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The interview of Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6) Commander, S-3, Tactical Operations Officer, Intelligence Analyst, and S-2 NCOIC opened at 2155 Zulu, 17 August 2011, at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: BG J. Colt, US Army

LEGAL ADVISOR: LA

GROUND FORCE ARMY ADVISOR: SME-GFA

MH-47 ADVISOR: SME-MH47

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR: SME-INTEL

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LA: Stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the statement you provide will be true and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief?

BG Colt: Can you first kinda describe the Task Force, it's composition and the CH-47 support. Let's go down that track first and then let's talk about mission tasking.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Yes sir, the Task Force originally started off as an assau battalion, with just UH-60s. When we found out that we were coming here, we configured in March to a Task Force configuration at home station consisting of Black Hawks and Apaches. Once we got into theater we were joined by - we actually joined the Medevac which had deployed early - 10th CAV Medevac unit which was here and at the time the Oregon Washington guard---- Oregon Washington Chinook crews. After we got here they were replaced; we also got an influx of Hawaii crews and later on the Kansas crews that are with us at this time. And just shortly about three weeks ago, we were joined by Colorado and Nebraska crews as well as RFF individuals from Korea

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and Honduras.

BG Colt: [inaudible] 47 crews.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Right all 47 crews - yes sir.

BG Colt: Can you describe the mission tasking authority and mission tasking process for a Team (b)(3), (b)(6) mission?

(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** Yes sir, -- Chinooks that are DS direct support to Team (b)(3), (b)(6). We have two Chinooks and two apaches that are direct support of Logar every night, obviously we work hand and hand with them to make sure that the crews get their day off every 14 days and work through that, but not to impede the mission. So essentially we do 24 well - not 24/7, all night operation every day of the week when called upon would from (b)(3), (b)(6) - if they had to be here at the time.

BG Colt: And the crew selection for those particular AWTs and 47s, what is the process for selecting and integrating those crews?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Sir, what we do with that is we try to select the best crews out of what we have here in order to do those missions. In many ways the hardest part about the (b)(3), (b)(6) set is the hasty planning, which is why we have TF (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) here that do that; that is their primary m (b)(3), (b)(6) is our TacOps; officer that is his number one job, but he and TF K (b)(3), (b)(6) come in at 1600 (local) and leave only after the (b)(3), (b)(6) set is done for the evening. Between the two of them, they are the one's responsible for planning the Logar mission every single night.

BG Colt: Is that the construct that you inherited from the previous task force or is that something in the Pre-deployment Site Survey (PDSS) system that you felt was the best way to do this? Can you describe that?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: When we first got here on the ADVON party they had one Captain who was doing the (b)(3), (b)(6) company LNO. We had a different team make up, team set there. Once we got here myself and TF (b)(3), (b)(6) started working hand and hand, cause I used to do the same mission set for my previous deployments - that was kind of my main role has always been on deployment not only being the tactical operations guy flight lead or something of that nature, working with ODA or working with other team members; that's what I would do. So I got here, took on the mission and then in order to keep myself flying and TF (b)(3), (b)(6) flying, we came up with

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[inaudible] and TF (b)(3), (b)(6) became primary and I became back up. Once we got them trained up [inaudible] deliver our mission.

BG Colt: Are you UH-60 rated by trade?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** Yes, sir.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** Just to add to what (b)(3), (b)(6) said, he and I have been together since OEF 7, --- and so---in those deployments which was in Kandahar, last time Iraq and now back here, we have had extensive experience working the Special Ops. community; particularly down in Kandahar working with not only United States special forces, but all the elements that were down there as well. So we have developed what we think is a very successful way of working these missions and the planning process and the execution and have become comfortable with that type, which is a little bit different perhaps than our predecessors, but we felt that it was necessary to have two individuals there not just one for the very reasons we just discussed, to back each other up.

BG Colt: Does the company itself or the platoon Chinooks however you are organized, do they have a dedicated planner? What is their participation in mission preparation?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** Whenever they come in on duty they decide to come a little bit earlier. Once they come in, I send them down to Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [inaudible] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ---team, we start working HLZs. It is the crews themselves; the crews themselves make their flight routes, they pick their HLZ's, but once again it all depends on the ground force commander's intent and what his actions are. What we have been doing is they will call me, they will chart this grid; looks well after looking, pass them through TOPO and the teams are pretty good at knowing what our constraints are. You know our constraints we got from brigade right now is that 300-meters from any type of Qalat structure, if it's going to an offset or (Y) if anything of that nature. So as long as it meets those constraints and at the same time it's within 05 degrees from the slope, it normally gets approved-- there been no issues with that. So the planners go down, the Chinook crews would pass me their flight routes, their time in-routes, their go-around directions, how they want to approach it, and again it's based off of them speaking with the ground force commanders. So when they develop flight routes sir and their planning.

BG Colt: Is there anything unique about LZ planning or LZ decks (pre-selected/approved) for the Tangi Valley?

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TF^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}TACOPS: The Tangi Valley is very limited to where you can land to meet those constraints again with three hundred meters and also of the terrain. What we try to do is typically we've done about 135 of these missions, we do brown outs and the dust landings and also the terrain has been more dangerous than the enemy. So just trying to find a place to land has been significant. However the [inaudible] Tangi Valley is very tight. There is not a place to go and especially in the green zone. So what I did prior to this mission, we will discuss it later, is I actually started working with the ground force commander also with the [inaudible] team to come up with a HLZs that we could find, not for a specific mission but because they were planning detainee operations for a few missions and we went through everything we could find. And it's just its very constrained inside of the green zone in the Tangi Valley.

BG Colt: Just for my own edification is the green zone a vernacular here? What exactly does that mean?

TF^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}TACOPS: We use the green zone for anything that has vegetati that's around where - mostly the way it works - especially for Afghanistan if you have a river there's life there's grass, there's trees, there's personnel. Most of the threat or enemy personnel even local nationals just one's who live around the water source, we call its the green zone and also its green.

TF^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}CDR: Just to clarify the process a little bit--- when the crews go own there, they actually go down, but the crews are the ones actually going to be landing the HLZ and PZ, so they help select those. When they get those they send them to TF^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}TACOPS: here as he indicated, once he gets those three and I look at those also to vet them. As he mentions himself he knows what my criteria are too. Which is the three hundred meters from any Qalat any threat area that we deemed could be a threat of any type, we also expand that further any kind of day time operations have to be either--- 800 to 1000 meters away or have a significant terrain feature between the threat and or by picking them up for whatever mission. So there are other parameters involved in that to. Once he gets the LZ and the PZ and the route it is also embedded into our S-2 section too for the very reasons that are very apparent. There are a lot of places out here; here the S-2 section looks at the SAFIRE that happened recently as well as anything that's happened on the ground to try and facilitate the best possible routes in and out and of course that doesn't speak to the normal piloting skills; not silhouetting yourself; flying silhouetted on ridge lines and staying away from built up areas things of that nature.

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BG Colt: And I appreciate very much the fact that you have given us such a comprehensive record of the (b)(1), (b)(4) mission since you have been here. How would you characterize the 135 missions since you have been here, as far as, day and night, in contact or out, number of missions that have gone in the Tangi Valley etcetera?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: I can give you the exact number for Tangi Valley. We have (b)(3), (b)(6) almost three or four that were all offset infil/offset exfil for the Tangi Valley and there were some that had terrain relief features---they were going more towards the Baraki Barak side of the Tangi Valley versus the deeper side that we went in for the IRF that one evening, but most of them had been just offsets [inaudible] I want to say it was four, but I don't know the exact number, no contact, no issues. We just go in, we got a few jackpots and again sir the list is inside there and I don't have them all, but we were more to the south; we ran into some issues where for the this operation some of the bridges; they looked at it and they didn't want to cross some bridges and be confined to crossing over, due to some of the historical threat about two command wires on the bridges and things of that nature; so that's the reason why they didn't want to come in from the north on this one or actually go into the green zone itself.

BG Colt: Predominately night missions though?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Oh, yes sir.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: They are all night missions. The only time we operate (b)(3), (b)(6) ring the day is on an extract; if they go long on their mission set, we do a day extraction and then we adjust the PZ's as necessary in order to facilitate the criteria that we established already; but even on our deliberate ops for conventional forces, we don't do day time operations down here, our Chinooks only fly at night.

BG Colt: Do you want to talk through the deliberate sort of intelligence -- how would you characterize the intelligence collaborations between Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6) and Task Force (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(6)?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: I'll address the first point, since we have been here we have had a very good working relationship with (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(6) better than most. A lot better than what I have experienced in the past with different SOF elements. So we never had a real issue with them. One reason for that is when a new team comes on board, we always

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do a meet and greet. We go there or they come here and from the very beginning we let them know our constraints or intentions [inaudible] [muffling background noise] are. Clearly we don't have a lot of the technical capabilities that some of the other Chinooks have whether it's 160th or anybody else and because of---that and couple other issues we point out to them 300, 800, 1000, the crews that we have, things of that nature. So they know from the very beginning that---if they ask us for a certain LZ that we may have to adjust, sometimes it's only 50 meters, sometimes, sure sometimes it's a 100, 200. And with that understanding from the very beginning, it has facilitated our operation considerably. So the back and forth feedback that we get from and they get from us from the very beginning has made that much simpler. ----- [BG Colt: started speaking.]

BG Colt: Do you think just [inaudible] [voice muffled] as far as risk management thought process, but do you think that most times when you are given a coordinate that; I don't understand not landing onto the X or not landing on the Y, but do you think that---intent of an area landing is clearly understood versus a precision or a point landing?

TF (S), (b) (6) CDR: can you clarify sir, ---are you saying that do they understand our constraints [inaudible]?

BG Colt: Do you think it is commonly understood by the crew that though you were given a grid that it may be an area landing that is?

TF (S), (b) (6) CDR: Yes sir, I don't mean to jump on you here but, our crews have to do that. When you have on an LZ, when you come in you pick the best possible location, send it up to brigade---brigade vets all of this as well. We should have said this at the beginning. When we give HLZ cards, we get the TOPO we are looking for slope, we are looking for any kind of laser imagery of what may be in that area. Given that when you make your approach as a pilot, as you know, that point may not be the most suitable for something that doesn't show up on imagery and they are well aware of that. So that's the one part. On the PZ, on the extraction part of it, again Logar is very professional, they know what we can and can't do. So what they will setup, they will go to that grid and they will set up that PZ so we can come in and extract them. The dust, the snow in the winter clearly makes some things very difficult, but the pilots are very important, the crews are very well aware that this is the grid, but it's that close proximity.

SME-INTEL: one of the questions with the HLZ [inaudible]

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development, it is not done here locally? How does that relationship gets transmitted down to the terrain team [inaudible] Brigade? Can you kind of talk through on how that works as far as when they take their analysis, how you get it [inaudible] [muffling sound] feasible suitable HLZ giving thee parameters, risk mitigation.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** I will start it and I will let (b)(3), (b)(6) take the last par of it. As he mentioned earlier, we get the intended n from Logar and from the (b)(3), (b)(6), whether it's (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(3), (b)(6). This is where we want to go and this is our objective; this where we want to get picked up from. Once we get that we make sure we refine it to what we can and can't do. Most of the time it's pretty close. We don't have to adjust too much and that comes from working together for so long. Once we get that or (b)(3), (b)(6) gets that, the crews, (b)(3), (b)(6), the three (S3) or myself looks at and it gets pushed up.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** [inaudible] [muffled und] to answer some more of that stion, once the, working with (b)(3), (b)(6) and the team down there; they will look at imagery; they will get our constraints, and he can pick a thing and know what they were. By the time he sent them to us passed maybe a month; they were already within ou [inaudible]. So I would just call direct to our TOPO team or TF (b)(3), (b)(6), we'll give him a call, give him the grid; once they receive the g d, they would look at it any point, in time our TOPO would also if our grids were on top of a house or if it's something; a dorked up grid for whatever imagery they have they will be put other grids around there, keep their original grid we gave them, but also show us other possible suitable HLZs that meet the 70 meters for Chinook, 300 meters and all of that and email them back to us. So that's kind of how that works over at our TOPO team in terrain analysis and it's just a slide that shows the zero to five is green, five to ten is yellow and ten to or greater is going to be red.

BG Colt: Is that a similar process used by the other Task Forces that all draw off the Brigade TOPO team?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **S3:** Roger---just to make sure there's no confusion with respect to the actual HLZ development, the TOPO team at brigade simply put in the grids and looks at the actual slope and pulls the imagery. All of the rest of it is actually done at the individual task force level. So the criteria of the Qalats, the slope, obstacles the threat the feasibility of approach departure that is all done at the task forces and we just use the brigade TOPO [inaudible] for the actual imagery with the ring and slopes and it's a back and forth really almost HLZ negotiations sometimes finding grids that work

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to meet all of those criteria. Other Task Forces use a similar, but not the exact same process.

BG Colt: Has it ever led to a timeliness issue?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: As far as getting it approved sir?

BG Colt: Or getting the analysis that you were looking for in order to make an informed judgment?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: In the very beginning when the process first started where we had to push everything up to the brigade to gain approvals, there were a couple delays, I think in its entirety, we had maybe two missions, one I know for sure that was momentarily delayed before they could actually execute the mission. It didn't impede the mission itself the mission still went, but as we did this more and more, the TOPO guys up there at brigade became very proficient at giving us the information quickly so we can then push it back up to the brigade commander because it's got to go through the S-3 and then the brigade commander as well for approval. That process has gotten much, much quicker over time and I can't remember the last time we had a really issue with anything impeding the mission.

BG Colt: Any other?

SME-INTEL: Given the Intel shop we had down at battalion; if there was anything you could do or changes you could make to help assist with that process it seems cumbersome, is there anything you would recommend to Intel, Intel architecture to change potentially?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Well if we could have our own TOPO team, that would be great cause that would facilitate, we could draw our own imagery quickly and then instead of going up back and up again that would take that part out of the equation, but now again you are talking money assets things like that. Those teams are at the brigade level and not at the battalion level that would take one part of it out.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: I was working with the team down at the [inaudible] trying to get some of their high speed imagery and also some of their graphics and also a program light art that we were working with and working on. The only problem with that was it was only I or TF (b)(3), (b)(6) working so we didn't have a full team of people, so if we were trying to do those ourselves we didn't have the manning or assets; [inaudible] if they were working to get user imagery as well. So if you had a dedicated cell to be working with special ops.

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Team or whatever is doing imagery then that is something that yes it would speed the process up.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: that's a good point, it does not matter where the TOPO tea s whether it's with (b)(3), (b)(6) or with us here, we can certainly cross level and then push it up again, but once again it's going to them and back to us, then up to the brigade. And even if we did have that capability it would also, just as (b)(3), (b)(6) said, it will require a dedicated team for that. And with the personnel issues the way they are with all the deploying units, they have the capability to manage that.

BG Colt: You referred to this back to brigade, is that a risk mitigation method? What is the purpose of that and your thoughts about that?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: It's considered a high risk mission. I'm only authorized to authorize moderate risk missions; high risk missions have to go up to the brigade commander for authorization for execution.

BG Colt: What defines a high risk mission?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Hasty planning is one thing that would do that. Also, --

BG Colt: Hasty is defined as less than three hours?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Three hours to four hours [inaudible] is considered hasty pl nning, yes, sir. Three hours is for our (b)(3), (b)(6), mission set, four hours for ISAF SOF.

BG Colt: Of the 135 missions that you have done in support of Logar, how many would you say were deliberate planning not hasty?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Of these 135?

BG Colt: Yes.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: These are all high risk sir. They are all considered hasty p nning [inaudible] for risk mitigation measure.

BG Colt: Everything single Logar mission is a high risk mission?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Every single one is approved by the brigade

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commander.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) Sir I can speak a little on that to. [inaudible] [several voices king low at the same time.]

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) was sworn in.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) For the deliberate planning process there would be some hts would talk with (b)(3), (b)(6) would talk with (b)(3), (b)(6) [inaudible] some of the [inaudible], we would work HLZs for the following night, the problem is most of the time we would pick HLZ, we have an idea whether [inaudible] would have a say in that, but more than likely the next day when we showed up he had moved, so most of our planning ended up being up for not. With that being said, on occasion we could pick a vicinity and have HLZ's already selected for that area and it did speed up the process a lot more because I already had TOPO from the previous night and we can then push forward with the planning and execute the SP time a little earlier, but for the most part, every time we would come in and do the check in that same (inaudible) had moved and therefore we had to re-evaluate where our HLZ's were. So it ended up being [inaudible] hasty planning process for an hour and a half plan and a hour and a half for the brief and the crews [inaudible].

BG Colt: Keep in mind I'm not impugning the methodology or the process here because I believe there has to be one. Of the 135 missions you planned so far, how many times has this risk mitigation process overturned the original plan or influenced the outcome of the original plan?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** The risk -- in other words getting approval from Brigade w many times has that changed?

BG Colt: Exactly. And what categorically might be a reason to change?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) I think it would be the risk for the Qalat near the HLZs would be the biggest risks that the brigade takes a look at and I can say we probably only had maybe one or two where they said take a look at this area again see if you can find something better. They didn't necessary disapprove it but said if we can find something else better based off the terrain maybe take a look at it. But maybe one or two missions sir. Usually we vetted it pretty well before we sent it up.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** Usually on those one or two occasions and **TF**(b)(3), (b)(6) is right would get a call from the boss and he will tell me h

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I'm looking at this I see that got a Qalat within 250 or 200 meters; are you comfortable with that. And I would take a look at it and I will tell him we have already done the analysis. I say sir, I its one Qalat, the door gunners are aware of it they are going to be concentrating on that it's an LZ or if it's a PZ, (b)(3), (b)(6) will clear that building before we actually come in for the PZ.

BG Colt: I think that's a healthy dialogue to have.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: You asked about permission process if it delays or whatever for the mission, I think since we have been here it has only been two or three missions that has process this way actually delayed the mission and pushed it. I know for myself I have requested some additional time through the team members because the request changed or I couldn't meet the intent and also put the plan together in a timeline they wanted because of a change or SIGINT mover hit. So that's the only time there have been delays with the approval process as if something happens or another SI pops up or he move and we lose flexibility but It's only been a few times that has actually happened where we were delayed taking off due to approval.

BG Colt: Okay. Have you ever sensed impatience from the ground force with respect to the pace of being prepared to take off?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Sir, that's a loaded question. Like any team they want to get out they want to go and SI hits the only problems we have is our constraints so there has been frustration we have expressed to them for things changed so much frustrating thing [inaudible] us, but again it's a mutual frustration we both understand, it's nothing that either one of us can affect, they want to go and get the targets as close as they can with the threat and pick that target up. However with for us our constraints if it moves, I have got to find new HLZ or TF (b)(3), (b)(6) has to find new HLZ's and [inaudible] looking for the 300 m ers and no Qalats and flatness also [inaudible] routes, the threat, it causes us to build a whole new brief which once again starts our time.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: And that's the good part about having a good working relationship, because we start from the very beginning with the meet and greet and when we get to know them, I mean this aircraft going down was not only hard hit because of our crews, we knew the guys that where onboard because we worked with them. And they came over here and talked to us, (b)(3), (b)(6) and TF (b)(3), (b)(6) they talked every single day, they go down there and do the planning. So it's helps to build that relationship because when there are frustrations on both sides

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everyone understands.

BG Colt: To what degree is using reserve component and their rotational basis affected your ability to integrate crews and can you describe that?

TF(b)(3),(b)(6)**CDR:** I will give you a perfect example, we have every unit is different with the reserves or active duty. You will see some units they are night and day from other units. The crew just left Hawaii, which is fantastic, absolutely fantastic to the man[inaudible] the Kansas guys that were here were just absolutely fantastic crews.

BG Colt: And incidentally, how long did you have that? Did you have that from RIPTOA or were they here before you got here?

TF(b)(3),(b)(6)**CDR:** When we first got here, it was Oregon / Washington. They had few very good, very competent pilots, worked really well. I'm a firm believer in the fact that the leader sets the tone for the unit and the Captain that was down here had a different disposition, a different outlook. They had several of their guys that were very, very proficient, very good and those were the guys that flew Logar. I had no issues with them at all and they were great. When they left Kansas came onboard. They integrated fully with our unit and that's one of the things that we do at (b)(3),(b)(6) the whole time anyway. And you've a new group comes in and the first thing they get is one of these to make them feel like they are part of (b)(3),(b)(6) They're not Chinooks; they're not Apaches; they're not Black Hawks. We integrate them fully into the unit and this Kansas crew has been phenomenal. They've got the right attitude. They want to go out and do great things. They want to be part of Task Force (b)(3),(b)(6).

It's easier when they come into a Task Force. When we first got here the Oregon / Washington guys had been here with 'Brawler' and so they've been brought up under 'Brawler, under different SOPs, different TTPs, and things of that nature. So, they then had to adjust to obviously how the new Task Force does things and that transition may have been a little bit more difficult. But, by and large, I personally don't have an issue with any -- not a single one of the Kansas crew. And, the new guys that have come in -- the Colorado, Nebraska, Korea, our newer guys are the same way. Fully integrated into the Task Force and I have had no issue with them.

SME-MH47: So, do they fly under your SOP or do they bring and

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SOP with them?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** They fly under our SOP.

SME-MH47: That's their fighter management --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** Absolutely. And, it's a 10th CAB SOP. They fall under th and we tell them right from the very beginning, "Look, this is not us picking on you, getting into your record and so forth and so on. It's making you part of the team. We are one team. We do things one way and it's the 10th CAB way, and of course the (b)(3), (b)(6) way.

BG Colt: Do we know -- Do they know, see, and train the 10th CAB TACSOP or methodology during their mobilization processes?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **S3:** They generally do not, but being with my previous life her efore coming to the (b)(3), (b)(6), we did forward out some of those documents to them and to the MOB sites during their training. For example, the Colorado/Nebraska guys, I was actually in contact with them prior to them coming out here when they were training forwarding them some of our business rules, the TACSOP .suggestions for training to flying at night and different pieces like that--

BG Colt: And can they VTC, or PDSS; anything between you and them before they got here?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **S3:** I can't speak to the PDSS, but we did do VTCs with them.

SME-MH47: So, from my understanding Hawaii's came through, and then Kansas, and now we are working with Colorado and Nebraska. So --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **S3:** Sir, it's an offset rotation. So, in essence there's Guard / Reserve components in RC (b)(3), (b)(6) at a time and they are off cycle from each other. So, originally when 10th CAB TOA'd and (b)(3), (b)(6) TOA'd there was the Oregon / Washington National Guard, which was B, 1st of the 1-60th. Hawaii, B, 1st of the 1-71 came in at about the same time that we did and then we being 10th CAB also brought our own organic crews and air frames. Five or six months into rotation here there was a redistribution of air crews and air frames across RC (b)(3), (b)(6) in order to even out and leverage all the capabilities based on all the different mission sets. So, the Hawaii Guard was split between (b)(1)14a, (b)(1)14c and (b)(1)14a, (b)(1)14c with mainly the Oregon / Washington focus out of Bagram with the traditional 10th

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CAB crews out of ~~(b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4b~~ and JAF. When the Oregon / Washington RIP'd out, that's when Kansas came in and then soon after Kansas came in it was time for Hawaii to depart, at which time the Colorado / Nebraska had just come in.

BG Colt: What challenges, if any, does that present with regard to detachment leadership and detachment maintenance management when you're always homogenizing crews and maintainers?

TF ~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~ CDR: The maintainers are now falling under D Company, so that a in it's one team, one fight, kind of thing. Because there was that transition period when we got here, initially we had the maintainers -- this is how "Brawler" our predecessors did it --

BG Colt: Do you also pull on a thin slice from the AVUM or AVIM-- No?

TF ~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~ CDR: There's none. No, sir. Essentially, Kansas the guys, an correct me if I'm wrong, but they came here with crews and that's it. So, that's the maintenance piece has been a little bit of a challenge, not insurmountable, and again there's only so many assets, so many personnel so brigade distributed those as best as they could to make sure that we could fight the fight.

SME-MH47: So you have an SPs that are 47 drivers [inaudible]? Do you all ever do unit collective training with these? Because over the 135 missions there's been other units dropping in, as far as pilots, whether it was Kansas and now Colorado / Nebraska. Do those guys just recently within the last month; is that correct?

TF ~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~ S3: Yes, sir. I should be happy to speak to some of the training pieces; I think we are starting to go down that road. There's two distinct mission sets that are here for those CH-47s; the general support and then also the direct support to ~~(b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4b, (b)(1), 1.4c~~. So, at least when I came on board it was primarily the Hawaii Guard that was on Logar. It makes it much easier too, like TF ~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~ CDR said, choose your best crews, they formed that habitual relationship with the supporting unit; not to say that the HLZ support or some of the missions are enormously different than the GS, but certainly the planning timeline and the repetitive nightly missions that they have. We kept them sort of programmed for that and cycled through front seaters were back in as necessary just to man that 14 day crew duty before reset. When Kansas came in and they did their RIP, the general process following the APG is to do all the academics. The CCTs, which includes the environmental, the local area orientation, an orientation on right seat qualification flight and then we would

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put them on the GS set. So, for a period of time we were running two sets of GS from right out here, so basically watching two separate teams. We called them the GS A and the GS B; so in essence we were putting up six Chinooks every night for either delivering hasty operations or delivery of supplies or [inaudible]

BG Colt: Still two of those dedicated to (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4b) mission though, right?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) S3: Yes, sir. So, the general progression was to get all of the (b)(3), (b)(6) SPs out of the company. Our Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6) is dual rated and the (b)(3), (b)(6) and fly a lot with the (b)(3), (b)(6) to assist with experience and oversight as well as the company commanders to fly with those crews and start to build the relationship and the training, the local area and then to try to overcome the red-illum that's here in Afghanistan as well. Once they had flown a number of GS missions and we could separate out who the go-to individuals were, that the Task Force Commander or that I was most comfortable with in a hasty scenario, to either have the skill to fly the aircraft or have the maturity to make the decisions that you have made then we selected people to rotate into the (b)(3), (b)(6) set with the Hawaii crews.

It's certainly important to note that there's only a two day overlap between the Colorado / Nebraska arrival and the Hawaiian departure. So we had to do a deliberate kind of left seat/right seat ride with the Kansas crew members going down participating in the planning. There was actually two nights (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4b) did an Op so that they actually did a planning exercise. Then riding jump seat, then flying as a PI or as an additional back-ender, and then ultimately [inaudible] moving to that mission set. We had to complete that over the course of about two weeks by the time that Hawaii was due to depart out and at the time of distance for them, we had just started the process of rotating in one of the Colorado IPs [inaudible].

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Just to get to that one, too, when Kansas first got here (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6), who is up in BAF right now -- he was one of the guys that we worked with down in Kandahar last time. This is the same exact Kansas crew that was with this exact Task Force down in Kandahar last time. So we knew -- Some of us, like (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself they're still around here. We knew some of these individuals. (b)(3), (b)(6) had the experience required to switch over to (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4b) fairly quickly and he was one of our stalwart pilots down that was doing that in anticipation of having to get one of the Kansas guys in there as we started doing afterwards, in anticipation of the Hawaii crew leaving and that was the same thing with (b)(3), (b)(6). When he came in there, you look at who you've got

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who's your most experienced guy, who's got the most goggle hours, who is the logical guy to put in the cockpit to then start getting everybody else plussed up, because you can't just have your two crews. You have to cycle those guys through, so again, which is why he was on that mission too.

SME-MH47: Do you have a standardized packet that they fall in on as far inadvertent IMC procedures, the time -- the objective diagrams, and the TDHs? Do you have that?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**CDR:** A need-board packet?

SME-MH47: Yes, a need board packet that you have -- you're basically -- it sounds like some -- you have peaks and valley as far as experience when these guys come in, so you do some unit training and crew coordination, training, things like that, TTPs you're teaching them. Do you push that to them or do you let them, or do you let them use what they have and then you cover them?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**TACOPS:** Sir, I can speak on that one. When the crews came in, you know, of course they first came in with their mission and products that they were used to. So, what I have done is most of their products, I have incorporated or I've incorporated ours into theirs. I'm kind of the keeper of the Master need-board packet and inadvertent IMC. I talk with the crews we came up with prior to the Oregon guys, and also with the Hawaii guys, and now with Kansas, "Hey, this is what we've been using. What do you guys like?" We've already seen things that look better, so it's our standard information, but it's all about the pilots and how they want to see it and view it. We set up a standard need-board packet that comes together with -- that they fill out at the company level. It's got their route card on there, but it is our overall mission standard for need-board packet and there company card, their inadvertent IMC. Same thing we use for our AMRs. There's a slight difference whenever we do our large Air Assault missions. We're using the [inaudible], things of that nature. We have some different setups since we have AWT, everyone kind of working off a larger packet. But for the hasty operation, sir, it's based off our standard, but incorporates what's more pleasing to them to see in the cockpit when they tell us more important information when they go on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c mission.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**CDR:** It's the same thing we did when we first became Task For Again, (b)(3), (b)(6) and I, we've worked with Task Forces in all three deployments so we know there's idiosyncrasies between

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units, but when the Apaches came over the first thing they told us was, "Well, we don't need all that stuff. We need two things. We need a GRG and a Concept of Fires (COF). That's all we really need." We made a point of saying for that one need-board packet, and if you want those two pieces of paper on the top, then that's fine. But, we got their input, just like (b)(3), (b)(6) said, "What did you want on that piece of paper," and we adapted that and made that our SOP.

BG Colt: And you have one AH-64 company?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**CDR:** Yes, sir.

BG Colt: And that is an organic company to 10th CAB?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**CDR:** It is.

BG Colt: And they have integrated now with three different 47 units in the (b)(1.4a), (b)(1).4c mission?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**CDR:** [*nodded indicating an affirmative response.*]

BG Colt: But also that same AH-64 company or have we ever changed that?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**CDR:** No, sir. The only thing we've changed -- Oh, go ahead.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**S3:** Yes, sir. I was just going to say the same thing you were sir. We have had other aviators rotate through OPCON to the Task Force to that company --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**CDR:** Two Apaches.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**S3:** --both from organic 10th CAB and also will have C., 1st of 2 pilots right now, that are here.

BG Colt: Okay. I understand. I take it anybody in the company based on this rotational crew cycle and still managed by that company commander is capable of performing the (b)(1.4a), (b)(1).4c mission; correct?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**S3:** They are capable, sir, but we still use the same process selecting crews and forming a habitual relationship with the attack company as well. So I maintain -- I have it here for my reference, crew rosters with experience, missions since they've been flying, all of their past training, leave dates, and everything

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on there. We update them every two weeks so I can assist in selecting the crews.

BG Colt: Is it an accurate characterization then that these two DS Apaches are formed most regularly by habitual crews. True?

TE(b)(3), (b)(6)**S3:** *[nodded indicating an affirmative response.]*

TE(b)(3), (b)(6)**CDR:** Generally speaking. Yes, sir. Again, we have to have -- cause of the number of hours flown, there will be a stint of maybe two weeks where the day crews fly 6 or 7 hours a day and they need a break. Whereas the (b)(3), (b)(6) set may only fly 4 hours a night depending on whether or not they get TIC'ed up on the ground or something like that. Infiles and exfil are mandatory; they've got to have AWT coverage. That's one thing we've put out from the very beginning. But sometimes they don't want us over head. They don't want to give us -- especially if it's an offset. If there are going in six or seven clicks, something like that, they don't want the Apache's hanging around. So we do cycle crews through there, but it's a deliberate thought process done, "Okay, this guy he's been a PI on the (b)(3), (b)(6) set before for a number of occas He's now a PC, granted, a new PC, but he's familiar with the (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4c set, the mission, the requirement and also the planning process. They are all briefed at the same time. When a (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4c mission gets briefed you get the Apaches over here, and you've got the Chinooks over here. Everybody gets briefed at once.

TE(b)(3), (b)(6)**S:** With the AWT guys as well, what w do is we'll take them do [inaudible] JTACs from Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6); that way we're all integrated with the specific JTAC [inaudible] or Striker element. We do have pretty much -- everyone that's [inaudible] through the (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4c set, has linked up with the JTACs at some point to talk TTPs

TE(b)(3), (b)(6)**CDR:** And done a face-to-face.

SME-MH47: So, the HLZ selection is a vetted process that goes up all the way through the chain and back down. Who does the Route selection? Do you leave it to the crews to do that?

TE(b)(3), (b)(6)**JACOPS:** Roger, the crews are looking at them. They will build a ute. Usually, again, talk to the ground force commander, we'll get his intent depending upon if they want you to stay off these terrain features or either noise, or whatever it may be. S2 then vets around. A lot of times, they'll walk over to their CP, look at their routes. They'll have their SAFIRE tracker on it also,

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the threat tracker is on. They'll look at that and vet their routes through S2, but the companies are the ones that build their routes, sir.

SME-MH47: And, you're a 60 driver; correct?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** Correct.

SME-MH47: And these are 47 pilots. So, sometimes there may be a disconnect between what a 47 may need? Yes / no?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** Negative, sir. We've talked to a lot of the crews, a when it comes to flat out mission planning, there were more times in the beginning when the Guard first got here on and how we would do our mission planning and what we looked at, but that's been fixed so they are -- right now they are tracking how the most tactical routes that we can come up with, the [inaudible] mission planning standards we can come up with. We gave them simple -- I mean as detailed as, "I want to see blue routes as the first route. Green route is going to be the second route." You know, the ACPs RPs, so they just went through a -- once again when they're getting trained and talking [inaudible] we've expressed what we want to see and what I wanted to see and then they were just doing it, sir. There hasn't been a big disconnect.

SME-MH47: In individual crews, of the AMC they have been spoken to by us. Say for instance the intel guys says, you know, they've be brought along and they say, "Hey, when you are doing your route selection be cognizant of these issues," [inaudible].

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) We've not only vet through the S-2, but a lot of times too, the was myself or (b)(3), (b)(6) talking to the S-3 of (b)(3), (b)(6) 6. Taking a look at the area we see a SAFIRE zone. We'll come up with an initial plan of where we would like to see the route and then we'll also talk to S-2, where they'd like to see th pass that to the crews to say, "Hey, we spoke with S-2 (b)(3), (b)(6) 6 wants you to come around from the east," or whatever and then the AMCs and the pilots do the actual routes and [inaudible] have to go to S-2 and have S-2 take a look at the route prior to it being completed.

BG Colt: Okay. Can you talk to AMC selection and what is the process with regard to; I understand there are element AMCs and then an overall mission AMC? Can you talk to that?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** Yes, sir. We have a memorandum for record that

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has every AMC listed on there. Every AMC and PC is spoken directly to by me. They first go through our SP and we essentially have two of them. We have an AH and a UH. Our UH requirement is also a [inaudible] pilot dual tracked. So they talk to them first, get their spin on the whole AMC or PC briefing and once they are done with that then they come talk to me. I give them what I consider my left and right limits, my expectations of them what I think they can do, can't do. I run them through several scenarios and I basically tell them that I'm here to back you up and you have to make the most informed decision you can. You can't run through every possibly scenario that happens out there. It's impossible, but the one thing that I express to them more so than anything else, and this is across the board, particularly the Apaches is I tell them that in order to make an informed decision you have to detach yourself from the situation especially if it's a critical one. An example that I always give them on the lift side -- on the MEDEVAC side, you can have some lieutenant colonel down on the ground yelling and screaming at you to come down there and CASEVAC this guy because he's dying, but when you see tracers going across, you can't come in during because you're just going to put four more casualties down. And, on the Apache side, I tell them, "Look, when you've got a guy screaming and yelling at you to shoot this building that we're taking fire from," but you know there are civilians in there that you have to say, "No, I can't." So, I stress to them all during this briefing is you have to detach yourself from the situation even if it's for a few seconds and make a non-emotional decision.

BG Colt: Let me rephrase. You designate, I take it, for each element the AH AMC --

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** Yes, sir.

BG Colt: For that CH element, with regard to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c specifically support, the CH AMC and then there is an overall AMC. How do you do we come to that determination?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** The AMC is usually the most experienced one on the mission; usually. In the case of EXTORTION 17, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6), he's our Task Force SP and he was the AMC designate for that. Now, given the way we do deliver ops out here, the way everyone does it, the Apaches are the ones that usually stay on station so they retained the overall AMC responsibility. Once the CHs leave, obviously (b)(3), (b)(6) he was off [inaudible]. But, he's designated and we have a designated AMC for the Apaches as well.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** To answer in more detail your question, the

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reason why I have two listed on there, is because whenever the CH47s are going to ground, of course, if the ground commander is onboard, the CH-47 don't leave the air mission commander. Once they break station and it's just the AWT on station, that's why we have it listed on the Con-Op or the slide showing two different AMCs. At one point in time, not both of them were there. That's how we have it listed out, sir.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** In fact, the only time that we have had an overall AMC for entire mission was when the conventional forces had very large scale air assaults. In that case I was the AMC for the overall mission. And when we broke station with the C2 bird and myself, you know trail, whichever it was, the Apaches took over. It was designated; it was briefed before-hand and then when I came back on station then I assumed overall AMC responsibilities.

BG Colt: Okay. During a (b)(1.4a), (b)(1).4 mission, for instance a support mission, what is this C2 node's responsibility?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** Our responsibility is for the flight in and out infil / exfil and the overhead coverage, AWT. We track that, either (b)(3), (b)(6) are generally in the TOC during the entire mission so if questions arise, they are the planners, they have the most insight to what was going on, how it was planned and how they operate. So it's not up to just the Battle CPT to get briefed before-hand and then try and figure it out. They are there to take care of any issues that might come up. Obviously the AWT is generally on station the entire time and that's to support the ground element, obviously wherever they happen to be. We know the ground scheme maneuvers; we know what their intent is; we know where they are going to go; where they are going to come out, so that obviously helps facilitate our support to them and that support comes primarily in the way of the AWT.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-MH47: Over the last 135 missions, sir, how many times was an audible called that wasn't briefed in the air mission AMB prior to stepping; that they did an IRF or a QRF, depending on how you would define it?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** There haven't been that many. (b)(3), (b)(6) can you think of any

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** I can only think of two that I had done. One of course was EXTORTION 17 and one previously for actually inserting

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an IRF. Other than that, the usual audible calls have been in PZs, moving, or things of that nature. Nothing of actually inserting an IRF; so for me, I have only done two.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) We needed [inaudible] the action. We have never done an IRF for most of the missions. I briefed -- (b)(3), (b)(6) fills in for me now twice a week; it was once a week. So, I have never conducted an IRF with any of the teams prior to this.

SME-MH47: I'm just curious if Colorado or Nebraska, and we'll talk to them later, if their competency level was to the point where they could audible and that and where the HLZ was brought out -- carried out to them the objective diagram right out to the aircraft when their blades are turning. That's a high level of --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** It is. It is in some ways and it isn't in others and the reason I say that is because the most experienced Colorado and Nebraska crew member obviously is (b)(3), (b)(6). High time IP; a lot of experience. Whether or not he in his 15 - 18 years of service has gone through that in the past, I'm sure he has, but we can tell you for a fact that we do audibles every single day on the GS set. We get emergency AMRs constantly, so we've got a perfectly planned mission and we'll go from one place and suddenly in flight, we are changing and we're going someplace else. So, we get the intel data dumped, basically, "Yeah, roger. No issues going from here to here." The battle CPT will call the crew and say, "roger, from BAF going to McClain (sic) instead of going all the way to Dehdadi (sic)," et cetera, et cetera. So, that stuff is done all the time on the GS side. Not done so much as we just discussed on the (b)(1), 4a, (b)(1), 4b side, but it's almost a nature set to be able to do that sort of thing. Having said that, not knowing (b)(3), (b)(6) exact experience with audibles in his previous life, you know, before he came to us obviously; the PC of the aircraft had done plenty of GS mission -- had gone through that and he had done (b)(1), 4a, (b)(1), 4b missions since too. So, he was there as the PC because he had experience and (b)(3), (b)(6) was in there because he was new to the mission. You know, even though he was an IP with thousands of hours et cetera, et cetera. I don't know if that answers your questions.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) Real quick, although we haven't done the IRF, we've done multiple PZ changes throughout the mission set; most of the time if they are taking a little bit longer in the 10 series or if they're [inaudible] and we have to push through the day time exfil we've done plenty of those where we have audible in the PZ and get out the products to them and then they move to it, for example [inaudible]. But, they have had to flex while they are out

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there ripping on two with the IRF the only thing that really changes is the number of PAX. With that being said, we have also done multiple recycled airs, where they do one and throw it, they come back and execute another infil. So, it almost is the same process to me as far as an audible change.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** We also have done two kinetic strikes involving primarily the Apaches, but that involved going out -- we had started, at least the very first one, we had started the planning process for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c set and in the midst of that some guy popped up that was on the Joint Targeting List (JTL) and they asked the Apaches to come out there and put a hell fire on them. Now, it didn't involve a CH side in that case. The last that we just did was down here, Char. That was a daytime mission and we actually infilled a Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) element. Now, that was with Black Hawks, but we have done that as far as the planning part of it. The crew part, like I said, most of that experience will definitely come from the GS because we had so many emergency AMRs.

BG Colt: Can you now step us through this Objective LEFTY GROVE mission?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** Yes, sir. You want me to start from the actual deliber plan itself of just from the IRF portion?

BG Colt: From the planning piece.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** We have the timeline thing set up right there sir, because I don't want to -- I will generalize because I don't have it exactly memorized. But, the one thing that started off -- We had started working on a previous mission where I went down -- **TF** (b)(3), (b)(6) was actually (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. I was talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) and a couple other guys, "Look at the Tangi Valley." So, we've spent pretty much two nights of sitting down there just looking at every HLZ we can come up with in Tangi Valley. But, it was for a different operation. We put imagery together. We talked and discussed the intents [inaudible] and also, we were talking about making them a map. We just pretty much found everything we could. So, that helped out later on in mission planning because we already had imagery. We already had stuff that came from TOPO due to that night there was some SIPR problems getting things emailed back and forth. That evening, once we received the warning order, same thing happened whenever they give you a call. They kind of give us the heads-up, they started sending us like [inaudible] they work in the Tangi. That night they were looking at Tangi Valley. We sat

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planners down. Planners were passing grids for the initial team going in, worked with those guys, came up and got everything put together.

BG Colt: And their planners were out of the company?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Correct; yes, sir. So that the pilots go down. They start doing the planning; looking at HLZs. They call us back and forth once again, when we get the colonel's intent and the gade commander's intent; they were always very very good with (b)(3), (b)(6) and those guys, saying, "Hey, look 300-meters. [Inaudible.] We didn't have to move anything or adjust anything. It was on the eastern side, closer to kind of where [inaudible] was at; looked at the imagery where they wanted to go; passed everything up and start building the standard brief.

BG Colt: Is that joint planning with the AH's also? The AWT?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Negative, sir. The AWT, we give a brief time -- their pl nning doesn't really come in until they get to discuss how they are walking in, where their check points are, with Concept of Fires (COF), the action zone, that's usually where they are mainly focused. But, they don't get the **debridged (sic) or** get briefed HLZs until we have come in here, sir. Sometimes some of the crews do pop in to the plan shop and say, "hey what's going on," and we will point out to them -- we'll show them what's going on, but we don't require them to be there as part of the HLZ selection because 90 percent of the time they are all offset and there hasn't been a reason really to bring guys in to have [inaudible] Usually the S2 deals with this, but that's well. But for that evening --

BG Colt: Incidentally, do you normally plan for an attached or detached escort? Do the AHs normally lead out? Are they attached to the flight or not; joint AMC or not?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Sir, it all depends on [inaudible] missions, but it all depends upon the ground force commander's intent. Our typical mission,; they go out early they make sure they get eyes-on, then make the "Cherry - Ice" call for us. If there's a higher threat area, sometimes I'll try to have them follow in. I think it all depends on the ground force commander's intent and what he would like to do. Like I said, we have done missions where one of the aircraft is shot; it was with a [inaudible] rounds [inaudible] follows them in. We've done where one is high/low -- and, again it all depends upon just the threat and the ground force commander's intent. For this evening, again, the normal plan was for them to

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be offset Cherry/Ice. We had some AC-130s to inspect everybody else's hold station so we were doing burns and we discussed that with the AWTs as well. We do the mission plan. We come in here and brief as a crew. Everyone briefs; any questions they have for me if there are any things they don't really understand or track, then I will call back and that evening there was no questions, no issues. It was a pretty straight forward mission where the HLZs were going. The flight routes were initial push and then we execute that mission, sir.

BG Colt: Is it common that the AMC has commo with the AC-130.

TE (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: With the Delta model Chinook, sir, the mission would have to have one Fox [inaudible]. We keep them up with the AWT. AMC does talk directly to the AC-130. The ground force commander in the back, he's on more COMs as well, so they were able to push and move things when they need to move. Typically, we will have -- the AWT will request [inaudible] for CH-47s and it's for the lead aircraft to go in. If it's zero illum, and they don't want to fire a rocket, they'll ask for a burn as well, because it's of course, quieter, but of course, a little better and more accurate. That evening, I don't recall if they asked for a burn or illumination rounds. I do not recall that evening. I think --

BG Colt: Are you talking about Brewers first?

TE (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Correct, sir. It was (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4c with HLZ. We had no issue after the brief, the execution piece. We took off on time. There was no issue with infil. The crews were sitting back there in the parking pads and the infil had gone with no issue. The guys where moving to the objective. Once we got a phone call a little bit later said, "Hey, look we're looking at some squirters and also some guys massing in this nity," and that's when I got the heads-up to get [inaudible] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4c team a call and talk with them about possibly getting an IRF. They need to approve it and put them in, but it was like, "hey, can you go and start looking at some areas," and this is kind of our intent. Our intent is 4 kilometers to the western side; trying to find an area everyone kind of masses us on the aircraft. The only thing, the guy said the flight routes were so polluted. He asked me to try to find something coming in from like the northwest. So that way, again, we were coming in from the northwest side and avoiding -- there was a spur that kind of stuck out. Some of the guys were going and being asked to try to keep the aircraft masked as much as possible for as long as possible on the sound. We started working through the process --

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BG Colt: Can I stop you there for a second? Again, back to the C2 component here, the responsibilities or situational awareness-- How aware were you the AHs had already made an engagement that evening?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) S3: We knew sir. We not only track it with the postings the fusions on MIRC. I will be in the TOC with Mr. Ford and TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c will be on the phone back and forth over to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c battle tracking and then we also track ever (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c g on BFT we will give reports from AWTs or the CHs as well.

So, not everything we have is absolute real time but most of the time it's pretty close.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: We made a point, obviously, and I think it's probably cross the board with everyone, if an AH or CH element becomes engaged, the response [inaudible] takes care of an engagement and the report when able, and that's what they do to. In close proximity, more often than not, we will hear them because we monitor the FM traffic.

BG Colt: Do you maintain any kind of MIRC with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c TOC? Any kind of chat?

(b)(3), (b)(6) In the window, the picture of the fusion itself usually the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c NO down there will be keeping log in that window and that's how we will track the situational awareness of the mission the entire time. Also, if there's something that comes up question mark -- you know, question wise we will call it down there, but it's in the window itself is an actual LNO from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that puts check points when they are clearing the target or [inaudible] --

BG Colt: Do you maintain an LNO down there during mission?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) Not during mission, sir.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: That evening, when they got engaged, I was already tracking that engagement and that's where some of the discussions came in from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Team talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) about putting them 4 kilometers from the original objective is what they wanted to do so that way, one, we are outside of the engagement area, but at the same time that's how these squinters and also the people -- the individuals were moving towards, so he wanted to be on the other side of them.

BG Colt: Okay. To any degree, does it influence your

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judgment with regard to risk assessment when you are considering another LZ like that in the direction of the line of drift of the squirter or threat?

TF ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)} **CDR:** Absolutely, sir. If we know -- it's just what I would c common sense. If we know you've got bad guys coming towards you, it goes back to some of the stuff with our UHs. We've done some vehicle interdiction training. Clearly, the biggest threats you got; a vehicle barreling down on you; that's not the place to be is right in front of it, but given the distance from that, that's where you determine how much of a threat it is. So, is there a threat when they are coming towards you? Absolutely. You mitigate that by the distance, and what you have to cover.

BG Colt: Sure.

TF ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)} **TACOPS:** And, sir, for me -- I'm the one that selected the HLZ and looked at it. To me, the ground force commander's intent looking at the historical information for that area, with command wires across the bridges, the intent for them not to cross over the bridge and do an off-set to the south and also have more reaction time to get towards the northern side of the valley to move over towards the squinters and also the -- you know, we had to report what we found; there's individuals massing. It was the best th in that area that we could find. I had already discussed it -- ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)} and I were talking back and forth, because he was like, "hey, look this one looks good; can we look at this one. Can we go here," the further west we went the worse it got from SAFire and when we came to just a lot of structures or -- and then the closer we went, once again, now we're too close to the enemy as far as the threat that we had already assessed was there. So, that's why we went with that HLZ -- the best one that I could find there that had been the intent.

BG Colt: To what degree was your endurance in the valley on the initial mission a consideration for the IRF infil? Did I phrase that -- The fact that you had been down on the ground now for essentially 3 hours and at 4 kilometer off-set in restrictive terrain did that play any part in the thinking about risk assessment?

TF ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)} **TACOPS:** The only thing I can speak of is our own -- I just viewed this as a supporting element, so when they asked me to go there I just started making the mission and planning it, because again I was viewing it as I am an asset supporting element not a -- don't dictate their ground tactical plan. That's what they asked for and that's what I started working on so, I didn't assess their

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abilities to continue operations in that valley. No, sir.

SME-MH47: I don't know if I missed it, but when they were at REDCON 2 sitting out here on the gravel, did the crews know what was going on, on the target as far as the shooting and the EKIAS on [inaudible]?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: When they are red-con two, we keep them up to date on what's going on.

SME-MH47: Did you call them on the FM?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Roger. Just like tonight, we had to change the PZ based on one of the two elements that's out tonight. One of them came in contact and they are exfilling. They actually called, saying, "No, we don't want to go to the other place because it's going to take us further in. We need to go out." So we keep them up to date on what's going on, pass them any new grids, and then in this case HLZ cards, imagery, and everything else that they need.

SME-MH47: Is the string that tight -- or maybe I don't have the geography view, that the PCs don't come in and you just leave the right seaters in the aircraft ready for trigger pull. Do you ever have to do that?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6): I can speak on that a little bit. In regard to the SA for the crews out there, they are also monitoring the Helo common which is 50.650 [inaudible] and they are also monitoring Atlas as well which is the fires from Task Force (b)(3), (b)(6) itself. So, the entire time they are out there they are monitoring the situation on the ground through the ground force commander. I've [audible] talked to -- we normally don't bring them in to the TOC because they have more SA, to be honest with you, from the aircraft with what's going on and they're also used as the emergency CASEVAC if needed for these guys. So, that's the reason we keep them out there [inaudible], sir.

BG Colt: Is it your situational awareness that the AHs were flexed to look at HLZ (b)(1)1.4a before they returned to the FARP to pick up the CHs? Do you believe that to be true?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: You're asking -- I didn't ask the AWTs to directly go over to (b)(1)1.4a and look at it. I didn't do that however --

BG Colt: No, is it your situational awareness for instance that that JTAC asked them to do that?

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TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** Roger, sir. What I'm tracking, sir, is that when they started pushing to [inaudible] HLZs, the guys on the ground were talking directly to the AWTs and then also to the CH-47s. So, from my understanding that was the initial push when they were to break station -- excuse me -- that they were just going to look in that general vicinity and also the AC-130 was supposed to look over it with ISR. I didn't ask them to do that or push anything over. That something that came over from -- and I don't want to speak for (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(11), (b)(14)c but I believe that came from them to look at it, sir. I don't --

BG Colt: Again, [inaudible] the division of C2 responsibilities. I'm just curious what your situational awareness was prior to them launching out for the actual second infil. That was the question, okay? Because it has to do with total duration in a relatively confined and restricted piece of terrain; right? Okay, we have been there for 3 hours at this point and the AHs have already cycled off the objective, back to gas, back on to the objective; to my situational awareness I believe over in the vicinity of (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(11), (b)(14)c and back to the FARP a second time. Does that sync with what you think happened?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** I believe that is what happened. I mean, obviously the cre will be in here tomorrow night.

BG Colt: Right. Right. Absolutely.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** [inaudible] exact from them, but one of our requirements -- one of my requirements is no lift aircraft or MEDEVAC aircraft goes into any LZ for any reason without being cleared first by the AWT. When there's any threat, I mean GS type stuff going FOB to FOB --

BG Colt: Is that either or AC or --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** No, sir.

BG Colt: It is an imperative AWT [inaudible] --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** Yes, sir. And that's something that we f out during our meet-and-greet because it was a question that (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(11), (b)(14)c asked with two different teams, saying "Hey, can we cover with AC 130," and we've said no. An AWT will be there for infil and exfil every time.

BG Colt: As a Task Force TTP, is there any kind of time

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sequencing to the LZ in order to achieve that task and purpose?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** It goes to what (b)(3), (b)(6) was saying earlier. A lot of that is dependent sometimes on the ground commander; what he wants or doesn't want on station. But, they always go out there with enough adequate time to check, clear the LZ itself and take up the high orbit with deconfliction. The deconfliction part is always taken care of, usually in the brief we break it down into sectors A, B, C, and D and deconflict it by altitude.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) [inaudible] answer there. They are briefed to take off 5 minutes prior to the CHs in their timeline and that actually goes into more than five minutes because we are BSO swap --

BG Colt: I'm sorry, you do the what?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) Battle space owner swap, sir, so the CHs have to go to one of the local COPs to pick up the battle space owner, a representative from them and then they go to the HLZ.

BG Colt: Is that unique to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c missions only?

TF KH: I can't speak on that, sir. I know we do it on every mission that we have a battle space owner that goes out with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** Yeah, it's deliverance as well, sir. The battle space owner -- with the big deliverance we've done battle space owner [inaudible].

BG Colt: So the CH landing [inaudible] individual. Is that right?

A. It's a concern, yes, sir.

SME-MH47: I didn't understand that; what you just said. So, on the IRF they landed and picked up the battle space owner?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) They may not have on IRF, but on the original [inaudible] --

[Inaudible]

BG Colt: [inaudible] -- this is only initial infil.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) Correct; and so that gives them a little bit more time

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when they have to do that pick up to do the Cherry/Ice call at the LZ.

BG Colt: It does. In this particular case, I think we can acknowledge though that initial or a first landing in conjunction with this mission set into the closer proximity to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and that second threat, right? Just a thought process.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir

SME-MH47: Was there an alternate for HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c chosen?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** Yes, sir. I can go through the mission back what we went through. We had a total three HLZs, actually four HLZs selected. We went through (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b was primary, there were some alternates. I don't really recall what the name was; and there also were two offsets.

BG Colt: Probably, to set exfil [inaudible].

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** Correct. Well, the exfil is one of them. So, it's inside the binder, there. I don't recall the names, but we did have some set-up for offsets and also for the green zone, they wanted to go with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b so that's what we went with the initial infil.

BG Colt: That was briefed to AMB, too, alternates?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** Correct.

SME-MH47: Was there an alternative for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** When we did (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c we sat down with the team and discussed and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was the only one we could find that met their intent. There was one further west in the valley. They did not want to go to that one, and what I was told by (b)(3), (b)(6) that we couldn't go there or land there; there was nowhere else they wanted to go at that point in time. It didn't meet their intent.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** Now, having said that; all of our pilots, especially Chinook pilots, know that if they deem an LZ untenable, then they do not land. We have proven that, and we used that example during our AMC briefings all the time, too. I personally do it. Our senior most Hawaii Chinook pilot, IP, when he got here, I think two weeks after he got here had two Chinooks landing. The first one landed to an actual COP out here completely browned-out. (b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(3), (b)(6) came three approaches and could not land the aircraft, and this with one aircraft on the ground loading up personnel and he called and said, "It's too dusty. We're not doing this." Called off that delivery that night for that reason and I use that ex with all our pilots especially because of -- not so much in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c case, but in the other cases, if you are not comfortable with go around is free and if you don't feel comfortable with it for whatever reason then you call it. So there is never that expectation of I have to get in there, you know, "I have to get in there," you know, they all know.

BG Colt: Sure. I think that's terrific.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: I never briefed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c in the initial brief, and I ju want to make sure that I was going through the timeline correctly; is that the original brief (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was not briefed, was because it wasn't part of the plan at all.

BG Colt: I understand.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: The only time (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c got briefed or talked to was via dio and actually having a runner run out imagery to the cockpit for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Was there ever a discussion about initiating -- you can acknowledge perhaps that this was a sequel or separate mission planning timeline. Did that discussion ever take place?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Sir, when I got the initial call on this, I never viewed as being a separate mission. They're there in support of each other. Yes, it was going to be a different team out there, but we had guys on the ground. We had received contact. We already engaged the AWT. The initial report that I received was that there were individuals moving and also individuals massing. To me, that was, "we need to get guys out there to assist," and that's kind of what was being pushed to me from the team as well from [inaudible]. That's what I was tracking, sir. It was in support of, not a total separate clearing operation.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Having said that though, everything had to go up to briga in order to get approved to do that. So, sir, what you are getting at as far as a sequel, in many ways it was, because again, we are not authorized to just arbitrarily say, "yeah, we're going to do this in support of this initial mission."

BG Colt: I understand. I'm just trying to understand your

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thought process. If there was a perceived pressure here, I'm not insinuating there was. I'm asking.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Sir, they asked me if they could do the mission; if we could put the IRF in. Talked about the HLZ, the HLZ selection, discussing where the threat was at that time. It was more towards the eastern side where the original team was at. HLZ selection -- as long as I could get the HLZ approved, I didn't see there was any issues; the crews were ready to go, they're at red-con two. Myself and the ground force with (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Recon team had already discussed -- we had already looked at the same imagery. They talked about their walk-in route, so it wasn't a -- for me, my thought process was it wasn't a difficult decision to make and to get it approved. That was the only thing I had to get approved, was the HLZ, sir.

BG Colt: Is shooting IR illum on infil a TTP that is an AMC call that 47 AMC can request it?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Yes, sir, basically how works is if it's so dark that the are going to crash when they land, they must have IR illumination, but it all depends on the illumination and also the threat. There have been times that we have gone to ground in the green zone where it's not very dusty without IR illum due to the fact that it's not dusty and that you could come in. It's going to be a little bit darker, it's going to be a little slower than zero-illum. I wouldn't say for this mission per say, but just other missions you [inaudible] to go to the ground. If it's going to be a very dusty and kind of a questionable terrain, then of course they always elect for the IR illuminations. We prefer to burn (AC-130 illumination), but not every time do we have [inaudible] to do the burn.

BG Colt: Sure. It was briefed as an option -- I'm asking a question. Was it briefed as an option for the initial infil?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: When the crews, basically, the AWT sits across from the - they go over their TTPs on what they're going to do. It comes from the guys flying with each other so much, that they do a 6, 3, and 1 call, so that's all they briefed was, "Hey, if you want illumination, we'll give you illumination, just give us the normal 6 minute call, 3 minute call, 1 minute call." So, the crews that discussed that, now whether on their infil, I do not recall if they shot illumination or not for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b. I believe it was a burn they had for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b.

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TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**S3:** They did not shoot.

BG Colt: Okay, I guess all I'm trying to contrast is, there was deliberate joint brief for the first one and the second one was as a sequel, a radio update and relied on a TTP or a previous brief that if they wanted it in the second infil, they would have asked for it?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**TACOPS:** Right, sir.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**CDR:** I talked a part of this, too. Here at (b)(3), (b)(6), Apaches n't go out without IR illums because it is an option for all lift aircrafts whether it's MEDEVAC, UH, or CH. I know some of the other Task Forces don't do that, but we always do. In fact, it's one of the lessons that we learned that we took away as a [inaudible] when we supported another element expecting them to operate the same way we did and finding out they did not have IR rockets on the other aircraft, but here at night-ops we always have and it's always AMC's prerogative or the PC's prerogative to ask for it or not based on the conditions on the ground.

BG Colt: In this case after 17 went down, what was your situational awareness then with respect to on site AMC?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**CDR:** It was [inaudible] AWT, sir. The AWT -- the second Chinook because of the mission constraints, there was an informed decision to put in just one Chinook. One, the ground commander wanted to mass troops, but two, it also minimized our risk. Rather than have one aircraft go down, than two, you produce a signature, you produced targets, etc, etc. For that reason, one Chinook went in. When that one Chinook went in, the other one set up the loiter area and was set away from that point. AWT was the AMC on station and when it went down they took control.

BG Colt: If we want to use point hotel, because I think I've heard that used in the vernacular here, but whether that's the 3 minute mark, the 6 minute mark, was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was his whole point pre-designated or was that anywhere on route after the 6 minute mark?

TF(b)(3), (b)(6)**TACOPS:** When we briefed the crews, and again we had about 25 minu from the time we got the, hey we're putting in the IRF in to -- they were launching and everything and approved the HLZs. We gave them the flight routes that they needed to take, to the north[inaudible] --

BG Colt: I'm sorry, say the time.

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TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: We had about 25 minutes from the time everything was appr ed, let's put them in, discussed and talked about it, so we ran things up to the crews. When they departed their flight routes, the ground force commander, once again wanted them to come request it from the northwest for the reason of masking an aircraft, trying to mask some of the sounds. Some are just kind of loud, but it was -- that's why the offset pushed them all to the 'airborne valley'. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, just picked their order points on their own, verses to the north with the understanding of having to stay off the Tangi Valley getting themselves an offset, just so they can escort and be around the general vicinity, but at the same time not flying with the aircrafts and going two ships down there.

BG Colt: Actually, it was pretty close to -- that segment of flight route was pretty close to where you picked up the BSO on first lift, correct?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: For EXTORTION 17, yes, sir. They actually went over it the 'Airborne Valley'. They were at the intersection where the Airborne Valley and Tangi Valley meet. They kind of flew that flight route down that way. Once again trying to the push off towards the west to like right in front --

BG Colt: For my SA is there a COP there that they landed to? It makes for kind of a natural hold point if that's where they wanted to pick up the BSO that you're at least holding in the vicinity of friendly force, if you must hold by yourself.

TF KH TACOPS: Are you talking about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d 7?

BG Colt: In this particular case this (b)(3), (b)(6) who is holding.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c: They never went over towards the Airborne Valley. They maintained north of the Tangi valley and east of the Airborne Valley. They were 4 kilometers to the north of the Tangi Valley with a terrain feature in between them.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: [inaudible]

BG Colt: I understand.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Extortion 17 continued on towards the Airborne really near -- I mean, in the same vicinity of COB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c came around towards the south around the green zone and to cut across straight into limiting their time on the

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green zone is kind of how they were briefed to go into the HLZ. So they didn't land or Chalk 2 never flew in, they just maintained to the north.

BG Colt: Right. Okay, and when he RTB'ed, did he RTB reverse course in the infil route?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: (b)(1) (4a, (b)(1)) When they departed, they departed more towards the northwest and then moved off to Tangi Valley and the reason why is because the AWT and things that were going on they were requested to just kind of --

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: When they were on the lower side, as soon as we got word that we had a Fallen Angel, I wanted to get them out of there. So we called them on the radio and said, "roger, single ship authorized and get back here." Close proximity, I didn't have as much of a concern, because I knew they were at altitude and I just brought them out there, because one, there was no reason for them to be there at the time. AWT was giving us the updates to get them back here; one, if we needed to use them for other infil for the Pathfinders or something like that, but mainly just get them out of the area.

BG Colt: What en route altitude did they brief, incidentally?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: For which segment, sir.

BG Colt: Infil.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: For the original infil or the IRF?

BG Colt: IRF infil.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Sir, I do not know. They were on the radios in the c kpit.

BG Colt: Okay, do you know what they briefed in the original infil? I'm going to assume until we talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) that it was a similar TTP?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Roger, sir. They maintain 1,000 feet in route minimum L as they're flying towards the COPS. What they've been -- it all depends upon the threat or the environment they're going into it's got to be a -- if it's mountainous training into a rapid descent, they're going to try to get a little bit lower to make it easier to descend it down there, too, but normally, for me at RP

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inbound they start getting a little bit lower versus 1,000 feet for their approaches, but their original TTP what was briefed was going to be 1,000 feet en route, RP inbound, to start their approach.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** If you look at the bread crumb trails you can see that when they go into Airborne Valley, again, to the mask the sound and themselves, they come back around the south side. You see them coming over the high ground and they start; and you can't tell this exactly from where the bread crumb trails are. But, the normal TTP would have had them hugging the ridgeline to the south side, again, to mask a little bit and then in the process of doing that, then set up for an RP inbound and that last -- Yes, sir?

BG Colt: I understand.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** -- In coming right there, you know, coming around there making themselves from here, hugging that high ground and then at this point here right before they get to the Fallen Angel site there is a large build up on the northern side, but if you look at that on the extended view, you will that from there you can draw a straight line from where the LZ was supposed to be. I believe they were about 350 feet or so setting up for the approach to the LZ. Again, red-illum and when we're doing these kind of things under red-illum conditions, really what you are doing is you are following your number one needle, and you know that it's a click out in front of you and you starting [inaudible] to yourself.

BG Colt: Do we know if (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c burned the LZ -- we'll find out --

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **S3:** I'm tracking that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was doing a burn on the LZ and then after the Fallen Angel was called out by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, then (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c assumed the on scene commander duties in the stack and shifted their focus away from the LZ over to the actual crash site.

BG Colt: That's my SA as well. That (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c became the de facto on site AMC.

TF(b)(3), (b)(6) **S3:** Yes, sir. The discussion I had on both the radios, I was in the TOC at the time Fallen Angel [inaudible]. All the radios had been on, the phone was an immediate declaration of the air battle net of the on scene commander. I asked the question over FM to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c who relayed that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was the on-scene commander and then we established the air battle net as the Helo common and then several hours down the road, the air battle net was transitioned to the actual fires net, I believe it was 78.05 and

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get on the phone with (b)(3), (b)(6) with (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4c and with JSOAD we established that the C2 would be held by TF (b)(3), (b)(6).

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: Just to correct, sir, if I may earlier when you were asking about the AMC as to AWT on station I meant that for AWT, obviously.

BG Colt: I'm okay. I was curious what your SA was on that, because I heard that in previous discussions this evening. Is the sparkle a common TTP here again, when we're using the AC-130 or do we ever use an AWT to do that, either with a system pointer or a hand-held pointer?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: When you are using the AWTs, the only way they can use their lasers -- to use their weapon, the fun part with that is, though -- it is shooting -- like if you wanted to put a grid in it [inaudible] --

[Talking over each other.]

BG Colt: [inaudible] -- I understand, you get a lot of jitter, too. Right.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: [inaudible] It's kind of a little more difficult and it kind of takes that one aircraft out of the fight if they're going doing the laser [inaudible] or putting an HLZ [inaudible]-- the sparkle down. So, we prefer to go through either [inaudible] the targeting pod or whatever else to use and mark an HLZ. [inaudible]

[Over talking each other.]

BG Colt: [inaudible] or a TTP at the one minute call. They are just going to burn the HLZ or sparkle it? [inaudible].

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Yes, sir, they cover that in the brief. The AWT will request that for the assault element if they want it, say, "Hey, do you know want to sparkle here the east asset here every night?" I said, "Yes, we want to get that," so the time we get on station to check in, they will say, "Hey, look we want to sparkle this HLZ and they'll have a sparkle and set up for the lead aircraft.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: That's also at the 6, 3, and 1 call before the 6 minute call, the 3 minute call, usually, if we are using IR rockets at the 1 minute call, that's what that's for. The 1 minute is what initiates the aircraft to setup and it shoots the rockets at that point. So, on inbound when they get the 3 minute call or 6 minute

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call they are already talking to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and they're establishing what they want and what they don't want.

SME-MH47: I've got uick question. (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed us, I don't know if [inaudible] (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed us that the infil into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was south, completely south and in your AMB, it's the blue infil routes all the way up around the top of the horn here and into [inaudible] and pick-up the battle space owner and then you drop down and go up (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c perpendicular to the green zone. Good TTP, I believe. And then, you basically pick-up and come back in and sit and then the exfil was south. You're going to come up and again go perpendicular in the green zone, loop back around to the north, back in a safe drop-off the battle space Joe and then, just beeline straight k to the house. Good route selection. The disconnect is what (b)(3), (b)(6) said that you all did, you know and then you went to an audible with IRF, you basically just went around to the north and came in and that's on the bread crumb -- the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. I'm just curious what was actually flown.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) S3: Either after we're done here, or right now, if you'd like, I' got the bread crumb trails --

SME-MH47: I have got them too. I was just asking for the infil. Did you all fly south for the infil in the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or did they go north?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Sir, the routes depicted on there is just how they flew. We have the bread crumbs trails for the initial infil prior to the IRF and it's pretty close to what the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c route that you have in front of you show.

SME-MH47: The (b)(3), (b)(6) brief?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Sir, I don't know what (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed. When they did their initial CONOP they'd usually come up how to [inaudible] going to enter and exit out of the area, so I'm unfamiliar what exactly (b)(3), (b)(6) briefs, sir.

[Inaudible]

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: And, that's all it is, sir. This is the initial assault rce route, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c route here and the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c route is actually -- this is the initial mission so not the IRF. That's initially how we came in to go into (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c route is actually the IRF route, so that's ba

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SME-MH47: This is your AMB right here, the (b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(1) infil route. The planned route was up to the north, in the safe, pick up the battle space guy and then south.

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** So, all that's missing it looks like to me is that the initial flight over to Sayyidabad is missing off of this one, sir. That's how they came in and they can talk about it more - is from Sayyidabad to the south straight in from this direction. So, I believe that all this is missing is the actual coming in part.

[Inaudible] [Several people talking]

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** And again, we can get to those breadcrumb trails, too.

SME-MH47: For the entire --

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** For the infil.

SME-GFA: Real quick, I know the mission started to morph a little bit. First, they had squirters, movers, whatever they want to call them. They were looking at interdicting those guys with 17 pax, I think it was. They eventually went static and turned into an assault with 38 PAX onboard; 32 or 33 PAX with 11 on board. And, that's what you guys were tracking all along, right? They are going in to assault the target?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** Yes, sir. Basically when I got the initial report at 17, that's what we started planning off of was having 17 individuals, they can exfil everyone with one lift instead of having two lifts. I was understanding that we were going into, one, to interdict the individuals that were masking also the eight individuals that were squirting towards the north. I don't know where that initial report came from. There was something that came over, and I don't recall exactly who I was speaking with; the number of 20 at some point in time about some guys on the northern side. But also the 8-Squirters. I didn't get the information until after the AWT had already engaged and again it was probably about 1:00 o'clock, Local, it is when we started discussing and talking about the IRF.

IO: One o'clock local?

[inaudible] [several people talking]

BG Colt: This is just as a follow up question. Can you think if it changing the urgency for that second take off if you knew your

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asset; that this was a static under observation deliberate assault versus moving to a potentially moving target to interdict?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** Does it make us react quicker, sir? Is that the question

BG Colt: Do you feel there was a greater sense of urgency to get out there based on the fleeting nature -- your perception of a fleeting target versus a static target?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **CDR:** The one thing, sir, that we always talk about in the meet and greet - when we meet with all the new teams, is one, I tell them my background. I came from the Ranger Regiment way back when, so my goal and the goal of the entire Task Force here, primary goal is support the ground commander with whatever he wants to do. Given your constraints and [inaudible]. So if the ground commander, whether it's (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(7)(C) or anybody else wants something, we're going to do the best we can to make it happen. We will not go over board and break our own rules in order to make that happen. So, is there an urgency if there is a MEDEVAC or if there's squirts coming a certain way, that's a natural human nature, yes sir; but not at the expense of making sure that your crews don't have the right information.

SME-GFA: I think that's kind of what I was trying to arrive at was the comfort level and your guys' comfort level as this thing kind of starts to morph and PAX numbers had increased and --

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** And, sir, the urge to just answer your question, of course for me, yes, they asked me, "What's the soonest you can get us out there? We're going to get moving." So, meeting everyone's intent -- that's as fast as I can go and that's kind of how we get it done is to the point of the fast track, not physically do it, but as fast as we can get everything approved and all of the grids and HLZs. With the crews, that was a conversation I had with the crews on the radio; talked to them about the difference of 17 PAX versus 32, power numbers, what the ground force commander's intent was the landing directions, things of that nature, kind of what the overall intent of their mission was.

BG Colt: Right, and this time, just for my own clarification again, the radio conversation is between you and the AMC?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) **TACOPS:** Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Not the guy who is leading the route, but the guy

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-- and you were assuming, right, that he is having an inter-plane conversation about it if anybody in the flight isn't ready to leave yet; right?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Yes, sir. Basically, both crews are [inaudible] up, EXTORTION (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 17. AMC was in 17, and we were discussing back and forth, "Hey, this is what's going on." Once I got told that (b)(4)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c would be the one to be going to ground, instead of talk to --

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR: --other way around -- AMC was on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c excuse me; and then when I got told that 17 was going on the ground, then I just addressed 17 with the mission information because there was only one CH-47 going on the ground.

BG Colt: You were talking to the lead cockpit only?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: after they had determined --

BG Colt: Yeah, I got it.

[inaudible] [Several people talking.]

BG Colt: Yes. Absolutely.

SME-GFA: Yes, sir. So, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is the one HLZ that is planned and if you can't get it -- if that's untenable, mission abort?

TF (b)(3), (b)(6) TACOPS: Talking with their ground force commander, [inaudible] if you put us on the south of the river, does that meet their intent that they clear through the building and then also worrying about the command wire on BRIDGES. That wouldn't meet his intent. If you put them both on offset, there's a few places towards the north that you can insert in and walk in. Once again, there was (b)(3), (b)(6) [inaudible], the town there, [inaudible] clear to that, so it did not meet his intent as well. So, I was told this HLZ was unsuitable for whatever reason, and we had to launch an alternate plan and that's why we started discussing once at brigade, and talking with (b)(3), (b)(6) and also the boss. If everyone looked at it, there should be no issues with it. We went ahead and started planning on that and got it finally approved, so I had everything [inaudible] other discussion points because I was under the impression that if they did not get to the HLZ then they wouldn't be able to assault or do their mission.

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SME-GFA: So mission aborted?

TE **TACOPS:** Yes, sir.

BG Colt: I think that's it for now. You guys did most of the talking there and I really appreciate the transparency and everything. We're going to think about this and review the transcript and if there's something else we will come back to you again. It's about finding fact, not fault here. I appreciate your time.

[The interview was completed.]

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