valley?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: No, sir there is not. That is bad guy terrain.

SME-GFA: How often does the battle space owner go through there, or ANA (Afghan National Army) or anybody?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I'm not tracking that, sir. I'm not sure. We don't go there -- our Task Force does not go in there very

often. It's been in a hand full of times that I can count since we've been here.

SME-GFA Plus, do you have an idea what the last time Task Force actioned an Objective [inaudible].

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: We went to Tangy Valley, there was an objective, I believe it was this guy right here that our (b)(3), (b)(6) squadron guys went to the first couple of weeks that we were here, we headed back - but had not been back there since, so this LEFTY GROVE was the second time we had been out there.

BG Colt: Was that also rotary wing assault?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: It was, sir. There was a sizable offset to the south and then our guys just made a silent foot patrol from the south as a few kilometers -- five plus kilometers, kind of walk, if I remember correctly.

IO: What is your threat assessment for the rotary wing infil? What did you give to your Task Force?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yeah, the rotary wing infil -- the numbers are kind of misleading. There's not a lot of Surface to Air Fire (SAFIRE) incidents, just because we don't fly there very often. But the thing is a percentage of how often we fly rotary wing into that valley, the threat is significantly higher, perhaps higher than metrics alludes to. We had the conversation about RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), where you know, this [ref. terrain feature] little finger that jets down into the valley is kind of known as RPG (rocket propelled grenade) hill. There's a lot of spotting activity [in the valley]. (b)(3), (b)(6) went in on Objective (b)(1)1.4a back in June [2011]. There was a more complex, coordinated attacks with RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), small arms fire, during the infil into that objective, so that was kind of conversations was because we were getting ready for [inaudible].

IO: Hence it is one of our TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) that you guys talked about the use of (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a. Has the S-2 noticed, has enemy noticed that? Can they take that as a precursor to an attack?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: If they did, I'm not tracking that they've been tipped off to that. Their comms do not reflect if they're tipped off TTP.

[Inaudible]

IO: Is this the same card that the aircrew has access to? Is there an analyst same exact product as far as hand to hand -- at what point in the planning process are they working on this?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: So, this product is cranked out very soon. As the mission, as soon as a WARNO (warning order) drops, initiate guys [inaudible] for all the CONOPs (concept of operations) across the theater. Whether this product specifically makes it to the ARSOA (Army Special Operations Aviation - 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment) guys or the Night OP (operations) guys here, I'm not tracking that, but as soon as the conversation becomes about yeah, we're going to look at this objective. I think the S2 shop for (b)(2), (b)(6) and the S2 for the ARSOA start cranking up their slide products. They have got a multi-slide threat analysis that goes through the Surface to Air Fire (SAFIRE) -- it's more air specific. This is more tailored to just an overall ground force [inaudible] encounter, but the nearest specific threat line is coming from the subject matter experts with the rotary wing [aviation] folks. So, that's kind of parallel on the threat planning processes from the 2 [Intelligence] shops. Does that make sense?

IO: For Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6) [inaudible] I guess it was an important part of that question was [inaudible] because I've got the products that they've been like [inaudible] and stuff and that's why I was asking like how soon before [inaudible].

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yeah, (b)(3), (b)(6). We've seen this before [inaudible] before it and bring it in to this room to talk, to get the playing pieces [inaudible] this light comes on. I'm not tracking if this goes to a specific S2 in ARSOA and what not. But, I know that they're also going through their parallel planning process.

IO: Do you have a descent relationship or what would you assess your level of relationship with (b)(3), (b)(6) S-2 and their lead planners [inaudible]. Have you ever met any of them?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: The conversations that I had with the (b)(3), (b)(6) come in the form of his slides would then come to me, but just looking over, "Hey, where are they looking at from rotary wing threat perspective?" If I have questions. At that point, I would go back and follow up with a phone call. [inaudible].

IO: Okay, so you don't have a direct relationship then? Objective LEFTY GROVE's got a PSD (Personal Security Detachment) I would imagine. Do you have an idea of what he has for PSD or other than small arms?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I'm not tracking any specific reporting that he has a PSD (personal security detachment) or what that conversation was like.

IO: Alright, how about NVG (Night Vision Goggles) use?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I'm not tracking that level of fidelity.

IO: Do you have any cache roll-ups out of any mission source any of the RPGs (rocket propelled grenades) were scanned - related to any activity that they found in that valley?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Yes, to the terms of the historic Surface to Air Fire (SAFIRE); is that what you're asking about?

IO: Just the last 180 days.

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: Just the last 90 days, there were, I believe four Surface-to-Air Fire (SAFIRE) events, to include this one.

IO: Any weapons found in caches as far as did they have anything down [inaudible] RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenades)?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: No, we don't go into that valley [inaudible] nor do we usually find caches of that type to really say, "yeah, [inaudible]" or "yeah, those are [inaudible] DsHK, etc." That conversation -- we don't have that level of resources. We get kind of a standard intelligence reporting related to [inaudible] AKs (ref. small caliber weapon), RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), PKMs (small caliber, automatic weapon), [inaudible].

BG Colt: I think what he's asking are there any unique RPG variants that have been decidedly determined to be present here in this AO?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: I don't know that, sir.

IO: Yeah, that's where I was going with that. What about the eight EKIA (enemy killed in action) that we had? Was there any SSE (sensitive site exploitation) done on them to identify those that had RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), what [inaudible] they had? Was that collected?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: If that's collected, I'm not tracking what that is, sir.

BG Colt: Do we know what happens to the weapons systems, for instance, of these EKIA's (enemy killed in action) from this particular event?

TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2: From this particular event, I don't know a standard procedure. I believe it's to blow those weapons in place; however, I'm not sure if these got taken off the objection and put somewhere else, I'm not tracking.

IO: Any other questions?

[Inaudible talking in the background]

BG Colt: Okay, thank you.

[The interview concluded]