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The interview of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c GDR, TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J3, TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J2, TM (b)(3), (b)(6) J2, 1/B PLT LDR, TM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c 1/B PLT S 1/B RECC d 1/B JT ned at 1607 Zulu, 17 August 2011, at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

PERSONS PRESENT

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD: Brigadier General J. Colt, US Army

LEGAL ADVISOR: LA

GROUND FORCE SME: SME-GFA

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR: SME-INTEL

CAB CH-47 SME: SME-CH47

NGB REPRESENTATIVE: SME-NGB

MH-47 SME: SME-MH47

ASDAT TM MBR #1: ASDAT3

ASDAT TM MBR #2: ASDAT4

COURT REPORTER: CR2

Derived from: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Declassified on: 7 September 2036

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TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Sir, what we have lined up for you is the LEFTY GROVE CONOP that was given on the day of the incident. Backed up to that it goes a little bit to the special story board. I'm just going to go through the events that actually occurred on the ground. And then we have a few bits of the EXSUM showing some of the photos, which we have all of them on CD for you guys. So there's plenty more than what we show here, but just kind of a run down.

I'm going to hit the wave tops, you know, please -- if you want to dive into details now, by all means, we've got most of the experts here. We have some that can come in later and --

(b)(3), (b)(6)

OBJ LEFTY GROVE-42S VC 83431 62373

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SAYYIDABAD DISTRICT, WARDAK PROVINCE
BSO: TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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NIGHT RAID

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[Ex. 39]

BG Colt: Can you just start by giving a little bit of context of when LEFTY GROVE really came to the fore. I understand it was about the 19th of June when he actually met the targeting deck for the first time.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J2:** Sir, we've been tracking LEFTY GROVE for a number of weeks prior to (b)(3), (b)(6) Squadron actually ripping in. So he had been on our deck, passed off to us by the

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squadron [(b)(3), (b)(6)] as one of those, kind of, hold over targets that they weren't able to act on during their four months out here.

So we picked him up a [redacted] with a host of other targets in the AO around TF [(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c]. So that's just kind of a handover piece, sir. He's been on or deck, not necessarily in our target during our cross-hairs every single day, but he's been one of those targets we've been looking at since we hit the ground here.

BG Colt Okay.



TF [(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] J2: So this is just our standard quad slide. It's just a piece that kind of lays out the intel on who we think this guy is, why he's bad, and why he meets the threshold to commit good guys with the actions. I'll not bore you with details here, but the highlights is that we think LEFTY GROVE is a pretty senior level commander in Tangi if not the senior guy that's kind of running Taliban ops.

BG Colt: Can you talk to him taking on added interest after taking out DUNLAP?

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TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J2**: Yes, sir. There is a conversation that he was subordinate to DUNLAP. So DUNLAP gets killed. And then he, you know, he -- there was an assessment that he had filled that leadership void.

BG Colt: Was DUNLAP killed on the 4th, or was it some time prior to that?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J2**: I would have to go back and check the exact date, sir. I don't have that information.

BG Colt: All right.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3**: For tonight, sir -- or for this night, the ultimate trigger was met when we had IMINT over the PG [P-grid]. SI got us in the area on a known compound. And we had IMINT of PAX on the compound. They left, went to a mosque. The mosque [meeting] broke [up]. Multiple PAX came back, and that's when we had trigger met - that we felt comfortable with the SI in the area in the LOC
ust the PAX activity. And that's what launched (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) that night.

BG Colt: Okay. Can I ask a question on that point? (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) **TE** (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [Commander], did you make the decision who is going to be the lead or the main effort, and then the supporting effort for the exploitation? What was the conscious decision criteria to do that?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR**: It was actually really deferred to Team (b)(3), (b)(6). They managed their troop and platoon. And as their leadership rolled - distribute who does what. And they had chosen actually early in the day before they even knew what target it was, that (b)(3), (b)(6) has got the target tonight.

BG Colt: Okay.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3**: To back up weeks [prior] to that, (b)(3), (b)(6)
pretty much, operated every operation together. The (b)(1)1.4c
in this area is hard to neck down to a single compound. So there were lots of NAI clearances. And so I think there was maybe one other op where (b)(3), (b)(6)

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were separated. But for the most part it was always together. We were talking about just the -- not necessarily OPTEMPO, but just that feel would go out almost every night - splitting them up. This was actually the first night of the trial, and it was 1 Bravo's night, and so they took lead. And (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d was on IRF, and exactly the opposite. This was a day later.

BG Colt: Okay. Just contextually, can you tell me how long you guys have been here.

1/B PLT LDR: We got here since the 5th of July, sir.

SME-GFA: So when (b)(3), (b)(6) goes on the ground, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is C2 of them or straight back to you?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: We C2 all the ops. They standby as the primary QRF.

BG Colt: Okay.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J3: So this is the task organization for the evening. (b)(3), (b)(6) taking lead. They had 47 PAX and one CAD [combat assault dog] on the ground, used (b)(3), (b)(6). As you see IRF or more appropriately, the primary QRF

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was Tea [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]. We also had the battle space owner, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] F. CASEVAC was DUSTOFF. You will see our [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] platforms, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] and [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)].

BG Colt: Is the CST a mission-to-mission call whether you're going to us it. Or does it always go in with an element?

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **J3:** It's a mission-to-mission call, sir.

BG Colt: A mission-to-mission call. How about [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c]?

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **J3:** Every operation. [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] on every operation.

BG Colt: Always on the lead element?

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **J3:** No.

BG Colt: No?

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **J3:** Just on the ground.

BG Colt: Okay. And always a BSO regardless of whether it's a [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] or [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] element?

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **J3:** Not MIN FORCE. But we try to get a BSO every time so we don't have to do a full battlespace handover or --

BG Colt: Okay. Thank you.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3**: Next slide. Just a big picture. This is our money slide --

BG Colt: Can you back up one. I'm sorry.

QRF, what is your understanding of the constraint or restraint against utilizing that force and who controls it?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J** Sir, the QRF is coordinated through the teams like (b)(3), (b)(7) and for example, I coordinated the QRF. We got her how many PAX they have, their response time, they know where we are going. We've picked up -- at times, picked up the same battle space LNO from that COP.

So we have realistic timelines and expectations for them. But, I mean, our primary is always internal. That's why we have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c for this one.

SME-GFA: I'm sorry. To employ them are you calling the battalion commander, or how does that work?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR**: That's exactly right. We have not employed a BSO QRF yet. But we will spin up to the battle captain. And

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then if we are going to actually launch the force, well, I guess like we did once in Bronco's AO, I call the battalion commander.

BG Colt: Did you do anything on this particular mission after the shoot down to cue them?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Didn't cue them. That was really with (b)(3), (b)(6) The discussions I had with (b)(3), (b)(6) about inserting their Pathfinder element and making the decision to whether or not infil them to the battlespace.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** We did contact them and made them aware of the situation, and put them on a higher level, but --

BG Colt: Okay.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** -- you know, there in the gates ready to go if we need it.

SME-INTEL: On the ISR, who controls - the 3 that controls the ISR, tasked the ISR on what their responsibilities are?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** The ground force commander has control of all the ISR, you know, pre-op - J2's doing development with the ISR. And certainly, it's a J2/J3 function, you know, with the commander's intent. But once on the ground, the ground force commander can take control of all of the ISR, or a portion of it, we can still control. It's really up to the GFC.

BG Colt: On this particular mission, did you control all the ISR elements and the gunship too?

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. I have a JTAC attached to me whose primary -- he lays out a deconfliction plan primary, and briefs the CONOP, before we SP, which is where we go from SP. And anything on the fly, we discuss between ourselves and adjust it from the -- he's actually going on Fires [inaudible].

BG Colt: We are going to talk to him at some point?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Yes, sir.

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SME-NGB: Can I ask, what is your understanding of the DS role of the lift asset that's provided to you as far as what you expect from them, and what you can command of them?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** My understanding is they provide rotary-wing lift to pre-approved HLZs, and they take our force in and out to target. Is that what you're --

SME-NGB: Well, looking more in terms of, you know, there's a three-hour, I think, hasty planning requirement that is laid on those guys. But as far as getting a FOB risk approving, all those things, it goes back to, I believe, to their aviation commander.

But to what degree do you interact with that? Do you just give them the missions and the departure time, and then they work the rest?

1/B PLT SGT: No. The flight lead will come over and plan with our routes planner too. And it's kind of a back-and-forth between their S3 and our routes planner. So they are going to talk saying, "Yes, we can approve this HLZ, we can land here." Then we base our routes off of what they said they can or they can't plan.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Normally, our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We give it to them, and they approve or disapprove. It initiates with us, the flight plans, for sure.


The three hours is their standard time for normal mission planning. They can have that faster if it's hasty.

This is just an overview slide showing this is what COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c taking the BSO, LNO and then into the target

BG Colt: Okay.

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TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** This is showing the infil route. This is the original one that (b)(3), (b)(6) went off, HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, for patrol in. They had 2k, a 40-minute walk.

BG Colt: We will get more into it later, but uneventful?

1/B PLT LDR: Actually, as soon as we touch down, sir, we are notified of five or six PAX that left the target compound ID'd with weapons. And we were briefed they were moving towards our location on the road. So we can get more into that later if you want.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3**: ORP over the target.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

This is for our planning and for this op.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

This is -- you know, we get these (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c overviews. So it shows all the stuff in Sayyid Abad that's been happening over the last few years, really. Each one can be broken down, give the time and date on it, what exactly it was. But for every operation, we look at the air threat to force on the ground.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Next slide is more detailed. It's just breaking down what happened and when.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Next slide is a close-up.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c


Next slide, basic GRGs we use.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Next slide, this is our fires and our sensors of how we are going to use them on squirters or contacts.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TF



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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TF

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

SENSOR TEMPLATE

ATTACK TEMPLATES

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Next slide, CASEVAC. ~~SECRET~~ Next slide.

SME-GFA: I'm sorry. That's SOP? That's pretty much standard throughout every op?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Correct. Yeah.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a
(HAF) LEFTY GROVE

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Next slide is just an overview of, again, the different BSO elements we have in the area that we used. Next slide.

JOC CHECK

Screen Check
IO
Fires
JMAU
CSAR
J6
ISR
Weather
CJSOTF
Staff by Exception
J2
OCG Notification
Deconfliction
J3
CSM
CDR

So at this point, these are the slides as they were

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briefed. And after this slide, we got into what happened on the ground. And (b)(3), (b)(6) can go into more detail if you have questions for them.

In the JOC before we SP, before he takes off, we are going to a stand-up brief, get a detailed plan, basically, of what we just saw to the commander. He had already been, kind of, pre-heated before by the platoon commander or the (b)(1), (b)(1) commander. And we go through all the different J codes, make sure everybody is tracking, everybody is on board, and then briefs the whole nine yards.

Commander can speak to it, but we were very comfortable with the operation, looked at this area before, a pretty good plan. We had a, you know, 2k offset. So we felt (b)(3), (b)(6) getting in was fairly safe, and we felt good about the target this night.

BG Colt: Can you talk briefly about the OPTEMPO of hits that have been going here and the operations you have been conducting?

TF (b)(1), (b)(1), (b)(1), (b)(1) J3: far as -- I would say the OPTEMPO with (b)(3), (b)(6) going out the door together was every third night, maybe -- second to third night. We would reset and go again. Hit a target -- develop for a day or to hit a target. Again, you know, the OPTEMPO in this area, in my opinion, is ve different than the rest of Afghanistan. The (b)(1), (b)(1) is hard to develop, especially in these areas. They re very savvy. There's more of insurgency than, you know, massing fighters anyplace.

So again, you know, it's getting those DPs and all the times we're doing delivering or doing any eye clearances. So I would say our jackpot ratio of getting our TIs are lower in this area than other places in the country just because the fidelity of the (b)(1), (b)(1). But the OPTEMPO we try keep up just to keep that pressure on them.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[Ex. 2]

So after the -- and, (b)(3), (b)(6), please jump in if you have more details to add in. As (b)(3), (b)(6) was approaching the compound soon after infil, we had ISR report squirters maneuvering towards you. And we had AWT, which is our only fire squad, went back and PID'd weapons from the air. They did PID weapons. And, (b)(3), (b)(6) called a fire mission.

Additional engagement resulted in five EKIA. There was a follow-up attack at another one. So it was a six EKIA. It was assessed from that original group of squirters that two did get away, moved to the northwest, and linked up with PAX from another compound. We don't know where they originated from.

BG Colt: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) ever SSE those six PAX?

1/B PLT LDR: Originally, the ISR reported that they found that six MAMS were linking up and moving down the road towards us. We took a halt and pulled off the road. We were going to push our Afghan partners to the front. I called off the AWT strike.

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So from that mission strike, we had the six EKIA, and two from that original strike pushed approximately one kilometer to the west/northwest. ISR reported that they were trying to [inaudible] to each other.

So we pushed through that original engagement, identified the six EKIA, and pushed an additional kilometer to the northwest as well, trying to interdict those two squirter, which we were unable to do.

Additionally on infil, two squirter from the 280 series [buildings on the objective] took off moving as well, and were just going. Those are the ones that pushed at least 1.8k to the northwest. And we were not able to even attempt to do --

BG Colt: So after infil, you initially bypassed the objective, went on, exploited that engagement. And did you ever come back to that original objective and do a clear?

1/B PLT LDR: We split forces, sir. So the platoon sergeant with one squad went to do the BDA and some interdiction. The other two --

BG Colt: Clear.

SME-GFA: You said, you reported squirter off the target moving towards you guys?

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. Once we pulled off the side of the road --

BG Colt: Do you have a pointer or anything?

1/B PLT LDR: I don't sir.

SME-GFA: Engagement is away from you guys?

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. So we're approximately right here, pushing off the side, pushing APU up to the front. Once we brought AWT over, they changed their mind, and then started to egress. It took AWT a good amount of time to actually acquire them in a zero CDE area, which will allow them to move so far off to the east.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Part of it was as they were moving south to there on the east side of that box, then they started moving to the south of that. It was already identified that they were armed. And I approved them to engage. But the we said to wait for them to get away from these buildings.

BG Colt: Okay. That helped.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CD** (b)(3), (b)(6), can you talk a little bit about, kind of, TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c during all this.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** So we had a (b)(3), (b)(6) leadership at this point when this is going on -- when the fire missions are going on. The (b)(3), (b)(6) and some of the team leaders were inside the TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c JOC just sitting there, watching ISR, watching what's

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going on, tracking.

At this point, there was a known amount of squirter that had gone to the northwest, and started talking about options to interdict. As, you know, this progressed over, I would say, 45 minutes to an hour. The squirter group kept moving, and changed, you know, numbers. But generally, it was a pack of roughly eight moving around. They hid under a bridge. They moved hiding in the fields again.

We had AC130 watching them, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] our AWT on the FARP. The [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] suggested a squirter interdiction team. We were considering it. We were playing with the numbers, how many people originally, we were looking at about 17 in just to get those squirter.

BG Colt: What was driving that number incidentally?

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **J3:** That was out the number of available [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] shooters -- [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] Squadron shooters at that time without taking all of our enablers and --

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **CDR:** And exfil in one package.

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **J3:** Right. With an exfil in one package.

BG Colt: I've heard that a couple times. So when you say "exfil in one package," you are talking about [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] and that 17-man element in one lift?

TF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] **J3:** Correct. That was the original mindset we had going in. As we started looking at it, realizing we need to put on our [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] and then, you know, if they landed and the squirter element went to a compound, now we're into a compound assault. So what the [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] commander and [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] f s add on basically their not quite their [redacted (b)(1)1.4a], but a [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]. So we had, we started taking more enablers, all the APU, and ended up being --

BG Colt: Thirty-two.

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TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **J3**: Thirty-two on the ground, correct.

SME-GFA: Where is the EXTORTION flight at this time? Are they sitting back here?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **J3**: Correct. So during the same time, EXTORTION is on the deck here. Our ranking team leader is starting to ask them, "Hey, you know, look at HLZs in this area. We are thinking about going in."

SME-GFA: Are they on the birds, rotors turning - what's their status?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **J3**: They were at Level 2. Their planners were in here. And I think that at that point, they brought the flight lead in as well. I will have to confirm whether the flight lead came in or not, but I'm fairly certain he did.

The end result was they did find an HLZ, which was about three kilometers northwest of the target compound and about 700-meters northwest of the actual squirter that they were watching on ISR.

BG Colt: Who actually engaged in LZ nomination -- the nomination of the LZs. My understanding is that for about a period of approximately 30 minutes, they were going through LZ adjudication and ultimately defaulted to a pre-planned HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4. Can you talk to that process at all?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **J3**: I'm not familiar with exactly the process that they got to that.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **CDR**: Fortunately, what we knew in the JOC, is the ranking team leader is in there talking with the planners, and we know that the LZ has to go up higher for approval, so we had gotten to the point where we had a plan with a couple different options and pending HLZ approval. We didn't really have an option until we got that approved.

BG Colt: Okay.

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TM (b)(3), (b)(6) **J2:** I was going to say, you know, we had been looking at Tangi Valley for a couple days ahead of this, preplanning some (b)(3), (b)(6) know a typical limiting factor we had with (b)(3), (b)(6) was preplanning these HLZs. The (b)(1)1.4a had already been nominating multiple HLZs lea (b)(1)1.4a this event for Tangi Valley in general.

So this HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c just happened to be an HLZ that they had already (b)(1)1.4a sed with (b)(3), (b)(6), who was already on board.

BG Colt: In the mind of the -- again, I'm not sure which echelon of command I should be addressing the question to. But my question is: Given the elapsed time between the infil at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and now the discussion about the subsequent infil in this particular terrain, in this known environment, did we approach the risk of additional infil differently than we did the first one? Or how did we, would by a better question.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** So I know we based on our additional infil, HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c - our two times that we have been in there. Despite the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, relatively uneventful because we don't go there a lot. And then we deliberately went up to the northwest. So there was a conscious decision to not come down into the same LZ and just have a race team zip up to do the interdiction.

BG Colt: I understand.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** So it's a combination of approach from where we haven't been yet, where their force is not. And then also proximity to where the squirters were. We were like 700 meters to the west of where the squirters were.

BG Colt: Was the line of drift of the persons of interest in the calculus of additional risk?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Our flight path to where they were or -- I think we were looking to where they were either going to go flee up into the hills. We had good ISR and fires platforms to interdict that, or they were going to hunker down. I'm not sure I answered your question on the line of drift piece.

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BG Colt: I guess - if you think the threat is maneuvering in a direction of relative safety, in your mind, do you think they are moving to a more -- either a more defensible position, or additional assets, that would elevate the risk?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: I think they were moving to -- they were gathering people to do that. We expected that they were going to flee away. So they were either going to come maneuver on our force, but we didn't really expect that. We wanted to maneuver on them to not let them get away.

BG Colt: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) have any small arms engagements prior to this

1/B PLT SGT: We engaged the squirter pack, sir. There was one WIA in the ditch [who presented an AK-47 to the interdiction team]. But other than that, we had no contact on the objective.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-MH47: The battle captain for (b)(3), (b)(6), in a discussion with the (b)(3), (b)(6) team chief, they were discussing how the IRF would be sent in. Was the (b)(3), (b)(6) team chief - did he make the decision to put all 32 on one aircraft?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J3: You are talking about the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c chief or --

SME-MH47: Yes. I'm sorry. Those words were the (b)(3), (b)(6) battle captain, that's what he referred to.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J3: Okay. Yeah. Roger. Yes. The (b)(3), (b)(6) element, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c chief -- yeah. In the end, they had a discussion between (b)(3), (b)(6) on risk to force, whether to bring two helos, a second helo having, you know, a higher chance of being shot at because of the lag time, or putting everybody on at once, getting them out.

They had that discussion. I wasn't privy to that discussion. But it's a pretty standard way we do operate, putting IRF in one ship.

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SME-MH47: So that was a ground force request that you will put them on one --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4**J3:** I can't answer that for sure.

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4**CDR:** That's a challenge. We don't know how that discussion transpired. So we are making speculation based on --

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4**J3:** I remember having one conversation with the (b)(3), (b)(6) S3 planners when we were spinning up the IRF that they were only approved for a one-ship infil. So I think that was one of the driving factors.

And there were 33 on the helo, not 32. Just to clarify that.

SME-INTEL: Talk about the threat, too, with the -- on the comms, the (b)(1)1.4a comms, were there any indication throughout the assault that there was any type of VISOPS or any type attempt to maneuver against the ground forces through (b)(1)1.4a communications?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4**CDR:** (b)(3), (b)(6) was hot most of the time. So almost every time we are on an op, we get that when we turn the jammer off. (b)(1)1.4a using comm.

SME-INTEL: Was there any -- a different question with that too. Was there any attempted jam prior to launching the IRF in to the block the squirter.

1/B PLT LDR: We jammed on infil, sir, and then went jammer off to try and collect as soon as we had started moving.

SME-GFA: (b)(3), (b)(6) was up at this time?

TF(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4**J3:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

BG Colt: Did there come a time in this op where you relinquished control with ISR assets back to the IRF commander?

1/B PLT LDR: Sir, we had cut one (b)(1)1.4a out. I'm not sure which one, to keep eyes on the squirter patch. I know they

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were deconflicting over the fires, and who was going to control the AWT on infil. And it was ultimately decided that (b)(3), (b)(6) would control the AWT assets on infil.

BG Colt: To your knowledge, did we do ever shift a sensor over the HLZ prior to their arrival?

1/B PLT LDR: Not to my knowledge, sir.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J3: My presumption is though that, as we deal with AC-130 it was looking -- I don't think we saw the HLZ, but they always take a look at it. So that's an assumption, but I think it's accurate.

And that's correct, the -- (b)(3), (b)(6) had control of the assets as soon as (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was on ground. 21 was going to take control of AWT, and the ISRs over the squirters to deal with that immediate threat. They were in the

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

So, sir, as you know, this is where it all came together. So the forces committed, you know, the PAX numbers, and coming in, you know, exactly where -- you could probably

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talk to the guys who were on the ground more. But 300-meters or so from the HLZ is where they took an RPG strike, spun around and crashed.

From this point on we, pretty much, go to Objective LEFTY GROVE personnel recovery, and immediately moved (b)(3), (b)(6) tasked them to go secure the crash site about three kilometers away. They had to finish what they were doing on target, reconsolidate, and give up there, about 45 minutes --

At the same time, we had CSAR come in from (b)(3), (b)(6) landed at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. They had a portion of a (b)(3), (b)(6) there with them. We prepped them to go on the ground but didn't insert them right away. We had the Pathfinder unit from (b)(3), (b)(6) on standby. They wanted to go right away. We wanted to wait until (b)(3), (b)(6) got on the scene to secure the site and get an assessment.

Once they got there and we started getting SA about ground atmospheric. We did launch a Pathfinder unit before first light to get them in as extra support. They have (b)(1)1.4a as well.

From that point on, no other forces from our immediate control were committed. We were talking to TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b and TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and they started to commit a ground force into the area to lock down the whole valley. And that was a -- I have to look at my time sheet -- probably a four to five hour process before they actually arrived and got on scene.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Obviously, there's a lot going on. I was trying to understand what the situation was. J3 is working a CSAR plan. And my discussions primarily with (b)(3), (b)(6) on the decision to infil the Pathfinder team. They agreed to do it. You can see where their infil site is. That's the LZ everybody uses. It's very close to HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. It's the same patch in the green zone. So for obvious reasons, I was reluctant to commit another helicopter force. We talked through it, and ended up paying off well to help the (b)(3), (b)(6) element.

(b)(3), (b)(6) element -- the (b)(3), (b)(6) element moved over there,

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basically, slit -- basically, had the target secured. They had detainees all ready to go. They were ready to move to, more or less, exfil. And when we re-tasked to release detainees, with the task to go to the crash site.

We didn't really pre-brief them. But we could tell from ISR that it was a giant wreckage in flames. And didn't get confirmation until they got on site. And then it was clear from the ground force commander's initial report that it was a hard impact, likely with no survivors. But we had already committed a Pathfinder team to get to the site, just in case there were survivors. That was kind of the -- and then it really transitioned into the recovery mode.

I would say once the Pathfinders were infiled and we got -- the ground force commander said, "We have got security," that's when we transitioned into talking with (b)(3), (b)(6) and established a ground line of communications for a recover op.

BG Colt: Did the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4f JOC offer additional assets and you either accept or reject those?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4f J3: We were pushed more ISR and fires. We accepted a few, and then it became -- we had -- you know, the stack became almost too big, so we ended pushing some away.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4f J2: That's correct. They pushed a number of assets, sir, from Central's AO. Over the next few hours, we constituted another entire manned line of (b)(3), (b)(6) flights, and then internally to the TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4f allocation, we just started flooding that battlespace with our own stuff.

So there's a few other things that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4f tried lay out, but I think we had a good idea of what was going on. That was hours posted, just trying to get all that stuff lined up.

BG Colt: When the (b)(3), (b)(6) element got down there, who was the principle command and control on the ground at that point?

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** It was (b)(3), (b)(6). And the agreement I had with (b)(3), (b)(6) was that so we set the grid lines of what was our battlespace. And once he established the ground line of communications down to the site, (b)(3), (b)(6) was going to assume the ground force commander

BG Colt: I'd like and try to get that, and then evaluate that as best practice, or however they looked at, that for our ground elements there.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** That was kind of our -- the next phone call that A26 and I had was with (b)(3), (b)(6). The battalion XO got on deck to conduct that turnover. And they would own the recovery operation, and our elements would support them.

SME-GFA: What exactly is the composition of that element?
(b)(3), (b)(6) is the battalion XO --

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** He's the battalion XO. So they led in a route clearance patrol. They had IEDs all over the place. There was seven IEDs in 600 meters in that section.

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So it took a long time. I want to say it ended up being two platoons. Is that about right? I thought it ended up being a little bit light of that.

1/B PLT LDR: It was two platoons, sir. And then the platoon from Sayyid Abad dropped down, and they filled in behind the convoy. So it ended up being three platoons.

SME-GFA: So once he got on the ground, (b)(3), (b)(6) ground force commander so to speak. You are still on the ground at the time?

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. And what actually ended up happening is they loaded up the FALLEN EAGLES, and then actually had to, pretty much, turn around and return back to Sayyid Abad. So he was only on the ground for -- it seemed like two or three hours before he was pushed back. And I just resumed the ground force commander role.

So, essentially, I would say I was actually the GFC through (b)(3), (b)(6) that entire time until I turned back over to the (b)(3), (b)(6) element.

BG Colt: Can you describe what the local atmospheric were when you got there with respect to Afghans in the vicinity of the objective for the downed aircraft?

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. When we got there it was still just before BMNT [Before Morning Nautical Twilight]. ISR was reporting several groups of MAMs [military-age males] kind of prodding the perimeter we established around the crash site. We were able to deter those by just pushing (b)(3), (b)(6) towards the built-up areas. And then deploying warning shots from some of our OPs.

And then as the day went on, they continued to probe the perimeter by, like, pushing children up towards it, or a man in the center of the group of children. But relatively no interaction between the village to the north and the crash site. Most of it came from this small village right down here, sir.

BG Colt: Did TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c do anything post crash, as far as civil affairs exploitation or anything in there?

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TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** I'm not sure, sir.

So there's two BSOs involved because coming from the east is Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and they started pushing. But it's just a lot longer route, and it took a long time for them to get there --

BG Colt: They ultimately did?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yes, sir.

BG Colt: What strength did they come in?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** I'm not sure. They had a lot of positions all over the place in an overwatch --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** They mostly manned the OPs on both ridgelines. And they had, like, six sniper teams out a couple k radius.

SME-GFA: TF Pathfinder rotary-wings in, links up with you at the crash site, what exactly do they do?

1/B PLT LDR: Sir, the Pathfinder element consisted of (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a PAX. And essentially what they did was allow us to fill in this perimeter. They, pretty much, took from the wadi the entire north side of our perimeter we filled in from the south.

SME-GFA: How long were they on the ground?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** The duration.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** They remained after (b)(3), (b)(6) came back.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Four days. We started pushing even though, you know -- BSO lead, we were engaged. We had element on the ground. We provided a lot of subject matter expertise for the resupplies, things like that.

BG Colt: How did you push those to them?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Air drop.

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TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3**: Sir, to clarify your earlier questions, too, you know, with the ground force commander. Obviously, (b)(3), (b)(6) was the senior man on the ground, but we as **TF** (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c remained C2 of the entire operation. Battlespace owners were coming through us and coordinate. So, you know, (b)(3), (b)(6) and then later on, the three Delta commander, I think, they were the C2 element, and not al
enior man on the ground. They had, you know, (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) signed off on the crash site. Obviously, it was handed over. We retained the coordination of all of that --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR**: So it was kind of that awkward, like -- and then, though, the rose was pinned on (b)(3), (b)(6) technically, but we just had the comms and infrastructure --

BG Colt: At what point?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR**: Once Warrior got back on the ground? The convoy then, when he left to take out the FALLEN EAGLES, had basically turned around and came back and - first light the next day or some time that night, right?

1/B PLT LDR: We only saw them once sir. It took them six hours to get there the first time. They turned around six hours before they had made it back we had exfil'd with --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR**: Then he shows up the next --

BG Colt: How did they physically get there? (b)(3), (b)(6)?

1/B PLT LDR: (b)(3), (b)(6) took in 160th package infil'd approximately a k or 2k to the north --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J** (b)(3), (b)(6) came back from J-Bad, RIP' d (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6). And they remained with the Pathfinders at t
crash site for the next over 48 hours.

BG Colt: Was that all coordinated at your headquarters?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3**: Yes, sir.

SME-MH47: I understand the (b)(3), (b)(6) took photos of the scene before the flood.

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TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **J3:** (b)(3), (b)(6) took a few photos, but they would not take it of the actual crash site because we saw the FALLEN EAGLES inside the helo. So there's some atmospheric pictures. But the majority of the crash site pictures come from (b)(3), (b)(6) over the next two or three days.

BG Colt: Incidentally, are any of those pre-flood?

1/B PLT SGT: Yes. There are, sir, pre-flood photos --

BG Colt: Okay. Good. Thank you.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **CDR:** I just want to hit on the C2 piece again because it won't be real clear. It was -- (b)(3), (b)(6) had the lead, but we were working, kind of, the de facto coordination of all the pieces. And kind of coordination at the 3s. And obviously, General Votel was very involved in communicating between RC (b)(3), (b)(6).

BG Colt: We will do reengagement more in detail from the --

SME-GFA: Yeah. I would assume that (b)(3), (b)(6) is talking to you. (b)(3), (b)(6) is talking to his headquarters, kind of, to guide the C2 with everybody working in conjunction.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **J3:** We were closely tied in with (b)(3), (b)(6). They were over in our JOC too --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **CDR:** I think there are probably a lot of people that will see it from our perspective is we were running the show the whole time.

SME-GFA: But we can characterize it as a BSO-led operation?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 **CDR:** Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Absent a photo, can you describe the debris field? What did you see with respect to principal portions of the airframe itself when you arrived there? Daylight would be helpful if that's the explanation.

1/B PLT LDR: Roger sir. Once the fire mostly burned out and daylight had come, you essentially had what was

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remaining of the [CH-]47 in the wadi. In the wadi, it's got about eight-foot walls on each side. The bird literally landed right inside of there, perpendicular to the wadi.

And then from there, one of the rotors had spun off and was approximately 200 meters to the northwest. And then another remaining rotor blade was just to the north in that open field up there. But essentially, everything was contained right there within a 20 meter radius from the crash site.

SME-MH47: But the rotor systems were -- you were saying [inaudible] 100 meters?

1/B PLT SGT: No, sir. The front rotor mast was about 150 to 200 meters to the northwest in a ditch, and then --

TE (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 4 **J3:** And then the rotor --

1/B PLT SGT: -- so the crash is actually about right here. So you've got the front rotor mast right here, and you've got the rear rotor mast up here.

BG Colt: You are talking about their whole pylon?

1/B PLT SGT: Everything. All three rotor blades, and what they all bolt to. I don't know what you guys call it. And then everything else was continued within a 20 meter radius of the actual fuselage, turbines and pieces.

SME-CH47: Could you tell the front part of the helicopter was --

1/B PLT SGT: The front part of the helicopter, sir, was actually buried in the north side of the bank. The only reason we can tell was because the foot pedals were still attached. Other than that, it was just a bunch of metal.

SME-MH47: So it came down perpendicular to the route of flight --

1/B PLT SGT: Yeah. It did. The tail was to the south, and the nose was to the north, just perfect right in the width -- the wadi was just a perfect width for the helicopter.

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ASDAT3: Understanding that there was some folks that were ejected from the aircraft, did you happen to plot those by grid from the helo.

1/B PLT SGT: I have it.

SME-MH47: Could you just point at the map.

1/B PLT SGT: So you have --

1/B PLT LDR: I would say it's more like 12.

1/B PLT SGT: It's actually about right here where it actually landed. And you've got your first EAGLE here at the 12 o'clock. And then you have two more along this terrace wall. One right at the base of the terrace wall and the wadi bottom. And then you had three more along the south wall, where the first eight that we found.

BG Colt: Okay.

ASDAT3: Can I back up to ask one more atmospheric question to this. (b)(3), (b)(6), as you are moving to the north, you've got FALLEN ANGEL when the aircraft is down, you are moving your forces to the north. Assessing the light level that you see from Joy Zarin to the north there, was there an ability to think the -- the unaided eye to be able to see the helicopter that may have been out there. I don't know the aircraft to shooter based on the location we have, point of origin.

1/B PLT LDR: Honest assessment, sir, it was still in the low part of the illum cycled and based off where the moonrise was. So we were still infil-ing, I would say at that time, extremely on the side of darkness.

And then once we started moving, the moon came up. So there was a good amount illum when we were moving to the crash site. But the exact time, it was extremely dark on target.

ASDAT4: So understanding that, was there any back-lighting from the village?

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1/B PLT LDR: No, sir.

SME-GFA: What was the illum level?

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J3: It was actually dark.

BG Colt: Okay.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: By the time we pushed (b)(3), (b)(6) guys up there, it was actually daylight coming.

1/B PLT LDR: Just to clarify, there's been some confusion. You see the Delta and Echo debris, none of that was there prior to the flash flood arriving that night, sir. Everything was extremely contained between Alpha, Bravo and Charlie.

BG Colt: That's helpful.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c CDR: So as (b)(3), (b)(6) said, they were on the ground, then that flash flood came in. It's probably helpful for you just to describe just a bizarre event.

1/B PLT LDR: Roger, sir. The BSO --

BG Colt: How long were you on the ground before that event took place?

1/B PLT SGT: We infil'd 1830 Zulu. The flash flood was about 1600 Zulu on the 6th, sir. So almost 24 hours.

BG Colt: Okay.

1/B PLT LDR: So when the BSO left with the original FALLEN EAGLE package and all the sensitive ops, we continued to scavenge through the rubble to identify sensitive items or any personal effects and then pile those in there.

And then right at 15 or 1600, right as the sun was starting to going down, we got a light drizzle where we were, but nothing really significant. And then probably an hour after the rain had stopped - we had our BP off to the western side. We thought a landslide

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or mudslide was coming, so we told them to get to the high ground. It was a wave of water between three to four feet tall came gushing down that wadi. Within 60 seconds it flooded the wadi which started to move all that debris down there.

SME-MH47: How long did it last?

1/B PLT LDR: The water started to go down as we were there. When we exfil'd at 0010, the following day, it was still two to three feet of water running through that wadi.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** The first day that (b)(3), (b)(6) was on the ground, everything was under water. We were talking about how they are going to get the helo out, you know, and start demolishing things. And by the end of that day, it was a non-issue. They could walk down there, dig through the mud.

SME-MH47: All the parts had to be cut, because you had to man-handle all of it out?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Correct.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** It probably just hit them. I'm going to highlight it. The exfil is behind that.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Correct, sir. The CSAR team went in with saws and demo [demolitions], quickly ran out of batteries and demo. So the BSO air-dropped some more stuff in. BSO was bringing more stuff in. Over the three-day period, they cut and blasted through, pretty much, everything.

In the end, I think there was a -- they felt pulling off there was nothing left behind. We saw some pictures with a dug up piece of a weapon --

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Hey, (b)(3), (b)(6), if you go to that regular brief, just the slides later than that in there that are hidden.

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[EX. 96]

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** Okay. So this shows the CSAR team here cutting through the rotor, different pieces here.

Go back up to Slide A [EX. 96], and work your way down.



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BG Colt: By the time this was going on, (b)(3), (b)(6) (ph) was there correct?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR:** Yes, sir.

We didn't really appreciate how disruptive that flash flood was. We heard about the flash flood and didn't realize -- basically, everything was there in a pile. And so, you know, everything there -- pistols to radio parts were washed away. That became the majority of what you will hear 3/D talk about. What they are doing is digging that out of the mud. It was just bazaar.

BG Colt: Okay.

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ASDAT2: Sir, (b)(3), (b)(6) went in on that second convoy. So it wound up being, I believe, about eight hours by the time Pathfinder was there. He was on the second convoy.

1/B PLT LDR: When we say, Pathfinders, it was the -- 10th Mountain

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Pathfinders came in originally that night. And then (b)(3), (b)(6) - (b)(3), (b)(6) came, the CSAR element as well. So probably eight hours from that second infil.

ASDAT4: When did the second convoy return back from --

1/B PLT LDR: I was off the ground --

TE (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4b J3: It was the early morning of the following day. It was the morning of the 7th.

ASDAT2: That's when (b)(3), (b)(6) went in.

ASDAT4: Then everything had already been washed out by then?



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TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b: Correct. So all these pictures are from -- the ones you see here are from (b)(3), (b)(6). So it's post-flood after (b)(3), (b)(6) was out. This is the Summit 15, RC South Team conducting the cutting and blasting.



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Site E



Site E

As you can see, as the flood came through, it buried everything. They started using rope systems to pull stuff out. So it was washed far down the wadi.

OBJ LEFTY GROVE RESPONSE SSE ROLL-UP

- Crashsite A (Main Hull with Both Engines)
 - 4x H&K 416 Upper Receivers w/ Suppressors
 - 3x Pistol Slides
 - 2x MBITR Radios
 - 1x 240B Machinegun
 - 1x SOI
 - 1x Suppressor
- Crashsite B (Front Rotator System)
- Crashsite C (Aft Rotator System)
- Crashsite D (Left Rear Wheel and Floor)
 - 1x 240B Machinegun
- Crashsite E (Right Rear Wheel and Strut)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4a

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RPG Booster IVO

(b)(1)1.4a



That was a rocket booster found in the general area.

SME-MH47: Do you still have that --

ASDAT4: Was that exploited --

CR2: One at a time, gentlemen.

SME-GFA: Where is that exactly on the map?

1/B PLT SGT: That would be probably the field on the south side, sir.

SME-GFA: Can you point it on --

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3:** You guys didn't see --

1/B PLT SGT: I just remember walking through this vegetation. This vegetation was very distinct to the south side. Probably on that GRG, sir, where that "X" is at -- the yellow X, somewhere in that vicinity.

ASDAT2: Is this plotted on any of your graphic charts?


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TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3**: Yes.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR**: I'm not sure where all of those parts went.

BG Colt: We saw them laying on the floor.



TM (b)(3), (b)(6) **J2**: The grid for that bottom "X" matches up with the grid on the slide.

SME-GFN1: So does that match up closely to the point of origin identified by the 64s?

1/B PLT SGT: Yes, it does, sir.

BG Colt: It's actually a little bit to the west of that.

SME-INTEL: You are saying this matches up to the point of origin.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3**: The point of origin, yellow "X", at the south there, matches up with the grid that's on this picture slide.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **CDR**: I would say you will have to kind of load that -- there's so many points of origin that I'm not sure which one we're talking about.

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TF (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4c) **J3:** That's a possible one on the end.

TF (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4c) **CDR:** I know the AWT -- the AH-64 guys have a good sense of, kind of, what they saw and where it was as well. I know it's on the list for your discussions with them.

BG Colt: I think they shot somewhere in the vicinity of (b)(3), (b)(6).

TF (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1), (b)(1.4c) **CDR:** They did. It was kind of like -- well --

BG Colt: All right. If you want to stop now.

The interview closed at 1707 Zulu, 17 August 2011.

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