[The testimony began at 1449, 3 November 2009.]

LtGen Natonski: I am Lieutenant General Richard F. Natonski, United States Marine Corps. I have been appointed by the Commander, U.S. Central Command to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the combat action at Wanat, Afghanistan during July 2008. Major General David Perkins, USA, has been assigned the Deputy Investigating Officer. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) and Lieutenant Colonel Beta (b)(3),(b)(6) are Judge Advocates assigned to the investigation team.

The testimony you provide today will be recorded, transcribed, and included in our report of the investigation. Based on your testimony we may also prepare a separate written statement for your review and signature.

Prior to coming on record today you signed a Privacy Act statement, is that correct?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: The testimony will be made under oath and you will now be sworn.

[Witness is sworn in]

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Please be seated. Would you please state your full name, spelling your last?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): (b)(3),(b)(6), (b)(3),(b)(6); (b)(3),(b)(6) is for (b)(3),(b)(6). Last name (b)(3),(b)(6). Alpha

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): What is your current unit and unit's location?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I'm working at the Pentagon currently in Washington, DC.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And you're a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I am.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): In July 2008 what was your unit and that unit's location?

Alpha 1 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I was the G-2/CJ-2 of RC East, Combined Joint
2 Task Force 101 in Bagram Airfield.
3
Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Afghanistan?
5
Alpha 6 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Afghanistan.
7
Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And what were you duties as the CJ-2?
9
Alpha 10 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Essentially, anything to do with intelligence
11 surveillance, reconnaissance, enemy situation, working
12 to--especially in counter insurgency working through
13 the population differences throughout RC East, the
14 environment, understanding of the environment
15 completely from its people to the government to the
16 enemy situation.
17
Beta 18 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Let me take you back here for a second for some
19 admin. Prior to coming on the record today did you
20 have an opportunity to review a 5-page double sided
21 transcript of interview with Combat Studies Institute?
22
Alpha 23 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I did.
24
Beta 25 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And did you have a chance to make changes you
26 wanted to?
27
Alpha 28 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I did. Yes.
29
Beta 30 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you sign the bottom of the first page?
31
Alpha 32 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I sure did.
33
Beta 34 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And do you adopt that as part of your testimony
35 today?
36
Alpha 37 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I do.
38
Beta 39 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Thank you. What at the CJ-2 level, what assets
40 did you available to collect information?

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1) 1.4a, c

(b)(1) 1.4a, c

MG Perkins: The warrior--what was it, the Warrior----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The Warrior Alpha, Sir.

MG Perkins: Warrior Alpha.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It's also, I think it--we called it the wraith, was its call sign at the time. That's an FMV, that's the Army full motion video system that's pushed through the aviation.

MG Perkins: Is the Warrior Alpha and the Red Ridge, are they similar platforms to the Predator?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Not at all, Sir.

MG Perkins: I mean do they look like a Predator?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, Sir. The Warrior Alpha looks like the Predator. The Red Ridge is a C-12 like aircraft.

MG Perkins: Okay, that's the C-12.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

MG Perkins: Okay.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): You mentioned you had 1 Predator.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We had one dedicated--RC East had one dedicated Predator FMV line. RC South had one dedicated because of the--at least the way JAOC Alpha was allocated lines. And there was what we called the swing line which is something that would be--that JAOC Alpha would make a call on based their priorities to either,

we would receive or RC South would receive it or CJSOTF, which was also a major player at the time and then of course the Task Force, TF 714 or 373 at the time, would also get allocation depending on what they working. So we had one dedicated Predator, FMV line, for RC East for four maneuver brigades.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): So that particular asset the division commander could dictate where it went?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely. Absolutely.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): How did a unit go, how did a brigade go about requesting ISR support from you?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Well, concepts of operations essentially. We would get briefed up through Breeze, I believe is what we called it, which is a computer system we get online with our head phones and the slides would get pushed and every player from battalion all the way up through the JTF would sit in on this briefing where the battalion commander who was executing a mission would provide a concept of operation and request, based on that concept, request assets. At the JTF level we were resource providers. So, we would receive these concepts of operations. I was listening in on them and General Milley, who was the assistant division commander for operations, at the time, would receive the briefings and then give an approval or disapproval based on what he received. Now, battalion commander, brigade commander, General Milley was the command chain. In addition, from an intelligence perspective--well operation side there was also the S-3 and the XO of each of the battalion and brigades that would sit in on it as well as the JTF. Then we would have, from an S-2 prospective, the intel perspective, we had the battalion S-2, the brigade S-2, and then the JTF. The CJ-2, myself, and then at my level, I would have my team sit in on it for situational awareness so they at least understood what the concept of operation was. So everything from my OPS, my intel OPS, that was sitting in a JOC, through my joint intel interagency support element that was sitting in the back. At least have my JISE chief and then some of the players, the SIGINT, the HUMINT and then if we had any interagency players, sit in on the briefings so they had an understanding of it.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): My assumption would be that most battalion would request maximum amount of ISR. They wanted 10 days of full motion video, 10 days of SIGINT and the DCG for OPS blessed the CONOPs. At what point then do you have to go back in and say, "We can only support this amount"?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Every night there would be a daily operational synchronization meeting again headed by General Milley, where the CHOPS, the chief of operations, myself as the 2 and then my players and then the 3's players we would also have the fire support element sitting in on it. We'd have the Air Force sit in on it. And we would sync ATO cycles or the air tasking cycles out to "D"+3, so from the day of--the day that we would receive the briefing would be "D" day and then would go 24, 48 and then 72 hours out in terms of planning purpose for ISR. My job was to make recommendations on the ISR based on what we knew, intel wise, then the 3 would be the allocation element. He would be the guy who would say, yes, it's a go. Then General Milley would make the call. So we would plan out that far. Normally the "D"+1, 2 and 3 is really the planning effort. The "D" day was pretty much decided the day prior to. I know it's kind of hard to understand a little bit but that's the way it was.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): So when they cross the LD on that first day, they're fairly certain what the ISR they're going to have for next couple of days?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Yes.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And then beyond that it they have to continue to request? To justify?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): They know--the brigades, the brigades because we would allocate to the brigades, we wouldn't allocate to battalions. We would tell the brigades out the "D"+3 what they would get. The brigades would look out to 96 hours and at least tell us what they would require beyond that point. But we would plan to "D"+3 so we would at least know out to "D"+3 what we would need. So 72 hours out.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you ever in reviewing a CONOP taking a look at the S-2 portion, the intel portion of a brief, kind of a raise some concerns that perhaps an assessment was incorrect or overstating a threat?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): By inlarge, no. The battalion S-2s were very good and they normally had a better picture then I ever could imagine at my level. It's a refined picture. They get most of the tactical intel. A lot of the stuff that I receive is either through teams that are in general support, whether it's a SIGINT system that's in general support, like the Red Ridge we talked about or a HUMINT team, a THT tactical HUMINT team that's in general support and that works in that brigades AO. The reports would essentially come through the same system. But very rarely would I go back and question, at least on a CONOP, the battalion S-2s call because they knew exactly--especially in this time frame having only been there two and half months to three months, even though I had done quite a bit of studying. They do what was going on. They had a better picture then I did. So I took their word for that.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): During your time as the CJ-2, did you ever--what kind of information, whether you got it from an external or an internal source to the CJTF, enemy information--information on the enemy, what kind of information would cause you to surge an asset for intel collection purposes?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): I--Okay, I would not personally surge an asset. That would be the 3s call. But typically any indications of a COP or a mass attack, a mass attack on a COP would be something that would be something that I would raise the red flag immediately. And the way I would do that is by cross-cuing information. Very rarely would I take a single source of information, one HUMINT from a day or one SIGINT intercept from a day and make the call to General Milley or to the 3 initially and say, "Hey, look, we've got a move an asset over based on this." At my level, at the JTF level, I would do that. The other piece is, a lot of times the information I received would typically be from the brigade S-2. The brigade S-2 would be my first call and I would say, "Hey, do you need this based on this?" And they would say,

"No, we've seen this before," or they would say "Yeah, absolutely, we do." And then I'd say "Well, get your 3 to come up through the lines to the 3 to make the operational move of that asset because I can't do it however I can make a recommendation based on that."

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Was there ever a time where you and the brigade 2 thought more assets require--ISR assets required but they weren't available to you, that the division commander had get involved?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah, rereading that five page report. I would sit in twice a week with General Milley on CENTCOM run joint collection management boards and I swear for the first six months, all we did was say, "Look, we need more Pred lines. We need more FMV. We need more ISR." It is just simply not enough to do it. And at the same time, where we saw an increase in enemy activity that's when General Schloesser came online and asked for additional troops to run a counter insurgency in Afghanistan because at that point, we were just not doing it. We had too many COPs. This is operational but we had too many COPs out there and just not enough people getting after the population centers. So before going in, from an intel perspective, I want to try to stick to my lane. We did several papers before going in and then while in there we did papers that talked about where do we need to focus our efforts, operational efforts. We looked at friction points and we looked at centers of commerce and the papers were all defined in that sense where our plan, going in, our plan, our CJTF plan was dedicated to going after friction points. And real quick a friction point would be an area where we had very good intelligence and historical information that lead us to believe that the enemy was with the population, they were in that village and they weren't moving out. So, we would--a friction point, we would have to go in hard and basically separate the enemy from the population and then hold. So, along the lines but that would be--and we had seven friction points throughout RC East. And I can't recall off the top of my head, but one of them was definitely up in to the Konar Province. We had centers of commerce was the other one. Which is a different approach which is where we could go in with a governance line, we could go in with a development line and the

population was not as influenced by the enemy and we could go in and absolutely use our development and governance lines of operations and start to sway the population and build and start to connect centers of commerce across RC East so that we were getting these movements of trade, for lack of a better term, a increase in agricultural and development and governance at the district level so that we could focus on the counterinsurgency operation. The hardest part was the number of COPs across RC East. I mean it was over 100 of which some where platoon and less. And, you know, you can't get to the population when you've got a platoon securing itself. It was a self licking ice cream cone. You can't get out to the population and start to influence the population. And in looking at the Konar, the N2KL region, it's not enough to say each province is different, you have to go valley by valley. And you have to, you have to absolutely separate each of those valleys and the type of population that are in those valleys. In this case, this particular valley, even the locals, if you were not a local from that particular valley, you weren't liked, you weren't accepted. So it wasn't so much coalition force, I mean, even their own government wasn't accepted in that particularly valley in most cases. The governor had a hard time going into some of those areas. That kind of--that's the perspective we went in with. Again we were on the ground three months before this occurred. So we were just ramping up and we saw this from day one and so we were in our methodology, trying to paint a picture, as best a possible, to those above us, in CJTF, to CENTCOM, and others, that okay, more was required, not only in the ISR realm but also in the operational realm so that we could get after this insurgency. We felt at the time that the enemy, what we called a syndicate, was more, it was more complex, more rooted RC East then it was RC South at the time just because of the proximity to Pakistan and the safe havens that were, you know, in Pakistan in various provinces. So, sorry I went long this one.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Who, for the CJTF, who set the ISR priorities, the collection priorities?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): The 3 sets the collection priorities.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you recall, would you speak to----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): The 3 sets them, the commander approves them.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Would you speak with the Task Force Bayonet too, on a regular basis?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Of all the Brigade S-2s he was, he was one of the ones that would constantly, we had what I called face phones but basically the Tandbergs that would, he had one in his office and he would always call me.

LtGen Natonski: Is that Captain (b)(3),(b)(6)? Magenta

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): No, that's the Battalion 2, Sir, (b)(3),(b)(6), Peach Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) was the brigade S-2. Magenta Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) was the battalion S-2. Peach

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): He would call you on a regular basis or requesting something?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah, if not every day, it was every other day. And again we were short on assets so he was doing his part to sway getting the assets for what he needed to do and good on him for doing it.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): While we are on that line. Do you recall during the, some point after the CONOP was briefed at division and then Operation Rock Move underway, (b)(3),(b)(6) Peach calling you and saying, "Hey, I need more ISR assets for Wanat?"

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): No. No, I don't.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): It would have been a call or an email.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): It would have been a face phone call most likely; more then what he had, based on the CONOP. I mean, on the CONOP a levels, it was a level one CONOP, which isn't the highest level, you know, we gave him pretty much everything they asked for in the CONOP; we being, General Milley. They asked for Pred lines, a Red Ridge and they got it. As far as we were concerned, they got everything that they asked for and we basically robbed Peter to pay Paul in that respect.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you sit through the CONOP brief with General Milley?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): I did.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): About Rock Move.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did anything jump out at you from an intel perspective on the analysis of the enemy situation or---

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): No, and I go back to the battalion S-2 has the best picture and normally what I do is I concur with the enemy situation and then I concur with the ISR assets that are requested and in some cases I would say, you know, we need to add more, but we had no more. Everything they asked for they got in this particular case. And again the information that you get, I thought they had painted a very good picture in the CONOP. I thought the battalion S-2 had done a great job in terms in analyzing where they thought the enemy was. But realize again from valley to valley the enemy doesn't always sit there, it's not always there, it moves. It moves from Nuristan down into Konar, it goes down to Nangahar, comes back up and neither group shall meet. I think I wrote it in that five page document, I didn't write, but I told Mr. (b)(3),(b)(6) that it wasn't synchronization of enemy it was more of a harmonization. So, if a group was lucky enough to conduct an attack and was successful at it, another group would claim it as theirs as well and would be saying, okay, great, good job, we've pushed the infidels again. So, very frequently we see that from valley to valley. In this particular one in this area, the Nuristanis and the Kuringalis were known historical enemies but through time they developed a bond, if you will, a relationship, symbiotic relationship. Not necessarily because they where synchronizing with each other but because it was a harmonious relationship that enabled them to push people out and that's how they built their forces.

Garnet

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): You mentioned doing some studies before you came into the battle space. Did you study the Waygal and were you familiar with an attack on Ranch House?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, we were familiar with the attack on Ranch House and I can't say we studied the Waygal in particular. We understood the population differences, at least attempted to understand and to this day I still don't completely understand but we attempted to understand what the population difference were in that area. We knew going in that that was a xenophobic population. So, to that, as much as we knew at the time. As we spent our time there, we started realizing that, and Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) said it often and I think, General Michelson now also said it, it's an economic insurgency, almost like a sopranos type of affair that their working black market type OPs to better their ends but it's not necessarily an insurgency that's working against us.

Delta

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): On the information, on the assessment flow of information on the 2 side. Was it, would the Battalion 2s do up an INTSUM and push it to brigade who would incorporate that and push an INTSUM up to you?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah. I wouldn't----

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Then what would you do?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): The battalion would send up an INTSUM the brigade would take pieces and parts of each of their battalion and put into a brigade INTSUM. In a way we kind of laughed at the brigade INTSUM because it was--I wouldn't call it an INTSUM. It was more of like a huge book. I mean it was 32 plus pages of an INTSUM that included every single piece of traffic that--phenomenal amounts. Good on them for analysis but it was hard to separate the wheat from the chaff in that INTSUM that says, "Hey, this is what we need in order to do something." That was every day. The brigade would consolidate, you know (b)(3),(b)(6) is a fantastic intel officer, I can't say enough about him. He really ran a great brigade S-2 shop with the people that he had. But that INTSUM was pieced together from all of the battalions that would get sent up and then we would look at that and then we would formulate our to go up to JIOC Alpha, up to higher.

Peach

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And then would your product be available back down the chain?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah, most of it was web based at the time. So a lot of it was posted on web portals. In the mornings we would also send out to certain, at least the intel side of the house, we would send out either our CUAs, commanders update assessments, or BUAs on email in addition to posting them on the portals so that there was enough distribution on them.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): I know before coming on the record today you had an opportunity to review some documents, some ISR related documents. You also came with some notes regarding----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): the ISR coverage for Operation Rock Move. If I could ask you to flip that paper around and show these gentlemen.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Essentially what I did, gentlemen, was, I looked at the ISR and down the left hand column, what we had at the JTF level that we could allocate as a resource down to the brigades. Broke down by the ATO cycles, so what you see, and I didn't not have 7-8 July or 6-7 July. I started on 8th-9th, which is what I had and I went all the way through the 12th-13th ATO cycle, which is the morning of the attack or the night of the attack. So each asset broken down by what its capability is, whether its imagery and SIGINT or just imagery or SIGINT and then the "A" stands for an allocation of hours. In other words what we could plan on having at the JTF level and what we handed to the brigades and then what was actually executed. What you see in term of the 8th-9th and the 9th-10th of July is right off. There's a seven and half hour difference. There's transit time. The Pred lines in particular would not take off from Bagram Airfield; it would take off from RC South. So it had to fly a good 2-3 hours. And I think it's reflected on the slides, in the ISR slides, what those transits times are from the time it takes off. So you lose immediately transit time, like four hours. But what we would do by ATO cycle is allocate to brigades so the assumption on allocation is that, okay, we gave it to the brigade

now you do with it what you want. At that point the brigade has the asset. The brigade is coordinating directly with the Pred ground control station and they're the ones that are looking at what's on the ground and translating that. As we move closer what I did is, you see a big a difference in terms of, we allocated 20 hours on the 10th and 11th of July and was actually only six and half hours was executed by the brigade and the reason is, and I put a footnote, the reason was while three hours of that Pred line was put down for maintenance, six and half hours was to a TIC, troops in contact, was an automatic move the asset that you have to--that's a higher priority. And then there was four hours to Radu Barq threat stream. Now Radu Barq was an operation that was down in the host region, the host Patika, Gosni area that 4th Brigade 101st had at the time and that was actually a higher priority as well. So what we did is, we split the asset, the Pred line, again to try to give them what we could, so we allocated certain times to it. In this particular respect, a threat stream could be what you were asking about, which is something like an indication that a mass attack is going to occur on a COP. And in particular, we were building a road out of host and very much Hacony network oriented, right through his tribal area and he was starting to make a play. The prior month of June, just little history, we had four soldiers that were killed and their bodies were pretty badly mangled and we had to dust one for a certain amount a time and that was in June timeframe where that asset was actually allocated to. But we had continue threat streams in that area because of that. So, just kind of explains, not the full, you know, what we allocated to them, and why it was not allocated to them. I did this for the record so that we, you can see it.

MG Perkins: The TIC on the 10th and 11th of July here, it was allocated nine hours and it looks like it went eight plus three.

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1) 1.4a, c

actually run by the JTF, not by the Air Force, we could extend the amount of time that it was on station. So we had--we had three additional three

additional hours because of a TIC it actually stayed up in the hours, it's----

MG Perkins: That's three hours, not three minutes or ----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That's right, three hours. So it actually instead of 9, it actually flew for eleven hours.

MG Perkins: But the TIC, where was the TIC?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That particular TIC, I would have to look on----

MG Perkins: Was that TIC in 173rd area or was this a TIC elsewhere?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): This was a separate TIC and I want to say its Tangi Valley, that the 10-11. That was a different day.

LtGen Natonski: So despite the fact that it responded to a TIC, it actually flew nine--two hours more than it was allocated for.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir. Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: But did that TIC take it away for some portion of the time that day?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

MG Perkins: Is that the three hours, is that three associated with the TIC?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

MG Perkins: So the brigade had it for hours, then three more hours toward the TIC. Is that what that says? I don't know.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I'm going to have to look exactly, Sir. I don't want to, since I'm on the record here. Let me make sure.

MG Perkins: So, I guess to suffice to say, as well look to that matrix that, for lack of a better term, I mean, since there's such high demand, low density items, ISR

or Warrior Alpha Predator, I mean, they're never sort of sitting on the air field not flying.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, Sir.

MG Perkins: I mean, they're doing something----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): If they can physically get off the ground.

MG Perkins: Yeah, if the weather is good and they're not broken.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely. Absolutely. We flew the wings off of all that we had. We flew the wings off of all that we had; literally every day, as much as we could. It was a TIC, from what I see here, it was a TIC down in Patika, D-9, the Wraith had to move down, so it was moved.

MG Perkins: So if it was allocated nine hours, and that chart said eight slash three then a TIC in parenthesis, does it mean it serviced 173rd brigade for eight of the nine hours allocated and----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, Sir.

MG Perkins: then the other three went to Patika?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): At that time the allocation was to another brigade and it flew those eight hours plus an additional three to that brigade and as I look at this it was down in the host area. It was allocated, the Wraith itself, the Warrior Alpha that we're looking at was dedicated to Radu Barq which was at the time the number one priority for operation.

MG Perkins: So I guess I come back to it. It was allocated nine hours to the 173rd, is that what that says on the 10th and the 11th?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, Sir. No, Sir.

MG Perkins: What's that "A=9"?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was allocated nine hours to a brigade not necessarily to a brigade, not necessarily the 173rd.

MG Perkins: Okay, so this isn't just the 173rd?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That's correct, Sir. We had other brigades in RC East that we had to--these are allocation hours to a brigade.

MG Perkins: To any brigade.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That's correct, Sir.

MG Perkins: Okay, then the eight plus three means it was allocated nine but you kept it up for eleven, part of that was in response to a TIC.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): To a TIC and not necessarily 173rd.

MG Perkins: So you can't determine the hours----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Not from this chart, that's correct, Sir.

MG Perkins: Okay.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Not from this chart. What I tried to do for you however gentlemen, if you look in the second graphic box, you look down and it says, "executed by Bayonet." I tried to summarize in total hours, not necessarily by day, but by total hours for each of the FMV or SIGINT platforms that we had. How much hours were executed by Bayonet during this time frame.

MG Perkins: And that's eight through thirteen July?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That's correct, Sir. And you can see the Predator line executed by Bayonet was 33.5 hours, the Warrior Alpha was 26 hours, the Red Ridge flew 32 hours, and then Green Dart was 13. So of the total FMV hours that were flown during this time frame for RC East, not the total, was 72.5, which is 58 percent of what we had as ISR was dedicated to--was executed by Bayonet as a brigade for FMV. And the FMV totals the Predator, the Warrior Alpha, and the Green Dart because that was also in their area of operation.

LtGen Natonski: If I look at the column that says 12-13 for allocated and executed is zero over Predator, Warrior Alpha and if I look at the foot notes, number 4 says, "high winds cancel Warrior Alpha all day." And then

three, four and half hours shut down for weather and then eight hours someplace else.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir. And go back to the description of the "D" day to "D"+1, "D"+2, "D"+3, so on the 10th and 11th, 11th and 12th, of July there was a higher priority that we had to plan for, to allocate for and that's why it says, "zero allocation" to that. What it said though is and again I don't have the 7th and the 8th and, the 6th and 7th, and I apologize but what it says is for the days that we dedicated this ISR to it, I as a J-2, I as a G-2 level, had no indications or warnings that would tell me that I had to keep that asset on there so on the 11th and 12th when we were deciding on "D"+1 the next day, I did not have information that would lead me to believe that an attack was going to occur, you know, a mass attack was going to occur on COP Wanat from these assets. And so the allocation plan went to a higher priority and again remembering the CONOP Wanat was a level one. Radu Barq I believe was a level two CONOP which is a higher priority.

LtGen Natonski: But if you look at the 12th and 13th you foot notes say that winds canceled Warrior A all day and it caused four and half hours of the shut down for the Predator.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: Does that mean winds--where were those winds?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Pretty much down--for the Predator line it was in RC South and those are seasonal winds--seasonal winds

(b)(1) 1.4a, c

LtGen Natonski: Okay, so that means winds where they--they couldn't take off.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That's correct, yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: Doesn't mean winds at the Waygal valley----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No.

LtGen Natonski: It was precluded from even----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Taking off.

LtGen Natonski: Taking off.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir. Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: So on the 12th into the 13th of July the Predator and Warrior Alpha were limited in their flight operations because of winds.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: So they--even if they had been requested, you couldn't have flown them.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, but that's the allocation piece. That's right, essentially yes, Sir. To answer your question, that's correct.

LtGen Natonski: I mean you wouldn't have taken off a Predator even if there would have been a TIC on the 12th, would you?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, no, because it couldn't take off.

LtGen Natonski: Yeah.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. And it was the Warrior Alpha that couldn't take off. The Predator was actually, on that day, allocated from footnote 3, you can see it was in Tangy Valley and Kapesa, which is further south, it was in the P2K region. And then four and half hours shut down for weather and then it returned, but it returned to RC South. So, it went back down to RC South, it shut down and then essentially that was it.

LtGen Natonski: Why in your column for the 12th and 13th do you not have allocated eight and then executed say four and half and then- executed three and half----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): For the Warrior Alpha?

LtGen Natonski: For the--yeah footnote 3, it's confusing to me because it looks on the 12th and 13th that the Predator didn't fly at all but in your note, it did fly. It flew--it was allocated eight hours so it

should still be--shouldn't it be A equals eight and then----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir. Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: And then four and half hours shut down. The note ought to say four and half hours shut down for weather.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

LtGen Natonski: But it still flew eight hours on the 12th or 13th. Now according to this, the Warrior Alpha didn't fly at all on the 12th and 13th----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah.

LtGen Natonski: According to your note it was canceled all day due to weather----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: But the Predator did fly for eight hours and then four and half. It may have been allocated for twelve and half----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

LtGen Natonski: But it only flew eight and four and half hours were shut down due to weather.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

LtGen Natonski: Is that right?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir. Yes, Sir. Now that I'm looking at it. These aren't--yes.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): What was the source document that you used compile this?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Essentially these here. But they were JTF Level ones that I looked at. They weren't the CENTCOM ones, these are CENTCOM's ISR slides. So these don't reference the exact TIC--the changes TICs per day, those are JTF slides that I don't have so.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you know--present any where that you are aware of?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): General Milley has, I believe, copies of those and then I know I have them. I don't know I have them but I believe I have them back in Headquarters in the 101st, those slides.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Fifty-eight percent of both the FMV and SIGINT assets flown or allocated by the division between the 8th and 13th went to--were executed by Task Force Bayonet.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Correct.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): How they proportioned them is up the brigade?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): When they actually had it. So a lot of that is based on what they had, if weather or maintenance or something else prevented it from happening but yes, once it's allocated it's their asset. They deal directly with ground control station through our MERC chat system.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): After the battle did you do, kind of, intel hot wash? Where you go back and look at the INTSUMs, at the imagery regarding that area?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): We probably did, I just don't recall. I'm sure we did, I just don't recall how soon afterward and what the results of it was but yes, I think we did.

Sigma

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): As a part of that hot wash, if you remember, was there any discussion how that size of force could of a massed or where you thing it might have come from?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): I'm sure we did. The enemy in that area, what I can tell you, the enemy in that area doesn't necessarily live there all the time. They come from various valleys again, goes back to that harmonious concept. They don't necessarily synchronize efforts but if there's movement to an area, most likely you'll get an increase in enemy in that area.

Sigma

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Any insight into the--how this might have been C-2ed? In other words, was it someone from the local area that was in charge of this type or this scale of

1 attacks or is it normally someone who's from elsewhere
2 or foreign fighters. It's kind of curious how they
3 pulled this off.
4
Alpha 5 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah. We had no indications of foreign fighters.
6 First and foremost, I know from looking at the SIGINT
7 information that we had that there was no foreign
8 fighters on there. And that's from, at least, the
9 Signals Intelligence piece, and from the HUMINT piece.
10 There's always talk that there was a foreign fighter
11 piece and the reason for that is because of the
12 precision and the discipline of the force that's
13 conducting the attack, the enemy that's conducting
14 attack. They are very good at what they do, they've
15 been doing it for thirty plus years, you know, in that
16 particular area so they understand every nock and
17 cranny of that particular place. So, you know, a
18 description, I think, and I can't remember who
19 described it, but when it's time to attack, it's like
20 call to arms, they start from one end of the valley
21 and they move down and people kind of just join in.
22 It's kind of like a revolution and then once you get
23 to the end you can conduct the attack and there it is.
24 That's how fast it can happen. So having an
25 indication or warning that that's going to occur is
26 not always there. At least from the ISR piece that we
27 had there was none of that. Now there's typically
28 HUMINT reports that describe attacks and again you
29 have to remember your source, a lot of these sources
30 that we get the information are either second hand
31 source, third hand source, with limited reliability,
32 you know, so it was like, mid level or low level type
33 of sourcing but you take it all in context which just
34 goes back to my comment of corroboration. You just
35 don't take a single source of intel and then say,
36 "This is what's going to happen." You corroborate it
37 with your SIGINT, you corroborate with your imagery
38 and all then you make the call on it. In terms of the
39 fighting force, you know, I think we estimated when
40 looking at this stuff, 50 plus. Just based on the
41 amount of fire power that was laid in on that
42 particular place and then we looked at the discipline
43 of the enemy force and again they've been there so we
44 look at, they take out key weapons systems, first shot
45 key weapons system are gone. No COMs at all during
46 the fight. Use of whistles, I think was mentioned in
47 terms of command and control or voice once the fire

1 starts, once the enemy start firing; so very, very
2 capable. Something that we started doing and I
3 mention it in my five page report, is looking at
4 effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the actually
5 SIGACT itself. We transferred, when we took over,
6 CENTCOM made it--mandated that we go to a SIDNE
7 database, which essentially is a web based SIGACT
8 system that has to be put in. Unfortunately when we
9 transferred over, most of the historical data that was
10 in there, did not transfer over from the previous
11 databases, so we were starting from scratch in terms
12 of the SIGACT itself. But what our 4th brigade 101st
13 started doing towards the end of the rotation was
14 trying to quantify each of the significant activities
15 that would occur in their AO. They did it at brigade
16 level and they did it by tier SIGACT system. They
17 would look at tier 1s, tier 2s and tier 3s and trying
18 to say, okay, tier 1 is an effective attack, in other
19 words, a KIA, a WIA, able to get into a perimeter,
20 able to stop a convoy, etc. Those are effective
21 attacks, indirect fire, direct fire, IEDs, they would
22 like at every, you know, suicide bombing, and they
23 would characterize those, where as tier 3, was
24 ineffective, in other words, pop-shots over the top of
25 the heads, not well aimed fires. Movement that, it
26 was a SIGACT but it didn't really, you know, result in
27 anything. So that was your left and right limits.
28 What they found interestingly and what we found
29 because we did the same thing as a JTF just before we
30 handed of to the 82nd again this year in June, was that
31 over 90% across RC East, not around Wanat, but over
32 90% of the SIGACTs were ineffective attacks. They
33 were attacks to either, you know, for the enemy to
34 garner money as a recruiting tool, as an information
35 campaign to get more people on their side but over 90%
36 were ineffective and the rest were effective. So,
37 then, as you look at the analysis of it, you sort of
38 have to get really deep into it and say okay, "Did
39 they use the ineffective attacks to get ready to do an
40 effective attack?" Well, probably so but that would
41 require the brigade to take a real close hard look at
42 patterns and movements and etc. That's really a
43 brigade and battalion fight to determine, you know,
44 where the movements are, the routineness of those
45 ineffective attacks and whether or not it was, you
46 know, practice, getting ready to execute a bigger
47 attack. But that really helped out in terms being

able to quantify. So, at the JTF level in March, and I fixed my notes in there, in March of 09, we were able to look at Konar, Konar all. Not just Wanat Valley or the Waygal but Wanat all--Konar all. And I think there was 174 SIGACTs in a month time frame, okay, 174, and 169 of them were ineffective. So, that kind of paints a picture in terms of, you know, what types of attacks and again it just not one single source of information. You have to look at the complete picture that you have. You have to look at your HUMINT report, your SIGINT, and then the numbers of attacks that occurred and whether or not you feel that it's--you need to ramp up. As with every other move from one COP to another or if we were, based on previous COPs closing down, we knew that it was a risky, you know, a risky type of operation, and it is a combat operation and that's why General Milley made the decision to ramp up the amount of ISR that was dedicated to this piece because of the risk of movement especially with aircraft in those valleys, movement and personnel into those areas.

MG Perkins: You talked about re-tasking a Predator or an ISR capability; it would take a large formation of insurgents or troops in contact, any other occasions?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** The only other occasions would be if higher, and by higher JIOC Alpha, so the ISAF Command to COM ISAF felt that there was situation outside of RC East or in Kabul because you remember RC Capital, even though RC--RC East surrounds sort of Kabul and that's RC Capital, that was separate from our piece. So, if there was something in Kabul that was necessary, JIOC Alpha would pull an asset and it would be the Predator, they wouldn't have asked--they wouldn't have the Warrior Alpha that was ours as the JTF.

MG Perkins: If there were indications and warnings at Wanat and things like a civilian saying, "Hey, you're going to be attacked." Sightings on the hillsides of individuals, a lack of women and children in the village, surveillance by military aged males in the village and that was pushed from the platoon position to the company and up to the battalion and it went to the S-2s, to the S-2, he engaged the brigade, it would have to take the brigade 2 to say, "Well, I think we need to re-task this." And of course you got this

Peach

from all the 2s. You mention LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) hit you up quite frequently. Did the other 2s? How many brigades were there? Three?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Three or four, yes, Sir.

MG Perkins: So, they were all saying, "Hey." So if that was reinforced by calls from the battalion commander to the brigade commander who then went the division commander or to the deputy commander for OPs or from the 3, through the 3 channel, that usually got more attention than just going through the 2 channel.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

MG Perkins: But you didn't see that in the case of Wanat.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): On the case of Wanat, I did not, Sir.

MG Perkins: Okay, so, this was just another outpost within the division AO that, you know, was part of----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: What--how effective from a 2 perspective is the Predator with full motion video from picking up the movement of people up and down valleys, I mean, it that----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): In that area, Sir. It's hit or miss. It really is hit or miss. I mean, you talking Rockies-like, if I was to--Green Mountain area. It's that thick in some areas; can't even see the trails, very hard to pick up personnel.

LtGen Natonski: Would a Predator with full motion video, do you think, have picked up the potential of moving down those----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): If--you are looking through a soda straw, Sir. Again, it's hit or miss. So, if it was looking at the right area when that movement was occurring and it was an opening in the trial at the time, yes, it could of.

LtGen Natonski: So, what you are saying is, overhead cover, trees could preclude you from seeing----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely, yes, Sir.

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): True, but we did not see anything on the Predator monitor.

LtGen Natonski: Do you know could the noise of the Predator be detected on the ground? I know shadow and our Pioneer sound like a flying lawnmower but what about a Predator, were they high enough or could they because it was overhead say, "Stop, freeze, hide under the tree" or whatever?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): I don't know, Sir, but I would be guessing but in those valleys it was very easy to hear stuff; the Predator flies pretty high; the Warrior Alpha maybe.

LtGen Natonski: Now, the Warrior Alpha has a different flight pattern then the Predator?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir. The Predator flies higher.

LtGen Natonski: It does?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: The size of the enemy force you projected to be somewhere, 50 over----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Fifty plus, 50-75 plus, I think.

(b)(1) 1.4a, c

-did they go on radio silence when they were moving to an objective.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Most of the time, yes.

LtGen Natonski: Okay.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Especially in that area.

LtGen Natonski: You would not have necessarily been able to pick up conversations on walkie-talkies, saying "Okay, we'll meet down in the valley and we'll move in towards Wanat."

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, and they knew our capabilities and so a lot of times what you would hear were call ups, simply, "You this is me," or "Me this you." As a check in, so we call those call ups. But again, hit or miss on that respect.

LtGen Natonski: And you don't know of anything that was collected between the 8th, between this window here on the 8th when they were, until about the 12th anything at all that was collected that might have provided some indication or warning

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Correct, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: And the turnaround for a conversation that is capture via SIGINT, you have translators that right there that are saying, "Hey, they're talking about an attack."

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Instantaneous. The Red Ridge system it would feed back immediately into the JTF Headquarters where we had a translation cell. And any indication at all, it would automatically go right into the JOC as an indication of warning.

LtGen Natonski: The Warrior Alpha, that's an Army asset?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It is, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: And that's flown by soldiers.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It is, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: What do they fly that from?

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1) 1.4a, c

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: And who flies though?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The Air Force flies them, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: Are they flying the out of the U.S.?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: They're flying them out the U.S.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir. Once they take off they're handed off to Creech Air Force Base out of Vegas where they have a ----

LtGen Natonski: Say a Predator is flying over Wanat. Will someone be telling it, how about flying up the valley a ways?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir. Once it's allocated to a brigade, the coordination is done through that brigade 2 to the battalion 2 and they come up on a MERC chat, essentially it's on a MERC chat window on the computer system, so it's an immediate, you see the feed, and then analyst----

LtGen Natonski: The feed is seen down to the battalion level but not at the COP.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That's correct.

LtGen Natonski: So the battalion is the lowest level where you have a feed down link.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: And that battalion with a brigade monitoring and maybe division can say to the pilot in the United States, "Hey, fly up the valley."

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah, and they would do that. They would do that. And it was instantaneous.

LtGen Natonski: So, that's not a problem, the communications. Okay.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): If they had the capability. No, Sir, it's not.

LtGen Natonski: Well the battalions had that capability.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): They had the capability. The other capability that we haven't mentioned is the Rover which is essentially a hand held system of video feed system that you can get down to the squad level.

LtGen Natonski: But that--Is that the Raven?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, Rover. It's a video--It's a video system.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): It's connected to the Predator.

LtGen Natonski: Okay. But that's ----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): But they didn't have it there, Sir. They didn't have the capability.

LtGen Natonski: And then what is a Green Dart?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The Green Dart is an FMV platform, it looks--trying to give you a comparative, it's essentially a Shadow. It's a Shadow full motion video.

LtGen Natonski: So, it's the Shadow size.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It's a Shadow size.

LtGen Natonski: Which is limited by line of sight communications----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That's correct, Sir. That's correct.

LtGen Natonski: And winds in the valley.

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1) 1.4a, c

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

15
16 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay
17
18 **MG Perkins:** Yeah, so you had said as you went back over your
19 notes that for--well the CONOP is written for 8 to 10
20 July but over that period as you were playing quote
21 unquote, they got everything they got. They basically
22 they got what you had to give. That they asked for.
23
Alpha 24 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** Yes, Sir.
25

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

39
40 **MG Perkins:** Yeah.
41
Alpha 42 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** So, it's a little bit associated with it.
43
44 **MG Perkins:** Yeah, so sort of a high risk area. Do you--and
45 you said there were opportunity cost, obviously when
46 you do this because do you know for instance at this

time during the CONOP what are some things ISR were not doing from you recollection?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): I'm not sure I understand your question, Sir. I'm sorry.

MG Perkins: You said every time obviously you give everybody--if you give one person the vast majority ISR then there is an opportunity cost because something else is not being done.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. Okay.

MG Perkins: Can you give me an example, for instances, during this CONOP period that we were in the Waygal, what were some other priority events that were not being covered?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Well we had, I know of Radu Barq, which is the operation name. It was a level 2 concept of operation by a 4th brigade 101st at the time that was working down in the host region. They were conducting operations, they required ISR. I mentioned the Tangi Valley region, which is Logar--Wordak, I'm sorry the Wordak region, just south of Kabul was another high priority because of the loss of soldiers that we had before then and we also had there was a huge highway--highway 1 basically goes from Kabul to RC South, there was a requirement to basically watch logistical convoys and movements from Kabul down to RC South. So, that was also.

MG Perkins: So, obviously the CJTF was taking risks someplace else. That's basically the job of commanders and headquarter to decide where to take risk.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir. Yes, Sir.

MG Perkins: So there was risk being taking in those areas while this was going on and then as you recall this had a large portion of all your assets for a number of days. You're saying you don't recall any indicators as you had either the Red Ridge or the Predator up or anything like that was sort of building on it.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

1 **MG Perkins:** And so at some point the decision, I guess, was
2 made to cover some of the higher assets, I mean,
3 requirements as they went around. Do you recall that
4 as the ISR in Waygal and Wanat tapered off here later
5 in your timeline in issue with that, with 173rd or the
6 task force or anything?
7

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1) 1.4a, c

17
18 **MG Perkins:** And how many of those did you have?
19
Alpha 20 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** For the Red Ridge?
21
22 **MG Perkins:** Red Ridge.
23
Alpha 24 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** I'd say two or three in the time he was there,
25 from when I arrived on the ground in March.
26
27 **MG Perkins:** That's how many systems you had, I mean----
28
Alpha 29 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** I'm sorry. That's how many.
30
31 **MG Perkins:** No, how many air craft?
32
Alpha 33 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** One.
34
35 **MG Perkins:** So it is an Army of one.
36
Alpha 37 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** At that time frame, yes, Sir. There was two, one
38 just crashed.
39
40 **MG Perkins:** It is just one?
41
Alpha 42 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** It is just one.
43
44 **MG Perkins:** Just like your Predator.
45
Alpha 46 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** Yes, Sir. It's a C-12----
47

MG Perkins: No, No, I mean the order of magnitude is one.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely, only one.

MG Perkins: As CONOP Rock Move was executed, et cetera, do you remember, up until, literally, you know, the hour before the attack, do you remember any issues at all, that in either 2 channels or command channels or operational channels on intel, etc, like that, do you remember any sort of building intel that okay, it looks like we're getting more indications and warnings, we're seeing this and this, an attack is imminent. Do you remember anything like that?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, Sir. I do not.

MG Perkins: Do you remember as they ready to do Rock Move what, when they thought they were at their most dangerous situation in the CONOP?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I would say from when they closed, when they went from Bella to establishment of Wanat is the most risk.

MG Perkins: So shutting down Bella and initial occupation.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

MG Perkins: You said you had done this analysis on SIGACTS and about 90, I guess you said you looked at a month period and about 90% were ineffective?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

MG Perkins: And so if I do my math right, that means that 10% were effective.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

MG Perkins: When you peel the onion back on that 10%, could you then go back and look at were there different indications and warning or different pieces of intel that led to those versus the 90, in other words, since you knew what the outcome was could you kind of go back and reverse engineer and say, "Yeah, these are the kind of pieces of intel which lead up to an effective attack."

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): We didn't do that, but we probably could have, Sir. And I would say that the battalion and brigade could have certainly done that but by the time we started doing tier SIGACT, 173rd was gone. That was----

MG Perkins: Okay, so this is after the incident?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): It was after, right.

MG Perkins: I guess it does give us some insight though into how many of the attacks become effective. Do you, with regards to that, there's always a steady stream of information coming in, intel channels like you said were sort of a sponge taking it up. How often did you get intel or reports that there's going to be an attack or big attack or something and then it just didn't pan out. I'm not asking for a number, but more often than not? Or less often?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): I would say more often than not, Sir. It took alo----

MG Perkins: So the norm was that you would get a report of attack and you wouldn't have one.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): That's correct.

MG Perkins: I mean that was sort of, I don't want to say typical, but typical, which is why as you said you generally had to go back and start cross queuing INTs to see because you have limited assets.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely, Sir.

MG Perkins: Okay, that's it. Thanks.

LtGen Natonski: You mentioned, is it 10% of the full motion video was effective I guess?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): No, Sir. 10% of the attacks, significant activities, what we would quantify as significant, so indirect, direct fire were effect throughout RC East as compared to 90% that was not effective in terms of attacks; nothing to do with ISR.

LtGen Natonski: Okay. How effective was the ISR, the full motion video, I mean how often could it help preclude an attack, because we we've talked about if they knew it was over head they could go to ground. I mean everyone wants Predator but how effective really is Predator.

MG Perkins: Do you ever--Do you remember instances of Predator picking up something before there's attack then being able to either, that alone or a cross queue or something else say, "Yeah, these guys are massing, I don't know, hit with artillery, call Apaches before they attack."

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Umm.

MG Perkins: Do you ever remember that happening?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, but I don't-- It was one time, out of the 15 months I spent there, I think it was one time that we could use a Predator feed that indicated enemy with, you know-- we could distinctively see a hostile intent.

LtGen Natonski: So you could give that--then you could give warning to the position.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right, and often I didn't do that, often what we were doing is just keeping SA through a video feed, by that time it was allocated to brigade.

MG Perkins: Because they were watching the same thing.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): They were watching it, so they had it.

MG Perkins: But out of 15 months you only remember once where Predator basically tipped you off as to an impending attack and they did something about it?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

LtGen Natonski: What about a SIGINT piece?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Now SIGINT and HUMINT were our--that was our best, you know, intel pieces that we could use.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** How often was SIGINT effective, say on the
2 Red Ridge or on the----
3
Alpha
4 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) **:** In terms of predicting an attack?
5
6 **LtGen Natonski:** Yeah.
7

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c

LtGen Natonski: So if you were a platoon out there in Wanat and you had LLVI with a linguist that would be fairly useful for this type of operation?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** Yes, Sir. And in terms of what 173rd had, if I was to compare 3/1 who RIP/TOA with 173rd, 173rd had way more, they came in heavy compared to 3/1. We had to robbed from other brigades once 3/1 hit the ground in order to get the same capability that the 173rd hard. They just came in with more.

LtGen Natonski: Where did they get them? Are these Americans that have gone to language school? Or are these----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** They came in with their own military intelligence capabilities was a little bit plus'd up compared with other brigades.

LtGen Natonski: Just luck of the draw then that they----

MG Perkins: They drew from actually the rest of Europe is where it came from.

LtGen Natonski: Is that right?

MG Perkins: No, Sir.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6)**:** Okay, I was going to say, I didn't--there was 300 plus folks difference from the 173rd to the that 3/1 brigade. So General Milley said, "Hey, look, when we do the RIP/TOA we have to set conditions, we absolutely have to set conditions or we're going to lose more Americans." So, you know, that was part of the process at the time as well, setting conditions in that area.

LtGen Natonski: Where you part of any of the conversations that--or privy to the conversation on the decision to pull because once incident went down at Wanat you pushed Predator over there, so I guess, so I guess you could watch the battle.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: Were you privy to any of the discussion on the pros and cons of remaining in Wanat or pulling out?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah, I wouldn't quantify it was pulling out, Sir, but yeah, during the operational night meetings, that I mentioned that we do each night, with General Milley leading it, essentially that's what that meeting was. We would discuss--okay we would look at the next days, the next 72 hours, the next 3 days of what we had for ISR and where we want to prioritize that so General Milley could make a decision on it. Well leading up to that we had no indications, as I show, we had no indications that Wanat was going to be so, we looked at a higher priority in terms of----

LtGen Natonski: What I'm saying, after the attack and you pushed Predator to watch the attack----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: And then I suspect for the next several days you monitored for a possible re-attack but there were discussions, I'm sure. Should we stay? Should be go?

MG Perkins: The ground force.

LtGen Natonski: The ground force. And ultimately, since this was another major CONOP to withdraw, obviously they probably pushed ISR to make sure they weren't attack during the withdrawal. But were you privy to the discussion as to why leave or why stay and where'd those discussions kind of go?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I think I provided analysis in terms of why leave or why stay but in terms of the decision making conversation I was not in that area.

LtGen Natonski: What would have been your analysis?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): I think-- We-- General Schloesser, the previous commander and the previous J-2, I've got to keep it in the intel realm, I'm not going to speak for people but from the intel perspective, the population was the key. We had to get after the populations and in those there was not population that we could affect. Konar River Valley which is further to east along the Pakistan border is where the majority of that population is for Konar. In those areas, I can't even describe what the numbers were, it was hundreds maybe thousands in each of these valleys compared to hundreds of thousands that could be effected where you can actually conduct a good counterinsurgency campaign. The governor of Konar was actually in Asadabad, he was outside of these valleys and the governor of Konar knew all well that this was a problem area. The populations were very hard, it's a xenophobic population.

LtGen Natonski: So really, why stay?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right, exactly. Why stay when you're not going to effect the population.

LtGen Natonski: Okay, other than the attack, what changed from deciding put the combat outpost in Wanat? You had a battle and then you decided to pull out. If the population was xenophobic before, I mean, we had experiences at the Ranch House in Bella. Why even bother with Wanat?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. That's a great question, Sir. I don't know. I don't know the answer to that question.

LtGen Natonski: That would have been handled at a lower level then you?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Higher level I think, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: In terms of deciding to put a combat outpost in Wanat, that wasn't directed by the division. You will put--I don't think they directed platoons, do they?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): No, Sir. It was decided at a lower level.

LtGen Natonski: That was a recommendation made up through the chain of command.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: But the decision to pull out was made at that level.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, based on recommendations from the battalion and company.

LtGen Natonski: And you reinforced that by saying, "Hey, based on the atmospherics in the valley, why waste our time?"

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, Sir. That's absolutely right. And, you know, you would have to go back historically a little bit, you know. Why did we go that far into those areas in the first place? I mean, when the 101st landed in March 08, you know, those COPs, we did not establish any new COPs, those COPs were there. We fell in on what we had.

LtGen Natonski: Where those COPs established for COIN operations or for interdiction of movement of supplies across the border from Pakistan?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Having had an AAR from, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) Hawk at the time, now I think he is full bird (b)(3),(b)(6) Hawk. Their intent was counterinsurgency. Their intent was to build roads at time, was to build roads to connect populations in order to bring, to be able to connect the valley populations with what was outside of that particular area.

LtGen Natonski: Was Bella and Aranus kind of like half way between Blessing and the Provincial capital?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Well, yeah, I mean, you have to go south and east from where Bella was.

LtGen Natonski: Well north, I'm thinking from Bella you would want to go, in the Provincial capital of Nuristan.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): You're right, separate province, Nuristan, yes, sir, is north.

LtGen Natonski: Yeah, so was Bella kind of midway? Is that how they made those areas? I'm just trying to figure out, I mean, that happened before you got there. You inherited that but----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): If you've got a map it would help me that would be great.

LtGen Natonski: Blessing would have been----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): There's Michigan. There's Blessing.

LtGen Natonski: Here's Waygal. I'm not sure I remember what the Provincial capital. I thought it was up here somewhere.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Well, Nuristan, Konar, yeah, that's right. So it's up in here. You're right, Sir. It is further to the north. You're right. And then Konar--I was thinking Konar which is over here. Asadabad is-- I'm thinking this river valley here is the Konar River Valley. This is where the majority of the population is. But it just right up into the Nuristan area.

LtGen Natonski: And then this is less populated.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely less. That's the Hindu Kush area. You come in here. The road was essentially to connect here, and I think what they were trying to do was to connect up into here then bring it back down so you had sort of a circular motion. But moving up into this area I'm not sure why--what the intent would be other, I mean----

LtGen Natonski: Is Paroon----

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Paroon, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: Is that the capitol of the province?

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): No, Sir.

LtGen Natonski: I see a star.

Alpha

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Let me see what the--it's a provincial-- so, yeah, you're right.

LtGen Natonski: So, they Waygal valley, working maybe up this way, even then I don't think Blessing was half way through because Blessing was only a few clicks past Wanat and Wanat was about 7 kilometers from Blessing.

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. Yeah.

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6)

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you have a chance to read the desk note ISR plan prepared the CENTCOM J-2?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was based of an RC East collection plan from up to the 12th of July 08. Was it accurate to the best of----

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): To the best of my knowledge, it is.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Thank you.

LtGen Natonski: Lieutenant Colonel Alpha (b)(3),(b)(6), you are ordered not to discuss your testimony you provided today with anyone other than the members of the investigation team. You will not allow any witness in this investigation to talk to you about the testimony he has given or which he intends to give. If anyone should try to influence your testimony or attempt to discuss your testimony you are instructed to notify Beta Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) or Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6). Sigma Do you understand that?

Alpha **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I do, Sir.

1
2 **LtGen Natonski:** I just want to thank you for your service to
3 our country, to the Army, and for everything that you
4 did on your last deployment and wish you luck on your
5 Pentagon assignment.
6
Alpha 7 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) **:** It's all good.
8
9 [The testimony closed at 1721, 28 October 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Alpha

Subj: TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL (b)(3),(b)(6), USA, GIVEN ON 3 NOVEMBER 2009, AT NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

(b)(3),(b)(6)

Sigma

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Judge Advocate

18 NOV 09
DATE