

1 [The testimony began at 1553, 6 October 2009.]
2

3 **LtGen Natonski:** I'm Lieutenant General Richard F. Natonski,
4 United States Marine Corps. I have been appointed by
5 the commander of U.S. Central Command to conduct an
6 investigation into the facts and circumstances
7 surrounding the combat action at Wanat, Afghanistan
8 during July 2008. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) and **Beta**
9 **Sigma** Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) are judge advocates
10 assigned to the investigation team. They are to my
11 right.
12

13 The testimony you provide today will be recorded,
14 transcribed, and included in our report of the
15 investigation. Based on your testimony, we may also
16 prepare a separate written statement for your review
17 and signature. Prior to coming on the record today,
18 you signed a Privacy Act Statement.
19

20 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.
21

22 **LtGen Natonski:** Your testimony will be made under oath. You
23 will now be sworn.
24

25 [The witness was sworn.]
26

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Please state your full name, spelling your last.
28

29 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy
30

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) What is your current unit and the unit's
32 location?
33

34 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Current unit is (b)(6)
35 (b)(6)
36 **Beta**

37 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) And you're currently a sergeant in the U.S.
38 Marine Corps?
39

40 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I am, sir.
41

Beta 42 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy In July 2008, what was your unit and that unit's
43 location?
44

45 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I was with the RCAC unit. I've been forward
46 deployed to Camp Blessing and been FAP'd out to Wanat,
47 Afghanistan.

1
2 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Would you please for the record, just describe
3 what a RCAC is.
4
5 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Regional Corps Advisory Command. We dealt with
6 major generals up at Black Horse and the president of
7 Afghanistan, Karzi-----
8
9 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) You work with the Afghan National Army advising?
10
11 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. I was part of the ETT.
12
13 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) In July 2008, what was your rank?
14
15 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I was a corporal.
16
17 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) You had previously provided some statements
18 regarding the combat action at Wanat on 13 July 2008
19 as part of the Army's 15-6 investigation. You
20 provided a four-page statement. And then on 18
21 February 2009, you provided a 13-page transcript from
22 **Garnet** your interview with Mr. (b)(6) from CSI. Did you
23 get a chance to review those statements today?
24
25 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I did, sir.
26
27 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Is there anything you'd like to change about
28 those statements?
29
30 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy No, sir.
31
32 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you, in fact, sign the first page of both of
33 those documents?
34
35 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I did, sir.
36
37 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And do you adopt both of those documents as part
38 of your sworn testimony today?
39
40 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
41
42 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): What is your MOS?
43
44 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy 3451, fiscal comptroller----.
45
46 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) How did you come to be on an advisory team as a
47 fiscal comptroller?

1
2 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I'd been put in charge of the 12-man shop with 2
3 PFC's and everyone else had rotated out or been FAP'd
4 out. I successfully did the job for seven months.
5 They gave me a NAM and the possibility of combat
6 action, and I jumped for it. They asked if I wanted
7 to join the next ETT team. I said affirmative and
8 when do I get to go, and they put me on the next team
9 in October with the RCAC.

10
11 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) And that's October of 2007?
12

13 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
14

15 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay. And ETT stands for what?
16

17 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Embedded Training Team.
18

19 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay. And is that a subordinate unit of the
20 RCAC?
21

22 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. The RCAC is the primary command and I
23 think we had eight ETT's below that, but even with the
24 RCAC it's still an Embedded Training Team.
25

26 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Who was the RCAC commander?
27

28 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy It would be Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) **Amber**
29

30 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) And was there another officer in the chain of
31 command?
32

33 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) **Gamma**
34

35 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you know Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6),Zulu
36

37 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I do, sir.
38

39 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Was he in your chain as well?
40

41 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy He was not in my chain. He was a subordinate
42 RCAC--or subordinate ETT. He fell under Colonel
43 **Amber** (b)(3),(b)(6) but my direct command was to Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) **Amber**
44 through Sergeant Major (b)(3),(b)(6) since I was a driver
45 guy.
46 **Steeler**

47 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So you came off of Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) personal team? **Amber**

1
2 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.

3
4 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) How long had you been in Afghanistan as part of
5 an ETT?
6

7 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I arrived in--February 21st.

8
9 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Two thousand and eight?

10
11 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct.

12
13 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) And your initial assignment was with an Afghan
14 unit or with Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) and his --
15

16 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I was originally with Colonel **Amber** **Amber**
17 (b)(3),(b)(6) at Camp
18 Black Horse. I'd been FAP'd out for smaller units and
19 smaller operations before Wanat.

20 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) You would go out and work with an Afghan National
21 Army unit for just a particular operation?
22

23 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir. Like--ratifications or other
24 operations of such magnitude. Also working with the
25 French and their Afghan counterparts.
26

27 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) What was the unit, the Afghan National Army at
28 Wanat? Do you recall?
29

30 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I don't know. I didn't--I wasn't there long
31 enough to get on friendly terms with them. I'd just
32 been FAP'd out to Blessing and them jumped a
33 helicopter to Wanat.
34

35 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay. Tell me how did you get to Blessing? What
36 was the--did someone order you to Blessing?
37

38 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. Colonel--I think it was Colonel
39 (b)(3),(b)(6),Zulu
40 **Elm** were having--Corporal (b)(3),(b)(6) was due to rotate out and
41 **Aqua** Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) was to rotate out for his four-day
42 pass and they needed a Marine to stick at the unit and
43 be the turnaround guy to--basically know everything
44 that was going on there while they replaced the other
45 two and I was given up by the RCAC to fill in that
46 spot.
47

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Do you recall what day you arrived at Blessing?
2

3 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I think--I think it was July 8th or 9th.
4

Beta 5 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) What did you do when you got to Blessing?
6

7 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Went to Blessing, reported to Lieutenant Colonel
8 **Zulu** (b)(3),(b)(6) and went on two patrols in the Blessing area
9 and put up security for one Shura before I was FAP'd
10 out to Wanat when they were breaking down and waiting-
11 -Bella.
12

Beta 13 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) How did you get up to Wanat?
14

15 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy By helo, we went in by choppers because the Army
16 had already sent their vehicles up there and I went
17 with the Afghan unit out of Whit----
18

Beta 19 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you recall how many ANA Soldiers there were?
20

21 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy There were 25, sir.
22

Beta 23 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And there were 3 Marines?
24

25 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.
26

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you receive an op order or see any written
28 orders regarding what you were going to go when you
29 got to Wanat?
30

31 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Nothing written, sir, just word of mouth from
32 officers to myself and what I was told was that we're
33 supposed to secure the location and make it possible
34 for construction crews to come up and build them a new
35 FOB to replace Bella.
36

Beta 37 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you receive that information from a Marine
38 officer or from an Army officer?
39

40 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy From both, sir. I received the first from--and
41 the second from the Army Lieutenant that was there.
42

Beta 43 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Was that Lieutenant Brostrom?
44

45 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I do believe so, sir.
46

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Did you have any chance to interact with the ANA
2 before you moved forward?
3

4 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I did, sir. With that unit, I had done two
5 patrols and that Shura.
6

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) With that same unit, ANA?
8

9 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.
10

Beta 11 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you recall the Army unit--the U.S. Army unit
12 you went up with? Do you know who they were?
13

14 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Negative, sir, I had yet to meet them. I had no
15 contact with them before I got in Wanat.
16

Beta 17 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When you arrived at Wanat, what was your initial
18 impression of the site?
19

20 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy It was the worst possible place you could ever
21 imagine trying to put a base.
22

Beta 23 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Why is that?
24

25 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy We were at the very bottom of the valley, there
26 was no stand-off distance from us and the neighboring
27 village, and on three sides we had blind spots that
28 unless you had people standing right on it, there's no
29 way to look back and there's a road that came up off
30 one of those blind spots. It was completely invisible
31 at nighttime or from any of our OP's.
32

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Was that to the north?
34

35 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
36

Beta 37 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) When you went up on the CH47 that day, what
38 equipment or what supplies did you have with you?
39

40 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I had my ALICE pack, my flak and Kevlar and my
41 bandoleers of magazines and my M9 and A4.
42

Beta 43 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): How about your water? How much water were you
44 hauling?
45

46 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I had my camelback and two canteens and two
47 bottles of water in my ALICE pack because I was told

1 that we were going to get a steady supply to the
2 location.

3
4 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And who were you to draw that from?

5
6 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy The Army.

7
8 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): The unit you were working with?

9
10 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.

11
12 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): What kind of equipment did you see up there
13 construction wise when you got to the site?

14
15 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy A Bobcat, sir, that was it.

16
17 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And what can you tell us about the Bobcat?

18
19 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy On the second day, it ran out of fuel because we
20 were not getting properly supplied. They dropped a
21 fuel bladder and a pump and the hoses for them but
22 neglected to send us the adapters to it so it might as
23 well been a rock. We ended up jerry-rigging up
24 something to connect up the two so we could get some
25 fuel for it. But as far as construction, on the
26 second day, they came out and did some land survey and
27 put in wooden stakes in the ground but that was it.

28
29 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did any other engineer support or construction
30 equipment come up there in your time at Wanat?

31
32 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Negative, sir.

33
34 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And you arrived there around the--do you recall
35 the date?

36
37 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy The 10th.

38
39 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Who determined where the ANA would put the
40 position, the unit within the perimeter?

41
42 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Both myself and Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6). We were given
43 a certain area that the Army wanted us to secure. His **Aqua**
44 words were, I don't care how you secure it, just make
45 sure it's secure. I said, roger. We took our guys
46 and set up fighting positions in that area.
47

Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And did you essentially have the north, northwest
2 area of the perimeter?
3

4 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.
5

Beta 6 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Before you left Blessing to come up to Wanat, did
7 you receive a briefing on the enemy situation?
8

9 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy We had, sir.
10

Beta 11 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And what was that?
12

13 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy The briefing was that there were hostiles in the
14 area that they knew of, that there might be an attack
15 on Bella before we left--before the last units left
16 that area and that this area was not friendly to
17 coalition forces.
18

Beta 19 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Once you moved to Wanat, did you receive any
20 additional information regarding the enemy situation?
21

22 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. When we got there, the mayor and the
23 chief of police had left. We were informed of that,
24 that's never a good sign along with --
25

Beta 26 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And who told you that?
27

28 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy The Army Lieutenant.
29

30 Also some of the houses had been vacated, the ones up
31 on top of the hill and we were told by the ANA, by the
32 civilians in the area that we were going to get
33 attacked every night. So every night that they were
34 there, they said, oh, you're going to be attacked,
35 you're going to be attacked.
36

Beta 37 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): So the ANA were learning that from the local
38 population?
39

40 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.
41

Beta 42 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And they'd come back and report that to you?
43

44 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir, mostly just our 'terps.
45

Beta 46 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And then did you report that to the lieutenant?
47

1 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy He was also being briefed at the same time, sir.

Beta 2
3 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): The ANA that you were with, you've worked with
4 them before on patrols.
5

6 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.

Beta 7
8 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Were they ready to go out on patrols?
9

10 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy With a little bit of persuasion.
11

Beta 12 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Were they technically competent to do a patrol?
13

14 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.

Beta 15
16 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): But they often lacked the motivation?
17

18 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir. They would do it if it was
19 something to their advantage.
20

Beta 21 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Such as?
22

23 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Such as they wouldn't have to do a patrol the
24 next day or they would get--we would ensure that
25 they'd get time off that afternoon or something like
26 that.
27

Beta 28 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Would you have been comfortable leaving the
29 perimeter at Wanat with some of those ANA Soldiers and
30 doing a patrol?
31

32 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Negative, sir.

Beta 33
34 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Why is that?
35

36 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Because I hadn't been with them that long and the
37 feeling I got from them was that they weren't exactly
38 trustworthy. The first day we were there, they
39 allegedly ate every MRE they had and then became
40 furious with us and upset when we wouldn't spend out
41 CIF money to get them fresh chow from the village when
42 we told them that they had to portion out their meals,
43 they were not happy. And I'd been with a unit before
44 that and was compromised by infiltrated ACF.
45

Beta 46 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): The ANA that you were working with had been
47 compromised?

1
2 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy One other unit--a unit in the Konar---- valley
3 with the French. That unit had been infiltrated by
4 some anti-coalition forces and it ended up with a
5 French officer being shot. I was getting the same
6 vibe off these guys.

7
8 **Beta LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) What kind of communication here did you have,
9 within the ETT?

10
11 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Within our ETT, we just had the hand mics that
12 were all preset to the Army's frequency. They had the
13 SAT line back to the main bases.

14
15 **Beta LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you have any night-vision capability?

16
17 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I did, sir. Each one of us had an NVG.

18
19 **Beta LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you have any other high tech assets?

20
21 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Just our RCO and PBS18--oh and a--for navigation.

22
23 **Beta LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When you arrived at Wanat, other than preparing
24 the defensive position, what was your understanding of
25 your mission?

26
27 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy My understanding was for me to monitor and to
28 control the ANA in a firefight and also to set up any
29 OPs that we were given. The little "COP-IN-A-BOX"
30 because they would drop down and we would man those
31 whenever came available for use.

32
33 **Beta LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): At no time when you were at Wanat were you tasked
34 to--were you ever tasked----

35
36 **Owl Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, if Sergeant **Burgundy** (b)(3),(b)(6) could just slow down his
37 testimony. He's speaking kind of fast.

38
39 **Beta LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): At any time, you were at Wanat, were you tasked
40 to establish an OP with the ANA?

41
42 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy On the day that we were actually attacked, our
43 mission was to scout out a position for a helo drop of
44 one of our OPs. We were supposed to go out at 0500 to
45 scout out a position and set up an actual OP up on top
46 of one of the mountains.
47

Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Do you recall if that was to the north, east,
2 west?
3

4 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Southeast, sir.
5

Beta 6 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) After the battle, what was the security situation
7 at Wanat?
8

9 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy After the battle, sir? I was --
10

Beta 11 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Were you wounded?
12

13 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
14

Beta 15 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Were you MEDEVAC'd?
16

17 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
18

Beta 19 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Were you up in the OP when you were wounded?
20

21 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. I was up at OP Topside.
22

Beta 23 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you--were you MEDEVAC'd back to----
24

25 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy MEDEVAC'd to Jalalabad ----
26

Beta 27 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): How did you learn of a withdrawal from the
28 position at Wanat?
29

30 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy When I was at FOB Huey, I was told by Colonel
31 **Zulu** (b)(3),(b)(6) that the base had been--all the personnel
32 from there had been called back because I was worried
33 about some of the--the other two Marines that were up
34 there and the Soldiers.
35

Beta 36 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And were the other Marines, the other two Marines
37 were they wounded?
38

39 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Not to my knowledge, sir.
40

Beta 41 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): How about the ANA? What kind of casualties did
42 they suffer?
43

44 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy One was severely burned when he abandoned his
45 post and got next to the HMMWV that had our TOW
46 missiles. When it exploded, he got pretty badly
47 burned. As far as I know with the other ones, no real

1 injuries were sustained by them because they--from my
2 field of view, they were withholding from the battle
3 and allowing the insurgents to come within five to 10
4 feet of their position and fire RPG's at us without
5 firing a round back.
6

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So what you personally saw was the enemy forces
8 very close to the ANA positions essentially firing
9 over those positions?
10

11 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
12

Beta 13 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) And the ANA making no effort to repel?
14

15 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.
16

Beta 17 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) At some point in the battle, you maneuvered up to
18 the OP?
19

20 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
21

Beta 22 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Can you describe please how that took place?
23

24 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy After we retrieved the burnt Afghan national, we
25 got--the mic went hot and we were hearing Topside OP
26 requesting----
27

Beta 28 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) By "hot mic," what do you mean?
29

30 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I don't know if it was intentional or accidental
31 but sounded accidental from how they were talking that
32 the key had been locked and it was transmitting
33 perpetually. It was not stopping as in you normally
34 would end a transmission to receive and we were
35 hearing them get hammered up there and requesting
36 backup or any type of supplies we can get up there and
37 **Elm** me and Corporal (b)(3),(b)(6) looked at each other and we
38 went, we got to get up there. He grabbed the 240, I
39 grabbed every--that we had for the 240 and we ran to
40 the first Army--I wouldn't say "base" but congregation
41 that they had and got all the. We asked who was going
42 to help us go up there because we knew that they were
43 hearing it too.
44

Beta 45 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Was that--so you maneuvered from your fighting
46 position to the rear of the ANA you moved back to the

1 south and east, did you go to the platoon CP or was it
2 to the----

3
4 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I would say to the platoon CP and then to the
5 other rallying point next to the entrance of the main
6 base.

7
8 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6); Down by the C-shaped building?
9

10 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
11

12 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay.
13

14 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy And well the first one was next to the C-shaped
15 building, the other one was to the left and a little
16 bit closer to the road--it was right next to that
17 brick wall--stone wall.
18

19 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Where they had a traffic control point set up?
20

21 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
22

23 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Then what happened?
24

25 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Then we--one of the Soldiers pops smoke for us
26 because we knew that if we tried to cross that road
27 without smoke, we were done. He popped smoke. We ran
28 behind one of the buildings, the main bazaar to the
29 right of it and we were about to come up and go
30 through the--one of the OP's that was up there.
31

32 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) So you're at the southern end of the bazaar?
33

34 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.
35

36 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6); And then you're heading up the hill to OP
37 Topside?
38

39 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. And there were two OP's there; OP
40 Topside and OP Lower. And we were about to cut
41 through there when one of the guys jumped up and told
42 us--well he didn't jump up he popped up just a little
43 bit and told us to stop and right before we went
44 around the corner of the building and we received
45 additional fire. He told us that they were all pinned
46 down so we had to backtrack back to the road and make

1 our way out behind their position and up a ravine up
2 the step ladders.

3
4 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) You say "backtrack," did you move to the south?

5
6 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy No. We went back the way we had come, sir.

7
8 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay. Back down to the bazaar?

9
10 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.

11
12 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And from the southern end of the bazaar, where
13 did you go?

14
15 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. We went back in the ravine that's
16 marked there. We could traverse up that ravine --

17
18 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): This way?

19
20 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.

21
22 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Further south from the bazaar?

23
24 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy From the bazaar because it gave us some cover
25 from the DSHKA fire that was coming from the
26 buildings?

27
28 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Now the DSHKA, why do you say that particular
29 weapon system?

30
31 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy One it was automatic and two by the amount of
32 damage that it was doing to the trees. I could tell
33 it was a very large caliber weapon, and as I far as I
34 knew that was what was being used from what I was
35 being told later that it was more than likely a DSHKA
36 from the rounds that were found.

37
38 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Is part of your training and pre-deployment
39 training, did you go over weapon systems?

40
41 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir, ours and Chinese and Russian weapons
42 that they use against us.

43
44 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And then what happened?

45

1 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy We went up the ravine, got to the steep--almost
2 to the top and followed the side because we were
3 catching rounds from farther south and --
4
5 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) So you're on the--essentially on the same terrace
6 as the OP at this point?
7
8 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
9
10 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Coming in from the south?
11
12 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir. And we were--the mic had finally
13 broken so we were able to radio in that we were coming
14 from their south and not to shoot us and we were
15 skirting the ridges trying to keep from getting fire
16 from further south.
17
18 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Who is with you at this point?
19
20 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Me, Corporal **Elm** (b)(3),(b)(6), and 6 Soldiers. We made our
21 way to the OP and to get into it because they had set
22 up the sandbags like this to get the wounded out and
23 everything, we knocked over the sandbags so that we
24 had an entry point. Because to climb over it because
25 they had an archway built kind of but it was too small
26 for an armored person to come through. So we knocked
27 it over to make room to go in and out.
28
29 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) When you were coming in from the south, from the
30 terrace--on the terrace, did you have to go through
31 concertina?
32
33 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, we did, sir.
34
35 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. So now you enter into the OP itself and
36 then what happened?
37
38 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy When we entered in, we found they had made a
39 collection point for their wounded and the very first-
40 -was right here next to the rock.
41
42 **Beta** **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): That's the southern portion of the OP?
43
44 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. I dropped the 240 rounds and I found a
45 person that was more--an Army Soldier that was more
46 familiar and accurate with the weapon system and
47 **Elm** Corporal (b)(3),(b)(6) went with him. He grabbed a shotgun

1 and his M4. I was told that there was nobody at the
2 northern part, so I low crawled to Topside over here
3 and grabbed the SAW that was located there. I found
4 two bags of ammunition up under one of the KIA
5 Soldiers and a live grenade--from what I've been told
6 by the description it was a Russian one and I just
7 threw it back out because I didn't want it going off
8 anywhere close to me. Then I started almost
9 immediately, I started receiving fire from the tree
10 line and there was one individual that popped up
11 almost in direct line with the--right there, sir.

12
13 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) So it was the north, northeast of your position?

14
15 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir. He popped up and was making his
16 way over on top of the concertina wire and I lit into
17 him because I didn't see any specific weapon and the
18 first thing that went through my mind was suicide
19 bomber, somebody with a vest that could get in there
20 and take us all out. And I fired a short burst into
21 him. He fell down. I turned the weapon back to the
22 tree line that was getting most of my RPG and small
23 arms from.

24
25 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) That's the tree line to the north?

26
27 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.

28
29 And as you can see, almost that entire area is
30 completely blind so right outside the concertina wire
31 they're able to basically come right up without me
32 being able to get fire on them.

33
34 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) In your opinion, from the way you were firing,
35 how many meters before you had no visibility on that
36 terrain?

37
38 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Maybe 10 meters, sir.

39
40 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Someone could be within 10 meters of you and you
41 couldn't see them?

42
43 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir. As long as they did some low
44 crawling and they weren't standing up, easily, sir.
45 The insurgent popped back up--but he regained his
46 footing and I laid into him until he actually--until
47 his arms stopped moving. His body still moved because

1 of the inertia but I wanted to make sure that when I
2 turned away this time, he did not get back up. Then I
3 received three RPG's from the tree line. Two of them--
4 --by that time, I'd been reinforced by one of the Army
5 Soldiers. He took the far left side. I took the far
6 right. He had brought up an extra 240 for that
7 position. We received two RPG's from almost directly
8 north that came through the tree line.
9

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Is that from across the valley?
11

12 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.
13

Beta 14 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): The creek?
15

16 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. We hadn't noticed them because we were
17 more focused on the guys that were close to us. We
18 hadn't noticed the two that were climbing up the
19 bridge behind us. They fired two RPG's at us. We
20 dodged those. They went safely overhead; they missed
21 us. But one from more up close just a little bit
22 beyond the bend of the farming area, he fired an RPG
23 and it hit the tree that was to our right. And I
24 caught shrapnel from that and so did the other
25 Soldier. After that, I came back to the world--I got
26 kind of fuzzy on that one. Once I came back, I got up
27 grabbed a SAW and put as many rounds as I could down
28 on these two locations as I could and as rapidly as I
29 could.
30

31 I think I went through four packs to ensure that
32 nobody else got anymore RPG's at us because they were
33 getting way too accurate with those RPG's. After
34 that, I bandaged up my arm while the Soldier was
35 replaced by another Soldier. He was carried back to
36 the wounded area. I bandaged up my arm from my field
37 pack. I kept firing until I'd actually lost the use
38 of my hand. I couldn't close my hand to fire anymore
39 rounds. I was replaced by a Soldier and put on the
40 rear guard at the southern most part.
41

Beta 42 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Was there a large stone at the southern part?
43

44 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir. I was put on guard there to ensure
45 that nobody came up from our back because I could
46 still fire my .9 mil with my left hand and to assist
47 in any MEDEVACs when the helicopters started coming.

1 We did have three helicopters--or three MEDEVACS out
2 of Wanat and then they--the first sergeant--the Army
3 first sergeant put me on the last helicopter because I
4 had wiggled my way out of the third one.

5 [Redacted]
6 **Beta** LtCol [Redacted] Sergeant [Redacted] we're going to have to stop you
7 right here and take a recess.
8

9 [The testimony broke at 1427 and began again at 1755, 6 Oct 09.]

10 [Redacted]
11 **Beta** LtCol [Redacted] Sergeant [Redacted] we're back on the record and
12 you're still under oath.

13 [Redacted]
14 **Sgt** [Redacted] Yes, sir.

15 [Redacted]
16 **Beta** LtCol [Redacted]: Gentlemen, in light of previous questions
17 regarding the general lay down on the emplacement;
18 does anyone have follow up questions for Sergeant
19 [Redacted]

20 [Redacted]
21 **LtGen Natonski:** For lay down or just general questions?

22 [Redacted]
23 **Beta** LtCol [Redacted] General questions, sir, excuse me.

24 [Redacted]
25 **LtGen Natonski:** I had a question on your movement to Wanat.
26 You came up on a helo. Did you come up with the
27 platoon of ANA, the 24 Afghan Soldiers, or were they
28 already at Wanat and you joined them on that location?

29 [Redacted]
30 **Sgt** [Redacted] I flew up in the helo with the ANA, sir.

31 [Redacted]
32 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. So you married up with that platoon
33 at Camp Blessing?

34 [Redacted]
35 **Sgt** [Redacted] Yes, sir.

36 [Redacted]
37 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. And how long had you been with that
38 platoon before you --

39 [Redacted]
40 **Sgt** [Redacted] Only about two or three days, sir.

41 [Redacted]
42 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. And to get back to the supply issue,
43 water, was water ever a problem for the ANA platoon at
44 Wanat?

45 [Redacted]
46 **Sgt** [Redacted] For the ANA's? Negative, sir, because they had
47 access to the local well in the village.

1
2 **LtGen Natonski:** And so they drank well water and they had no
3 problems with that?
4

5 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy No, sir.
6

7 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. And food, you had mentioned that they
8 had eaten some of the HALAL---- rations, more than --
9

10 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. We'd given them a three-day supply and
11 had told them to ration it out. But when they came
12 back to us and told us that they had eaten it all that
13 night or the next day. It's the same thing you do
14 with your little kids. You'll say we don't have any
15 more, you should have rationed it out but you got a
16 box of it in the back. We weren't going to let them
17 starve or anything like that but we wanted them to
18 know that they couldn't just eat as much as they
19 wanted whenever they wanted. That they actually had
20 to ration out their food.
21

22 **LtGen Natonski:** Was supply ever a problem with respect to
23 any water, food, or ammunition while you were at
24 Wanat?
25

26 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. We had from what I know, the
27 lieutenant had called in for a resupply of water,
28 MRE's and some extra ammo. I don't know how they
29 planned on bringing us ammo, but it never arrived.
30 But we were told by the radio that they'd sent up the
31 MRE's and water cases by local workers and it took two
32 days for them to get to us and what a convoy took five
33 hours to do and they supposedly sent up two convoys
34 and we only received one of the food and water.
35

36 **LtGen Natonski:** So, however, you did get resupplied just not
37 very quickly.
38

39 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir. We were actually having to ration
40 out our water and food because we were running short
41 because when we arrived on base, we'd only had what we
42 had on us because most of what we brought in the--what
43 the Army brought in their trucks was ammo and gear for
44 the base because they were told that they were going
45 to get a resupply behind us. So we had what we had on
46 us and that wasn't exactly a whole lot.
47

1 **LtGen Natonski:** Going back to the morning of the 13th, the
2 morning of the attack, the army platoon did a stand-
3 to. I believe approximately 0400 before down they
4 went to full battle waddle---- in preparation for
5 potential attack. Did the ANA platoon, did you also
6 do that?
7

8 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. We were in a--we were about to go out
9 on a patrol at 4:30 so I had reveilled all the ANA
10 that were not already on watch and we were about to
11 move out at 4:20. We were forming up for the march
12 off at 0430.
13

14 **LtGen Natonski:** And where were you going on that specific
15 patrol?
16

17 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy We were going up to the southern mountain ridge
18 to scout out a location to put a --
19

20 **LtGen Natonski:** So you were going back towards the direction
21 of Camp Blessing?
22

23 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir. We were going to put a topside COP
24 in a box to--at a higher elevation so that they could
25 view both roads, the one to the south and the north
26 from that location.
27

28 **LtGen Natonski:** And that would have been your first platoon
29 while you were at Wanat?
30

31 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
32

33 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you ever volunteer to the lieutenant to
34 send out a patrol during the building in the first
35 couple days that you were at the combat outpost?
36

37 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Negative, sir. We were actually just trying to
38 dig through the dirt to actually set up a fighting
39 position. It took us about two days to actually dig
40 dirt, even with the Bobcat that we had.
41

42 **LtGen Natonski:** And you saw, did you see any patrols
43 originate from the combat outpost?
44

45 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Negative, sir.
46

1 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. Did your troops have interaction with
2 the locals in Wanat?
3

4 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. They had--first I saw every night they
5 would sit around or during the day they would sit
6 around with some of the local elders and some of the
7 other local civilians.
8

9 **LtGen Natonski:** Do you think that any of your Soldiers, your
10 ANA Soldiers, had any inkling of the attack that was
11 coming?
12

13 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
14

15 **LtGen Natonski:** Is that why they hunkered down?
16

17 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. I do believe that they were either,
18 from my personal opinion, either paid off or coerced
19 into not retaliating in lieu of that they would not be
20 shot.
21

22 **LtGen Natonski:** However, you and Sergeant **Elm**
23 **Aqua** (b)(3),(b)(6) did fire?
24

25 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
26

27 **LtGen Natonski:** And yet you were providing security on the
28 north side of the combat outpost towards the village?
29

30 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Actually away from the village towards the tree
31 line, sir.
32

33 **LtGen Natonski:** Were there any buildings in your direct
34 fire?
35

36 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. The mayor's house and a local elder's
37 house.
38

39 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. That house that's directly to the
40 center of the screen is that kind of --
41

42 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy That was a mosque, sir.
43

44 **LtGen Natonski:** That's the mosque, okay. Were you oriented
45 more in this direction?
46

47 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.

1
2 **LtGen Natonski:** Towards these trees?
3
4 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Towards those trees and the mountain ridge, sir.
5
6 **Beta LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So to the northwest?
7
8 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct. Or northeast, sir.
9
10 **LtGen Natonski:** And the number of Afghan Soldier who were
11 wounded--I know one you mentioned was burned by the
12 TOW vehicle cooking off, were there any other --
13
14 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy To my knowledge, there were none, sir.
15
16 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. And you were not in a position to ask
17 why they didn't fire when you were done?
18
19 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Negative, sir, I was already back at JAF-----
20
21 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. And no one ever, did you ever see
22 **Elm** Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) or Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) ? **Aqua**
23
24 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Negative, sir. By the time I--by the time they
25 returned back to Blessing, I was already at FOB Huey.
26
27 **LtGen Natonski:** You had only been with this platoon for less
28 than a week?
29
30 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
31
32 **LtGen Natonski:** So you didn't know these Soldiers. What
33 about the interpreter? Was he--
34
35 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes. We had two interpreters, sir.
36
37 **LtGen Natonski:** With the platoon?
38
39 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir, one of them by my opinion very much of
40 afraid of anything and everything. He shied away from
41 the American Soldiers and the Marines and hunkered
42 down more with the ANA. The second interpreter was
43 more shunned by the ANA because he refused to do the
44 prayers every night or the four prayers a day and what
45 not and he affiliated his self with the troops and the
46 Marines more. He was with us more and he gave us the

1 low down of exactly what they were saying. The other
2 interpreter was not forthcoming with information.
3
4 **LtGen Natonski:** That one interpreter that was forthcoming,
5 did he give any inclination of a potential attack?
6
7 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. The night before we went out at 0400
8 combat ready because he said a 90 percent chance that
9 today they weren't joking and when we noticed that the
10 entire village was completely empty that really set
11 off some bells.
12
13 **LtGen Natonski:** And did you report that to Lieutenant
14 Brostrom?
15
16 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
17
18 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. So he knew, based on what your
19 interpreter had said that there was a potential for an
20 attack the next morning. Hence, you were part of that
21 stand to; however, you had no idea that the Afghan
22 Soldiers----
23
24 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Had turned----
25
26 **LtGen Natonski:** ----might not participate.
27
28 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.
29
30 **LtGen Natonski:** That the Marines--you were positioned
31 directly behind the Afghans?
32
33 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.
34
35 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. So you were able to at least defend a
36 portion of that perimeter----
37
38 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct, sir.
39
40 **LtGen Natonski:** ----when the attack broke out?
41
42 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. We were able to defend from our
43 location behind where the insurgents had gotten behind
44 the mortar pit and along the tree line. We gave
45 suppressive fire with M4, 9mils, and the 240.
46

1 **LtGen Natonski:** I think I read in one of your statements
2 that you saw improvement in the Afghan units while you
3 were in Afghanistan. Was that true?
4

5 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. With the units I was with in RCAC, but
6 as far as this unit, negative, sir.
7

8 **LtGen Natonski:** But you were only with this unit less than a
9 week.
10

11 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct. I didn't see any improvement because of
12 those actions. But when I was in Black Horse they
13 went from being the most brag-tag---- thing you could
14 ever see to showing up with all their gear, their
15 boots, and everything, ready to actually to go out on
16 a mission, and they actually before I left, created,
17 conducted, and briefed their own mission and it went
18 smoothly.
19

20 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.
21

22 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) What type of communications equipment did you
23 personally have access to? Did you have a radio at
24 all times or was there just somebody --
25

26 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy It was a radio that we passed between the three
27 of us, sir.
28

29 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) Who was on the other end of that?
30

31 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy The Army main command. It's more for internal
32 during night time so that we didn't have to walk
33 outside the perimeter or anything like that and
34 potentially get ourselves shot.
35

36 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) Did you have any--did anybody brief you before you
37 went up to that wire if that medical evacuation--what
38 the plan was if somebody got wounded or --
39

40 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy We were told if it was a small thing, we might
41 drive them out, but if was a major thing and it was an
42 emergency thing we'd have to helo.
43

44 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) Air MEDEVAC? So had that happened, would you have any
45 idea how to call in an air MEDEVAC or would you have
46 to go to the Army guys and have them probably do it?
47

1 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy We could call in an air MEDEVAC. We have to use
2 their SATCOM but I know the 9-line just as well as
3 anybody else, sir.
4
5 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay. What about ammo? You carried your own personal
6 basic load of ammo when you went up there; is that
7 right? How much ammunition did you have?
8
9 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy I carried eight magazines on my person and I had
10 at least five or six other magazines in my ditty bag.
11
12 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) What were the ANA guys--did they have AK-47's?
13
14 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy They had AK's, they had RPG's, and they had one
15 DISHKA.
16
17 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) And how much ammo did you guys bring for them, do you
18 know?
19
20 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy They brought their own ammo, sir. I think they'd
21 had about five or six mags each, sir.
22
23 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) And did the Marine element that was with you, did they
24 have the ability to call in any type of indirect fire
25 or close air support or Apache's or anything like that
26 or did you guys have to kind of depend on the Army for
27 that?
28
29 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy We did once the battle happened. But up to
30 before that, we actually had to rely on the Army for
31 the SATCOM. But when the battle actually happened,
32 the pilots of the Apaches and other helicopters called
33 into the Army and told us a--to get them a freq that
34 we would be on directly so we were talking directly to
35 them without a middle man.
36
37 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay. Where did you guys sleep at night?
38
39 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy We slept in our foxholes, sir.
40
41 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) In the foxholes. Just like a poncho liner or----
42
43 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy We had the little pop-circle tents----
44
45 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay.
46
47 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy ----with the mosquito netting and that was it.

Sigma

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LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay. Was there anything that comes to mind that you felt like you could have had equipment wise that would have made this--obviously, there's all kinds of things you would have liked to have had but just realistically speaking, was there anything when you got there and said man, I wish I would have had? Some type of equipment that you didn't have that would have made life easier?

Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Not equipment, but more manpower would have been definitely warranted in that area so that we could have spread out a little bit more and covered all the blind spots that they used coming up on us. We all knew the blind spots, but we were limited by how much manpower we had. We didn't want to put two man teams out there to where they could just get snuck up on and killed because there was nobody watching their back.

Sigma

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. I think that's all I have.

Zeta

Maj (b)(3),(b)(6) You mentioned early on before we started that you were not impressed with the location and position and you just referred to the dead space again. Did you mention your concerns with the location and the position to anyone?

Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. Because I was supposed to be the stationary person because the other two Marines were due to rotate out. Me and the lieutenant had had conversations about that and he knew just as well as I do that that was--this place was completely a bad place to be as far as much dead space and how few troops we had and he was, as far as I know, he was actually calling back trying to get more, more personnel up to that location for us. But as far as I knew, this platoon was supposed to rotate out very soon and then we would get a new platoon in for their turnaround and we'd get more troops then.

LtGen Natonski: Did the lieutenant ever discuss with you perhaps an alternative site to where you were setting up in Wanat? Did you point out, "I think I'd rather have had the platoon over here --

Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** Where would that have been?
2

3 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Up south to where the building was that we were
4 getting mortar fire from. It would have taken more
5 time and stuff--follow that ravine up and back up,
6 sir--up along this area--up here. We would have liked
7 to have flattened this area out and made a base up
8 here because then we would have been able to see more
9 of the dead space and it'd been harder for them to get
10 within 30 meters of us without us knowing somebody was
11 sneaking up on us.
12

13 **LtGen Natonski:** And Lieutenant Brostrom had mentioned this
14 to you?

15
16 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
17

18 **LtGen Natonski:** Had you ever seen people during the day
19 working up here or living?
20

21 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy When I arrived that first day, that house had
22 become vacant. The people that had lived there had
23 left. On the second day, we noticed people around
24 building, but we had no grounds to go and search the
25 building. And as far as I know only the ANP are
26 allowed to search building and the chief of police had
27 still not shown back up yet at that point. So we had
28 suspicions that it was insurgents up there, but we had
29 no grounds to go and interrogate anybody up there.
30

31 **LtGen Natonski:** And in order to have established a combat
32 outpost here, there's no road. You would have had to
33 ----
34

35 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy We would have had to made a road up there. As me
36 and him were talking about looking to drop in a Bobcat
37 or some other dirt moving vehicle and have just carved
38 in a road and before that you could have parked down
39 at that lower area, but that would have been a staging
40 area instead of the main base.
41

42 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) And for the record, Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) has been
43 referring to the building that's about 120 meters to
44 the east, southeast of OP Topside up the hill.
45

Beta

1 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy We were catching a lot of mortar fire from this
2 building before we were able to attack it with the
3 helos.
4

5 **LtGen Natonski:** The helos ran on this site?
6

7 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. Once they've ran on that building, the
8 mortar fire stopped and we--that would have been--me
9 and the lieutenant both agreed that would have been a
10 more prime spot to put a base because it's already got
11 standing buildings and it would have been easier to
12 fortify with the 25 troops we had being able to put
13 them at the corners of it and had more coverage of the
14 dead space.
15

16 **LtGen Natonski:** Did he tell you why he didn't use that
17 location?
18

19 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Because of--as far as I was told, higher ups had
20 gotten consignments for the land that we were on and
21 they were not able to secure the property rights or
22 whatnot for that area. We were told that we had to be
23 down there.
24

25 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you know if the ANA guys fired the DISHKA at all
26 during the attack?
27

28 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy They did, sir, after I--we'd thrown a rock at
29 them and had our interpreter yell at them to start
30 firing but their fire was erratic and it almost--if
31 they'd actually--I had to throw another rock to get
32 them to stop because if they hadn't when the helo's
33 had finally shown up they would have flown right into
34 the fire.
35

36 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): And I think I read some of the transcripts where
37 they're talking about them just essentially just
38 firing up--almost straight up in the air as well.
39

40 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Correct. They would fire but in any effective
41 manner.
42

43 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. Okay.
44

45 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Major (b)(3),(b)(6),Owl
46

Owl 1 Maj (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir. You were just talking about the ETT's.
2 You'd mentioned that you had night-vision goggles?

3
4 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.

Owl 5
6 Maj (b)(3),(b)(6) Was it just for the Marines, the NVG's?

7
8 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. But at night, we passed it off to the
9 ANA because they were farther off post and wanted them
10 to be able to--because at that point we were still
11 trusting them and we were passing off our NVG's to
12 ensure that they would be able to spot any incoming
13 insurgents that would be in our dead space because we
14 were farther into the base.

Owl 15
16 Maj (b)(3),(b)(6): Another question, you said the water load that
17 you brought was a camelback, two canteens, two bottles
18 of water. Is that the usual amount of water you bring
19 or were you instructed to----

20
21 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy That's usually what you bring if you've been told
22 that you're going to get resupplied at your location
23 because it's enough for at least two to three of days
24 of water by yourself.

Owl 25
26 Maj (b)(3),(b)(6) It sounds like you were repeating an SOP. Is
27 that something that you, as Marines in an ETT, follow
28 or is that something from the company here?

29
30 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy That was from the RCAC. It was our SOP for
31 whenever we went out into the field you would fill up
32 your camelback, your canteen, and put in a few bottles
33 of water into your ALICE pack or your ditty bag just
34 in case you had to buck out of a vehicle quickly you
35 weren't waterless and whatnot.

Owl 36
37 Maj (b)(3),(b)(6) And my last question is: were you aware or do you
38 remember hearing a claymore used north of your
39 position when you were at OP Topside?

40
41
42 Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir. When we were getting danger close with
43 the artillery, one of the Soldiers cried out, everyone
44 down, I'm firing the claymore. And all--the claymores
45 went off because we had insurgents coming right at us
46 and it was the only way to repel them.

47

1 **Owl** Maj (b)(3),(b)(6) It was an effective use of the claymore?
2

3 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir, very effective.
4

5 **Owl** Maj (b)(3),(b)(6) Nothing further, sir.
6

7 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. I'm going to give you an order here
8 and now as part of this investigation. Sergeant

9 **Burgundy** (b)(3),(b)(6) you are ordered not to discuss your testimony
10 you provided today with anyone other than the members
11 of this investigation team. You will not allow any
12 witness in this investigation to talk to you about the
13 testimony he has given or which he intends to give.

14 If anyone should try to influence your testimony or
15 attempt to discuss your testimony, you are instructed
16 to notify Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) or Lieutenant **Beta**
17 **Sigma** Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6). Do you understand that?
18

19 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy Yes, sir.
20

21 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. I just want to tell you that I want
22 to thank you for your service to the country and to
23 our Corps and particularly thank you for what you did
24 on that day in Wanat. Do you have any questions?
25

26 **Sgt** (b)(3),(b)(6),Burgundy No, sir.
27

28 [The testimony ended at 1819, 6 October 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Burgundy

Subj: TESTIMONY OF SGT (b)(3),(b)(6) USMC, GIVEN ON 6 OCTOBER
2009, AT FT. LEAVENWORTH, KS

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify
that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

(b)(3),(b)(6),Owl

Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Judge Advocate

10 Nov 09
DATE