

1 [The testimony began at 1021, 13 October 2009.]

2 **LtGen Natonski:** I'm Lieutenant General Richard F. Natonski,
3 United States Marine Corps. I have been appointed by
4 the Commander of U.S. Central Command to conduct an
5 investigation into the facts and circumstances
6 surrounding the combat action at Wanat, Afghanistan
7 during July 2008. Major General David Perkins, United
8 States Army, has been assigned as the Deputy
9 Investigating Officer. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) Beta
10 and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) Sigma are judge
11 advocates assigned to the investigation team.

12 The testimony you provide today will be recorded,
13 transcribed, and included in our report of the
14 investigation. Based on your testimony, we may also
15 prepare a separate written statement for your review
16 and signature.

17 Prior to coming on the record today, you signed a
18 Privacy Act Statement?

Jade 19 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. Your testimony will be made under
21 oath. You will now be sworn.

22 [The witness was sworn.]

Beta 23 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Please state your full name, spelling your last?

Jade 24 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): (b)(3),(b)(6) , (b)(3),(b)(6) . Jade

Beta 25 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): What is your current unit and unit's location?

Jade 26 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Current unit is HHC--Headquarters, Headquarters
27 Company, 2d battalion, 503rd Infantry, located at
28 Caserma Ederle, Italy.

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And you are currently a first lieutenant in the
30 United States Army?

Jade 31 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 32 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): In July 2008, what was your unit and the unit's
33 location?

Jade 1 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): In July 2008, I was with HHC, 2/503rd Infantry
2 located at FOB Blessing, Konar Province, Afghanistan.

Beta 3 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And in July 2008, what was your rank and duty
4 assignment?

Jade 5 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): In July 2008, I was a first lieutenant, assistant
6 S2 with the Battalion.

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And you have not made a previous written
8 statement to either an investigation or as part as a
9 historical analysis?

Jade 10 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, sir.

Beta 11 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): What is your occupation field?

Jade 12 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Military Intelligence.

Beta 13 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And how long have you been with 2/503rd?

Jade 14 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I've been with 2/503rd since December 2007.

Beta 15 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So did you go through the pre-deployment workup
16 with the battalion?

Jade 17 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, sir, I did not. I joined the unit downrange,
18 sir.

Beta 19 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When did you get to Afghanistan?

Jade 20 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I got to Afghanistan in December 2007. I arrived
21 here in Italy in May of '07. I was assigned here to
22 SETAF for six months and then they moved me down range
23 to join up with 2d battalion.

Beta 24 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. Regarding the--are you familiar with the
25 plan for what was called Operation Rock Move?

Jade 26 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you participate in the planning?

Jade 28 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): How did you participate?

Jade 1 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Provided the Intel piece, helping develop the
2 enemy's situation, most likely and most dangerous
3 courses of action for the move to Wanat.

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): How did you do that?

Jade 5 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): It is a combination of historical reporting in
6 the Waygal Valley.

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): What resources did you have for the historical
8 report?

Jade 9 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): HUMINT reports, eagle eyes in the different data
10 bases that were available to us, SIGINT reporting that
11 was available to us. But majority of the reporting,
12 intel, came from HUMINT reporting.

Beta 13 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And from a battalion asset collecting that
14 information?

Jade 15 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you get any HUMINT from the company level
17 that would come up?

Jade 18 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): We did, sir, not as much though as through HUMINT
19 reporting.

Beta 20 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you recall when you started the planning
21 process for Operation Rock Move?

Jade 22 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I can't recall a specific time when we started
23 the planning. I want to say probably around April but
24 I'm not a hundred percent sure.

Beta 25 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So April of 2008?

Jade 26 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. That's when we started looking at the
27 move from Bella to Wanat. As far as the specific
28 planning for the actual move, we didn't start that
29 until June.

Beta 30 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So in April you were essentially alerted that you
31 had a task coming up?

Jade 32 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And in April, what action did you take personally
2 regarding a possible operation?

Jade 3 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Just kept my ear to the ground listening or
4 keeping an eye out for any HUMINT reporting indicating
5 that the AAF were aware of our intentions to move to
6 Wanat.

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Who was in charge of the HUMINT side of it in the
8 S2 shop?

Jade 9 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Captain ^{Magenta} (b)(3),(b)(6) . He was the S2,
10 battalion S2 and he's the one who provided taskings to
11 the HUMINT teams.

Beta 12 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And were the teams a battalion asset or a brigade
13 asset that came to support the team or division asset?

Jade 14 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): The specific team we had at FOB Blessing was a
15 division asset that was direct support to our
16 battalion.

Beta 17 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And you mentioned SIGINT reports, where would
18 they come from?

Jade 19 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): The majority of our SIGINT reports for that area
20 came from our Red Ridge intercepts, aerial platform.

Beta 21 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And who controlled that platform?

Jade 22 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): That was a division asset. We would request Red
23 Ridge sorties, as many as we can get and they would
24 fly over the area for our blocks of times and collect.

Beta 25 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Could you please describe your intelligence prep
26 for the battlefield for this particular operation.
27 What specifically you did in the month or weeks
28 leading up to Operation Rock Move? For example, did
29 you request specific flyovers? Did you request
30 specific assets to support?

Jade 31 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I did not, sir.

Beta 32 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Who would have done that?

Jade 1 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): For the actual Wanat move operation, Captain
2 Black (b)(3),(b)(6), Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6) at the time, requested those Black
3 assets. I was out of the country at the time that the
4 actual--that portion of the CONOP build was being
5 conducted.

Beta 6 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): You were out of the country or you were out of
7 the----

Jade 8 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I was out of the country. I was on R&R at that
9 time. But previously to that, Chosen Company had done
10 several missions up in that area.

Beta 11 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Up near Wanat?

Jade 12 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Up near Wanat. And moved--on up to Bella and the
13 entire Waygal Valley and we would consistently
14 whenever they'd conduct operations, request ISR for
15 their operations. So the intel build was kind of a
16 compilation of all that--all their previous missions.

Beta 17 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you get a chance to see the CONOPs? You
18 mentioned you were out on R&R, when did you go on R&R?

Jade 19 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I went on R&R--I think I left country 16 June and
20 got back into country 30 June.

Beta 21 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And then you mentioned developing--one of your
22 items you developed was the most likely and most
23 dangerous COA?

Jade 24 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 25 **LtCol Bligh**: Did you do that before you went on leave or when
26 you came back?

Jade 27 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Before.

Beta 28 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When you came back and it was briefed, did you
29 attend a CONOPs brief?

Jade 30 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I don't recall attending the CONOPs brief, sir.

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. I'm going to take a moment here and ask
32 you to review the CONOPs for Operation Rock Move,
33 specifically, the portion dealing with the Wanat move

1 enemy situation and down at the next page, the most
2 likely and most dangerous COA.

3 [The interviewee did as directed.]

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): My ultimate questions for you are going to be
5 based on the page you just read and then the next
6 page, are those, in fact, what you prepared?

Jade 7 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I didn't prepare this assessment, sir.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): You did not prepare?

Jade 9 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): The assessment, sir.

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay.

Jade 11 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): A lot of the language in the most likely and most
12 dangerous, sir, is language I would use on a pretty
13 consistent basis when I developed them. However, I'm
14 Magenta sure Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) since I was not there for the actual
15 builded this and made adjustments to it.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): In early June, you prepared a most likely and
17 most dangerous COA. Do you recall--was your
18 conclusion similar to what was in the brief right
19 there?

Jade 20 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 21 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. Are you aware of--when you returned from
22 your R&R or when you were out of the country, did you
23 recall had there been any enemy action in the area
24 between the time you developed your intelligence prep
25 and then when the operation was to be executed?

Jade 26 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I don't recall if there was, sir. I came back
27 and started trying to get caught up on all the
28 activity that's been going on. And shortly after I
29 got off block leave, off R&R, I was assigned SCMO
30 duties.

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And for the record, could you describe what SCMO
32 duties are, please?

Jade 1 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Summary Court Martial Officer. You're assigned
2 to gather the personal effects of a fallen hero and
3 get them back to Bagram to be transported back to
4 Dover.

Beta 5 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And was that for one of your battalion Soldiers?

Jade 6 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, sir. That was for the incoming unit. One of
7 their Soldiers was killed in an IED attack. They
8 weren't prepared to execute SCMO duties because they'd
9 just gotten in country so I was assigned to assist.

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you, upon returning from your leave,
11 participate in the intelligence portion of Operation
12 Rock Move?

Jade 13 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, sir. By that point, the CONOP--I believe the
14 CONOP had already been briefed. The plan was already
15 in place and I do remember when we were getting back--
16 and I do remember when we got back, they were starting
17 to do the prepping Bella to close down and prepping
18 that move.

Beta 19 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): But in the--were you physically in the command
20 post during the time you were doing your SCMO duties
21 or----

Jade 22 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, sir.

Beta 23 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. So you're not aware if there were any new
24 SIGINT hits or HUMINT hits regarding Wanat?

Jade 25 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, sir.

Beta 26 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Could you describe ISR assets that were available
27 to the battalion during your deployment, just
28 generally speaking the platforms please.

Jade 29 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): The ISR assets we had available to us Shadow
30 which was a brigade asset--Shadow UAS. We had LBI--
31 I'll go through the FMV connectivity first, Shadow,
32 UAS, we had Predator UAS available to us, Warrior
33 Alpha UAS, Reaper UAS, Global Hawk, then the SIGINT
34 assets available to us were Red Ridge and LVI. Red
35 Ridge--there were other aerial SIGINT assets available

1 to us however we primarily relied on Red Ridge because
2 it performed the best for us and that's normally what
3 we requested.

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): You mentioned one of the brigade assets, they
5 controlled that asset?

Jade 6 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. And did you have any battalion assets that
8 you controlled?

Jade 9 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): The only assets that we directly controlled as a
10 battalion were HUMINT assets, our HUMINT teams and the
11 LVI teams that were direct support to us.

Beta 12 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And you stated earlier because of your leave and
13 then your SCMO duties, you did not participate in the
14 ISR request for the move to Wanat; is that correct?

Jade 15 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Correct, sir.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6)? Sigma

Sigma 17 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): You mentioned that a lot of your most likely and most
18 dangerous course of action was developed using HUMINT
19 information?

Jade 20 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Sigma 21 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you remember if you guys had HUMINT sources that
22 were familiar with specifically the Wanat area?

Jade 23 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. I knew of one source. I don't know
24 all the details of that source because that
25 information was protected.

Sigma 26 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

Jade 27 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): There was one source who consistently reported on
28 that area, was very familiar with the area. In fact,
29 I believe he probably even lived in Wanat but I'm not
30 a hundred percent sure.

Sigma 1 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) And then the SIGINT platforms that you used, the Red
2 Ridge, would just collect on just ICOMS and cell
3 phones, etcetera, voice coms?

Jade 4 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): ICOM push to talk communications.

Sigma 5 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) And then the other platforms were just primarily just
6 to provide a visual picture of what was on the ground?

Jade 7 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Sigma 8 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) Did you guys--how did you, there at the battalion
9 level, kind of, fuse all this intel? Did you have a
10 daily fusion meeting update or----

Jade 11 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): We had a daily commanders update where we would
12 go over, highlight some of the more significant intel
13 reports that came out and all the commanders
14 throughout our AO would hear that information.
15 Additionally we'd publish a daily INTSUM that
16 highlighted all the reporting throughout our AO for
17 the previous 24 hours.

Sigma 18 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) And then--presume all the fusion activity also
19 included SIT-REPS from the platoons and the companies
20 up through, probably, their S2's to you guys, so that
21 would help you develop the picture?

Jade 22 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Sigma 23 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) Who within the 2 shop was in charge of ISR
24 prioritization and tasking and etcetera, was that
25 Captain**(b)(3),(b)(6)** Magenta

Jade 26 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Captain**(b)(3),(b)(6)** was primarily in charge. However the
27 senior person who was on duty at the time was
28 available to stand in so if the Soldiers up front
29 were--normally when a TIC would break out one of the
30 Magenta senior guys, myself, Captain**(b)(3),(b)(6)** Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) or Black
31 Sergeant First Class (b)(3),(b)(6) would go up front and Bronze
32 make sure the ISR got directed to the direct fight.

Sigma 33 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) That was my next question was it reprioritized when
34 there was a TIC, you guys had the authority to do
35 that?

Jade 1 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Sigma 2 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) I think that's all I got for right now.

Beta 3 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): General?

4 **LtGen Natonski:** You were pretty close on your most dangerous
5 enemy COA as to what actually happened. It sounded
6 very similar when you read it. When you got back from
7 leave, did you hear about any of the indications and
8 warning that were coming out of the Waygal Valley or
9 the fact that Bella was shutting down and there were
10 thoughts that the enemy forces that were working
11 around the Bella area would migrate down to Wanat.
12 Did you hear about that?

Jade 13 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

14 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you hear about some of the reports at
15 Wanat, from 2d platoon, about groups of males in hills
16 being spotted at night through their IR sensors or
17 villagers giving warning to the Soldiers on the ground
18 that that they were going to be attacked? Did you
19 hear any of that?

Jade 20 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

21 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.

22 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Before the battle or after?

Jade 23 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Before the battle.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** You were getting fed intel----

Jade 25 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** I mean that's what your job was so you were
27 hearing about the threat to Wanat?

Jade 28 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

29 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. Now based on the CONOPs, it only
30 covered a period of 8 to 10 July but we were hearing
31 threats to the installation all the way up through the
32 12th and even early morning on the 13th before the

1 attack, they were spotting groups of males up on the
2 hillsides in the valley. So you get these reports
3 that come into the battalion, do you pass them up the
4 chain to the brigade?

Jade 5 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir. They are included in our INTSUM, all
6 those reports we get.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** Those INTSUMS from that period, are they
8 still around? Do you know where they are?

Jade 9 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir. They should be on our hard drive that
10 we brought back from downrange.

11 **LtGen Natonski:** Can we get that one?

Jade 12 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir, I'm consolidating that.

13 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. So you forward that up to the
14 brigade. Now you're getting indications and warning
15 that there's going to be an attack. ISR ended on the
16 10th with a Predator. Do you know whether anyone in
17 the battalion requested the Predator to come back
18 because of these indications and warning and the
19 threat to the Soldiers that were at Wanat?

Jade 20 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** I don't know for a certainty, sir. I wasn't
21 physically at Blessing.

22 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. You weren't at Blessing at that time?

Jade 23 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** No, sir. I was--I want to say it was July 5th or
24 6th when I got assigned SCMO duties and that took me
25 away from Blessing.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** So you were outside of Blessing then?

Jade 27 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir. I mean I----

28 **LtGen Natonski:** But you still heard of these indications and
29 warnings?

Jade 30 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir.

31 **LtGen Natonski:** Where were you at the time?

Jade 1 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** I was in Asadabad for probably about a week just
2 kind of keeping tabs on things while working my SCMO
3 duties and then I moved on to Bagram.

4 **LtGen Natonski:** But that was kind of the SOP. If you got
5 intel, you would pass them up--from all of the units
6 reporting--at the time of Wanat on the 13th of July,
7 how many other combat outposts were in the battalion,
8 just a rough guess?

Jade 9 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Rough guess, sir, I would say ten.

10 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. There were that many? Was that
11 pretty much one platoon sized outpost spread out
12 across the battalion's AO?

Jade 13 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir.

14 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. Do you know from your experience in
15 the battalion when these combat outposts as you were
16 gathering the INTSUMS, were they all reporting
17 potential attacks or was what you were hearing from
18 wherever you were at the time at Wanat, was that out
19 of the ordinary or was that something that was, you
20 know, they're always going to be attacked?

Jade 21 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** The reports of attack come on a pretty consistent
22 basis. It differs with specific valleys or areas--I
23 can tell you in particular the Waygal Valley, that
24 included Wanat and Bella, they've been reporting since
25 I showed up in December of them wanting conduct a
26 large scale Ranch House style attack on Bella.

27 **LtGen Natonski:** And Ranch House was kind of your most
28 dangerous COA, full scale attack on Wanat?

Jade 29 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir.

30 **LtGen Natonski:** So Waygal Valley did have repeatedly
31 reporting potential attacks. Were you ever able to
32 redirect Predator back over in light of some of these
33 reports?

Jade 34 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir. Once we got the ISR asset, it was
35 pretty much ours to do what we wanted with. Depending

1 what was going on at the time, we would have the ISR
2 asset look a particular place.

3 **LtGen Natonski:** How hard was it to get the ISR asset? I
4 mean you're talking one platoon and the Predator
5 belonged to the division?

Jade 6 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir. They would assign the Predator to the
7 battalion for, normally, it would be a 12-hour block
8 that we would have the Predator assigned to us.

9 **LtGen Natonski:** And why would they assign it to you for that
10 12 hours? Was it because of indications and warning?

Jade 11 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir. We would send up ISR requests
12 consistently saying there is indicator and warning at
13 this particular place. A lot of times we used the
14 Korengal Valley to----

15 **LtGen Natonski:** So there should be a record whether you all
16 sent up an INW request for the period sometime between
17 12 and 13 July on Wanat if one was submitted?

Jade 18 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir.

19 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. And then it would go to the brigade
20 S2?

Jade 21 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir.

22 **LtGen Natonski:** And then who would make the argument, hey,
23 we've got to have this. We're getting multiple INW on
24 this--who would make the argument? Would it be the
25 battalion commander or the S2 or they'd go through the
26 2-channel, they'd go commander to commander?

Jade 27 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** It went through the 2-channels and normally we
28 were able to get things solved that way.

29 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you ever have to resort to going to the
30 Commander?

Jade 31 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Not directly. We would push it through brigade
32 and brigade--it would usually be pushed up to the
33 brigade commander, not so much the battalion

1 commander. As the S2, we would really push the issue
2 with brigade and brigade, if they couldn't get what we
3 were asking for from division through the 2-channels,
4 they would utilize the brigade commander to push it up
5 from brigade directly to division channels and try to
6 get it that way.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** How often did you have to request for ISR?
8 I mean, it was part of Rock Move because of course
9 there's a certain vulnerability those first initial
10 days when you're setting up a COP. But when you had a
11 case, whether it was Ranch House or Bella, and you
12 really thought there might be an attack, how hard was
13 it to get a limited asset like the Predator pushed
14 down, for say, a 12-hour period?

Jade 15 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** It wasn't hard, sir.

16 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.

17 **MG Perkins:** As you're working through the initial mission
18 analysis before you took off on R&R, did you or was
19 there established as part of Rock Move specific PIR
20 for Wanat, just for the Wanat piece?

Jade 21 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** I don't know for certainty, sir, that there was.
22 I never saw any.

23 **MG Perkins:** And routinely would that PIR then assist in
24 generating some of these requests for ISR as well and
25 then the collection manager would take a look at what
26 he was given and assign it? I mean, was that sort of
27 the process?

Jade 28 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir. There were standing PIR of course----

29 **MG Perkins:** Right.

Jade 30 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** ----for the AO but I don't recall ever seeing a
31 particular PIR----

32 **MG Perkins:** Specific one?

Jade 33 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** ----specific to Wanat.

1 **MG Perkins:** Going back to the intel flow, so you would have
2 the--the normal process you would provide INTSUMS that
3 Wanat--would you say that just about everything that
4 you all find intelligence wise--was there any
5 filtering that went on at your level of things that
6 you did not send out because you say either it didn't-
7 -wasn't relevant or was it really the vast majority
8 just automatically went higher?

Jade 9 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** We send everything up, sir.

10 **MG Perkins:** Systematically, everything you had, brigade would
11 get?

Jade 12 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir.

13 **MG Perkins:** Flip side of that, was your experience, not just
14 Wanat, but just your experience over the time that
15 everything that had any relationship to what you were
16 doing there from division or brigade, you got--did you
17 ever find instances where after the fact and I don't
18 know if you took part in AAR's on this one as well
19 that there was intel that higher had that after the
20 fact, you found out you did not have?

Jade 21 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** No, sir. I was never aware of any intel----

22 **MG Perkins:** Did you take part in sort of an AAR of this
23 afterwards from an intel point of view?

Jade 24 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** No, sir.

25 **MG Perkins:** Okay. As you worked intel from battalion down to
26 the company since they don't have a staff, who did you
27 mainly interface with? Did you have the COIST, the
28 company intel support teams at that time?

Jade 29 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** No, sir, we didn't.

30 **MG Perkins:** Okay. So who would you work with physically in
31 the company with intel?

Jade 32 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Either the Company Commanders or the Company
33 FSO's.

1 **MG Perkins:** With Chosen, do you specifically remember who
2 sort of was tasked to be the intel fusion person in
3 the company?
Oscar

Jade 4 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** I don't, sir. I know Captain^{(b)(3),(b)(6)} the Company
5 Commander for Chosen was located right there on
6 Blessing with us. And I know his FSO and himself
7 would come down to the S2 office frequently and we'd
8 interface.

9 **MG Perkins:** Was there routine intel update or anything you'd
10 like to add that you did for the company level
11 routinely where commanders came in, FSO or something
12 where you would give a INTSUM one over the world or
13 was it by exception that they came in individually?

Jade 14 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** It was by exception that they came in
15 individually. However, there was the Commander's
16 update everyday and we would highlight the 2 pieces
17 and in addition to that, the INTSUM would go out to
18 all the Company Commanders and XO's and First
19 Sergeants. Anyone who had a SIPR account, basically,
20 in the battalion would get the INTSUMS.

21 **MG Perkins:** And do you know what level of connectivity they
22 had at Wanat?

Jade 23 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** At Wanat, I don't think they had any connectivity
24 other than FM or TACSAT.

25 **MG Perkins:** But the Company headquarters at Blessing would
26 have full SIPR access?

Jade 27 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir.

28 **MG Perkins:** Okay.

Sigma 29 **LTC(b)(3),(b)(6):** Just a quick follow up, you mentioned that
30 essentially that there were some indicators that
31 the enemy was planning another Ranch House style
32 attack. Did I read that correctly?

Jade 33 **1LT (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir.

Sigma 1 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6): But normal enemy TTP was essentially just to probe.
2 Is that--what I'm trying to get at is how you arrived
3 at what you thought was your most dangerous course of
4 action.

Jade 5 **LLT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Through HUMINT reporting, sir, they indicated
6 that they wanted to conduct attacks similar to Ranch
7 House or they referred to it as "Aranus". They
8 wanted, they indicated through HUMINT reporting their
9 desire to overrun a Coalition FOB, particularly FOB
10 Bella. And like I mentioned, that reporting went on
11 for--you know, since I was there, they were wanting to
12 do that. It would--they would conduct probing attacks
13 pretty consistently on a monthly basis during the high
14 illumine period they would come in, hit a couple times,
15 you know throughout a five or ten-day period in the
16 night they would probe and then it'd quite down again.
17 During these heightened periods of activity, we were
18 always prepared that, hey, you know, this is when
19 they're going to try to overrun this month or during
20 this high illumine period, they're going to try to
21 overrun. We would use that to increase our ISR--our
22 surveillance of the area, just keeping a closer eye on
23 it. And like I said, it would always quiet down
24 again.

Sigma 25 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) Right.

Jade 26 **LLT** (b)(3),(b)(6): And this was an ongoing trend that we saw.

Sigma 27 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) But the feeling, not to put words in your mouth,
28 correct me if I'm wrong, the feeling obviously amongst
29 the battalion leadership was that this type of thing
30 was not going to happen at Wanat otherwise you would
31 have made preparation for it. Is that a fair
32 statement?

Jade 33 **LLT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I wouldn't say so, sir. We expected this to
34 happen at Bella. And when we moved Bella and it never
35 happened, we fully expected it to happen at Wanat. We
36 didn't know when or at what--at what scale it would
37 happen but I know at least myself and I'm pretty sure
38 Captain(b)(3),(b)(6) and Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) were all pretty much on

Magenta

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1 the same page felt that they would try to overrun one
2 of these COP's at some point. We felt it was going to
3 happen because they'd--they'd always expressed their
4 intent to do it. They were able to do it pretty much
5 at Ranch House. They breached the wire. They got
6 inside the COP. So we fully expected them to try
7 again.

Sigma 8 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) And so you allocated the ISR that you had available
9 and just had to assume risk with regard that this
10 might happen?

Jade 11 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Sigma 12 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) Is that --

Jade 13 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): We went on the assumption that the most dangerous
14 would happen and that's why we tried to prepare
15 ourselves for it.

Sigma 16 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) Okay. Just your personal opinion, based on your
17 experience, any thoughts as to how the enemy could
18 have massed so many folks Wanat and have this attack
19 occur? Was it just the fact that ISR is just a
20 limited thing and we weren't able to look down and see
21 or any thoughts on how they were able to mass like
22 that undetected?

Jade 23 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Well, first off, sir, I would say that we didn't
24 know the human terrain in Wanat probably as well as we
25 should have. We knew----

Beta 26 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): What do you mean by human terrain?

Jade 27 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): The atmospherics how the local population would
28 respond to us being there or would they welcome the
29 AAF? Would they welcome us? We didn't have a good
30 feel on that. Of course, we got one side of it when
31 we show up there. They were all about, hey, come on,
32 we want you guys to be here, this, that and the other
33 thing but we would leave and HUMINT reporting would
34 come up saying, hey, the elders don't want you there,
35 you know, none of the villagers want you there, they
36 support the AAF, so on and so forth. So we didn't--I

1 don't think we had a good read on exactly on the
2 actual sentiment of the local population for Wanat.

3 As far as the ISR being able to detect these guys,
4 that's hard to say. These guys are really good about
5 moving around the terrain. I mean we could have a
6 full scale TIC and have ISR directly overhead and not
7 pick up a single guy on the ground. And that's with
8 every available sensor that we had, IR, electrical,
9 optical, I mean, we just couldn't pick these guys up.
10 They knew every crevice and crack.

Sigma 11 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) It's not like a bunch of guys out in the middle of the
12 desert where you could----

Jade 13 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, sir. These guys knew the terrain very well
14 and they used the terrain to their advantage.

Sigma 15 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) It is possible, you think that they could have kind of
16 drifted in in onesies and twosies as well prior to
17 this attack and then just kind of been laying up in
18 the village its self? Do you think the indicators
19 would be that the villagers would have been amenable
20 to that?

Jade 21 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. I believe they did kind of filter in
22 gradually and I can't recall that there's specific
23 reporting or--I can't recall exactly. I may have seen
24 some at some point that said or that indicated that
25 the population was kind of changing as far as the
26 personnel in the town, you know, the amount of
27 fighting-age males that were showing up. There may be
28 something like that. I want to say I remember seeing
29 something like that, sir, but I can't be a hundred
30 percent, sir.

Sigma 31 **LTC**(b)(3),(b)(6) Okay.

Beta 32 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Major (b)(3),(b)(6)? Owl

Owl 33 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6) : Yes, sir. Just going back to I believe one of
34 the questions that General Perkins had talked about
35 was that you said that as far as intel or information

1 that would go up, everything you got you would send to
2 brigade; is that correct?

Jade 3 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Owl 4 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): And then the next question was anything that
5 brigade or division got would make its way to you?

Jade 6 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Owl 7 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you at any point feel that intel or ISR
8 requests or something that would send up to brigade or
9 division, or we'll say brigade got filtered about you?
10 As in, do you feel confident that information requests
11 you sent up there made it to division in one piece or
12 do you think there was a filtering?

Jade 13 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. I fully believe and had full
14 confidence that everything we sent up went straight to
15 division.

Owl 16 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): You had talked about--you said that we tried--
17 that we used the term "we" that expected Ranch House
18 style type of attack. Are you talking about "we" as in
19 the battalion or "we" as in the S2?

Jade 20 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I know that "we" as S2 felt that way and I'm
21 fairly certain that that feeling was shared in the
22 battalion.

Owl 23 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): And just, again, the basis of that, is that an
24 assumption or did you know--did you know--specifically
25 you said we tried to prepare for a Ranch House style
26 of attack. When you say that, do you know what type
27 of effort or what type of--or I'm sorry efforts that
28 the battalion to prepare for that? Was that something
29 you passed onto the Company or Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) or---- Oscar

Jade 30 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I know our assessments were passed on to the
31 companies. I don't know specifically what battalion
32 did, you know, to try to mitigate things. I'm certain
33 they did but I don't know specifics as to what steps
34 they took.

Oscar

Owl 1 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): And do you remember if it was specifically passed
2 to Captain(b)(3),(b)(6) that you should expect a Ranch House
3 collateral effect or Ranch House style type of attack
4 vice a probing attack for instance? Do you know if
5 that was passed on to anyone specifically?

Jade 6 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): I don't, I don't, sir. I mean, I'm making an
7 assumption by saying Captain(b)(3),(b)(6) passed that to him Magenta
8 because he was--he was really good about putting that
9 information out to all the Commanders, calling them up
10 on the phone or shooting them an email, but mostly he
11 would call them up on the phone before any kind of
12 operation we conducted and he would talk directly with
13 that Commander and give him his assessment of what
14 happened. I don't recall hearing a conversation
15 between Captain(b)(3),(b)(6) and Captain(b)(3),(b)(6) but I'm making Oscar
16 the assumption that that information was passed down.

Owl 17 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): I understand. Thank you, sir.

18 **MG Perkins:** One follow-on question, do you know or recall
19 prior to the Ranch House large attack, were there and
20 if so, sort of how many probing attacks in the
21 previous six months or so before that, if any?

Jade 22 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Before the Ranch House?

23 **MG Perkins:** Yeah. At Ranch House.

Jade 24 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): At Ranch House, I don't, sir. I wasn't present
25 in the battalion during Ranch House----

26 **MG Perkins:** Oh, okay.

Jade 27 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): ----so I don't know for certain if there were
28 probing attacks.

29 **MG Perkins:** If it was preceded?

Jade 30 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): That is right, sir.

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Just to clarify for the record, after you came
32 back from leave and then were assigned your SCMO
33 duties, you were just monitoring the intel situation
34 via the daily INTSUMS?

Jade 1 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 2 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): From a remote location?

Jade 3 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. And that was down at Jalalabad?

Jade 5 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Asadabad.

Beta 6 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Asadabad, okay.

Jade 7 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Jade

8 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6), I'm going to give
9 you an order here. You are ordered not to discuss the
10 testimony you provided today with anyone other than
11 the members of the investigation team. You will not
12 allow any witness in this investigation to talk to you
13 about the testimony he has given or which he intends
14 to give. If anyone should try to influence your
15 testimony or attempt to discuss your testimony, you
16 are instructed to notify Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) or
17 Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) Sigma Beta

18 Do you understand that?

Jade 19 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** I just want to thank you for your service to
21 our country and to the Army and I wish you all the
22 best as you get ready to go back to Afghanistan.
23 Thank you.

Jade 24 **1LT** (b)(3),(b)(6): Thank you, sir.

25 [The testimony closed at 1105, 13 October 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Subj: TESTIMONY OF 1LT Jade (b)(3),(b)(6), USA, GIVEN ON
13 OCTOBER 2009, AT VICENZA, ITALY

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify
that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

(b)(3),(b)(6)

Owl

Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Judge Advocate

10 Nov 09
DATE