

The interview occurred on 15 August 2011 at Bagram AB.

INTERVIEWERS PRESENT

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DEPUTY INVESTIGATION TEAM LEAD:	IO-DEP
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MH-47 ADVISOR	SME-MH47
GROUND FORCE ARMY ADVISOR	SME-GFA
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVISOR	SME-PAO
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COURT REPORTERS	CR1, CR2, CR3

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INTERVIEWEES PRESENT

~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(4a) (b)(1) J3

JSOAC CDR

~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(4a) (b)(1) J2

JSOTF J2

~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(4a) (b)(1) DEP J3


JSOAD DIR

JSOTF CDR

JSOTF J3

JSOAD DIR

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c JB: Welcome my name is (b)(3), (b)(6) I'm the J-3 here. We will provide you an overview of what the Task Force is currently working and I think (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is probably going to dive a little deeper as well.



This is our task organization; the first thing I want to point out notice that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c remains OPCON to COMCENTCOM, and that really allows commander CENTCOM the flexibility he needs to adjust forces as appropriate throughout the CENTCOM wide AOR. Not the least of which is in Iraq where the Task Force is considered the main effort there for USFI, as they assist at providing space and time for the USFI for re-posturing. So that is one of the reasons we ran OPCON, we also have some other

RTFs under the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and we also had one under the (b)(1)1.4a hat. Having said that, you will notice the coordination line there, it's really like coordination plus and we like to say there's not a whole lot of space between those dots there going up to COMISAF with good reason.

As well as COMIJC we are very well nested within the overall campaign plan for COMISAF. And as that plan gets updated, it is supposed to be updated again end of October, we will ensure we stay nested with that. With COMIJC tremendous coordination with them, it's really two major reasons: number one, they own the battle space; and number two, they are providing a lot of extra capability for us. Of our helo's assault forces (HAFs) GPF provide (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c total packages, they provided (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c enablers for us in support and we have been told, at least for the 10k draw down, that nothing will impact us. We are still kind of negotiating for the 23 K. draw to keep as many enablers as we can for our current operations.

We do have a JSOAC, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) is the commander of the JSOAC and under him he has about a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c total platform: rotary wing, fixed wing, all of our ISR, our lift, our CSS, again a lot of those aircraft are from IJC.

SME-JSOAC: The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c has (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c HAFs that they utilize on a nightly basis right now, GPF provide (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c of them.

~~(b)(1)~~ 1.4a, (b)(1) ~~(b)(1)~~ 1.4c: That's correct. ~~(b)(1)~~ 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4c as I'm sure that's everybody knows that really the maneuver effort - their headquarters Ranger Regiment heavy; it is joint Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines as well as combined and then the strike underneath you see the color code in there, it's very heavy Ranger. So it's Rangers, ~~(b)(1)~~ 1.4a and then the temporary holding areas we will talk in just a bit, they are also OPCON to ~~(b)(1)~~ 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4c as well as the temporary screening facilities.

The ~~(b)(1)~~ 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4c that's really the ~~(b)(1)~~ 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4c we have been working with since 2009. They are going to be critical as we talk transformation. Currently, about there are 560 of them, we're hoping to get up to about 760 in the next year. The truth of the matter is we use them to help, initially to help enable our operation. Now the big changes as we go to transformation, or our transition rather, we are working to with after Afghanization that's really what's heading the transition piece over the next perhaps four years. How do we transition this force? What do they become? They could become kind of their Afghan Tier One, or it could be battalion level perhaps, maybe just super squads. What we do know in pursuit of Afghan sovereignty is we have to come up with a plan to help transition the ~~(b)(1)~~ 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4c

Likewise you see on the left there the OCG. We made some real money with the OCG; they are the Operational Coordination Group and they assist us with the planning, and the vetting, and de-confliction of our operation. Likewise once we are done executing the operation they are able to send the results report, the result of the operations up through their various administrates. They are made up of the ANA, Afghan National Army, the National Director for Security, as well as the National Police Force. They are here on site. They are here on site, but we also have them down at the regional level in RC-South and in September we are going to stand up region site up in RC-North.

IO-DEP: So they have visibility on every operation?

TF (b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(1) **J3:** Every operation.

IO-DEP: So they knew about the operations.

TF (b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(1) **J3:** Oh yea.

IO-DEP: And they were briefed on it.

TF (b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(1) **J3:** Absolutely. And (b)(3), (b)(6) - is there, are they going to visit the EOCG as well.

JSOAC CDR: Umm not planned, but we can start the process.

TF (b)(1), (b)(4a), (b)(1) **J3:** Yea, I would definitely recommend that.

IO-DEP: So they have the ability, do they have approval authority on that, to cancel an operation?

TF [redacted] **J3**: Technically they do, they don't exercise it, but technically they do have authority.

IO-DEP: So they either task or approve the operation.

TF [redacted] **J3**: Yep. So again another critical enabler as we move more towards Afghanization, as we move towards empowering Afghans, it will be a critical player as well, and we have - that we're figuring those two units as well as the Task Force, those are our primary concerns with transition forward. So working with CJSOTF and working with CFSOC - and as a matter of fact we are meeting with those players and the commanders this Friday, we are going to have dinner and hash this out.

BG Colt: How can we complement each other's efforts in support of transition?

TF [redacted] **J3**: And you take a look at our total number just over [redacted]. We don't see that during the surge recovery. We don't see that changing a lot, we want to maintain about the same footprint. We have [redacted] strike forces now, but during the surge recovery by [redacted] [redacted] and that's the enduring footprint that we want to maintain [redacted] strike forces. Again those strike forces are Ranger, [redacted] and SEALs.

Over here you've got JIATF [redacted] which is located with us, JIATF [redacted] which is located with us. They are assisting us build

our SA [situational awareness], on, you know, the lines in and out of Afghanistan, those foreign fighters moving money,

weapons, equipment out of Central Asian states, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. And so they have been very critical to our success in that regard as well. And you see 57-1: they are in DC and


they are also linked with another (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and what they do is they facilitate our working with the inter-agency, and covering the gaps, and seams not only for a regional Task Force, but also for COCOMs as well.

That's been a tremendous effort in that regard. And are they going to see the JIATF, are they going to talk to the JIATF guys?

JSOAC CDR: We plan to.


TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J3: Yep, may be a short one that would be good. Okay any question on the overall Task Force? Okay next slide please.



TF HQ J3: You can see some exponential growth since 2006.

2006 [redacted] total strike forces in RC-South and RC-East with the appropriate support that we need for those strike forces, and in 2009 really a seminal change - that's when we took on the [redacted] our [redacted] as well as the OCG and we started to build that capacity because we knew in 2009 we would have to really work more with Afghans to initially enable our operations, and then eventually enable their operations, as they take over more of this piece of the pie. And then a big change in 2009 and 2010 as we move towards sovereignty, every operation is coordinated through GIROA. [The] enduring Task Force footprint - again it will be [redacted] total strike forces with associated ISR. And again the MOI, MOD and NDS, much more

involved - they make-up our OCG - and just exponential growth with the ANSF. [Inaudible] thing the final numbers for the [redacted] to just short [of] [redacted] that is our goal. What that will look like at the end again, whether it's battalion construct, whether it's 'super squads', we don't know at this point.



J2: Ok I'm [redacted] I'm the [redacted] J-2.

One of the things I would like to clarify for those who are not familiar with the difference between [redacted] and [redacted] General Votel is responsible for all of our combat operation in Iraq, in addition to what we are doing here in Afghanistan. And as [redacted] he also wears the hat as the [redacted] commander which does the operations we are doing in [redacted] and as [redacted] he [redacted] got

our operation in [redacted] as well. So, from [redacted] the staff - which is pretty light when you go upstairs, you see all of us you are seeing about [redacted] of us [right] now - we are responsible to him in giving him that additional information so when it comes to Afghan-specific we look hard to [redacted] to run the Afghan fight and everything underneath it - we provide him support at the [redacted] level and we do what we can to sort of serve as an umbrella over [redacted] when it comes to - when RFI's coming from IJC, RFI's coming from ISAF, if there is anything we can do, briefing requirements we try to take that burden off of [redacted] so they can focus on the fight at hand.

Speaking of the fight at hand, what we look for in Afghanistan is three lines of enemy threat. I will start with Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda's primary goal is to attack the US homeland. It's been that way from the start, it has not changed. [redacted]

[redacted]

So, what we have not seen since May 2 is that being manifested around the world, specific attacks on Western interests by Al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda does enjoy a sanctuary across the border. I'm

going to point across here to try to keep the [laser pointer] flash from hitting you guys in the eye. It enjoys sanctuary over in the FATA; they do push people, operatives, over into Nuristan, Kunar. We've seen them recently trying to establish a safe haven in Nuristan, in Kunar, and the reason being is they are getting some pressure from our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. Because of that pressure, they're going to move over into Afghanistan. We see withdrawal of Coalition Forces from that very rugged area right along the border and because of that this allows some freedom of movement for these Al-Qaeda operatives. Why would they want to do that? Because they have been in Pakistan for so long, one is the freedom of movement.

The other thing is they are very much invested in the Taliban fight. Ok, if the Taliban wins at the end of the day over here in Afghanistan, then that is a win for Al-Qaeda. So they are "all in" as far as the Taliban is concerned. When Al-Qaeda is operating in Afghanistan they are operating under that Taliban hat. We have actually rolled up Al-Qaeda operatives, had them in the THA's, in our temporary holding area, and our temporary screening facilities; the guys from the get go say they are Taliban, but when we get them to come off their story through our exploitation, they will say "I'm actually Al-Qaeda," and then they will start giving up the rest of the

story by how they train in Pakistan they bring operatives over in Afghanistan in order for them to get their creds, if you will. And they will move them back to wherever they came from to continue getting after the U.S. homeland.

SME-JSOAC: [Inaudible]

TE (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4c **J2:** We see a lot of Arabs come through here still and we will pick them up in (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1), 1.4c speaking in Arabic as opposed to Pashtun or Dari or Urdu. So we do see Arabs come through a lot from different places: Libya, Morocco, different North African countries, and we see them from the central European countries as well. We see Tajiks come down as well. They will also fight with IMU, it's mixed, but for the Al-Qaeda folk most of the Arabs are what we are seeing traditionally. Any question on the Al-Qaida threat?

When you are in Afghanistan, you are fighting the Taliban - that is the bottom line. Mullah Mohammad Omar is the leader; he does have two rulers underneath him: Zolcure and Monsure. Zolcure is an interesting character: he was [a] GITMO detainee up until April 2008; he was released in 2008 and came back to Afghanistan, was detained here very briefly and then released. He went over and by June of 2008 he's run into the Taliban and he's leading the fight against us. So we call him a recidivist.

In addition you have Mua Monzua as the sort of the military leader, but they both are very active in pushing [the] Taliban up into the southern area. Now the goal of the Taliban is to replace the GIROA government, [and] reestablish what they had before we came in after 911. They do not have any external aspirations, but they do want to run Afghanistan and they want to focus it in Kandahar - that's their historical sort of homeland there, and then expand everywhere out. We do see some Taliban specific up in there, but again anywhere you are fighting in Afghanistan you are fighting Taliban. They enjoy saying sanctuary just like Al-Qaeda in Quetta area as well as in Peshawar. They have shuras in each of those; of the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c provinces in Afghanistan there are [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c shadow governors that we know about. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c of those shadow governors are in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. So a lot of these guys command from the rear, if you will, tell[ing] their guys by orders what to do and what not to do. Any questions on Taliban, what are their goals and intentions?

Finally, the Haqqani network. The Haqqani network is led by Siraj Haqqani and he's got his brother, Badruddin Haqqani, they are running it from the Miram Shah sanctuary. Miram Shah is about 22 kilometers across the border. They are interested in P2K [Paktika, Paktya and Khowst provinces], they have family ties [and] tribal ties in that area. At the end of the day that

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is all they really care about. No external aspirations - they want to be the king of the roost right in this area now and in the future. [They have a] tremendous amount of ability to push forces cross the board. We consider them the most lethal, resolute, and resilient of the insurgent element[s] we are fighting today. They have the ability to push forces across, conduct attacks - they will actually see to the attacks themselves. Haqqani routinely comes up in comms during the attacks, getting SITREPS from the elements he has conducting the attack.

An example: the end of June, the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul, these guys all had suicide vests on, they were using small arms, [and] as they were attacking from the roof of the hotel they were calling back SITREPs to Badruddin Haqqani, who was just across the border during this. So very hands on. See it is very easy for them to attack and get back across the border, lick their wounds, re-arm, re-equip, and prepare for another attack at a later date. Any questions on [the] Haqqani network? There are also lesser smaller elements that we will target here within Afghanistan, but again, of the three main lines of threat, those are the ones: Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Haqqani.

BG Colt: I guess what you need to be able to do for us as

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we go from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and down to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is to be able to articulate, or get some context into, the relationship between (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and ISAF. Why the operations that you are doing, like LEFTY GROVE so important to the ISAF effort and also mutually important to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c effort, alright?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3**: I can talk a little bit about that now Sir, as far as the Taliban.

LA: The microphone[s] aren't picking up as well as we thought because of the sound deadening material in this room. If you can, pull the microphone in your direction when you are talking.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J3**: LEFTY GROVE is a Taliban target; he's still out there and what (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c does for ISAF is target Taliban senior leadership, Al-Qaida senior leadership. Not all the ones - you know, I mention a lot of them are in Pakistan, but they have a lot of their commanders and sub-commanders that come forward. Each of these commanders and sub-commanders have networks, and within those networks we will target, using a network approach to targeting, those particular individuals that will lead us to the top of the pyramid if you will. And by doing this, what (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c does for ISAF, for IJC, it buys time and space for those conventional regional commanders to accomplish the COIN [counterinsurgency] task that the ISAF commander is giving

them. So again, that we are looking to buy time and space, but we are not encumbered with those COIN tasks: we don't run any shuras, or anything like that; we are focused on man-hunting, getting after those leaders that will disrupt those networks, those three predominant networks that I talked about, again to allow those COIN tasks to take effect, gain traction, and have long-term effects.

BG Colt: At some point, are you going to talk about asset allocation or re-allocation?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J2:** That is probably more of a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c discussion. [Inaudible] I will give you rough overviews. Are you talking specifically how that unit moved out? If so, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c will deep dive into it. I will give you a rough overview of how we are talking - specifically, on how the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c will be reconstituted, or the additional combat power that we move out to **TF** (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: It really is about how you utilize enablers and things like that. Then, for instance, if you get 11 other hits/operations this night (5 AUG) - right?- were the other hits/operations (most specifically to my question) that were of equal value or lesser value competing for the same resources, that either by geography, time, region, or something else? How was Lefty Grove assessed and weighted in the effort? Are you with me?

TF HQ J2: Yes, sir.

BG Thank you.

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TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Disposition and Priorities (Current)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JSOTF-J2: Ok sir, this is Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c disposition, understanding that after this brief (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is going to come in here and they are going to recap this thing, however they think the storyboard for Objective LEFTY GROVE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [is] arrayed for Task Forces (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c as you could tell by the colors, by the Tier that leads them. TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is primarily a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c squadron leadership; they've got two (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c up there and the Ranger platoon TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c had two (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c of SEAL (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c since the loss of that combat power they pushed Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c up there and they become Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Down in TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c there is one (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, it is the TOC B from the Ranger

battalion that is out here forward and down in TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c- I'm not going to use my laser on TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c but down in TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is the Ranger Battalion Headquarters proper, along with the remainder of Ranger Battalion that was not pushed out to augment the other task forces. So their main effort, sir expands the security around Kandahar, expands the security around Kabul, and then the P2K area here and the Baghlan-Konduz area out here in the North. The way they are going to do that is expand the two security bubbles around the two major cities and then link them along Highway 1. Okay, sir, our steady state is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c strike forces, currently at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c due to the loss of one (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c I know you are aware of. This is kind of how we sit. The density plot that you see back there, Sir, these are the objectives that we have hit; we are (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c based, we are not (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c based. So you can see by the way that we arrayed our forces, our forces are arrayed so [as] to focus on where the enemy is most dense.




JSOTF-J2: Sir, this is what we are going to look like after September first, we are working right now to reconstitute that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We will be down to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c total strike forces; it's essentially the loss of one Ranger company which will be Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and you will see that it's more down south - I don't want to laser that poor gentleman back there - but it will be down south is where the combat power will kind of thin out, and so this will be our layout here in the next couple of weeks.

BG Colt: Okay.

BG Colt: Is the OPTEMPO of all those pretty much the same?

TF HQ DEP J3: Depending on weather, yes sir. The thing that affects OPTEMPO most is weather. There has been one or two times where we had so many detainees that we needed to move

our process along. I think it was a couple months ago, we slowed down on operations so we could move our exploitation process through, but weather is our primary deterrent.



TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **J2**: Sir, I know many of the current and former JSOC members of the group here are familiar with your targeting methodology but for the wider audience this is what we use here in Afghanistan, as well as Iraq and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and other places around the world, and I will talk you through quickly. Over here we do bottom-up targeting predominately so the subordinate strike forces will identify a target. We will have a baseball card on them; it will have the derog[atory] information that we have about the individuals, where they fit in that particular network that we talked about, where they are

on the battlefield, what strike forces are closest proximity in and most likely to respond.

We have a targeting board every (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c with the subordinate task forces; they nominate target up to the J-2 and J-3 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c they evaluate those targets based on the analytical input from the subordinate Task Forces against what analysts here at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c see. Once the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c J-3 accepts the target they go onto the target deck. Any given time, like tonight, on the target deck there will be about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c particular targets loaded up on our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that we are out there looking for.

Not all of those will be Task Force targets; some will be CJSOTF, RC East, RC South - we will load them all up on our ISR and if we get one of those other targets will pass them to the appropriate battle space owner as necessary. Again, the final portion is really the big hand on the small map where we are trying to isolate where exactly the one bad guy happens to be on the map. We will use a variety of intel disciplines to get there. We are very dependent on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c as of today (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and we define an orbit as the ability to look at one NAI [named area of interest] for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c hours.

So a continuous stare, that is considered one orbit. We have a whole litany of aircraft platforms that provide that capability. Once we have a good idea of where we sort of found

that target, then we are going to fix that target, we are going to have an unblinking eye on it. We will put some additional ISR stacks on top of it (multi-sensor) and - what's happened over here in Afghanistan, a lot of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c triggering that we did in Iraq, we don't have that benefit here; they will shut off the cell phone towers during the evening so we would get the fix during the day and we will use FMV [full-motion video] for the period of darkness and maintain that unblinking eye on the target.

Again, we refine that location as best as possible in order for the strike force to go out there and conduct the finish. From the finish piece again, that's where we use tactical call out; we isolate the compound, do a tactical call out - 80 percent of the times no shots are even fired. The targeted individuals comply with the guidance given in their native language, separate the woman and children from the military age males, begin tactical questions, begin sensitive site exploitation, get all the communication devices, pocket litter - that type of material off the objective. The purpose of the tactical questioning is to possibly identify the targeted individual; again, the intent is to not do a relocation effort over here but get the key leaders out of the network to buy that time and space for the battle space owners.

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Once we have that information, we narrow down who we think the target individuals are: their immediate conspirators there, or based on finding the guy with the whole bunch [of] IED material, we'll take the individuals, we'll take the material, we'll take them to our temporary holding area. We have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c temporary holding areas here in Afghanistan, where we do a more deliberate tactical screening, tactical interrogation. Again the task is to positively identify the targeted individual, and the purpose is further exploitation to drive our targeting methodology here.

We will screen out many, many folks and I will give you specific numbers in just a moment, from our temporary holding areas and bring back to the temporary screening facilities here in Bagram. We have one of those here, and then do the deliberate exploitation. And again analytically-driven interrogators armed with all the information from the objective from the SSE [sensitive site exploitation] armed with the DTK lab results. We have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c DTK [Defense Intelligence Agency Office for Forensic Intelligence] labs here in Afghanistan (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. We take the clothing of the detainees, we put them in their jump suits, we analyze their clothing for any explosive residues, we take templates off their fingers [to] see if there's any explosive residue on

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their fingers. All the biometrics data from any objectives from the THA hit biometrics again when they get to TSF, all that information, cell phone data, computer data, all that is given to the interrogators to empower them to get the detainees off their story. We do a lot of map tracking in the interrogation booth in order to get the detainees to give up information on the rest of that network, all of that is combined to give us a new target and we begin the whole cycle again.

Any questions on targeting methodology, defined as find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze?

IO-DEP: Two questions from earlier, just to go back to what Major (b)(3), (b)(6) said, the targeting validation is done at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c with obvious visibility by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c but (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is the one who says this target is a valid target. Then second, ISR is minimum force so if you don't have eyes on the target do you still hit it? Normally is ISR considered minimum force before you go on an operation.

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c DEP J3: [For] each one of the operations, sir, that would be a risk the commander will have to weigh. There are some operations that are valuable enough or safe enough that would be an acceptable risk or you can mitigate that risk by additional battle space owner's assets or by keeping human

assets in the area. So, each one - I couldn't say if each one of you didn't have ISR you wouldn't go out on the target, but I would tell you it's a risk that has to be weighed. If you don't have any overhead ISR it does tend to leave you a little bit blind.

TF [redacted] J2: And you are right about the validation happening at the [redacted] level, but one thing I would add though. Before I just talked about the targeting board: before they go launch a strike force, the subordinate task force will push a warning order up to [redacted]. Now that warning order has already been approved by subordinate task force Commander it's already been coordinated through the battle space owner. Then it comes up and is briefed in here to the [redacted] Commander. They will go through their warning order then cover everything: task organization, fires, medical, CSARCSAR, everything from start to finish. Then, when the [redacted] commander approves it, that's when they launch; not only is the target vetted through the targeting board process, but before the strike force will launch on a mission it goes through that O-5 level commander approval process, O-6 level commander, and battle space owner coordination.


BG Colt: Once OCG jumps back into it.

TF HQ J2: OCG actually happens when the warning order

comes up here.

SME-JSOAC: Most of the detainees in Afghanistan come from

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c operations, right?



72 percent and those numbers are around 10 percent of those come from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c operations.

Okay. I mentioned a little bit about the numbers that come off again just to orient you here from January 1st to 31 July. The numbers of military-aged males on the objective: the green are the ones that were actually released - they were screened off, they were not the targeted individual, and the assessment of that strike force commander down there that there was not enough incriminating derogatory data found on the objective to merit moving them from the objective to the temporary holding

area.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c percent did come off, and went to our temporary holding area; at that point some were turned over to GIROA. And we do transfer some to the host nation so we will do it from the THAs. Over half were actually released because once we had a little more deliberate tactical screening occurring determining these guys weren't worth keeping - they may be bad actors, they may be criminals, but again they are not part of the network, they are not in such a position to lead us further up in the food chain.

We did keep (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c percent, and actually moved them up to a temporary screening facility here in Bagram. Again we still have transfers to the host nations which will occur. When we release them from Bagram - and say they were picked up by TF-(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c we don't just put them out of the gate. We have to fly them back down to Kandahar and release them as close as possible to the point of capture. Then about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c percent of the ones that arrive at the temporary screening facility are kept here for about an average of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c days. We can keep them up here (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c days under (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c commander's authority. We can keep them for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c days under General Votel's authority. If we want to keep them up to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c days we have to go to General Mattis to get CENTCOM Commander's approval. Anything beyond (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c days we

have to go to SECDEF's office and the Deputy Secretary defense, Mr. Lynn, is the approval authority for anything over (b)(1) days. Most of these get transferred (b)(4) percent - over to the DFIP the detention facility here in Parwan, and you can see the various means of disposition at that point.

Little over half are detained, some are still released, some are transferred to GIRoA and now they are standing up the prosecution facility over there where they actual try, under Afghan law, and convict - or not - these detainees and then the Afghans determine their future disposition. Tremendous amount of intelligence is derived from that targeting process and the detainee operations. They contribute a tremendous amount of information that allows that circle to keep spinning at the high tempo it does. Any questions on our detainee operations?

BG Colt: (b)(1) directly control the TSF?

TF: (b)(1) **J2:** No, sir. They are both --

BG Colt: Are they both a (b)(1) construct?

TF: (b)(1) **J2:** -- They are (b)(1)

TF: (b)(1) **J2:** So they are Task Force but they are both underneath (b)(1) So THA's and the TSF are (b)(1) entities. Now what we do and what is ongoing now is (b)(1) will do staff assistance visits and ensure that we are meeting all the appropriate standards for detainee operations, and twice a year

CENTCOM sends ARCENT down here to inspect our facilities, they inspect them here and inspect them in Iraq. In fact, on 6 September, ARCENT will arrive in Iraq (we have one TSF there and two THAs) and then they will come and do an inspection here in Afghanistan.

TF HQ J2: Any other detainee operations questions?

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Mission: The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, under command of the Ministry of Defense and teaming with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, refines targeting, deconflicts the battlespace, and executes actions on the objective to defeat terrorist networks and improve security for the people of Afghanistan.

Key Tasks:

- Enhance cultural awareness
- Integrate human terrain intelligence
- Improve synchronization with local ANSF
- Enhance interpretation skills
- Conduct call outs
- Protect non-combatants
- Clear sensitive sites
- Improve sensitive site exploitation

End State: Enemy terrorist networks defeated and security significantly improved for the people of Afghanistan.



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TF HQ J3: Ok, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c we talked about it earlier but the bottom line is we are going to continue working them during Afghanization and, (b)(3), (b)(6), if we can get them to at least talk to the OCG, that will be great.



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ **J3**: All right, this really is for your SA -- I'm not sure if you are going forward you may see some of the Cultural Support Teams, really good news story for us - turns out to be a critical enabler. We started this program back in March and it is a three person team that are females, two CST and an interpreter. And we did this to increase our capability on the objective. So what the CST allows us to do is they allow us to refine further our IO messaging as well as get more intelligence off the objective. Because of these females we are getting a lot more out of the females that we are searching after we segregate them as well as the children. Another benefit is we have had about eight military age males dressed up as females on targets over the last couple of months and

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Having said that, a lot of the times we are the go-to Task Force for the ISAF command because we are very adaptable and you know we are very flexible and we do things quickly. Now he's asking the Task Force to take a look at Nuristan which is in RC-East. What else can you guide? how can you help us apply pressure RC-East within Nuristan? So we are assisting with that. A lot of missions and we do maintain a high OPTEMPO.

Secondly for the night raids: night-raids are a very political hot potato here in Afghanistan. A lot of conjecture on whether they are valuable or not, but the bottom line for the Task Force is they are extremely valuable for us. It's how we train and it's how we train with our Afghan counter parts and, of course, how we execute. If you take a look at the stats, 92 percent of the operations were conducted at night. And then, of that other eight percent conducted during the day - but take a look at the CIVCAS [civilian casualties]. Twenty-three percent during the day is when we had CIVCAS casualties. I mean that's pretty powerful, the bottom line: we are much more effective at night. How does that play for local Afghans and how does that play for Karzai? We are portrayed as the guys coming in at night disrupting the local communities. There may be some truth to that but the bottom line is there is less CIVCAS. CIVCAS is the hot potato item for Afghanistan right

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now. Are we perfect? Well, we are one percent right now of CIVCAS overall and we are not, but we are constantly refining our tactics, techniques and procedures to get better.

IO-DEP: The [redacted] mission[s], are they strong point assaults or does that include vehicle interdiction as well?

TF [redacted] **J3:** Everything.

TF [redacted] **J2:** That also includes VI.

TF [redacted] **J3:** Again 89 percent no shot fired, that is a powerful stat there, and [redacted] talked about, when we are on the objective first we conduct tactical call out typically, that is the [redacted] calling out and we just have many option for escalation of force if we have to go through those. The bottom line is we want to take these guys back and put them through the last half the F3EA, exploit them to get the intel. And then the jackpots: 50 percent of the time we have gone out we've got the intended target. That's a little misleading as well, it's actually a little higher than that when you figure out you bring guys back. We don't get the jackpot, but we bring some detainees back and they give us more intel on the jackpot and we get them later - the percentage is actually higher, it's more like high 70.

Eleven percent of the times shots were fired, and again one percent [CIVCAS], not perfect, we are looking to improve.

Any questions on this slide?

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Key Takeaways

- **This Task Force has been operating in Afghanistan since 2001**
 - **Every Tactic, Technique, and Procedure (TTP) is designed to capture or kill the enemy while avoiding Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) and protecting the Afghans**
- **Our targeting process is resource intensive but precise**
- **Inter-agency integration is essential in our fight against violent extremism**
- **Every operation is coordinated with the GIRoA through the Operational Coordination Group (OCG) and** (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
- **Task Force counter-network operations will not be decisive but are a necessary aspect of COMISAF's Counter Insurgency campaign in Afghanistan**
- **Pressure the enemy networks, remove and keep insurgents off the battlefield (in cooperation with the DFIP) and incentivize insurgents desire for reintegration and reconciliation**

16

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c: Here, the takeaway is we have been here since 2001. We have evolved quite a bit. Probably one of the biggest changes philosophically for the Task Force is going from enabled operations to enabling the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. I am an SF guy by trade and to see the Rangers training the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, I would have never believed it and they are doing a bang up job at Camp (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, so that really shows the flexibility built within the Task Force. The targeting process - we know it's very resourceful, it takes a lot of intel, it takes a lot of ISR, and it takes a lot of air assets to support, to support the Task Force, but that allows us to be as precise. The OCG - we talked about that critical

coordination as well as the inter agency. We have reps that work with us upstairs from DIA, CIA, ICE, FBI - another part of our interagency partners as well as providing regional expertise as well. And then the last bullet, we are going to continue applying relentless pressure on network, that's what the ISAF commander wants us to do in support of his overall campaign plan. While ISAF transition down what I see in Afghanistan over the next few years, you don't want to compare and contrast too much with what is going on in Iraq. But remember earlier on I said the Task Force is the main effort in Iraq right now, providing space and time as force protection for USFI as they re-posture. I see some of that as well for Afghanistan as we transition with our [redacted], the OCG, but again those [redacted] strike forces - we are here for the duration. Barring any questions, that's it for [redacted] overview.

SME-JSOAC: [Inaudible] as CJSOTF expand[s] [Inaudible] does that leave the targets for you all [Inaudible].

TF [redacted] J2: I will ask you to ask [redacted] the [redacted]-2, I haven't seen many targets being passed from DSO to us I'm sure they go from DSO to CJSOTF, but I haven't seen them come to us that way, but Con may have a better insight to that.

BG Colt: Does the ISAF campaign plan here influence the re-allocation of the strike forces? I'm sure they would really

like to have these effects everywhere all the time, but you sort of emphasize that down South is sort of the priority migrating North and having talk[ed] to General Votel, it sort of three main areas of Kabul and Kandahar and trying to protect route one in between. But -- back to the essence of my question again, is everything important and we want simultaneity of OPTEMPO or ops all over - what does that do to asset allocation, particularly enablers.

TF (b)(1)4a, (b)(1)4c: I don't think we are trying to do everything all over. I mean the Al-Qaida mission for us is clearly in the North right now. And it's an expeditionary Task Force up there - (b)(1)1.4a, they have VID capability, a very special capability and one of their (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is expeditionary, so they can range throughout all the RC-East. Likewise, [Team] (b)(3), (b)(6) has the same capability. So you know that gives us a few more options of where to apply pressure where it needs it most. We are enemy focused, not terrain focused and I think right now we are focused on the hot spot where we can make the critical difference.

BG Colt: Can I ask the question differently? How many times can we say Logar Province - or the Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Wardak area there to be very specific - receives SOF aviation versus conventional aviation?

TF [redacted] **J2:** I would have to refer that to [redacted]. You have the JSOAD commander right there, he might be able to answer that.

JSOAD DIR: Sir, the answer is for the last 6 weeks Team [redacted] has had conventional aviation more than 90 percent of the time. They are co-located and the capabilities required to put them on the target are able to be met by the direct support package. When it comes to the conventional package the altitude of the LZs, the PZs, really drive us to a capability set that requires CH-47Ds.

BG Colt: No that helps tremendously that's exactly the logic I'm looking for.

BG Colt: About 50 percent of our team has previous history with this Task Force and as a result of that we are still trying to understand current OPTEMPO and the way you are operating today versus our frame of reference. What we are going to do is, again, as a matter of formality; swear in the group for the purpose of this brief.

LA-DEP: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: And this is only for the purpose of having this on the record. We are going to go back and do individual interviews for points of clarification and things like that. Alright, this is for our formality; no other reason.

LA-DEP: For each of you that have a speaking role, would you go ahead and identify your name, rank, and unit and we'll get sworn in.

JSOTF CDR: Sir, the only person that's currently planning to speak is [REDACTED], who is the J3, who is going to provide the CONOP end of the story board, sir.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: Sir, [REDACTED] is going to hit the intel on the target itself.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: LTC [REDACTED]. I'm the J3 of Task Force [REDACTED]. Back home, I'm the S3 of the [REDACTED].

JSOTF J2: LTC [REDACTED], Task Force J2 and I'm the Ranger Regiment S2 back home.

JSOAD DIR: LTC [REDACTED]. I am currently the JSOAC director for [REDACTED] Joint Special Ops Aviation or Air Detachment here for Afghanistan.

JSOAD CDR: I'm LTC [REDACTED]. I'm the JSOAC Commander here for Task Force [REDACTED] JSOAC Afghanistan. Back home I'm Aviation Tactics Evaluation Group J5, Special Plans.

JSOAC CDR: If I get any questions, I'm [REDACTED] [REDACTED] JSOAC Commander.

JSOTF CDR: And I am COL [REDACTED]. I'm the

commander of Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and back home I'm the DCO [Deputy Commanding Officer] of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

All personnel identified were duly sworn.

JSOTF J3: Sir, what we would like to do first, we've got an overview on Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and I know (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c just walked you through some stuff too, so if I'm hitting on stuff you've already heard just let me know and I'll skip ahead and I'll do my best to avoid acronyms but, if there's any questions on anything, again stop me and then we will run through the CONOP. So the plan for Objective LEFTY GROVE as was briefed in the JOC here to set the stage and so that everybody understands what the plan was, and then I will walk through our special story board, which I know you have the original copy. We have made just a couple slight revisions that will help me articulate it. As I was rehearsing there was one slide that we left off, one of the squirter locations. So, it's slightly different than the version you have, but really not that big of a deal.



JSOTF J3: Okay, sir the task organization I know (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c walked you through how Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is TACON under USFOR-A Commander, for all intents and purposes, we call them ISAF. We are working directly for him but it's important to understand that we get our priorities from the battle space owners, from the battalion level all the way up to COMISAF himself. Even though technically it's just direct for COMISAF, we are getting our priorities from the battle space owners. We have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c subordinate task forces reflected here and I will show you geographically how they are oriented in the next slide, but there are (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c primary subordinate task forces. Normally, we have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c general support assets and they're on the upper left hand corner. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Of them is Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is the

Expeditionary Targeting Force; and there's another (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that we have temporarily folded into Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c here to back-fill the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that we lost on LEFTY GROVE. But normally, that's a two platoon element and another general support asset that's around. Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is commanded by a Ranger battalion commander out of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. He's got (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c teams underneath him right now: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Team in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c up in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c you can see the strike forces below, sir. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Ranger strike forces, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c a SEAL (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and then the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

Moving up, Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is commanded by the battalion executive officer from the Ranger battalion that's forward, so there's an O-4 that commands Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. He's got two teams underneath him, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c co-located with the Headquarters out of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c out at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is headed by that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c commander. He also has a Ranger platoon with him. The, moving up to Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c they are commanded by a squadron commander from SEAL (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. He normally has a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and a Ranger platoon in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and Ranger platoon out at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. This is what we currently have right now due to the loss of that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. And then Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c they are commanded by a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c squadron commander. They're headquartered out of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c but their strike forces are primarily out at Team
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c With a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and a Ranger Platoon.

Temporarily right now the Expeditionary Targeting Force - really, we used to call this a day vehicle interdiction package. It's essentially a VI package beefed up a little bit - with a Ranger squad. And then, Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, right now is sitting down with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and I'll show you that here in a second. No surprise to you, sir, extensive LNO network, both the LNOs in and out. We have the LNOs down to the brigade level at the key brigades that we are working with, interagency, no surprise there as well. That is a key aspect to what we are doing. And then the Operational Coordination Group; I'm going to talk in detail in a minute about that as I will with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

IO-DEP: (b)(6), (b)(3), can I interrupt you?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir.

IO-DEP: The change from the VI to an ETF in an additional force, is there a strongpoint assault capability there when required?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. That was the concept. When we updated our campaign plan back in December of 2010, one of the things we have been presented with for some time was COMISAF - Petraeus at the time, he directed us into areas that we did not

have a sustained presence for quite a bit. So, to address that for the longer term we took the day vehicle interdiction package, we gave it some enablers, some additional intel, all of those things where it could pick up - it could go in an area we did not have a sustained presence. A perfect example is where they are operating right now out of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, way up in the west up here. And so, we want a force that we could push around the battle field relatively quickly and have enough beef where it could do standard night raids or strong point assaults. That's why we changed the name of it so people didn't get stuck that it could only do day vehicle interdictions.

IO-DEP: But it doesn't do day strong point assaults normally or are you still sticking to vehicles?

JSOTF J3: We still assess day strong point assaults as very high risk. Not to say we have never done them, but they are extremely rare.

IO-DEP: Got it; okay.

JSOTF J3: Sir, any questions on the task organization here?

BG Colt: You have dedicated your assets against different ones; do you have to make slides to fix it?


JSOTF J3: Yes, sir we do.

BG Colt: Okay.



JSOTF J3: Okay, sir this slide upper left-hand portion depicts our overall priorities throughout all of Task Force





more." And so, for all of Regional Command East, that is their

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

IO-DEP: So (b)(6), (b)(3), LEFTY GROVE was in support of secondary for one or two?

JSOTF J3: It is supporting effort one there, sir; Kabul Security.

IO-DEP: Right. Okay.

JSOTF J3: And right now total Strike Forces are (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and we did have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c prior to LEFTY GROVE.

JSOTF (b)(3), (b)(6): And, sir, as (b)(6), (b)(3) clarified before too, that is not the task organization of Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c the night of execution.




JSOTF J3: Okay, sir, this is what you asked about earlier. So to execute these operations obviously ground mobility is extremely limited here in Afghanistan, as everybody



This slide is actually a little bit ahead of things. This

slide right here is depicting a course of action that we have to adjust for the realignment of combat power that we are going through right now. But, I will describe what we got at this



Okay. Two questions, if I could.

JSOTF J3: Sure.

BG Colt: One, do you have an OPORD, or something that codifies those command relationships between those guys and you guys?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: And, if you do, I'd like to get one.

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: And the second one is as you depict all the Apache relationships down there, are those dedicated DS crews to you?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: To what degree do you see the same crews flying in support of you or is it a company that just has the responsibility to provide air?

JSOTF J3: (b)(3), (b)(6), do you want to address that?

JSOAD DIR: Sir, it's a very high degree of dedicated crews. It's more than one crew per asset that you see so that they can sustain the right - in Kandahar, for example, where you have two AWT packages, they both come out of the same company. There are about three to three and a half crews worth of crew members that are dedicated to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b mission. They are familiar with our mission. They fly it regularly. They do all of their planning in our Joint Air Operation Center, so they are embedded in our planning cells.

BG Colt: Does that contrast at all with what the support you get from TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is?

JSOAD DIR: No, sir. In TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c they have more crews that fly the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b mission, so you don't see the identical crew night after night, but there are established DS crews and

that's because TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is separated across so many sites, that they have to be able to cross level.

BG Colt: Exactly.

JSOAD DIR: But the crews that fly for us are dedicated to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c missions. They have a certain training and competence.

BG Colt: So here's my follow on question to that. If they are required to provide you one pair of Apaches DS - right? Is DS a requirement through the duration of the mission regardless? You know what I'm saying? So, if they shoot out, do they have responsibility to flex another pair in support?

JSOAD DIR: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: They do? Okay.

IO-DEP: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ?

JSOAD DIR: Yes, sir.

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir; we do.

IO-DEP: Are you using those in the assault role?


JSOTF J3: Yes, sir; they did.

IO-DEP: So that's your (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c package?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. They do a tremendous job actually. They offer us a lot of flexibility based on the speed in which they can get us the target.

JSOAD CDR: And that package is OPCON for command

relationship to the JSOAD.



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Yes, I understand.

JSOAC CDR: Sir, in respect to your question about the FRAGO's, I think there's about four or five IJC FRAGOs out there right now. But, at IJC right now is an omnibus IJC FRAGO that will cover all the direct support aircraft relationships. We will provide you a copy of the current FRAGOs and the omnibus tomorrow.

BG Colt: Alright; thanks.

JSOTF J3: Any further questions on these slides?

SME-INTEL: I understand the relationship with the 160th, but for the DS assets from the conventionalist, how is the intel collaboration done with them? Is it done by their organic resources?

JSOTF J3: Yeah. For their route planning it is primarily done by their organic intel folks. (b)(3), (b)(6), that's accurate; right?

JSOAD DIR: That's correct. The threat assessment that feeds into their mission planning is done by their organic

assets. When it comes to imagery analysis, we have some augmentation that helps with the analysis, with the LZ and route selection. But, their threat analysis is done by their organic S2s.



JSOTF J3: Okay, sir, this is just to give you an appreciation of the OPTEMPO. This depicts operations over the past year, really from 1 August back 12 months. This is a standard slide we normally show in our command brief, but it kind of highlights a couple of different things. Over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c missions executed. The vast majority of those are standard grades. 92 percent of those are at night. And then of those 89 percent of them - there's no shots fired; very low drama on them. Right now, we are just under 50 percent jackpot right

there. And then the CIVCAS, that's always a topic of discussion out here. So we show this thing.

Right now, we are averaging over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c operations a month; that's where we are. We are about ready to end the Ranger surge here in the next couple of weeks.

BG Colt: Can you define that for me, please?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. The Ranger surge is an extra Ranger company; so (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c additional strike forces that are deployed forward. So when the Ranger surge ends, the combat power that's going to go away is going to be Team (b)(3), (b)(6). That was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c single strike force under Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. And then, one of our GS assets, Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, is currently out of Organy with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c strike forces. Those are the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c strike forces that are going to go away; really (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is kind of the last night of those strike forces executing any operations.

IO-DEP: When you've got high - low, I assume that's OPTEMPO on the targets on the map. Is there a numerical value? How do you determine what's on there?

JSOTF J3: You know, sir, I can't talk to how this density graph was calculated, but we can absolutely put something together to show density based on no kidding numbers. We have got that by province.

IO-DEP: That would be useful for us, obviously,

especially for Wardak.

BG Colt: That's allocation and correlation.

JSOAC CDR: Just a prior answer, sir. You talked earlier about OPTEMPO.

For context, (b)(6), (b)(3), can you tell them the OPTEMPO you are operating at for the last two months versus a year ago?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. I think it was back in, I want to say September or October of 2010, is when we went above (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c operations in a month. And then it was two months ago is when we went over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. We went over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c it was November - December of '09, I want to say. So, generally about the past two years we've increased by about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c operations in a month due to a myriad of reasons. Some of which is all the additional lift, you know, of course it's the additional strike force. But, primarily it's enablers, ISR, those types of things.

IO-DEP: Was the surge of the additional Rangers, was that directed by ISAF? I mean was there a directive to pick up the OPTEMPO now and capitalize on the summer months?

JSOTF J3: Sir, we were not directly tasked with providing (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c extra strike forces. We were told to increase OPTEMPO and maintain increased pressure on the enemy. So, when we did that we re-evaluated our campaign plan back in December, when we did that. I was here then as well. As one of the COAs, it

was to surge and quite frankly we had already been surging extra Ranger forces. At that time it was only (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c additional strike forces. It had kind of ebbed and flowed over the year prior to that. It was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. With that campaign plan, really, it was our internal decision or proposal that we increase or surge to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c total platoons up through this fighting season. So September is really when that was decided. That was to provide the additional pressure on Kandahar. Really it was to sustain the pressure that we had down at Kandahar, because that had always been our main effort. It was to sustain that pressure and then increase pressure on the enemy networks in the Kabul security zone because that was the piece we did not think we were addressing very well and it was an area we thought we could make the most impact on because of, you know, there was so much stuff down south - that's where all the surge, standard GPF, General Purpose Force, was coming in down south. That's really why we focused around Wardak - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and said, "Let's kind of mass our effects up in this area and help out in the Kabul security." I can talk pretty extensively through how our current set came about but that's it in a nutshell.

IO-DEP: But in the end it was ISAF's intent to increase pressure on the networks overall-

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir.

IO-DEP: I mean, they didn't tell you how to do it, they just told you what they wanted done obviously.

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. That's right. But, I want to highlight, nobody - General Petraeus didn't say, "Hey, I want (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c additional," --

IO-DEP: They just said, "increase the pressure," "keep up the pressure". Does that generalize?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Is there something that goes into your planning calculus here? Who is the lead for planning versus supporting effort at any one of these missions, for instance, like LEFTY GROVE?

JSOTF J3: So, for a standard mission every night, sir?

BG Colt: Yes.

JSOTF J3: Those missions are planned by the strike forces down in those task forces that are executing the mission. They will do the planning with support from that task force headquarters in the form of imagery and intel and all those enablers. But as far as the tactical level planning that is executed by that strike force down there.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: Okay. Sir, this doesn't apply directly,

certainly to LEFTY GROVE but it's important to understand our --

BG Colt: Well, it does indirectly; right? Because every mission including LEFTY GROVE is vetted through these guys; true?

Operational Coordination Group (OCG)

Mission: Partnering w/ TF (b)(1)4a, (b)(1)4c, fuse intelligence, inform and monitor tactical operations to destroy enemy networks, protect the people of Afghanistan, and enhance GIRoA confidence in coalition SOF operations

Key Tasks - Maintain Freedom of Action:

- Build and maintain common target list
- Maintain security (no public awareness)
- Vet nightly targets
- Battle space de-confliction
- Monitor mission execution
- Facilitate post mission reporting
- Participate in post operation mitigation
- Notify ministers



Way Ahead:

- Regional OCG's
 - RC South complete
 - RC N IOC 30 June, FOC SEP 11
 - RC East, Capital, West
- Manning for Tashkill with the right people
- Rank structure; more MOI, NDS
- Infrastructure for additional ROCG

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
AFC

JSOTF J3: It is, sir. So the Operational Coordination Group, it was formed over two years ago when we said we needed to have really better legitimacy in the eyes of GIRoA in order to maintain our freedom of maneuver. So, these guys are high level officials from Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and the National Directorate of Security. There are (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c teams right now. They go on 24 hour shifts and they sit in a JOC right next to ours; and you can go visit it really anytime

you want. So, they will go through 24 hours. You can see down here, its set similar to our JOC, just not nearly as big. But they watch all our ISR, they'll see our JOC blogs, they will hear the radio calls. Really the only thing we keep from them, obviously, is the TS level how we got to the target piece of it. They are briefed on all the targets prior to execution and, you know, technically speaking if they would come to us and say, "I don't want you to execute this mission," we wouldn't do it. Not because they have-it's because internally we have kind of given them that say. Now, I do not know of a time when they've come to us and said, "I don't want you doing this mission." They have come to us and said, "This is a very sensitive area. You need to be careful here." They have said, "We need to do additional mitigation for you," those kinds of things. But, you know, to be perfectly honest, these guys are kind of on-board here with what we are doing. And, you know, obviously they show a lot of concern when we make mistakes in those few times when we have CIVCAS incidents, those kinds of things. What this has provided us is personally I think legitimacy in the eyes of GIROA, because of that linkage they have with their ministries and they are able to talk to them directly about what has happened, etcetera.

JSOTF CDR: They have a role post mission as well, sir. I

mean, they provide us a lot of reflections in the battle space about—you know a lot of times we come off the objective without a lot of clarity, maybe in terms of some additional people we might have pulled off the objective. And, a lot of times what they do is help clarify that picture for us, help us better understand some of the people who have taken off, maybe some of the impacts that that operation had on the environment.


I think I can name one time fairly recently where the OCG ahead of the operation came to us with some concerns and as a result of those concerns, the Task Force decided not to conduct the operation. So, they didn't outright say "don't do it." But, as a result of their concern of the operation and the location it was being executed in, I think we reconsidered and thought it was probably not in our best interest to do the operation.

IO-DEP: So, (b)(3), (b)(6), internally you have given them a veto vote on this thing?

JSOTF CDR: Yes, sir. That's very true, and we advertise that with them. We've made that perfectly clear to them, that they do have a veto with regard to our operation. I think, for the legitimacy the transparency that (b)(6), (b)(3) talked about, I think that's an important part of our operations. They have not [used] that pretty frequently, but they've been invaluable

ahead of the operation in helping us better understand some of the places that we are going into.

IO-DEP: Thank you.



JSOTF J3: Sir, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, about the same

time that we stood up the Operational Coordination Group, we stood up the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. We recruit from Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police and National Directorate of Security to man this force. The vast majority of the personnel though are from Afghan National Army. So, through time over the past two years as we have slowly built this force we have gotten to a level where we have seven (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c personnel going out on every target with us. The only exception is with the Expeditionary Targeting Force when they

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executing day vehicle interdiction type of missions based on ACL indications.

But, other than that, the minimum is seven. A lot of forces will take more, when they can, out with them. And the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, the intent is that they are absolutely out in the front they are executing the call outs, they are doing their first-in clearing. And, you know, so they are the face of the strike forces out there. We train these guys back at a camp right outside of Kabul, we have an element--you the recruiting is primarily done by the Afghan leader of this unit. But then we bring them in, we train them, we put them through a basic training course, put them in their companies, put them through the standard individual and collective training and then push them out. So each company has got four platoons in it. The companies are rotated through, not unlike how we rotate forward for 3 months; they deploy for three months at a time. Each platoon is habitually related to a subordinate task force so they keep going back to the same areas in theory. And then when they come back they go back into an individual and then collected, just like we do. Another thing to note is we do -- the Ranger Regiment and CAG is doing it now as well, we'll bring a handful of these guys, 10 to 20, back to the States during our final Task Force training events prior to.

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My personal opinion on that is really that is more for us than it is for them, because it trains our guys on how to utilize them on target more than anything. But, this is continuing to grow right now; I think we are ~~(b)(1)~~ at ~~(b)(1)~~ percent strength.

Any questions on the ~~(b)(1)~~ general overview?

BG Colt: No. Thank you.

OBJ Lefty Grove CONOP

The overall classification of this briefing is
~~SECRET//REL FVEY~~

JSOTF J3: Okay, this is the CONOP as was briefed in the JOC, so all we did is we went to mission tracker that records all the basic statistics from each mission and we store the CONOP here, we store the EXSUM, you know all the post operations product and we pull this CONOP, so this is as it was sitting on our mission tracking portal.

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TM

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

OBJ LEFTY GROVE-42S VC 83431 62373

QARI TAHIR

SAYYIDABAD DISTRICT, WARDAK PROVINCE

BSO: T (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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
NIGHT RAID

~~SECRET//REL FVEY~~

JSOTF CDR: Sir, just for clarification too, the order is briefed to us by the LNOs and some of the intel personnel that sit in the JOC itself. Obviously, (b)(6), (b)(3) doesn't normally in-brief it to me. We are receiving the order kind of together. Alright, so what we've done is we have taken this product and we are going to brief it back, but we are not the individual Task Forces LNOs that brief these CONOPS to us.

BG Colt: I'm with it. What I'm really interested in is, talk to me about that target development timeline of when did - at this level - did you know that this particular strike Team, or Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was getting ready to conduct LEFTY GROVE.

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JSOTF J3: Okay, sir. I will start at a more basic level there. The J2 and myself approve every target and we put it on what's called the JTL-A, so it's Joint Target List-Afghanistan. We do not use ISAF, IJC's JPEL process. We just couldn't keep up with it. But we do approve every single target, so every (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, we've got a Joint Targeting Board where each subordinate task force will propose the target and it's in the form of this. This is generally the format. Left hand side, it shows kind of the characterization of them. General overview it will show the reports there that support why he is a valid target. On the right hand side, we show just geography where he's hanging out and then down at the bottom is the link analysis and where he fits in the network. So Con's guys will

do very good vetting of these targets before they go to board. They'll come to the board and then we will look through the reporting and make sure it is a valid target and this all goes back to over two years ago, when we started the OCG and the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c We started this process as well to make sure that the targets our guys are going out on, one, are worth risking the strategic negatives that can come from the mistakes and then two, it's worth risking our own guys going out an executing. So, that's how we vet that piece.

BG Colt: I understand completely.

JSOTF J3: Now, as far as the nightly basis, the first time that we will hear about a target will be (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c It will be the joint asset allocation meeting that I chair every day. All the subordinate task forces are up on that VTC and then we've got all the enablers up here at Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c so all the air supporters-- (b)(3), (b)(6) sits right next to me on my left. On the right is my fires guy, and we go through weather, we go through all the assets available so (b)(3), (b)(6) will brief any maintenance issues on the aircraft, etcetera. Fires, same thing, they will brief what's available there. ISR guys will go through the ISR stuff, and then each subordinate Task Force will brief the targets that they are looking at for that night.

BG Colt: When did you first get visibility over LEFTY

GROVE relative to the brief that took place at 1400Z the day they did it?

JSOTF J2: I'd have to go back and look specifically. Sir, he had been on there for a while. I'd say a month plus.

BG Colt: And, I don't want you to think I'm cherry-picking this particular operation, though it is important to us and to get that understanding. But, contextually, I'm trying to understand how long in advance - particularly these non-organic units - really get to develop what's the threat where we are going at night and so forth. Are you with me?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: Air planners specifically.

JSOTF J3: I can talk to that piece, sir. So, in the asset allocation meeting that will be the first time the brief- - quite frankly, I'll have to dig back to see. I don't know if LEFTY GROVE was actually briefed. Most targets are briefed in that.

Was it, (b)(3), (b)(6)?

JSOAD DIR: It was.

JSOTF J3: Okay, most targets are briefed in that, but sometimes we achieve --

BG Colt: I understand. So, they are emerging targets and things like that.

JSOTF J3: Yes.

BG Colt: I absolutely get it.

JSOTF J3: So, that will be the starting point of when I push assets around and say, "Okay, you've got this," and it will be based on target priorities and we'll pretty well set on lift and everything. So, generally, it's just I'm pushing around gunships, EW assets, and then the AOD fixed wing lines.

BG Colt: What I'm trying to get understand is: what is a general norm for planning time for these supporting elements? And if we were to cherry-pick this particular mission out, is that within a standard aviation normal or is that way out of normal.

JSOAD DIR: Sir, these crews have a requirement to be able to plan what's labeled a hasty planning process, which is three hours from the time you are given grids for planning your target area until the time your wheels are up. They generally do not meet the three hour window. Generally, we go at about anywhere from four to five hours is the norm. Sometimes that's because of the planning process and sometimes it's because of the target.

BG Colt: I'm absolutely with you. And, I think we all kind of agree depending upon the nature of the target, we shouldn't leave until we are good and ready.

JSOAD DIR: Right, sir.

TE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c DEP J3: LEFTY GROVE would have previously known within your (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Joint Targeting Boards and then added to the list and then just popped up this day; is that accurate?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. No, some targets are what we call TST, time sensitive targets. So, if somebody's got a target that they develop and he meets all the criteria for a target, but they do it on Wednesday, we don't make them wait all the way until Sunday. They can submit that and then we will approve it outside of the Targeting Board. I want to be clear with that.

JSOAC CDR: Is it important to note that when you add LEFTY GROVE to your target list, it doesn't necessarily mean you know where he is?

JSOTF J3: That's absolutely right, sir.

JSOAC CDR: Make sure they understand that.

JSOTF J3: Yeah, we just know he's a bad guy.

BG Colt: A person of interest; right?

JSOTF J3: We will not generally have a fix on him. If we did, we'd be striking that night.

BG Colt: I absolutely understand.

JSOTF J3: Now, it is rare to have more than that kind of night's planning for a mission. So this, you know, the three

hour standard and then the actual length of time that it takes, four or five hours, that's what happens every night. It's not like it's normal where the night prior the DS guys or ARSOA guys can take a look at the target and plan it 1, 2, 3 nights out, because the guys is never in the same place. Now, occasionally there will be NAI, named areas of interest, where we will execute deliberate targets, but usually we only do that when we are having a hard time getting a fix on a guy through either (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or some other way. So generally speaking for a trigger on a night, and this is a good example, it's going to be that night those guys get the grid and they start planning in the three to five hour to do that. That's the standard.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOAD DIR: It's important to know that there's a dedicated planner. You talked about the crews and whether they are habitual, but there's a dedicated planner at each of our supporting battalion task forces. That is the planner for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c missions. That's their job.

IO-DEP: Is that planner co-located with the ground task force?

JSOAD DIR: They are from within the aviation battalion Task Force, sir.

IO-DEP: I know they come from there, but where are they physically located?

JSOAD DIR: It depends on the location.

IO-DEP: Are they with the ground force?

JSOAD DIR: It depends on where you are, sir.

IO-DEP: Okay. And, you said there's a three hour standard from when they receive a mission until they should be able to launch.

JSOAD DIR: Yes, sir. And that's in the IJC FRAGO. That's directed as a requirement.

IO-DEP: Okay, and that FRAGO is what directs the training standards for these conventional units that support them?

JSOAD DIR: Yes, sir.

IO-DEP: We can get a copy of that?

JSOAD DIR: Yes, sir; of course.

BG Colt: I want to make sure we deconstruct the planning timeline down at the CAB or battalion task force level. My interest is if they have multiple competing requirements and this pops on the deck for the night, are they getting the best possible planner support they can get or they utilize residual sort of capacity.

JSOAD DIR: Yes, sir. I understand.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: Okay. Sir, any further questions on planning timeline?


BG Colt: No.

JSOTF-J2: Sir, I'll just cover the target real quick. LEFTY GROVE was targeting Qari Tahir, who was the senior Taliban Commander within the Tangi Valley in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, Wardak Province. He had taken over that role from Din Muhammad, Objective Dunlap, who was killed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c June during execution of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. Although Din Muhammad, up here, as Objective Dunlap - he was actually killed on Objective (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c going after somebody else, but he was an associate of LEFTY GROVE.

BG Colt: Okay.

SME-JSOAC: Dunlap was killed by the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c?

JSOTF-J2: He was. They were familiar and had operated in this area.




JSOTF J3: Okay, sir. This slide is one of the products that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) personal put together. This is not a product that the subordinate Task Force does. This is a way that we kind of check and do our own vetting and our own risk assessment when we present these to the Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c commander. So his guys will pull SIGACTS along the area and along the routes there. You can see, here is where the mission launched from. This is FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and there's the target objective LEFTY GROVE.

BG Colt: Here's a question for clarification, too. Those are events that are within your database; right? Not necessarily, (for clarification) within (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c database, if he had been operating in that battle space?

JSOTF J3: That's pulled from the Afghan SIGACTS. So, it pulls from all battle spaces. It's the common picture everybody is operating from.

BG Colt: Okay, thanks.

JSOTF J3: So this is what we saw here. There's a small arms engagement of a C-130. It didn't hit. It was close. And then the other significant point over here, to the left, this was on 20 July. This is actually against Unit Eight aircraft. Unit Eight is ARSOA aircraft that support CJSOTF. And, it says "hit RPG" it was not an RPG hit - they did observe what they assessed to be RPGs and then when they landed, they noticed sheet metal damage from a round, small arms. So, that's what where the hit came from there.



JSOTF J3: This is a close-up of the objective area. That right there is objective LEFTY GROVE. These are all the SIGACTs. As you can see there, those dates are pretty old. And, I'll note that the battle space owner used to be in this valley and he no longer generally operates in there and that is our assessment on why those are old SIGACTS.

JSOTF CDR: And, sir, sometimes a big, clustered SIGACTS can relate to an operation that was conducted, like a big deliberate operation and maybe conventional forces conducted it. I mean, there are a number of things you can draw from this as you take a look.

SME-JSOAC: No SIGACTS or service identifiers during

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

?

JSOTF J3: No, sir. We will confirm, but if you go back to the previous slide it would have shown up on there if it was entered in the database.

achieved trigger, how that subordinate task force got trigger. On this particular day, it was based on a p-grid. Does everyone in here have a TS Clearance?

IO-SEC: We have five Secret.

JSOTF J3: I can describe that in detail offline if you'd like, sir.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: But, it's based on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and the last time we got was at 1425Z at that particular location.

JSOTF-J2: Just of note, that was the historical location where we had repeatedly seen LEFTY GROVE, talk to, but it was not--

BG Colt: Okay.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JSOTF J3: Okay, sir. This was the task organization as planned. The assault force was the Ranger platoon out of Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c is 1/B from actually (b)(3), (b)(6). So, this was from the surge force. So, a Ranger company that actually deployed early from (b)(3), (b)(6) that just happened to be this force right there. I will walk through what that consisted of.

So, the top line there is Rangers, and that is 35 actual Rangers and one dog. There was one SEAL (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c EOD tech; that is what is there in blue. One CST, that is the female Cultural Support Team member we had on our target list. Several (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c personnel, two terps and the BSO, battle space owner. When we know that the battle space owner cannot do a battle handover and actively come out to the target - take over, take control of the target into the day, execute key leader engagements, etcetera, a technique that a lot of the Task Forces are doing to mitigate that is they actually go and pick up a battle space owner, they call him an LNO, that will go on target with him.

BG Colt: Firsthand knowledge --

JSOTF J3: Firsthand knowledge is exactly what happened on target that they can take back to their chain of command. It is not as good obviously as having a true battle handover, but it's better than having nothing. So this individual was out of COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and they were picked up by the DS lift package

en route with the assault force, and I will show that on the route later on.

Next over to the right there, the lift package EXTORTION (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c you will notice that you don't see (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c on there. The reason for this, - and (b)(3), (b)(6), you can jump in if I screw this up - but during planning it's based on the chalk; you know, chalk one and chalk two and the general call signs. In the ATO, though actual tail numbers are assigned, no kidding call signs, and that's where EXTORTION 17 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c came from. I'm sure you know about that better than I do. So, that's why there was initial confusion on that. Then the Immediate Reaction Force consisted there, out of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that's the other strike force packages. It's at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c there. Then the quick reaction force from the battle space owner was coming out of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, consisted of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c personnel, and there's a slide here later on I will show you where exactly that's out of and what the time -- response time for those individuals were. Primary CASEVAC was coming off of the standard dust-off out of FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c --

BG Colt: Anywhere in here are you going to talk about what the standing task for QRF were? And did the Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c the mission commander, have control over those, or did somebody else have control over that?

JSOTF J3: Technically, for the quick reaction force, sir, technically, the battle space owner still controls the employment of those guys. There is no official command relationship other than the battle space owner provides those guys to be ready --

BG Colt: Is there a priority for planning after it though?

JSOTF J3: There should be, sir. I cannot tell you what the priorities were given to this particular quick reaction force.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: That is not reflected in the CONOP.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: As you can see there, sir, the top two (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c those are two-man platforms. (b)(3), (b)(6) is one of our unmanned assets that was supporting this. And for the fires assets, the top one is actually the Air Weapons Team AH64s, call sign, "(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c" then we said a gun ship that was dedicated to this mission. And then call sign "(b)(3), (b)(6)", that's a Prowler EW asset also. So they had -- this objective was outfitted as good as any of our objectives can be based on rotary wing CCA, having a gunship and having EW; that's the primo package.

BG Colt: How are the priorities tasked for the AC transmitted to them assuming, of course, the AC crew is not ever going to attend any of the briefs?

JSOTF J3: Sir, there's -- the primary document we use is the COF - Concept of Fires - document that gets transmitted. Even if that asset is already airborne, we can push that document up there. But then, you know, it's -- they are controlled by the JTAC on the ground and given their priorities. And we can actually -- I think we've got it as a hidden slide in this CONOP. I believe we have got a COF in there I can show you.

IO-DEP: (b)(6), (b)(3), the ISRFs it's -- I thought there was an MC12, AC130 and the AWT. Isn't the (b)(6), (b)(3) a PC12, or was it a --

BG Colt: What was (b)(6), (b)(3) in this?

SME-GFA: (b)(6), (b)(3) is the [inaudible].

IO-DEP: Okay. So you had a PC12 and an MC12 and the AC overhead? And then what's (b)(6), (b)(3)?

JSOTF J3: That's a Predator. It's an MQ-1, sir.

BG Colt: Can I ask you a question? I'm sorry. Based on mission time, though, right, and when I see the window of coverage there, right, (b)(6), (b)(3) and (b)(6), (b)(3), were those not pre-assault, pre -- those were condition enablers. But their

window expired prior to the hit, right?

JSOTF J3: That's right, sir. But we have assets that backfill them, and they are not all reflected here. It would actually take up most of the slide. But we can look back at what actually backfilled these assets.

BG Colt: Okay. I appreciate that.

JSOTF J3: Okay. Any questions on the task --

IO-DEP: Just to make sure I'm clear. So those three assets, PC-12, MC-12 and MQ-1, there was maybe not the same tail number, but those three assets were over the target during the fall --

JSOTF J3: We will lay out from, you know, development of the fix all the way through, we can lay that out on a slide for you.

SME-JSOAC: This was just for the briefing?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir.

SME-JSOAC: Okay.

OBJ LEFTY GROVE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c **DATE 6 AUG 2011**

MISSION: On 06 Aug 2011, conduct an assault to capture/kill OBJ LEFTY GROVE (Din Tahir) IVQ Sayed Abad District, Wardak Province, A/C ICI disrupt IED activity in Wardak.

Significance: Din Tahir (LEFTY GROVE) is a IED CDR and was the deputy to **Din Mohammed (JUNLAH-CRJA)** active within the Jang Valley, Sayed Abad District, Wardak Province. **Din Tahir** is the replacement for **Din Mohammed** and assumed to be the overall IED Commander of the Jang Valley.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

IN BERT: 1 x BSO FROM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

INFIL: HAF IN (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

AAD: ISOLATE TGT, TACTICAL CALLOUT, BREACH, ASLT TGT, TQ/ESSE, EXPLOIT, BSHO

EXFIL: GROUND EXFIL TO HIZ

EXTRACT: HAF RTE

BSO	(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c	IMP. CIS	BLACKHAWK BASE 47.125	LOCATION	(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
SVQ	(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c	COMP	25 US PAX	Resp TIME	45 (GRD) 25 (AIR)
ASSET	UNIT	CALLSIGN / FREQ	LOCATION	ALERT TO WIGGLS UP	Target to Med Facility
UH-60		(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c		10 min	7 min
UH-60		(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c		10 min	7 min

JSOTF J3: Okay. Sir, we call this slide the money slide.

This is kind of a one stop shop slide that can go out to supporting assets that has a lot of the critical information that they need to support. At the top is the mission

statement, "Team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c conducting an assault to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c objective LEFTY GROVE in Sayed Abad District in order to disrupt Taliban activity in Wardak."

The significance there, no different than what Colonel

(b)(3), (b)(6). On the left hand side, you will see just the basic timeline, the task org. It will have the primary methods of infil, those platforms there. You will see EXTORTION (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [actual call sign "EXTORTION 17"] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [actual call sign "EXTORTION (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c] reflected with the number of personnel on each

of those platforms.

Some of the key grids will be on there, key call signs, the fires assets. They are currently allocated as well as ISR, and the EWs are reflected as well, basic signal information in the lower left-hand portion. And the concept of the operation takes up the middle of the slide there.

There's two errors on this that I just want to highlight: When it says "insert one BSO from FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to target," what -- it was poorly articulated on there and inaccurate. Really, what they are talking about is they are going to pick up one BSO member from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c on the way to target. And you can see that reflected in the blue -- blue line over COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that's why they were making that movement and then into target. We got the detailed air route later on.

The other error on here is on the infil it says "A helicopter assault force insertion (to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c)". We did not do a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c this was an offset -- about a two kilometer offset. I just want to highlight those two areas, sir.

And then the battle space owner QRF element is reflected down here with their composition and response time.

BG Colt: Is that what was done or what was approved with respect to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JSOTF J3: Sir, that --


BG Colt: Was the MC approved to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and they just elected afterward not to go there or --

JSOTF J3: Sir, the plan from what -- from what I understand, the plan was offset from the get-go. I think that was probably just an error -- a typo in haste.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: Any further questions, sir?

General Colt shook his head, indicating a negative response.



JSOTF J3: Sir, this is a depiction of the movement -- the planned movement route from the infield, offset infil HLZ, HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, into the target. It also depicts the exfil HLZ, HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Okay.




JSOTF J3: This shows the route from the objective rally point right there into target.



JSOTF J3: And then this is just the route from the target

back to the EXFIL HLZ, HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: Okay.



JSOTF J3: Sir, standard GRG reference grid. We used

macro, next, and then the micro target building being in tent series here.



JSOTF J3: Sir, this slide depicts the geographic orientation of the quick reaction force as well as where we were picking up the LNO from the battle space owner. So this is FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c where Team (b)(3), (b)(6) operates out of --

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: Here is COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c where we picked up the battle space owner member to go on target with us. This is COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c where the actual quick reaction force was out of there.

BG Colt: Okay. Just a question: In this particular case, were those pathfinders?

JSOTF J3: No, sir. That was a separate element.

BG Colt: Okay. Who made up the QRF?

JSOTF J3: The QRF was, you know, the exact --

BG Colt: Is that a battle space owner function?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. So this is from Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

which is the battalion that owns that particular battle space --

BG Colt: Did (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c exchange liaison or anybody with them in case they were going to go in there.

JSOTF J3: As far as putting somewhere there, no, sir.

BG Colt: Anybody with a QRF at all?

JSOTF J3: No, sir. It is all coordination done by distance, sir.

BG Colt: Okay. And as far as GRG and products like that, we send them, and they --

JSOTF CDR: You know, what we do have, sir, is we have an LNO that sits in their brigade TOC. But not one, necessarily, that would have gone to that location.

BG Colt: Okay.

CHALK LOAD INFIL
(HAF) LEFTY GROVE

POS	NAME	SSN	POSITION	WEIGHT
1	LD 10		SS	255
2	BTG		BTG	255
3	STRONTERJ		MORTARMAN	225
4	LD 11		TC	270
5	LD 12		LOGHANDLER	270
6	LD 13		SNIPER	255
7	LD 14		SNIPER	255
8	LD 15		OPERATOR	240
9	LD 16		TRAINLEADER	225
10	LD 17		SAW GUNNER	210
11	LD 18		GRNADER	262
12	LD 19		GRNADER	262
13	LD 20		MORTARMAN	265
14	LD 21		SGT. GUN	262
15	LD 22		MP	255
16	LD 23		GUNNER	225
17	LD 24		AD	270
18	LD 25		AMMO CARRIER	280
19	LD 26		IG	245
20	LD 27		MACHINE GUNNER	270
21	LD 28		CT	160
22	LD 29		DEP	170
23	LD 30		SSG	262
TOTAL WEIGHT				2147

POS	NAME	SSN	POSITION	WEIGHT
1	LD 31		SSG	240
2	LD 32		SMIC	240
3	LD 33		SQUAD LEADER	255
4	LD 34		TRAINLEADER	225
5	LD 35		SAW GUNNER	220
6	LD 36		SAW GUNNER	225
7	LD 37		RFLOWAN	245
8	LD 38		MACHINE GUNNER	250
9	LD 39		SQUAD LEADER	230
10	LD 40		TRAINLEADER	230
11	LD 41		TRAINLEADER	250
12	LD 42		SAW GUNNER	265
13	LD 43		RFLOWAN	262
14	LD 44		RFLOWAN	241
15	LD 45		SAW GUNNER	235
16	LD 46		TRFP	200
17	LD 47		PL	200
18	LD 48		ATL	200
19	LD 49		RF	200
20	LD 50		RF	200
21	LD 51		ATL	200
22	LD 52		ATLIT	200
23	LD 53		RF	200
24	LD 54		FOG	270
TOTAL WEIGHT				2668

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JSOTF J3: Sir, this is the manifest for the two infil chalks, EXTORTION (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. Just to highlight, obviously, the vast majority of these folks are from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, the Ranger platoon, you will note down here, the Cultural Support Team member, two terps, sir, cross-leveled between the two. We have got there one member from the battle space owner, 2/4 Infantry. And then over on the right, we've got all the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c personnel, and that's the one SEAL (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c EOD tech came along.

BG Colt: Okay. Can I ask you one more time about the QRF? Were those guys resourced via [inaudible]?

JSOTF J3: Sir, we -- they did not have dedicated air, no sir.

BG Colt: That was the question.

JSOTF J3: No, sir, not dedicated.

BG Colt: Okay. Conceptually though, it was coming from where?

JSOTF J3: COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c up here, sir.

BG Colt: I meant the air that would have supported them.

JSOTF J3: The air would have been that package, sir.

BG Colt: Yours?

JSOTF J3: Recycled.

BG Colt: That's what I want to know.

JSOTF J3: Okay. Sir, this is just internal to the JOC there at the end of the CONOP brief. We go through all of the primary staff elements at Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c They will give updates, you know, and they will annotate any concerns or issues at that time, and then give a final -- you know, the J2, myself and the sergeant major give a final recommendation to the commander on mission execution.

IO-DEP: And do they normally lay out the chalk load plans for the IRF as well or not?

JSOTF J3: The -- you know, normally -- I mean they absolutely should, sir. I can't say who went and sifted through our stuff, whether we see that stuff. We definitely focus on, you know, the infil manifest. And, you know, it's

not -- most of the immediate reaction forces that are utilized by strike forces are actually on the original assault -- a part of that original assault force. They just stay on the helicopters after infil. There will be, like, a 10 minute loiter ready to be employed somewhere should they need to be employed. Normally, it's based on squirts coming off of the objective.

JSOTF CDR: And, sir, sometimes that's known as the airborne reaction --

BG Colt: No. I'm with it.

JSOTF CDR: There's a number of different terms that are used.

JSOTF J3: Can you unhide and see if we get the --

BG Colt: In this particular case though, if we go through a couple of contingency points, right, was it in your mind that the first reaction force that was going to go to (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c), for instance, they got into something more than they thought they were going to get -- would it have been the organic remainder of Team (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c) first, then the QRF, in that order?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. I can't speak for any of the subordinate task force commanders or even Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6). My personal opinion on the quick reaction forces that we had dedicated, they are primarily there for situations where we

absolutely have to have some kind of battle handover. For instance, we discover a large cache --

BG Colt: I'm on it.

JSOTF J3:-- we can't handle. The reality of -- and I don't want -- we put a force on the ground that is overwhelming for the particular enemy threat. And I'm not saying the guys are never going to get into trouble and won't need help. But they, you know, a Ranger platoon, a SEAL (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c with the right enablers, you know, it will be a rare, rare occasion where we would have to, in duress, infil a quick reaction force.

Now, that's -- again, that's my personal opinion. We enable everybody pretty well. And, you know, to have to bring in a battle space owner quick reaction force because of, you know, a dire situation; I think the likelihood is extremely low.

I have always approached the quick reaction forces to be there for, you know, large caches, you know, CIVCAS incidents, all of those types of things.

BG Colt: I understand. The thread I was on at that time is we described three functions against this one lift package right now, priorities for planning, and when things go dynamic, how adaptable are they in being able to do those things we have

asked them to do? So that was the question.

JSOTF CDR: As the commander, I agree completely with (b)(6), (b)(3). I mean, in-extremis - which is when we are most likely to employ the IRF or QRF --

BG Colt: Right.

JSOTF CDR: We would exhaust our own forces first that were planned into the operation because they understand the operation. They understand the way we operate. And if we have exhausted them and still needed assistance, I think that the QRF would then be the next best option, because they are most readily available at that point.

IO-DEP: How often, and I know you can't give me an exact, and I'm not asking, just a general idea, how often do employ the IRF on a target?

JSOTF J3: Rarely, sir.

IO-DEP: It's not normal?

JSOTF J3: It is rare to have a separate IRF element that is planned in like this one. You know, that is my experience. Now the ARF, the Air Reaction Force, it is more common to use that technique.

JSOTF CDR: Like I said, sir, I commanded Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c January to May. And pretty frequently, on infil we establish the ARF and kept a force on the helos, but they

didn't recycle. I mean, they loitered and --

BG Colt: I understand.

JSOTF CDR: -- then they moved to interdict. You know, that might be the difference here. Not very often that we would do it like this.

JSOTF J3: When we do squirter interdictions, the vast majority of them are done by the ground force in pursuit by foot.

This I do want to note before we leave the CONOP, the ground force CONOP that they briefed is much more extensive. There's a lot more -- you know, the concept of fires is in there. You know, usually a detailed slide on MEDEVACs, you know, it varies by supporting task force and strike force. But it's more detailed, generally speaking, but that's what we briefed here in the JOC.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: Okay. Sir, this is the special story board. I just want to check, has everyone seen this and read through it yet or not?

Affirmative response by all members.

that they assessed. I will talk through that later.

This is a location where the other squirters, movers stopped and went into a compound. This is the immediate reaction force HLZ, HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c they were infil-ing to when EXTORTION 17 was shot down. Here's where it generally -- you know, in space, it was struck by what we assessed to be an RPG. Here's the actual crash site. And this is the location that (b)(3), (b)(6) assessed point of origin of the RPGs and suppressed after the crash.

Any questions on the general geography?

TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c DEP J3: HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was that a preplanned HLZ?

JSOTF J3: I don't think it was preplanned.

JSOAD DIR: It was not preplanned, sir. When they got notification that the QR -- they were talking about infil-ing the QRF, that's when they started that LZ plan.

Now, having said that, sir, it was an LZ that had been planned for a previous mission in the area, had not been executed. It was one of the previous (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. So they already had products on file. They keep on file every mission they ever planned for. So they were able to look at that exact area, determine whether they had planned a mission there before. And they had all the product analysis available.

IO-DEP: So they had planned, they had identified the HLZ,

mensurated the imagery for [REDACTED], but not executed any infils to that HLZ. Is that a true statement?

JSOAD DIR: That's correct, sir.

BG Colt: At 2130 Zulu, the IRF was directed to infil by whom?

JSOTF J3: Sir, Task Force [REDACTED] Commander was the guy that controlled the immediate reaction force. We actually have -- discussing it before, there've been reports about the ground force commander, [REDACTED] asking for the immediate reaction force to handle, to interdict those orders. Actually, it was from Task Force [REDACTED]. They recommended to call over to the ground force commander and said, "Hey, we have got the immediate reaction force that we can employ against this thing, and that's where it came from."

They did -- Task Force [REDACTED] Commander called up to us and notified us that he was planning on employing the immediate reaction force.

JSOTF CDR: That was a personal conversation he and I had over the phone about the conditions that existed and why he wanted to employ them.

IO-DEP: Just for clarification, it was contained the --

JSOTF CDR: Yes, sir. It was directed at the squinters.

JSOTF J3: Originally, it was to interdict them when they

were still moving. But once they settled in, it was to go and, you know, capture or kill the squirter. We absolutely knew what was going on and concurred with the actions, sir.

BG Colt: Okay. Just because this is sort of open source stuff, okay, one of the roles we are going to have to do when we are done with our responsibilities here is to attempt to satisfy the curiosities that existed before.

Is there anything in the execution of the mission that happened on Objective LEFTY GROVE that could possibly lead somebody to believe that the (b) (1), (b) (7)(C) force was in trouble there?

JSOTF J3: Never.

BG Colt: Never?

JSOTF J3: Quite the contrary.

BG Colt: Okay. That's the impression I got too.

IO-DEP: And just one point of clarification. So the Task Force (b) (1), (b) (7)(C) assault force was staying with the original objective, and then the IRF's mission was to get the squirter at the bed down location?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. I will walk you through all of that.

JSOTF CDR: You know, sir, I would say nine times out of ten when you detain a squirter, you've got them, I would say, from the objective to within 700 or 800 meters at the objective.

You know, once they get well beyond that, obviously, for distances, you know like we are talking here, there are a lot of things you have to take into consideration: The amount of time that that would require; the amount of work that you've still got to do on the existing objective. In this particular case, I know (b)(6), (b)(3) is going to talk to this. You know, they had detainees. There was EKIA, all of that they were trying to address.

IO-DEP: Not trying to put words in your mouth, but the distances would also create an issue potentially for a period of darkness and getting out prior to light.

JSOTF J3: Sir, that's absolutely accurate. Obviously, whenever we do these raids, we do everything we can to get exfil'd prior to light based on the additional risk to aircraft of coming in there or, you know, having to keep a strike force over day until the next night.

But based on the distances, you are absolutely right. For the ground force to close that distance, execute, you know, another raid there that other compound, it would have put them well into the day.

BG Colt: Do we know what the focus of the AC or the MC was? I mean, I take it they are on a persistent stare now on this compound that the squirters moved to --

JSOTF J3: That's right, sir. (b)(3), (b)(6) did the -- well, AWT initially did some of the follows. And I do not know enough off the top of my head to talk through the exact pieces. I do know originally (b)(3), (b)(6), the AH64s, they picked up the original movement off of the tent series. They assess the hostile intent based on weapons on those individuals, which I will talk through here in a second, and engaged based on clearance from the JTAC on the ground. But as movement from other individuals that got away from that engagement, as that movement continued, (b)(3), (b)(6) picked up the tracking of those individuals. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the one -- that's the gunship -- the gunship was the one that followed them eventually into that compound. Then during the infil of the force, we had both Air Weapons Team and gunship covering the infil of the immediate reaction force, which you will see later.

JSOTF CDR: I was going to say, sir, the Task Force level, they built a detailed sensor plan that gives priorities to the assets that were providing coverage during the operation. And then once you are on the ground, I mean, they're under the control of the JTAC or the fire support officer as they relay to that point to move them as necessary --

BG Colt: Right.

JSOTF CDR: -- but at least a plan is built that de-

conflicts it all, and gives specific areas of coverage for each of them. And we don't brief that as part of our report, sir --

BG Colt: Okay. Right. What time was the original infil?

JSOTF J3: Sir, the time of the original infil, 1831 Zulu is when the assault force landed at HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

BG Colt: And was that an attached or detached escort because the 64s were with the 47s on initial infil.

JSOAD DIR: Sir, they have a pretty specific team. So the AWT team would go in and clear the infil LZ. They will link a Cherry ICE call --

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOAD DIR: -- they call it "Ice," and they provide over-watch during the infil, and they are prepared to sparkle the LZ from --

BG Colt: I'm good with that. So we are talking about the initial infil. Did they leave station to go get gas at any time between that and the IRF infil? Because at some point, I understood that after the EXTORTION element went down there were already 20 minutes of station time remaining. And I think that was fuel constrained, not anything else.

JSOAD DIR: Yes, sir. They had two hours and ten minutes on station when they initially go out. It takes them a 32-minute hard turn and then go back. So 1830, they would have

already done a FARP turn, been back on and already been eating their second tank.

JSOTF J3: Sir, this is one of the hidden slides.

BG Colt: At what point during the OP did the man squirt?

JSOTF J3: From what I understand, it was post infil. And I don't know whether it was at infil. But the time I'm tracking for when (b)(3), (b)(6) called the -- you know, identified the squirters/movers as hostile, it 1901 Zulu. I don't have a time for you on when they, no kidding, picked them departing. I don't know if that was infil or some time later.

BG Colt: I thought I got the impression that (b)(3), (b)(6) had the squirters. Did I miss that?

JSOTF J3: Sir, they could have. I have not done a detailed analysis on every asset.

JSOAD DIR: Sir, it's in the MIRC log. And that's available in the file --


BG Colt: Okay.

JSOAD DIR: -- I don't have it memorized either. But I know it's very specific in the MIRC log when they got it out.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: Sir, this is an -- you asked about -- you kind of asked us -- or the sensor plan -- this is just an SOP that this particular element uses based on the assets that you have

got available. So if you just have a manned ISR asset, fixed wing CAS assets, this is the -- you know; this is the plan. And if you have got, you know, a gunship, here's the plan here, but pretty well established techniques that those guys are using on that.



JSOTF J3: Sir, you know the -- I want to caveat the times in the special story board. These are based off of, you know, a reliable record of some type for each of these times. Whether it is the, you know, MIRC, whether it is, you know, internal logs from one of the assets, but these haven't been scrubbed extensively, against each other. And I have already, personally seen some discrepancies on, you know, the exact times. So this is our, you know, best initial assessment on

this thing. So don't take these as, you know, perfect times. But it does lay out the general sequence of events. So around 1830 Zulu is when the assault force infil'd down on HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c in the lower right-hand portion there, sir. Then during -- sometime during the movement -- and [inaudible] could have been right on infil. I mean, my gut is telling me it likely was. But some time during the movement there, squirters were -- the Air Weapons Team, (b)(3), (b)(6), picked up the eight squirters, identified weapons, and assessed hostile intent, called that back to their ground force. And the JTAC element cleared them hot to engage.

Now, I do want to highlight that not all eight personnel came from the ten series building. Right now, our assessment is four, you know, based on what we got from -- really, it's from the Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d log. Four of them did come from the ten series. It's the target location. So those were officially squirters.

They linked up -- we think they linked up with four other individuals. So those four, we classify them as movers. So anybody from the target compound we classify as "squirters". Anybody else just moving around from somewhere else is classified as a "mover".

So eight all together. Bottom line, eight were accessed

as hostile. And the initial engagement consisted of 60 30 millimeter rounds. And they assessed five EKIA off that first engagement.

Two individuals got out of that group, and one remained around there still --

BG Colt: Who actually clears those guys hot?

JSOTF J3: Well, the JTAC on the ground cleared them hot.

BG Colt: And he was maneuvering with the (b)(1) element?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir.

One individual remained there, and an AWT did a re-attack, another 60 rounds of 30 millimeter, and assessed one additional EKIA for a total of six at that site. But two additional personnel were still moving up to the northwest along there. Now, over time, they kept linking up with additional personnel. And according to, you know, the Task Force (b)(1) log, the group got as big as 13 personnel as it moved up. It has not reflected on the story board, but that is what I have seen from Task Force (b)(1) records on this.

IO-DEP: So there were 13 squirters at that location -- an estimation of 13 squirters?

JSOTF J3: Well, anywhere from -- at the most, there were two squirters and 11 movers --

IO-DEP: Well, 13 individuals. Let me put it that way.

JSOTF J2: -- and it could have been 13 movers. It just depends on, you know, the original four from the ten series, you know, if those were all killed, then everybody is a mover. If, you know, the two guys that got away were from the ten series, then you've got two squirts.

You know, we were in pursuit of those guys based on their associations, their actions, weapons on those guys. Clearly, we knew that, you know, the individuals were likely associated with the target. If not, they targeted the individual himself.

BG Colt: And just one more time for my edification. From the time it infil'd, it was -- what was it? Two hours later? Three hours later that they actually took the shots?

JSOTF J3: For -- who took shots, sir?


BG Colt: I'm talking (b)(3), (b)(6).

JSOTF J3: (b)(3), (b)(6) took -- 30 minutes after infil is when they --

BG Colt: Okay. I see that -- 1910. I'm Sorry.

JSOTF J3: They engaged -- after they engaged that squirter location, you know, the [inaudible] continued to move up, and I will talk that timeline here in a minute. So at this point, the assault force, they're continuing movement. They finally get at the targeted compound, and they begin to call out about 1950 Zulu. They clear through the ten series and

Building 69 as well. And they sent an element forward to conduct sensitive site exploitation of the squirter engagement location. While all of this is happening, assets -- and I believe it was primarily (b)(3), (b)(6), continued to track all of those movers continuing to the northwest. Like I said, it got as big as 13. And I think the final report was that eight moved into a compound, was the final report there.



JSOTF J3: Okay. And then approximately 2130 Zulu is when the IRF was directed to interdict the squirters and movers. What I don't have for you, sir, is exactly when the planning started, and when they started looking at it. I do not have that time. So the IRF goes wheels up from FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c at 2154 Zulu, sir. And I will show you the exact route they took here

in a later slide. But they go wheels up at 2154 Zulu. And then about 2209 Zulu, they are RP inbound.

At 2209, almost 2210 Zulu, all four AWT crew members identify a red flash coming from the point of origin as depicted on the slide here. And then they see a second flash they assess to be the right side of EXTORTION 17.

I do want to highlight that only one aircraft was infiling. Two were on the flight, but only one was executing the infil. They had all the IRF on that one aircraft.

BG Colt: Do we know where the hold point was?

JSOTF J3: The hold point for the other aircraft, I do not.

(b)(3), (b)(6), do you know?

JSOAD DIR: I don't know, sir.

IO-DEP: Do you have any insight on why they put all the IRF force on one aircraft?

JSOTF J3: Sir, I do not have insight into their particular justification. I know -- I can talk to why I think it is lowest risk technique to use.

IO-DEP: I would like to hear it.

JSOTF J3: I believe whenever -- you should minimize the number of aircraft you have to bring into a threat area. If we were to bring in two aircraft for the sake of spreading out

that (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) Ac in the event that we lost one of them, the threat to the lead aircraft, in my mind, is the same as a single aircraft. Yet, the threat to the second aircraft is significantly higher because of the advanced warning that you give the enemy when he's coming in.

You know, doctrinally speaking, when we talk about tactical cross loads, tactical cross loads are important when you have multiple aircraft that you are using. But that doesn't mean you should increase the number of aircraft that you're using to infil for the sake of, you know, minimizing the impact if you lose one.

But tactical cross load is important so you don't have all of Alpha Company on one C17, or you don't have all your leaders on one particular aircraft. But when we are infil-ing somewhere, we don't need to bring in more than one aircraft. I think it is a smart call to not bring in that extra aircraft just for the heck of it. It drastically increases the risk to that second aircraft in my estimation.

Now, I can't guarantee you that's what they were thinking, but my guess was it was.

(b)(3), (b)(6), do you have anything to add?

JSOAD DIR: Yes, sir. Sir, we've had conversations about this. This is a TTP within 10th CAB. I won't put words in

their mouth. I know you will interview them. But we've had extensive conversations with the planners about this. And this was actually go/no-go criteria for them that the size of the QRF needed to -- the original size of the IRF, in this case, was when they initially began the planning upon notification, this evening they were planning on infil-ing about 17 guys. So they started their planning. Then they talked about increasing the number.

And the aviation planners stated that was go/no-go criteria. It needed to fit on one aircraft because their TTP is when possible they would infil only one aircraft, bring it to the ground for those exact reasons, to minimize the exposure on the ground and to allow -- and because we've seen in other places in the 10th CAB footprint where there is -- what is perceived to be a greater reluctance to fire on the aircraft when there's another aircraft overhead. So you keep one a little later, and you have one on the ground. That seems to be a protective measure or risk mitigation measure.

IO-DEP: Okay. So that's helpful; but just to make sure I understand it. You launched the second aircraft into an aerial hold because, from your understanding, that seemed to have an effect on the enemy --

JSOAD DIR: Yes, sir. They always travel in two ships

too. I mean, you will never send out a single Chinook for an infil-ing. They will always travel in two ships. But put one on the ground instead of two, is protective for those same risk mitigation measures that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) talked about. You only expose one to the threat on the ground, and one that's, you know, outside the reach of small arms and presumably the other threat and because you have a protective measure by having [inaudible]. That's been the TTP we've seen across the board.

IO-DEP: And that's a consistent TTP --

JSOAD DIR: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: How long was the (b)(3), (b)(6) element in the target area -- the objective for infil before they showed up?

JSOTF J3: Well, you know, this -- that's a good -- if you mean "area" in terms of by Objective LEFTY GROVE, you know, it had been there since infil 1830 Zulu, sir.

So there clearly was a noise signature of aircraft at the -- these guys probably could hear all of the activity going on down there based on the AWTs. I can almost guarantee you based on the distances there, you know, especially when they were supporting that IRF infil there. My guess is that there was absolutely a noise signature there.

BG Colt: The real question is: At some point prior to

the IRF infil, I take it the commander on Objective LEFTY GROVE released them to go do this second infil. Their next task and purpose was to conduct LZ reconnaissance in order to facilitate the infil of the IRF.

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir.

BG Colt: And he told them to do that.

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. He had the original objective location secure --

BG Colt: All I'm trying to ascertain is when did he tell them to go away, and how long were they up there conducting reconnaissance and making that more specific check of a location?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. I don't have the answer. We will try to find out that.

Okay. Sir, moving on to item number seven there. 2210, we had two calls, one from AWT and one from (b)(3), (b)(6) that EXTORTION was down. Then about 2211 Zulu is when (b)(3), (b)(6) -- one of the (b)(3), (b)(6) elements engaged, suppressed what they assessed to be, you know, a location near the (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1) site. Then shortly after that, sir, obviously, ground force was immediately notified, and they stopped what they were doing. They released the detainees, and they started moving as quickly as they could. And we've got that route on a later slide that

they took.

The time we have reflected here is 0015 Zulu as to when they had the crash site secured. I think you will see some variations on that time, you know, just based on when they actually got there, and when they called it, it was, no kidding, secure.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: Immediately after the crash happened, you know, obviously, the battle space owner element, they offered up their Pathfinder element, which is a quick reaction force they have standing by primarily for aviation incidences like this. They said they're ready to go and they wanted to infil them.

Obviously, we were very hesitant to put in any additional aircraft. So we were weighing the time it was going to take (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c to get there because it was about a 3.9 kilometer movement. By the time it was going to take them to get there with -- you know, they needed to get that site secure and the additional risk, the rotary wing aircraft getting them there. Based on our assessment of the time it was taking (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, you know, the decision was made to infil the Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c element into an HLZ, you can see reflected there at item Number 10. But, really, what had ended up happening was our guys (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ended up getting their prior to the path finder element.

They secured the site, and the Pathfinder element linked up with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c on the ground about 0027 Zulu there.

Upon arrival of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d to the site, there was an immediate call that they confirmed six friendly KIA, no survivors found. They had to back off the wreckage based on the fire and munitions cooking off. There were actually, I think, it was two individuals wounded by munitions going off there whenever they initially arrived.

So they pulled off there, no signs of survivors. I do want to highlight here, and I will show you in the next slide, there was a single, coherent crash site. It was all together. There were a number of individuals outside the wreckage, and those were the individuals, the six friendly KIA. Later on, I heard a number that there were actually eight outside -- identified as outside the wreckage that were not really burned and they were recognizable.

no detonations. So the ground force commander -- let me back up. The ground force commander made a call at 0328 Zulu that he assessed no survivors from the crash. So the battle space owner arrived at 0721 Zulu; they linked up with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, and they recovered -- the ground force commander, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, he called back and said they had identified, and removed 38 remains, is what he called back.

So they were able to pull them out. And, you know, later on after he came out, we, kind of, got the back brief of how they were able to do that. But there was -- I will let you talk to him about that piece. But he was essentially able to identify 38 remains there.

IO-DEP: Was there a manifest for that aircraft back at the --

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. And I'm sure you know by now the manifest was accurate with the exception of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b personnel that were on. So the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c personnel, they were the incorrect -- all seven names were incorrect. And I cannot talk to the back story of why, but --

JSOTF CDR: But the bottom line is: We knew the total number that were on the aircraft. We knew the total number that we were trying to account for on the ground.

IO-DEP: Correct.

JSOTF J3: So the -- it was determined the best way to, you know, remove the remains was by ground. We avoided -- we wanted to avoid bringing anymore rotary aircraft in there at all. The only aircraft we brought in, obviously, was supporting ISR - fires assets, and then aerial resupplies that we executed through the duration of this operation, pretty extensive aerial resupplies actually.

But the ground force exfil'd all the remains at that time, and they did a deliberate clearance all the way out as well. They took quite a bit of time to get them back. They drove the remains back to COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. And then we used one of our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c packages, and we lifted the remains back to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c loaded them on the fixed wing and got them back here at BAF.

So on this slide here, you will see a depiction of multiple sites there. So what happened some time during the day on 6 August, there was extensive rain, not at this location, but at another location. There was a flash flood that rolled through here. And it washed away the wreckage to all these different sites to include the turbines. It washed things all over. That was post -- that was after we got the remains though, thankfully. So it made the recovery quite a bit more complicated, obviously, based on that flash flood that came through and removed everything.

Guidance from General Votel at this time was that we were going to completely sanitize the site. Obviously, that was in conjunction with the battle space owner. That night, we made a decision to relieve (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c for obvious reasons. And we put the Ranger platoon from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c we infil'd them offset -- well offset up into the high ground. They walked in, executed a relief in place with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. And (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c walked out to an actual HLZ and we pulled those guys off.

IO-DEP: No enemy contact for that whole --

JSOTF J3: No contact, sir.


So that new platoon that came in was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and they began the recovery operations. We enabled (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c with a CSAR element with some of their special equipment, SAWs, etcetera. We also brought in an EOD tech. It was the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c EOD tech from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, went in with them as well to help reduce some of this wreckage into sizes that could be man-handled out of there on the flatbed trucks and driven off. But it was a pretty extensive problem that those guys had to work through.

Bottom line, that was executed, you know, throughout the next seven days in conjunction with the battle space owner. The battle space owner made multiple movements back and forth to pull this wreckage off. And there's one other thing I want to note. It's not on the special story board. Regional

Command East pushed out a mortuary affairs team to go in there as well to help identify additional remains, personal effects, et cetera.

After the original movement out of the 38, there was a report that additional remains, not coherent, of course, but additional remains were identified, and those were further evacuated.

And then finally on 9 August, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, he is the Brigade Commander -- Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d Brigade Commander, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), personally flew out to the site. He assessed that the site 100 percent cleaned that afternoon. And then we -- the battle space owner and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d we exfil'd battle space owner by ground. We exfil'd (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d and the Pathfinder element -- that original element that went in that night, we exfil'd them with one of our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d packages. And that was it, sir.



JSOTF J3: We have some additional supporting slides here.

This slide depicts both air routes. So the blue route to the south there, is the original infil route the assault force took into HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c.

IO-DEP: Are these BFT plots, or are these planned routes?

JSOTF J3: I don't know where --


JSOAD DIR: This is a planned route, sir.

JSOTF J3: These were the planned routes, sir.

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF J3: And then, as you can see, they stopped at COP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, picked up the one over the battle space owner and then they infil'd. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c route depicts the IRF infil route. Obviously, they took a separate route up to the north,

and came in from the northwest.



JSOAD DIR: Sir, the IRF infil route is the BFT breadcrumb. That's how we built this slide in this route.

JSTOF J3: But the infil route --

JSOAD DIR: But the original infil route was the planned route.

IO-DEP: After they departed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, did they go direct back to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c or you don't know?

JSOAD DIR: I don't know, sir.



JSOTF J3: This depicts the route of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that they took when they moved in haste there from objective LEFTY GROVE up to the crash site. And that completes the special story board, sir. I will open up for any questions.

BG Colt: They didn't perform any additional clearing actions or anything when they passed the squirter site north-bound, correct?

JSOTF CDR: Sir, I was just going to say, they were on the objective. They had moved to a subsequent building. The force was split; this is 1B. Is that what you are talking about, sir?

BG Colt: Right.

JSOTF CDR: So at that point, they were working through

both of those, and also trying clear the EKIAs. But when they got word that EXTORTION 17 had gone down, they also had six detainees. At that point though, they left them all behind, and moved immediately to get to the crash.

JSOTF J3: They bypassed. In fact, they used the fastest movement technique that they could --

BG Colt: Understood.

JSOTF CDR: Two locations right there in close proximity to the original target.

BG Colt: Okay.

IO-DEP: From your perspective, there was some open source reporting that this was an established ambush to down that aircraft. I will ask the same thing of the (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4c) folks. But do you assess that to be credible? Is there any evidence that you see that indicates that that was the case?

JSOTF J3: No, sir. My assessment is that this was a lucky shot of a low level fighter that happened to be living there. He heard all the activity and he happened to be in the right spot.

Somebody mentioned the reports earlier, the assault forces were in trouble, you know, the bad guys were on the run. And we were simply trying to take advantage of the opportunity they presented when they settled down into that compound.

JSOTF-J2: Beforehand, and then even afterwards, we saw no indication that it was a planned ambush.

BG Colt: Okay. How about the sequel of which, within, like, 48 hours, we announced publicly that we got the shooter with an F-16? Can you talk about that a little bit, please?

JSOTF J3: Yes, sir. As far as the -- I'll hit the IO piece first. It was a decision by General Votel to not have any press release while we had guys on the ground, just to minimize the risk to those guys. And then we got to the point where, you know, we were exil-ing folks, and then we did more active IOs. As far as zeroing in on the actual shooter, (b)(3), (b)(6) you want to talk to the intel piece that developed, and I will talk to the connect strike.

JSOTF-J2: Yes, sir. So aircraft went down, what we immediately do -- kind of our immediate action drill is surge (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c with a force protection box for both the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and then as well as to look at any task (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c selectors that are in that area.

The next morning what they picked up was an individual claiming that his fighter was responsible for shooting down that aircraft. He continued on to say that he was exfil-ing that fighter from the area, move him to another location for his protection with the ultimate intent to bring him to

Pakistan as a symbol for the Taliban.

We were able to track his movement out of the Tangi Valley up over into Wardak further over. And that's what ultimately led to his destruction there. But it was essentially (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c that was able to track it. And then on the final day, we also have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c corroborating what we had heard on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c side of the house. So, really, it was a surged effort from the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c folks immediately after the crash, looking at all the available selectors, they were able to pick up the right one. And then we were able to follow that individual and execute the strike.

JSOTF J3: Sir, the day of the strike, you know, we had the fix on the actual vehicle, followed him around throughout the day into the evening. We got approval to execute a kinetic strike based on positive identification of that individual. And that authority rests with General Votel. He approved this strike.

We followed him around. We tried to take multiple -- we wanted to strike the vehicle while they were in that, but we could not get him, really, into a low CDE environment. He finally stopped at a compound. The individuals got out, moved out into an orchard area, settled into, kind of, a tree line, vegetated area, and we executed kinetic strikes with both

F-16s. I think we dropped eight 500-pounders, and then we also had Air Weapons Team -- four or eight 500-pounders and then 30 millimeter from the Air Weapons Team as well. And then we got positive reflections after that we had killed the shooter and then the guy close to him.

JSOTF-J2: There were other claims of responsibility, sir. But based off, you know, all sorts of analysis that we looked at. We are absolutely confident that we killed the actual shooter based off everything we've seen. The other claims that we saw, they were later, meaning, they weren't the immediate claim. And then there was no corroborating information other than, you know, kind of, one guy coming saying, "Hey, no, it was my guys that were responsible." So I have got a roll-up that I can provide that we sent to General Allen --

IO-DEP: No SSE on the ground though after the kinetic strike?

JSOTF J3: No, sir. We had a force ready to go in there, and the weather prevented us from getting in there. This was an area, you know, as a back-up. We tried to get ANSF in there. This is an area that they really don't go into either. So we did have the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c source take photos of both the commander that was responsible and the shooter. So the source went in there, had great access, was able to take photos at the

funeral. And then to follow up, a couple days -- I think it was two days, we actually saw the Taliban discussing martyr payments to the family of the shooter as well as the commander. So additional confirmation several days after the fact.

JSOTF J3: In my experience, sir, the intel leading up to the strike and then post-strike verifying is as compelling as it gets, sir.

BG Colt: Were there any elements attached to either Ranger element that wound up doing -- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c probably -- who did the actual talk to the village elders about actual observations of the aircraft downing? Who did that? Or was that the battle space owner?

JSOTF J3: Sir, I can't talk to the specific engagements that were going on with the locals. I think they were minimal interaction with the locals. I think that would be better answered by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and the battle space owner.

JSOTF CDR: We try to keep our elements focused on security at the site itself, and ask the battle space owner what to do, any of the engagement that was --

BG Colt: Okay.

JSOTF CDR: -- going to be done within the NSF.

You know coincidentally, sir, when you looked at the imagery the GAF that came in there, the coalition trucks, could

not get down to the crash site itself. They could get the ANA vehicles to pick-up trucks down there, but the roads themselves were too narrow. So, you know, ANA ended up being a big assistance helping us transport, you know, the equipment, and the pieces of the aircraft that were being recovered back up to the trucks. In my assessment, they were pretty instrumental to many of the engagements that were going on.

IO-DEP: There was an open source reporting on this police chief that had provided us information on the two shooters underneath the tree. And seemed to be corroborated by, you know, reports from the AWT.

Do you know if anybody from the Afghan forces spoke to the same individual, that's [redacted (b)(6), (b)(7)c], I think his name was, or are you aware of the reporting?

JSOTF-J2: Sir, only [inaudible]. I have not seen the reporting, nor did it factor into any of the intel that led to the strike. So all of that, and I have only heard it, like I said, hearsay, I have not seen it -- any of it personally. None of it attributed to our identification of the shooter and the method --

IO-DEP: No. I'm saying there was open source reporting in the Early Bird that somebody -- and it's in that -- I can't recall who it was, interviewed the [redacted (b)(6), (b)(7)c] that talked in

detail about two shooters that moved underneath a tree and fired at the aircraft --

JSOTF-J2: I have not seen it.

IO-DEP: So there's no corroboration from either of you at the end of the day.

JSOTF-J2: The corroboration on the description came through (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c of the commander and the shooter describing the incident to an associate in Pakistan via (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. And that matched the crew descriptions from the AWT and the AC 130 that I had [inaudible]. So that was kind of corroboration of how the incident took place. I, at no point, factored in anything from the (b)(6), (b)(7)c saying any of --

IO-DEP: Okay. Some of the preceding operations in there leading up to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c on 6 June. When was Dunlap?

JSOTF-J2: Dunlap was killed on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c --

IO-DEP: Okay. So the same night?

JSOTF-J2: Yes, sir. And we can go back and pull all the previous objectives within the valley.

IO-DEP: So Dunlap was just the name associated with that individual for the target death?

JSOTF-J2: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c was a person. Dunlap was a person. The objective names are tied to a personality. So we

executed [REDACTED] for that individual, and ended up killing objective Dunlap on that.

TEP [REDACTED] **DEP J3:** Do you know the 20 July MH47 report for small arms on this one here, what op was that associated with?

JSOTF J3: I must have left it out. I actually had our guys print out that SIGACT, sir. It was a [REDACTED]. It was a [inaudible], so I'm pretty sure it was a CJSOTF mission.

SME-GFA: The shooter that you ended up killing, any indication he was part of the LEFTY GROVE network or his commander, they tied in at all?

JSOTF-J2: Yeah. I mean, we would say that they were associated based off being in that Tangi Valley. I've got to go back and look through some -- specifically through the [REDACTED] on how exactly they were tied. We didn't see LEFTY GROVE pop up until the 9th, I believe. After the shoot down. So he was quiet for a bit, and then he popped back up. He was referencing the shooting, and he was aware of who had done the shooting. But we have to do some detailed [REDACTED] analysis to see exactly how associated he was. But with him being the overall commander for the valley --

SME-GFA: Making the assumption he is. Another thing is, is there any TQ or any other intel on the target [inaudible] was one of the movers or anything like that?

JSOTF J3: Sir, not that we got reports of from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b
I don't know where they -- obviously, they were not able to go
through their full process on target. I'm not saying there
wasn't, sir, but nothing that came back to us.

SME-GFA: Just so I understand --

CR1: I'm sorry, sir. Could you speak up, please?

SME-GFA: -- I mean, where are they actually based out of?
Are they a co-located DS force?

JSOTF J3: They are at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c EXTORTION is based at
FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JSOTF-J2: And was there any (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c chatter [inaudible].
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

JSOTF J3: I mean, we can go back and pull the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
There was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c chatter, but nothing specific for -- before the
shoot down of the [inaudible]. Afterwards, I think there was
specific reflections of helicopter went down.

SME-GFA: Pretty standard?

JSOTF-J2: Yeah. Nothing out of the ordinary, sir.

BG Colt: Anybody else?

Negative response by all members.

BG Colt: I appreciate this very much. And please don't
take it like we are trying to get after hostile witness or
something like that; that's not the case.

A lot of what we are asking about are things that have

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been in open source reporting. And to these different eclectic stake holders that are going to require some kind of out brief, we are duty bound to try to give them the most full accounting we possibly can to include trying to dispel whatever belief system they have of -- that they've heard that is not true, right, and that's why we have to try to find out what you know.

Anybody else?

Negative response by all members.

BG Colt: Okay. Thank you.

The investigation recessed at 2254, 15 August 2011.

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