The interview of the 10 CAB J-2 and Assistant J-2 opened at 1500 Zulu on 16 August 2011 at Bagram AB.

PERSONS PRESENT

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR SME-INTEL

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)
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SME-INTEL: Good evening my name is [SME-INTEL] (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6). I am a member of the team investigating the circumstances surrounding the crash of the CH-47 helicopter and Wardak Providence, Afghanistan on 6 August 2011. BG Jeffrey Colt is the investigating officer in this case and was appointed by General James N. Mattis, Commander of U.S. CENTCOM, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The findings and recommendations as to appropriate action will be included in the report to General James N. Mattis in accordance with AR 15-6. Before we began the interview will you please review and sign the following privacy statement which has been completed. Next we will administer an oath at this time. And right now the time is 1515Z August 16, 2011. If we can start at the beginning and review the package that you presented in front of me and the other documents presented here.

10 CAB ASST J2: What we have presented to you is an overall threat assessment. The top document is the 10th CAB HLZ [helicopter landing zone] Air Threat Criteria [Ex. 50] that 10th CAB S2 created near the beginning of the deployment to assist in our analysis and understanding of how ground threat relates to air threat. This sets the standard for how the 10th CAB assesses HLZ threat. So basically, what you have on the front page is the condensed version. The next couple of pages are the in-depth version as well as the justification to what the left and right

limits for the assessment and assist our analyst in understanding why it matters. This is an internal document pushed from the Brigade to all the Task Force S2.

SME-INTEL: So the reporting criteria for HLZ [HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE] threat is the 10th CAB standard?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes

SME-INTEL: Has this been vetted up through the chain?

10 CAB S2: Yes

10 CAB S2: 10th CAV S2 here, this has been vetted through the Brigade S3, the Brigade XO and was presented to (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) is the final approval authority.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes Sir. For situational awareness the process was implemented in November [2010] as we prepared for the Spring and Summer [2011] offensive. We did review it again and it was re-approved in May.

SME-INTEL: Okay, so the initial implementation of this was in November 2010, and just recently 10th CAB approved and reviewed in May 2011, approximately every 6 months.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: Has this been vetted outside 10th CAB and socialized with any other units?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB ASST S2: Myself, I've passed it up through two divisions [CJTF-101 and CJTF-1,] to the RIIC [Regional Information and Intelligence Center] - there is a Captain up there, they are helping with air precedents for our coalition force partners - this is also posted on CENTRIX [Coalition SIPRNet] and SIPRNet portals so that everyone has an awareness of what the standard is but, again also pushed up to the CJ2 [at Regional Command-East] so they understand how we are assessing threat in case questions come up.

SME-INTEL: Can you define the RIIC?

10 CAB ASST S2: I'm sorry, sir, the RIIC is the S2 cell - the functional cell for the CJ2, where several sections are located like your GEOINT [geospatial intelligence], your SIGINT [Signals Intelligence] - your analysts are located – it is also where your COIC civilians, CAOC civilians would be located, and your overall – not necessarily the J2 or the CJ2 - assistant J2, but, all the captains – also your (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d cell would be located in that section.

SME-INTEL: Okay, that is with CJTF-1?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, the initial one was through CJTF-101.

SME-INTEL: Now what I would like to do is go over the next package, which is the air threat assessment?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir, the second document that we provided for you is the Area Threat Assessment. We completed

this in June [2011]; again this was in preparation for the summer fighting season we have been asked by (b)(3), (b)(6) to come up with a method and a manner with which to describe the threat for a HLZ, but for a threat for an area, transitioning to and from an area. So sometimes an HLZ will have a different threat assessment in an overall area, meaning that the area itself has a risk level, but certain HLZs based on coalition force presence or lack of presence may have a higher threat, that's just situational. The method that we use is we look at historical (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c activity against aircraft in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c from the first of April 2010 through the 30th of May 2011. What we notice is that essentially those SAFIRE locations don't change greatly. So those are your highest risk areas historically, from one Spring to the next Spring so that includes a Spring, a Summer, a Winter, and a Fall fighting season so that gives us a look forward on what we can expect this upcoming Summer. We then - if you go through the packet - reviewed threat criteria. It's the second page. The threat criteria for an area are very slightly different than HLZ threat criteria. And, that's just because you are talking about an area versus necessarily a specific location related to a ten-digit grid. Very similar, but some slight differences. We identified in June high threat areas those were in the Pech, Korengal and Watapur area - as well as in the Alasay River

Valley. What I highlighted, tabbed in the very back with a red tab is an assessment for Sayyid Abad and Tangi. Again this was an area that has had historical SAFIRE which it was identified as potentially being a threat in the upcoming Summer. Based on the information in the next couple of pages, you will see the justification on why we assess Sayyid Abad and Tangi as a moderate threat.

SME-INTEL: Okay, what I would like to do is to neck-in to Tangi Valley, and just discuss what you saw as a threat at that time - not at that time, but what your assessment was in the Tangi Valley.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

10 CAB ASST S2: Okay, sir, do you want me to read the block here?

SME-INTEL: Not necessarily read it, if it helps you that's fine, but if you can describe it to me in the aspects of what you saw and what type of SAFIRE, what frequency of success there was, what type weapons system you saw, so just a general overview.

10 CAB ASST S2: Overall sir, Tangi was a historical hotspot for SAFIRE activity. The normal TTP [tactics, techniques and procedures] we saw in that area was IDF [indirect fire] and IED [improvised explosive devices] against coalition force movement. Your small arms fires, you are going to have your AK-47, we did

have reports of heavy machine guns things like that in the nature - not necessarily manifested but a lot of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c correlation. We knew that the Tangi was a support zone for the insurgent area. The local population was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c we didn't have a lot of friendly local population in the area - again which is why it was a rich support for the insurgents. When coalition force presence, specifically US coalition force presence decreased in the previous months, the insurgents gained a lot of momentum. We had assessed in June [2011] that the risk to aircraft was going to increase as the insurgent population continued to gain local support over the Summer months. So this was an area that we wanted to keep an eye on as with all of the areas in this packet. If you turn to the next page, this kind of goes down into the SAFIREs. Now these SAFIREs - again this was done in the beginning of June [2011] so we went through the end of May. These are the SAFIREs that we saw from the fall, essentially just prior to 10th CAB taking over here and all the way through the Spring, so these are the SAFIREs that we saw. The type of weapons systems were primarily small arms fires, or we did have a couple instances of RPGs [Rocket Propelled Grenade] combined with small arms fire, and so we did have a couple instances of RPG alone. We had one instance with heavy machine gun: that was against a V-22 [CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft]. So this is kind of a roll-up of what we

saw from the Fall to the Spring, of SAFIRE activity overall. Overall, sir, we had ten - eleven SAFIRE involving RPG's.

SME-INTEL: Okay, what makes them significant going back to the assessment?

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, again this is [10 CAB ASST S2] (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), the way 10th CAB assesses SAFIRE criteria starting from the top and working our way down, we have four levels. A

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

total loss, but if the aircraft cannot continue mission. Also if any personnel within the aircraft have been hit because of that enemy fire, so if a bullet hits and a shrapnel piece comes off and hits a person, that is considered a "major" SAFIRE. Also, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c SAFIRE, because it's an advanced TTP. So that's a "major." A (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c SAFIRE means the aircraft was hit, but the aircraft can continue mission and no personnel were injured. That is one of the most common types of hits that we have with small arms fire. So (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c means that the aircraft was hit - another level of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c if it occurred from two or more points of origin. So if they shot at from different location, and again that comes from the S2 and it falls under the criteria of the first document of the advance TTP's and how well is the enemy able to collaborate the

attack, if it's a complex attack, things of that nature. So that is why it would be (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to us. A (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c means that they were shot at but, that neither the aircraft nor any personnel were hit also it happen from one point of origin. And then a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is where the aircraft itself did not realize at the time that it was being shot at and they were reported from either a ground or a wingman "hey, you are getting shot at." Usually, in a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c the aircraft does not maneuver, does not take evasive action. So those are the four criteria as you see a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-INTEL: So for clarification under documentation here for the - how far out does that look again? I don't know if you brought that up or not. You are looking at center mass grid and how far out?

10 CAB S2: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Kilometers

SME-INTEL: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: So over the last year of the data available, 29 September 2010, was the major SAFIRE incident in the area - it was a UH-60 - RPG, and the number of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was four.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

10 CAB ASST S2: When this document was created in June, yes. That is correct.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Do you have an update?

10 CAB ASST S2: I do, sir, it's not in this document but it's in further as we go through this packet.

SME-INTEL: So we will get to it?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Alright, thank you.

10 CAB ASST S2: The reason we wanted to include this area threat assessment from June is because this is the document that Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c our Task Force, had available to them as a moderate threat, and why brigade was pushing down that this is a moderate threat. So this is the document that the S2 at Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was functioning under or would have fallen under.

10 CAB S2: Yes, this is [10 CAB S2] (b)(3), (b)(6) yes, (b)(3), (b)(6) would see all these packets and again he approves them and then we send them to the task forces to make sure that they know what (b)(3), (b)(6) approved, and then they can disseminate it and brief their pilots, their aircrews.

SME-INTEL: Okay, alright.

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, one caveat for understanding purposed at the brigade level we push down the approved minimum threat

assessment. The Task Force - built into the original documents our check and balances based on time line. So how often something is reviewed. If something is a high threat and it is only in effect by definition for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c days, then in that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c day mark it is re-reviewed, and the Task Force themselves submit a packet up to brigade for (b)(3), (b)(6) for re-approval for either an elevation or a downgrade of a threat assessment. So the Task Force has a lot of internal capability to adjust their threat assessment - not necessarily dictated to them from brigade, except in a very minimum standard. Its offers task forces the ability to know the battlefield better than we do at the brigade level.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: Also, as I turn the page, one more time, as we refer back to the area threat assessment [Ex. 49], the next slide is reporting. This is reporting of significant threat to aircraft. What we saw over the spring was essentially that they were moving ZPUs [12.7mm anti-aircraft artillery system] into the area or heavy machine gun the threat to aircraft was that insurgent (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

that we had against aircraft for the aviation threat.

SME-INTEL: Okay and the second report there in Chak-E Wardak is that the one - you referring to the one bring up the threats specifically?

10 CAB ASST S2: Two reports, yes.

SME-INTEL: The second one on the report is what the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c there - what was stated in that report there? Do you know specifically or can you provide that report to me?

10 CAB ASST S2: I can provide that report, sir. Let me grab that, I don't have that in this packet. The overall from it was that insurgents were going to attempt to target aircraft directly.

SME-INTEL: Did not say how or TTPs?

10 CAB ASST S2: No, just that they were going to, yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: If you can provide me with reports of what the source level - was it an (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c source.

10 CAB ASST S2: Absolutely, sir, we will get that to you. Both of those are IIR [intelligence information report] are situational.

SME-INTEL: They never developed into TDs or anything?

10 CAB ASST S2: No, sir.

SME-INTEL: Okay, whatever the summary of the report is - any attributes provided in the report I'll submit that into our records as well.

10 CAB ASST S2: Okay.

10 CAB S2: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: On the next page, sir, this is the recent reporting. This is all the reporting in the Tangi Valley in the Sayyid Abad districts specifically - overall, not necessarily just against aircraft. The reason we include this when we do an air threat assessment, as you know sir - if a ground threat, even if it's not directed at aircraft, shows a certain level of insurgent capability and desires to target coalition forces. A lot of times, in fact the majority of everything we have seen SAFIRE-wise in b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c has been a target of opportunity. And if you have a TIC [troops in contact] going on or you have something else where the insurgents are actively shooting coalition forces and we bring an aircraft in, even if we never saw a threat to aircraft prior to that, the ability, and the will, and desire, and the motivation of the insurgents to target that aircraft when given the opportunity is obviously increased.

SME-INTEL: Can you orient me real quick on the job here, where the aircraft is? The location?

10 CAB ASST S2: On this particular slide right here, this was done through the Spring from May to June so the aircraft itself - as far as the FALLEN ANGEL -- sorry sir, it's not a really good printout, I will have to get back to you on where exactly the FALLEN ANGEL was.

SME-INTEL: That's okay, let follow up with that after this so I can use this as a reference. It's a good roll-up of the SIGACTS [significant activities] that means they are all from SIGACTs; correct?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, this is all from SIGACTs.

SME-INTEL: Great.

10 CAB ASST S2: If that - what type of attack it was what we suspected the targets to have been, and the weapon system used on it. Sir, this last side here, for Tangi Valley was the overall threat assessment given from the BSO - also Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c itself their (b)(3), (b)(6) - commander there [TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6)- theirs, and our, internal recommendation to (b)(3), (b)(6) CAB CDR] this was approved by (b)(3), (b)(6) as a moderate.

SME-INTEL: That is good to see, now do you know or does that relationship exist when we do it by target? It's probably something more Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c S2 can answer, but if everybody can hear [inaudible] - do you guys have any kind of stamp of approval on per operations from the intel perspective? "We agreement with their assessment for the CONOPS"?

10 CAB S2: When they are doing CONOPS [concept of operations], the ground forces get with our Task Force - in this instance (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c so when they look at the threat - I mean the ground and also in the air. So the S2 down in battalion will tell them, "this is the threat as far as the air is concerned,"

so let's say it's moderate, but yes, the Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and the ground force from - this is Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - so they will get together and they go - and the S2 will get together and go over the threat criteria and our S2 will say, "okay, for us for the air threat is moderate," so, yes there is a procedure to where the Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c gets with the BSO to make sure that they are all working together and concur on the threat.

SME-INTEL: And that is one of the things that we are tasked to look at is: What is the process? How we can do the threat assessment? How do we mitigate against the ground operation and the target data? And how do we then mitigate those risk when we are doing these operation or what process are in place for this? So I appreciate this.

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, if you would slide to the very last slide. This is mitigation measures that were developed not by the S2 but by the TACOPs [Tactical Operations] and the S3. We included it into the S2 folder for the area threat assessment for situational awareness to our task forces' S2s as well as to make sure that the S3 and the S2 and the TACOPS function smoothly and have a unified understanding. If it's a moderate risk, if it's a high risk, if it's a moderate or high risk, there are certain things that are overall expected of a task force in preparation for operations and that the mitigation letters in place.

10 CAB S2: And that is done also at the battalion level with the S2 and the S3 and the TACOPs.

SME-INTEL: So at the brigade and the battalion?

10 CAB S2: Yes

SME-INTEL: How often is this mitigation measure reviewed?

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, I am not knowledgeable on that, particularly because it is again a S3 and TACOPs product. We just publish what we have been told is the standard. I don't want to speak out of my lane on that.

SME-INTEL: Okay. That is a cue to talk to our TACOPS guys about that as well.

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, the third document that we provided for you in the packet is what (b)(3), (b)(6) just kind of explained. This is the S2 portion of the actual CONOPS [Ex. 30] from that night with the Extortion 17. I'm sure you will see it in its entirety; we just included the S2 portion so that you can see how it was developed. This CONOP - it takes the SIGACTs prior to going into the operation so that the first two slides are from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c in fact the first three slides are from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. The fourth slide is from Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c itself and this is the air threat that is briefed to the pilots prior to the mission. As you see this one was briefed "moderate to high" for all of the LZs. The reason that it was a briefed moderate to high is as you know - as we discussed, the overall

threat for the area of Tangi Valley was a moderate, but based on whom they were going after and the level of protection that the person and early warning network that would be involved in any separate operation, can elevate and so this one due to the location, due to the proximity of Qalats and due to the target, went from being just a moderate to high. And there is a justification on there as well.

SME-INTEL: This is also the planned for the air threat on their ingress and egress route?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes that is what you see here actually.

10 CAB S2: It's from the beginning from when the crews are going to load up the aircraft all the way to the infil operations and then also from exfil operation. That is what you see on this slide.

SME-INTEL: I have a couple of questions. That is backing up with AO (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c SIGACTs that first sought after the coverage that is the last 24hrs prior to going in SIGACTs.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

10 CAB S2: I don't want to speculate how they do their briefing, but I'm pretty sure they want to know the last 24hrs before they commence the operation to see if there were any changes on the threat.

SME-INTEL: Near the target, but not necessary in the vicinity that day – this is 1132D, 1528D, 0426D, we had a small fire, RPG's and a burst of PKM [7.62mm machine gun].

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: That day prior to the insertion.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB ASST S2: And then the second slide is the two weeks and as you can see Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c identified a disruption zone as well as obviously as we mention before Tangi Valley being a support zone for the insurgents, and where they believe the objectives to be located in vicinity to the disruption zone and operations in the SIGACTs.

SME-INTEL: Okay, and then the assessment of the support zone, was pretty the valley area where Objective LEFTY GROVE and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)d were located.

10 CAB ASST S2: Were located. Yes, sir.

10 CAB ASST S2: And then even deeper, again situationally then there's one for the last (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c days of SIGACTS to get more broad of this historical prior to going in. That leaves you with the air threat, the accumulation air threat from all that data from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. The next slide is the most recent major SAFIRE in the valley that was on the 6th of June.

SME-INTEL: So approximately one month prior to the execution?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: Can you give me a roll up of what the SAFIRE was type of weapon, was there damage or no damage to the aircraft?

10 CAB ASST S2: I'm going to review the story board quickly sir. There was no damage to the aircraft this one was a major SAFIRE based on the amount of points of origin from being shot at. There have been in 30 days prior to this, four other SAFIRE as well within 10 nautical miles of COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Specifically this one.

10 CAB S2: Yes, for this one as you see the events time of the major events its talks about 10 to 15 RPG rounds that were fired at the aircraft.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, 10 to 15.

10 CAB S2: So that why it is considered a major SAFIRE because it was more than three POO sites. Even though it didn't hit the aircraft, but that is why it's considered major SAFIRE.

SME-INTEL: So 6 June, 10 to 15 RPG's fired?

10 CAB S2: Correct.

SME-INTEL: What was the number of POO sites?

10 CAB ASST S2: Well there was also small arms fire.

10 CAB S2: It doesn't specify on this story board how many POO sites there were.

SME-INTEL: Yea - it says it looks like five.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, and this particular instance they did not think hasty air assault, they didn't land they ended up aborting the mission because of the heavy enemy activity in the area that evening.

SME-INTEL: And this was objective-

10 CAB ASST S2: I believe also Objective LEFTY GROVE.

SME-INTEL: And they aborted this mission?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, they did sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

10 CAB ASST S2: Later on Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c aircraft did complete the hasty air assault.

SME-INTEL: Say that one again.

10 CAB ASST S2: When this event occurred it was right after midnight, it was about 0044D so that was local time and at approximately one hour later Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was able to go in and complete the air assault. So this - with Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c the mission was called off, but the mission overall did occur without further incident with SAFIRE. So they had to pull out and they had to go back in later.

SME-INTEL: So scoping that: same night?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: 10 to 15 rounds against conventional CH-47D, next night MH-47G go in complete mission at approximately

midnight local 0010 local. Okay, thank you that's significant right there.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: This explains the picture of this. Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: And then you have your last slide that shows the LZs, where they were. What were the available LZs that were used for that mission, I'm sorry for this upcoming mission that they were working on. Again the entire CONOP is briefed from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to (b)(3), (b)(6) and the brigade S2 sits in - (b)(3), (b)(6) sits in on that and either concur or not concur based on any information that we may or may not have that they don't have. So that is one of the method we have prior to an operation in order to insure that everyone has the same knowledge base for assessing threat.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB S2: And also it also gets brief to the division by the ground unit and our Task Force S3 sits on that brief. And we also sit here me, the S3 and the brigade commander and we listen to the brief that is being presented to CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force].

SME-INTEL: Okay, if you could walk me through the next piece here is - we want to talk about the process for a HLZ development and how it works within the S2. Who has the

proponency, and who has approval for that to make sure that they've been properly selected?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir, the process overall is that the ground force identifies an objective and says "we would like to get within a certain range of this." Based on terrain they then pass those grids to our terrain team. The terrain team goes through and looks at slope analysis, suitability. They work with TACOPS at that point to determine - now these all non-standard HLZs we have a different once they are standardized HLZ, the process is almost automatic because those HLZ are like landing on Bagram where it's secure, they have other methods, they are certain tarmacs that are available. So for non-standard HLZ this is only the realm I'm speaking of. The TACOPs and the S3 will look at those for suitability prior to being submitted for any threat assessment. Once it has been reviewed by the S3 at the Task Force level and the TACOPS at the Task Force level, my understanding is that it's passed up to the TACOPs and the S3 at the Brigade level. If there are questions about suitability then they go back and review until they can identify the best location to land that meets both the ground forces intent, but also gives the best survivability to our aircraft. At that point once an HLZ is suitable, it's passed to the Task Force S2 to do a threat assessment they create a threat assessment and that assessment is put on a nonstandard HLZ card. That nonstandard

HLZ card is passed back up to brigade and is briefed in the overall CONOP to (b)(3), (b)(6) or the DCO [Deputy Commanding Officer], or whoever is receiving the CONOP that evening.

SME-INTEL: Okay, so the S2 doesn't see the HLZ for threat assessment until after TACOPs approved it for immediate ground commander intent and survivability?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Is there any way to go back and rebuttal, if you will?

10 CAB S2: Yes, we can, because we go back and look at those grids, we look at the grids of the HLZ then what we do we go back to the brigade talk and we go back 60 days and go out 10 kilometers and look at any SIGACTs events. Whether it's SAFIRE, IEDs, small arms fires, it does not matter. So we look at the HLZ. And that the way how we can rebuttal and show it TACOPs and the S3.

10 CAB ASST S2: And, sir, that process - that procedure occurs we get it generally the CONOPS prior to the briefing to (b)(3),(b)(6), but again the S2 is present for those briefings. So any concerns that might be brought up, specifically some of the things we look at the brigade level is, has the DSO requested ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance]? Have they identified any NAI [Named Area of Interest], TAI's [Targeted Area of Interest]? Do they have coverage of the high ground?

So those things essentially are check and balances. The Task Force has the initial say on the air threat. The brigade merely provides a concurrence or non-concurrence and brings up any additional concerns to (b)(3), (b)(6) Several times during in this process (b)(3), (b)(6), also the DCO, have said, "look it's a suitable HLZ, but I'm not comfortable with it due to it being so close to a qalat," or something of that nature and they have been sent to go back and get me another HLZ.

SME-INTEL: Is there any HLZ standardization for example: offset, versus Y, and versus X?

10 CAB ASST S2: That would be a TACOPS question sir, I know that there is a comfort level for our commander - obliviously we do everything we can to provide the least risk to our aircraft. That really goes into ingress, egress, it goes into HLZ selection those are going to be things that - I don't want to say that it's out of the S2 realm because we do attend the CONOPS briefings, but our primary assessment is going to come on what they finally say this is where we want to go. The other thing and the other point of that is ultimately the pilot, when he gets there on the ground, they make those cherry-ice calls at that point. And the pilot has the lead way to say, "I can't land here." And so that is something that comes into play, that pilot has the leeway to say on where he lands his aircraft. They are given the risk, they are given suitability,

but as with any operator the ultimate decision is going to come down to the person who is flying.

10 CAB S2: That is what I stated - we go back and look at the HLZ go out (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and go back (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c days. Then when we presented TACOPS and the S-3 and if (b)(3), (b)(6) wants to see it, now if they want to land on the X or the Y (b)(3), (b)(6) will make the decision.

10 CAB ASST S2: Say if that what we have to do then you know that's what we have to do. We don't have to do it. I've never seen in my experience here (b)(3), (b)(6) approve landing at the X when there is another option. When there was a high risk or a moderate risk. When aircraft were at significant risk. I've multiple times where I sat in a CONOPS brief and have him say no. I get it, the next one [HLZ] is going to be a kilometer away, but a kilometer away - they are going to have to hump it. Because it's just not, we are not going to land there.

SME-INTEL: Okay are they synched with the TACOPS as for as the standard?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Do they understand the definition of the X, the Y, and the offsets.

10 CAB ASST S2: Specifically our TACOPs and our terrain team. We don't have imagery - yes, so I want to make that clear. The S2 has a terrain team - they do work under the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g system

which is an imagery system, but they are a terrain team, not a GEOMET team for 10th CAB. I know different CABs might have different make ups, but our CAB does not have imagery analysts.

SME-INTEL: I don't know if that is part of the packet, but it would be interesting to see what is the layout of the organization for the brigade S2 shop?

10 CAB ASST S2: There is an MTOE [modified table of organization and equipment], and then there is what we have.

SME-INTEL: If we could have the MTOE – this is what we currently have in place. We can discuss it now - your intel systems and your process. What works for you right now, what is solid and what are something that may need help on or assist. What is your assessment of -- Your intel architecture your personnel manning and the training that you currently have in the section?

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, do you want to go ahead and start with that?

SME-INTEL: If we need to revisit this then we can come back.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes sir, I can give you intel specifically and I will tell you that our S2 shop is significantly undermanned at the brigade level. I believe - I'm not 100 percent - I believe there is a 16 person allotable S2 section right now we have (b)(3), (b)(6), our S2. I am the assistant S2.

We have (b)(3), (b)(6) who is our S2 plans as well electronic warfare. I am an SI1D which is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c specifically schooled trained, and (b)(3), (b)(6) is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c specifically schooled trained. So we have those capabilities in the shop as officer side. We also have one intel warrant, and we also had one MI Lieutenant, a 35D. Unfortunately his father died and he had to go home on emergency leave. He will not be returning to theater; he has actually been gone since prior to EXTORTION 17. So, on the officer side we have four personnel. On the enlisted side, our NCOIC transitioned to warrant officer just prior to the deployment. We did not get back filled. So our next highest ranking noncommissioned officer, which is (b)(3), (b)(6) stepped up to the plate, he has done a really good job at that. We had from him, we should have more analysts available, but we don't. What we have is we have is (b)(3), (b)(6), we had (b)(3), (b)(6) who got injured during the deployment and had to be redeployed home. We received (b)(3), (b)(6) during the deployment who is right out of AIT, we have (b)(3), (b)(6) also in the TOC, we did have another (b)(3), (b)(6) which we gave to a task force because they were undermanned and ultimately when you make the decision between who is going to be undermanned, it's going to be brigade rather than task force. So what we have at brigade essentially is four officers, we have

one senior NCO, and we have (b)(3), (b)(6) as well, so we have one junior NCOIC and two enlisted soldiers.

SME-INTEL: Where does the terrain team reside? Is it in the S2 section?

10 CAB S2: It's inside the S2 shop.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, they are part of our shop we had sergeant now (b)(3), (b)(6) and we have (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6). They were running three people, 24hrs operation. We just last week received another NCO on the terrain team. He is really just kind of learning and he just got here, he's not going to be here full 90 days to make having a deployment count ultimately, but he is going to help us in the things he can help us with in preparation for redeployment. So we now have two NCOs in the terrain team, but for the majority of this deployment, and during this instance we only had three people who have been doing 24 hours operations in the terrain.

10 CAB S2: And having said that, it's been challenging but we have been able to track the battlefield throughout the whole deployment. So on that aspect there has been no issues as far as far as tracking what has been going on a daily basis. Whether it's in the TOC [Tactical Operations Center] or back in the office, we're tracking the traffic, what the enemy is doing, what we're doing as far as operations, it has not affected it.

Even though it has been challenging, but we have been able to do the job.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yea.

SME-INTEL: So talking about personnel, what about the intel systems that you use that you kind of alluded to - some of them there. How do you produce the products and how do you battle track?

10 CAB ASST S2: Well we have a couple of methods and it really comes down to how we fall into the overall brigade battle rhythm. Primarily, sir, as we spoke about, every week we assist in writing what we call the CG script, which is an overall threat assessment, significant acts that have occurred within the week. That document is combined with S3 relevant information (b)(3), (b)(6) then briefs that to the CG once a week. So that is a document that goes out. Additionally every day we provide a GRINTSUM, which is a graphical intelligence summary. And like a battle space providing a daily INTSUM [intelligence summary], the GRINTSUM - we get submitted any SAFIRE, any major event, any significant reporting, and it's rolled up every single day. That's a primary function of our analyst in the TOC and our noncommissioned officer, (b)(3), (b)(6). That document is published and it's also emailed out to certain people, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) gets it daily, (b)(3), (b)(6) gets it daily, anybody - it's on our portal, it's open and available to anybody who is

curious. Often our document is used by a CAOC and they will call and ask questions about it. So that is our essential publication to the rest of our CPs [command posts]. And that also kind of summarizes all of the task forces' daily operation on what happened in their battle space in the last 24hrs. Another document that we do on a regular basis is, we go through like a set and we review - based on internally - a threat, if there is a threat that is (b)(1)4a, (b)(1)4a day threat - if this event happened and it's going to elevate something for (b)(1)4a, (b)(1)4a days, once that (b)(1)4a, (b)(1)4a days is up then that what is reassessed. So we keep track of those types of situations. We are also - any time that the S3 has a specific request, based on an identified target or a RFI [Request for Information] from the division that we might be able to answer, we create those products as well. And it is very unified as a team in getting something done. Often times (b)(3), (b)(6), will all work together on different perspectives for getting a product pushed forward and it's reviewed by everyone in the office before it goes forward for accuracy, and also - to be honest everyone has different backgrounds. Myself I'm pure MI; (b)(3), (b)(6) --

10 CAB S2: I was field artillery, also before I became MI.

10 CAB ASST S2: And (b)(3), (b)(6) worked with the infantry before he transitioned. And so we use those different perspective to - and (b)(3), (b)(6) who use to be a Marine, so we

- everyone sometimes sees the situation differently, so whenever we have a product, internally we review it before it get pushed out. Obviously everything goes through (b)(3), (b)(6) before it goes up to (b)(3), (b)(6) or the DCO. So for us at the captain level, we give it to (b)(3), (b)(6), and then (b)(3), (b)(6) presents outside of our shop.

SME-INTEL: What about processes then - can you explain to me the systems you use to gather this data that would be - and alluded to before the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g software, you also alluded to the MIRC chat--

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes

SME-INTEL: What are those databases where you go and pull that data from?

10 CAB ASST S2: We have three primary databases. One of them more recent ones is the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. We have published a standard operating - that was actually published in May - for all the task forces to report SIGACTs. Internally we use the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g system only on SIPR for reporting both pilot debrief as well as any other significant acts that might involve air threat. All (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g has the ability to pull imagery, so we have we use that system - that is one of the systems we use. We have the terrain team that uses the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g System. In the TOC we have the CPOF system being used. In our actual office we have

the D6 system being used, and that is on (b)(3), (b)(6) desk that our warrant, our intel warrant.

SME-INTEL: D6-A?

10 CAB S2: We also have one in the TOC. We also compared the CPOF and we also look the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g because you have also the BSO which also posts all of the SIGACTs on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. So that is another way we can get information to better present the problem sets - the enemy threat with what he is looking at.

10 CAB ASST S2: The GRINTSUM [Ground Intelligence Summary] for example one of the things that we do is we have a SIPRNet GRINTSUM and then also every day we scrub that and we publish a CENTRIX GRINTSUM. Obviously some reporting is removed when we published the CENTRIX GRINTSUM, but overall that document is - again that is our external document to the rest of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and even Afghanistan for those who need it or want it. So that is another method that we do, we do a SIPRNet to CENTRIX publication as well.

10 CAB S2: And we also check, of course, our emails, Microsoft Outlook because we are on the distribution lists through (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and that is how we also gather information. From the other S2s, G2s, throughout (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

10 CAB ASST S2: And then there is of course this is - again I don't want to assume that you know anything, but by default there's the intel systems that are available on

INTELLINK link. We use CIDNE to look up reporting. These are standard military intelligence databases we are heavy users of those as well. So when we have questions we obviously use the standard available resources.

SME-INTEL: Quick question, referencing when you talked about collaboration, distro lists, what is your relationship with the Task Force, with team (b)(3),(b)(6). With (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, mainly Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Do you have any established relationships with the ARSOA [Army Special Operations Aviation], JSOAD?

10 CAB ASST S2: Well there is definitely a relationship there. Every day, for example, I'm on the distro list for the TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CAOC. So they provide intel, they provide a lot of information. I would say that primarily though, for us at the brigade level - now the Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is different because they have this specific TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c mission, so they would have Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c there, they would have Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. So their relationship is a little different than us at the brigade. We are read on to that, I can walk down to Camp (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c I can have access to briefings, so we certainly have that - we are not excluded from them, but I wouldn't say that it's necessarily - we're not necessarily invited to their briefings.

SME-INTEL: But there is a pathway to exchange information.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, absolutely, sir. But, I would say, again that our majority of our correlation through them or for them is actually through Division. We go up to Division and we get a lot of information. Again, information push - pull. We go to Division and we get a lot of information on what requirements, what - Since the majority of our air assets are in fact, direct support - we do have some however that are general support, and those general aircraft are located here at Bagram and they are run by Division so, depending on the mission set, part of our collaboration with TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c comes not from TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to us or from us to TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c but through the filter of Division.

Does that make sense, sir?

SME-INTEL: Yes. So, to summarize that: You are to receive--Whenever you have GS aviation assets sliced over to TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c --

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: --Division then filters that data or information through you, here, but you still receive that information.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: Absolutely.

SME-INTEL: Has there ever been deconfliction of data related to air threat? Have you been able to synchronize that through TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or do you have to go through Division to do that to get through TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c?

10 CAB ASST S2: We -- I'm sorry.

10 CAB S2: For the --Again, when it goes through the task forces who's conducting the operation, thus the S2s will go up to Team (b)(3),(b)(6), their S2, and deconflict if they have any conflicts they have to work out as far as the air threat --

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB S2. --for that particular operation. And that's how they do it, not at the task force level--

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB S2: --because we try to keep it as low to the task force level as we can.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yeah. What we are saying, sir, the task forces themselves have a different working relationship because they are co-located and they are conducting that mission. At the brigade level, primarily we have oversight and checks and balances. So, one of the things for our brigade that we try to do is to empower our task forces and that's to allow them -- I mean, obviously there has to be a standard understanding of what threat means, because, for example Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is located

here at Bagram. If there's a mission that, say, Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c views as being a certain risk or a certain level, but it's not pushed out to all of the brigade, then they might say, "Hey, we're not doing it," but then Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is going to get called to do it. And, that creates a disproportional type environment so what we do - we have to have a minimum standard. There has to be one for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c because we are in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c footprint. So, because of that, within those boundaries, we try to empower the task forces, who know better their own specific battlespace, the best that we can.

SME-INTEL: Does the other task forces, willing to DS or not DS, do they put out the distro of what their threat assessment is? Do they shoot it out to everybody to get -- not necessarily get feedback, but for situational awareness?

10 CAB S2: Yes. Yes, that's what we do.

10 CAB ASST S2: Another system --

SME-INTEL: So, if I'm Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is doing a mission, and very specific to that there's individual groups, I see it regardless of it's my operation or not?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: And, again, another mechanism that we probably should include in this, to go back to our previous

conversation, every other week there is an S2 synch on "breeze" [secure chat session] and (b)(3), (b)(6) runs that.

10 CAB S2: You remember those?

SME-INTEL: Yes.

10 CAB ASST S2: And, so that is one again, the way it's nested is first there's the J2 "breeze" that we -- there's a brigade at (b)(1)4a, (b)(1)4c Division, and then the next week would be our internal S2 sync. The next week would be the J2 and then the S2, so it alternates weeks.

SME-INTEL: Every other week?

10 CAB S2: Yes.

10 CAB ASST S2: Every other week.

10 CAB S2: And within the S2 syncs, they brief what has happened the last two weeks as far as SAFIREs, IDFs, any significant event. As part of their brief to us here at brigade, they also have a slide that shows us the HLZs and then make their assessments. Now, while they're tracking and we're tracking, if there's a difference, then we talk about it and if they feel and they say they want to upgrade a certain HLZ or downgrade it, then they're supposed to submit a packet that comes up to brigade and we look at it, the S3 looks at it, and it is presented to (b)(3), (b)(6) and then (b)(3), (b)(6) makes their final decision whether an HLZ is going to be upgraded or downgraded.

SME-INTEL: Okay. Last night at the discussions with TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c they talked about the standard air planning threat timeline the general norm. That was the brief by the JSOAD OIC. They talked about hasty planning; three hours is what's stated in a FRAGO. Are you guys aware of the three hour time?

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, often times there is - it's a three hour, but sometimes even less planning timeline. There have been -- when it comes to TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c specific operations there have been some, I know, that have been 24 hours or less from the S2 / S3 combination into execution. And so, three hours is definitely a minimum that should be, but based on mission and based on what's going on especially trigger-based -- when you have a trigger-based target and that trigger's met the timeline could be significantly shorter.

SME-INTEL: How does that timeline -- that short timeline of three hours impact the intel picture; the intel processes that we just went through? How is that --

10 CAB S2: Again, if a hasty comes down that is going to take place, the three will come to us and we'll go, again, to the TOC and go to the CPOF and look, "Okay, we need the grid. Where is this going to happen," and that's what we do. We do (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c kilometers up and we go (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c days back.

10 CAB ASST S2: And then --

10 CAB S2: We'll make an assessment of the threat.

SME-INTEL: Are you able to produce a -- How is that done? How do you communicate that?

10 CAB ASST S2: We have a standardized threat assessment template. And that standardized threat assessment template is very similar in form to what you see in the area threat assessment packets. What it'll have is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c a kilometer circle; it'll have SAFIRE activity separately; it'll have reporting; and separately it'll have overall SIGACTS. That'll be CPOF and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g that are the primary databases used to mine that data. We pull that up and based on the pre-established threat criteria we are able to say, "Our left and right limits are this, and this is the criteria that we would assess it to be." Again, one of the reasons that we did an area threat assessment, even in the beginning towards looking forward towards the summer is because it's not that common to have an operation occur outside the boundaries of where we've historically events happen. Support zones remain support zones. Active zones tend to remain active zones. There are small fluctuations, but in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c overall, when we are conducting operations, the bad guys tend to just live in certain areas. Rat trails that are from Pakistan to Afghanistan have been same places that have been used for 10 years, since our history of this war. And, while we do operations that certainly affect their ability to use them, they don't adjust them in a manner that is significant to changing in

overall location. And that is a simple fact about the nature of this particular war we fight. SO, when a hasty comes down, especially because we have been there 10 months already, everyone has a general idea of what the threat is before we even look at CPOF or (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. Then we use CPOF and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to confirm or deny the tacit knowledge that is already existing within our organization. Again, we have people with different backgrounds from artillery, infantry, MI pure, different services and while we may not all agree, we all have an idea of what is existing and we use those systems to make sure that we are not looking east when the azimuth points north. So, when it comes -- I'm sorry, I know I'm kind of verbose on this, but the bottom line is when it's a hasty, we look at what we already know and then we add to it the checks of what we don't know.

SME-INTEL: Okay, and that's done on the JOC [Joint Operations Center] floor as well with, kind of, each system in place to do the check. So, whether it be a hasty or deliberate the process is the same.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: Just condensed.

SME-INTEL: Condensed. Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: And if you have two weeks to look at it, we might get a little more in-depth with CIDNE and we might try to find anything that is obscure - anything out there that is just random that maybe we haven't tied together.

SME-INTEL: Okay. Let's run through the other portions through here. I see you've got another -- a packet here, the RPG Summary or RPG SAFIREs?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir. This is a Summer packet specifically in the last month dealing with RPGs throughout (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and it goes into detail for each and every event.

SME-INTEL: Can I ask, real quick, what spurred this to be the --

10 CAB ASST S2: This happened after -- this was a request from (b)(3),(b)(6) to look at after the EXTORTION 17 incident and based on this event, we went back and historically looked -- again, one of the things we try to do at the brigade is to find out whether or not the azimuth that we're on and making threat assessments is correct and that's both looking forward and looking backwards. And, so this was an after the fact product, but what it does is it does confirm our assessments that we had made prior to the EXTORTION 17 based on RPG threats in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-INTEL: Who is (b)(3), (b)(6)?

10 CAB S2: This is from the incident from the happened at the Alasay Valley with the Kiowa helicopters.

SME-INTEL: That was --

10 CAB S2: That was back on April 23rd.

10 CAB ASST S2: That was our first FALLEN ANGEL.

10 CAB S2: --FALLEN ANGEL. I think CJTF --

SME-INTEL: That was --

10 CAB S2: 101st was still here.

SME-INTEL: Correct, that was --

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: That was your Task Force's first FALLEN ANGEL?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

SME-INTEL: Kiowa?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay, so that's the start point, was 23 April to 11 August?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: Correct.

10 CAB ASST S2: The bottom line is that since that first FALLEN ANGEL, we have had 35 RPG SAFIREs which have resulted in an additional two FALLEN ANGELS.

SME-INTEL: Can I scope that 35 RPG SAFIREs, is that still looking at - You're looking at Konar, Deghab --

10 CAB S2: Through the whole (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

10 CAB ASST S2: Across all (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-INTEL: So this is all (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

10 CAB S2: All (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c; yes. (b)(3), (b)(6) wanted to look at RPGs engagements from the 23rd April when (b)(3), (b)(6) happened all the way until 11 August. We wanted to see if there was a pattern -- if it was a change of pattern or TTPs from the insurgents or not since this incident happened from the 23rd of April.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB S2: And, it was just to give him a picture.

10 CAB ASST S2: And, so the next slide is an overview of those RPGs and then all of the subsequent slides are the details for those RPG events.

10 CAB S2: The different colors you see on that slide: green meaning it's green illumination; red, of course, red; and the yellow is amber. The black square means the operation took place during the day.

SME-INTEL: Go through this one again with me.

10 CAB S2: Yes. The red color means, red illumination.

SME-INTEL: So, greater than -- what's red illumination?

10 CAB S2: It's less than 10 percent.

10 CAB ASST S2: Illumination or its minimum is, you know, under the mountains to a certain elevation.

SME-INTEL: Angles? Okay. From an angle? So, less than 10 percent for red? Okay.

10 CAB S2: Then you have the yellow, which is amber illumination.

SME-INTEL: And what is that defined as?

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, I don't have the left and right limits for that, but I can get you that.

SME-INTEL: If you could follow up with that, please.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir.

10 CAB S2: And, then you have the green which is green illumination and the black box --

SME-INTEL: And green is, just kind of put it in the scope of the current discussion. Green is high illum?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay. Does that mean daytime illumination?

10 CAB S2: No. Nightime.

SME-INTEL: This is all night?

10 CAB S2: Right. The only -- the black square you see, that means that's during the day time.

SME-INTEL: That's day?

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB S2: And then all the following slides is just one by one.

10 CAB ASST S2: And it just goes through one by one, all 35 events.

10 CAB S2: That's all it is.

10 CAB ASST S2: The next slide that you should see in there, is actually a copy of the story boards that we have available from essentially the 6th of June. In the Tangi Valley up through the FALLEN ANGEL, but not including the FALLEN ANGEL.

SME-INTEL: 06 June 11?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Up until 5 August.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: 6 August.

10 CAB ASST S2: So, these are the four SAFIREs that occurred in the Tangi Valley since -- for 30 days prior to the FALLEN ANGEL. The first storyboard you see, sir, is the one we already reviewed where they were going after -- where they had that -- the air assault that was called off and then later fulfilled. The second Story Board -- Sir?

SME-INTEL: Can I back up real quick? And I don't know if you know the answer to this, but given this template here, was there any indication or any efforts to use MH-47s versus the CH-47s to do LEFTY GROVE?

10 CAB S2: That would probably have to be on the S3 side of the house.

10 CAB ASST S2: To be honest we do not have the MH47. So if it's tasked out to Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that's not an available option for us.

SME-INTEL: But there was no discussion that you were aware of?

10 CAB ASST S2: I would not know that [inaudible]

10 CAB S2: I am not aware of that [inaudible]

SME-INTEL: The only reason I ask that is because when he first heard about this operation, his though is, "Did we have any discussion across the aviation task force to use this as a template and say, maybe this isn't the right package."

10 CAB S2: Okay. That would probably S3 and Task Force, I guess TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c for that operation. It would be in those channels.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: The next slide was a witnessed SAFIRE. Again, "witnessed" meaning that the aircraft themselves did not know they were being shot at the time that they were being shot at. Again, there was no damage to aircraft.

The third one is a rotary wing. The reason this is a CAOC storyboard is because this did not happen to a Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c aircraft. When it says "rotary wing," that is generally an

indicator of another airframe. That's where you might find the MH event. This is the information that is passed to us, from again CAOC. We don't have that internal to our Task Force.

SME-INTEL: This one was small arms RPG?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes. Confirmed RPG and possible small arms.

SME-INTEL: Just for your clarification, and I want to be upfront with this. This was an MH-47.

10 CAB ASST S2: Okay.

10 CAB S2: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: We suspect, but again, since it's not our aircraft we can't --

SME-INTEL: Well, I think it's important to highlight here, and this may not be in line with the investigation as something that we need to look at, is sharing the data and information of the most accurate data. That way commanders, ops, have the greatest situational awareness going back to the comment earlier that if we knew from the intel side that there was an element done, you know, CH-47s go in, is there ever a decision cycle - and we always struggle with this - is the use of MH-47s. And, we've got to understand what is classified and what is shared, and how can we build the best picture versus hiding behind - or not necessarily hiding, but there is some type of - I guess, what I'm trying to say is it needs to be

transparent, and it can be transparent in making sure that that occurs.

10 CAB S2: Right.

SME-INTEL: Not necessarily your area of emphasis, but something that I think I need to carry the mail on.

10 CAB ASST S2: Okay.

10 CAB S2: I know it would be appreciated. We -- like I said, we do get information from Division. This kind of story board is sent to us, both from CAOC, but when we get to see the actual TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c we are on their distro, so they do send us information, but we don't necessarily get all the same details that we would have if it was an internal event.

The second part of this story board, this is attached to the one you just saw, shows the three different points of origin. Based on Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c criteria, we would have assessed this as a major SAFIRE, because it's three points of origin. CAOC story boards do not use the same SAFIRE criteria; they assess it as either close or distant, things of those terms. So, for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c this story board would have been assessed as a major.

SME-INTEL: So, they use close and what?

10 CAB ASST S2: They use "close." They use "distant." They use "probable," "possible," and to be honest, sir, I'd have to pull up their documents to pull up their documents to find

out all the other variance. But CAOC has a different SAFIRE delineation than what we use.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: The fourth story board is Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c would have assessed this as a "witnessed," because the aircraft at the time did not know they were being shot at. It was reported to them from another location and no damage was done. So, again, this is CAOC assesses it as a "close probable small arms". A Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c assessment would have been a "witnessed".

10 CAB S2: Right; and another way to assess it also when we call it "witnessed," CAOC would call it as a -- oh, the word just left.

SME-INTEL: Did they call it a --

10 CAB S2: A "sighting."

10 CAB ASST S2: A "sighting;" yes.

10 CAB S2: Usually we call it "witnessed SAFIREs" and CAOC would call it as a "sighting".

SME-INTEL: There's not a lack of information or the information doesn't get out there. It's a standardization issue.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes. The reason -- just to kind lean forward on this; the reason that we, as Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c assess our SAFIREs different than CAOC does is, is because for rotary

wing it makes more sense to our pilots in understanding the threat and also to or commanders when use terms like "a witnessed" "a minor" "a significance" and "a major". It's much easier for them to understand the level of the SAFIRE and what that means, rather than saying it was "close" or it was "distant". For them, how far away is important, but it may not be the most important thing, and that's why we have a difference.

SME-INTEL: Thanks. That's great data there. If you could, dive into that portion.

10 CAB ASST S2: And then sir, the last document we have is situational awareness. As a Task Force, when we accessed weapon threats in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c the most common weapon is small arms fire. The most dangerous weapon is RPGs on the HLZ. Now, that's what we've always briefed in our academics. However, because there are MANPADSs and reports of MANPADSs in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c we periodically review the recording and the incidences related to MANPADSs and MANPADSs trafficking because that is a significant event for aviation risk in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c The overall for MANPADSs is a "low threat" in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. We just don't see them used very often. They're very expensive and they're very hard to transit from one location to the next. But, again, as an S2, our job is to still assess what we see, especially if there's developing patterns. What you have here was our most recent

MANPADSs assessment in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Specifically, the number one that you see on this top page did not occur in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c it actually occurred in RC-Southwest. However, it occurred right outside of Ghazni very close to the border; on that mountain right outside of Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. It occurred right about here [pointing at an exhibit]. This is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [pointing at an exhibit].

SME-INTEL: What's the name of that location?

10 CAB S2: You've got the Aikundi Province.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: The Aikundi Province?

10 CAB S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: This assessment, sir, was done in the Spring essentially, in April and May time-frame. It did -- like I said, it did include the one from March that occurred in RC-Southwest because that's -- insurgents don't have the same boundaries we have. So, if it's close to us, we're still concerned about it. So, what we saw in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c are possible MANPADS events. They were not confirmed, and they were not probable, but again with our S2 assessment we note them as not necessarily SIGACTS, so much as situational awareness. We pushed this document out to Division - higher - as well as pushed it to all the Task Forces - lower. This is a document

that we wanted everyone to have a copy of for pure situational awareness so if anyone saw something that maybe would relate to any of this, they would be able to report it back up and we could have a more free information flow. So-

SME-INTEL: Do you ever lay this over other intelligence to -

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes. We do.

10 CAB S2: Yes. Right, we get any (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c traffic or any (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that come we receive throughout the battle field we go back to the Task Force of the BSO, wherever the report came from, and ask them to verify that report. What is the source? What is the reliability of the source? Does the source just want money? Because MANPADSs - they can call it for anything. It could be RPGs, they can call as MANPADS.

SME-INTEL: Question with that. Can you discuss - or, are you prepared to discuss about MANPADSs themselves and what they mean to the threat -

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: --and then talk me through the suspected employment of them in relationship to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c from your knowledge.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, sir. Absolutely, we can discuss that. MANPADSs risk as we previously stated is a low for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Now, the reason for this is not because the weapon system

itself is not dangerous. It is, in fact, the most dangerous weapon system to aircraft. The reason we assess it as a low, is because we just don't see them in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Overall, when we see MANPADSs in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c reporting wise, when we do get these reports, we know that they generally come from three locations. Just a little bit of history, when we first came into Afghanistan as a coalition force movement, there was the Northern Alliance that was up in Panjhir. Panjhir -- there was Mashud who was known as the Lion of Panjhir. Now, Panjhir--the Lion of Panjhir, Mashud himself, was not necessarily a fan of the coalition force movement, but he was also anti-Taliban. And, up in Panjhir area there was a lot of old Soviet cache locations that we know contained MANPADS. MANPADS themselves are laser guided, often wire weapons that can track on an aviation heat signature, the more -- the primary MANPADSs that we see in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c are what are known as first generation. These are not the most advanced systems. They were commonly used from the Soviet 1980's era. They require a munition, they require a battery, and they require a trigger and these are separate parts. Now, often times when we see reporting on MANPADS in (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and it's missing parts, we know that it kind of came out of the Panjhir location. When we see pictures taken and it's busted and it's old, and it's rusty we have a good delineation that it probably came out of the Panjhir area and those old

cache storage that we allowed them to keep up in that area. So, sometimes up in the Konar area we see reports. We know that people have them but we also know they're not functional, and we do get those reports. Second location that we'll see MANPADSs in RC-East come out of would be to come out of Kabul or from -- and a third location is coming out of RC-South transiting along Highway 1. Generally, if we see a MANPADS reports or reports of MANPADSs that are functional, that have all their pieces, or that are relatively newer then we know that they've come out of Kabul or either transit RC-South along Highway 1. The reason being is that that's where the money and the illegal illicit sales tend to travel. Those are the avenues and lines of communication that are of course used by all insurgents for a lot of notorious activity. That also plays into CJTF's [Combined Joint Task Force] role of maintaining freedom of movement along Highway 1. The insurgents don't want that. They want it to be their freedom of movement, not necessarily our freedom of movement and so that, again, it poisons the overall goals of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and the Division here. Now, when we see those three cache locations and we see the types of MANPADSs coming out of those locations, we try to track it. We very, very rarely have ever seen any reports that are specific MANPADS reports. A lot of times, the insurgents in this area call them rockets or they don't really know what they have. Because

MANPADSs are very, very expensive, they are very difficult to move throughout (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c based on terrain. The lines of communication are so restrictive, that for an insurgent leader to have a MANPADS, usually there's a lot of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c reporting that goes along with it, because, for lack of a better analogy, a 40 year-old guy in America buys a Viper, his neighbors are going to know about it. That's kind of what a MANPADS is in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c It is a status symbol. It is significant. It is expensive, and it means that you are the leader of that valley. Usually, it is something that somebody with a lot of time and a lot of external alliances is able to obtain. It's not something that your regular insurgent guy down the road who works at the bazaar during the day is going to be able to get. So, we get a lot of reporting when there is something of relevance. There are civilian organizations out of Kabul that we worked with to try to remove MANPADS systems from the battlefield. They are based out of Kabul and that's because, again, if you see something that's functional, generally, that's where you see it come out of; and they have been successful in doing those kind of things. Now, we have not seen an advanced, and by advanced, I mean, past-generation one MANPADS in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c The last confirmed MANPADS event was in RC-West, and I believe there's one in RC-South, but not in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c specifically. What we did was get a probable MANPADS event. That happened in Ghazni this

past April. That operation was actually conducted by TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c out of RC-Southwest. It was not an (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or CJTF-101 event. We received the information after the fact, and it is included in this packet that you have in front of you, sir.

SME-INTEL: Okay. So, that was RC-West of the operation?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

10 CAB S2: For the Ghazni one?

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes.

SME-INTEL: Yes.

10 CAB S2: It was RC-South.

10 CAB ASST S2: South, I'm sorry. Yes. It was RC-South.

10 CAB S2: It was from RC-South.

SME-INTEL: That was Ghazni?

10 CAB S2: It occurred right over this lake, sir.

10 CAB ASST S2: They had just come in [inaudible]. Again, you have that in your packet.

SME-INTEL: Let's go to those (Ex. 51], and review the bidding for what occurred and how is it assessed in the MANPADS.

10 CAB ASST S2: Absolutely, sir. By the numbers, this is number one, this is the one that occurred in March and this did not occur in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c but again was of concern to us. Possible MANPADSs. This is assessed by CAOC as being possible because of the reporting from the spotter. Specific to a MANPADS you see a different type of sparkle, smoke trails, cork screws are an

indicator of MANPADS versus RPGs. So, when we make a differentiation between the signatures and traits of a weapon -- enemy weapon system, MANPADSs have very unique features, which is one of the reasons we believe the event for EXTORTION was not a MANPADS. It just -- it doesn't fit the MANPADS profile. Now, on number 2, this is the one that was considered a probably MANPADS event. It did occur in Ghazni. The main reason that this was assessed as a MANPADS is that the munition changed course, it did not explode. They did not actually -- the pilots did not observe the air burst. On the next slide, you can kind of see a 3D version of what had happened, where it was shot, how it tracked on the aircraft. Again, something that tracks on aircraft is generally a MANPADS and then also, I believe they also saw the corkscrew smoke trail. I don't think that's in the CAOC write-up, but from reviewing the pilot de-briefs I believe they did see a smoke trail with this event.

SME-INTEL: Okay. DO you know of any -- was there any (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c indications at this time that a MANPADS was fired?

10 CAB ASST S2: Unfortunately, sir, we didn't get that information. Again, it came from RC-South, so we didn't get a lot of -- their objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, we didn't get the mission set prior to, and we didn't get the an email , (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or any

other push of intel related to it, other than the MANPADS story boards.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: The third event is of concern. This is along Highway 1; and TACOPs can definitely go into a little bit more about MANPADSs versus RPGs, but this was assessed by CAOC as an unidentified rocket overall. We looked at it as a "possible" as Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c because it sets off some of the red flags for us internally as an S2 for things like 8 seconds of flight level. When something burns for 8 seconds, that's a little bit different than say a rocket or an RPG. Again, the smoke trail -- things like that. It says that this did not appear to maneuver towards the aircraft which is why CAOC ultimately assessed it as an unidentified rocket, but for situational awareness it had a lot of traits that are very similar to a MANPADS, and so we included this. This packet is a bottom line up front to the task forces situational awareness, again. So, we push this out and we say, "If you see something that resembles any of these events, this is high priority. Let us know." We are tracking that they may be moving MANPADSs into the area and we want to hear anything that sounds unique in either reporting, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, or observation, and so, that's why these are included. The forth -- this is another pilot de-brief from the number three, just more detail on it.

And then the fourth one was Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c It did occur near Sayyid Abad, which is relevant only in the fact that, not necessarily Tangi, but Sayyid Abad is a known operation zone for insurgents. This was significant to us in that the munition maneuvered toward the aircraft and again, when we see something that maneuvers towards an aircraft, that is a warning sign to us as far as MANPADSs. And, again, they had the smoke trail that the pilots observed as being a cork screw.

SME-INTEL: On this one here, what was the AGL [Above Ground Level]?

10 CAB S2: AGL, I'd say it's 1,800 to 2,000 AGL.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yeah, 2,000 feet AGL. 1,800 to 2,000 feet AGL. It's on the second slide.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: This was also against Chinooks - against our CH-47s. We have not seen any other reporting again of MANPADSs, suspected MANPADSs used, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c traffic in the Sayyid Abad area with MANPADSs. We included this for situational awareness so that you could see what we're tracking as far as MANPADSs. The reason that we drew this line as we did, is essentially, because we know the method of insurgent TTPs to import weapon systems into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c from RC-South along Highway 1, when we look at the time-frame of these - specifically event 2, 3, and 4 - they travel along a line of

Highway 1 towards Kabul. Again, this was in the Spring into the Summer, and so we are sensitive to the possibility that such a weapon system might be being attempted to be brought into the area for sale. And so, again, this was a document that we sent out to the task forces to say, "Be aware. Let us know if you see any suspicious that relates to these kinds of events".

SME-INTEL: You had said also that there was a MANPADS incident in RC-West.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, there was. I don't have all of those details right now.

SME-INTEL: Could you look that one up and forward that to me as well so I could just take a look at what the report is.

10 CAB ASST S2: Absolutely. That was earlier this year.

10 CAB S2: Forward it to where?

SME-INTEL: I'll give you my email after this.

10 CAB S2: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: That kind of concludes the threat assessment packets that we have for overall (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c specifically to EXTORTION 17 and then the Tangi Valley.

SME-INTEL: Kind of a question that we talked about the MANPADS and the next thing would be is, there's some questions out there as far as an open-source media that these were -- it was assessed to be a weapon system that the U.S. had provided the Taliban during the -- back in the Afghan - Soviet war, and

that they are attributing to it that it is something that we provided. The question would be, or if you would just describe that, what is your assessment right now that you've heard through intel channels of how the Taliban receives their equipment or gear. I think alluded to it earlier with the different caches locations within theater itself, but you're not aware of any other programs out there that funnel weapons into the Taliban or even through other means outside of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. That the Taliban receive equipment or support.

10 CAB ASST S2: I'm not sure what classification level we are talking --

SME-INTEL: We are discussing at the SECRET level right now. Our point for release is SECRET//ACGU at that point at least, or SECRET//REL ISAF so they can get a hold of the reports, so as long let's keep the discussions at that level for right now.

10 CAB ASST S2: Okay, and the reason I ask is because there are special access programs that do address the MANPADS threat in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and would be exempt from that classification. I don't feel comfortable talking about those particularly, especially if it's again - because those are NOFORN programs.

SME-INTEL: Okay.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

Page 63 redacted for the following reason:
- -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

Meaning, that some US weapon MANPADS -- you're talking about STINGER [US MANPAD] - you're talking about a little bit more advanced, and if you look at the MANPADS data of the last 10 years, it has decreased significantly. Basically, the insurgents used them and they didn't have a lot more coming in and they were not extremely effective. So, you'll see -- I don't have the exact numbers, but there is a chart that shows there was, you know, 20 MANPADS in 2005 across all of Afghanistan. 2006 there was seven. 2008 there was two. 2009 there was one. 2010 there were none. And, I don't have the exact numbers, but that's the trend, but basically what happened is they had them, we came into theater, they attempted to use them. They didn't have a replacement for them, and then they were out and, again, they weren't very effective and that's another reason that we assess the MANPADS threat in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to be low, because the ones that were able to be used, were primarily already used. And, because they don't have a good mechanism for bringing them into theater because of expense and because of terrain difficulties, they just haven't been replaced and they know that -- this is the other thing: for MANPADSs to be effective, a shooter has to be trained. There has to be a certain distance for armament. A regular guy off the street, who gets a MANPADS is not going to necessarily going to be able to use it effectively. And, so that is why even the MANPADS

that were shot had a very, very low effective rate. The training is just not in existence in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c for the Taliban. Even the Taliban training camps that we know exist, they're not training on MANPADS. They are training on things that they are most likely capable of. Suicide vest, VBIED, they are training on small arms weapons. We do know that they get foreign fighters into the area that assist in training up from Uzbekistan and across from Pakistan. We know this because of the different language dialects, and also because when we've had complex attacks on location occasionally with those foreign fighters are with the bodies that are found. So, we do know that foreign fighters with more experience have been brought into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. Whenever there's a MANPADS shot -- most recently, again, there's been reports in RC-South that have said they've brought Iranian personnel into the area, specifically with this weapon system as the shooter for this weapon system. We don't see that in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We track the reports. We're aware of reports primarily in the south and southwest, but we've not seen those same reports in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c And so, again, as an S2, I would not give a high credibility to the report of a US-sponsored system in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that could be relevant to this attack because it just doesn't - it has not corroborative intelligence at all.

SME-INTEL: Okay. That's a good summary of that. The next area of discussion is we haven't not necessarily an open

source, but just trying to look at the whole aspect of this OPS, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and also, too, is always talking about the night vision devices or night vision goggles. Can I get your assessment with where you think (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is with those aspects? (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and also, too, is the employment of NVGs [night vision goggles] line of threat.

10 CAB S2: Yes, we've seen a lot of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c traffic on VISOBS. They're always doing that. They're always trying to see what are our TTPs as far as the aircraft is concerned. Are we taking the same routes? Always flying in the same direction? We do see that, so of course we pass all that information to the task forces. NVGs: as far as NVGs, I know Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c had found quite a few of them, five I believe, or four of them, in Kapisa area province, in Tagal Valley, so that's where we've mostly seen the NVGs. We've seen reports of NVGs up in the Konar Province and also, not that many of them down in Paktika and Paktya Province, mostly it's up in the North of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. [The interview was paused for a brief moment due to an interruption. The interview was continued.]

10 CAB S2: Yes, as far as NVGs, that's what we've seen the most is up in the Tagal Valley. We know they have foreign fighters up in that area. I know that when (b)(3),(b)(6) is conducting some of the operations and some of their enemy KIA [Killed In Action] we've seen some Chechen rebels [Rebel Group

in Georgia ---former Soviet republic]. So, we know there are foreign fighters coming in, so we know they are highly skilled. So, as far as NVGs, I mean those can be bought off the market, as we all know. I mean, I can buy some. You can buy some. But, like I said mostly it's been up in Takah Valley. That's where we see the NVG threat.

SME-INTEL: Also, do you know what generation or what type of NVGs we're seeing? Are they military grade? Commercial grade?

10 CAB ASST S2: Sir, to elaborate on that, we've seen a broad spectrum. We have seen military grade night vision goggles up in the Tagal River Valley. We have also seen the lowest grade. I mean, down to the point of people had their video cameras that you can buy commercially off the market that have an NVG basic capability. All of these VISOPs and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c all of that, although we don't see large amounts of the night vision goggles across (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. What we do see is a robust early warning network and when you're talking about your (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and you're talking about repeater towers, and you're talking about visual observation with binoculars, and there (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, cell phone use, all of these things portray into an early warning network and that is really quite robust for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. We have had time and time again, where we go to do a mission, and we know based on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c based on collections that we've conducted,

that the insurgents know when we leave the FOB and the general direction that we're going. So, that always increases risk for certain operations. That is one of the reasons that Objective LEFTY GROVE was a "moderate to high," because an insurgent at a certain level is going to have a more robust early warning network than say, again, your common IED facilitator. The most common (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that we have had any real use for at Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c has been with our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c systems during an operation that was counter IED called Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. The mission was conducted under CJTF-101 construct].

Now, Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was based on successful operations of Iraq. It did not turn out to be as successful in Afghanistan due to terrain constrictions and some other factors. However, what it did is it paired an Apache attack helicopter with a Blackhawk fitted with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c system that enabled us to detect (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c traffic and helped us to try and target IED emplacers along Highway 1 and other major MSRs in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. What we were able to get from that is proof that, well, two things. One, that when we're flying overhead insurgents tend to not emplace IEDs at that particular time, and two, they are aware of certain levels of our TTPs. That we have targeted their repeater towers in an attempt to try to degrade their early

warning networks, but nonetheless remains a robust system throughout all of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and I'm not sure how that can be combated better. I'm not sure about that, but we do know that it does exist, and it is efficient, and it has so far not been degraded in capability since.

SME-INTEL: So, operations that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. What was the name of the operation itself?

IE1: The operation itself is called Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. What we mostly got out of that was a deterrent effect for IEDs; which affects what you're going for to help decrease IED activity and to support the MSR. That is an effect; that's a desirable effect. Nonetheless, it's not sustainable based on other aviation missions and that's why (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c doesn't exist at this current time.

But, to go back to your question regarding (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c regarding visual observations, and regarding night vision goggles, all of those things come into play, again, with that early warning network system. Part of that is political corruption. Part of that is that it's very inexpensive to employ. It is also very easy to train somebody to participate in a network. It is very easy to coerce somebody who may not necessarily want to fight to be able to say, "Look, we won't kill you and your wife and your kids if you sit on this mountain top for five days and you just

watch and let us know if anybody comes by or what travel method are the vehicles going. What directions are the helicopters going? What is the shape of the helicopter? Does it look like the grasshopper? Does it look like the skinny one?" We see all sorts of nomenclature used to describe helicopters but we picked that up on an (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SME-INTEL: So, the threat uses code names?

10 CAB ASST S2: Absolutely.

SME-INTEL: Do you know what those code names are?

10 CAB ASST S2: It varies between province and networks.

SME-INTEL: What are some of the common code names that we hear?

10 CAB ASST S2: For expressing helicopters there's "the fat one"; they talk about the Chinooks. "The big one": Chinooks; "the skinny one" they're often talking about Apaches. "The grasshopper looking one" is generally talking about Apaches. "The medical one" again, they see that cross for our MEDEVACs. Those become a higher level of targets, because they know they're going to come in one way or the other. So, they'll talk about, "here comes the ambulance ones." Those are common nomenclatures that we'll here.

10 CAB S2: And sometimes they'll say, "The one that has a ball on the top" which means the Kiowa.

10 CAB ASST S2: The Kiowa they'll also say "the little one" for the Kiowa.

10 CAB S2: The insurgents are also are starting to go more into the commercial aircrafts, because they know the commercial aircrafts cannot defend themselves. So, we've seen that.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes; "the white ones".

10 CAB S2: So, that's a code meaning the contract air. So, they go after them.

SME-INTEL: Talking about that, and kind of changed the subject away from the VISOPS and NVGs. It's now looking at TTPs with aviation. When you develop a threat, or when the operations are done, are the considerations of how many times they've used they air avenue of approach. How many times that they've used the HLZs or how many times they've done operations with the ground or air center [inaudible]--

10 CAB ASST S2: Absolutely.

10 CAB S2: Yes, it is. Every time, there's a CONOP that is briefed to (b)(3), (b)(6), the DCO. Yes, they go over that, they go over the HLZs. They look at the grids. They look at the operations. "Wait a minute, we've used this HLZ too many times and we've used this route too many times. We need to change it."

SME-INTEL: In relationship to Objective LEFTY GROVE, do you remember?

IE1: I know TACOPs has been specifically looking at that as well for operations both previous within the 24 hours the two weeks prior to, and also the month prior to. TACOPS would be able to give you more fidelity on that specific issue because they've pulled up the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c lines to show exactly what levels -- how many times have we gone over this area; have we burned the target. When we sit down and we do a CONOP, those questions are always asked. That's a primary concern for our Task Force. (b)(3), (b)(6) and all of everybody that are in the Task Force, down to the task force themselves level because it's a big concern for us if they know -- granted there are some things we can't avoid. When you are going up into Konar, you're terrain is very restricted. When you're in the Tagal, your terrain is restricted. When you're in Kapisa, you're terrain is very restricted and there are only certain ways you can go, but that doesn't mean there's only one way. And, so they do everything in every capability to try and vary it as much as possible for survivability of our crew aircraft mission.

SME-INTEL: So, risk mitigation is part of that and intel plays a role in assisting TACOPs with risk assessments. Okay. I can't think of any other questions.

10 CAB S2: Okay.

10 CAB ASST S2: Yes, absolutely.

[The interview was completed. The interviewees were briefed regarding OPSEC and informed that they could be recalled to clarify any answers].