

1 [Investigation Open 1505, 15 October 2009]

2
3 **LtGen Natonski:** Captain [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] I've got to read you a
4 little script before we begin. I'm Lieutenant General
5 Richard F. Natonski, USMC. I have been appointed by
6 the Commander, U.S. Central Command to conduct an
7 investigation into the facts and circumstances
8 surrounding the combats action at Wanat, Afghanistan
9 during July 2008. MG David Perkins, USA, has been
10 assigned deputy investigating officer. Lieutenant
11 Colonel [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] and Lieutenant Colonel [Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6)]
12 [Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6)] are Judge Advocates assigned to the investigation
13 team.

14
15 The testimony will be recorded, transcribed, and
16 included in our report of the investigation. Based on
17 your testimony we may also prepare a written statement
18 for your review and signature.

19
20 Prior to coming on record today you signed a Privacy
21 Act statement, is that correct?

22
23 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] That is correct, Sir.

24
25 **LtGen Natonski:** Your testimony will be made under oath and
26 you will now be sworn.

27
28 [Witness is sworn in]

29
30 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Would you please state your full name, spelling
31 your last?

32
33 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)]. Last name is spelled [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)].

34
35 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] What is your current unit and that unit location?

36
37 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Currently I am assigned to HHC 173th. Location
38 is Vicenza, Italy.

39
40 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] You are currently a Captain in the U.S. Army?

41
42 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir.

43
44 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] In July 2008, what was your unit and that unit's
45 location?
46

1 **CPT** [Redacted] I was assigned to HHC 173th. We were in
2 Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
3
4 **LtCol** [Redacted] And in July 2008, what was your rank and duty
5 assignment?
6
7 **CPT** [Redacted] I was a Captain, U.S. Army. Duty assignment was
8 Brigade S2 Operations Officer.
9
10 **LtCol** [Redacted] And the occ-field, intelligence?
11
12 **CPT** [Redacted] Say again, Sir.
13
14 **LtGen Natonski:** Your occupation field, intelligence?
15
16 **CPT** [Redacted] Yes, Sir.
17
18 **LtGen Natonski:** In July of 2008, how long had you been with
19 the Brigade?
20
21 **CPT** [Redacted] I had been with the Brigade for just over a year,
22 Sir.
23
24 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you go through the work ups with the
25 Brigade?
26
27 **CPT** [Redacted] No, Sir. I did not. I arrived about 1--2 months
28 prior to deployment. So I had the individual
29 replacement training and then joined with the unit
30 deploying on main body.
31
32 **LtCol** [Redacted] In the Brigade S2 shop, what were you duties?
33
34 **CPT** [Redacted] Duties as the Brigade shop Operations Officer
35 were handling daily ISR tasking and re-tasking. As
36 well as the intelligence report that was sent out
37 daily and facilitated communication between division
38 and our Battalions.
39
40 **LtCol** [Redacted] When the daily IN, was it INSUM?
41
42 **CPT** [Redacted] The daily INSUM was produced by our Brigade
43 intelligence section. Then we would distro it. The
44 Brigade S2 operations actually produced a separate
45 intelligence report, which is a roll up of all the
46 kinetic and non-kinetic activities that had been
47 happening throughout the day, then we would produce

1 that daily and also distro that from the operations
2 floor.
3
4 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] When you say "non-kinetic," what type of items?
5
6 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Non-kinetic, that would be key leader
7 engagements, Shura meetings, any type of information
8 that had been coming out of the actual day to day
9 activities from units going on patrol and actually
10 doing operations in Afghanistan.
11
12 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] That would be throughout troop, the Brigades.
13
14 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Throughout the entire AOR.
15
16 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you, as a matter of course, read the
17 INSUM that was prepared by the S2 section?
18
19 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir.
20
21 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] On a daily basis?
22
23 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir.
24
25 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] You say you managed ISR assets?
26
27 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir. The way that we were operating in
28 Afghanistan, our collection manager would do the
29 initial request and always build up into the ISR plan.
30 Once ISR assets where either within 24 hours or in the
31 operations window, it would then fall under the task
32 of the operations section and my soldiers in my
33 section to "re-task the assets that we had or request
34 assets from the division."
35
36 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] So if division, say today, gave you a Predator;
37 gave the Brigade a Predator. You had the ability to
38 say where it would go within your AOR?
39
40 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)]: Yes, Sir. That was typically a decision made----
41 [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] We would look at the current situation on the ground,
42 assess what was going on, talking with the Battalions.
43 If it was assigned to one Battalion and we where
44 looking at possibly shipping to another we would talk
45 to both those elements. Then it would be a decision
46 between myself, the Battle Captain, and the CHOPS;

1 with the CHOPS being the overall person signing the
2 order that we do to chop that asset.

3
4 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] You were in the OPS sections, you're fighting
5 the, really, the current fight.

6
7 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir.

8
9 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Were you aware of what ISR assets you might be
10 getting 48 hours ahead?

11
12 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir.

13
14 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] And how's that?

15
[Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)]

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c

[Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)]

[Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)]

31
32 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] What assets, ISR assets, did the Brigade have
33 organically that you controlled?

34
35 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Organically, we had, for full motion video, we
36 had the Shadow. Was the only, aside for the hand held
37 Ravens that the unit had. At Brigade level the only
38 organic asset was the Shadow. There were the HUMINT
39 collection teams, but they where tasked down to the
40 Battalions so that we could actually use those teams
41 and have them operative within the AAO.

42
43 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] And those were Brigade assets, the HUMINT teams?

44
45 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir. They were Brigade assets, however they
46 were pushed all the way down to the lowest, to the
47 Battalions, so there Battalions so that their

1 Battalion S2 could actually have a lot of influence on
2 how they were being used. How they were going on
3 daily operations.

4
5 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) Did the shadow have any limitations due to
6 terrain?

7
8 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, Sir. The Shadow is extremely limited in
9 where it could reach in our AO. It could only reach,
10 it could reach all of Jalalabad and some portions of
11 Konar as well as it could reach through Lagman. But
12 as for the northern sections of Konar, it could not
13 reach out far enough to where we need the asset to go.
14 Specifically, in reference to Wanat, the Shadow did
15 not have the range to actually reach from Jalalabad to
16 Wanat based on line of sight where the ground control
17 stations were located in the mountains that were
18 there. Even if we have forward control stations at
19 Blessing operating Shadow, it still didn't have the
20 line of sight to be able to reach over the mountains.

21
22 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) And you mentioned the Battalion level asset or
23 the unit level asset not used?
24

Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)

Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)

1 had ground control station located at Jalalabad that
2 was directly broadcasting into TOC and then
3 broadcasting from the station into DVBRCS which then
4 rebroadcasted the signal from us to Bagram so that
5 they could actually broadcast it back out to our
6 Battalions on the GBS systems.

7
8 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) So your Battalions could watch the same time you
9 watching it?

10
11 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, Sir. As long as the systems were
12 operational they could watch it the same exact time we
13 were watching it. But there were occasions where it
14 would go down however that would be a phone call from
15 the Battalion, quick trouble shoot, and we get system
16 back operational.

17
18 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) At the Brigade level did you have any of your
19 analysts watching that feed constantly or is that an
20 assigned responsibility?

21
22 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, Sir. In the operations floor the S2 ops
23 guys constantly had the feed up. Anytime there was an
24 aircraft flying, if it was the Shadow, as I said we
25 had direct feed into the TOC and they would be linked
26 in with the video stream right there that one of the
27 Shadow operators were watching and two of our analysts
28 at the TOC could look at it as well as anyone that was
29 on the floor. In the predators launch station, we
30 would then take over one of the battle tracking
31 screens and broadcast it there and the analyst that I
32 had working at the desk would be watching the feed as
33 well as monitoring the chat windows that the Predator
34 was talking so he could relay any of that information
35 to the Battle Captain, and the CHOPS and the people on
36 the operations floor.

37
38 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) Now the MERC Chat, you're talking about, is that
39 communication with the op, like the Predator operator?

40
41 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Right, Sir. The MERC Chat is the instant
42 messaging windows that we were using downrange that
43 could actually talk, not only to Predator operator,
44 but you could talk with the Battalion. So what we
45 would typically do, since the battalions had feed with
46 the Predator, with most of the assets that were up in
47 the air, they would be talking directly to my analyst

1 who would be sitting there monitoring. That way in
2 case there was anything that popped up, as for the AO
3 we already knew what was going on with the assets we
4 were working with. Additionally, if something
5 happened with the Battalion where they lost
6 communications, our analyst could step in and keep
7 information flowing with the assets so we didn't lose
8 it just based off the line of communication.
9

10 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] So essentially that asset would be in direct
11 support of the Battalion? Battalion could control it?
12

13 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir. Our Brigade S2 Colonel was very
14 adamant that we pushed access to the Battalions, that
15 way the Battalion had control over it. As for Brigade
16 level we were the facilitators trying to give them the
17 assets they need so they can conduct their operations.
18

19 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] In early July, were you prepping for a RIP/TOA?
20

21 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir, we were.
22

23 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] When did your relief get in? Do you recall?
24

25 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] I do not really exactly, Sir.
26

27 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Did you a left-seat/right-seat with your
28 replacement before departing?
29

30 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir. Before we left a female Lieutenant, I
31 do not recall her name, had actually been assigned as
32 the S2 operations officer, replacing us. We had been
33 doing left-seat right-seat all the way up through my
34 actual departure.
35

36 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] When did you depart?
37

38 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] I do not recall the exact date, Sir.
39

40 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Was it the beginning of July? Middle? End?
41

42 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] It would have been around the end of July, Sir.
43

44 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Was it after Operation Rock Move? Are you
45 familiar with----
46

47 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] I do not recall that name, Sir.

1
2 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] When a unit at one of the task force, one of the
3 Battalions was preparing to do an operation, how would
4 you be made aware of that?
5
6 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Whenever one unit was preparing for an operation,
7 we would get the operation order through the S-3
8 channels, through the S2 channels. Additionally when
9 they would be briefing Bayonet 6, we would be
10 listening and monitoring it in there.
11
12 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] For confirmation briefing?
13
14 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir.
15
16 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] An op order, did you routinely see an op order?
17
18 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir. Typically, anytime a unit would
19 produce an op order it would be pushed through S-3
20 channels and then it would be distributed across the
21 email to primary staff and almost everybody in the
22 TOC. We could actually sit there and pull it up now
23 off the email that additionally tried to post them on
24 to the share drives so we could actually pull down and
25 look through the plan for everything, so we could look
26 at the base of the operation and how ISR was to play
27 into that.
28
29 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Who in your shop would actually do that portion
30 of planning? Would that be you or somebody else?
31
32 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] The planning actually-- The plan CO-Operations
33 was actually done by the Battalions. We would simply
34 be reviewing and then working with the Brigade S2 to
35 either troubleshoot different issues that were coming
36 up or try to get the assets that the unit was
37 requesting. Typically units would put in a lot of
38 request for multiple assets and me and my two SIGOs
39 for full motion video and what we would have to do.
40 Collections would then go work to get those assets and
41 then as the operations were progressing, the
42 division's requirements were progressing, our
43 operations guys had to make sure the assets that were
44 requested and approved were going to be on station at
45 the right time according to the op order the Battalion
46 had produced. As well as if there was a gap in some
47 kind of coverage route then try to get it in as best

1 we could with anything that we could use to fill that
2 gap.

3
4 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] And you said the Battalion requesting ISR was
5 that simply in the op order itself or was there a
6 separate request document?
7

8 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Typically from what I remember them doing, is
9 they would do request for platform, as well as taking
10 that request for flight then putting it in the op
11 order. So that they had, almost like they were double
12 tapping. You had the request form in with collection
13 management that they could push that up through the
14 channel, but they would also have the slide that
15 showed everybody, these are the assets requesting,
16 this is the time it's supposed to be on station, this
17 is location where we want it to be and so it is
18 essentially two different documents that their
19 producing.
20

21 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] And then did you have to, from a Brigade level,
22 essentially advocate with division to get those
23 assets?
24

25 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Once they were either approved or denied through
26 collections and it came to operations, if for some
27 reason, an asset was being pulled to another Brigade
28 or was down for some reason, it was our job to
29 actually work with division. And either plead our
30 case that we either needed this asset or to try to
31 figure out what the second order of effects were and
32 what going on outside our AO that was reason that we
33 couldn't. And then explain division and second third
34 order of effects of what's going to happen in AO if we
35 don't have the asset.
36

37 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] How often did division pull an asset from you
38 after they had given it to you?
39

40 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Honestly, Sir, I couldn't give you an exact
41 number. A lot of time we had issues with, for
42 instance, the biggest one that people had issue was
43 the Predator would constantly get pulled. And it,
44 when I say constantly, I'm just using as anytime it
45 got pulled many of times but I know it wasn't. It
46 could be pulled for any number of reasons to include,
47 the higher mission that they only had a limited number

1 of assets in country and our operation was basically
2 trumped by another unit's operations, so it be
3 attached there or we have storm between our area of
4 operation was and where ever the Predator had to go
5 back to land. They would have to pull it back so that
6 they could get it in front of a storm. That happened
7 in separate AO.

8
9 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Do you recall in July of 2008 having division
10 pull assets from you, toward the end of your tour?
11 You said it seemed like it happened often. Was it a
12 weekly occurrence or something that----

13
14 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Typically, more often because of the weather.
15 Towards the end of deployment it seemed that a lot of
16 times our operation, especially since our operations
17 where more along the line of what people deem is.
18 What we deem at time as steady state operations and
19 operations outside of our AO were being sent up as
20 Level 1 type operations. So we were losing assets to
21 areas that we couldn't cover with our shadow and
22 internal assets to those Level 1 operations. I don't
23 know any details of those operations, but we put in a
24 request for Predator coverage in our area and based on
25 the fact that we could not reach with our own assets.
26 I mean we would be losing. When we would go for the
27 division approval we have one more operation we were
28 still zero operation.

29
30 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] What's a level 1?

31
32 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Level 1 operation is basically is where, I have
33 to look up the exact guidelines but they had Level 0,
34 Level 1 and Level 2. Level 1 typically you need the
35 assets that are now arranged to you from outside you
36 AO in order to conduct the operation. So given that a
37 lot of our operations as we were going into RIP TOA
38 were being steady state it wasn't a requirement that
39 we had to have assets. There was no actual time that
40 you had to have eyes on the objective and we were
41 losing out to other operations that were classified as
42 Level 1.

43
44 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] So if you, for example, had a Battalion FOB, such
45 as Blessing, and they were just doing a RIP TOA and
46 they were not doing any operation and you had a
47 request in, that would be a Level 0?

1
2 **CPT** [Redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, Sir. That is what they would classify it
3 as, Sir.

4
5 **LtCol** [Redacted] Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) But if they were executing an operation that had
6 movement that would be a Level 1?

7
8 **CPT** [Redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) You actually have to look at the TOC board, they
9 actually had one slide that had below zero, Level 1,
10 Level 2 and what the exact definitions are and they
11 would highlight the reasons that they are classified
12 as that type of operation. So, if you have say, for
13 instance, an air insertion, you have an infill and
14 exfil time. Typically you have to be within a Level 1
15 operation because you need assets such as full motion
16 video to provide live SIGINT which we did not have at
17 the Brigade to actually monitor that infill and exfil.
18 And being that a lot of these operations were now
19 going towards RIP TOA, one was small unit patrols
20 doing day-to-day operations. They weren't doing major
21 movements or anything like that pretty much unless we
22 wanted to play games and combine everything and we
23 don't always move with pieces it was just a level 0 in
24 steady-state operations.

25
26 **LtCol** [Redacted] Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) You mentioned SIGINT, you had a SIGINT platform?

27
28 **CPT** [Redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, Sir. There were most types of SIGINT
29 platforms out there. The one in particular that the
30 unit requested, for most operations was actually a
31 platform called Red Ridge, just based on its
32 capabilities it was a much better asset especially
33 with the terrain there it gave, it could give you
34 better information than other assets that were
35 available.

36
37 **LtCol** [Redacted] Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) And how did that, the SIGINT platform, how did
38 that information get in to the Brigade?

39
40 **CPT** [Redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) The way that it was working, once again comes up
41 that the MERC Chat rooms. Most of the assets would be
42 monitoring not only a Bayonet Intel window that they
43 put the information into, ones such as the Red Ridge
44 would actually put it in the Intel window as well as a
45 direct chat with the Battalion S2 shop down there. So
46 they could be that information directly to the guy on
47 the ground. Occasionally they even then, if coms were

1 down, there were ways that, as a fall back the pilots
2 could actually relay information back, not necessarily
3 all information but at least the locational
4 information through the JTAC on the grounds as they
5 had communications between the aircraft and the JTAC
6 on the ground.

7
8 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) You've talked about how you pushed information
9 down. I'm curious how information came up the chain,
10 like the point of HUMINT teams out with a platoon have
11 an interview from a source that has some information.
12 How would you as Brigade ops know about that?

13
14 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) If any information had come up, our person, you
15 said HUMINT, if it was coming from human channels, the
16 S2 actually notifies, so we can actually take the
17 initial report and actually push those over to guys
18 that the division operations any collections assets
19 that were on the ground were constantly reporting back
20 so if we had intercept team. They were constantly
21 radioing back through the Battalion who would then
22 pass that information to us as well as our JICE
23 section, compile that information. And then if we had
24 something of importance that we were sending over
25 email or over and IM chat someone we always followed
26 up with a telephone call to our counterpart at
27 division, say they have a hot piece of information
28 come up so they can actually pull up on their computer
29 as well and look at it.

30
31 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) So if a platoon was out on an emplacement and
32 noticed many indications and warnings, saw more
33 military age males come in the area, how would that
34 get to you, just from the Battalion via a chat or
35 INSUM?

36
37 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Typically if there is something with a lot of
38 indications and warnings come, the Battalion would
39 actually call us and say hey, here is what's going on
40 the ground, we have indications of this, there's more
41 military age males gathering or that there is some
42 absence of everybody in this village or with a patrol
43 here we are looking to get some eyes on this location
44 or get some ears up in the air and they would
45 instantly notify with a call. And we just ask them
46 to, aside from the phone call, send us any information
47 they have so that they have something like a HUMINT

1 report or something that they could pass that to us,
2 and ask them to send that up to us. We immediately
3 call and notify our counterpart in division, say this
4 is what we need to see on the ground, this is what
5 they are requesting, this is the reasons why. And
6 then as we get more information from you, we
7 continually send that up higher.
8

9 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) All this message flow, or information flow, was
10 that captured anywhere by the Brigade and did you
11 preserve the chats or emails?
12

13 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) I know on some of the computers you can set an
14 automatic logging system which would record all your
15 chats on any specific day. The computer I used in
16 particular I had it set up on there. Unfortunately
17 that was a stay behind piece of equipment so all the
18 information stays on its hard drive unless someone
19 deletes it. As per emails and phone calls, no we did
20 have to record that that I know of.
21

22 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) You had the Brigade S2 ops computer that's there
23 with your replacement Brigade?
24

25 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) We actually had for operations for three separate
26 computers as well as a ASAS for the S2 section on that
27 floor. Each of those computers used the MERC with the
28 logging back up. However I do not know where I can
29 find the logs on those computers. I don't know, of
30 the ones that came back, what computers they are even
31 on. I know the one computer I used in particular was
32 a stay behind piece of equipment that I inherited from
33 3/10 and I passed on to my replacement.
34

35 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) You mentioned the op orders that you would see
36 coming up from the Battalion that you reviewed. Then
37 you mentioned there were slides in them. Were they
38 CONOP or did they clearly say OPORD?
39

40 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) They were CONOPs, Sir.
41

42 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) Similar to this CONOP for Operation Rock Move?
43

44 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, Sir. As previously I mentioned before, I
45 was talking about the Level 0, Level 1, Level 2
46 operations since we are always here. They are
47 basically saying Rock Move, required resources from

1 outside the organization but within CJTF-101, so I did
2 have that higher lane there so that they could
3 actually say, that's the reason this is a Level 1
4 operation and why they're requesting it to be a Level
5 1 as well as some assets that they were looking at.

6
7 **LtCol** [Redacted] Now have you seen that CONOP? Does that look
8 familiar to you?

9
10 **CPT** [Redacted] I have to honestly look pretty good at this, Sir
11 because the first couple of slides----

12
13 **LtCol** [Redacted] If you would take a moment to look through them.

14
15 **CPT** [Redacted] I would have to say, Sir, that those look
16 familiar.

17
18 **LtCol** [Redacted] Could you describe what you would do--talk about
19 your review of them to essentially validate the ISR
20 request, is that fair to say?

21
22 **CPT** [Redacted] Yes, Sir.

23
24 **LtCol** [Redacted] How would you do that with this particular CONOP?

25
26 **CPT** [Redacted] After I went through the entire CONOP,
27 specifically looking at the enemy situation, as
28 discussing that with the Battalion S2, usually on the
29 telephone just asking them what their take was on what
30 the enemy actions was going to be. In review of the
31 courses of actions were and reviewing their courses of
32 actions with them. We would look at that after
33 discussing with them the location, say for instance
34 with Rock Move here, if you notice that a lot
35 operations centered on the move from COP Bella in down
36 south towards Wanat. I know just based on location of
37 Bella, we don't have any organic assets in the Brigade
38 that can actually reach up there. So immediately went
39 to full motion video that we need have a Warrior out
40 there or Predator on station. So based on the
41 discussion course of action and location we go to the
42 ISR request which----

43
44 **LtCol** [Redacted] You're reading the Rock Move ISR optimization
45 slide?

46
47 **CPT** [Redacted] Yes, Sir.

1
2 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Can you stand and show these?
3
4 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] So after reviewing the enemy's most likely course
5 of action discussing that with the Battalion S2 as
6 well our Brigade intelligence section, I can look and
7 say that this area here is as they already stated up
8 here, beyond reach of our shadow. Our shadow would
9 have been down south unable to reach the area. So I
10 look at the assets that they're requesting. This
11 slides shows me that they were looking to get a better
12 UAV on the range which would be a FMB and a SIGINT
13 platform, which what they're looking to do makes, does
14 make a lot of sense to me. As well the MHCT that is
15 on the ground. So, this request here from my point of
16 view would be a pretty solid request for this area and
17 what they are trying to do based on the situation
18 based on the fact that I know during this time frame
19 they had a lot of reports indicating that Bella was
20 going to be attacked and they had a pretty
21 significant, pretty significant activity up there
22 during that time frame, that they needed Predator UAV
23 for any helicopter assets that were coming in so that
24 if you wanted to scan high ground and you want Red
25 Ridge so that they can identify any enemy that were
26 inbound. So with that once I've taken a look at it
27 and confirmed with the collection management team or
28 with S2 timeline ----
29
30 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Could you explain that time line please? It
31 looks like this third block down is full motion video.
32
33 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir.
34
35 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Are these dates?
36
37 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] These are actually, this is actually time. So
38 you are looking from 0001Zulu to 03Zulu--or correction,
39 04Zulu to having coverage on station along with
40 continuous FMV throughout the day. This slide right
41 here is actually only depicting one day.
42
43 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Okay. Can you tell what day that's depicting?
44
45 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] : To be honest, Sir, I could not at this time.
46

1 LtCol [Redacted] But that's one day, is there something else in
2 here that tells you how long they want this?
3
4 CPT [Redacted]: Typically what we would do for the CONOPs that we
5 want to pirate is that there would be a main slide
6 that would show the major piece of the operation, what
7 on station, what time it would be back up slides. I
8 also had all of the—they look almost—almost identical
9 to this bar chart here that would lay out the next
10 couple of hours, correction, days, the ISR assets that
11 they were looking at stacking this operation, Sir.
12
13 LtCol [Redacted] Does this look like the document?
14
15 CPT [Redacted] No, Sir. That is the CUOPs Sync Matrix however
16 what we would do with that is they would actually take
17 all the action across the Brigade and they will down
18 at the bottom stack the ISR assets and what they
19 corresponding.
20
21 LtCol [Redacted] And that the information the General has here,
22 did you provide that information to S-3 to build this?
23
24 CPT [Redacted] This was actually our collection management team
25 would constantly produce that, and then I would be
26 reviewing it with them. As well as every morning with
27 the CONOP and we would review that with the CHOPs and
28 with collection management as well all the LNO for
29 each of the Battalions, Sir.
30
31 LtCol [Redacted] So on the Brigade, the Sync Matrix here, if your
32 collection managers are listing an external, an asset
33 external to the Brigade that means the division has
34 chopped them to you?
35
36 CPT [Redacted] Yes, Sir.
37
38 LtCol [Redacted] Is that desired support?
39
40 CPT [Redacted] No, Sir. What we strive to do because sometimes
41 they have mistakes on there. But what we strive to do
42 is have assets that were attached to us that we were
43 putting in the air.
44
45 LtCol [Redacted] That you would actually control, were given to
46 control?
47

1 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir. To the best of our ability, if we knew
2 72 hours out that the division had forecast to use
3 these assets then on the Synch Matrix for those days
4 that we have forecasted we would have those assets
5 placed on there and against what they were being
6 tasked to. We tried not to get into the habit of
7 putting on there what were requests because when you
8 got into that area we were pretty much zap your unit
9 and then if the instrument that was requested but we
10 don't have assigned to us, now we are sitting there
11 with this whole argument of "I thought I had this" and
12 now someday we are trying to avoid that.

13
14 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Taking you back to the CONOP itself. This is a
15 one day slide. This is what Battalion Commander, the
16 Battalion S2 wants on a particular day of the
17 operation?

18
19 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir.

20
21 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] There would be hidden slides that you would then
22 look at?

23
24 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Depending on the length of the operation, Sir.
25 They would actually have----

26
27
28 **LtGen Natonski:** The CONOP is for the 8th through the 10th?

29
30 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir.

31
32 **LtGen Natonski:** Would that cover each one of those days?

33
34 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] To be honest, Sir, I could not answer that right
35 now. Typically what we had seen was that there would
36 be multiple ISR slides. So, the reason I say that
37 this slide, to me, would be for one day is this would
38 be for one day, if this was the 8th through 10th you
39 would have to actually look at the phases of operation
40 and see if phase 1 might be preparation of move which
41 could be taking up the 8th. Movement on the 9th and
42 closing out on the 10th. So you actually have to look
43 through and the look they have the phases of operation
44 here which is 8 or 9 July, the one thing going on 9
45 July is a Pesh resupply going awhile on five turns.
46 That to me that ISR slide was simply to cover the move
47 from Bella back to Blessing.

1
2 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] If you could explain, please, the Brigade Sync
3 Matrix, and the operation at least the CONOPs for 8 to
4 10 July.
5
6 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir.
7
8 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] On the Brigade Sync Matrix, looking at the ISR
9 assets available from the 7th of July through the 13th
10 of July, we are really focused on the Bella Wanat
11 Move, so operation Rock Move. The first time it
12 appears on the Sync Matrix is 8 July? Let me take a
13 look. So does that mean that the Predator and the Red
14 Ridge became available on the 8th?
15
16 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] For that particular operations, yes, sir.
17 However, in the lead up to move there--if you look at
18 the Bella they had significant amount of reporting
19 indicating that AAF were planning to overrun Bella.
20 This is what kind of stemmed the whole push to close
21 out Bella and go ahead and move down south. So they
22 actually had, according to the Sync Matrix, assets
23 prior to the 8th that were focused specially on Bella
24 and then on the 8th went to Bella Wanat.
25
26 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] So the Battalion had an asset at Bella that they
27 were controlling?
28
29 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] On the Sync Matrix, Sir.
30
31 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Okay. How would you know what they actually had?
32 Is there a record? And if there is, who would keep
33 that?
34
35 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] I did not have a record, Sir.
36
37 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] How about the assets themselves, the Predator or
38 the Red Ridge?
39
40 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] I do not know if they keep records of when and
41 where they were flying. I know for the Brigade S-2
42 operations we didn't keep a specific record saying if
43 we had an asset and had lost it or shift it to a
44 specific area.
45
46 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Okay. Now the Bella Wanat shows for the first
47 time----

1
2 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] On the 8th.
3
4 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] On the 8th of July, okay. And if you follow
5 through as it appears on the 9th and the 10th the 11th
6 and then on the 12th, it appears to be the last, the
7 Predator listing on the Sync Matrix.
8
9 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] The Predator. The only thing I can say is ----
10
11 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] On the 11th it appears to be the final, now when
12 this says the 11th, is this--are these times--is that
13 Zulu time?
14
15 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Zulu time, Sir.
16
17 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Okay. So the last Predator coverage scheduled
18 that particular time on the 11th?
19
20 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, Sir.
21
22 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Then the Red Ridge coverage seemed to continue
23 for a slightly longer period? An extra day?
24
25 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] That is correct there, Sir.
26
27 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] With the operation being from the 8th to the 10th,
28 the CONOP for the 8th to the 10th, can you explain why
29 the coverage continued out for a little bit longer?
30
31 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Typically, Sir, with the operations what we do is
32 try to request assets so we can continue to monitor
33 any changes in the atmospheric or indicators that--so
34 that if we come back to the operation area. You
35 always have to that follow up, that you look and still
36 what's going on. Just because you have done an
37 operation, in this case, you move from the area to
38 another, you still have to continue to keeps eyes on
39 that area to see what you can. Assess what's going on
40 there. In this case it looked like a lot of the
41 Predator to continue operation, as you said, through
42 the 11th, and then after that they had the single Red
43 Ridge sortie that would be collecting on most of the
44 town area to see if there is anything that would
45 provide indications and warnings in that area.
46

1 **LtCol** [Redacted] So does that mean on, essentially from midnight
2 on the 12th, let's see when the Red Ridge, as far as
3 the video feed, for the last video feed that would
4 have come into the Battalion or Brigade would have
5 ended here somewhere around 1200 Zulu on the 11th?
6

7 **CPT** [Redacted] That reached the particular area around Wanat?
8 That is correct, Sir. The only other thing that was
9 up to provide full motion video would have been the
10 Shadow.
11

12 **LtCol** [Redacted] And that's your asset?
13

14 **CPT** [Redacted] That's the internal. And it was pushed to Task
15 Force Rock; however, as I said previously, it did have
16 the capability to actually reach as far north as it
17 would need to reach the Wanat area.
18

19 **LtCol** [Redacted] So, the Battalion could have been operating at
20 somewhere else in Rock?
21

22 **CPT** [Redacted] Roger. On here if you look the way the Shadow is
23 listed, they actually listed by Korengal and Korengal
24 is the valleys that attach, two of the major valleys
25 that the Task Force—two of the major valleys that Task
26 Force Rock was operating in were Korengal Valley,
27 along with Chow Kay, being two of the more violent
28 areas that they had. So they typically had a lot
29 trying to keep eyes on those areas as they have
30 patrols moving around. The easiest way to cover that
31 was with--are internal assets, the Shadow, since it
32 was within its range. With that being down there that
33 would have freed up if you have division assets to go
34 there in there so you reach for the Shadow.
35

36 **LtCol** [Redacted] So is it fair to say that after, let me double
37 check that time, somewhere between 12 and 1300 Zulu on
38 Friday the 11th there was no video coverage up at
39 Wanat?
40

41 **CPT** [Redacted] Yes, Sir.
42

43 **LtCol** [Redacted] Do you recall, let me ask this back on the
44 CONOPs, based on your review of the CONOPs, how would
45 your collections, would your collections folks just
46 simply based on the dates of the op then request the

1 external asset out the 11th? Would that be a normal
2 course?

3
4 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Typically they would extend their request and
5 they would actually talk to the Battalion S2 to see
6 how far out they wanted to push collect. One of the
7 big things to that Brigade S2 folks is that we never
8 did anything without talking to the Battalion S2 and
9 we made sure that we were trying to meet their end
10 state. So the collection management team would
11 automatically be looking at assets that we need to tag
12 on an extra couple hours so that we can get the follow
13 up information as well as talk to the Battalion S2 to
14 request it as far as they could possibly use the asset
15 for.

16
17 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) Is there a document that comes from Brigade that
18 specifically says task force Rock you have this asset
19 at this time for this length, this number of days?

20
21 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) That would have been the ISR Rollups that they
22 put out on a daily basis. That would have told them
23 exactly what assets they had and when. The follow up
24 to that is also pull out sync matrix. This down here,
25 that's the other form of them, getting the same
26 information of when the assets are supposed to on
27 station and what assets they are supposed to have.

28
29 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) So if a Battalion thinks they have any assets,
30 let's say 10 days. That would be based on a review of
31 the CUOPs and also getting a copy of that ISR Rollup
32 next 96 hours?

33
34 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

35
36 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) Would that next 96-hour rollup indicate how much
37 longer beyond that 96 it was scheduled for?

38
39 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) If known, sometimes you would see on there, they
40 would list the time that the Predator was going to be
41 on station or a certain assets if it went off the edge
42 of the chart. However, if the time blocked that the
43 asset was supposed to be on station for that
44 particular 72, 96 hours was still on the chart. You
45 wouldn't stay that it's all the way through to the 12th
46 and 13th. You just see those set days there.
47

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LtCol [Redacted] And that roll up was pushed electronically or posted somewhere?

CPT [Redacted] It was posted on the shared folder on the internet; it was also emailed out electronically.

LtCol [Redacted] Do you recall any calls from the Task Force Rock regarding ISR during operation Rock Move, or around that time? Where they had an asset or they wanted an asset?

CPT [Redacted] I remember during the rough time frame, that particular, as they were moving, and preparing to take over the Wanat area, consistent requests for ensuring that we had extended full motion video as well as the red ridge on. Based on, they were basing on the constant stream of reporting that's coming out of the area, that while we had taken troops out of Bella, they had a threat that went away; there was still a lot of indications and warning coming up from HUMINT channels and SIGINT channels that Wanat was still going to be dangerous area. They were consistently pushing request to try to get assets to try to get assets that they could be watching they area, Sir.

LtCol [Redacted] And those requests would come in the form of what?

CPT [Redacted] They would come in the form of telephone calls, emails, as well as MERC chats, basically, the guys at Task Force Rock were pushing--were pushing every form of communication they could, saying they need to get assets.

LtCol [Redacted] And you recall those request come in specifically for coverage at Wanat?

CPT [Redacted] Yes, Sir. Specifically they were looking FMV and SIGINT. So they continually to cover Wanat throughout the entire time they were setting.

LtCol [Redacted] When you say continually, was there a particular time of day that they wanted that coverage?

CPT [Redacted] I couldn't recall off the top of my head, Sir.

1 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] Was it normal to have 24 hour ISR, or full motion
2 video coverage, or a particular time of the day that
3 units preferred to have that coverage?
4

5 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Typically, what we would try to do with them,
6 depending on the type of assets we had available, and
7 what their mission was, is either work to correlate
8 those assets working in conjunction with an operation
9 on a specific timeline or based on peak activity. In
10 this particular case with, they want a day order, from
11 what I remember requesting, 24 hour continuous
12 coverage throughout the time. And then they were
13 setting, that's for full motion video. They were
14 specifically requesting a couple hours before sunrise,
15 usually a 2 hours before, 2 hours after, as well as
16 before sunset, at least those 2 times as a minimum so
17 they could actually catch people talking on the push
18 to talk networks.

19
20 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] The formal method to request ISR, there is a name
21 for that?
22

23 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Request for collect. Also known as an RFC.
24

25 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] What's the time turn around, if on day one I
26 submit a request for collect, how long until I get
27 that asset?
28

29 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] When request for collects are done through
30 collection management, I believe that the time line
31 they were looking for as far as 96 hours out
32 requesting it. However, as situations change, as they
33 constantly do, that's when they start coming to the
34 ops channels and we start pushing from the Brigade
35 operations on the division operations to say, hey we
36 need to these assets, we need to shift them over here.
37 And then having our CHOPS, their CHOPS as well as our
38 two channel all talking, trying to get them to lay out
39 based on what an asset is currently doing,
40 consequences if shifting to what we would like it to
41 be and seeing if we pull an asset over to us.
42

43 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)] : During the time of Rock Move, you mentioned
44 earlier that most, many of the units prepping the RIP
45 TOA, were zero operations.
46

1 **CPT** [Redacted] In Task Force Bayonet, Sir. Pretty much they
2 were going on left-seat right-seat rides as well as
3 going through the process of bringing in people and
4 also pushing people out. So, it wasn't, there wasn't
5 as large an increase, there wasn't a large amount of
6 operations as you would typically see going on.

7
8 **LtCol** [Redacted] During Operation Rock Move-or-during early July,
9 what was the Brigade's focus?

10
11 **CPT** [Redacted] That-as far as I recall, sir, from my personal
12 opinion, up until Task Force Rock decided that-to
13 close down Bella and proposed the Operation Rock Move
14 a lot of focus had been on RIP TOA. Once this
15 operation came about in the concept of bringing the
16 guys down from Bella, based on the threat that was
17 happening there, focus shifted towards that, but it's
18 kind of going from-you're looking one foot out the
19 door with guys starting RIP TOA and new units coming
20 in, new unit comes in doesn't understand the AO,
21 doesn't understand what's going on. You've got guys
22 doing left-seat/right seat ride and that had been the
23 focus and then now all of a sudden it's kind of like
24 stop, shift focus now.

25
26 **LtCol** [Redacted] What did you think of that?

27
28 **CPT** [Redacted] Personally-Personally, I thought taking guys out
29 of Bella was a good idea. As for establishment of
30 Wanat, I was seeing back in Jalalabad back from where
31 I sat based on how close we were towards the end of
32 the deployment; it just didn't seem to me like a
33 logical move. However----

34
35 **LtCol** [Redacted] Why's that?

36
37 **CPT** [Redacted] Because we were a matter of weeks out and when we
38 came into AO Bayonet, we inherited a footprint of COPs
39 and FOBs that previous unit had set up. Some of them
40 had been washed out; some of them had been kind of
41 hastily set up. And, in doing so, our forces were
42 spread thin. Now, my opinion, if you bring guys back
43 from Bella allow the new unit to decide whether they
44 want to establish this new COP up further north make
45 more sense than putting COP in place and now forcing a
46 new unit to take over a footprint that you've decided
47 for them just based on the fact that we would not have

1 the time to actually establish a good solid COP for
2 them to take over. It would be at best within a
3 couple weeks you could get some necessities out there,
4 basic defenses, and now your forcing a new unit—new to
5 the AO to come in and take over that area and it's
6 just not something I'd want—situation I'd want to put
7 somebody into.

8
9 **LtCol** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) How about up on the Brigade staff itself, you
10 mentioned that you had some folks with one foot out
11 the door, I don't know if any of your soldiers had
12 rotated out yet, that the focus had been on the RIP
13 TOA, were you as the OPS Officer forced to focus on
14 both the RIP TOA and Operation Rock Move or were you
15 able to totally set the RIP TOA aside and put you and
16 your whole shop onto Operation Rock Move?
17

18 **CPT** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Based on the way the new unit was working in, my
19 guys and myself had never really rotated out. While
20 we did have our counterparts coming, we were still the
21 guys that were there on the full role. At no point
22 did we actually, based on the way operations were
23 going at no point did Colonel [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), the Brigade S2 [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)
24 at the time, have our guys rotate out just based on
25 the fact that we still had our units on the ground out
26 there and he wanted to ensure that he still had
27 oversight on everything that was going on S2 wise.
28

29 **LtCol** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Were you able to—your own personal view, were you
30 able to put—give the Operation Rock Move the attention
31 it needed from a Brigade S2 OPS Officer's perspective?
32

33 **CPT** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I believe our S2 Ops Section gave its best
34 attention as they could----
35

36 **LtCol** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) As you could. Is that as a result of also trying
37 to do the RIP TOA or was it the same level as you had
38 with previous operations during your tour, or was it
39 something different?
40

41 **CPT** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) For us, sir, it was still the same level as
42 previous operations. Our S2 operations section had
43 basically already pre-determined that we were going to
44 stay as long as we still had units on the ground. So,
45 as long as there were still units on the ground, our
46 focus was still to be that we were going to support
47 those Battalions as best we could. And, whether that

1 was pulling assets for them to conduct RIP TOA as we
2 had to do for Task Force Saber or working on their
3 operations. For us, we actually had because we were a
4 smaller section, just five of us that were actually
5 working S2 OPS between day and night shift, because we
6 were a smaller section, because we were already
7 located on Jalalabad for us our section could actually
8 stay pretty well focused. You'd have your bags packed
9 but you're sitting out there so you didn't have to
10 worry about whether you are going to catch a plane to
11 here to here because we also had the ability to at
12 anytime talk to our Brigade air element and figure out
13 what the next step was on a lot of our pieces. So we
14 didn't have to focus on the RIP TOA like some of other
15 sections would have to just base on the number of
16 people we had, sir.

17
18 **LTC** [Redacted] : You mentioned that part of what helped you develop
19 Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6) your ISR plan periodically or consistently was the
20 SIT-TEMP. How often was the SIT-TEMP updated, do you
21 know?

22
23 **CPT** [Redacted] Typically, we actually have Brigade S2 meeting
24 Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) with all the Battalion S2s over Adobe Connect once a
25 week. If there is any significant changes in the SIT-
26 TEMP prior to those meetings or at any given time
27 there is never an issue with the Battalion S2 just
28 sending us the update and letting us know what was
29 going on in their AO.

30
31 **LTC** [Redacted] But the SIT-TEMP itself was essentially a slide that
32 Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6) was provided to the Commander how often?

33
34 **CPT** [Redacted] Typically, I'd say about once a week, sir.

35
36 **LTC** [Redacted] : Once a week and that was just to give him a
37 Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6) generalized picture of the enemy situation in his area
38 of operations?

39
40 **CPT** [Redacted] Roger, sir.

41
42 **LTC** [Redacted] : Okay. Do you remember at all the enemy SITTEMP being
43 Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6) updated based on information with respect to what was
44 going on at Wanat? In other words, the second platoon
45 moved up there and started to establish their
46 positions and they appear to have done a significant
47 amount of reporting with respect to indicators and

1 warnings. Do you recall--If you recall, was there any
2 talk or update of the SIT-TEMP based on that
3 information?
4

5 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] I do not recall coming through my channels,
6 however, it may have come through CPT [b)(3), (b)(6)] to the [Magenta]
7 Brigade S2 and I just never saw it or might even come
8 through me, I just do not recall, sir.
9

10 **LTC** [Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6)] Okay. One of the things you talked about was that
11 part of how you planned your ISR coverage and what you
12 requested that was outside of the Brigade's assets was
13 based on--essentially driven by the Battalion's
14 operations and their operations orders and in CONOPS.
15 When there was a period of time when a Battalion was
16 operating not in accordance with a CONOP or a named
17 operation, how did you determine what ISR coverage
18 they would get then? And what I mean by that--it's
19 kind of a long question--but say this covers 8 to 10
20 July so on 10 July, what Task Force Rock is doing is
21 not necessarily covered by this CONOP or something
22 else. How would you determine what it was they needed
23 if it's not part of a formal request process?
24

25 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] : Typically, what we were doing is even without the
26 CONOPS you still had, as I previously mentioned, the
27 requests for collects that were being pushed up
28 through Collection Management. Additionally, the
29 [Magenta] Battalion S2s in particular, CPT [b)(3), (b)(6)] and CPT [b)(3), (b)(6)], [Black]
30 were extremely good about passing up information
31 ensuring that they had a solid request for everything
32 that they were looking at. I know CPT [b)(3), (b)(6)] was [Black]
33 typically the guy from, as the assistant S2, he was
34 very good about putting out requests even if there was
35 not an operation going on, he could lay out exactly
36 what he wanted for his Battalion.
37

38 **LTC** [Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6)] So, the Battalion says this is what we'd like to have
39 and then at some point in time the Brigade provides
40 the feedback as the ISR roll-up that says okay this is
41 what we've got for you during these particular periods
42 of time. Is that right?
43

44 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] : Roger. They would take what the Battalions were
45 looking at after doing the bouncing back and forth.
46 They'd push that request up. Then, once those
47 requests were either approved or denied, that's when

1 they'd come back and put out their ISR roll-up as well
2 as add in to the collection matrix.

3
4 **LTC** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) And I apologize, we probably covered this, but I am
5 not very bright. So, the request for collect and the
6 ISR roll-up those documents, that documentation, any
7 idea if that exists somewhere?

8 **CPT** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : That, I'd have to ask the Collection Management
9 guys, which at the time were CPT [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) and Sergeant
10 [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) . CPT [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) is PCSing and Sergeant [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)
11 still works here. I know that he had at one point and
12 I don't know if he still has those or not, sir.

13
14 **LTC** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Do you remember who the division collection manager
15 you worked with was, or CJTF?

16
17 **CPT** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I typically didn't talk to the Division
18 Collections Manager. I would talk to Division
19 Operations. There's Major [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) and Captain
20 [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) were typically the two guys I was talking to
21 on that day.

22
23 **LTC** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : We might get with you after this to try to get a
24 little more fidelity on those guys because we are
25 trying to figure out who we need to talk to in
26 Division. When the Wanat operation was or when Rock
27 Move was taking place it appears that just looking at
28 the COP and looking at the Sync Matrix that at a
29 certain point ISR coverage, specifically Predator, ran
30 out. I mean are we reading that correctly that it
31 expired, if you will, at a certain date and time?

32
33 **CPT** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) As it appears here on the COPS Sync Matrix, sir
34 that's what I would say, sir.

35
36 **LTC** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : So, it doesn't appear, and I'm not putting words in
37 your mouth, so I want to understand, it does not
38 appear that they had it beyond a certain point in
39 time, but it was pulled for a different reason. It
40 just appeared this is when the requested time ended
41 and that's it.

42
43 **CPT** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) From what it has on here, sir, I couldn't say
44 what the requested time is. I can only say what the
45 approved time would have been----

46
47 **LTC** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Okay

1
2 **CPT** [Redacted] : As it appears on here, on the COP Sync Matrix, I
3 Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) would say that the approved time was through
4 approximately 1230 Zulu on the 11th.

5
6 **LTC** [Redacted] : But that wouldn't have been any surprise to the
7 Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6) Battalion, right? They would have known that based on
8 your ISR roll-up that you provided them. They would
9 have had a good idea when it was—when the approved
10 time was—when the end of that was?

11
12 **CPT** [Redacted] : Yes, sir.
13 Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)

14 **LTC** [Redacted] : Okay. After that, it's just a matter of them trying
15 Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6) to say, make their case through you guys to division.
16 Do you remember at all Lieutenant Colonel [Redacted] Foxtrot (b)(3), (b)(6)
17 talking to division during this time period about we
18 need ISR—we need Predator or coverage at Wanat?

19
20 **CPT** [Redacted] : Yes, sir. In particular, any time that a
21 Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Battalion made a request, if we were pushing up and we
22 got the answer back of no, Colonel [Redacted] Foxtrot (b)(3), (b)(6)
23 [Redacted] Foxtrot Colonel [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) would actually then go and, as you know
24 sir, Captain calling to division requesting assets—
25 pushing up information—there's a little bit of push
26 back sometimes and then when need be, Colonel [Redacted] Foxtrot (b)(3), (b)(6)
27 would then also call his counterparts up at Brigade as
28 well as Division—as well as his Division Counterparts.
29 Additionally, anytime we were pushing a request up
30 through those two channels it was going at the same
31 time through the CHOPS. So, our CHOPS is talking to
32 Division CHOPS. So, you have Colonel [Redacted] Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6) and
33 [Redacted] Foxtrot Colonel [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) on both ends talking to their
34 counterparts to make sure and at that point my job is
35 to make sure that Colonel [Redacted] Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6) has the same
36 [Redacted] Foxtrot information Colonel [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) is operating on so that
37 we're—as they're talking we're talking the same lines
38 of communication.

39
40 **LTC** [Redacted] : You may not know, just because it may be kind of out
41 Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6) of your lane, but was there ever a time when Colonel
42 [Redacted] Delta (b)(3), (b)(6) would get involved and something that
43 significant where you would have to—you would have to
44 kind of carry the flag to Division?

45
46 **CPT** [Redacted] : I had heard a couple times that there—that there
47 Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) were cases where Colonel [Redacted] would then go get
[Redacted] Foxtrot (b)(3), (b)(6)

Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6)

Colonel [redacted] involved just because it was going to be elevated to General Officer level based on what was going on.

LTC [redacted] Okay. Sure.

LtGen Natonski: The approved Sync Matrix there, how many Predators did the division have access to?

CPT [redacted] If I remember correctly, sir, I believe they had only two Predators and one Warrior Alpha which were capable of reaching later again. As for, Predators belonging to 3-7-3 or other agencies out there, I don't know how those were operating.

LtGen Natonski: But those wouldn't have been tasked down to the Brigade?

CPT [redacted] It only happened once on a very rare occasion and that was just based on the situation that they just happened to have a predator that was in our area and saw our need for it. They weren't using it—they allowed it to work for us. But, on daily given basis in our division had—actually it was assigned to ISAF if I remember correctly two Predators and the Warrior Alpha.

LtGen Natonski: The Warrior Alpha is the one that carries Hell-Fire.

CPT [redacted] Warrior Alpha as it was being flown carried only the video package. The predators were the only things carrying the Hell-Fires at the time. But, I don't know if that's changed since we left.

LtGen Natonski: So a Predator actually carried the full motion video plus a Hell-Fire and then the other one is called the what?

CPT [redacted] Warrior Alpha, sir.

LtGen Natonski: Warrior Alpha, that's just full motion video?

CPT [redacted] As its being flown, yes, sir. I understand it might have other capabilities I don't know the full extent.

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LtGen Natonski: And you mentioned that one could be pushed down to the Battalion level in the case of 2nd Battalion that would be at Camp Blessing?

CPT Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: When you're watching that I guess it would be someone in the 2 shop that's watching this video coming down. Would it be reasonable to assume you might see a group of 3 or 5 individuals on the screen?

CPT Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Possibly, the thing about FMV, sir, is it has to be looking at the right place at the right time. The terrain there with the way the Mountains work, from, just from my personal experience watching a lot of screens, the way they typically caught movement was either a flash of a rifle or a mortar tube or something that was actually moving. So, with that being said it's very hard for a Predator. They can catch movement, they can see people moving on the ground, but then to distinguish that movement of whether it's enemy or if it's just local people----

Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)

Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c

Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)

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LtGen Natonski: And the Red Ridge captures enemy communications?

Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)

Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)

Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)

Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)

37

38 **LtGen Natonski:** And if they're trying to infiltrate an area
39 and can hear the Predator, which I understand the
40 Predator could be heard in some of these higher
41 elevations, they could be taking measures to limit
42 their visibility to the aircraft? Do you know if they
43 do that?

44

45 **CPT** Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) I had heard rumors of interesting things that
46 they would do to hide from full motion video, however,
47 when the aircraft were in the area, I did not

1 specifically observe some of that and say it was them
2 specifically trying to hide from that asset. Just
3 based on the fact that a lot of times what the pilots
4 were observing and what the analyst was observing was
5 they would see movement on the screen which is the
6 easiest thing to capture is when something is moving.
7 And to me, I didn't see any specific tactics that they
8 were using to hide.
9

10 **LtGen Natonski:** According to those SYNC matrixes, they did
11 have Predator when they were establishing Wanat and I
12 think they also had it before that as they tore down
13 Bella. Now, there was concern that Bella was going to
14 be attacked by a large group of Taliban or insurgents
15 and then the concern of course was that they would
16 migrate down towards Wanat. There was coverage before
17 the 12th had ended; actually the 11th was when the
18 Predator, how do we know whether they captured
19 anything from the 8th to the 11th? What would that be
20 in?
21

22 **CPT** [Redacted] : If they actually captured something of
23 [Redacted] significance between the 8th and the 11th the pilots
24 would submitted to us a form saying that they--this is
25 some of the things that they saw--that information, as
26 well as if it was actionable at that time we would
27 have actually taken the steps to conduct action. If
28 there is something that they just saw movement they
29 would have sent that to us and then we at that time
30 had started including in our daily Intelligence report
31 the results from any lead he's ever submitted. So if
32 you look at the INTREPS----
33

34 **LtGen Natonski:** The INTREPS those are the Brigade----
35

36 **CPT** [Redacted] : The Brigade Rep, Sir.
37

38 **LtGen Natonski:** Say from the 8th to the 11th, the Brigade
39 Intelligent Reports would indicate where the predator
40 saw anything in those days leading up to the attack.
41

42 **CPT** [Redacted] : And, I'd actually look beyond that, sir, just
43 based on sometimes communications flow was a little
44 bit slower than people like, but--if the time a UAV
45 report had come in that had said that there was
46 significant activity in the area, it would have been
47 included in the daily INTREP.

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LtGen Natonski: Okay. And, we've heard reports and we've talked about it already, but indications and warnings from the Soldiers on the site of a pending attack. They didn't know when. We believe that that word made it to the Battalion and as you said, the Battalion would have notified you. In your experience, while you were in country, how often could a Predator be re-tasked based on a unit's urgent need based on their indications and warnings of an attack? Did you see Predators being re-tasked?

CPT Golf (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. It happened quite often. Basically, I mean from what I saw when I was down there, especially when we were working with 82 and 101st, if we could express to them the importance and the need of shifting that asset, it could happen. They would typically have to weigh against what was going on, but there were multiple times where we didn't have assets that could cover a lot of areas and we would show them reporting, show them the activity that's going on in the area and we could get those assets diverted to us to support those operations or support--confirm or deny activity that was going on in that area.

LtGen Natonski: Okay, this was during a RIP TOA, the Rock Move?

CPT Golf (b)(3), (b)(6): This was during RIP TOA.

LtGen Natonski: What was the main effort in the Brigade during RIP TOA?

CPT Golf (b)(3), (b)(6): To be honest, sir, I couldn't really tell you an honest answer on that, sir. Most of what I was saying before about guys looking at RIP TOA is just my personal observation. I couldn't tell you what Delta Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) guidance was for what his focus was to be for the Brigade.

LtGen Natonski: But from an operational perspective, Rock Move was one of the biggest evolutions going on during that period.

CPT Golf (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** They were getting indications and warnings
2 of a pending attack. The Battalion went to the
3 Brigade to pass their concerns. You engaged the
4 Division. You mentioned Lieutenant Colonel [redacted]
5 would have engaged the Division---- [redacted] Foxtrot (b)(3), (b)(6)
6
7 **CPT** [redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
8
9 **LtGen Natonski:** So, we didn't get the Predator but you
10 actively engage--and Colonel [redacted] Delta (b)(3), (b)(6) was your boss at
11 the Brigade?
12
13 **CPT** [redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) : Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] was my immediate
14 supervisor---- [redacted] Foxtrot (b)(3), (b)(6)
15
16 **LtGen Natonski:** No, Brigade Commander?
17
18 **CPT** [redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) : Brigade Commander was Colonel [redacted] Delta (b)(3), (b)(6), sir.
19
20 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. So, he would have engaged the
21 Division if he felt it was that urgent a requirement?
22
23 **CPT** [redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
24
25 **LtGen Natonski:** Do you know if he did?
26
27 **CPT** [redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) : I cannot say, sir.
28
29 **LtGen Natonski:** Do you know if Colonel [redacted] Foxtrot (b)(3), (b)(6) engaged the
30 Division?
31
32 **CPT** [redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) : I am pretty sure that on multiple occasions
33 Colonel [redacted] Foxtrot (b)(3), (b)(6) actually did engage.
34
35 **LtGen Natonski:** For this specific----
36
37 **CPT** [redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) : For this specific, I am almost positive that
38 because his office was just off the TOC floor, so
39 adjacent to the floor. If in this instance if we got
40 push back and they're saying no, my next step was
41 immediately to notify Colonel [redacted] And, Colonel
42 [redacted] Foxtrot (b)(3), (b)(6) ---- [redacted] Foxtrot (b)(3), (b)(6)
43
44 **LtGen Natonski:** And you were at Jalalabad?
45
46 **CPT** [redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
47

1 **LtGen Natonski:** And, where was the Division?
2
3 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)]: Division is at Bagram, sir.
4
5 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.
6
7 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Colonel [Foxtrot (b)(3), (b)(6)] would, with me in his office, call
8 the Battalion S2 and make sure that he was talking
9 with all the information that we could possibly arm
10 him with, and then I'd also go pass that information
11 [Kilo] to Colonel [Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6)] and I am most positive I saw
12 [Foxtrot] Colonel [Foxtrot (b)(3), (b)(6)] talking to the guys at Division on more
13 than one occasion during this time frame, sir.
14
15 **LtGen Natonski:** But, as far as you know, the Predator is not
16 diverted to support the----
17
18 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] That is correct, sir.
19
20 **LtGen Natonski:** How would we know where the Predator was on
21 the 12th and 13th of July? Because I believe it was
22 diverted after the attack.
23
24 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)]: It was diverted after the attack, however, prior
25 to, as you said with indications and warning, we could
26 not get, as far as I could tell from Division, they
27 did not see a solid case being presented by us to
28 divert.
29
30 **LtGen Natonski:** How would that decision be recorded--the
31 request denied?
32
33 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] I know one of the things that Second Battalion
34 and my Operations guys started doing just so that a
35 lot more people have visibility on it was using the
36 BAYONET-INTEL-MERC window. As long as the computers
37 had automatic logging, they would type in there the
38 request and then we would reply back to them with
39 specifically the Division J2 OPS denies this asset so
40 they could actually have it on there. However, at
41 Brigade level we did not record any of the e-mails or
42 conversations taking place on telephone that would
43 have said that an asset was denied.
44
45 **LtGen Natonski:** So, there as far as you know--what about
46 this MERC chat you said?
47

1 CPT [Redacted] Yes, sir.
2
3 LtGen Natonski: And, that's not recoverable because it's on
4 a computer back at least turned over?
5
6 CPT [Redacted] I know my particular computer, sir, was one that
7 was--would leave my equipment in Afghanistan. I--as
8 for the other two computers that were part of my S2
9 OPS section, when we returned here, I moved down to go
10 be First Battalion 1-503 S2 shop, so I never even saw
11 the equipment get unpacked from the ISO containers, so
12 I do not know where their particular computers went to
13 that could possibly have that information.
14
15 LtGen Natonski: Would it be on a computer hard drive or
16 would it have been recorded and put on a CD?
17
18 CPT [Redacted] It would have been on the computer hard drive,
19 sir.
20
21 LtGen Natonski: So, finding the right computer would be a
22 challenge?
23
24 CPT [Redacted] Yes, sir.
25
26 LtGen Natonski: Okay. So, the request probably went to the
27 Division because we know the Predator wasn't there, it
28 was denied by the Division because they are the
29 ultimate deciding factor?
30
31 CPT [Redacted] That is correct, sir.
32
33 LtGen Natonski: If Division said, okay, you've made a case;
34 we're going to give it to you. You would have had it.
35
36 CPT [Redacted] Yes, sir.
37
38 LtGen Natonski: Okay. And, you made the case, but you
39 didn't get it?
40
41 CPT [Redacted] We presented them with as much information as we
42 could in order to present our case; however, based on
43 our information, we were not cut the Predator for the
44 indications and warnings of the imminent attack.
45
46 LtGen Natonski: Okay. Thanks.
47

1 **MG Perkins:** That's a Brigade Synch right there, was there a
2 similar product at Division put out?
3
4 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] This particular one, I do not know, sir.
5
6 **MG Perkins:** Was there a Division ISR roll-up? You said you put
7 out----
8
9 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, sir. The Division produced just like our
10 guys produced the daily ISR roll-up, Division Officer
11 produced theirs.
12
13 **MG Perkins:** So, it is possible if we have the Division ISR
14 roll-up that we could take a look and see where the
15 predator was? We know it's not here, but if we could
16 look and see where it was?
17
18 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, sir.
19
20 **MG Perkins:** And, Division would have those--that file?
21 Did you all get a copy--did you ever keep that?
22 Would those be around here anywhere?
23
24 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] I did not keep a copy of it. I don't know if
25 Collection Management kept a copy. But, they did
26 produce a daily ISR roll-up that you could----
27
28 **MG Perkins:** So we could sort of reverse engineering and find
29 out where everything went?
30
31 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes, sir.
32
33 **MG Perkins:** If--when Division ISR roll-up would come out and
34 Bayonet got these and this went over there, did you
35 have an ability--and so you would submit your request
36 up to Division, make the case in this case for why I
37 want all this, did you have visibility on other
38 requests that were going so that you would maybe sort
39 of for a lack of better term know what you're
40 competing against?
41
42 **CPT** [Golf (b)(3), (b)(6)] I didn't see other units' requests, however, the
43 way the Division ISR roll-up side is laid out, if it
44 was going in some named operation, it would be listed
45 on there and then you could go to Division's website
46 and you could actually look at the Operation. They

1 also list the level of that Operation, so you could---

2
3
4 **MG Perkins:** Zero, one, or two

5
6 **CPT** [Redacted] Roger. So, you could look at that and you could
7 actually pull up the other units, their actual
8 information and go through their CONOPs slides.

9
10 **MG Perkins:** So, at one time it would have been possible to sort
11 of run the whole train here on the Predator--in other
12 words we take yours here and--now how far out would
13 these ISR roll-ups go? In other words, how far out in
14 advance would you have visibility on Division's ISR
15 assets?

16
17 **CPT** [Redacted] I don't know if it was 72 or 96 hours. It was---

18
19
20 **MG Perkins:** So you could look and say okay I--or even the
21 Battalion okay I don't have it here, pull out the
22 Division, it's being used here, pull up that CONOP and
23 say okay this is what it's being used for. I mean you
24 could sort of do that?

25
26 **CPT** [Redacted] Yes, sir.

27
28 **MG Perkins:** Unknown if that information is all available now?

29
30 **CPT** [Redacted]: To be honest, sir, I know I didn't save it. I
31 don't know if they did----

32
33 **MG Perkins:** Where would be the place to start looking?
34 Starting here maybe?

35
36 **CPT** [Redacted]: Here, the best people have to be in Collection
37 Management. The only person left here from that is
38 Sergeant [Redacted] and other than that Captain [Redacted]
39 sir, he PCS'd. So, Sergeant [Redacted] first name [Redacted]

40
41 **MG Perkins:** How about what guys at Division would have that?

42
43 **CPT** [Redacted]: I am not familiar with the guys who are at
44 Division Collection Management.

45
46 **MG Perkins:** Would Sergeant [Redacted] maybe----

1 **CPT** [Redacted] He would know all about parts up there.
2
3 **MG Perkins:** So, he'd be a good guy to tell us who to look at
4 Division?
5
6 **CPT** [Redacted] Yes, sir, for Collection Management.
7
8 **LtCol Bligh:** You were talking about Colonel [Redacted] and others
9 engaging their counterparts to more strongly make the
10 case. You're saying Colonel [Redacted] on occasion had
11 been known to do that. And then, you talked that
12 simultaneously at all times the CHOPS guys would be
13 working. Do you know in this case did the OPS guys
14 engage specifically on the Wanat ISR, do you recall?
15
16 **CPT** [Redacted] From what I recall, I'm almost positive Colonel
17 [Redacted] had made a phone call to ----
18 [Redacted] Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6)
19 **LtCol Bligh:** And then who would he have called, CHOPS at
20 Division?
21
22 **CPT** [Redacted] Roger, sir.
23
24 **LtCol Bligh:** Do you know who that was?
25
26 **CPT** [Redacted] Yes, sorry, sir----
27
28 **LtCol Bligh:** He would have talked to the CHOPS guy and not the
29 3 probably?
30
31 **CPT** [Redacted] He would first talk to CHOPS based on the way
32 CTJF 101 was working on their operations floor. The
33 guy who had the say on whether or not assets were
34 going to be shifted was the CHOPS ----
35
36 **LtCol Bligh:** CHOPS. Okay.
37
38 **CPT** [Redacted] If need be, he would go to [Redacted] That
39 seems to be correct, sir. [Redacted] Bristol (b)(3), (b)(6)
40
41 **LtCol Bligh:** He's the Division CHOPS?
42
43 **CPT** [Redacted] Yes, sir.
44 **LtCol Bligh:** Okay.
45
46 **CPT** [Redacted] But, Colonel [Redacted] would call the CHOPS first
47 because he is the guy that is on the TOC floor that

1 has the say of yes or no. Now, if need be, if you
2 need to try to get another person to help back up his
3 case he could additionally call the 3 or if couldn't a
4 hold of the CHOPS he could call the S-3 and work from
5 that channel.

6
7 **MG Perkins:** Do you recall the Ranch House incident prior to
8 Wanat--the similar attack?

9
10 **CPT** Yes, sir.

11
12 **MG Perkins:** Do you recall if during that incident there was
13 full motion video surveillance and if there was, do
14 you recall any of that being picked up, the fidelity
15 of that fight?

16
17 **CPT** During the time of Ranch House, sir, I was
18 actually working as a liaison for the Fusion South of
19 Jalalabad. So, I was not on the TOC floor at the
20 time. So, as to the specifics of whether they had
21 full motion video I----

22
23 **MG Perkins:** I guess if we could pull this OP of the Ranch House
24 day it would tell us, right?

25
26 **CPT** It should, sir.

27
28 **MG Perkins:** If there was full motion video. And then if we did
29 go back on the records and determine it was full
30 motion video, how would we determine what intel value
31 that was during the attack?

32
33 **CPT** That, sir, I could not say because I honestly
34 know from that we as a Brigade did not start really
35 tracking and reporting from the UAVs until a good
36 portion of the way through the deployment when we
37 actually realized where their reporting was going and
38 how we could get our hands on it.

39
40 **MG Perkins:** If there was full motion video during Ranch House,
41 who would have physically been watching it at the
42 time? The Battalion?

43
44 **CPT** The Battalion should have had GBS feed as well---

45
46
47 **MG Perkins:** So they had a ground station or feed----

1
2 **CPT** [Redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Roger, they had feed. They have the GBS
3 satellite dish as well as the Brigade had GBS.
4 Additionally, most units out there had the OSRBT
5 viewers that they could----

6
7 **MG Perkins:** And who was usually watching that? Ops guys or
8 intel guys? Or both?

9
10 **CPT** [Redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Typically, it was both.

11
12 **MG Perkins:** They have it up on their TOC floors somewhere?

13
14 **CPT** [Redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) As I understood, from having talked with the
15 Battalion S2 Operations guys over at Task Force Rock
16 they actually had their feed coming on to the TOC
17 floor. The way we did it at Brigade was it now went
18 to our Brigade Intelligence Section. It also was fed
19 to the TOC floor where we had our AOS looking at it as
20 well as had it up on screen for everyone on the TOC to
21 see.

22
23 **MG Perkins:** Okay so what we'd have to do is probably track down
24 some of the guys that were in Task Force Rock's TOC on
25 the day of the attack or the day before to see if they
26 can remember what intel value they got out of there---

27
28
29 **CPT** [Redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

30
31 **LTC** [Redacted] Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6) Given what you know about the terrain and the
32 attack itself, and I know its speculation, but what
33 could Predator have done for the guys at Wanat that
34 didn't get done since there was no Predator? Could it
35 have detected the guys massing--enemy massing around
36 Wanat? Just help me understand what value added it
37 would have been

38
39 **CPT** [Redacted] Golf (b)(3), (b)(6) If they had Predator on station--there is a good
40 chance they would have been able to actually observe
41 as you said the guys massing or with the known point
42 of where our friendly location was, there's a good
43 chance it could have caught any large scale movements
44 that were heading towards our position. One of our
45 typical things that we actually put in--had request
46 was looking for personnel moving towards friendly
47 locations. Now, they would have been--the Predator

1 would have had the grids for the Wanat base that was
2 out there as well as a complete NEI deck of areas of
3 interest that have been provided beginning at the
4 Battalion level and working--you know add-ons from any
5 points of interest that the Brigade might have
6 identified in the area as well. And, there is a good
7 possibility we'd have been able to detect the movement
8 of people coming up towards Wanat.

9
10 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay, CPT [Redacted], you are ordered not to
11 discuss the testimony you provided today with anyone
12 other than members of the investigation team. You
13 will not allow any witness in this investigation to
14 talk to you about the testimony he has given or which
15 he intends to give. If anyone should try to influence
16 your testimony or attempt to discuss your testimony,
17 you are instructed to notify Lieutenant Colonel [Redacted]
18 or Lieutenant Colonel [Redacted]. Do you understand?
19

20 **CPT** [Redacted]: Yes, sir.
21

22 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. I just want to thank you for your
23 service to our country, to the Army, and for what you
24 did during your last tour in Afghanistan and are you
25 getting ready to go back?
26

27 **CPT** [Redacted]: Yes, sir.
28

29 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay, well good luck on your upcoming
30 deployment and stay safe. Thank you.
31

32 [The investigation closed at 1642, 15 October 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Subj: TESTIMONY OF CPT Golf (b)(3), (b)(6), USA, GIVEN ON
15 OCTOBER 2009, AT VICENZA, ITALY

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify
that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

Sigma (b)(3), (b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Judge Advocate

2 DEC 09
DATE