1 [The testimony opened at 0830, 3 November 2009.]

Bravo 2 **LtGen Natonski:** (b)(3), (b)(6) I am Lieutenant General
3 Richard Natonski, United States Marine Corps. I have
4 been appointed by the Commander of the U.S. Central
5 Command to conduct an investigation into the facts and
6 circumstances surrounding the combat action at Wanat,
7 Afghanistan during July 2008. Major General David
8 Perkins, United States Army, has been assigned as the
9 Deputy investigating officer. Lieutenant Colonel
Beta 10 (b)(3), (b)(6) and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) are Sigma
11 the judge advocates assigned to the investigation
12 team.

13 The testimony you provide today will be recorded,
14 transcribed, and included in our report of the
15 investigation. Based on your testimony, we may also
16 prepare a separate written statement for your review
17 and signature.

18 Prior to coming on the record today, you signed a
19 Privacy Act; is that correct?

Bravo 20 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir, I did.

21 **LtGen Natonski:** Your testimony will be made under oath. You
22 will now be sworn.

23 [The witness was sworn.]

Beta 24 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Please state your full name, spelling your last.

Bravo 25 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Full name is (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) Bravo

Beta 26 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, you are a Colonel in the U.S. Army?

Bravo 27 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): I am.

Beta 28 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And what is your current unit and that unit's
29 location, sir?

Bravo 30 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): It is the North Carolina National Guard in
31 Raleigh, North Carolina and I am the State Inspector
32 General.

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, in July of 2008, what was your unit and that
34 unit's location?

Bravo 1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) It was the 101st Airborne Division--CJTF-101, it
2 was at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan.

Beta 3 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And your duties, sir, at that time?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): I was the director of Logistics, the CJ4.

Beta 5 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, prior to coming on the record today, you had
6 a chance to review an interview that you had with the
7 combat studies institute and you had chosen not to
8 make that part of your sworn testimony today, is that
9 correct, sir?

Bravo 10 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): That is correct. I just quickly reviewed that as
11 I remember looking over that, everything is factually
12 correct, and there are no errors that I can see in
13 that, it was done as part of a historical interview
14 with the historian, so I know it will be part of the
15 record, as I understand, but I do not want to put that
16 into the sworn testimony.

Beta 17 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Understood, sir. Sir, as the CJ4 in Afghanistan,
18 what were your responsibilities, sir?

Bravo 19 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): I was the principle staff advisor to the
20 commanding general for all logistics matters. I was
21 working within CJTF-101. I dealt with contracts, I
22 dealt with supply and services, mortuary affairs,
23 transportation, all aspects, contracting--all aspects
24 working with that.

Beta 25 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What was the CJ4's role with regards to
26 contracting?

Bravo 27 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): The CJ4's role was to provide oversight to the
28 contracting, just as a principle integrator for
29 contracting. There was a PARC; Principle Agent
30 Responsible for Contracting within Afghanistan. I am
31 not sure if that is correct terminology, but that
32 agency was responsible for contracting, my
33 responsibility as the CJ4 was to provide them the
34 oversight for contracting and also to help integrate
35 that with the units as well.

Beta 36 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, can you explain the process for contracting
37 goods and services in Afghanistan. If a platoon
38 needed a particular service or supply, how would they
39 go about actually getting that supply or service?

Bravo 1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): The platoon would then provide that information
2 to their battalion--or to their company and to the
3 battalion. They would then usually have local
4 contractors they would try to contract with and
5 actually let those contracts be filled locally if
6 possible. I dealt mainly with the higher level like
7 LOGCAP contracts. Overseeing the total contract
8 system and how the contract system worked. But from a
9 local--I am trying to think, get the exact methodology
10 that was used.

11 So if the platoon leader, say using the CERP
12 funds, if he had a local contractor, he would go to
13 the local contractor to get something done. If he
14 needed to get something accomplished, he could also go
15 back and have the PARC actually try to contract for
16 services as well and that would be going through the
17 company to the battalion to the PARC itself.

Beta 18 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Could only a warranted contracting officer
19 actually enter into an agreement with an Afghan?

Bravo 20 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): A warranted contracting officer?

Beta 21 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Could a platoon sergeant enter a contract for a
22 good or service?

Bravo 23 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): I am not sure I can give you the best answer on
24 that. And the reason so is because I am not sure,
25 maybe that did occur--that actually occurred down at
26 the lower level for certain services. If you are
27 speaking of a larger commodity, such as trans--a large
28 transport service or then--fuel or water--bulk water
29 or Class IV then yes, it would have to be a
30 contracting officer.

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And that would be done at the--is that
32 contracting officer work for the battalion, sir, or do
33 they work for----

Bravo 34 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): They were at the brigade level, most of them at
35 the brigade level, then would let the contract at that
36 point or at the PARC itself for larger contracts.

Beta 37 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And once that contract was let, sir, who was on
38 the--who was responsible for making sure that the
39 contract was----

Bravo 1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) We had a COR that was actually appointed and that
2 COR would be at the brigade level, depending on the
3 size and scope of the contract at the brigade level,
4 battalion level or down to the company or platoon
5 level; the lowest level but that contracting officer's
6 representative, COR.

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And if something was wrong or wasn't being
8 performed or a good was not delivered, sir. Are you
9 familiar with the process----

Bravo 10 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): That would be the COR that would actually give
11 notice and bring it back up to the PARC to either--I
12 am trying to think of the correct terminology--give
13 notice that they are not fulfilling the contract
14 correctly and then you could actually terminate the
15 contract, if necessary.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): As the CJ4, sir, did you ever get involved or
17 were you ever briefed on those situations?

Bravo 18 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): At the larger level, yes.

Beta 19 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What do you mean by "larger," sir?

Bravo 20 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): As an example, we had a contract trying to build
21 external fixed storage tanks for fuel at Jalalabad.
22 And so that is a very large contract as far as money
23 goes and we would not deal with that at the battalion
24 or brigade--or below brigade level was more of a CJTF
25 function responsibility. So we were dealing with that
26 and at that point it was a--I can't think of the term-
27 -but the contractor almost failed on that and so we
28 actually gave notice to the contractor and he had to
29 complete the work or we were going to stop the
30 contract and not pay him.

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): You said that it was a CJTF responsibility, sir,
32 and why is that?

Bravo 33 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Again, a larger scope of the project, and it was
34 an enduring contract whenever it was something that
35 was going to last. It was something that supported
36 more than just a brigade.

Beta 37 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And you were covering that for Jalalabad, sir
38 that was in a brigade's battle space?

Bravo 1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): It was in the Brigade's battle space but realize
2 that there were many and are many units at Jalalabad.
3 And those storage tanks, as an example, those storage
4 tanks would support fuel storage for the Air Force,
5 for the Army, for the Special Operations Forces, just
6 dependent upon the whole of the forces that are in
7 that area.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): So one of your action officers, out of the CJ4
9 takes on that project and----

Bravo 10 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Between the joint logistic command and the CJ4,
11 yes.

Beta 12 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Is there a dollar threshold or is it tied to the
13 scope of what that----

Bravo 14 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): It is more--larger dollar figures but more tied
15 to the scope.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): How about, sir, the establishment of a new COP
17 that has been approved through the JFUB process, who
18 oversees the completion of that project?

Bravo 19 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): If you are talking--larger COPs--I am trying to
20 think of--we started the expansions in the south, the
21 establishment of the larger FOBs would be the CJ7's
22 responsibility and I would work there supporting to
23 help oversee the construction and then the
24 establishment of those COPs and FOBs. If you are
25 looking at something platoon-sized or smaller, it's
26 initiated by the Brigade then the Battalion or Brigade
27 would be responsible for that.

Beta 28 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) And what would some of those responsibilities be,
29 sir, if you were the action officer or your action
30 officers up at the CJ4, sir, when they had a project
31 to see it from start to finish, what did they have to
32 do in order to get that to the end, sir.

Bravo 33 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): The establishment of a COP or a FOB then you
34 would have to establish security, sometimes that would
35 mean contract security or it would mean establishment
36 of security from military sources, bringing in the
37 Class IV, making sure you had proper Class IV, making
38 sure you had life support for the contractors as well
39 as for the military personnel that were there,
40 ensuring that supplies were coming in on the bases

that would support the construction of the COP and the FOB. And then that is--and then monitoring the progress of that and if there are any issues, then continue to push--make sure that they got what they needed.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And would that action officer, sir, I am not sure if you have any personal experience taking a project from start to finish, would there be some sort of matrix or synchronizing type document to--excuse me, a document to kind of synchronize the efforts, you know, if you are using multiple contracts?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): We had those at the larger--again the CJTF level. Yes, we had those in the establishment of the COPs and the FOBs or building, especially as I set forth, when 10th Mountain came in--the 3d of the 10th, the establishment of those FOBs and COPs. When you lived down in RC South and we started establishing those and we had those kind of matrixes, well, that was to ensure that life support, Class IV material, and all of those things that I just spoke of, that they were getting in and arriving in a timeframe that supported the construction efforts and the timeline that was associated with that. I don't know what the brigades have, but they have brigade engineers in each headquarters, they were supposed to monitor those and actually that construction and make sure that that was done appropriately. And my assumption would be that, yes, they had the same thing.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): When the third brigade of the 10th mountain was establishing COPs or FOBs, do you recall any particular names of the COPs or FOBs that they were establishing?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yeah, but not right now. Give me a little bit and I will try to come back to it.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, and you were at the Division headquarters at that point, sir?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) : At the CJTF headquarters.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. And there was involvement at the CJTF Headquarters as the 3d of the 10th was establishing those COPs and FOBs?

Bravo COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, because there was--there were--no--not sufficient COPs and FOBs and life support to support the Brigade's arrival. So, we were setting up the structure for them to come in. And that is why the CJTF is involved. We also did winterization, we were involved in the winterization efforts monitoring that and the Brigade is responsible if they were going to expand or they were going to retract COPs and FOBs. They were responsible for where they were going to put those COPs and FOBs and then the establishment of those as well.

Beta LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): When the CJTF headquarters, sir, were involved in the planning for and through the completion of the FOB or COPs in the 3d of the 10th's area. Was there a team assembled in the CJTF Headquarters? Was it on the single action officer and if there was a team, sir, what functional areas would participate?

Bravo COL (b)(3), (b)(6): We had a weekly meeting that covered that and it had several IPR throughout the week for establishment of those FOBs and that carried through, as I understand it, it is still ongoing for RC South as well. So there was a weekly meeting that was a group that was put together for that and then again the action officers underneath that. Principals that would--that organization composed--it was composed of the Comptroller, myself, the 7, Log Cap, PARC, and I am trying to think, the JLC, and all agencies that might be involved that bring in supplies for actually establishing the COPs and FOBs. And that was briefed--the status of that was briefed to the DCGS once a week.

Beta LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, were you at the CJTF Headquarters when the 1st of the 503d established a CAP at Malikashey or relocated a COP to Marqal?

Bravo COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Do I remember those exactly? No, I don't remember those specifically.

Beta LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): In a normal course, if a battalion was establishing a new COP, what information would come up to CJTF sir?

Bravo COL (b)(3), (b)(6): In many cases, not a lot--not much information, if it is a platoon-sized COP or a small company-sized COP, beside the initial notification that one was

1 going to be established and then the request for
2 supplies or Class IV, any kind of stockage along that,
3 if we are going to move ammo, if we were going to pre-
4 position other kinds of sustainment at that location,
5 that is when the information would come to me.

Beta 6 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And what assets did you have to source that, sir?
7 What was your distribution system, if they wanted
8 Class IV to build a new COP, how would you do that?

Bravo 9 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, we have Class IV yards that we stocked the
10 Class IV and then transported that Class IV forward
11 using contractors usually. It would be contract
12 trucks.

Beta 13 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And what, just based on your own personal
14 experience, sir, what was the reliability of
15 contracted transportation in Afghanistan?

Bravo 16 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): I think that is--it is not a straight--I don't
17 think that I can give a straight answer to that, I
18 mean not just a very black and white answer. Contract
19 trucks were reliable as far as--for the most part as
20 far as getting and transporting sustainment from one
21 location to the next. What we found issues with was
22 with the timeline. You could not always count on
23 contract trucks to make the required delivery date.
24 It was just a principle; it was just the fact of doing
25 business in Afghanistan. But for the most part, we
26 used to get the stockages delivered where we wanted
27 them to. Now, at that time--or when I first got
28 there, we only had one truck company, one military
29 truck company and it was in lieu of unit, so it was
30 not even a truck unit. So, therefore, we had to --
31 and the reason I bring that up is because we had to
32 rely upon contract trucks to actually move things. It
33 was the way that we did business.

Beta 34 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) When you said, sir, they would not necessarily
35 hit the date, the delivery day, was there somewhat of
36 a norm, was it a couple days later was it a couple
37 weeks?

Bravo 38 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): It just all depended. It depended upon security,
39 it depended upon the threat at the time, it depended
40 upon weather, it just--where it needed to go. It
41 just--if it was something that had to get there, then

1 you either had to provide green truck escorts, put
2 them in a CLP to get something there----

Beta 3 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And that is the Combat Logistic Patrol?

Bravo 4 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, to get it there or you need to move it by
5 air. And some locations, air was all that you could
6 use because of the road infrastructure. Some
7 locations you had to provide escorts because the
8 contract trucks--due to the threat environment would
9 not go to certain locations.

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, as the CJTF CJ4, did you have kind of a view
11 where some areas of Afghanistan were easier to supply
12 or resupply and some were harder?

13 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Absolutely.

Beta 14 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What were they, sir? How did it break down from
15 your perspective, sir?

Bravo 16 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Up in the area in the northeast, there were
17 certain areas up in there that were very difficult to
18 get supplies up to because of the threat. There were
19 areas south, in the southeast of our sector as well
20 that were tough to get to as well, and then of course
21 the southern part if you look to the west of Kandahar,
22 then there was some areas that were tough to get to
23 because of the threat as well.

Beta 24 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And some of those areas were air-only, sir, for
25 resupply?

Bravo 26 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Some areas were air-only due to threat but much
27 of that was due to terrain.

Beta 28 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) In what area, if any, did you on that lower
29 level, the actual delivery, sir, did you have any role
30 as the CJ4?

Bravo 31 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, not as far as directing the movement at that-
32 -just providing oversight seeing where we need to
33 provide emphasis but the BSBs provided that support.

Beta 34 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And what is a BSB, sir?

Bravo 35 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Brigade Support Battalion.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And that is assigned in direct support of the
2 Brigade itself?

Bravo 3 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And did you have anything at your level, sir, a
5 unit of general support type unit?

Bravo 6 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): No.

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, do you recall----

Bravo 8 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you mean underneath the CJ4?

Beta 9 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

Bravo 10 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) No, no, the JLC was there providing oversight as
11 well.

Beta 12 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And that is----

Bravo 13 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): A Joint Logistic Command.

14 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And that is a sub-command of the CJTF?

Bravo 15 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, do you recall in the spring of last year or
17 early summer any request for funds for an
18 establishment of a COP at Wanat by a Task Force
19 Bayonet?

Bravo 20 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): I know that it occurred, but I do not remember a
21 request for it.

Beta 22 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): At any time, sir, while in Afghanistan, do you
23 recall receiving word that there were some critical
24 supply issues regarding the establishment of the COP
25 at Wanat?

Bravo 26 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, I do not. I know that there has been--there
27 had been supply issues--not supply issues, that was--
28 constraints or being able to get supplies to the
29 different COPs and FOBs, that was always a struggle,
30 that is something that the BSBs always struggled with,
31 moving those sustainment stocks out and again it was
32 because of terrain, it was because of weather, because
33 of the threat, it was just something that they fought
34 daily working through any method--any means possible

to get things out. It was just--it was not easy for those guys to get it done. And they did a great job, I mean, those guys are heroes, they did a super job getting that stuff out, it was just--it was just a hard--it was hard getting the stuff out to the smaller COPs and FOBs, it was just the environment. But as far as specifically at Wanat, no, I don't remember anything specifically on Wanat as far as the establishment of that or there is difficulty in preparing it and getting it ready.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): How about other than Wanat, sir, was there any other time that a new position was being established and they were having difficulties that you learned about it up at the CJTF level?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Nothing specific to sustainment.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What did you learn on that other one, sir?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): There could have been concerns of threat, concerns of maybe--I know there has been concerns at time because of weather in trying to get things established before the winter came in and making sure that their life support was set but, I can't think of anything else really.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): On any given day, sir, during your tour, at your level and your supply stocks, would you have HESCOs, sir? If a unit wanted to establish a COP tomorrow, would you have the HESCOs that they needed on hand or the wood that they needed on hand or the sandbags or the concertina? Or would that have to be brought into Afghanistan?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): The answer to that is yes and no. We did have stocks on hand, we did keep stocks on hand, DLA did a really good job, actually starting to stock--providing some stocks forward in Kabul, so that worked out well, that was later on. Initially the time lag was between 6 and 9 months, if it was not in country, I should be getting those stocks in--the Class IV stockage and it has gotten much better now. So you had to plan out, but we did have some stocks on hand, it just depended upon at any one time if that stock was there or not.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): If the package, sir, was moving into the COP establishments and the engineers had done their

business and said you are going to need X, Y, and Z to do it, as it heads-up through the JFUB process, is it someone in your office that would oversee that and say, hey, we are going to need that order--we have this amount on hand, we need to order some more?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Between the 7 and my guys, the 7 would do the requirements and my guys would actually help to push those requests through the system.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Was there ever--do you recall any time, sir, that a project could not go forward because you did not have the supplies needed?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, in fact, I feel very good about that. I don't think that there was ever an instance where we stopped constructions because we did not have the stocks.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you ever have to modify a construction, sir, because of a shortage--not having a particular item on hand?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): We had some really great Soldiers, especially in the 7 section, they were able to take--the answer to that is no, I believe the answer is, yes it was modified, but it did not slow down construction. And by modification, what the guys were able to do, if they did not have a 2x16 or a 4x16, they were able to take several 2x4s put them together and still make things work. And that is a very simple example, probably not exactly correct, but a simple example. But they were able to take the designs and actually work through the designs to make things happen; to actually make--get the--put the project together so it did not--and with the goal, and we push extremely hard so that we did not slow down or hamper the operational construct and what the plan was to the Brigade Commander.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): If, sir, after the JFUB approved a project and the contracts start to be let, gear is pushed forward, who actually is pushing that gear forward, sir?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Okay, so it's sustainment that is stocked, as an example, let's say we had a Class IV yard in Bagram and we are trying to push this to a COP forward. The Brigade that ordered that would go up through the 7

and the 7 would actually authorize it. It would go down to the contracted----

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): You say 7, sir, what was the role of the 7 in the CJTF? What did the 7 do?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): The 7 is the engineer. So the engineer would say roger, we are going to allocate this much Class IV for this project and once it is allocated at the yard--the Class IV yard, that would be contracted through the transportation battalion who would then contract trucks, contractors to come in and actually pick it up in the Class IV yard and push it down to the different COPs. If the Class that were--we would push Class IV yards down to the Brigade level as well and that could have come out of Bagram or it could have come out at the Brigade level as well, the Brigade site, to be pushed out to the sites also.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And once it gets to the--once it is pushed forward to a battalion FOB, sir, is the role of the CJ4 effectively complete at that point and it is now on the unit to complete the next portion--if further on transport is required, is that down on the unit now to do the last portion?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, we try to push straight from the Class IV yard down to where it was needed and if it went down to the battalion level, it was transferred to the battalion and then battalion would take it or the Brigade would take it at that point and then push it to that smaller level COP there. Once it got to that location where we pushed it from Bagram and it got to the Brigade and the Brigade took hold of it, they could always redirect it upon Brigade priorities or they would then push it out to that lower level location; if it was not direct through put.

So, I guess the answer is, if it is a direct through put we would monitor it all of the way, if it was not direct through put it was going to the Brigade or coming from the Brigade, if the Brigade was moving it internally, it would be their responsibility.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And once it had gotten to the site, sir, or down to the battalion or brigade level, is someone, is there a document that is signed or an email sent back saying, "roger, we got it"----

Bravo 1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yeah, it is a show approval that is how the
2 contractor is confirmed--confirmation that it was
3 moved and then they get paid or get payment. It has
4 to be signed off by a guy on the ground that it has
5 arrived.

Beta 6 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Check, sir, thank you, sir. Lieutenant Colonel
Sigma 7 (b)(3), (b)(6)

Sigma 8 **LTC**(b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, who was the CJ7?

Bravo 9 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): CJ7 was Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Chivas

Sigma 10 **LTC**(b)(3), (b)(6) And was there some type of battle rhythm event that
11 tracked construction? Did they talk about that in the
12 commander's update?

Bravo 13 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): We had winterization meetings that occurred
14 weekly. I chaired it one week and then the "S"
15 chaired it the next week. So we would go off and on
16 like that and that tracked the improvements moving up
17 into winter. It also then continued on looking at
18 construction projects as well.

Sigma 19 **LTC**(b)(3), (b)(6) Was there probably something maintained probably by
20 the 7 that showed these are all of the outposts that
21 are under construction or in place?

Bravo 22 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes.

Sigma 23 **LTC**(b)(3), (b)(6) And that is something that the 7 would monitor or the
24 4?

Bravo 25 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): That would be something that the 7 would monitor.

Sigma 26 **LTC**(b)(3), (b)(6) Sir?

27 **LtGen Natonski:** You mentioned contract security was
28 available?

Bravo 29 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, we had some contract security--different
30 types, there was contract security for fixed sites.

31 **LtGen Natonski:** Who provided that?

Bravo 32 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): That was done, sir, the PARC actually provided
33 the contracts for that and it was local Afghans.

34 **LtGen Natonski:** So these would be Afghans with rifles?

Bravo 1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

2 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.

Bravo 3 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): And then you also had--we were trying to
4 establish--each--well, let me say this--each trucking
5 company had some level of security--each afghan truck
6 company.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** Organic to it----

Bravo 8 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Organic to it, it could have been a guy in cab
9 with a driver with a rifle or in some cases they had
10 trucks that would go along with that for enhanced
11 security that had crew served weapons in it. And then
12 we were actually working through a contract last that
13 got approved to provide security of--contract
14 security--actually the ESC would be able to----

15 **LtGen Natonski:** And the ESC is?

Bravo 16 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Expeditionary Sustainment Command--the 143d, but
17 that did not come on board until right before we were
18 getting ready to leave, so it was not in place when we
19 pulled out.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** The contract--was there formations like
21 platoons in contract security or were these mostly to
22 provide local security to the movement of contract
23 vehicles?

Bravo 24 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Local security on site and then, sir, then they
25 would be for the trucking company.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay, local security on site. How big of
27 force could you envision in something like that?

Bravo 28 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I think it all depend upon the size of the
29 COP and the FOB.

30 **LtGen Natonski:** But they would actually put Afghan--not
31 Afghan National Army but-----

Bravo 32 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Afghan Security Guard, sir.

33 **LtGen Natonski:** Security Guards?

Bravo 1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. The ASGs and they were not--they were
2 not paid as well as the Afghan Army, the Soldiers--
3 Afghan Soldiers.

4 **LtGen Natonski:** What kind of reputation did the ASG have?

Bravo 5 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) As I understand it, sir, pretty good. They would
6 right.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** And they could be in terms of a platoon then
8 depending on the size of the site?

Bravo 9 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): I am very reluctant to say the size guides it
10 because truly, I just don't know. I just don't know
11 the size. I know that they would--the force was
12 contracted appropriate to the size of the COP and FOB.

13 **LtGen Natonski:** You mentioned RC South, was CJTF-101
14 responsible for RC South?

Bravo 15 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, initially.

16 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay, this is before NATO forces assumed RC
17 South?

Bravo 18 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir, this is after--U.S. Forces--and this
19 really looking at U.S. Forces as they are starting to
20 move in and we were the national support element----

21 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay, I got you.

Bravo 22 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Until U.S. Forces Alpha actually stood up and
23 took that role. So, while you had National Command
24 Element responsibilities for RC East, we had National
25 Support Element responsibilities for Afghanistan.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** All of Afghanistan?

Bravo 27 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

28 **LtGen Natonski:** I heard you mention RC South and I was
29 wondering----

Bravo 30 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Once, U.S. forces stood up, then they took those
31 responsibilities over and then took lead on the
32 expansion--U.S. force expansion in RC South.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** Are you familiar, at all, with the
2 contracting that was done for Afghan construction
3 personnel and vehicles for Wanat?

Bravo 4 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** No, sir, not specifically for Wanat.

5 **LtGen Natonski:** So, you did not get down to that level?

Bravo 6 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** No, sir.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** And that would have been--you mentioned
8 contracting it--hat would have been done at the
9 Brigade level?

Bravo 10 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** At the Brigade and Battalion-level, yes, sir.

11 **LtGen Natonski:** And the stocks of engineer supplies that
12 would have been pushed down through the CJTF to the
13 brigades and potentially down to the battalion,
14 depending on the construction?

Bravo 15 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Here is my understanding on how it should have
16 worked, sir. Wanat, I think it was a platoon-sized
17 COP, so the battalion would have given approval of
18 "Yes, we want to establish this COP". They would have
19 said, "This is the size, here are how many people we
20 want to put here, here is what we think the
21 requirements are." That would have gone up to the
22 Brigade Engineer. The Brigade Engineer would have
23 looked at the plans and the battalion would have said,
24 "Roger, I understand this and modify it as necessary."
25 That would have gone up in the JFUB and gone back up
26 to the CJ7 for approval to look at to see, "Roger and
27 we got these stocks on hand. Here is where we are
28 going to pull from." Many of those stocks probably
29 should have come from Jalalabad, that location, some
30 could have come from Babec, some could have actually
31 come from stocks in Sherona/Sherlerno. And that would
32 have been pushed up to a central location because as I
33 understood it, those stocks that were pushed out to
34 Wanat, I believe----

35 **LtGen Natonski:** They would have gone to Blessing?

Bravo 36 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) They could have, sir, I am not sure.

37 It would have gone out from that location and
38 then out to Wanat. And that transport could have been

1 going to Jalalabad to say from Sherona or from Bagram
2 to Jalalabad or to Blessing. Most of that would
3 probably would have been contract truck transport to
4 those locations. From there out to Wanat, it could
5 have been contract trucks or it could have been green
6 trucks as well.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** Or aviation?

Bravo 8 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Aviation. The one thing about aviation, but your
9 CH47s and at that point, sir, you are talking about,
10 especially for Class IV, you got limited amount of--
11 you can choose, sir, between sustainment, ammo, Class
12 IV personnel are the 47s and with any kind of air.
13 So, would they have pushed Class IV by air? I am not
14 sure if they would have pushed that much for air.

15 **LtGen Natonski:** Is that why they didn't?

Bravo 16 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes, sir.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** Now if there was a problem with the Afghan
18 construction company and it was brought up by the
19 platoon and the company, did it ever get to the
20 Division level or was it handled down at the Brigade?

Bravo 21 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** It should have been handled down at the Brigade
22 level, sir, for that.

23 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.

Bravo 24 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** We would have looked at--and we dealt with the
25 same--for movements we dealt with a larger multi-
26 million dollar contracts for Afghan trucking within
27 our sector. And then moving the--as we were the
28 National Support Element, movement down south as well.
29 But the smaller trucking--the smaller transport that
30 was done at the battalion and brigade-level.

31 **LtGen Natonski:** Were you sensitive in contracting with the
32 Afghans sending different tribes of Afghans into like
33 a different region and where different tribes regions
34 were?

Bravo 35 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** The trucking company themselves did a pretty good
36 job of policing that and knowing where to go and when
37 and who--where they could go----

1 **LtGen Natonski:** They would not bid on a contract if there
2 were any reluctance about going into that area?

Bravo 3 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): They would bid on it, sir, but they might have
4 put their price much higher. In other words, they
5 were going to make money off of it and that is the
6 reason that they did this.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** How reliable, in your observation, were the
8 Afghan contractors either the construction workers, or
9 the truckers or the general trucks?

Bravo 10 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Most of the construction works, as I understand
11 it, sir, came from the local area. So, again, it is
12 day labors that you are bringing up, not very skilled,
13 took a long time to get things done. You had to train
14 them as they go along. So, anything beyond just basic
15 manual labor, not skilled labor, that is what you were
16 looking at. Now, for skilled technicians, the
17 tradesman----

18 **LtGen Natonski:** Guys who could run a vehicle----

Bravo 19 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): A vehicle----

20 **LtGen Natonski:** A bulldozer, a backhoe, or----

Bravo 21 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): I think those. Reliable, sir, they would show up
22 for work, sometimes you would have man camps in order
23 to keep people there until construction was complete.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** What is a man camp?

Bravo 25 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Just a camp that you would keep the Afghans, you
26 would have life support for them, make sure that they
27 were fed, there is a place for them to live, and that
28 was a security thing for both the American Soldiers
29 and Marines as well as it protected the Afghans from
30 the insurgents that were supporting, they were working
31 on the FOBs. So you keep them in certain locations to
32 make sure that they showed up for work and to make
33 sure that they were protected.

34 **LtGen Natonski:** What was the expectation if you had a
35 contract with one of these companies, was it normally
36 a timely execution of the contract or were they
37 consistently late or?

Bravo 1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): They would try to make the timeline, sir. I
2 mean, it is not like they would try not to make it or
3 that they did not care, they would try to make the
4 timeline because they got--they were evaluated off of
5 that so if they made timelines on a regular basis on
6 the RDD, then they would get paid more at the end. So
7 it is to their advantage to make the timeline.

8 **LtGen Natonski:** Do you have a rough estimate of the number
9 of COPs that are overseen by the CJTF while you were
10 there?

Bravo 11 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, that number fluctuated and it also depends
12 upon how you--if you included OPs or not but it was, I
13 think, the count was about 100, anywhere--it
14 fluctuated 100 plus or minus.

15 **LtGen Natonski:** Somewhere in there----

Bravo 16 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): About a 100, yes, sir.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** Approximately 100.

Bravo 18 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

19 **MG Perkins:** Was there a daily log report that came up to CJ4
20 for channels of tracking all classes of supplies?

Bravo 21 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, sir, it actually went up through the JLC.
22 It went from the battalions to the BSBs then the BSB
23 with the JLC and then we grabbed a hold of that as
24 well.

25 **MG Perkins:** And it covered all classes of supply?

Bravo 26 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

27 **MG Perkins:** And was it sort of green, amber, red, black kind
28 of stuff or do you remember the matrix?

Bravo 29 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): I mean, it had colors on there, sir, but it dealt
30 more with numbers and it dealt more with percentages
31 than just Green, Amber, Black.

32 **MG Perkins:** And was this covered in any sort of daily update
33 to the commander or internal to the staff or
34 something?

Bravo 1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** It was, sir, it was actually--there was a--there
2 was a daily update to the JLC SPO and we listened in
3 on that as well or went there for that and that was
4 done via breeze and then there was a weekly session at
5 the JLC also to look at that and then once a month we
6 did a logistic meeting and there would be us.

7 **MG Perkins:** Were there any critical areas of supply that if
8 it came up red or black were immediate attention
9 getters?

Bravo 10 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** III and V, definitely, it was not as big of an
11 issue because Supreme dealt with that and they pushed
12 out and you always keyed on that but that was
13 something that--we did not have as big of issue at
14 that as we did with Class III and V, just watching it
15 constantly. Also, in the commander's update briefs,
16 and that occurred about 3 to 4 times a week and then
17 that update, that supply update from the different
18 COPS was actually, it was an overview that was given
19 to----

20 **MG Perkins:** Was it by COP or?

Bravo 21 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** It was actually, yes, sir, by major COPs that
22 were out there; any of them that were showing amber or
23 red status or black statuses.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** So, if you had a platoon COP but if it was
25 amber, red, or black, it would----

Bravo 26 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** It would come up----

27 **MG Perkins:** Its visibility would come up at your level.

Bravo 28 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** The visibility would have come up and you would
29 had been able to see and the CG--it would had been
30 briefed to everybody right there and both the Brigade
31 commander would have had a chance to say something
32 about it as well as the JLC commander. And that would
33 have come from the stock--the information would have
34 come from the--again, it would have come up--the
35 information through the battalion, to the BSB, and
36 then to the JLC.

37 **MG Perkins:** Do you ever remember specifically with regards to
38 Wanat, amber, red, or black status coming up on any
39 class of supplies in any of your routine briefs?

Bravo 1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

2 **MG Perkins:** And as you described it, even though Wanat was
3 only a platoon COP, if they were red or black, you
4 would have seen that as a platoon COP and it would
5 have been briefed to the CG or the chief, or something
6 like that.

Bravo 7 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. But I never remember anything--in
8 fact, sir, I did not realize that there were issues
9 with truthfully with sustainment until I actually read
10 about it.

11 **MG Perkins:** No, I understand, that is why I am just trying to
12 understand and who and how.

Bravo 13 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): And the reason that I bring that up, sir, is
14 because I never remembered that being something that
15 was a major issue in Afghanistan. It wasn't something
16 that was brought up in Afghanistan. It was not
17 something that was brought up that we have got to push
18 water, push Class IV, push something to Wanat.

19 **MG Perkins:** Speaking of water, was there a macro, like bulk
20 water contract with Afghanistan that you guys manage
21 for like all of the bottle water?

Bravo 22 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): There are several contracts for bulk water. From
23 Pakistan to throughout--a couple locations in
24 Afghanistan as well.

25 **MG Perkins:** Was that generally a push item that you had sort
26 of come up with a matrix of how much water we use a
27 week or a month versus well we are not going to order
28 any water until we get a request for water.

Bravo 29 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, we had stocks, very ample stocks on hand.
30 Extremely up on stocks within Kabul at the supreme
31 warehouses. We then pushed--that water was always
32 pushed out as well. I never know----

33 **MG Perkins:** So you never reached----

Bravo 34 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): I never had a location that got close to going to
35 black or red on water.

36 **MG Perkins:** Coming back to the Class IV, at a lot of places
37 you had Class IV yards like, even the battalions and

brigade, and they would have, for the lack of a better term, sort of a basic load of Class IV that they would have to----

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): You had that for Jalalabad and I think they pushed some out to the different locations as well. That was a pushed item in many cases----

MG Perkins: So it was a pushed item of certain stockage?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

MG Perkins: And then somebody has what they manage as their basic load that they would use for FOB or COP repair or do things like that and then they put together a project to say build a COP and then it goes through the JFUB and say, okay, we need 50 2x4s and they look at their stockage and say well we have 80 2x4 for instance. Would they just pull from their Class IV or would it go forward as a contract for that COP and then it would sort of be back-filled or how would that work?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Contract, sir, the contract is put into place to transport that Class IV.

MG Perkins: Yes.

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): The Class IV is actually managed then by the U.S. forces on site. If you had it on site in Jalalabad as an example then you get approval from the CJ7 unless it was a stock that was controlled at the Brigade level and then we get approval to allocate that Class IV, that Class IV thing would then be pushed out via air or via green truck, a CLP. Or the contract trucks to the COP. Then it would be immediately requisitioned again and then pushed to replacement.

MG Perkins: So, if a battalion was doing a project for Class IV and the approval went up through brigade or whoever was the approval authority to do that; and the supplies are on hand, the contract; "generated by that project" is really an authorization to withdraw after your basic load whatever Class IV and then it is sort of automatic of the Class IV to refill your basic load?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

1 **MG Perkins:** So, in other words, you would not then--I am
2 doing this, I need this many sandbags, 2x4s, and I go
3 out and have a contract for those, it is really an
4 authorization to draw from supplies.

Bravo 5 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** That is correct, sir.

6 **MG Perkins:** And then again, your Class IV stockage and all of
7 that were monitored on your LOG SIT reps and daily
8 reports, etc, like that?

Bravo 9 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Down to the eaches, we were down to monitoring
10 2x4s, HESCO Barriers, Wire----

11 **MG Perkins:** Do you ever remember specifically in the July
12 timeframe--June, July timeframe of any significant
13 Class IV shortages and then your various Class IV
14 yards?

Bravo 15 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Sir, we always had shortages, I mean, we always
16 had issues with Class IV. It was just until DLA
17 started pushing stockages forward, which is really a
18 great initiative on their part to do that, there was--
19 something was always a give and take and understanding
20 that we needed to know priorities because for many
21 cases you would take to say the sector in the south or
22 the Sherona, as an example, we may take from Sherona
23 and those stocks to support that brigade and push it
24 up north to support an operation or a construction of
25 a COP somewhere else. So you will need to back-fill
26 that. It was always a give and take and you are
27 moving dice around in a shell game.

28 **MG Perkins:** I understand that there was sort of a routine
29 resupply, the Pesh Ring I think it was.

Bravo 30 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** There are several different ring routes
31 throughout RC East location.

32 **MG Perkins:** Did your shop get involved in sort of
33 prioritizing what went on those and managing them or
34 who did that?

Bravo 35 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Sir, actually what we did, the Brigade controlled
36 the ring route, but my shop did, and I was personally
37 responsible for that was the actual organization that
38 the ring route and looking at when it would fly. And
39 that was done in conjunction with the Brigade and as

1 far as who got on the plane as far as what stocks
2 would get on that aircraft to go, that was controlled-
3 -that was the helicopter ring route that we are
4 talking about?

5 **MG Perkins:** Right.

Bravo 6 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Then that would be by the Brigade. The Brigade
7 would then determine what would go on those aircraft.

8 **MG Perkins:** So the Brigade sort of set the priority in
9 determining what was going on each lift. Who
10 allocated how--as you say, there were various ring
11 routes, who would allocate how many aircraft were on
12 ring route A or ring route B?

Bravo 13 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** That was set, sir. That was set, use two
14 aircraft.

15 **MG Perkins:** Okay, if a brigade had a special requirement,
16 say, "look for this week, I need three aircraft." How
17 is----

Bravo 18 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** What has happened pretty regularly, sir----

19 **MG Perkins:** And who would the Brigade go through to do that?

Bravo 20 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** The Brigade would actually go through the JLC or
21 through my shop to actually get that--request that to
22 get additional aircraft that would go to the commander
23 of the aviation brigade to see if we could resource
24 another aircraft as well. We did that trade-off
25 pretty regularly. And as far as the Pesh resupply
26 ring route, if for any reason that was going to be
27 canceled that had to go up to, at a minimum, my level
28 and then go up to the chief of staff level for
29 approval as well. So, it--it was not something that
30 was cancelled and no one monitored it. It was
31 something that was brought up to a level of the CJTF
32 to know that that ring route would not occur.

33 **MG Perkins:** And you said that a number of times, brigades had
34 come up and said, I need more aircraft, and you would
35 move one from another? Do you remember that occurring
36 at all in the June / July timeframe requesting
37 additional aircraft?

Bravo 1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Not specifically for Wanat, sir. I know that
2 there were always--not always, almost that--there was
3 pretty regularly concerns or needs for additional
4 aircraft for either operational missions, not
5 sustainment, not logistics, or for logistic missions
6 and you had to surge aircraft on one date or another
7 date or for one reason or another reason and we would
8 work that out.

9 **MG Perkins:** So you did all Class IX parts as well, repair
10 parts?

Bravo 11 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

12 **MG Perkins:** Do you remember throughout your tour of duty
13 there being an issue with inaccurate parts or constant
14 issues with small arms malfunctioning having to get
15 new parts, you know, contract repair, just as a
16 general macro?

Bravo 17 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** No, sir. I do not remember any concern across
18 the board with SARP at all.

19 **MG Perkins:** Last question, some people we talked to, they
20 referred to sort of a COP-in-a-box as engineers, in
21 other words, you sort of have this standard design or
22 something like that, is that a term you guys used or
23 are familiar with?

Bravo 24 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** We tried to work that out, sir, and finally, I
25 think what we were able to do was--and the principle
26 we were trying to--we did it in order to try to get
27 requisitions from DLA, so they could start planning
28 because if I was going to build a company-sized COP or
29 I was going to build a battalion-sized FOB then what
30 type of Class IV and how much would I need. So we
31 could then tell DLA, we are going to build three
32 battalion-sized COPs or FOBs in the month of December,
33 it is now June and that would allow them to then
34 requisition that and start putting into a pipeline.

35 **MG Perkins:** So, it was a way to generate demand on the supply
36 system?

Bravo 37 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes, sir.

1 **MG Perkins:** It wasn't necessarily you had them preposition as
2 literally, you know, from here to here are a stack of
3 stuff and that is a COP----

Bravo 4 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** No, sir.

5 **MG Perkins:** Worth of stuff----

Bravo 6 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Some of the Brigades may have done that, sir,
7 they may have had stocks set aside and knew what their
8 design looked like and would push it out. I did not
9 get anything--I did not get involved in anything that
10 detailed down at the brigade-level. I was mainly
11 focused on the requirements and being able to get that
12 pushed into country.

13 **MG Perkins:** Okay, thanks.

Beta 14 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, what--from the CJ4 level, when you had RIPs
15 going on, say a brigade RIP where the Brigade and its
16 two battalions were RIPing out and a new Brigade
17 coming in with its battalions, what, if any, strain
18 did that put on the logistics piece from the CJTF-
19 level, sir? What were your observations as far as
20 impact on logistics?

Bravo 21 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** There was an impact, but we just--I felt that we
22 were pretty successful because we planned for it. And
23 it had to be a lot of details from the Brigade side,
24 the Brigade-level because you had a COP that could
25 only sleep so many people, house so many people. And
26 so if I put an extra squad of guys on there then you
27 are putting bunks in other locations outside wherever
28 you are trying to establish a life support for those
29 additional personnel that--there was not swing space
30 in other words. So that had to be--that RIP-in/RIP-
31 out had to be really closely monitored by the Brigade
32 and we dealt mainly with the transportation of those
33 personnel in and out and then the life support at the
34 larger locations. As an example, Sherlono / Sharona
35 and Bagram, there was a strain, there was additional
36 personnel coming in but it can always be managed.

Beta 37 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** The transportation, sir, air transportation of
38 personnel, did you have control of the aircraft that
39 moved the people in and out?

Bravo 40 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And were those aircraft, were they diverted for
2 other missions or did you own them and that was the
3 priority for the Division to get those forces in and
4 out?

Bravo 5 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): I personally controlled the C-130s and then
6 helped manage the C-17s that would fly from your
7 different A-Pods and your airstrips back to Bagram and
8 then the C-17 up to Manus or down to Kuwait. So, I
9 would manage that and would then look at C-130s and
10 the 47s. That would go to your major hubs, your 47s
11 with your C-130s to Jalalabad and Sherlono and
12 Sharona. Below that then the Brigade would actually
13 control that movement back to those major hubs. Does
14 that make sense?

Beta 15 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): The 47s, you said to sequence them?

Bravo 16 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, the 47s and we would sequence those then to
17 go from the major hubs back to Bagram and then the
18 smaller COPs the Brigades would get the personnel from
19 the smaller COPs back to the major hubs. But that did
20 not take, that was not--that was in addition to the
21 ring routes. So, that is not something that took the
22 place of the ring routes.

Beta 23 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): All right, sir, and when you were RIPing a
24 brigade with battalions in and out, was that the focus
25 of effort for the Division at that point?

Bravo 26 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes. I mean, it was a large focus, it was not
27 the only focus, there were too much other things--too
28 many other things going on. We had something and we
29 had a weekly or twice weekly meeting and it all
30 depended upon where we were in the process to RIP out
31 units.

Beta 32 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): In those 47s, sir, that you were moving the folks
33 in that first link after they got off the fixed wing,
34 did you effectively own those at the Division-level
35 during the RIP so that you could do that initial
36 movement of folks?

Bravo 37 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): We had so many that were allocated to do the
38 moves as far as owning them, they were not put under
39 operational control of the CJ4, but they were
40 missioned, they are tasked by the 3, it was part of
41 the plan, there was a plan that was put out, we knew

1 when they were going, what they were supposed to--
2 leave, come back, fly, how many people were supposed
3 to be on them, it was something that was--again, it
4 was a very detailed plan.

Beta 5 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, if I could take you back to one of the first
6 questions that I asked you, regarding the--when the
7 Division--or the CJTF was establishing a COP,
8 initially for 3d brigade of the 10th. You mentioned
9 that there were some documents that reflected the
10 planning?

Bravo 11 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Umm-hmm.

Beta 12 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Would it be so detailed that it would say, on
13 day-3 this type of progress would be made or these
14 supplies would arrive?

Bravo 15 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): When the 3d of the 10th came in, their equipment
16 was stacked by battalion, by company going to COPs.
17 So all the thing--the company commanders when they
18 arrived, they could look down and they could see all
19 of their equipment. And then we knew from that
20 equipment, when those pieces of equipment--and working
21 with brigade, when those pieces of equipment then
22 would move out to the COPs and to the FOBs. So we
23 knew when they were going to move. It was an OpPlan
24 that was put together so we knew what ISR was there
25 with them, what was going out. We knew how many
26 Soldiers were going to be on each day, when they were
27 going to arrive, we knew how much--the Four would know
28 how much food we had to have on hand, how much fuel
29 was being arrive--when the fuel was supposed to
30 arrive, how much was supposed to be there, every day
31 we knew the same about ammo, when the ammo was
32 supposed to arrive, when it was supposed to get there,
33 who was going to come in for the accountable officer,
34 when the accountable officer was suppose to sign for
35 the ammo. Class IX the same thing, we knew when the
36 Class IX was supposed to arrive, we knew when it was
37 supposed to get to the COP, when the accountable
38 officer was going to come in, when he was supposed to
39 sign for it. Let me--I'm telling you, it was a very
40 detailed plan throughout. We knew the expansion, when
41 this was supposed to happen, when that was--I mean,
42 expansion, when this should be completed, when another
43 portion should be completed. It was--it had to be
44 done in that detail. We had to look at it in that

1 detail, there was too many moving parts, it just could
2 not be done otherwise.

Beta 3 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And sir, when those COPs for the 3d of the 10th
4 were being set up, do you recall from the date the
5 first Soldiers arrived until HESCOS were up and full?
6 Was there an average, sir, was it a week? Was it two
7 months?

Bravo 8 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Per COP?

Beta 9 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

Bravo 10 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Or per FOB?

Beta 11 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

Bravo 12 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): I mean, let's see, I think the initial birms were
13 constructed in about a week and then you are able to
14 start to get the ASG security that came in and then
15 you are able to put in U.S. Security expansion out at
16 that point. I mean, I would have to guess for those
17 larger ones, you are talking about a week. Small
18 locations, I am not sure what that would--of course
19 then it would be different in that location than it
20 would in P2K versus N2K, then there would be a
21 difference in each location just because of the
22 terrain, because of the threat, the environment, I am
23 not sure you would be able to say that in this
24 location it would be this matrix and in that location
25 it would be this matrix. It had to be worked with the
26 guys on the ground to kind of know what had been done
27 historically and what they thought they would be able
28 to accomplish.

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Thank you, sir.

30 **LtGen Natonski:** Was there a designated main effort within
31 the CJTF during this timeframe? Was it engaging the
32 people with COIN? Interdiction? Was there just a
33 kind of generic focus of effort within CJTF?

Bravo 34 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, the 3 would be much better off to give you
35 as far as the focus of priorities. COIN was
36 definitely a priority with working with the people.
37 The CG had very clear guidance on what he wanted to
38 achieve, that was done through his approval, it was
39 briefed--those things were briefed to him--I can't

remember the name of the meeting right now, but they came up for his approval, he made sure that was very clear, the Brigade Commanders had to brief back to him on what their concept was and how it synched in with his priorities.

LtGen Natonski: So the establishment of COPs all dovetailed at the Brigade and Battalion level with meeting the expectations and guidance from the Division?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes, sir. The CG was very clear about that and the brigade commanders, I think that, they should have had a very clear understanding of what the priorities were and where the CG wanted to go.

LtGen Natonski: Of course it was your job to support his priorities with logistics.

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: Okay, I have to read you another spiel here. Bravo Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), you are ordered not to discuss the testimony that you provided today with anyone other than members of the investigation team. You will not allow any witness in this investigation to talk to you about the testimony that he has given or which he intends to give. If anyone should try to influence your testimony or attempt to discuss your testimony, Beta you are instructed to notify Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma or Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you understand?

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: I just want to thank you for your service to our country, to the U.S. Army, and for all you did on your last deployment and wish you luck in your current assignment.

Bravo **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Thank you, sir.

LtGen Natonski: Thank you very much.

[The testimony closed at 0932, 3 November 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Bravo

Subj: TESTIMONY OF COL (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, GIVEN ON 3 NOVEMBER 2009, AT NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

Beta

Beta

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Lieutenant Colonel
U.S. Marine Corps
Staff Judge Advocate

9 November 2009
DATE