

1 [The testimony began at 0834 hours, on 6 October 2009.]

2 **LtGen Natonski:** I am Lieutenant General Richard Natonski,
3 United States Marine Corps. I have been appointed by
4 the Commander of U.S. Central Command to conduct an
5 investigation into the facts and circumstances
6 surrounding the combat action at Wanat, Afghanistan
7 during July, 2008. LtCol [Beta] and [Sigma]
8 [Sigma] (b)(3),(b)(6) are Judge Advocates assigned to the investigation
9 team.

10 The testimony you provide today will be recorded,
11 transcribed, and included in our report of the
12 investigation. Based on your testimony, we may also
13 prepare a separate written statement for your review
14 and signature.

15 Prior to coming on the record today, you signed a
16 Privacy Act Statement.

[Yankee] 17 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** Your testimony will be made under oath. You
19 will now be sworn.

20 [The witness was sworn.]

[Beta] 21 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Please state your full name, spelling your last?

[Yankee] 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): [Yankee]

[Beta] 23 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): What is your current unit and that unit's
24 location?

[Yankee] 25 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): (b)(6)
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[Beta] 27 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And you're currently a Sergeant First Class in
28 the United States Army?

[Yankee] 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

[Beta] 30 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): In July 2008, what was your unit and the unit's
31 location?

[Yankee] 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I was in 2nd platoon, Chosen Company, 2/503rd.
33 We were located at Fort Blessing at the time.

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Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And that's Afghanistan?

Yankee 2 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 3 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): In July 2008, what was your rank and duty
4 assignment or job assignment?

Yankee 5 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Sergeant First Class, I was the platoon sergeant
6 for 2d platoon.

Beta 7 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6), I'm going to ask you a series of
8 questions. As we go through I would ask that you
9 provide as many details as possible. What is your
10 occupation?

Yankee 11 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Infantry.

Beta 12 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): In July 2008 how long had you been platoon
13 sergeant?

Yankee 14 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): About five months.

Beta 15 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): What job did you had before that?

Yankee 16 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): I was weapons squad leader for 1st platoon.

Beta 17 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): How long had you been with the 2nd of the 503rd?

Yankee 18 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): At that point about three years.

Beta 19 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you participate in the pre-deployment
20 training?

Yankee 21 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 22 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Can you describe that training?

Yankee 23 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): A majority of the training was set up for
24 deployment to Iraq, so it was heavily involved in
25 convoy and convoy security, plus fighting inside
26 cities. Towards the end of the last training we
27 started getting into the mountains because once we
28 knew that we were going to switch over to Afghanistan
29 we shifted the focus. Besides that it was your
30 typical squad and platoon and company live fire
31 exercises running the whole gamut of your average
32 typical Infantry drills, but, like I said, the first
33 couple training rotations were keyed on Iraq.

Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you receive any Afghan cultural training as
2 part of your pre-deployment training?

Yankee 3 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): We did yes, we did. Yes, we did.

Beta 4 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Could you describe that please?

Yankee 5 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): It was set up where they, actually, I'm pretty
6 sure the individuals, the people that we would deal
7 with were actually Afghanis that they brought in, but
8 that's just an assumption, but they were definitely
9 people of that persuasion, that culture, and we would
10 set up like we were talking to them, like we'd come
11 into a village. So it was very role-play type
12 situation, and you'd come in and they could speak
13 English, but you'd pretend you were talking through an
14 interpreter and you would just sit there and get to
15 know them and run through exactly how certain
16 scenarios would be over in Afghanistan. Actually it
17 was pretty helpful, especially for individuals that
18 hadn't been deployed yet.

Beta 19 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And how close to your actual deployment did you
20 go through that particular cultural training?

Yankee 21 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): It was the last training. I mean it was a few
22 months before we left, or a month, two months.

Beta 23 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And when you left for Afghanistan did you feel
24 that your squad at that point was ready to go?

Yankee 25 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely.

Beta 26 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): During your tour in Afghanistan had you been to
27 various COPs?

Yankee 28 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): I had been to quite a few.

Beta 29 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Could you name some of those please?

Yankee 30 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Ranch House, Bella, Blessing. I did some time
31 helping out Battle Company in the Korengal at their
32 various outposts there.

Beta 33 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Could you describe the various COPs and their
34 relation to terrain? The COPs you visited, what was
35 their setting in the terrain?

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SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): The average COP, especially the ones north of Blessing, Ranch House, Bella, and then trying to build Wanat were very precarious positions because of the terrain. Ranch House was set on top of the ridge, a high altitude with 25 guys, Americans, enough to where you-- there wasn't enough to man the entire perimeter. We actually had to have Afghan National Army guys help man the perimeter of the facility. Bella was the same way. Our OP's had to be covered by ASG, except the one American OP and so my impression of the COP--most of the COP's that had been there were undermanned and precarious positions that could not be well defended against meeting a large hostile force.

Beta

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LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Precarious because of the terrain?

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SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely. It's--there you couldn't--you always had to make compromises. If you wanted defendable ground sometimes it wasn't what you would typically think of defendable ground as weird as that sounds. You know, Ranch House the high ground was key but there is always higher ground. Some of the positions were steep so you couldn't--couldn't have max coverage. You couldn't have interlocking defensive fires. There's a lot of stuff that, you know, my 14 years in, I've always been taught to do, especially when setting up defense, you couldn't do all the time. You had to make certain concessions in certain spots.

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When I was running Ranch House to offset that, I would, you know--we would try to do little tricky things; I had the false guard post made, you know, the Afghans thought we had some sort of weird, like, a laser around there, basically, put the fear and make them react to us. That was kind of my way of help--offsetting the fact that I only had 22 Americans at that time at the Ranch House attack. We would take sandbags to make--the terrain was steep in certain spots, so we made sandbags stairs in order to facilitate moving around plus primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions. So a lot of times it's the ingenuity of--the soldiers come up with stuff to help offset that.

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Bella was the same we just--they -- it was at the bottom of a valley, always high ground all around it and a river running right next to it and that was just massive, massive buildup of defense; HESCO walls and

1 then a path, there was HESCO wall next to that path.
2 So it was as if you were walking down a hallway of
3 HESCO. Buildings were fortified with HESCO and
4 sandbags on top so we relied on just hunkering down at
5 Bella. Some of the high ground that they would catch
6 fire from even the .50 Cal set up and trying to go as
7 high as you could, you couldn't hit the top of the
8 ridge, just because the way the positions were. So
9 the terrain was not friendly towards setting up any
10 kind of defensive position.

Beta

11 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did Chosen or the 2nd of the 503rd establish
12 either Ranch House or Bella?

Yankee

13 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No. Those were established by the 10th Mountain.
14 That was one of the, you know, the instances coming
15 from reports that, you know, we were inadequate and
16 10th Mountain didn't have issues like that when they
17 went in. The enemy didn't have any reason to be up
18 there, and the 10th Mountain had pushed out to try to
19 talk to more and more of these villages but they had
20 left these areas. They were just completely
21 undermanned.

Beta

22 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): At Ranch House and Bella, was there overhead
23 protection?

Yankee

24 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): There was.

Beta

25 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And that was with what?

Yankee

26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): They were--Bella--or Ranch House had--what they
27 chose to do was--and half have the positions it was
28 the living quarters--they were all by plywood
29 construction with--with sandbag reinforcing the sides
30 for cover and on top was a sandbag cover, very little
31 use of HESCO just for the fact that you couldn't move
32 enough--there was not enough dirt up there to fill
33 them and there was only 10 meter by 20 meter spot
34 where a Bobcat would move anyway up there at Ranch
35 House and that was the LZ, which they had to blow out
36 of the side of a mountain in order to get a Blackhawk
37 to land on. A Chinook couldn't land on it. And then
38 the guard posts were made up of the plywood and 2x4
39 with sandbags.

40 Bella was a little bit better. They actually had
41 HESCO--couple bunkers that was all sandbag and HESCO.

1 The buildings were the plywood but on the side were
2 HESCO lined up to the top, to the roof, and then the
3 roof was I know double--double protected with
4 sandbags. I know the engineers have their formulas
5 that they do and I know they doubled it for Bella for
6 rockets and stuff.

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): At Ranch House, how much plywood do you think was
8 up there?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): A lot. We had numerous--two of the guard posts
10 actually the living quarters, the guard posts was on
11 top of the living quarters because of the way the
12 terrain was. It's all you could put in and in two of
13 the others, the living quarters were back off the
14 guard posts. So we had five positions like that plus
15 the CP plus the aid station. So there was a lot.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): If you had to estimate how many sheets of plywood
17 sheets had to be brought in to Ranch House?

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): A lot, sir. I couldn't even guess. I couldn't
19 even guess. It was a lot, numerous buildings were
20 plywood plus we had a supply room, two supply rooms so
21 numerous buildings.

Beta 22 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): At Ranch House, did the unit have a relationship
23 with it local populace? Was there a populace nearby?

Yankee 24 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes. It was situated right on top of Aranus.
25 And we did have a working relationship. The people of
26 Aranus, they were, kind of, neither for nor against
27 the government. They--you know, for starters before
28 we had gotten up there, the government had never
29 reached them before. They were high in the valley.
30 The people of that area are very proud and to the
31 point I want to say stubborn, but only stubborn by
32 their ways. They've been the way they are for
33 thousands of years and they--no one is going to come
34 in and tell them--so they were receptive to us. They
35 knew the grand scheme of things we would not be there
36 very long anyway. You know, time for them is not--
37 where as Americans, we're all about fast and fast pace
38 for them it was the last couple hundred years is short
39 term to them. So the fact that how long we would be
40 there was short term to them. And then one part of
41 them was what could they get from us, for sure. But
42 to them, their biggest thing was, you know, the water

1 bickering that they had with the village next to them
2 and that was their biggest thing.

Beta 3 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did the ANA or the ASG's at Ranch House and
4 Bella, did you use those to interact with the local
5 populace?

Yankee 6 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We did. We had a really good relationship with
7 the ASG Ranch House. Since they would stay on our
8 base, they would go home every now and then when they
9 did their little rotations but especially the leader,
10 and his name escapes me at this time, but I really had
11 a really good working relationship. But, like, the
12 head enemy guys, Hazart Omar, that were there--he was
13 kind of our HVT for that area. They had grew up
14 together, so they would talk, you know. And if the
15 HVT would tell him, you know, why are you working for
16 the Americans? He would say, you know, well you
17 should settle down and listen to what they had to say.
18 They're not here to occupy, you know, and we can make
19 a lot of money off of them. You know, their way but
20 then they would still talk. It was a weird--weird
21 situation, but we would talk to them all the time.
22 And we would use them to get in the village and they
23 would tell the people, you know, come sit here and
24 talk to these guys because we would eat dinner with
25 them and discuss family and, you know, lack of better
26 words, get close to them.

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): At your time at Ranch House and the barrier plan
28 that you had up there, did you feel that it was a
29 secure location based on the fortification that was
30 there?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, I did not. I was always constantly trying to
32 get more--there was always more build up you can do
33 and switching around of things always keeps enemy
34 guessing instead of us--keep them reacting to us
35 instead of us reacting to them. My biggest problem
36 was just the lack of men. At the time of that attack,
37 I had 22 Americans. One was a computer guy that was
38 fixing our CPOF and then one was a medic, so we had 20
39 guys that I had trained with before to fight and there
40 hadn't been any action up there. The enemy had been
41 low key besides setting off an IED in the village
42 during the Shuura. Other than that, we knew they were
43 coming around, at least keeping an eye on us. But the
44 biggest thing was not enough men. We didn't have

1 enough concertina wire--at that time, concertina wire
2 was very difficult----

Sigma 3 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The attack we're talking about is the big attack in
4 August 2007, correct?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Sigma 6 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): When you guys were almost over run?

Yankee 7 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So not enough concertina at Ranch House?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. Not enough concertina. You know, you
10 could always use more sandbags, stuff like that, but
11 we'd used them extensively there. There was sandbags
12 all over that place for different things that I had in
13 mind but we would constantly drill--I would wake them
14 up at three o'clock in the morning and tell them that
15 we were under attack and just see their response, see
16 what we could do better, that kind of thing.
17 Constantly training them because I knew that if
18 something was going to happen, it was going to be
19 something big and that since we didn't have--since
20 they were just little spots, almost like little FOB's
21 on a, kind of, a big FOB, plus the terrain was going
22 to be hard for us to maneuver around reinforcements.
23 That's why the plan was for the ANA to move around.

Beta 24 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And down at Bella, the physical barrier plan,
25 were you comfortable with that location?

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No. And all you had to do was land there once
27 and look up and around. It was like a fishbowl.
28 Right away it just--the pucker factor would go up, so
29 Bella was never a comfortable position.

Beta 30 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And how far was the local populace from Bella?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right across the street was the clinic and then
32 the village, kind of, wrapped--wrapped around so there
33 was one part that was close by but that was--across
34 the river was a house. That was about it.

Beta 35 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And Bella was--if you had to do distance to the
36 nearest structure, non-U.S. structure in the village,
37 how far?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Five--ten meters--or five meters just across the
2 road.

Beta 3 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And how about at Ranch House?

Yankee 4 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Ranch House was--I'd say about 25 meters and it
5 was downhill. And then from around there, the village
6 kind of--it was built up a hill of terraces. It kind
7 of looked like, you know, like some of the house out
8 in North Carolina coast, they're built on those poles.
9 That's like half on the mountain and the other half
10 was off those kind of poles, just off the sides of the
11 mountains and they were right below us.

Beta 12 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Earlier in your tour, did Chosen establish,
13 before Wanat, did Chosen establish any of the COP's?

Yankee 14 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No.

Beta 15 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you know if the 2/503rd had anybody?

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): In the Korengal they were establishing new COPs.

Beta 17 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Was that one of the other companies?

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger, Battle Company. And Able might have too,
19 I was never--we worked a lot with Battle, not a lot
20 with Able so I'm not exactly sure what they
21 accomplished.

Beta 22 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): We're going to focus now on some questions on
23 Wanat itself.

Yankee 24 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay.

Beta 25 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When did you learn of a possible move to Wanat?

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Wanat was always kind of thrown around. It kind
27 of fit with the current operations where the most
28 success was in Afghanistan was shown was that if you
29 build an American base near the district center and
30 start that as your central point and then expand it
31 from there with the American forces working with the
32 government of Afghanistan, it had huge success in
33 other parts of the country. So we wanted to try that
34 because Wanat--we were away from Wanat, we didn't know
35 what was going on at their district center--about that
36 time we're always getting reports that the district
37 governor was bad, the district chief of Wanat was bad.

1 They're using that area for running the supplies.
2 It's like they're meet and greet and they've come down
3 to Nangelem to get their supplies and go up to Wanat
4 and then spread it out from there. So it was a supply
5 for the enemy.

6 And we, from the get go, you know, Ranch House
7 was going to be torn down. It was just a horrible
8 position. And then Bella was certainly--everybody was
9 very uneasy about Bella so that was kind of the
10 thought process just a few months into it was we need
11 another place, Wanat is looking like it. After just a
12 few months of being there, after four or five months
13 into it, November, December timeframe was when they
14 started doing the discussion with the leaders in Wanat
15 for using the land for the FOB.

Sigma 16 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Before you get away from the other two, did you get a
17 sense, with respect to Ranch House and Bella, that
18 obviously you knew at the platoon level it's just not
19 a defensible position or it was just a precarious--was
20 there much discussion up and down the chain about,
21 hey, this is not a good idea? And if so, what was
22 your sense of why you guys were there? I mean, if
23 everybody agrees this is a bad place to be tactically,
24 did you get any sense from your higher as to well we
25 need you there because--to do X, Y, and Z?

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. I think right from the onset we kind of
27 adopted the 10th Mountain's plan about get out there,
28 work with the populace and then--we--they started to
29 give that a try like I said the first month or two.
30 But once we started seeing the--just how difficult it
31 was to keep the supply running for that base and the
32 manpower--just starting to really look at it saying
33 this is not a good idea just to be defending this FOB
34 with 22 people, even with the extra ANA and ASG. This
35 was just not a good idea. And so from the onset from
36 when they were visiting us, you know, and I would
37 voice my concerns. We had our little FOB security
38 outlines that we did. Mine was four, five, six pages
39 of how much I just did not like and what I feared
40 might happen. If they hit the enemy position, they'll
41 run and we're done, which is exactly what happened.

42 So they knew, they wanted change, and then from
43 then on, it was just sitting down, working up the
44 mission and getting the assets. In my opinion, not

1 from a direct conversation, I think, from Lieutenant
2 Commander or the XO or anything, I think the assets
3 was the biggest thing about moving everything out of
4 there, establishing something in the short order
5 before winter set out.

Sigma 6 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I know it's hard at the platoon level to make a
7 determination, but do you have any sense of how far up
8 the chain your concerns were passed? Do you think the
9 battalion commander had a good sense of what was going
10 on?

Yankee 11 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely. I was--he was fully aware on the
12 visits he would stop--he would definitely mention
13 that, you know, Ranch House is closing because it was
14 just not working into the idea and for the other
15 reasons that I stated previously. And he was very
16 aware and very adamant about getting--breaking down
17 that place.

Sigma 18 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): So the battalion commander and the CSM, would they
19 come out and see you guys at the Ranch House?

Yankee 20 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger that, sir.

Owl 21 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, if you could just clarify which particular
22 unit you were with at each particular time. I think
23 you said you were with weapons platoon at one time --

Yankee 24 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. Okay.

Owl 25 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): And time and wherever when you made those
26 particular statements.

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Gotcha. The--all the stuff talking about Ranch
28 House, my platoon was split in half. First, second
29 squad plus the platoon sergeant was down at Bella and
30 then third and weapons squad plus the PL and myself
31 were at Ranch House so my PL was there, but I was the
32 NCOIC of Ranch House so in a sense, kind of, you know,
33 platoon sergeant of the place.

34 **LtGen Natonski**: Was that second platoon?

Yankee 35 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was first platoon, sir.

36 **LtGen Natonski**: Chosen company?

Yankee 37 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger that, sir.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** That was at Bella and Ranch House?

Yankee 2 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Second platoon at that time was at
3 Blessing running missions out there.

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): How many Soldiers at Bella, were down at Bella?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Once I got to Bella was when once they actually
6 finally closed Ranch House, so we had the full platoon
7 there.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): First platoon?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): First platoon.

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Before we move on, there's one administrative
11 item I need to address here on the record. You've
12 made some previous statements regarding the combat
13 operation in Wanat; you did have a chance to review
14 those statements this morning. And for the record,
15 there were four statements from the Army's 15-6
16 investigation, a three-page statement on 13 July 2008,
17 a three-page statement on 13 July 2008, a two-page
18 statement on 21 July 2008, and a five-page statement
19 on 25 July 2008. There were--there was an 8-page
20 transcript of an interview given at CSI dated 21
21 October '08 and a 19-page transcript of an interview
22 to CSI 2 April '09. You had an opportunity to review
23 all those documents this morning. You have signed the
24 first page of each of those documents. You did make a
25 change on page 15 of the 2 April '09 statement and you
26 would like to clarify an item on page 4 of the 21
27 October CSI statement.

Yankee 28 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): We'll address that later. Do you adopt those
30 statements as part of your sworn testimony today?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 32 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Had you been to Wanat and the site itself? Had
33 you been to Wanat before you received the orders to
34 move them?

Yankee 35 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. We had done numerous patrols and
36 Shuuras up there plus site surveying for the future
37 FOB, so we'd been up there numerous times.

Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And you personally went on those?

Yankee 2 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): No. On more than half of them, yes, sir.

Beta 3 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you attend some of the Shuuras?

Yankee 4 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): I did not. I would be running the defense
5 outside while the lieutenant and sometimes--twice the
6 BC came out so he was out there and I was running the
7 defense outside, security operation.

Beta 8 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you go and walk the ground that you ended up
9 putting the COP on?

Yankee 10 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 11 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you walk the ground where the OP Topside
12 ended up?

Yankee 13 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 14 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): When you initially walked that ground, can you
15 please relay your thought?

Yankee 16 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): When we walked through it with the idea of
17 finding a COP, I didn't like any of the ground. The
18 only--the only--the only plus--the only good thought I
19 had about it was just the location of it because I
20 thought surely they wouldn't hit a COP that was in the
21 village proper. And then the OPs we had sighted
22 numerous spots for once the FOB got established where
23 we were going to put OPs. The one we settled on was
24 always going to be just an intermittent kind of OP
25 until we could branch out farther. The big concern
26 was the high ground all around. Once again, typical
27 Afghanistan, everywhere you go, there is higher ground
28 than the one that you're on. But, again, I didn't
29 like it. It seemed exposed, but at the same time,
30 like I said, I just didn't think that they would ever
31 attack rockets or anything that close to the village
32 because they didn't want to tick the people off so I
33 thought that that was our security was being in there
34 with the civilians.

Beta 35 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): You had moved over to become second platoon
36 sergeant at this time just to clarify after Sergeant
37 Kahler was killed?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. Blue

Beta 2 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6) was your platoon leader?

Yankee 3 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes.

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And you guys, you were tagged for the Wanat thing
5 which is why --

Yankee 6 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger, sir.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** As you look at the lay down when the COP was
8 established, when you came up there on some of these
9 visits, did you see any other alternative sites that
10 might have been met better in your mind, whether here,
11 short of the city, or on the other side?

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We had some ideas over to the east. It were to
13 require --

14 **LtGen Natonski:** Can we move the map?

Yankee 15 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Up where that--if you pan over to the right a
16 little bit more, right there where that house is about
17 at, we had some ideas around in that area but it just
18 would have been a lot of excavation kind of work. But
19 we liked that area up there just because of the view
20 down there because where we're at now, we have no idea
21 what could move in along that river bed and to the
22 north. I mean, a lot of that spot was just huge
23 heartburn to us.

Zeta 24 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Are you talking about that smaller tributary to
25 the north that runs up --

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Exactly, sir. You could move a large amount of
27 individuals down from through that from the position
28 we're at now and not even know it, even with an OP set
29 up. So right up on top of that terrace is where would
30 be pretty good. You could level some of that, get
31 some good eyes on, knock down some of that brush down
32 there in the trees by the river there. I would have
33 been happier with something like that but that would
34 have been a lot of work as far as excavation.

Zeta 35 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Are you talking about farther up the terrace?

Yankee 36 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah, just--

Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Since we're building a record here, gentlemen,
2 we'll need to describe and let's reference off of OP
3 topside.

Yankee 4 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Off of OP topside.

Beta 5 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Which direction?

Yankee 6 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): That's east, I believe was up the terrace there
7 and about where that building about is--about where
8 that building is. Yeah, it was a little flatter right
9 there and we're thinking that you could do something
10 off that. I mean, that was an idea that the
11 lieutenant and I had kicked around and a spot that we
12 would be much happier with something up there.

Beta 13 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): (b)(3),(b)(6), could you get a guess measurement, please,
14 from OP Topside over to this point?

15 LtGen Natonski: Could you have moved a vehicle up there?

Yankee 16 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): No, not at that time. Like I was saying, sir, it
17 would of--I mean, that was the best as far as around
18 but it would have done a lot of work. You have of--
19 what we discussed. We would have had to have build a
20 road, we would have had to flatten some of that in
21 order to facilitate building a FOB. But at that time,
22 it would have been the best position if I would have
23 had the world as far as equipment at that time and
24 materials, stuff like that--that would have been the
25 position I would have chose.

Beta 26 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): To clarify for the record, you had looked at a
27 position about a 120 meters further east and up the
28 mountain?

Yankee 29 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. Along up there, when we had walked around
30 up in there, that would have been our ideal--ideal
31 position was up there was because of what you could
32 see and the terrain that we could occupy.

Sigma 33 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): You would have had to negotiate also with the locals
34 and --

Yankee 35 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Sigma 36 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): --probably people living in that house?

Yankee 37 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. Exactly.

Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Ultimately, what drove your decision to not put
2 an OP there?

Yankee 3 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): The OP we had--once we decided where the--or once
4 they decided where the FOB was going to be set up and
5 then we had to start looking at OP's, we wanted
6 something that could also be--what drove it down to
7 there was not farther up that ridge was that we wanted
8 to be able to support it.

Beta 9 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): By there you mean OP Topside?

Yankee 10 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right, OP topside. You know, the OP was--there
11 was never a good position for the OP and I don't even
12 say that was the best of the worst positions but the
13 biggest driving factor was being able to support it?

Zeta 14 Maj (b)(3),(b)(6): Support in the sense of support by fire or by
15 support by resupply or --

Yankee 16 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Both and support by, you know, reinforcements so
17 all three.

Beta 18 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): What resources would you have needed in your
19 opinion in order to establish an OP at that location
20 about 120 meters further up the hill to the east,
21 resources that you didn't have? Additional Soldiers?

Yankee 22 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Definitely additional Soldiers. I mean, that
23 could go --

Beta 24 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Munitions?

Yankee 25 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. I mean, definitely additional Soldiers
26 would have helped. As far as equipment, that whole
27 area, you couldn't get any kind of equipment in there
28 without building a road up it first. Some of those
29 terrace--those little ledges and stuff were, you know,
30 a good three, four feet high on some of them; so just
31 more Soldiers with good old grunt work with shovels
32 and sandbags.

33 LtGen Natonski: What was the condition of the road from Camp
34 Blessing to Wanat?

Yankee 35 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): It was--it was good. You could get a HMMWV up
36 it. At one point in time, we were going to try and
37 get a MRAP up there, but the last thousand meters to

1 Wanat was the spot that we're thinking might not be
2 able to--some of the road had been washed out the year
3 earlier--the year previous from flooding so--and it
4 was rebuilt, so it was weather dependant on that road
5 but just HMMWV could travel up that thing.

6 **LtGen Natonski:** All the base which is where you brought your
7 HMMWV's --

Yankee 8 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Right. Yes, sir.

9 **LtGen Natonski:** Was there any initiative by the engineers to
10 repair that last thousand meters or so into the --

Yankee 11 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** There was--there was some--there was some
12 discussion, especially much further down the road,
13 sir, about not necessarily maybe getting it paved,
14 definitely widening it so we can get some--I think the
15 biggest plan was for Wanat to be able to get large
16 amount of supplies to help distribute that out to the
17 other villages that were in the mountains.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** And it was your impression that Wanat was
19 going to be an establishment permanently?

Yankee 20 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir.

21 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. You've referred to it as a forward
22 operating base, combat outpost, and then one of your
23 statements you called it a vehicle control base. How
24 would you have defined it?

Yankee 25 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Well, when we first got there, the plan was the
26 vehicle control base and set up the defensive
27 positions. The day after we got there, the engineers
28 started already outlining their survey stakes about
29 where things were going. Actually, it was kind of a--
30 I don't want to say heated discussion--but the
31 engineer didn't want us in the positions where he was
32 staking our guard tower and stuff and I told him that,
33 you know, we needed these defensive positions up now.
34 Whatever spot you wanted to work on first, we can
35 always move that perimeter one direction or the other
36 way. Once you're done with there and moving to
37 another spot, we'll move. But I wanted the security
38 first. So at first it was a vehicle control base from
39 day one it was already being outlined on where--by the
40 end of day one, I already knew where the LZ, the

1 barracks, the guard--I knew where everything was going
2 to go on the FOB.

3 **LtGen Natonski:** How do you, in your mind, define "vehicle
4 patrol base"?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We had positions--we had a perimeter with
6 concertina wire. A vehicle control base is--start as
7 using the vehicle as positions and then you built off
8 vehicles, so it's a permanent but something that could
9 also be broken down in a moment's notice.

10 **LtGen Natonski:** So I want to get this straight in my mind.
11 A vehicle patrol base doesn't necessarily mean it
12 could be temporary. It might be a defense established
13 initially around vehicles that then is built into a
14 permanent facility?

Yankee 15 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

16 **LtGen Natonski:** And it was always your impression that Wanat
17 was going to be built into the district in the
18 district center as a permanent COP to interact with
19 the people and the district government?

Yankee 20 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

21 **LtGen Natonski:** And how many people, ball park, do you think
22 lived in that Wanat area?

Yankee 23 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Wanat proper, I would say anywhere from--you
24 couldn't get people, it was always by families is how
25 we did our count. I think it was anywhere between 60
26 to-- around 60 to 80 families.

27 **LtGen Natonski:** 60 to 80?

Yankee 28 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Around that, maybe a little- - and inside the
29 village, but then, you know, kind of the houses
30 around, so somewhere around that figure, and each
31 family could be anywhere between a husband and wife
32 team to, you know, husband and wife, sons, kids,
33 grandparents.

34 **LtGen Natonski:** Was this the biggest concentration of people
35 in the Waygal Valley that you knew of?

Yankee 36 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No. It was not. I think Aranus. The way it
37 kind of wrapped around and filtered out was actually

1 bigger, and it may have been a little less families.
2 It's kind of hard to say, you know, where a different
3 village starts and Wanat the head center and then
4 houses up and around, so inside the village it was
5 probably less than that, but through all the little
6 spots, so.

Zeta 7 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, if I may. It may be helpful if Sergeant
8 Yankee (b)(3),(b)(6) described what he understands the composition of
9 what it looked like, or the position rather of what it
10 looked like. It's going to be kind of hard to do and
11 capture it on record.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** Can we pan out to . . .

Zeta 13 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): So if you could just describe for the general
14 what your recollection is of what the plan was for how
15 it would work?

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Actually, sir, we could hold on this and then we
17 will ask for a cop shot and after we take a break,
18 sir, we'll print it off and then for the record we
19 could reference directly off a particular fixed shot.

Zeta 20 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): We've got some here.

Beta 21 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Does this look accurate?

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I'd say it's a decent--well, the mortar pit was
23 kind of down to the south a little bit more and the
24 latrine was down a little bit more south than that.

Beta 25 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Actually, Sergeant Yankee (b)(3),(b)(6), it might be best if we,
26 during the break, tighten up the graphics and then go
27 off of that so we're not referencing on the record as
28 we make these changes and adjustments. When you went
29 for your site survey of Wanat, did you know what
30 assets you would have, how big your unit would be and
31 what external attachments you might have?

Yankee 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No. I mean we assumed it would be a platoon as
33 far as what other assets, and then there was talk on
34 the mortars, but what other assets that we would have,
35 no, there was no--it was still working through, and
36 this was months, and months before we're going through
37 the land deals with the local Elder, the Shuura, so
38 this is months and months before.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When you were selecting the OP, okay, or looking
2 where the OP might be it was your understanding you
3 were going to have a 3 squad platoon plus attachments?

Yankee 4 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It would be our three line squad and one weapon
5 squad, so it was four squads, and that's what we knew
6 it would be at least--the least amount that we'd have.

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you or Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6) identify
8 additional assets you would want?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger, with the idea that this was being set up
10 and 1st Platoon would no longer have to occupy Bella.
11 We were kind of hoping that we would get something
12 from 1st Platoon, be it the entire platoon or half, we
13 were kind of hoping that we would get that in order to
14 help facilitate building the base. We had ran across
15 some documents in talking to 10th Mountain that when
16 they built that bridge they had set up right where we
17 were setting up. They had a vehicle patrol base there
18 to help defend the bridge, but they also had--and I'm
19 not sure the unit size could be a squad, I'm not sure
20 the positions up in the high ground, blocking
21 positions, which we instantly, you know, fell in love
22 with, I guess you would say, that it was great idea to
23 have positions up in the high ground, so that was kind
24 of- - we were always talking about that, you know,
25 "Man, we really need to get some more people so we can
26 have positions up in the high ground."

27 **LtGen Natonski:** They built two bridges at Wanat, did they
28 not?

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, I'm not sure the exact number. I only know
30 that we ran into the map and where they had their
31 positions for one of the ones that they were building.

32 **LtGen Natonski:** Could you from the combat outpost--there was
33 one bridge just to the north near the district center
34 and a police station, and then just a little bit
35 further up the valley to the north was a second
36 bridge. Do you remember those two bridges?

Yankee 37 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The first bridge, yes, sir, I do. We didn't push
38 further than that first bridge, so I don't know where
39 that second bridge was, sir. I never laid eyes on it.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** The first bridge was the one built by 10th
2 Mountain. Could you see it from your positions in the
3 COP?

Yankee 4 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, very little. From the northwest corner of
5 the base you could see down there and see some of it,
6 but not from the majority of the base, no, sir.

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): After you'd been to your site survey, did you
8 communicate any requirements to the First Sergeant or
9 Company Commander like you'd mentioned, it would have
10 been very nice for you to have a small rotation for 1st
11 Platoon?

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, there wasn't a lot of hard talk. At this
13 time it was still—I mean they're negotiating it and
14 there was a timeline present. I think there was a
15 small part in some of us that didn't even think this
16 thing was going to happen just cause of how they were
17 going about it and just how much resources it would
18 take, so at that time there wasn't a lot of—I mean it
19 was something like "well, if we're going to take this
20 position and an OP here, then we're going to need more
21 of these guys. Where are we getting the Engineer
22 support, where are they getting-- you know, we're
23 going to need some pretty big trucks here to knock
24 this down 15 feet of the ground because of the way the
25 terrain is sloped in that area," so there was
26 discussion of that about where we were going to get--
27 it was more of an ongoing discussion than at that time
28 a deliberate "well, we need this, this, and this."

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): On the day you left Blessing to move up to Wanat
30 what was 1st Platoon doing?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): 1st Platoon was at Bella and the plan was that
32 when we moved up to Wanat, the day that we moved up
33 they would be breaking down.

Beta 34 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Chosen had given up a platoon to another company,
35 is that your understanding?

Yankee 36 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. The way it worked was 3rd Platoon was
37 attached, if you will, I guess, with D Company, and
38 then we had a platoon of theirs because they were the--
39 - D Company was the motorized section, so they had--
40 motorized platoon, so their platoons were a lot less
41 men than 16 guys, so they needed a line platoon in

1 order to facilitate the building at one of their
2 vehicle patrol bases in the Shuurac, and then we had
3 their platoon, which helped run COP Michigan, which
4 was down the road from Blessing, and then one of their
5 trucks added on to us.

6 **LtGen Natonski:** In addition to the platoon, the 2nd Platoon
7 that moved to Wanat, what attachments did you move up
8 there to establish that COP with?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We moved up with the one vehicle from Destined
10 Company and then we had the 60-millimeter mortar
11 section. They were—I can remember the exact—I think
12 he had six guys, little bit more than usual, around 60
13 because we knew we were getting the 120 the next day,
14 so we knew we'd have two more, but the initial
15 movement out there was 60 plus my platoon with their
16 HMMWVs and the Destin Company.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** Anything else? There was a TOW.

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right, the TOW was from the Destined Company.

19 **LtGen Natonski:** That came with the mortar?

Yankee 20 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was the Destined Company truck that we were
21 using from that platoon, so my trucks, my four trucks
22 had 50-Cals and MARC-19s. The fifth HMMWV had the
23 TOW, which was from the Destined Platoon.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** Engineers?

Yankee 25 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Engineers didn't come out until later, sir.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** And how many?

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I think there was a total of eight.

28 **LtGen Natonski:** Had you asked for Engineers knowing what you
29 were going into?

Yankee 30 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. We didn't even go with the entire platoon
31 either. It was all one could fit in the HMMWV and
32 then the rest were coming up that morning on a
33 Chinook, so the Engineers came up that morning, so we
34 knew that after that initial drive up there that we
35 would have more people on the ground.

36 **LtGen Natonski:** And you say eight Engineers?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger, sir.

2 **LtGen Natonski:** Is that what the norm was for the establishment
3 of a COP?

Yankee 4 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): To be honest, sir, I wouldn't know--this is my
5 first FOB to establish, I wouldn't know what the norm
6 is. Roger, sir, I just wouldn't know what the norm
7 is.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When was 2nd of the 503rd due to rotate?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We were going to start actually on the five days--
10 after five days up there we would actually--five or
11 six days, you know, tap us around the fourth day, we
12 were actually going to start just splicing people out
13 and then 10th Mountain was going to start bringing
14 people in, so less than a week we would have people
15 rotating out already, and then I was going to be the
16 last one to leave, and I think that was like 10 days
17 from the 8th, so around the 18th, 21st, something like
18 that.

19 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Owl 10th Mountain or 1st ID?

Yankee 20 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I'm sorry, 1st ID. Sorry, sir.

Sigma 21 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): And what day did you actually arrive in Wanat?

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We drove up there on the 8th.

Beta 23 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And what time did you arrive on the 8th?

Yankee 24 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was at night, the middle of the night.

25 **LtGen Natonski:** When you do a RIP or a transfer of authority
26 and in a position like this, what is the normal--we
27 call it in the Marine Corps left seat/right seat,
28 what's the normal timeframe for turnover of a position
29 to another unit?

Yankee 30 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Sometimes, the way it worked for--what you want
31 is two weeks. Definitely the leadership needs to be
32 together for two weeks. We try to get the Soldiers as
33 much face time with each other as possible also. The
34 way it was kind of working out for us cause of how far
35 we were from everything was that we were going to get
36 some of their guys at the same time some of my guys
37 were going out, and it's kind of hard to say "norm"

1 and it's kind of like in the middle of a combat
2 operation we're trying to do a RIP.

Beta 3 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When you came in, when you rotated in could you
4 describe your RIP TOA when you did it?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was actually a very good RIP TOA. Ranch House
6 was - - me, the PL and two other individuals went
7 straight up to the Ranch House then just a couple days
8 after getting in country. None of their guys RИPed
9 out, so we were able to - no, I'm sorry, one of their
10 NCOs went back to help start moving some of the gear
11 and get accountability of all the equipment that was
12 back at Blessing, but other than that myself and the
13 leadership for part of the platoon that was going to
14 be there was able to sit down and go through
15 everything at that base, and then we started getting
16 some guys in and they would send some back, and then
17 they would intermingle on the base, get all the ins
18 and outs; we did joint patrols together, did a joint
19 Shuura together down to the point where their guys at
20 the guard post would quiz real quick, you know, even
21 without looking at the compass, "What degree is that
22 over there," you know, getting them to get their
23 memory's eyes on the guard post that they were going
24 to be working, so it was a very good RIP TOA.

25 **LtGen Natonski:** Had they set a date for 1st ID to come up to
26 Wanat to begin the RIP?

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Yes, sir.

28 **LtGen Natonski:** You mentioned five days. What day was that?

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I know it was going to start . . . on the 15th was
30 when I was going to start—we were going to start
31 swapping. I was going to send a few guys back.

32 **LtGen Natonski:** Starting on the 15th of July?

Yankee 33 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

34 **LtGen Natonski:** And you mentioned it could take somewhere in
35 the neighborhood of two weeks with the leadership up
36 front doing the turnover during this period?

Yankee 37 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Normal, sir. That one was actually going to take
38 or this that we were doing was going to take about

1 five or six days. The 21st was--I would be the last
2 one out.

3 **LtGen Natonski:** And the reason for that was your return to
4 the states?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right, the return. We would have went back to
6 Blessing and then hopped a flight back to Bagram.
7 Just from all the little flights heading towards
8 Bagram, cause I know that we were going to be like
9 out, out of country like around the 27th or 28th, so the
10 way the timeline was working----

11 **LtGen Natonski:** You had already sent you personal effects back?

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. They were either--some of our stuff had
13 been sent forward to Bagram and then some of the stuff
14 was waiting at Blessing for us to grab. Like if we
15 had an Assault Pack with a laptop on it, that was
16 waiting at Blessing for when we got back from Wanat to
17 grab it and then get on the next thing smoking for
18 Bagram.

19 **LtGen Natonski:** So you anticipated a five day RIP with 1st ID
20 starting about the 15th of July. Did you feel rushed
21 because of the fact that you were on your rotation
22 home, the establishment of the COP, and then the
23 immediate turnover to another unit?

Beta 24 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): What were your duties related to the
25 administrative side of the RIP, getting your platoon
26 home?

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The first part, sir, rushed? I mean we were
28 rushed to get the defenses up. It didn't matter that
29 we were about to RIP. It was just getting everything
30 up so we had something, not necessarily to hand over,
31 but just had something for us to work out of and then
32 hand over as they came along, and we were working the
33 piece of "Okay, if I'm going to be missing--you know,
34 crap, I'm sending my best machine gunner home at that
35 time, now we need to have an idea," and so we already
36 starting to work that, and then, sir, administratively
37 we had a continuity book that we would help, had a
38 patrol, stuff like that, but none of that stuff ever
39 got handed off because of the fact that instead of
40 doing it at Blessing and doing left seat / right seat
41 rides out of there and being able to use our computer

1 because we would save all patrol reports. Pictures
2 and stuff like that we had on a computer and stuff
3 like that, which was never able to give them cause we
4 moved up to Wanat, so as far as administrative, there
5 was going to be hardly--it was little to none as far as
6 what kind of a handoff we would be doing up there.
7 Matter of fact, the XO had already signed for the
8 vehicles and stuff like that, so there wasn't even an
9 issue of responsibility of equipment. That was
10 already taken care of, so.

Beta 11 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did any aspect of the RIP of moving your platoon
12 back impact your duties at Wanat? Let me clarify. As
13 a platoon sergeant establishing a new position you had
14 duties you had to perform up there. Did the fact that
15 you were preparing to phase your platoon out and
16 whatever time you spent working on phasing the platoon
17 back, did that impact your duties?

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I would say that it added to it just a little
19 bit. Like I said, if I'm going to be missing--about
20 who was I going to rotate back first we had a set
21 number. Okay, well, I don't want to leave this
22 position down too many. I know I'm getting Soldiers
23 coming in, but they're not going to be as experienced
24 as my guys. Where do I start pulling back from, and
25 where do I start these guys, because I already knew
26 after 14 plus months of combat my guys were
27 experienced. They knew what to look for, and I could
28 trust them whereas these new guys coming in I had not
29 been battle tested with them yet, so I was trying to
30 figure out where I was going to move from, but, yeah,
31 I would say it hindered it in that way because not
32 only now did we have to concentrate on building a
33 base, but now I have to get it out of my men's heads
34 that we're going home soon because then things start
35 to slow, and every RIP TOA people start thinking about
36 home a little bit more than usual and that this is
37 almost done and things start to slip, so.

Sigma 38 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Not to get too far down in the weeds, but would you
39 have left any equipment behind for 1st ID or would you
40 guys taking all your weapons and supplies and just got
41 on an aircraft and gone back to Blessing?

Yankee 42 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, it was already set up to where like our
43 personal--our M4s, 203s, ops would come with us up to
44 240 would be coming back with us, but everything else

1 had been signed for. They had already done the--
2 matter of fact I believe, but not 100%, but I believe
3 one of the 50-Cals that we left was actually
4 technically ours, but they did the--I don't know what
5 the technical term is, the administrative switch of
6 the equipment, so the only thing going back with us
7 was our Ruck sack and our personal rifle and knives.

Beta 8 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you have any reservations related to
9 establishing a new position in relation to your return
10 to the building?

Yankee 11 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, in the middle of the RIP, absolutely I had
12 reservations about doing the building.

Beta 13 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And why is that?

Yankee 14 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Because the biggest thing is all the assets.
15 Afghanistan, especially at that time, was already just
16 asset dry.

Beta 17 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Can you describe that term please?

Yankee 18 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): It was very difficult, and this is from the
19 experience of being at the Ranch House, Bella, and
20 numerous missions that we were on that in order to get
21 any kind of a ISR, just to start with, we would have
22 to wait for the resupply that was coming into Blessing
23 in order to try to sweet talk the Apache pilot into
24 going into this area to take a look at a spot, and of
25 course you had ten different people asking for that
26 Apache to do the same thing, so it was hard. There
27 was that aspect, and then there was the resupply
28 aspect. The Chinook pilots would be flying all the
29 way from Bagram to Jalalabad and from Jalalabad out to
30 us. By the time they would get up to Blessing, in
31 order to start doing the runs from, up to Ranch House
32 they had already been flying for 4 hours, so I know
33 these guys are already tired, and then they would do
34 one run up to Ranch House, and we're trying to get--
35 "Hey, could you do one more run so we can get some
36 mail up here?" I mean we'd have to sweet talk the
37 pilots every single time because we were at the
38 northern most outpost, so even planning a CONOP it
39 never-getting the birds to fly two routes it was
40 always depending on what the air commander wanted at
41 the time. It usually never went that way. So when I
42 say asset dry at this time, even during normal

1 conditions it was very difficult to get any kind of
2 CAS or CCA in order to support. It had to be a
3 battalion operation in order to get that stuff laid
4 on. Forget about trying to get Predator to take a
5 look at something because, hey, hearing movement, a
6 lot of chatter about guys moving over here. You
7 couldn't get any kind of asset, so then we started
8 tossing in a RIP where you're moving troops to and
9 from, now you're chewing up even more assets and----

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): By that, you mean the CH-47s.

Yankee 11 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): On everything, sir, is what I'm talking about,
12 everything from UH-60, CH-47, AH-64s, even when we had
13 the Kiowa even that was being--and they couldn't even
14 come up to those positions because of the altitude and
15 the way the valley was set up they could fly, but they
16 would skid too much because of the altitude, and plus
17 the close air support. So all that was dry.

Sigma 18 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did that change at all when you were--it was a TIC
19 situation? You said some things were diverted to you
20 in a timely manner and there was a TIC which was a
21 situation where you couldn't lay it on and plan for
22 like a deliberate operation?

Yankee 23 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right, if you were in a TIC and called for close
24 air support it would take anywhere from 30 to 40
25 minutes. So I don't know how quick that is sometimes
26 on the ground, but 30 or 40 minutes might as well be a
27 lifetime. But I do know that from talking to some of
28 the A10 pilots I ran into on leave that they would
29 actually-- if their sector of flight was anywhere near
30 our area, they would fly to the closest border,
31 because they always knew that during their timeframe
32 they would be called over into our area.

33 **LtGen Natonski:** You mentioned the RIP. Was there ever any
34 discussion about the timing when the optimum time to
35 conduct that RIP might be?

Yankee 36 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): To conduct the RIP or the move----

37 **LtGen Natonski:** The RIP-- actually more so the establishment
38 of Wanat as a COP. Because of the RIP and what you
39 just said had any discussions been done about timing
40 it better than perhaps it was?

Blue
(b)(3),(b)(6)

Yankee

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SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir, numerous. I know Lieutenant talked with the Company Commander numerous times that this was not a good idea in dead-- not only the dead heat, but the smack middle of the fighting season. This needed to be done during the winter when all the fighters were tending to their families, and the original idea was for this to be done earlier that year, it just the way everything kept getting pushed because of the land deals and stuff like that, it just kept getting pushed to the right, pushed to the right, pushed to the right until now it was it was pushed right in the middle of the red band of fighting season.

14 **LtGen Natonski:** So why did they go with the time they did?

Yankee

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SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): It would be pure speculation, sir, for me to go into that, but if you're asking my personal opinion, my personal opinion is just that some of it was that this mission had been kind of on the table for quite a while. But I think some of it was driven by arrogance and pride, sir.

21 **LtGen Natonski:** You mentioned a scarcity of assets that takes place during a RIP and you alluded to ISR. Did you have any indications while you were--before you moved to Wanat or while you were establishing your COP of any impending attack by Afghan forces?

Yankee

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SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. We knew before we went up there that the enemy was massing around Bella, so we knew there was a large enemy force up there.

29 **LtGen Natonski:** And Bella is how far up the valley from
30 Wanat?

Yankee

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SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): It's not far, 5 kilometers, I think. I would have to take a look but it was not far at all. So we knew they weren't just going to disintegrate when they finally heard that we were coming to that area. We knew the enemy had known for the longest time that we would be setting up a base almost by the footage of where we would be. We know the Shuura would have told them where we were going to build it, and then once we got up there from the get go it was--we had some individuals, one guy was from Bella or around that area that Lieutenant Brostrom had said he had known before from when he was working in Bella, and he came

1 down and said that they, you know, yeah, today their
2 celebrating their victory by running around inside
3 Bella and the base, cause we had just left that night
4 before. And then he said that they had planned on
5 coming down here and attacking you guys, so from the
6 get go the morning of we started getting HUMINT that
7 they were going to attack us at some point in time.

8 **LtGen Natonski:** Was this reported to higher headquarters?

Yankee 9 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Roger that, sir.

10 **LtGen Natonski:** To whom?

Yankee 11 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** My LT did the report. I know he discussed it
12 with my Company Commander. I'm sure he discussed it
13 with the Battalion Commander too because at that same
14 time I was also getting on the horn with the Company
15 XO and the Battalion XO because that morning there was
16 some supply issues. I think we were scheduled for 12
17 lifts with a CH-47 and they only wanted to do like
18 two, so, again, from the assets and stuff like that it
19 was starting to bite us in the butt within the first
20 12 hours of the mission.

21 **LtGen Natonski:** So you had indications and the warning of an
22 attack?

Yankee 23 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** Through multiple sources, you reported to
25 higher headquarters. What mitigating factors did you
26 take in order to meet the attack that you thought was
27 coming?

Yankee 28 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** The mitigating factors were already worked into
29 it. Sir, I went into the whole thing expecting some
30 sort of firefight, so everything was laid on. There
31 wasn't a lot of changes because it's what I expected,
32 so work faster and harder to dig your positions
33 because you're going to need the cover. Not just you
34 might, but you're going to need it. So it was-- we
35 rolled on the plan that me the PL had set up before.
36 Get our positions dug deep and rough, and tough
37 interlocking fields of fire and some patrol and just
38 get ready for----

1 **LtGen Natonski:** These were actions taken at the platoon
2 level. Were there other actions from outside
3 agencies, be it the battalion or others that helped in
4 preparations for a potential attack? You mentioned
5 ISR. Were any unmanned aerial vehicles locked on to
6 cover your position?

Yankee 7 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** The first 48 hours were still--it was all part of
8 a battalion CONOPs so we still had--I don't know what
9 time, I think it was the second day or part of the
10 second day. It was very little time left to when the
11 Predators got pulled, but we did have Predator, and I
12 want to say with 80% accuracy that we also had some
13 Red Ridge during that first 48 hours, so we had things
14 in position.

15 **LtGen Natonski:** Red Ridge is?

Yankee 16 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** I don't know who runs it, but it's the plane that
17 can listen in to the chatter----

18 **LtGen Natonski:** Signal Intelligence.

Yankee 19 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Right, Signal Intelligence, sir.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** So you had that capability initially when you
21 established, and then did you actually have a down
22 link into your position or was it down----

Yankee 23 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** No, sir, it was down in the Battalion.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** And the Battalion was at Camp Blessing?

Yankee 25 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** And you said that eventually that capability
27 was removed. Did you know that you lost your
28 coverage?

Yankee 29 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir, we did know. We knew that as part of
30 the CONOP that it was going to go away. I never heard
31 of a plan to get more coverage, but I know I was
32 sitting in on a meeting with Division not before we
33 went up on the 4th, it was the one before, before it
34 was canceled the first time, and they said that we
35 would have the coverage even afterwards because it was
36 their priority. Well, then it was canceled once or
37 twice from the 4th through the 8th, so then I know

1 that they briefed them again before we went up on the
2 8th, but I was not privy to that, so I'm not sure what
3 was discussed as far as assets, so I didn't know what
4 we would have after the initial 48 hours of the CONOP,
5 and from my understanding it was actually pulled a
6 little bit before the coverage was supposed to end
7 because of another mission that was going on.

8 **LtGen Natonski:** You still had indication of warning after
9 the coverage was pulled?

Yankee 10 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Absolutely. Actually, it was coming in more now
11 and now there was other signs that were reported, like
12 the women and children leaving the area. There was
13 still some work being done in the fields, but there
14 was definitely a drop down in----

15 **LtGen Natonski:** And was that reported?

Yankee 16 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Absolutely, sir.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** Was there any effort to re-task ISR assets
18 based on the threat in your position?

Yankee 19 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Sir, I wasn't part of any kind of that discussion
20 or anything like that, but if I know my Battalion, I'm
21 sure there was, but that's all pure speculation.

22 **LtGen Natonski:** But it was reported by the Platoon?

Yankee 23 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir, absolutely.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** Up until the day of the attack that you had
25 indications warning of a pending attack?

Yankee 26 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir, and then even the CO came the day
27 prior.

28 **LtGen Natonski:** And the CO being Captain Oscar

Yankee 29 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Captain Oscar and I know he had reported about--
30 but at that time too was not only all this other
31 information, but like the Shuura going on behind their
32 back, and he would repeat everything that happened a
33 couple days, so I know it was reported on.

34 **LtGen Natonski:** You mentioned that the loss of some CH-47
35 sorties to the position which affected supplies.

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely, sir.

2 **LtGen Natonski:** What supplies were you short in COP Wanat as
3 you established your position?

Yankee 4 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The biggest thing, sir, being water. On the
5 initial drive up there we packed every crevice with
6 the HMMWV off setting between ammo and water. We
7 brought as much as we could. I also knew during the
8 first initial slings from the CH-47s sorties would be
9 a couple pallets of water. Once that got dropped down
10 we kind of had to start making decisions on what
11 should come up first, so we had to make some
12 compromises and the water is the only thing we really
13 fell short. Everything else we got as we needed it,
14 if that makes sense. The Class IV that we initially
15 got wasn't what we originally wanted in our first
16 lift, but it was enough to keep us busy and establish
17 positions until the next came, and then from then on
18 and so forth. The only time that kind of bit us was
19 the water as far as the supply. Now we had a backup
20 plan for local civilian--I don't know if they're a
21 company or just two guys with pickup trucks that we
22 pay to run supplies; that were going to bring water
23 up. When we say immediately, meaning drive up there
24 now, Afghanis in their timeframe in their head think
25 "Oh, I got a day or two," so that is where the
26 disconnect is.

27 **LtGen Natonski:** Was there also Afghan engineers that were
28 coming up?

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): They were supposed to be coming up--from my
30 discussions with the XO they were supposed to come up
31 the day of, and then of course they----

32 **LtGen Natonski:** The day of?

Yankee 33 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The day of--On the 9th.

34 **LtGen Natonski:** On the 9th of July.

Yankee 35 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

36 **LtGen Natonski:** There as an Afghan engineer or construction-
37 ---

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Construction Company that was supposed to be
2 coming up, and from my understanding was that the
3 first day they kind of blew it off and they tried to--
4 the XO kept trying to get in touch with them. They
5 essentially said, well, we're not--and I'm not sure
6 the timeframe. I know that they had heard that there
7 was enemy up there and there was no way in heck they
8 were coming up there.

9 **LtGen Natonski:** And what was their task?

Yankee 10 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Their task was with--because where we were at
11 there was small terraces. They were tasked with
12 leveling it and plus helping build the wall, the
13 permanent wall that was going to be there for the FOB.

14 **LtGen Natonski:** And that wall would have been built HESCO
15 barriers or---

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Some of it was going to be HESCO, and then right
17 by the village they wanted they wanted a nice stone
18 type wall in order to have more of an aesthetic value
19 plus a defensive value.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** And that was the mission of this Afghan
21 construction company?

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. Yes, sir, plus they're using their heavy
23 equipment to help start building all the permanent
24 structures for it.

25 **LtGen Natonski:** Were they bringing workers with them?

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

27 **LtGen Natonski:** They were not going to hire a local Afghan--
28 --

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I think some of it would have been local and we
30 definitely had plans to hire the locals right away. I
31 say right away, but within the short period of time
32 that we were there getting things established and
33 start putting the locals to work in order for them to
34 make money and keep them busy.

35 **LtGen Natonski:** You mentioned the hot weather. How hot was
36 it when you were establishing this combat outpost?

Yankee 37 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Hot, sir.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** Over 100 degrees?

Yankee 2 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Around there, I don't think it ever got much
3 above that.

4 **LtGen Natonski:** Hence the shortages of water?

Yankee 5 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Right. Roger, sir. Yeah, we were burning
6 through water extremely, extremely fast because of the
7 heat, but also the work loads. The Afghani ground
8 didn't even want us there. I mean you could only dig
9 about a foot and then to get another foot was just
10 extreme work, plus filling sand bags, your typical
11 infantry duties.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** You were in a valley and there was a river?

Yankee 13 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Yes, sir.

14 **LtGen Natonski:** Was there any water points in the COP
15 itself? Was there a well of any kind?

Yankee 16 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** There was--just a few meters away from the
17 northern most position there was a well and we did get
18 water with use of iodine tablets.

19 **LtGen Natonski:** Iodine tablets?

Yankee 20 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** And we did have-- actually one of the other
21 corrections I want to make, we did have one per squad
22 the Ozark little filtration system, something that you
23 couldn't use for the heavy work load that we would
24 have needed to run our emergency water supply
25 situation there, but once we got our resupply of water
26 we still had some water bottles, but we had to cut
27 workload to get that, sir. Through my instruction
28 through my courses and stuff like that it's always
29 been that if you're down to your emergency, which is
30 the iodine water tabs and stuff like that, it's
31 already too late, so when we're calling in black on
32 water we were at about 20 percent to where I had to
33 shift the workload. I also didn't want to be having a
34 full workload with iodine tablets, because the iodine
35 tablets with the water gives men diarrhea and I did
36 not need to complicate the situation more with
37 diarrhea. We were already dehydrating enough and that
38 would make it even worse.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you report through higher headquarters
2 that you were black in water?

Yankee 3 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger, sir.

4 **LtGen Natonski:** And did you get the resupply after that?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Roger. It did take some time to get the water
6 because the way the Chinook sorties were operating and
7 then our backup plan of using the Afghanis bring the
8 water up was happening very slow, so there was a time
9 that we were, I think the second day we had to not
10 necessarily cease defensive base building operations,
11 but definitely bring it down to a slow halt.

12 [The testimony broke at 0948, 6 October 2009.]

1

2 [The testimony opened at 1104 hours, on 6 October 2009.]

Yankee

Beta

3 **LtCol Bligh:** Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6), we were discussing earlier the
4 timing in relation to your RIP/TOA and that you had
5 mentioned that you had spoken with--you and the
6 platoon leader had spoken with the first sergeant and
7 the company commander expressing your reservations.

8 What was their response?

Yankee

9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Their response was--and this is where I mentioned
10 earlier about the arrogance and the pride coming in.
11 The arrogance and the fact that the people. And when
12 I say "people," I do mean, kind of, everybody had the
13 general idea that they knew the enemy. They knew what
14 they were going to do, knew what actions they would
15 take, and there was consensus that between the first
16 sergeant and CO, were talking that the enemy was just
17 going to observe for a couple months and then hit,
18 like has been their, kind of, standing operating
19 procedure with the other bases. You know, Ranch
20 House, they observed how we would act up there for a
21 little bit and then they hit. You know, Bella, they
22 worked a few things around to see the best avenue of
23 approach. The Korengal was kind of a more kinetic
24 activity but there was always a sense that they would
25 sit there and watch first and then act later, so that
26 was the response that we were getting from the first
27 sergeant and the CO then. You know, if we got
28 anything it would be harassing fire but the enemy was
29 just going to observe and kind of find where our
30 faults were.

Beta

31 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): In retrospect, you label that as arrogance and
32 pride. At the time, did you see it as arrogance and
33 pride or an informed decision based on experience?

Yankee

34 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I had mentioned the fact that they had had, you
35 know, 8 or 10 months to do their recon. They knew
36 exactly where we were going to be at, how we were
37 going to be set up, where we're going to be set up.
38 They knew that we would have HMMWV's, so their recon
39 was already done. It was just going to be a time to
40 act. They had the supplies because they were getting
41 ready to hit Bella, it was thought to continue moving
42 on with the building of the RIP was to break Bella

1 down because it was, you know, threat of being
2 attacked by a large number of supplied forces. So in
3 my discussions with them, it was brought up that it's
4 not normal if they have everything they need, they
5 will hit us. At that time, in retrospect of course, I
6 did not believe that it would be a full on like it was
7 because I thought--I continue to think that the safety
8 inside the village was going to be our number one
9 asset was the safety inside the village so that kept
10 getting brought back up. But, you know, we're going to
11 keep charging. That's not saying that the first
12 sergeant, CO, actually, I know the first sergeant
13 didn't want us to go either. The CO--I know before,
14 and I'm not exactly sure the timeline, he--this was
15 kind of his baby, if you will, had been pushing for
16 it. I do know about two days before we did go up on
17 the sixth, you know, when we were talking, he did
18 mention that, you know, he wished now that it would
19 have went away instead of going forward like we were.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** Just to point a clarification, the CO
21 meaning?

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Captain Oscar, sir.

23 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.

Beta 24 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When you arrived at Wanat, what was the security
25 situation when you pulled in?

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We set up the perimeter around the main area that
27 we were going to be working with. We got individuals
28 up into where the OP was going to be. At that time,
29 we have a relatively decent idea about the area where
30 it would be but we just wanted somebody up in that
31 ground to help for an OP for the morning time. Since
32 security was good, we had air constantly going back
33 and forth because at that time Bella was breaking down
34 so we had the Apaches--and it was raining out--and,
35 you know, they don't like--they like getting wet even
36 worse than American Soldiers do, so we felt pretty
37 secure in the fact that they weren't going to do
38 anything in the middle of the night. They weren't
39 expecting us.

Beta 40 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When you initially arrived at Wanat, did you have
41 any interaction with the populace?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Once dawn hit and when we first got up there and
2 set up, we didn't have any movement at all, like I
3 said, it was raining. And in the morning timeframe we
4 started moving around. Now they didn't really--I
5 don't want to say used to seeing us, but we had been
6 up there numerous times to where it wasn't unexpected
7 that we would be there so there wasn't an initial
8 reaction until they saw us get--start getting, you
9 know, vigilant, and then they started figuring, you
10 know, two and two together that they were--we were
11 there to stay. And then very early that morning,
12 seven o'clock in the morning, you have the police
13 chief and his second in command and the district
14 governor saying oh we've got a prior engagement in
15 Abad. We'll see you guys later, and they just took
16 off.

Beta 17 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): On the morning after you arrived?

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. Now we thought, okay, so they do have a
19 previous thing to do but one of the guys--that one guy
20 I mentioned earlier that my PL had known from Bella
21 had contacted me that he had talked numerous times
22 before when he was at Bella had said that that was
23 actually like an Afghanis way of slapping you in the
24 face because you're technically their guest and for
25 them to up and leave like that, he said that that was
26 not a good sign; and that was reported higher also.

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): I want to switch and talk about some of the
28 supplies that you had with water. Did the unit have a
29 written SOP covering a basic water rule?

Yankee 30 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. And at that time, we had went--I had went
31 above it. In the amount of time that figuring in the
32 water resupply, I actually, kind of, planned for two
33 days without getting a water resupply. Now I thought
34 I was actually being quite liberal with my water
35 figures but it turned out I was actually short. Even
36 with the biggest thought in my mind that time the heat
37 of the day working was like, we're going to need more
38 water than this. And taking more than what I even
39 thought was necessary, I was actually undercutting it
40 for my water that we actually burned through.

Beta 41 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And the written SOP, whose was it? Was it a
42 Company SOP, a Battalion SOP?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I can't give a hundred percent on that but I know
2 we worked it through, I know, the company. As far as
3 who designed it or made it, I can't give a hundred
4 percent if it was company or battalion but I know
5 that's what we worked off of.

Beta 6 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And when you planned previous movements of your
7 platoon, did you routinely go above that standard?

Yankee 8 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Not as much as we did for this, but I know on a
9 lot of our patrols we always had 24 to 48 hours worth
10 of water, even if it was supposed to be a 2-hour or 3-
11 hour patrol with the HMMWV's. Now on foot, you know,
12 a local disarmed patrol was a camelback was the--what
13 you wanted. And then I would always have them bring a
14 couple bottles extra, always go a little bit above--
15 it'd add a little bit more weight, but you never knew
16 when you might have to traverse up a hill to track
17 something down or might have to stay longer than what
18 was originally expected so----

Beta 19 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Now when you said for your plan, you went above
20 and beyond the standard. Can you recall the amount
21 per soldier?

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, sir, I can't remember the exact--I had it in
23 my computer too because I had it worked up and figured
24 it out that way I wouldn't have to remember--I can't
25 remember the exact amount. But then we went above it
26 by stuffing just water in spots in the HMMWV.

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So for the movement, you deliberately planned
28 accordingly on your computer in determining the basic
29 load you would need?

Yankee 30 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger, Yes, absolutely.

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And you say you stuffed into the HMMWV's above
32 and beyond that. Ballpark how many boxes of water?

Yankee 33 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, sir, not even a ballpark because I mean it
34 was to the point where the gunner couldn't even, like,
35 he was having to, like, squat inside the turret
36 because we had filled the center console with ammo and
37 water.

Beta 38 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And you we're planning on a 2-day water load?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That was my--even knowing I was going to get a
2 resupply within a matter of 12 hours, I wanted all
3 that extra water.

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Why did you think you were getting resupplied in
5 a matter of 12 hours?

Yankee 6 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Because the CONOP stated that we would get them
7 around 12--12 slings on that first day as part of the
8 CONOP.

Beta 9 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): To include water?

Yankee 10 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. All Class IV items that we would need.

Beta 11 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Were you involved in the planning at all for that
12 water resupply in determining the amount of water that
13 would come up?

Yankee 14 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): A little bit. I got with the XO and we
15 determined what was going to be on those slings, what
16 do we need extra of, what couldn't we take on our
17 initial push up there? You know, it definitely
18 included--we also, you know, and the trucks had enough
19 food for probably more like four or five days, food
20 was never an issue. So I believe that was actually
21 one of the first things cut once we knew we weren't
22 getting that many. But we sell things for defense
23 material for the base; HESCO'S, 2x4s, you know,
24 concertina wire was a lot of it, water, there was a
25 couple pallets full.

Beta 26 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): At what point did you determine that you were low
27 on water?

Yankee 28 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Once--once it got word back to us that the
29 resupply operations from the CH47s was going to be cut
30 way down, like from 12 down to, I think, like 2, the
31 battalion actually sweet talked our way into doing
32 six. And so we had to cut half of what we wanted that
33 day. That's when we started--that's when I realized
34 that, okay, we're going to need, you know, water but
35 if we get one pallet up here or two plus the ammo and
36 building supplies, we'll still be straight because
37 I've got all this water in the HMMWV. That was in the
38 morning timeframe. By the end of that first day, and
39 I wasn't even--I was digging my hole plus doing my
40 rounds burning through the water and then I started

1 just really think about it at the end of the day when
2 I started getting my ACE report from my men and stuff
3 like that that water was going much faster than
4 previously thought.

Beta 5 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And that was on the 9th?

Yankee 6 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): How was your water distributed throughout the
8 position? Did the squads have their own water point--
9 --

Yankee 10 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Roger. And then we'd--we still had them
11 in the HMMWV's to help keep them a little bit more
12 cool, keep them out of direct sun, plus some in some
13 positions that we'd already, kind of, had some shade,
14 and then we distributed the water up to the OP. Each
15 platoon had an equal amount of water plus continually
16 enforcing the men--or re-impling about hydration at
17 night too because even though it was cooler and didn't
18 need water, we needed to not only put water back in
19 that we used, but get ready for the next day.

Beta 20 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When did the--did you get water on the 9th on
21 that pallet?

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. I want to say it was one.

Beta 23 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And if you'd describe an estimate of how much
24 water that is, a bottle per platoon member, a box per
25 platoon member?

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It'd be about a box per platoon member.

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And each of those boxes containing --

Yankee 28 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The ones that we had, it was about 24 water
29 bottles.

Beta 30 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): The liter bottles?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): They were the half liter, the smaller ones, 20-
32 ounce.

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And did you receive a water resupply at a later
34 date?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger, the following day. There was--the
2 following day--

Beta 3 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So the 9th you got in a pallet?

Yankee 4 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): And then the following day, I think, later that
5 afternoon, we actually got the Hilux truck with some
6 water, but, again, by that time, I mean, we were going
7 through, I mean, one of those boxes that we got for
8 one guy was gone in a matter of half the day.

Beta 9 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So with the heat and the work load that your
10 soldiers were doing they were effectively acquiring
11 two boxes of water.

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): If not a little bit more.

13 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Had you communicated your water situation? How
14 did you communicate your water situation?

Yankee 15 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): With the XO. We discussed numerous times he was
16 working the issues with getting more soon and the
17 Hilux and let him know I was black on water and that
18 we were starting already to utilize the iodine because
19 at the point where I start using the iodine, like I
20 said, we still had some bottles of water. And what I
21 wanted to do was just not so--make it so they weren't
22 just drinking straight iodine water at some point in
23 time. I wanted mixture. Drink, you know, some iodine
24 water and then you use the bottle water and then go
25 back to the iodine.

Beta 26 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And other than the trucks that came in, perhaps
27 on the 10th or the 11th, did you get any additional
28 water resupply?

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We did get--the day before the attack we got two
30 or three pallets full. At the point of the attack,
31 water was not an issue whatsoever anymore. We had
32 plenty of water, you know, over abundance, if you
33 will. So it was corrected.

Beta 34 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Was the company XO aware that you had to reduce
35 work?

Yankee 36 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 37 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Due to the water?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 2 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Gentlemen, before, actually you wanted to clarify
3 from one of your statements to Garnet --or your
4 statement to Garnett, the CSI report regarding
5 the water purification equipment.

Yankee 6 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. In the statement I do mention the iodine
7 tablets, but I also wanted to make sure that it was
8 mentioned that we did have the little Ozark little
9 filtration system. Not that that would have helped
10 hardly any then in the situation of that area and the
11 work we would have had to put a filter system through
12 but we did have numerous emergency water supply
13 assets.

Beta 14 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you ever use the Ozark?

Yankee 15 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I--no, we didn't. I never did. It was--again,
16 it was the hand pump and I don't--we just went down
17 with the iodine and by the time that, you know, like I
18 said, we only used the one of the five gallon buckets
19 of the iodine tablets and then we were able to get
20 some water.

Beta 21 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So you did have soldiers drink the iodine water?

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. We did have to start using it?

Beta 23 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did anyone get ill?

Yankee 24 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, no, not that I'm aware of. There wasn't a
25 whole slew of it. I think each person probably drank
26 less than a canteen in reference to size or volume or
27 less than that.

Beta 28 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Gentlemen, before we move beyond the water issue,
29 any follow up questions regarding water?

30 **LtGen Natonski:** I guess the only question I would have with
31 respect to water; you had established positions
32 throughout the COP, including OP Topside.

Yankee 33 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

34 **LtGen Natonski:** Was each position self sufficient in terms
35 of supplies?

Yankee 36 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

1 LtGen Natonski: Including water?

Yankee 2 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Including water.

3 LtGen Natonski: Okay. So OP Topside had their own water?

Yankee 4 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger that, sir. Just to make one final thing on
5 that. On some of the days, the timeline that's been
6 kind of the hardest, everybody I've talked to about
7 the timeline the way the water--a lot of those
8 resupplies because we would get some Chinook missions,
9 it's just I don't know extremely accurate I am on
10 beginning it was day two when we got this so as far as
11 the timeline as far as when we got this water or a
12 certain pallet, it's best guess; if that makes sense?

Beta 13 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sure. And you took protective steps by reducing
14 work load. Did any of your soldiers--did your medic
15 come up to you and say your soldiers were experiencing
16 water related issues?

Yankee 17 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): No. No, we didn't have any issues. By that
18 time, again, that just goes with the experiences the
19 team leaders and squad leaders watching their men.
20 And when I initiated that down work load, they were
21 already starting to keep a good eye on them. The guys
22 knew when--where that fine line between hard and
23 stupid was--was, you know, was I pushing too much and,
24 you know, going the distance, you know, the long
25 distance run not the sprints that was going to win us
26 out of there.

Beta 27 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): The three Marines with the ETT, did they come to
28 you for water?

Yankee 29 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): They--we distributed water to them. They were
30 kind of worked into my role as far as numbers and
31 distribution of water and food.

Beta 32 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And you knew about that requirement as part of
33 your planning before you went to Wanat?

Yankee 34 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

35 Maj (b)(3),(b)(6) Owl Sir, just to clarify on your resupply of water
36 throughout the 9th and the 10th, you talked about a
37 couple of pallets of water somewhere around the 11th
38 or the 12th, was that with Captain Oscar when he came

1 in via helo or was that from some other source that
2 you remember?

Yankee 3 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Both, I think, like I was just stating, some of
4 the dates and as far as what we got, it's still a
5 little bit of a blur but I know by the 11th, water was
6 no longer an issue as far as we were getting in, we
7 were above the black--not necessarily way above the
8 black but definitely above 40 percent to where--enough
9 to where I was content with, okay, we're going to get
10 more the next day, we can resume normal operations.

Beta 11 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): We're going to switch to fuel now.

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay.

Beta 13 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did your unit have a written SOP covering the
14 basic fuel load and how you would proceed when
15 planning the move?

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The HMMWV's would be topped off. They would have
17 fuel, and they also had two cans with it. Now I took
18 one of the cans off to make room for ammo and water
19 and unless they mount it on the back of the truck
20 there is no gas inside the truck in gas cans because I
21 wanted more room--we were moving up to this position,
22 it wasn't that far. We had plenty of fuel inside the
23 trucks. There was no--the only place that we would
24 have to end up going is back down to Blessing which we
25 had more than enough fuel for. You couldn't push
26 anymore north with the HMMWV's, you couldn't maneuver
27 around so fuel was not going to be an issue for the
28 HMMWV's.

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Were you aware that you would get a Bobcat as
30 part of your plan?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes. Yes, sir.

Beta 32 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And was fuel for the Bobcat planned by you or by
33 someone else?

Yankee 34 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That was part of the XO. I know that the fuel
35 for it was part of the resupply operations. As far as
36 what turn and--I can't remember when--when he set up
37 for it--it to come over.

Beta 38 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Does the--what type of fuel does the Bobcat use?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The JP8 like the HMMWV's.

Beta 2 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): As far as fuel transferring equipment, were you
3 part of that planning?

Yankee 4 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No. I was told that all that was being done with
5 the engineers and I didn't--I never had any link up
6 time with the engineers before we went up there but
7 hindsight being 20/20, you know, I wish someone would
8 have done a PCI with them because they didn't bring
9 things that they needed to transfer the fuel to the
10 Bobcat.

Beta 11 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Now you had--you did have some cans of diesel on
12 the HMMWV's --

Yankee 13 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We used them for the Bobcats.

Beta 14 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And did you communicate at that point--did you
15 consider your vehicles in need of a resupply?

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): My vehicles --

Beta 17 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah.

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): for fuel? No, they didn't need any resupply for
19 fuel.

Beta 20 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you, on occasion, have to start the HMMWV to
21 charge batteries?

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right, right. We would.

Beta 23 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And how long, based on your experience, if you
24 weren't moving a HMMWV but simply starting it every so
25 often, how much would that consume?

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Not much at all, just enough to make sure the
27 ACIFS inside were good and charged and even some of
28 them were starting--one of the trucks we only started
29 once a day just for PMCS purposes. Other than that,
30 the radio was taken out in order to make another
31 manpack so there was no need to start that up once an
32 hour or once ever couple of hours.

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you receive any verbal or written op order
34 addressing fuel or fuel resupply?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, but I may have skimmed past that part of the
2 OP order just because of the fact that--as far as my
3 part that the fuel was not an issue and that we would
4 have a blivit out there for the Bobcat.

Beta 5 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Could you describe for the record what a blivit is
6 and how you would normally get the fuel from it.

Yankee 7 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): They have numerous sized blivits. This thing
8 wasn't the big ones. I can't remember the gallon size
9 it was but just big, rubber bag in a balloon, if you
10 will, that's thick enough to hold the gasoline and on
11 both ends there's a metal nozzle, if you will, that
12 you take a connecting piece that will puncture the--
13 not puncture but move the valve or push the valve so
14 they can get the fuel out of it in order to pump it
15 into whatever you need.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And the piece of equipment that--how did that
17 transfer equipment --

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): With the load that came up on the sling.

Beta 19 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And who determined it was the wrong piece of the
20 transfer equipment?

Yankee 21 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The engineer mentioned that and, I believe,
22 actually, they had the wrong--I think they just
23 completely forgot it.

Beta 24 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did--how was that communicated to higher?

Yankee 25 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I got on the radio with the XO and told him that
26 we needed this piece and then I put the engineer on so
27 he could describe it and tell him what it is because I
28 didn't know--wouldn't have been able to.

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And how long from the time you communicated that
30 you needed that piece did it arrive?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The following day it came up.

Beta 32 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Would that have been on the 10th or 11th?

Yankee 33 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We didn't need--I think it would have been the
34 11th because I don't even think they attempted to even
35 get any fuel out of that until the 10th. And when
36 they did run out of fuel, there was nothing else to be
37 done with--it was already late and there was nothing

1 else done until we got the next resupply of HESCO's
2 and stuff like that so there was no work to do anyway
3 and then once that early morning came that we got some
4 more material got the Bobcat fueled with--because by
5 that time, we had already used all the cans that we
6 had and there was talk that if we didn't get that
7 piece in the next day that we were going to try
8 siphoning fuel from the HMMWV's in order to get the
9 Bobcat going.

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So how much would you estimate downtown with
11 Bobcat use was there?

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Very, very little. It did--in my opinion, it did
13 not impact us building the FOB.

Beta 14 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Was there ever an hour that you wanted to use the
15 Bobcat that you couldn't because of fuel?

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No. By the time that thing was--he was--it was
17 almost literary to the point where he filled up the
18 last HESCO that he could for the day, pulled it to a
19 spot and was, like, just ran out of fuel. And, you
20 know, we had discussed what we were going to do the
21 following day if, you know, we didn't get the fuel or
22 didn't get started in time then we'd start siphoning
23 from the HMMWVs. So it was already done for the day
24 by the time it ran out.

Beta 25 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And that piece of equipment, transfer equipment,
26 came up the next morning?

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. And we were able to get some fuel and was
28 able to get back to business with--plus with that came
29 resupply of different materials so they can keep on
30 working.

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Gentlemen, regarding fuel, any questions?

32 **LtGen Natonski:** Who was the senior engineer? What rank was
33 he?

Yankee 34 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): A Staff Sergeant.

35 **LtGen Natonski:** Staff Sergeant? Okay.

Beta 36 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Major (b)(3),(b)(6)? Owl

37 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. Just two things: When you say, it's a
38 chance to review the Op Order, what are you referring
39 to? Is it the CONOP or was it a written order that

1 you were reviewing to determine fuel and fuel
2 resupply?

Yankee 3 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was the CONOP slides and op order of when we
4 were originally supposed to come up on the 4th.

5 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6) Owl And then my second question is you were just--you
6 were talking about the Bobcat and you said the Bobcat,
7 it was able to fill up the last HESCO before it died.
8 And you say the last HESCO, it could, were you
9 referring to according the base defense plan or----

Yankee 10 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The last one that it could fill for that day that
11 we had material--and it was already late in the day
12 enough to where the Bobcat was going to stop running
13 anyway, if that makes since. You know, the plan for
14 the Bobcat filling what positions I envisioned being
15 done for that day, as far as for what the Bobcat could
16 get done, he was already done.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** You mentioned the Bobcat filling HESCO's,
18 now could the scoop on the Bobcat fill to the top of
19 the HESCO or--HESCO's are 7 feet----

Yankee 20 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. We had the 7 foot ones and it could fill
21 till about 5, 5 1/2 and then it couldn't do anymore
22 because the way of the angle the shovel was and stuff
23 like that. That's why we had--I had them dig 2 feet
24 below inside so that you could--there was you know 6
25 feet of some cover on the sides.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** So 2 feet of the HESCO were below ground
27 level?

Yankee 28 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

29 **LtGen Natonski:** You didn't cut the top of the HESCO?

Yankee 30 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, no. Some of the--on some of the positions
31 the way the ground was, some of it was a little bit -
32 you could see inside the HESCO. Some of it was buried
33 underneath in some spots. The mortar pit did a good
34 job, especially on the south side of it of being able
35 to get the HESCO down 2 feet and then built it up to
36 the straight top and then sometimes there was a little
37 bit exposed. We didn't cut just because I felt
38 another 2 feet of concealment was better than nothing.

39 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): We need to further explore the construction
40 equipment issue. You had the Bobcat. And was there
41 any other construction equipment that came into
42 establish Wanat?

Yankee 43 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We had shovels, pick-axes, e-tools----

Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Is that part of your normal kit?

Yankee 2 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): We had that BIIs from the HMMWV's and plus a few
3 extra that we had--whatever we could grab.

Beta 4 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. And you grabbed that at Blessing?

Yankee 5 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 6 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): What in your view type of equipment is required
7 to establish a COP?

Yankee 8 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): In my opinion, I mean, to establish that, I mean,
9 the Bobcat was great. I know a lot of people were
10 like well this thing, you know, it's not going to be
11 able to totally fill the HESCO's and it didn't seem
12 like it would be a very good asset. That thing was a
13 lifesaver in my opinion because there's no way we'd be
14 able to fill anywhere close to that amount. It did
15 the job that I needed it to do as compared to waiting
16 on the big equipment from the civilians because as
17 much as I knew--I knew that that would be our biggest
18 hiccup was getting them up there because they're just
19 civilians. So you can't place the same kind of
20 timeline on that. So the Bobcat did the job
21 fantastic, so definitely that thing was a huge, huge
22 asset when building a FOB.

Beta 23 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did the engineers ever point out any issues with
24 the Bobcat, with the blade up front? Was there
25 another piece of equipment or attachment to the Bobcat
26 that would have been more useful?

Yankee 27 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): No, not that I can remember them ever mentioning.

Beta 28 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Now what did you anticipate would come with the
29 civilian construction company?

Yankee 30 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): From my understanding it was going to be a
31 backhoe and then, I believe, I want to say something
32 like some sort of a crane, a large crane to start
33 moving--to help move things around, but I definitely
34 know the backhoe was supposed to come up there.

Beta 35 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): So based on your review of the CONOPs and other
36 discussions, your understanding that that civilian
37 construction equipment would arrive on what day?

Yankee 38 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): The day that we--the morning--the 9th.

Beta 39 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): You had already mentioned that that civilian
40 construction equipment never made it up to Wanat. At
41 what point did you learn that it was not coming?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Not until after the fight and talking with them
2 did they say that they weren't going to come up
3 because they were still working and trying to get them
4 up there. They were supposed to be on their way.
5 They're in so and so place now; they'll be coming up
6 soon. So there is always a "they were coming". They
7 were eventually going to get there.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Were you relying as part of your planning, were
9 you relying on the civilian construction equipment as
10 part of your additional establishment of the position-
11 ---

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I was not, no. No. My plan was to use the
13 Bobcat because I knew I would have it on the ground.
14 And the backhoe, you know, if it got there, great. I
15 definitely would have used it--used the heck out of it
16 for building up some walls and stuff like that, but my
17 initial plan was to figure that thing was not even
18 going to be there, which I assumed correctly.

Beta 19 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Gentleman, questions on construction equipment?

Sigma 20 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Was the Bobcat able to dig fighting positions or
21 just built HESCO's?

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It just built the HESCO's. It took out some
23 chunks into the terrace that was coming up. It, like,
24 made a road and then it moved a chunk out of that
25 terrace for the Marines to have a position. So it was
26 able to do a little bit of that, and it moved some of
27 the ground from the mortar pit and made it more level.

28 **LtGen Natonski:** Did your soldiers run the Bobcat, or did the
29 engineers?

Yankee 30 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The engineers did, sir.

31 **LtGen Natonski:** And there were six engineers?

Yankee 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Eight--six or eight. I'm having a hard time
33 remembering exactly the right number, sir, it was six
34 or eight.

35 **LtGen Natonski:** Were there enough?

Yankee 36 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): For that part of it, yes, there was enough, sir.
37 And I know that they were talking about maybe some
38 others coming. They were planning on having a lot of
39 local labor to help start building the base.

Beta 40 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Major (b)(3),(b)(6)?
Owl

1 **Maj** [Owl]: Yes. Just to revisit one question. Did you say
2 that you did not have to cut HESCO's in half or you
3 did cut HESCO's in half?

4 **SFC** [Yankee (b)(3),(b)(6)]: We did not have to, but I know that before we got
5 one of the 4 foot ones up, we did pick one to make--to
6 help for the--OP Topside, I believe, for something
7 they wanted to do with the smaller HESCO.

8 **Maj** [Owl]: Oh, so you had different size HESCO's?

9 **SFC** [Yankee (b)(3),(b)(6)]: There's different size, 7 and 4 foot. And I want
10 to say one of them was cut a little bit to help them
11 but that's only because, and I can't even remember if
12 they actually got it done because the way that metal
13 is set up and all we had was some Leatherman and some
14 wire cutters that weren't exactly doing the job right
15 away.

16 **Maj** [Zeta]: Was there any equipment that you requested or the
17 platoon requested that you didn't get from your higher
18 headquarters? You know, besides the civilian
19 construction equipment that didn't show up?

20 **SFC** [Yankee (b)(3),(b)(6)]: For the construction--well I know overhead cover
21 was--it never did make it and a lot of it had to do
22 with, you know, that cut slings but we definitely by
23 the time of the attack, the day before, could have
24 started working overhead cover on a majority of the
25 positions.

26 **Maj** [Zeta]: So the positions you had, when do you feel that
27 you would have had overhead cover built for those had
28 the equipment that you requested showed up--Class IV.

29 **SFC** [Yankee (b)(3),(b)(6)]: Yeah, the Class IV--within a day, at least
30 something decent, you know, constantly improving
31 defensive position, so it's never exactly how you want
32 it. But we would have had something that would have
33 been able to protect soldiers within about a day.
34 But, again, that was one of the--the overhead cover
35 was something when we first found out these things
36 were getting cut, that was one of the things that I
37 could push towards later because I couldn't use that
38 right away. I had to establish a position first and
39 then put--kind of building with the Legos a bit, had
40 to get the proper Legos in first.

41 **LtCol** [Beta (b)(3),(b)(6)]: What supplies for that Class IV did you plan for
42 to establish a position before you went to Wanant?

43 **SFC** [Yankee (b)(3),(b)(6)]: HESCO, 2x4s, plywood, sandbags, 4x4s, you know,
44 nails for that, some more shovels definitely come in

1 later. I figured that we would break more than a few
2 when--during the process of building. And that's just
3 off the top of my head right now.

Beta 4 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you recall the amounts of those supplies?

Yankee 5 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): I do not. It was a lot. But I don't recall the
6 number, actual number.

Beta 7 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): How did you determine the number? Do you recall
8 how you determined the number?

Yankee 9 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): I was kind of running off of--thinking about
10 what--how we had positions set up at Bella and Ranch
11 House about what we needed. And I knew by far that
12 most of these--everything that I initially would set
13 up was just going to be just temporary, but I wanted
14 something solid. So it was all guesstimate work.
15 There was always going to be--the engineers were
16 always having something come up because their plan
17 was, like, using CONEXs for guard towers and stuff
18 like that; that was their plan for later on. And I
19 was just worrying about what to use now. What can I
20 use now plus be able to reuse it for the engineers if
21 they needed more plywood or if they need it? So I
22 can't remember the exact number but it was just for
23 initial setup of--that was my main concern was the
24 initial setup of defensive positions.

Beta 25 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you plan concertina?

Yankee 26 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): I did, concertina.

Beta 27 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): What else do you need with concertina wire?

Yankee 28 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Pickets.

Beta 29 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): When you had a particular for plywood, was it you
30 that determined this is the amount of plywood I need
31 or did you utilize the engineers to help you
32 determine?

Yankee 33 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): The engineers--when we did the initial planning
34 or when I got with the XO, he was just asking for my
35 numbers so there was no getting with the engineers.
36 When we got there, all that stuff was already--mostly
37 pre-pulled either at Blessing or other positions
38 waiting. So there was no real adjustment of numbers
39 and that was, like, hey, now I need another--I need
40 that other palette of HESCO's, another palette of this
41 so----

Beta 42 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you--you had a chance to walk around and see
43 the repositioning of items?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Some of them at Blessing I did see. I do know
2 that some of the plywood and stuff like that was
3 coming from Jalalabad, I believe, so I didn't get to
4 see those.

Beta 5 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Would it be fair to say that the supplies you
6 saw, someone had taken deliberate steps to get them in
7 position?

Yankee 8 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes.

Beta 9 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): After your arrival at Wanat, did the platoon
10 develop any issues with supplies or shortages of
11 particular supplies?

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Just the water right off the bat. Like I was
13 saying --

Beta 14 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you have enough concertina wire?

Yankee 15 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We did for the initial--the plan was to always
16 keep building on the concertina wire. There was in
17 most, in a lot of positions triple strand, some of it
18 single strand, but the single strand had soldiers
19 nearby and it was always constantly observed. So for
20 the initial--for the initial, we had to have something
21 to work with, I was satisfied because I knew that we
22 only had so many people and a lot of other things to
23 build and eventually all that was going to turn into
24 triple strand and I did actually want to have a second
25 layer outside it. But as far as what we had to work
26 with, I always had what I needed when I was working
27 that part, if that makes sense?

28 **Maj** Zeta: Did you have supplies?

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you have enough concertina wire to circle
30 your entire position?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): 360, roger.

Beta 32 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And did the amount of concertina you have limit
33 where you could set your perimeter?

Yankee 34 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): A little bit, but it was a perimeter that we
35 already, kind of, pre-established. Like I said, once
36 we had a chance to get our basic defensive positions
37 down, we could start, kind of, branching out. I did
38 want to put another layer out there for the initial
39 defensive purposes plus there was some that, you know,
40 Topside was able to have to get some strands of
41 concertina wire up there.

Beta 42 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. Were all those strings attached to stakes
43 or pickets?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Down at the--down the vehicle patrol base a
2 majority of it was some of it along the--we used some
3 of the concertina wire on top of the actual wall that
4 was next to the road rather than stake just because
5 there was a wall and already something there as a
6 barrier. Up top, they used a couple pickets, but some
7 of it just the way the terrain was, you couldn't get a
8 picket into that. They would attach it elsewhere, to
9 other things.

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When they attached it to other items that was not
11 because there was a lack of stakes or pickets?

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): If it was a lack, it was the small ones, but it--
13 it was the terrain also and it was never--I didn't
14 know that we had a lack of pickets. It doesn't seem
15 to be screaming in my head as far as lack of supplies.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Gentlemen, questions on supplies?

17 **LtGen Natonski:** Just one question. You had mentioned
18 overhead cover at previous outposts you'd been
19 stationed at; did you have provisions for overhead
20 cover at Wanat?

Yankee 21 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Not yet, sir.

22 **LtGen Natonski:** Had you requested materials for overhead cover?

Yankee 23 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. It was part of the plan, but it was
24 put --it was pushed to the right a little bit in order
25 to--because of the cut slings in order to get the
26 equipment I needed right away instead of something I
27 needed.

28 **LtGen Natonski:** So that was a second priority after the --

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger, sir. I needed to get the walls built
30 before I could worry about the roof.

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): But did you--who set those priorities?

Yankee 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): As far as --

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): The sling, the loads coming in when they came.

Yankee 34 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It's when I got on the radio with the XO, and he
35 was telling me this is--we have to cut this and what's
36 priority, what really needs to get to you. So it was
37 mostly myself plus him, plus the XO, but mostly it was
38 myself and correlation with the PL, but I ran the
39 supplies so it was myself that made those calls.

Beta 40 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Major Owl ?

1 **Maj** [Owl]: Yes, sir. Was Task Force Duke or 11D part of any
2 of the planning or placement of the supplies or
3 concertina wire or anything?

4 **SFC** [(b)(3),(b)(6)]: No. The XO and the First Sergeant were there at
5 the time before we left. They were aware of it.

6 **Maj** [Owl]: And I'm sorry, the XO, First Sergeant of Chosen or
7 -----

8 **SFC** [(b)(3),(b)(6)]: For the task force that was replacing us.

9 **Maj** [Owl]: They were--I was sorry. And they were there?

10 **SFC** [(b)(3),(b)(6)]: They were at the company. He was aware of the
11 operation that was going on. He had his input. He
12 went with whatever--you guys put the positions where
13 you guys feel necessary. He had a little bit more
14 input, or tried to have some input on what the
15 engineers of permanent FOB's were going to build just
16 because that's what they would be building and
17 assuming. So because, you know, we weren't going to
18 see any bit of the ----

19 **LtCol** [(b)(3),(b)(6)]: General, I think we could take a break here. We
20 can hit another point when we return, sir. Go off the
21 record please.

22 [The testimony broke at 1149, 6 October 2009.]

1
2 [The testimony began again at 1339, 6 October 2009.]

Beta 3 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): The investigation is back in hearing.

4 Sergeant Yankee, you are still under oath.

5 We will proceed on a couple quick follow up
6 questions on engineer support. To the best of your
7 recollection, you had eight engineers attached to the
8 platoon? And what were their--to your understanding,
9 their primary duties in Wanat?

Yankee 10 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Their primary duties were to prep the base and
11 get things going to build the actual FOB. As soon as
12 those civilian engineer assets came online and got
13 there, they were going to immediately start work and
14 put some labor and work on the wall, building up the
15 wall that was already existing and making it higher
16 and then the surveyor was already out there laying
17 flags and stuff like for where guard post one would go
18 and guard post two, where the road was going to go,
19 where the barracks would be, where the CP is, he was
20 already laying the groundwork that way as soon as they
21 got there and they started getting the supplies in,
22 they would start building the base proper right away.

Beta 23 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Who was the senior engineer?

Yankee 24 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): That was a Staff Sergeant. I can't remember his
25 name, sir.

Beta 26 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you meet with that Staff Sergeant during the
27 planning phase?

Yankee 28 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Negative, sir.

Beta 29 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): So the first time you met him was at Wanat?

Yankee 30 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 31 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And did you task him? Was he under your tasking?

Yankee 32 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Mostly--once he got there, I separated
33 the engineers into various positions to help bolster
34 each site plus I didn't want to stack them all in one
35 spot. We would have to build another position, so we
36 just piecemealed them out. And then he was doing the
37 surveying, but he also understood my plan of getting
38 the defenses up first.

1 The first day was kind of well you need to move this
2 because I got to make room for... All right well we'll
3 move it once the equipment gets here, and then
4 supplies get here to start making it. But right now
5 security is the number one issue. So he had to work
6 around positions we had set in. And we were
7 discussing, depending on what we got up there, but
8 where we were going to start first.

Beta 9 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And the engineer support arrived by the 9th?

Yankee 10 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 11 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you ever read an Op Order or read through the
12 CONOPs that specifically addressed the level of
13 engineer support you would receive? Stated otherwise,
14 when you went to Wanat, did you know exactly what you
15 were going to get for engineer support?

Yankee 16 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Around the number, I knew around the number that
17 we would get. But as far as them increasing in order
18 for the demands of building the FOB, I didn't know
19 what outlined plan they had for after--after we left,
20 so to speak.

Beta 21 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): General, questions regarding engineer support?

22 LtGen Natonski: No.

Beta 23 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Major Owl ?

24 [Non-verbal negative response by Major Owl.]

Beta 25 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): We had early discussed some items related to
26 intelligence--and just hit portions of them again and
27 flush out some prudent details. During the planning
28 for Operation Rock Move, what was your understanding
29 of the enemy situation in the vicinity of Wanat?

Yankee 30 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): My understanding in the immediate vicinity was
31 observation, be it in the village itself and on some
32 of the high ground. We knew that the towns directly
33 to the north and northeast were, you know, enemy
34 controlled/sympathetic towards the Taliban, Al Qaeda,
35 or ACM activity, Ataza and a few of the others. So we
36 knew that that was a place for them to hunker down.
37 And, of course, we knew that there was a large force

1 in Bella which was, you know, less than a half day
2 travel down to us.

Beta 3 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): How did you know the enemy situation? How did
4 you learn of that?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Well before--prior to the move, you know, Bella
6 was getting a lot of--a lot more action than usual and
7 then, of course, on July 4th was when Specialist Green
8 was wounded from a mortar round hit right inside the
9 OP which indicated that it was no longer just local
10 Afghans that were part of the group because they were
11 never that--and it may have been a lucky shot, but few
12 of the ones before that and after that were actually
13 getting extremely close to the OP. And about the only
14 time they start getting close is when they usually
15 have foreign help either Arabs or Pakistanis that is
16 helping either do the actual direct lay for them with
17 a mortar tube or at least instructing the local
18 Afghans. So we knew that there was a much larger
19 presence and a lot more thought put into it. And ICOM
20 chatter stated that, you know, they were getting ready
21 to--they had sufficient force and supplies to overrun
22 Bella, which told us that there was a large enemy
23 presence out there.

Beta 24 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): How did your knowledge of the enemy situation
25 impact the planning for Wanat?

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I don't want to say that it, you know, we didn't
27 take into account. We really just took an account the
28 large--a large force being out there with--and then us
29 knowing that they just did not want us there period.
30 So it wasn't my change because we already had plan,
31 but there was going to be a large presence and they
32 did not want us there and that there was --some sort
33 of show of force from them and/or attack not this
34 severe. So the planning was always build up the
35 defenses, get as much HUMINT as possible. Saying, you
36 know, there was no change even though, you know, we
37 get more Intel, it should change but we were already
38 geared towards--towards such a large thing.

Beta 39 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): After you arrived at Wanat, did you receive any
40 updates on enemy situation?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That morning, or that day, you know, we found out
2 that the enemy was celebrating their victory quote
3 unquote up in Bella and --

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): That would have been the morning of the 9th?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Hanging out inside Bella, in there, you
6 know, telling the locals, look, see, we kicked them
7 out, that sort of thing, having their fun inside the
8 base, and that they would then come down the next day
9 or shortly thereafter and let their presence known to
10 us.

Beta 11 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And you learned that from whom?

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I can't remember the individual's name, but he
13 had had dealings with Lieutenant Brostrom before.
14 Lieutenant Brostrom would send--and he had talked to
15 this guy numerous times. The guy was pro-American,
16 pro-American, I mean, you know, he made his point
17 clear. He kept telling the locals we stand to make a
18 lot of money off this. You should support it, and,
19 you know, he was always passing along Intel. He was
20 trying to work on behalf for us, especially inside the
21 village when people were watching us and a lot of them
22 were angry about it. He was trying to convince them,
23 no, this can be a good thing for, you know, the area.

Beta 24 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you relay or did Lieutenant Blue relay
25 that word up to the company?

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And do you know what was received back, anything
28 from battalion or the company regarding that
29 information?

Yankee 30 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No. Just continue to observe and report, but it
31 was being noted. At that time, of course, we still
32 have Predator, and they were still keeping an eye out.
33 And if I remember correctly, I do remember them saying
34 that they did see a lot of people up in that area. Of
35 course, they couldn't tell who was who, but there was
36 activity up there. Reinforcements that guy had said,
37 but I'm not a hundred percent sure.

Beta 38 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): From the Intel--Intel report?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. And that's coming from my PL and that I
2 didn't hear any conversation--it was just hearsay from
3 him telling me so I don't know where he got that or if
4 it was confirmed or what but he just mentioned that
5 yeah they did see that group up there.

Beta 6 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Based on your experience, were there any other
7 indicators? I think you mentioned that perhaps some
8 of the some of the populace had departed the town?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Every day there was something that was
10 stepping up, that was ramping up towards something
11 other than people just saying, oh you're going to be
12 attacked.

Beta 13 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Could you run those through those in
14 chronological order as best you can recall?

Yankee 15 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. That morning, when we got there and the
16 people started seeing that we were there and you could
17 tell that they were starting to finally realize that
18 they're digging; this isn't something they normally
19 do. And then, we were trying to conduct a Shuura. We
20 were, like, hey, go get the district leader and the
21 police chief. We want to talk to them, and they came
22 up in their Hilux truck and it was the police chief,
23 his XO, or second in command, and I want to say the
24 district governor came up and said, hey, we'll talk to
25 you later. We have previous engagements in Abad, so
26 we've got to get going, and they've left.

27 And that one guy, that one contact that my LT had
28 told us was that that's not a good sign because that's
29 actually a slap in the face. You're technically their
30 guest and they should be here to greet you and talk to
31 you and they're just up and taking off. That's not a
32 good thing. That's not normal.

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Was that reported?

Yankee 34 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Then they came back and didn't talk to us
35 just went on down to the district center. We tried to
36 converse with them that day. They said they would
37 talk to us the next day, and then that's when, you
38 know, that guy plus two or three other sources were
39 saying, you know, they want to attack you but today
40 they're in Bella.

1 So on that first day on the 9th, it was the
2 leader--the leader and the police chief leaving and
3 then we heard that they were having a good time at
4 Bella and that they would come down and attack us
5 soon. And then the day after, you know, there was an
6 increase in, you know, fighting age male type
7 individuals hanging out. But it's not--that's an
8 abnormal thing and a normal thing at the same time
9 because when we would go up there all the time, they
10 would have large groups of people come. We've give
11 candy to kids, that kind of thing because, I mean,
12 there's is nothing better for Afghanis to do than come
13 stare at Americans I guess. So the next two days,
14 there was always just people watching us. And we
15 knew, you know, some of them weren't on the up and up,
16 some of them were just bored, some of them were
17 kidding--and we would walk around and talk and try to
18 get a feel for things. But, you know, we had tossed
19 around the idea of pulling some people in, stuff like
20 that, but at this time it was, you know, you don't
21 want to--we're trying to turn this into a friendly
22 operation. We're trying to do the talking not the grab
23 'em up and, you know, harass them, which, you know,
24 may or may not be a good idea. But it's always kind of
25 rubbed me the wrong way to kind of go in Gestapo like
26 because that's just not American forces in my opinion
27 and there was just so many. And there's no doubt in
28 our mind that some of them didn't have the greatest
29 intent, but it's not like they were going to come out
30 and say it, you know, what they were up to.

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you report to higher that you felt you were
32 being observed?

Yankee 33 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. And we told him that there was definitely
34 a lot of people sniffing around that may or not have
35 been innocent, but there was a lot of people just
36 hanging out in the bazaars watching us. And then
37 that's when the female and child, kind of, population
38 started going down drastically. They started some
39 working in the fields, kind of, far out but nothing
40 close.

Beta 41 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When those reports were going to higher
42 headquarters, was Lieutenant Blue speaking with --

Yankee 43 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Chosen 6, Captain Oscar.

Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Were there any other indicators that you noticed?

Yankee 2 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): The guy that's house that was directly or that
3 was by the base, I can't remember his name, but his
4 son was actually an interpreter for the American
5 forces. Now whether he was currently working or had
6 been fired, I didn't get the full story on that guy.
7 But he had been working in Abad, so he knew enough
8 about what kind of assets we could bring to bear.

9 And I know the night before the attack, they had
10 a sit-down in that guy's house because he wanted it
11 late at night and he told us they're going to attack
12 you tonight. And, of course, we've been hearing that
13 every day. But he said--and his son had leaned over
14 to Captain Oscar and said, you know, hey, do you have
15 your Predators up tonight? And, you know, Captain
16 Oscar had ignored him and said I don't know what you're
17 talking about because he didn't know whether the guy
18 was being, you know, fact-finding for the enemy or was
19 he trying to say, hey, you need to have those up
20 tonight.

21 So it's still unknown whether these guys were
22 acting in our interest or fact-finding for the enemy.
23 And I wouldn't even gather to make a guess.

Beta 24 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And that was on the evening of the 12th?

Yankee 25 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 26 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And that house, just looking at that schematic,
27 could you reference off the COP where that house was?

Yankee 28 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. It was the--keep going in closer, right
29 in the center of the screen in there. That compound
30 there was his. Roger. That one, sir, that compound
31 there with his.

Beta 32 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): So outside of the--outside of your wire, about
33 how many yards would you estimate or meters?

Yankee 34 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): The wire is right there at the trees and a
35 terrace and it was right up onto his house, so if
36 that's extremely accurate of how close they were.

Beta 37 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And that's off to your--the southwestern
38 perimeter in the COP?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. And just to add to it, that's also where
2 I was engaging for the first half-hour of the fight in
3 the mortar pit. There was enemy all along lined up in
4 there. And using that house and using other things
5 for cover, and I don't know if they ran him out or he
6 was part of the plan or what. I couldn't even--it's
7 one of those things I couldn't even gather to guess if
8 he was working for or against us.

Beta 9 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So the indicators and warnings reported by
10 Lieutenant Blue to Captain Oscar do you know if he
11 reported it to anyone else?

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Oscar I don't know. I know that night that Captain
13 (b)(3),(b)(6) was pretty hot on the mic discussing what had
14 gone down, plus what the interpreter had said about,
15 you now, a pointed question on, is your Predators up
16 tonight?

Beta Oscar
17 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) was on the radio relaying that
18 information--

Yankee 19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 20 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): In the planning phase for the ISR assets, what
21 was your understanding of the ISR support you would
22 have?

Yankee 23 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I knew we would definitely have it for 48, and
24 the thing is that the part that I knew about and
25 before I said and where they were talking with
26 division, this was the one we were supposed to go up
27 on the 4th, so it was prior, it was like the last week
28 in June and it was that we would have it for the con
29 op and then anything else we needed, we had the direct
30 support, but it was the number one support for the
31 division. The number one mission was supporting this
32 operation that we would have all the assets that we
33 would need.

Beta 34 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So after the meeting in late June that you
35 attended, you saw the con ops the first 48 hours you
36 would have a certain amount of ISR assets, did you--
37 when the operation was delayed, did you attend any
38 other meetings that readdressed ISR's?

Yankee 39 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I did not, sir.

Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): So when you left Blessing on the 8th, it was your
2 understanding for 48 hours you would have a certain
3 amount of ISR dedicated to you?

Yankee 4 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger that, sir.

Beta 5 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): What ISR assets did you believe you would have
6 dedicated?

Yankee 7 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): A Predator.

Beta 8 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Anything else?

Yankee 9 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): The Red Ridge. I knew that we would have some
10 sort of platform that we would be able to listen in to
11 the chatter. Beyond that, I knew we would have CAS,
12 if not 24 hours, it was during the high times of
13 possibility of attack that we would have those.

Beta 14 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): What organic ISR assets did second platoon have?

Yankee 15 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): We had the TOW, the ITAS, and then we headed the
16 dismounted, the LRAS, roger.

Beta 17 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And could you describe the capabilities of each?

Yankee 18 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): The ITAS could, it ran--and so it was the thermal
19 and infrared spectrum with the laser rangefinder
20 capability in order to keep your distance for what you
21 were looking at.

Beta 22 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Is that the man portable?

Yankee 23 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): That's on top of the HMMWV. It's not man
24 portable. And then the LRAS was relatively new to me,
25 but I knew that it also operated in the -- heavy
26 ability for range firing unit, and some other
27 capabilities I'm not sure if it was thermal or long
28 distance.

Beta 29 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did the OP Topside have ISR capability?

Yankee 30 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. The OP Topside had the LRAS plus it had
31 some--13's the kind of hand-held thermal sites.

Beta 32 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you recall how many they had of those?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I believe they had one that was attached to the--
2 that weapons squad always had. It was the medium,
3 probably the medium.

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And down at the COP, did the other squads had
5 that----

Yankee 6 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. We had we had two lights and a medium
7 attached to each squad. Each squad had one.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did the terrain impact your ISR capability?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. That's why we kept the TOW mobile so that
10 we can move that around and get the ITAS, get eyes on
11 anything plus a lot of the setup for a TOW shot. You
12 know, not only constantly moving just for defensive
13 purposes, don't ever want the enemy to think that's
14 it's just going to stay in one spot but also the
15 capability of the ITAS. The LRAS was, kind of,
16 generated more towards the north and northeast across
17 the ridge across the river.

Beta 18 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): After you were in Wanat, and you understood at
19 the 48 hour mark you would lose your Predator support.
20 Did you request additional support?

Yankee 21 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger that.

Beta 22 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And who did that?

Yankee 23 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The PL did.

Beta 24 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): To the Company Commander?

Yankee 25 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 26 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you hear how that request went or turned out?

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No. I do know that, you know, it was--there was
28 other things going on. And I do remember at one point
29 of discussion the PL was like look we don't need this
30 all the time. When we do need it is between, like two
31 o'clock in the morning until about five or six o'clock
32 in the morning. That's all I'm asking, was just this
33 timeframe because this is when they're going to move
34 in and set up and attack. They are going to attack
35 right after daylight.

Beta 36 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you ever get that additional support?

Yankee 1 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): We did not.

Beta 2 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you know at what point your Predator support
3 actually went away?

Yankee 4 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): I do not, sir. I don't remember a certain point
5 when it did.

Beta 6 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did your ISR assets, either organic ones or
7 external ISR assets, identify potential threats?

Yankee 8 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. The ITAS on the TOW, on the truck, the
9 night before the attack picked up some--a group of
10 about five people moving in the high ground to the
11 west, moving parallel, not moving away or towards us
12 just parallel. It looked like they had something on
13 their back like backpacks but we couldn't tell if they
14 had anything in their hands. And then the morning of
15 the attack, again, witnessed some individuals moving
16 up there.

17 And that's when I started talking to the CO about
18 putting a fire mission on them because there is not
19 supposed to be anybody up there. People already
20 stated--the one individual, the contact Lieutenant
21 Blue had plus the guy that lived in that house
22 that nobody goes up there ever and if anybody's up
23 there, it's a bad guy. And we put out to the village
24 anybody up there is--it's a free fire zone for us. And
25 they all said, okay, yeah, nobody goes up there
26 anyway. So there are people up there we're trying to
27 talk the CO into firing that location with the 120 and
28 with the TOW.

Beta 29 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And did you, in fact, fire?

Yankee 30 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): We did not. The discussion was going on. This
31 is the point in the 15-6 where I made it a point to--I
32 made it a point to point out that usually I don't want
33 to give the impression that, you know, we were gun
34 crazy and shooting people, but when we would set up
35 the request for why we wanted to fire a certain spot,
36 Captain Oscar was usually quick on the ball about
37 saying, roger. If you feel it's necessary, use your
38 command directive and go ahead and do it. This time
39 he was a little gun shy and I think that it's--a
40 hundred percent reason is because of that 15-6 with
41 the Apache--Apache engagement that was a couple weeks

1 prior to that up in Bella, so I think it made him a
2 little gun shy. So while he was deciding on whether
3 to order not to shoot it was when I walked down to the
4 mortar pit to talk to Sergeant Romeo about go ahead
5 and lay it in just for--because I envisioned that he
6 would at some time in time give the go. And then
7 that's when we started taking fire.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Prior to that, though, had you put out rounds?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We had for registration purposes.

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Never anything else.

Yankee 11 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, never anything.

Beta 12 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Now compared to your previous operations during
13 your deployment, how did the ISR assets assigned to
14 support second platoon differ from when you went to
15 Wanat, you had a certain level of ISR support. You've
16 been other places; could you compare, please, the ISR
17 support you had?

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): On the other numerous battalion con ops, this was
19 worked out the same, we always had a Predator online
20 that could watch us--like Operation Rock ---- for
21 example, once we set up, you know, they told us to
22 stop moving, you know, get a quick security, stop your
23 movement. There were no plans of landing and going
24 someplace, we'd stop. That way, okay, these are the
25 spots the Predator picks up. Okay, we know this is
26 you, we know this is you. This group over here is not
27 you, so we're engaging them at this time with Predator
28 and they would hit a sheet of hell fire into a house
29 that the enemy had ran into. So we'd had Predator
30 support before perhaps using fixed wing.

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): How about duration? Here you were given 48 hours
32 to your understanding. In previous operations, do you
33 recall how long you had that support?

Yankee 34 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We would always have some sort of asset up during
35 our battalion CONOPs either 24 or 48 hour. I think
36 maybe the only one was the Operation--near the
37 Pakistan border where we didn't have complete coverage
38 from Predator but we had F15 and AH64s.

Beta

1 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): General, questions on indicators and warning and
2 ISRs?

3 **LtGen Natonski:** A couple questions. You mentioned the enemy
4 didn't want you going up the Waygal Valley. What was
5 the impression of the people there? Did they want you
6 in Wanat or were they neutral or --

Yankee

7 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I think up until that Apache attack on that
8 pickup truck, they were pretty neutral. If they
9 opposed it, it was only because the Shuura and the
10 elders were pushing against it. After that attack,
11 they were, you know, pointedly they were against
12 Americans because they, you know, it got out--or not
13 got. It was directed to them by the enemy that it was
14 all civilians that were killed, and so they felt that
15 we were just killing civilians. So now, after that,
16 they were against it or at least not supportive enough
17 to warn or stop the enemy from doing it.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** You mentioned there was a series of threats
19 over the days that you were in Wanat; people telling
20 you of an impending attack, troops or individuals up
21 in the hills. In previous outposts, I guess there was
22 a--was there any standard method of attack that the
23 enemy would execute? You said you were preparing your
24 positions from the get--go for an attack. You had
25 seen indications and a warning. Was there a standard
26 methodology that the enemy would use in attacking a
27 position, or did they----

Yankee

28 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): From what I was used to up in that area--and I
29 was using the Ranch House attack as a template that
30 they would fix their fires on one point, what they
31 viewed as the weakest point and then exploit. If they
32 were successful like they were in Ranch House
33 exploiting that breakthrough in a very quick and
34 organized manner and then pushing on with their
35 attack. So I expected that they would try to find a
36 spot, that's why they would have their little--their
37 guys out there. And the OP was always concerned
38 that's why I wanted to make sure it was close enough
39 to be able to reinforce--that if they could isolate
40 and pick that off.

41 **LtGen Natonski:** So their method of attack based on your
42 previous experience was to look for the weak point and
43 exploit it?

Yankee

1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Exploit it while keeping the rest of the 360
2 fire, keeping the rest of the forces pinned or at
3 least otherwise occupied so as they can't reinforce
4 the area they're concentrating on.

5 **LtGen Natonski:** So in your previous experiences with respect
6 to ISR's, and you had inclinations based on a number
7 of different incidents that there was an attack
8 pending. When you were at Bella or Ranch House and
9 you asked for ISR because of indications and warning,
10 did you ever have an instance where you would ask and
11 they would provide it?

Yankee

13 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Ranch House, we did twice but it was only when
14 Predator was in the area and it came across the net,
15 do you need them to look at anything. There was never
16 a real request because they actually played it pretty
17 smart at the Ranch House to where they didn't do any
18 kind of harassing fire, didn't set up anything like
19 they were going to attack. Just--just kind of let the
20 comfort set in, I think, is what some of it was.

21 Bella, I think, that they've gotten Predator up
22 there before and I know they had him up there in the
23 time before the break down just because of the fact
24 that there was a large enemy force and they did not
25 know where they were at.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** And that Predator, was that the request of
27 Bella or was that just pushed because of the fact they
28 were breaking down?

Yankee

29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was right before that. The idea was it was
30 going to break down but they had reinforced it with a
31 platoon and they knew a large amount of enemy was up
32 there and they requested it. Through talking to the
33 battalion commander and stuff, they actually got that
34 asset pushed to them because of the fact it was a
35 large force operating there that they didn't know
36 where they were at.

37 **LtGen Natonski:** And there were indications and warning that
38 the large force that had been in Bella celebrating
39 that you'd moved into Wanat the 9th of July, so there
40 were, once again, indications and warning. You did
41 forward a request for ISR after the Predator had run

1 out based on your indications and warning. And this
2 was not the norm. You would not request a Predator
3 unless you felt you definitely needed it.

Yankee 4 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

5 **LtGen Natonski:** This wasn't a standard; let's see if we can
6 get it. This was a specific request based on those
7 indications and warning that you had had over several
8 days.

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Not only the indication that, you know,
10 the civilians were probably saying that they're
11 planning on attacking but also a large enemy force
12 just doesn't up and disappear especially when they're
13 looking for a scrap.

14 **LtGen Natonski:** So when that happened in the Bella area and
15 they were a large force and they couldn't be found,
16 Predator was pushed at the request of the battalion to
17 look for that enemy? Okay. That's all I got.

Sigma 18 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): When you were talking to higher with respect to the
19 logistical stuff that we were talking about earlier;
20 water, etcetera, was that primarily you talking to the
21 XO, company XO, is that kind of the way it worked or
22 did you----

Yankee 23 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Sigma 24 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I'm just trying to get a feel for how what you guys
25 needed got translated up to company and higher.

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It did get translated. I know the battalion
27 really busted their hump if not burn a couple bridges
28 getting Chinook lifts pushed to us.

Sigma 29 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): But primarily that was you and Lieutenant Blue
30 talking to the company XO?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger, me and XO.

Sigma 32 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. And then with respect to the operational stuff
33 that we're talking about indicators and warnings, did
34 you guys have normal, certain times of the day that
35 you were supposed to talk to the company talk? Is
36 that the way it would work as far as who you were--

1 when you picked up the FM ---- who were you talking--
2 you were talking to an RCO----- the rest of the time?

Yankee 3 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. And a lot of times especially on that
4 Intel stuff that he would ask for specifically Chosen
5 6 and relay the message.

Sigma 6 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. So there was a lot of back and forth direct
7 between you and the LT and the company commander?

Yankee 8 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah. Normally you have your certain times for
9 updates being 1700 but this thing was constantly in
10 motion.

Sigma 11 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. I'm just trying to get the feel for who the
12 LT was talking to up there most of the time. What I'm
13 getting at was it wasn't just an RTO on the other end
14 that was taking notes, it was normally the --

Yankee 15 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Chosen six and the Chosen 9, the FSO,
16 who worked hand in hand with the Chosen six.

Sigma 17 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): And then since you guys knew you weren't going to
18 have the Predator and you had the concerns about the
19 indicators and warnings, you'd had, I understand, from
20 the Cubbison report you had indirect fire that was
21 kind of on-call, was that --

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. We were under the umbrella of the 155's.

Sigma 23 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay.

Yankee 24 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): So they had set up some prepositioned targets,
25 had them register, had them shoot to get used to the
26 targets.

Sigma 27 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Who was authorized or what was the plan to call for
28 fire at the platoon level, was it you the PO or --

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Lieutenant Blue or myself and also Sergeant
30 Cyan, the FO.

Sigma 31 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. So you had an FO down there?

Yankee 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes. Roger.

Sigma 33 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you have a TACP or --

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, just that--was mostly in charge of taking
2 care of that.

Sigma 3 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Same thing with CAS or actions, it would be the PO or
4 the --

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Or the FO.

Sigma 6 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. And then that was all pretty much FM comms?

Yankee 7 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger that, sir.

Sigma 8 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. Did you feel--did you guys and we'll get into
9 this in minute, but once the battle kind of started,
10 did you--I know you call them AH64's but was there
11 indirect as well? Was there 155?

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. There was 155 being fired.

Sigma 13 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. That's all I've got.

14 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Major (b)(3),(b)(6)?
Beta owl

15 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Thank you, sir. Going back to when you received
16 some of the knowledge or intelligence on the threats
17 in the Wanat location, did you have any subsequent
18 worry about the defense lay down where you were? And
19 meaning, you know, relative to that a hotel, a bazaar,
20 the mosque that (a) did you feel like you could or
21 couldn't move from your location or (b) is it just you
22 just felt that you just had to stay where you were?

Yankee 23 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We--as far as a dug position, as far as the
24 positions that we have them is we could not move from
25 that position. We had zero--zero maneuverability as
26 far as emplacement this ground is what we negotiated.
27 This is where we were going to stay that's why with
28 the OP, it was a bad a position, but it was the best
29 of the bad positions that we had available because we
30 had such little freedom of movement. Now like I was
31 stating before, I felt that the proximity to the
32 village was actually going to be an asset to us
33 because I felt that they would not fire, especially
34 with a mosque right on our door step and a hotel in
35 the populace, I felt certain that they wouldn't
36 attack. And I've never, you know, with the Ranch
37 House, they were using some of the houses and stuff
38 but they never, from Aranus but if the people didn't--

1 they weren't part of it. So they weren't inside it,
2 they were like either popped up on the roof to engage
3 or to the side or using it as cover. So it wasn't
4 exactly like how this village went where they totally
5 emptied out so they could use it as a battle ground.

Beta 6 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Regarding to planning Operation Rock Move, when
7 did that begin?

Yankee 8 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I couldn't even give a good guess on a date, sir,
9 but, I mean, this had been going on for a while.

10 **LtGen Natonski:** Would you say months?

Yankee 11 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Months, definitely because it was April but then
12 it was May?

13 **LtGen Natonski:** It was going to be April for execution?

Yankee 14 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. It kept getting pushed. Land deals
15 couldn't get worked out so it kept getting pushed to
16 the right and pushed to the right and pushed to the
17 right and pushed to the right. Now as far as what
18 kind of planning was involved at setting up the actual
19 op order and con op for April, I'm not entirely
20 certain if they did or not but I do know that it was
21 definitely in the works at that time.

Beta 22 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): You mentioned around the 4th of July, the
23 operation was to have been done?

Yankee 24 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. We were two hours from execution when the
25 OP was hit and Specialist (b)(3),(b)(6) was injured and then **Kite**
26 they were pulling him out in the----

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): The OP----

Yankee 28 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): OP at Bella. And, again, I wasn't in any kind of
29 talk. I wasn't in the operations to hear it for
30 myself but the word is that the brigade commander put
31 a stop to Rock Move because he was uncertain if it
32 was--if they should be proceeding.

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): You say you're two hours from crossing the line
34 of departure. What assets did you have there on the
35 4th of July ready to go?

Yankee 36 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): A64 and Predator (b)(3),(b)(6) and then once that tic happened
37 it was pushed off to help facilitate the medivac out

1 of there and give them some ISR and see who shot, that
2 kind of thing.

Beta 3 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you have the same number of vehicles planned
4 to move?

Yankee 5 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 6 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Same number of soldiers? When did the operation
7 actually start, the 8th? Were you the first element
8 to move on the 8th?

Yankee 9 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Roger. We started moving ten, eleven
10 o'clock at night--I can't remember, and it was well
11 into the nighttime, midnight or one--I can't remember
12 exactly the time.

Beta 13 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Were you aware of any formal risk assessment for
14 the operation? Did you see any orders or --

Yankee 15 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Again, it was for the 4th when I saw the
16 size that the commander had set up for and there was a
17 risk assessment done. And, again, the mitigating
18 factors to bring the risk level down was--the way it's
19 set up for the con op not afterwards, so that's where
20 a whole new risk assessment should have been done.

Beta 21 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): So when you're saving for the COP, you mean the
22 48 hours?

Yankee 23 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 24 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): The initial move up and then kind of--what combat
25 operations had occurred in the immediate area, let's
26 say from the 1st of July up until you moved?

Yankee 27 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): The 1st of July as in, like, that year?

Beta 28 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, excuse me. The first of July of '08--let me
29 back it into June.

Yankee 30 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Bella was the area, they were having numerous
31 direct and indirect fire plus lots of ICOM chatter
32 about them setting up, they're getting in position,
33 they're going to have a 360 around Bella and over run
34 it. I don't know when--another platoon was set up
35 there from Battle Company and I can't remember what
36 date they went up on. I think that was when Green was
37 hit. They moved them up there to help secure it

1 better. And then in June is when they had the--they
2 got direct fire from guys in a truck. They got in a
3 truck and started taking off and they lit up the
4 Apache and that's when they said, you know, there were
5 civilians in there and that's when it came out that it
6 was--not came out, it's when it was put out by the
7 enemy that it was all civilians.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Was Bella being hit on a regular basis

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Daily?

Yankee 11 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. If it wasn't daily, it was pretty darn
12 close to daily.

Sigma 13 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): With mortars or --

Yankee 14 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): They had mortars and RPG's and I believe there
15 was some other direct fire that involved small arms.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): After you arrived at Wanat, what, if anything,
17 did you change in your platoon operations based on the
18 change in enemy situation? As you saw from your
19 indicators and warnings that something was likely to
20 happen, did you change your operations at all?

Yankee 21 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No. It just reinforced what I was stating to
22 them earlier about dig fast and hard because they--
23 they're going to want heads very soon so as I stated
24 before there was no real changes to the fact--I mean,
25 I went up there with the mind set I wanted to talk to
26 my squad leaders and the position of the men to expect
27 a fight so, you know, we had both 240's up at the OP
28 plus a SAW because we had the heavy weapons down at
29 the FOB. There wasn't really any change besides
30 having to, you know, start working because the
31 supplies not getting the full slings so now having to
32 work priorities at work, but there was no real change
33 to the fact that I went up there already knowing that
34 there would be some sort of an attack but we had to
35 have some sort of cover for an attack.

Beta 36 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Between the 8th and the 12th, were any security
37 patrols sent outside the perimeter?

1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): There was--not going very far. There were some
2 that were used to stop at the OP's, to go down to the
3 district center and talk to them, to go down south a
4 little bit, again, to look at some other positions for
5 OP's.

6 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Would this be a platoon leader with a squad or --

7 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Team leader with a squad and them some
8 ANA talking to them about where they would like to go,
9 that kind of thing. So it wasn't very far from the
10 base and it wasn't anything necessarily mover here for
11 a while, squat, listen, you know conduct--that sort of
12 thing so there was some moving around but nothing that
13 you would classify as a quote, unquote security
14 patrol. All of them had alternate purpose.

15 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And you recall these three times the squad
16 outside the wire. Do you remember the dates?

17 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): There was one each day. There was one each day.
18 And like I said, it was normally between one of the
19 villages, but it was never very far. We weren't--I
20 was always a bit nervous about kicking them out too
21 far knowing the large force that was--bad enough the
22 precarious position that we were already in. I didn't
23 need a squad out there cut off, so it was always, kind
24 of, a kind of tough decision for my PL's that, you
25 know, because my advice was well we need something out
26 there that's short not long patrol, not long distance
27 just because of what I just stated.

28 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): As you received the indicators and warnings, did
29 you, as a platoon sergeant, feel that you needed
30 additional assets up to Wanat immediately?

31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

32 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): What were those assets that you would have
33 wanted?

34 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I wanted, like I said, the ISR was willing to
35 compromise on just from one or two o'clock in the
36 morning until like about five or six o'clock in the
37 morning. That's when I knew the fact that they would
38 come up and I was still really hoping for or talking
39 to PO about trying to get some of first platoon up

1 there for additional personnel to push out a little
2 bit more.

3 **LtCol** Beta Blue
4 (b)(3),(b)(6): Did Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6) submit a request for
additional man power that you're aware of?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I can't remember but we talked about it and he
6 agreed then I can't imagine that he wouldn't know to
7 ask for more.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did he agree that you needed more?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Roger.

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): How about equipment? Do you recall wanting
11 additional equipment based on what you had seen after
12 arriving at Wanat?

Yankee 13 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I don't remember at this time.

Beta 14 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you ever receive additional manpower,
15 Soldiers?

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, negative.

Beta 17 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you incorporate the Afghan National Army into
18 your positions?

Yankee 19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. If there's anything that I--that I was
20 extremely forward was coordination between myself and
21 my forces with ANA. We added positions on to
22 strengthen the perimeter. You know, hind sight being
23 20/20, we could have pushed them out somemore on
24 patrols but I always had a hard time working with the
25 ANA because it was always an argument with them to get
26 them to do anything. So, and my previous experiences
27 with the ANA didn't help either, every serious fight
28 that I've been in, they've always ran, never really
29 stuck it out. And so I sometimes felt it was put them
30 on perimeter or work them in the security and this is
31 about the best I'm going to get out of them without
32 even going into a real in depth discussion with the
33 ETT's about what they could and could not do as an ANA
34 platoon.

Beta 35 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you consider where they were on your
36 perimeter a strong point?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I definitely felt that we add on TCP who were
2 always worried about some sort of vehicle point IED
3 and granted it's not their style in that area, but
4 it's definitely been it's been working its way into
5 that. It was definitely a possibility with how close
6 we were to the road. So we had them further south as
7 a TCP and then worked into the north side because the
8 way that path ran and the way behind the Mosque was
9 always worried that they could come up and get real
10 close to the base. And since they don't have optics,
11 I needed them for a close fight.

Beta 12 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): General, any questions on risk management and
13 risk --

14 **LtGen Natonski:** Yes, Risk assessment for Wanat, did you
15 look at the likely enemy COA and the most dangerous
16 enemy COA?

Yankee 17 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** And do you remember what they were?

Yankee 19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I do not, sir. I do remember hand writing that
20 the most likely course of action for the enemy would
21 be to observe with the possibility of some harassing
22 fire and the dangerous course of action being
23 something similar to this.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. So you knew that an attack such as
25 you received on that morning was a possibility in that
26 ----

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

28 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. As you did your risk assessment, you
29 talked about placing the ANA on the northern side of
30 the position. What was your biggest concern? You did
31 mention towards the Mosque as being the potential
32 direction for attack. Was that the probable area you
33 saw or----

Yankee 34 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, that was just one position. There was also
35 one to the north by--roger--those are good. You know,
36 I don't see protecting that HMMWV position, but I was
37 setting them up for a close fight that could be
38 possible from inside the village. And plus those
39 trees and stuff like that, there was a lot more under

1 grub and then behind it, you couldn't see very well,
2 so I wanted them to help with the close fight. Plus I
3 wanted a group to be able to move around in case we
4 needed support elsewhere, so there was a really strong
5 front because of how close the fight would be up
6 there. I wanted it to look so dense that they didn't
7 want to get that close.

8 **LtGen Natonski:** So you had confidence in the Afghan platoon
9 that they could hold a vulnerable section of the
10 perimeter?

Yankee 11 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** And you mentioned in part of your risk
13 mitigation several patrols that were put out,
14 primarily reconnaissance patrols to look at specific
15 items but not far out. Were these all day time?

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Negative, sir. They were just a couple hours in
17 light.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** And they went out at night?

Yankee 19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): They went out during the day, sir.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** They were daylight?

Yankee 21 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

22 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. But no security patrols, to include
23 the ANA platoon were used in the time that you were
24 set up at the combat outpost?

Yankee 25 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger that, sir.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.

Sigma 27 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6) And I know hindsight is 20/20. If you had had more
28 personnel available when you said--you mentioned some-
29 -first platoon. Do you think you guys might have
30 kicked out more of the OP's and all that kind of
31 stuff?

Yankee 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger that.

Sigma 33 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Blue a discussion you had at all with Lieutenant
34 (b)(3),(b)(6) ? If we had more guys, we could do X, Y, and
35 Z?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Exactly. That's exactly what it was. There was
2 always talk and it was always--it didn't help, I mean,
3 I wanted to patrol but nothing too far because we had
4 to get these defenses up and my concern was, you know,
5 defense of the base, and obviously patrols are part of
6 defense of the base but you know there was contentions
7 going up all over on this thing.

Sigma 8 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): And yeah with the terrain with the way it is, those
9 guys, like you said, could get cut off pretty easy.
10 And you had--you felt like you had enough ammo for the
11 whole time you were there. Was there ever a concern
12 or something talked about?

Yankee 13 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, sir. We had plenty of ammo that we--that was
14 part of the sling to come in for ammo. We had plenty
15 of ammo.

Sigma 16 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): And everybody had NODS.

Yankee 17 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Sigma 18 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Plenty batteries and all that stuff?

Yankee 19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Hoo-ah.

Sigma 20 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. That's all I have.

21 **LtGen Natonski:** I have one more question. Did you ever
22 consider an LP or listening post out a little bit
23 beyond the perimeter but within distance where they
24 could receive support?

Yankee 25 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. We discussed it a little bit. The OP--
26 the discussion kind of fell to the wayside about where
27 to put it when in retrospect we should have pushed up
28 a little bit to the east of the OP, kind of near that
29 house. Again, hindsight being 20/20. The other areas
30 was just--you didn't want to get in front of the ANA
31 who didn't have NVGs that was about the only spot that
32 you could do it. But, again, just the watch down in
33 that valley so hindsight being 20/20, I wished we
34 would have put one up there.

35 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you have--wired in the position between
36 their ANA platoon and the Marines and the OP where you
37 laid wire so you could communicate?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, we did not have any kind of TA-1 or any other
2 kind of wire.

3 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you ever utilize wire while you were in
4 Afghanistan?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We did, as a matter of fact, up at Ranch House.
6 We had some wire to free the ASIP's for other things.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** Was that a plan that you were ultimately
8 were going to implement as construction continued?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was an idea. The equipment was the issue, not
10 enough for the TA-1's.

11 **LtGen Natonski:** You were in the midst of--you didn't come
12 up there with any----

Yankee 13 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): And I know that was going to be a--that was
14 probably in my contingency book and stuff that I had
15 jotted down and took up there with me to discuss with
16 the platoon sergeant was you need the hardwire into
17 the security positions if we ever had a chance of
18 running it--running a defense from your position.

Sigma 19 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Your squads had squad radios? How did you guys
20 communicate?

Yankee 21 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Yes, sir. They all had at least two
22 radios at each position an ASIP and then an IMBITR, so
23 we had two different comms.

Sigma 24 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): How did the comms hold up once the attack started?

Yankee 25 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Good. The comms was good.

Sigma 26 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Was it you that dropped your handset?

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah that was--except me--except the one, for
28 lack of a better word, (b)(3),(b)(6) kicking me in the butt--
29 and now I'm out of comm.

Beta 30 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Major (b)(3),(b)(6)? **Owl**

Owl 31 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. Just a quick one, just to make sure it
32 was--Rock Move was a movement for second platoon to
33 take Wanat? First platoon was always at Camp
34 Blessing?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No. Rock Move was--on that night we were, or
2 that 48 hours, but it was pretty much done that first
3 night was us moving into Wanat at the same time Bella
4 was breaking down. First platoon was breaking down
5 from Bella and moving back to Blessing, and we were
6 using the helicopters going back and forth, you know,
7 the major focus was on them while we pushed up to
8 Wanat.

Owl 9 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. And I guess that's what I'm saying. So
10 was second platoon at Blessing?

Yankee 11 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): First platoon was at Bella, we were at--second
12 platoon was at Blessing. And we moved from Blessing
13 to Wanat while Bella--first platoon moved from Bella
14 to Blessing.

Owl 15 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Thank you.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did any of the supplies you received at Wanat
17 come from Bella?

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. The ammo and some of the food--some of
19 the food that came in came from there and I know even
20 some of the building material, I believe, came from
21 there.

Beta 22 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When we discussed the withdrawal from Wanat,
23 after the battle, what was the security situation at
24 Wanat?

Yankee 25 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): After the battle would be all hearsay, sir,
26 because I was in the hospital in Bagram.

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): How did you learn of a decision to withdrawal
28 from Wanat?

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was when I was in Bagram, they decided to make
30 the move back--I was in Bagram, I think, going into
31 one of the buildings that, you know, our brigade ran
32 or our battalion ran, just they had mentioned it.

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And what were your thoughts when you heard that?

Yankee 34 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was kind of mixed. You know I've always
35 heard, you know, a lot of talk especially from Vietnam
36 vets about always fighting hard for an area and then
37 having to leave it but it's, you know, we didn't want

1 to go there to begin with so it was hard to say that,
2 you know, I fought for a ground--we fought for each
3 other that day, it wasn't for the ground. And so, you
4 know whether or not you feel like you fought for
5 nothing, no, absolutely not. We fought for each other
6 and, you know, and we fought to engage and kill the
7 enemies of our country, period. Now as far as ground
8 concern, I mean, we had a mission there. If the
9 people don't want us there and they don't want to
10 better their lives, that's their call. One part,
11 whatever, it's their country, and second part, you
12 know, we fought a lot for this mission to work out and
13 now it's not going to work. Mostly this decision
14 from, you know, from my understanding was, you know,
15 if they don't want us there, then we don't need to be
16 there. I guess my overall answer is 50/50.

Beta 17 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Understand. The General had asked you earlier
18 this morning about the term "vehicle patrol base," and
19 during the planning for Operation Rock Move, was the
20 term "vehicle patrol base" used or was "COP?"

Yankee 21 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Both. I know we started with COP, but, I mean,
22 you know, the term used by Soldiers, you know, the
23 men, they don't really appreciate the difference. I
24 knew that it was a position that we were going to.
25 Now where I think where the name game starts coming to
26 be an issue is it was initially we were setting up a
27 vehicle patrol base to secure the building of a
28 COP/FOB.

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And did you see that in writing somewhere that
30 you were going to initially establish a vehicle patrol
31 base? What led you to believe that you were going to
32 go establish a vehicle patrol base?

Yankee 33 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The mission was to build the COP, but you have to
34 start from somewhere and, you know, it was my
35 impression that you needed this first and then when
36 talking to CO and stuff and I'd, well, it's a vehicle
37 patrol base, well whatever you call it, it's vehicle's
38 with HESCO's around it and this is what we need first
39 in order to start building the COP/FOB. So it's just
40 ----

Beta 41 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And you said in talking with CO, is that the
42 Company Commander?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Because I know, like, first, when we
2 started saying, you know call it COP Kahler, and they
3 were, like, well no it's a vehicle patrol base, again,
4 that's where I was like whatever.

Beta 5 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): The "they" were the Company Commander?

Yankee 6 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. So at that point it was a vehicle patrol
7 base but we were--if the civilian engineers on that
8 first day, they would have started building the FOB
9 proper. We still would have the vehicles set up they
10 were because we needed a defensive positions and that
11 was my main goal. They can do whatever they want
12 around the perimeter to start building and I'll adjust
13 accordingly when the time comes, but my main focus was
14 getting defense positions up to protect the platoon
15 and the building of the FOB/COB.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And the company commander was correct in the use
17 of the term when he was saying it's a "vehicle patrol
18 base." Was that during the planning phase or after---
19 -

Yankee 20 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was after when we started setting up. During
21 the planning phase it was no real discussion. We knew
22 we were there to build a base, call it what you will.
23 And that at first we need to go up and secure
24 ourselves so there was no real thought about the name
25 of it.

Beta 26 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So that conversation with the CO, Company
27 Commander, took place after his arrival at Wanat but
28 before the battle?

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 30 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And then during the investigation the 15-6, do
31 you recall what term was used whether it was vehicle
32 patrol base or COP?

Yankee 33 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I think vehicle patrol--but I think either one
34 was used indiscriminately of trying to make it sound
35 differently than the other. Most of it was just
36 focused on what positions we had, if that sounds --

Sigma 37 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): You understand your task or purpose was to secure this
38 piece of ground until such time as you could build the
39 permanent facilities?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. And at the time, and like I said, there
2 was discussion on the radio and we kept calling it COB
3 Kahler and they're like well no it's a vehicle patrol
4 base, roger, call it, you know, call it Disneyland for
5 all I care, where is my water and my Class IV's
6 already?

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And that was on radio call with the XO and first
8 sergeant?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I believe, I can't remember exactly who was on
10 the other line during that part of the discussion but
11 ----

Beta 12 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): General, questions?

13 **LtGen Natonski:** You understood when you set up that vehicle
14 patrol base that it was permanent?

Yankee 15 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely, sir.

16 **LtGen Natonski:** Had you sat on vehicle patrol bases before?

Yankee 17 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, not to this extent. I had set up 24 hour
18 defense, which was essentially just a diamond
19 formation facing out the perimeter.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** And you call that a vehicle patrol base?

Yankee 21 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): And that would be a kind of quick hasty vehicle
22 patrol base.

23 **LtGen Natonski:** You've never set up --

Yankee 24 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Nothing like this, sir. No.

25 **LtGen Natonski:** This was to be a COP?

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

27 **LtGen Natonski:** And you set up with vehicles the initial
28 perimeter which was pretty much like a vehicle patrol
29 base except you were doing construction for a presence
30 that was going to remain there for some time in the
31 future?

Yankee 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Like I was saying, the survey on day one
33 was already marking spots out with little flags and
34 marker or chalk or whatever they had about, you know,

1 I could tell you down to a meter where this, this, is
2 going and this wall, and this is where the road is
3 going to come along, down to the exact planning of it,
4 down to where he had schematics of how the guard tower
5 was going to look with two CONEXS, one CONEX placed on
6 top of the other with reinforced steel, sandbags, all
7 this other stuff that he was feeling proud of.

Sigma 8 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Going back just for a minute to kind of risk
9 management and risk mitigation. Obviously the primary
10 method for MEDIVAC was going to be air MEDIVAC,
11 correct?

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger that, sir.

Sigma 13 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. That was all done via FM?

Yankee 14 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Sigma 15 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you guys have any kind of backup plans for a
16 ground MEDIVAC or was it just you'd have to deal with
17 whatever you had to deal with the guys you had on hand
18 until the air could come in?

Yankee 19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was kind of both. You could, if reinforcement
20 came up and if something drastic to where air could
21 not fly you could move with the QRF coming up, you
22 could move casualties back by ground but it was a slow
23 process and stuffing them in HMMWV's, I mean, if they
24 required a stretcher, we were in trouble.

Sigma 25 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): How many medics did you have in the platoon? Any
26 idea?

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We had one, but one of my men was also an EMT
28 before joining so I kind of considered it two.

Sigma 29 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you feel like you had adequate CLS bags and all
30 that kind of stuff?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. That's some of the training that we took
32 extremely serious was training--we had CLS bags plus
33 ILSK kits on our individual plus the guys--forwarding
34 medical equipment.

Sigma 35 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): And I guess that worked out as good as it could have
36 worked out during the course of the battle?

Yankee 37 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Sigma 1 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): It wasn't like a shortfall with respect to you didn't
 2 feel like you needed more medics or --

Yankee 3 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): No. The medic was wounded pretty early on but --

Sigma 4 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): And where did the air MEDIVAC come into? Was there a
 5 pre-designated LZ or was there just like one LZ for
 6 the whole --

Yankee 7 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): There was the LZ right to the south of the
 8 position where we set up as our permanent LZ--keep
 9 going down.

Sigma 10 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Inside the perimeter or outside the perimeter?

Yankee 11 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Inside the perimeter.

Sigma 12 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay.

Yankee 13 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right inside there. That was actually a little
 14 less a little more flat, enough to where a Chinook
 15 could land and UH60 and then they also landed up on
 16 the terrace by the OP to pick me up plus the other
 17 three that were wounded after me.

Sigma 18 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): So you guys feel pretty comfortable with fires and
 19 MEDIVAC as kind of risk and mitigation?

Yankee 20 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

21 LtGen Natonski: When you were at Bella, what was your means
 22 for MEDIVAC, and at Ranch House, both?

Yankee 23 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): There was air MEDIVAC only. We had one LZ at
 24 Ranch House. It had to be cut from the side of the
 25 mountain then the UH60 pilot had to be pretty good in
 26 order to land. You couldn't land a Chinook. We had--
 27 on the day of that attack, we did do a hoist. He just
 28 dropped down and because we were worried about this
 29 guy that was hit in the lungs and some other place if
 30 we could move him or not. And they dropped their
 31 medic there and he's like okay I'll secure him--gone
 32 to the LZ, so we had preparation for hoist at all
 33 spots.

34 LtGen Natonski: There was no bad weather plan in getting
 35 one out?

Yankee 36 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): No. You were in trouble.

Sigma 1 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you know where those guys launched out of
2 Jalalabad--- or

Yankee 3 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I believe so, Jalalabad --

4 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Was it UH60 over there?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Yeah. The same with Bella, Bella and
6 Ranch House, if it was bad weather, we were in
7 trouble.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, are we going to need Major (b)(3),(b)(6) on this Owl
9 one, sir?

10 **LtGen Natonski:** No.

Beta 11 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, a five minute break?

12 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.

13 [The testimony broke at 1447, 6 October 2009.]

1

2 [The testimony began again at 1500, 6 October 2009.]

3 **LtGen Natonski:** Just a couple questions to bring back some
4 issues from this morning. Your battalion was slated
5 to go to Iraq and was training to go to Iraq. You
6 mentioned convoy ops and that during the training was
7 redirected and told to be prepared to go to
8 Afghanistan. And you did do some cultural training
9 and mountain training. Did you feel the battalion was
10 prepared when you got to Afghanistan for the mission
11 that you were to perform?

Yankee 12 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** I do. Even though we couldn't train the entire
13 year that we were back for Afghanistan, we had gotten
14 down the fundamentals or the team and squad live fire
15 and moving together as a team and in all actuality it
16 was a little, I think, we were more ready for
17 Afghanistan than we were for Iraq. And the reason
18 being we had just come from a deployment from
19 Afghanistan. We still had a lot of veterans from OEF
20 6, so there was some--now there was some confidence or
21 security especially with the younger guys saying oh
22 okay well my team leader and squad leader have been in
23 Afghanistan before and now the guys, the team leaders
24 and squad leaders were like, okay, this is how, we've
25 been here before. I can direct you more now, I've
26 been in this kind of operation before.

27 **LtGen Natonski:** When you arrived in Afghanistan and went to
28 Nuristan province that was the area that your
29 battalion operated in Task Force Rock. Was your
30 mission when you went into that area as a company and
31 a platoon was it to interdict infiltration wise from
32 Pakistan into Afghanistan or was it to conduct counter
33 insurgency type operations?

Yankee 34 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** When I first got there and prior to first platoon
35 going up to Ranch House, it was working--the counter
36 insurgency operation, getting to know Aranus better,
37 getting the people to accept us and just try to build
38 the working relationship between us and the Afghani
39 people in that area. So for my part, it was that
40 mission. Now second platoon, they started theirs out
41 at Blessing. They kind of had two-fold. They had to
42 do the con-operations in the local area around
43 Blessing and Nangalam and then areas to the west but

1 the ops were part of the teams--the QRF if you will
2 and the interdiction.

3 **LtGen Natonski:** How much did second platoon do with respect
4 to counter insurgency? What was their interaction
5 when they were at Blessing? I guess they were at
6 Blessing?

Yankee 7 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

8 **LtGen Natonski:** How much interaction with the local,
9 civilian community did they have?

Yankee 10 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): They had a lot. They had to do a lot of
11 different operations there and with the different
12 villages so they had multiple filters to work with
13 whereas I at the Ranch House just had Aranas to work
14 with and a couple of the little villages that were
15 sort of within walking distance of Ranch House.

16 **LtGen Natonski:** And what types of interaction did you do
17 with the Afghan community?

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Mostly reassured--at that time, we had built a
19 school right there in Aranus so facilitated help that
20 getting finished and at that point it was still
21 getting Afghans to know us because 10th Mount came in
22 and it was--we were new to the people so it was
23 mostly, just, kind of, public relations kind of and
24 securing our norther----

25 **LtGen Natonski:** You mentioned the attack on the convoy in
26 which the medical personnel were killed, the medical
27 personnel in the Waygal Valley, I think, by Apache's--
28 --

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

30 **LtGen Natonski:** Was there a change in atmosphere that you
31 noticed within the valley within the Afghan people?

Yankee 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I was--I was at Blessing at the time. I wasn't
33 up at Bella, but even down at Blessing the people
34 were, they were not--I don't want to say more
35 understanding, but they were willing to listen because
36 we hadn't done anything there so they had a hard time
37 believing that we would do that.

1 So they'd listen to their people because they're
2 saying we did it on purpose but at the same time, the
3 people at Nangalam---- also looked to the Waygal
4 Valley like redneck hicks, if that makes sense.
5 That's what they felt of the Waygalians so --

6 **LtGen Natonski:** Which includes Wanat?

Yankee 7 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

8 **LtGen Natonski:** And one last question, do you have like
9 go/no go criteria? Say for example in your platoon
10 when it came time to finally establish Wanat, were
11 there any considerations that would drop it into a no-
12 go criteria that you had established as part of your
13 plan to occupy that site?

Yankee 14 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I do know that no-go criteria for the operation
15 was loss of ISR assets and loss of CAS asset. And,
16 again, that's from the briefing that was supposed to
17 be before the 4th and then once Specialist [redacted] got **Kite**
18 hurt that was dictated as a no go because of all the
19 assets that were being used to strengthen Bella and
20 pull Specialist (b)(3),(b)(6) out and to reassess the **Kite**
21 situation so that's why that became a no go at that
22 time.

23 **LtGen Natonski:** So CAS and the ISR were a no-go criteria for
24 the establishment--the initial establishment?

Yankee 25 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** So if that had not been available on the
27 8th of July, you would not have gone?

Yankee 28 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Lieutenant Colonel Sigma (b)(3),(b)(6), any follow-up questions?

Sigma 30 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The only other thing is how you knew that your ISR
31 support had been lost? Your PO said we lost our
32 ISR's?

Yankee 33 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah. That's pretty much how it went down. And
34 I couldn't remember a certain even timeframe of where,
35 I just remember that he mentioned how we don't have
36 any more ISR.

Sigma 1 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): When you guys had those, would you talk to them
2 through battalion or --

Yankee 3 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Through battalion. And then after that I made
4 the comment because now we're reaching out there to
5 try to get some sort of assets up there. I made the
6 comment, you know, I guess we're just another stop in
7 the old resupply because that was our response when we
8 need something up here to take a look at it, well when
9 the next resupply get here, we'll send the Apache's up
10 there for five minutes. It's like, you know, 48 hours
11 into it and all we are is just another bump on the
12 log.

13 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3),(b)(6): Major Owl (b)(3),(b)(6)?

Owl 14 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Just a quick one, sir. Just going back to the
15 General's comment on the COIN, did you ever feel at
16 any point, in your opinion that emphasis on COIN had
17 changed either from higher or just amongst your
18 soldiers from COIN to more just a kinetic mindset?

Yankee 19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The soldiers, even when properly explained, and I
20 spend a considerable amount of time trying to explain
21 COIN, they never really understood it. To them, it
22 was just get out there, engage and destroy and kill
23 everything and that will solve--and everything being
24 everything that's bad, like, why are we trying to make
25 friends with them, you know? It was always hard to
26 try to get the younger Soldiers to understand.
27 Especially when we would go to all the different spots
28 like the Korengal where, you know, COIN and kinetic---
29 --- was all one big fluid motion anyway because the
30 enemy would get inside the house and, you know, we'd
31 have to bomb the houses. So it--it was kind of a--the
32 COIN operations going on in the Korengal was different
33 from what was going on at Nangalam---- even though it
34 was separated by a mountain range because Korengal's
35 show of force is what would make the local go to
36 capitulate. If you show that, you know what, I'm done
37 playing nice guy. If we get shot from this house, the
38 entire house will be leveled by a bomb. And then when
39 it did, that's when the people were like oh they're
40 not playing around anymore. We'll work with you. And
41 things got better, whereas you couldn't do that where
42 we were at. You had to do, you know, we never did a
43 real dedicated MEDCAP but we did what we could with
44 our medics. You know, the handing out of the Afghani

1 flags, the Shuura's, the bringing wheat. We'd have an
2 agricultural guy from the (b)(6) an
3 come out there and help explain to them well if you
4 raise this other few feet, you'll increase your yield
5 by such and such so he's willing to work with them
6 agriculturally to get more out of their crops so we
7 did all that sort of stuff. And a lot of times
8 village--one of the villages to the west, you know,
9 when we got attacked one of the numerous times on that
10 road, a (b)(6) girl was hurt from an RPG and that
11 completely turned the village on our side. So from
12 then on, the enemy would stop shooting at us when we
13 were near locals or they would tell the locals
14 beforehand we're going to engage them some point here.
15 So if you didn't see any people out by the road you
16 knew that you were going to get hit at some point in
17 time. So the COIN operations differed from spot to
18 spot. You know, we had our missions where we went out
19 looking for kinetic activity but any large or COIN
20 operations for humanitarian aid and stuff like that
21 all outweighed any of the go out looking for kinetic--
22 looking to fight.

Owl 23 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Thank you.

Beta 24 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, do you desire to go over the schematics at
25 all?

26 **LtGen Natonski:** Maybe just a summary from your perspective
27 of the battle?

Yankee 28 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay.

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Could you pull out on the COP please?

30 And Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) Yankee
31 you're making reference off of a location as the
32 latrine or the bazaar, an estimate of distance. And
33 for the record, after we go off the record, Sergeant
34 Yankee First Class (b)(3),(b)(6) will annotate on several map shots
35 the points he's referencing.

Yankee 36 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): At the mortar pit which was--do you want me to--
37 each position or just go from the beginning or --

Beta 38 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): If you wouldn't mind coming on this side, just,
39 kind of point to where you were and then reference
40 audibly where you were.

Yankee

1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. All right, that morning after with stand-
2 to which started around four, everybody was up in
3 their positions and then around, probably around 4:30,
4 4:45 is when the TOW saw some individuals to the west.

5 We're talking to the commander trying to get him
6 to engage that area with the TOW and with the mortars.
7 You know, we were going over were we sure, you know,
8 we're not sure if we see any weapons, you know. Well
9 this is--that's bad-guy country. And then going
10 through talking to him about what had been said
11 beforehand about the enemy is the only one that moves
12 up there. We'd put out in the beginning that anybody
13 up in that region would be hostile and that we would
14 engage them. So it was fully known so --

15 **LtGen Natonski:** Is that TOW about where it was?

16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. This should actually move down a little,
17 too, about right here.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.

19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): And the TOW is about right there.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** And the TOW vehicle was moved around the
21 position?

22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. At that time I think he was trying
23 to move around trying to get the best spot for a shot
24 on those individuals because the way the elevation
25 was, it was such a--you actually had to get their
26 truck to kind of tilt in order to get the TOW to hit.
27 And plus trying to keep a good eyes on. I had
28 already--before that I had kind of gone to my
29 positions. I hadn't done a full sweep yet. But after
30 talking to the CO, after he was trying to make the
31 decision about firing, I walked over to the mortar pit
32 to talk to Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) about already having him **Cherry**
33 lay in the gun and get ready, and to be frankly honest
34 a little pissed from the inaction from the commander
35 and me--that we really needed to engage.

36 So I was going to go over and talk to Sergeant
37 **Cherry** (b)(3), (b)(6) and then once I got about here, and there was
38 two or three mortar guys kind of standing by the
39 entrance waiting for it because they were anticipating

1 the command to fire so they were starting to get all
2 the coordinates --

3 **LtGen Natonski:** What time in the morning was this?

Yankee 4 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That was about--right before five.

5 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. Did you do a stand-to that morning?

Yankee 6 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely, sir.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** And what time was that?

Yankee 8 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That was about four o'clock.

9 **LtGen Natonski:** And what happens during a stand-to?

Yankee 10 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): At stand-to, about half hour to 45 minutes before
11 it starts getting light, I have the men a hundred
12 percent and in their positions scanning for enemy. No
13 movement, no working, no nothing, just drinking water
14 and scanning; and then about an hour after daylight is
15 when I'm starting the priorities of work. So at that
16 time, everybody was well into stand-to.

17 Once I got about here, I hadn't reached the
18 position yet, was when the first--the first gunfire
19 hit--hitting the HESCO to my left and then hitting
20 Specialist Abad. And then from then on, that must
21 have been the queue because from then on, it was
22 indistinguishable from where fire was coming from
23 because I hopped in over here in the pit on the side
24 on the inside there and, you know, just kind of
25 thought, well, here we go. And from then on, all you
26 heard was explosions and machinegun fire
27 indistinguishable from whatever direction.

28 One of the guys started working on Specialist
29 Abad. That's when I dropped my hand mic in the water.
30 I could hear what was going on but couldn't talk out
31 and then this area here, we were taking a lot of fire
32 from up in this region and then along the path here.

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So that's the path, the tree line to the west of
34 your position?

Yankee 35 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. And all this tree line here, we were
36 taking fire. They were moving around. You could see

1 them moving, running from spot to spot, using the
2 inside of the building.

Beta 3 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): The building on the southwest corner of the --

Yankee 4 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. And so from there, I could get over the
5 HESCO about this far, kind of standing up like this so
6 I can engage and I was engaging targets all along this
7 line right here.

8 We had some of the mortar guys, they were
9 throwing grenades up in this area here, firing AT4.
10 We were getting shot at by an RPG in here in this area
11 but he was kind of back trying to shoot through the
12 trees. And every time he'd shoot the RPG would pop
13 out and catch a tree, it'd go shooting off and the guy
14 wasn't smart enough to move positions. He'd tried
15 that, like, three times, popping from position to
16 position over there but the result being the same
17 because he was trying to fire through the trees.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** Where was the mosque?

Yankee 19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The mosque is right here.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** Was there fire from that building?

Yankee 21 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. From my understanding my guys in the
22 second squad that were right here, that was how one of
23 them got wounded was them shooting through there.

Sigma 24 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The Mosque being directly to the north of the
25 position.

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Now fire from in here at that time and
27 the first part of it, I was firing down this way. I
28 know we were taking fire from here because --

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): You were firing at the southwest taking fire from
30 the south?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. You could--we were taking fire from this
32 whole area plus on this ridge line that was over down
33 here.

Beta 34 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So from the southeast all the way around to the
35 southwest you were taking fire?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. This ridge up in--if you pull up. I know
2 there was long distance firing from here and farther
3 down the ridge.

Sigma 4 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That's the house that's about 120 meters from the OP?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. And this ridge continues up and around--
6 and we were taking fire from there. There was some
7 long distance shots going. The only time I really
8 noticed that we were taking fire when I was engaging
9 because it first hit the top of the HESCO coming
10 across me, that's when I realized we were taking fire
11 from here and then when we were getting ammo--Sergeant
12 Cherry (b)(3),(b)(6) was taking the ammo from the back side of
13 that HESCO and then all of a sudden you could see it
14 hitting the ground where he was grabbing the ammo.
15 The only way you could do that was firing it from this
16 direction. They were putting some good fire down the
17 end--the TOW truck was hit almost within the opening
18 shots of the fire.

19 I don't know how many RPG hits because I got to
20 my position, returned some fire, sat down because my
21 hand mic went into the water and all of a sudden I'm
22 hearing all these explosions but then I see like
23 orange and that's when I turned to see the HMMWV on
24 fire.

25 **LtGen Natonski:** And that was in the open?

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That was--that was--roger.

27 **LtGen Natonski:** And that was specifically targeted, do you
28 believe?

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Absolutely.

30 **LtGen Natonski:** They knew where it was.

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Well it didn't take long to--I mean, where it was
32 that night, I think, was kind of down here. It moved
33 around. It moved to get in a better position to fire.
34 So where they fired from, that was definitely a number
35 one target for them.

Sigma 36 **LTC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The TOW vehicle didn't get off any shots?

Yankee 37 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It did not get any shots, sir.

Sigma 1 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): It was hit with an RPG or was it a mortar, do you
2 know?

Yankee 3 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): RPG, from the guys that I was talking to and
4 (ixia) Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) was the guy in charge of the truck and
5 he said it was three RPG's but that's from what he was
6 saying. I didn't observe it.

7 LtGen Natonski: Were any soldiers wounded in the vicinity
8 of the TOW?

Yankee 9 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): They weren't.

Beta 10 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): If I could just take you back real quick to the
11 stand-to, when you were a hundred percent stand-to,
12 did you physically confirm all your soldiers had stood
13 to?

Yankee 14 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. That was actually part of what I was
15 doing when they were seen at 4:30. I had been to
16 these positions and I was going to make my way up to
17 the OP when that, hey, I've got guys, and then that's
18 when I--with the CO and the PL, part of his decision
19 making process on what to do.

Beta 20 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Before that decision making process, had you make
21 coms with the OP?

Yankee 22 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 23 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): So you were confident they had stood to?

Yankee 24 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely.

Beta 25 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you know who you spoke to up there?

Yankee 26 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), Cyan

Beta 27 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Thank you.

28 LtGen Natonski: During the evening, are you on 50 percent
29 alert?

Yankee 30 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): It was pretty darn close to it, sir.

31 LtGen Natonski: But half were sleeping and half are awake?

Yankee 32 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Plus we had roving guard on the base and movement
33 around to check the positions, especially in between

1 here. So they would kind of move up here and then
2 move back around----

3 **LtGen Natonski:** What's the roving guard consist of?

Yankee 4 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was an NCO and another soldier.

5 **LtGen Natonski:** Two people?

Yankee 6 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. I don't really like roving guards but it
7 seems like the necessary evil for the situation that
8 we were in.

Beta 9 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): They were roving where?

Yankee 10 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Their main jobs were to go from vehicle and stuff
11 and then pop up over here to the OP and make sure
12 everybody was awake and that nobody was moving around-
13 -moving around in the village, that sort of thing.

Beta 14 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So they would take the southern approach up to
15 the OP?

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. And which was good because a lot of times
17 the ANA soldiers would walk off to go use the bathroom
18 or something and might get lost and start walking
19 through our line and then they'd have to get us get
20 them back so roving guard had to do that also.

21 **LtGen Natonski:** And on that map, where was the ANA?

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): They had a position here as kind of a front
23 TCP because we were worried--just in case of vehicle-
24 borne IED's and then another, the American TCP's back
25 here and then we had the positions up here.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** Towards the populated area?

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. And this low ground here. Right in this
28 concealed part here.

Owl 29 **Maj** (b)(3),(b)(6): Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6), do you know or remember who was
30 on roving patrol that night?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No. It would have been a majority of the NCO's
32 taking turn. They kept their shifts short trying to
33 get more sleep.

Beta 34 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): After you left the pit, where did you go next?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The pit, we stayed there for, again, concept of
2 time, 20 minutes probably around that. Once the ammo
3 got hit and I don't know if it was cheese charge going
4 off, there's a big, bright flash and a second it took
5 me to like, okay, great, I'm not dead. I was fully
6 expecting 120-rounds you wouldn't even see the flash.

7 **Cherry** Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6), who was the mortar section
8 leader was like, we need to get out of here just in
9 case this goes up so that's when we moved over to this
10 position, over here, the headquarters HMMWV. Sergeant
11 **Pepper** (b)(3),(b)(6) was carrying Specialist Abad. Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) **Pepper**
12 was hit while he was carrying wounded; hit through the
13 legs, right back here around the buttocks area and
14 still carried Specialist Abad back to a position while
15 he was wounded.

16 Once we got there, I got the assessment from **Ixia**
17 that he was up, just to--his M4 was still in the HMMWV
18 so --

Beta 19 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And that was the TOW gunner truck?

Yankee 20 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. So I got confirmation that they were all
21 alive. Nobody was left in there. I kind of sat up
22 here real quick in the sandbag area I had between that
23 here and that HESCO and scanned here because I wanted
24 to see, since the fire had died down there, what they
25 were doing.

Beta 26 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): You were facing the west, southwest?

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Still talking to the CO and **X-Ray**
28 (b)(3),(b)(6) asking
29 where the PO went. He said the PL took off to the OP.
30 The OP had casualties just not sure how many. So I
31 was observing that for a few minutes, moved to the
32 back of the HMMWV. There was still very little fire
33 from the village. I think at this time, I think, the
34 concentration was on the OP. I think they had done
35 they're either keeping us occupied so as not to
36 reinforce or they were testing the defenses by the
37 village and decided it was too strong and moved off.
38 At that time, they were maneuvering. My opinion was
39 that they were--they felt that the OP was within their
40 grasp and they were maneuvering to get it, but their
initial assault failed.

41 I moved over to the second squad position----

Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): So further north and within the COP?

Yankee 2 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. In here because I heard they were
3 wounded. I checked on the wounded there, was
4 assessing the situation and that's when, during this
5 timeframe was when Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) had moved up with Scorpio
6 his guys up there because they weren't getting coms
7 the last thing wasn't very good.

Beta 8 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) moved up to order. Scorpio

Yankee 9 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger, He had moved from this position with
10 Sergeant Garcia at some point had went from here over
11 to this position. I don't know if he called through
12 the radio to grab another guy or two and Sergeant
13 Garcia made a trip over to first squad and then had
14 went out to help secure OP. That was the time that I
15 was over here with second. Right before I got over to
16 second section and there was a lot of fire coming up
17 from the hill and then they had zero com with anybody
18 up there. It was not that long of a pause.

19 That's right when the Apache's came on scene so
20 that was about 40, 45 minutes. Through the position
21 here the Apaches started firing danger close which I
22 could see and smoke looked like it was almost rising
23 from the OP. So I yelled over to CO that they were
24 too close and he replied that there's no coms up
25 there. I was, like, I'm taking six or eight guys and
26 I'm heading up there, and he said, roger.

27 So I grabbed some guys. We ran over to this portion
28 right here.

Beta 29 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): To the southern end of the long building?

Yankee 30 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

31 LtGen Natonski: That's the bazaar?

Yankee 32 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. So we're at this point right here and was
33 just about ready to start moving up here and just as I
34 was about to go, we caught a bunch of fire from this
35 building over here.

Beta 36 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): From the north?

Yankee

SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):

Roger. At first, I thought it was just first squad firing and I pulled back because we we're about to cross and he's like it wasn't me, so we started taking some more so we threw some HE. Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) and myself stayed there. The rest of the guys, six guys, moved up here to this top terrace and ran across. At the same time that they were going across, I was concerned that through this undergrowth and dead space that they would be flanked and not know that they were being flanked so with Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) behind me, I ran through the smoke, fired into the windows, threw a grenade, and popped up here. Didn't get any return fire and then ran up here and linked up with Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) and that's where--that we started setting up--redo the defensive positions and----

(b)(3),(b)(6) Pisces

(b)(3),(b)(6) Pisces

Cherry

Beta

LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6):

A portion of your men came in from the south but you came in from the west?

Yankee

SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):

Right.

19

LtGen Natonski:

How hard was it to run up those tiers?

Yankee

SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):

This wasn't bad. If you pull back a little bit. I mean, even this even gets it looking like more distance than what it was. Once you did two, three leaps and bounds, you were there. So it wasn't even this gives a misconception of it looks farther than what it was.

26

LtGen Natonski:

How high were those ledges?

Yankee

SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):

These ledges here were about up to your hip.

28

LtGen Natonski:

Okay.

Yankee

SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):

So you kind of had to bound over it. There was always some sort of break in the wall where the locals had, kind of, made their own little steps so it was kind of easy to get through. And even these were a little closer because we found--once I got to this rock area and pull back a little bit, even this was a lot bushier around this area, but that was nothing but dead space.

37

And you got up here and this is where the bodies were, this tier here or this tier here.

38

Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And that's a sleeping terrace?

Yankee 2 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah. Yeah. Right here, and there was a body
3 here, Hovater, I believe was there.

4 LtGen Natonski: Did you have to negotiate concertina to get
5 into the position?

Yankee 6 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): No, I did not. This was wrapped--could you pull
7 away, please? Thank you. This was set up--the
8 concertina was set up because even this it was
9 actually from like--your thing was a little closer
10 because we had concertina going this way up to it,
11 concertina wire here, but since this area was observed
12 at all times, we left a spot to reinforce for first
13 squad and to----

Sigma 14 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): So you had concertina running west to east both on the
15 north and south approach?

Yankee 16 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. And out this way. And this kind of
17 dropped a little bit and there was a lot more
18 undergrowth in there.

19 LtGen Natonski: Did you see--there was an enemy body found
20 in the wire, where about was that?

Yankee 21 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): It was about right here. Actually, I think it
22 Burgundy was (b)(3),(b)(6), the Marine with ETT when I put him in
23 position he was like there's a--there's somebody on
24 the wire. And I shot him twice and was like well he's
25 dead now or was dead so just continue to scan the
26 area. So we set up the defensive positions. We
27 weren't taking any fire and we began to work the
28 casualties and the wounded, Sergeant Garcia, Sergeant
29 Scorpio (b)(3),(b)(6), and start moving them and I started to get
30 accountability of my KIA. I still didn't--Lieutenant
31 Brostrom's body was kind of wedged in near this rock.

Beta 32 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): That's the large rock by the --

Yankee 33 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. Yeah. This tree wasn't as prominent. It
34 was more skinny and dead and this was pushed over so
35 this area was pretty, it was nice because it kind of
36 right by the rock, it actually dipped into the rocks
37 and it was a low ground and a rock. So, like I said
38 this--up all day. And that's where he was at the
39 bottom of that rock face down.

1 I started to get the accountability, that's when
2 the QRF showed up and then First Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) and Victor
3 Raven Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) and a medic and a few other guys
4 came up reinforced. I linked up with first sergeant
5 and let him know this is what I got so far. I believe
6 at that time also that two of the MEDIVAC's had
7 already taken off with some individuals. The timeline
8 on that, I'm not a hundred percent positive. I was
9 working that up there at the defense and all that.
10 And I know the helicopters came in and out.

11 **LtGen Natonski:** Where did they land on the----

Yankee 12 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** They landed on the LZ.

13 **LtGen Natonski:** I thought you mentioned there was one that
14 landed----

Yankee 15 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Right. After I was wounded, one landed right
16 here to pick me up.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** That's where you were picked up from?

Yankee 18 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** Roger.

19 **LtGen Natonski:** And where were you wounded on the site?

Yankee 20 **SFC (b)(3),(b)(6):** After the QRF got there and the QRF actually
21 pushed past the mosque, whether the LT did that on
22 purpose or not, he pushed past and kind of trapped
23 them. He kind of came in here and I think they were
24 still setting up and started a fire fight and then the
25 other guys across the way started shooting at us
26 thinking, probably thinking that they started their
27 assault or in support of their buddies but they were
28 shooting us. So then we got RPG's, small arms, LPK in
29 our position. We returned fire. I was back right by
30 Lieutenant Brostrom. At that time, I knew who he was
31 because Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) had found him before the
32 engagement--we had started to pull the body. We had
33 gotten two bodies moved out. We had moved Specialist
34 Rainey over and, I think moved (b)(3),(b)(6) and I think and
35 then Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) had rolled over Lieutenant
36 Brostrom.

37 At that time, once I had found Lieutenant
38 Brostrom, I had accountability of my soldiers. Not--I
39 couldn't by name say at the point because we started

1 moving bodies, but I at least had the numbers and the
2 names correct as far as accountability of the
3 Soldiers. At that time, we started taking fire and I
4 was right by that tree--or right by that rock. We
5 ended up engaging the building over here, that's when
6 an RPG hit the tree and rained shrapnel down. The
7 medic came over, threw a tourniquet on, morphine, and
8 I was still engaging until the tourniquet couldn't--I
9 couldn't move my left hand anymore and it was
10 impossible to use my right hand to fire so at that
11 point I just tossed water and ammo to the guys that
12 were up there.

13 The fire died down a little bit. First platoon
14 was hammering, doing a real good job of keeping
15 everything on our back side off us. Now they were
16 starting to react to us instead of us reacting to
17 them. I know there were a couple of 2,000 pound bombs
18 that were dropped. The Apaches were running and then
19 the MEDIVAC came in probably about 30 or 40 minutes
20 after, I think, I had been wounded. It landed right
21 here, and----

Beta 22 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): That's just to the south of the OP?

Yankee 23 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah. It was just land here real quick and then
24 flew out and then once I got to Abad I know that three
25 more guys were hit up there right after I left even.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** You mentioned some bombs being dropped as
27 well as the Apache ones. Do you have an idea where
28 those bombs hit?

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I know--could you come up, please? Right--I know
30 the house--all the houses over in here were just
31 smoking ruins.

32 **LtGen Natonski:** On the other side of the creek?

Yankee 33 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. And this house here, we were actually
34 getting some direct fire poured down on us. They also
35 were--could you come down like turn down. This ridge
36 here, which was actually a little bit more forward but
37 not much, all along that ridge they had good spots to
38 fire. They were firing RPG's and RNCA----

Beta 39 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): That's the ridge to the north and east of the
40 position across the creek?

1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. And they were using that as like their
2 support by fire and their harassing fire.

3 **LtGen Natonski:** So close air support hit positions on that
4 ridgeline?

5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Yeah. This house wasn't two stories
6 anymore and was charcoal and smoking--houses were hit
7 also.

8 **LtGen Natonski:** There was that high group up to the, I
9 guess, southwest, that structure there. You were
10 receiving fire from up there?

11 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** Were they engaged by close air?

13 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I believe so. I couldn't say for a hundred
14 percent.

15 **LtGen Natonski:** And artillery, where was their artillery
16 hitting?

17 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): It was numerous positions that they were hitting.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** These were registered fires or were these
19 adjusted?

20 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. They were using register and adjusting.

21 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Gentlemen, any additional questions for Sergeant
22 **Yankee** (b)(3),(b)(6)?

23 **Yankee** (b)(3),(b)(6), with the exception of the CSI
24 personnel for you to help to adjust the graphics
25 accordingly, General Natonski is going to issue an
26 order right now regarding the investigation.

27 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. Sergeant First Class **Yankee** (b)(3),(b)(6), you are
28 ordered not to discuss the testimony you provided
29 today with anyone other than members of the
30 investigation team. You will not allow any witness in
31 this investigation to talk to you about the testimony
32 he has given or which he intends to give. If anyone
33 should try to influence your testimony or attempt to
34 discuss your testimony, you are instructed to notify
35 Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) or Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6), **Sigma**

Beta

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay, sir.

2 **LtGen Natonski:** Stand at ease. Just as a side, I would
3 love to thank you for your service to our country and
4 to the United States Army. I commend you for the
5 actions of that day that you performed at Wanat. And
6 I think the performance of your entire platoon were in
7 the highest traditions of the United States Army.

Yankee 8 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. Thank you.

9 **LtGen Natonski:** But well done.

Yankee 10 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Thank you, sir.

11 [The testimony concluded at 1537, 6 October 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Subj: TESTIMONY OF SFC Yankee (b)(3),(b)(6) USA, GIVEN ON 6 OCTOBER
2009, AT FT. LEAVENWORTH, KS

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify
that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

Owl

(b)(3),(b)(6)

Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Judge Advocate

9 Nov 09
DATE

1 [The testimony began at 1735 28 October 2009.]

Beta 2 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sergeant Yankee (b)(3),(b)(6), welcome back.

Yankee 3 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Hooah, sir.

Beta 4 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Prior to coming on the record here, Sergeant
5 Yankee (b)(3),(b)(6) was sworn and is ready to go. We have a couple
6 of follow-up questions from our previous interview
7 with you.

8 The first area that we would like to focus on is
9 small-arms weapons and any malfunctions, damage to the
10 weapons within 2nd Platoon, Chosen.

Yankee 11 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): With the rate of fire that the Soldiers were
12 firing at, there is some talk that there was some
13 malfunctions. Now, we would clean our weapons
14 religiously; and, plus, clean the magazines. The
15 problem with the rate of fire, some of the guys were
16 going through a lot of magazines. I, myself, fired
17 about 13. At one point, about eight, nine, or ten, I
18 had to dump a bunch of oil on it to keep it firing and
19 then had to slow down the rate of fire in order--so my
20 weapon would continue operating.

Beta 21 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): What kind of weapon was that?

Yankee 22 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): M-4. M-4. Now, with the experience throughout
23 the deployment, and also including this fight, was
24 that after a sustained rate of fire with some of the
25 weapons was that they would seize; especially the
26 SAWs, the squad automatic weapons, the M-249s. They
27 did have a tendency to lock up.

Beta 28 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you know why?

Yankee 29 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): A lot of the dust in that area would just get
30 into everything. So you would have to find the happy
31 medium to what was too much oil that would trap that
32 dust and make it worse; and enough oil to keep it
33 operational. In a sustained fight, with not enough
34 oil in there, it was just a quick fix to keep it
35 firing through all of the carbon and even some of the
36 brass shavings from the rounds, from firing that much
37 ammo to keep it firing. Umm, in my experience,
38 especially with the M-4, is that if you kept it clean
39 and you kept it--and the magazines--that is kind of
40 the key that some leaders forget is that the magazines
41 and rounds need to be cleaned as well. Usually,

1 firing your basic load, seven magazines, you would not
2 have a problem. But when you are talking about firing
3 double that, 14 mags, stuff like that does become an
4 issue; especially with the overheating.

5 But as I do--talking to some of Soldiers before,
6 there was some issues. The previous fight that I had
7 at Ranch House, I had learned to bring some kiani oil
8 with me and tell my Soldiers that because I had
9 problems with my M-4 then and had to dump a
10 significant amount of oil to get it firing again.

Beta 11 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Problems from the large number of rounds?

Yankee 12 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Large number of the amount of magazines being
13 fired.

Beta 14 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): How did you carry that oil?

Yankee 15 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): In the little kit, over on the side, I had a
16 large bottle. I found the cold weather oil worked
17 better. It was a little more white and not as oily.
18 That seemed to work better.

Beta 19 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): CLP?

Yankee 20 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): It--roger. Roger. They have a kind of cold
21 weather version too. It was in a green bottle; a
22 significant amount where you could just squeeze like
23 crazy and then keep firing.

Beta 24 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And did your Soldiers have that as well?

Yankee 25 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Yeah.

Beta 26 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): You said some other Soldiers mentioned that they
27 had problems with their weapons. What were those?

Yankee 28 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Uh, the same thing; just from fire--I know the
29 240s kept firing. They were able to sustain a large
30 amount of fire. And--I know some of the M-4s pushed
31 it up at the OP. I believe Specialist (b)(3),(b)(6) had some
32 issues with his weapon firing a large amount of ammo.
33 As far as who else or whatever weapon systems, I
34 wouldn't be able to answer that in full confidence of
35 giving you guys a full answer. I know there is some
36 M-4 problems and SAW.

Beta 37 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Changing gears; the engineers that were assigned
38 to you guys up at Wanat, what was the C2 relationship?

1 Were you and Lieutenant Brostrom in charge of those
2 guys or were they--who did they answer to?

Yankee 3 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. I mean, they--I don't know who, like the
4 HARPS were to talk about engineering questions, if
5 they had any.

Beta 6 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6) Right.

Yankee 7 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): They had--they answered to Lieutenant Brostrom or
8 myself. They didn't give us any problems as far as
9 positioning, help manning certain positions; I did
10 talk with that staff sergeant. I knew he had a job to
11 do, and I had mine also. We supported each other
12 using the bobcat to build a position and stuff like
13 that while he went around with his overlay--I guess is
14 the best way to describe it--umm, of where the FOB or
15 COB was going to be built. So there was some cross-
16 talk.

Beta 17 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So he had, essentially, for want of a better
18 description, a plan that he was looking at saying;
19 okay, this guard tower needs to go here, this needs to
20 go there. I thought that's what we understood last
21 time we talked to you.

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger that, sir. He had a schematic. That is
23 the best word. A schematic of where--down to even
24 where the drainage was going to go for the field down
25 below the LZ like where the waste would go down. They
26 were going to use there--I am not an engineer. I
27 don't know the proper terminology for their little
28 sewage deal, or what have you--but down to that. Down
29 to where the wall was going, where the barracks would
30 be built, the guard towers, and that was the topic of
31 discussion there. It was like, I have to build a
32 tower here, and I have one of my guard post going
33 there.

Beta 34 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. Yeah. I remember you saying that --

Yankee 35 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): When it is time to build that, then I'll move,
36 but right now I need to secure the area. But he did.
37 He had it down to the little flags and other things,
38 trying to get the outline ready for the base.

39 **MG Perkins:** Who set the priority of work then like you said?
40 Did he have the schematic and who decided he is going

1 to build the guard tower before he builds the latrine
2 or something? Was it briefed to you? Did you decide?

Yankee 3 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir--

4 **MG Perkins:** You know, the order that he was going to go
5 through it.

Yankee 6 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. I think a lot of that was going to go by
7 material. We didn't really get too much into that. I
8 know the wall right by the road by the bazaar. That
9 was one of the first things the civilian engineers
10 were going to start; with them starting to build that
11 ten-foot wall, I want to say, first. And then how
12 they were going to do the materials. I know he had a
13 schematic for the guard tower; how he was going to
14 build. But as far as the priorities going on right
15 then and there, it was myself and Lieutenant
16 Brostrom's decision on building that stuff. And then
17 we would move the positions that we built with what
18 they wanted to build first.

19 **MG Perkins:** Did he have, like, a list of materials and when
20 they were going to show up?

Yankee 21 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. He did have a list of materials. Sir, as
22 far as when they were supposed to show up, I can't
23 remember what days they would start. But I know that
24 they're Class IV was supposed to start --

25 **MG Perkins:** But there was a plan? I mean, maybe you don't
26 remember the order, but there was --

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

28 **MG Perkins:** HESCO, concertina is going to show up 8, 9, 10,
29 or something like that. And the engineer had it.

Yankee 30 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): He did.

31 **MG Perkins:** He is the guy that had it?

Yankee 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The engineer had it. Roger, the staff sergeant
33 there.

Beta 34 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): If I can take you back to the weapons issue. I
35 have a list of weapons that were taken out of Wanat,
36 in some form, for not working.

Yankee 37 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay.

Beta 1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Just taking a look at those particular weapons,
2 do you recall the reasons why some of those weapons
3 and weapons systems weren't working; specifically the
4 ones that have a check mark by small arms? You said
5 some Soldiers had problems with their M-4s.

Yankee 6 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

Beta 7 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Were there any M-4s that suffered battle damage?

Yankee 8 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): I know there was some equipment that suffered
9 battle damage. I didn't get to have a first-hand
10 look. I had been evac'd out. Umm, Mark 19, I don't
11 remember them taking any kind of direct fire, but it
12 is no surprise that a Mark 19--that area was really
13 rough for the Mark 19s; great weapon when it's
14 working. But you had to use a lot of LSA and--just to
15 get it operational. And a lot of times, especially
16 the dust from the helicopters, it's no surprise that
17 it may have got some rounds off and then stopped
18 working.

19 But I know that there was a .50 cal, that when he
20 opened up the upper feed tray, it had took a round
21 stray. But I think that was actually still
22 operational. Umm, and I believe that there was an M-4
23 that I saw up at the OP that I had seen some damage to
24 it. But the rest of these, I wouldn't be able to say
25 that the M-14--I didn't know that we had one that was
26 down or from battle damage.

27 Umm, I would suspect that would have been from
28 battle damage. I hadn't had any experience with the
29 M-14s going down for any kind of overheating or lack
30 or anything like that.

Beta 31 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Colonel Sigma (b)(3),(b)(6), questions on this witness?

Sigma 32 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): No, sir.

33 LtGen Notanski: Based on the intensity of the battle, it
34 appears to be a good number of weapons that were
35 damaged. We have testimony on a SAW gunner who had to
36 put a lot of SLP or using a Febreeze bottle.

Yankee 37 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

38 LtGen Notanski: The problem wasn't the manufacture of the
39 weapon itself, but the RPG's kept hitting the sandbags
40 and throwing dirt into his weapon. He kept having to

1 brush it off and put more oil on it. And, eventually,
2 it got gummed up. I guess my question to you is,
3 would you have any reservations about taking these
4 types of weapons into combat again; M-4s, SAWs?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I think the biggest one I would have the biggest
6 problem taking is the M-249. The M-4, like I said, as
7 long as the maintenance is kept up on it. And there
8 has always been talk about people wanting to go to a
9 different weapon because the M-4 is garbage. I have
10 been a firm believer that a Soldier maintaining his
11 weapon, an M-4, is an excellent weapon; and
12 maintaining the magazines. I have no problem taking
13 an M-4 into combat. The M-249 has always been hit or
14 miss.

15 **LtGen Natonski:** What specifically?

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The dust getting in there. The sand getting in
17 there fouls it up much quicker than any other weapon
18 besides the Mark 19. The M-14, I never had any
19 problems, operational-wise. It is the same with the
20 M-203. But the Mark 19 and the M-249 have always been
21 issues, especially using some of the, um, the ammo
22 holders that carry a hundred rounds, the soft cover,
23 you have them up underneath. And we would always,
24 after every mission and patrol; we would pull them out
25 and clean them. But after a few days of that dust,
26 after the M-249 would shoot that, then usually
27 reloading it you would start to have problems.

Beta 28 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): On the engineer's squad, do you recall the squad
29 leader's name?

Yankee 30 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I do not, sir.

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): During our previous interview with you, we asked
32 you many questions regarding supplies; water, fuel----

33 **LtGen Natonski:** One quick question on the engineers; you
34 said they had a schematic on the lay down of what was
35 going to become COP Wanat. Did someone in the chain
36 of command approve that design; whether it be the
37 battalion commander, the company commander, or
38 Lieutenant Brostrom? Did someone say; okay, this is
39 the way it is, or let's modify this because of the
40 building over here; or let's pull it back 10 yards
41 because of the proximity of the bazaar; did someone in
42 the chain of command have a say over the schematic?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, the schematic I had saw previous to that; of
2 the planned COP. The one he had was completely
3 different than the one that I saw that--the
4 Lieutenant's name--I think he is a captain now--his
5 name escapes me that was part of the battalion----

6 **LtGen Natonski:** (b)(3), (b)(6) ? **Falcon**

Yankee 7 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Yes, sir. The one that I saw him--that
8 he showed me, was different than what the engineer
9 had. And it was done up like using the CAD system I
10 remember from high school. That is what it looked
11 like to me; all computer drawn; and some of the
12 schematics for the guard. It was completely different
13 what he had than what I had seen from Lieutenant

(b)(3),(b)(6) Falcon

15 And I am not sure who approved it or--that is
16 what he had. That's what he said the way it was
17 going.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** Based on his discussions with the company
19 commander or the battalion commander, did someone--
20 when they briefed the operation, they briefed the
21 movement up.

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

23 **LtGen Natonski:** Essentially, the 8th through the 10th of
24 July. But beyond that, did they brief; this is what
25 it's going to look like at that point, or was that
26 just something that--you were going to get up there
27 and start building?

Yankee 28 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger, sir. And I knew there was a schematic
29 from talking to Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6). Falcon

30 **LtGen Natonski:** But you didn't know if Lieutenant Brostrom
31 knew?

Yankee 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I think he had an idea through the same thing
33 that I was doing.

34 **LtGen Natonski:** But what you saw from Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6) Falcon
35 wasn't the one that you saw out there?

Yankee 36 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No, it was not, sir. It was different.

37 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.

1 **MG Perkins:** One last question on the engineers; so when you
2 went up there, was your understanding, coming back to
3 timelines, that you would complete the building? Or
4 you would just start it and then 126 would finish? I
5 mean, when you hand off 126, what did you think it was
6 going to be like when you handed it off?

Yankee 7 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I knew it was going to be a work in progress,
8 sir. I think that was--I did not think that it was
9 going to be anywhere near complete.

10 **MG Perkins:** And so what did you think was going to be, sort
11 of, the trigger for you to hand off to 126? Was it
12 event driven? Was it time driven? Were you given a
13 date for, sort of, a TOA at Wanat?

Yankee 14 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. It was definitely time driven because we
15 were--they already had us down for the flights. I
16 already had to----

17 **MG Perkins:** Did you know when you were--if you had not been
18 attacked, when you would have left Wanat?

Yankee 19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. On the 21st, I would have been the last
20 Chosen guy to leave.

21 **MG Perkins:** So that was the plan? That you would have worked
22 through the 21st; the engineers? Then 126 would have
23 come out and you would have done some right-seat ride?

Yankee 24 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

25 **MG Perkins:** How much before that? Was that planned in, the
26 right-seat ride?

Yankee 27 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. I think on the 15th was when we were
28 going to get our first 126 guy. Then I was going to
29 be sending some of my guys----

30 **MG Perkins:** About a week?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. There would be a week where, the next
32 day, five more guys would leave.

33 **MG Perkins:** Had you met the incoming platoon sergeant?

Yankee 34 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I had not, sir.

35 **MG Perkins:** You hadn't met any of the guys?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Just the first sergeant and the XO were the only
2 ones I had met, sir.

3 **MG Perkins:** But not at Wanat. That was back at Blessing?

Yankee 4 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That was back at Blessing. Yes, sir.

5 **MG Perkins:** Okay. Thanks.

Beta 6 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): On the supply issue with water and the other
7 supplies, did you personally communicate the shortages
8 up the chain?

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, I did, sir.

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Who did you speak to?

Yankee 11 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I talked with Captain (b)(3),(b)(6). Papa

Beta 12 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): The Company XO?

Yankee 13 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The XO. Yes, sir.

Beta 14 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And did you do that on one occasion or multiple
15 occasions?

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We had multiple discussions on the supplies;
17 especially the water.

Beta 18 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And once you started getting low on water, was it
19 multiple times a day that you would call?

Yankee 20 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Even before we started getting low, and
21 once, especially that morning, once I found out we
22 weren't getting all the lifts to us that we were
23 supposed to get was when I said; okay. We are not
24 getting the water that we need. I need water. I
25 might as well just say it's a emergency resupply right
26 now because the water we have and the water I just
27 received is not going to be sustainable. And then
28 that's when they started working the piece of getting
29 with the Afghanis. And then as that day progressed,
30 and the following day; continues saying we were going
31 through water a lot faster than what we have. For
32 what the plan is, we need emergency resupply for
33 water.

Beta 34 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): You mentioned that you didn't get the sling you
35 were planning on receiving. When you went up there,
36 what did you plan to receive? How much water, for
37 example, did you think you were going to receive?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I want to--I believe it was around four slings of
2 water. Umm, the numbers--I have been really racking
3 my head on that as far as how many lifts. I want to
4 say it was like 12 lifts. And in that lift, there
5 would be; Class IV water, the engineers, the ammo, and
6 I want to say it was three or four slings of water.
7 It was definitely enough to where I didn't have to
8 worry about that for a couple days so we could get
9 much more Class IV and ammo up there.

Beta 10 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Now, you got that perception that was what you
11 were going to receive from where? Was it a Con Ops
12 brief?

Yankee 13 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. From--they had a slide with what was
14 being brought up; plus from my discussions with
15 Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) about the water.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And your understanding was about how many
17 aircraft were supposed to come in?

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Umm, it would have been--it would have been about
19 12 coming up. I can't honestly say a number of 12.
20 It's really kind of--I don't know a definite 12. But
21 I know that what we received was like half of what we--
22 significantly less than what we were supposed to get.
23 And so that's why we had to cut certain things out;
24 and some of it being the water because I needed just
25 enough Class IV to start building. And then the water
26 and the ammo for the 120; plus the ammo for the
27 positions.

Beta 28 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): You said cut some of the water out. So did you
29 affirmatively talk to someone and say, change the
30 load?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. We were discussing what should get cut
32 out and that sort of thing.

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Once you were up in Wanat?

Yankee 34 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Right. Right when we were up in Wanat.

Beta 35 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Who did you talk to?

Yankee 36 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Captain (b)(3),(b)(6).

Beta 37 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): There was--if you could just clarify for us--one
38 minute here. Excuse me.

1 We previously discussed the concertina. At the
2 time of the attack, could you use your finger to
3 demonstrate where the concertina wire had run; and
4 also if it was single or double.

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We had--we'll start from right here. There was
6 an opening here because of where that road came in.

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Over here by the bazaar?

Yankee 8 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. This is where the HqCp was. Umm,
9 there was a brick wall right here. And we had single
10 strand on top of that wall. And then once it got off
11 of that wall and into the wood-line here along the
12 edge --

Beta 13 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Up by the mosque?

Yankee 14 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Was also single strand. At some point in
15 here, right behind the mortar pit, is where it got the
16 triple strand. It was triple strand down to here.
17 It's--I want to say down to here.

Beta 18 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So all the way down the western side then?

Yankee 19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. All the way down and then they come
20 across. It may have been a little--that seems about
21 right.

Beta 22 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So along the southern, was that double or triple?

Yankee 23 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That was triple up to here. And I can't remember
24 what it was along this; single or triple. And then
25 they had some up here and some around the OP; single.

Beta 26 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay. And when you went up--before you came up
27 to Wanat, what was your plan for concertina? How
28 much? What did you think would be --

Yankee 29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The triple strand, all the way around.

Beta 30 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And also up to the OP?

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

Beta 32 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So did running wire up to the OP cut down the
33 triple strand? Had you not run concertina up around
34 the OP, would you have had enough to do triple all the
35 way around?

1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): No. No. And the single strand on top of the
2 wall, again, was--that was there in place to--they
3 were using that wall. We had troops on that wall. It
4 was just to help with a little more security. But
5 that wall, like I was stating, was supposed to start
6 getting worked on. And on the 8th, they were going to
7 start building that wall. And when they didn't show
8 up, we just continued to improve that position. That
9 was going to move to help that civilian construction
10 team start working on the wall. And as far as what
11 was next after that, I don't know. I just know that
12 was the plan first; for them to start doing the work
13 on that wall.

14 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): When you had gotten up to **Papa** Wanat and you had your
15 conversation with Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6) regarding--I am
16 assuming he told you; hey, we are not going to get as
17 many aircraft as we were planning or as many slings as
18 we were planning?

19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That was the morning of the 9th. The first day
20 of the mission is when I found out that we were not
21 getting anywhere near what we were supposed to get as
22 far as lifts and slings.

23 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): Based on what you thought of or heard, your
24 understanding based off the Con Ops?

25 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

26 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): And then--so then you and Lieutenant **Papa** (b)(3),(b)(6) made
27 the decision as to--do you recall how you prioritized
28 the items?

29 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): From my discussion with him, I let him know that
30 we had--the food was not a priority. We had enough
31 MREs, even with the people that we were getting, to
32 have food for a couple days. I did not--food was not
33 priority. I did need water and I wanted Class IV for
34 building the defenses; plus the ammo for the 120 and
35 getting the bobcat up there.

36 Umm, so as far as singling out slings of
37 everything or down to a certain number, umm, I just
38 let him know what I needed. Because at that time,
39 when we were having that discussion, we still didn't
40 know how many aircraft were actually going to make it
41 back and forth. So my priority to him was Class IV,
42 the 120 and 120 ammo, the bobcat, and the water was

1 what I really really needed. Not necessarily in that
2 order, but that's the stuff I needed; enough Class IV
3 to start facilitating the building until we can get
4 our next aircraft up there on the next day.

Beta 5 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And once you got that load in on the 9th, several
6 loads in, did you then report up your log status?

Yankee 7 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Yes, sir.

Beta 8 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you do that at night or in the morning?

Yankee 9 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. We do that every night. At this point,
10 though, for this it was kind of an ongoing thing all
11 day; letting them know how much we were going through
12 stuff, how far we were getting, so give me some more
13 HESCO. Get me some more sandbags. We are going to
14 need more sandbags up at the OP, so front load some
15 more along with some different sizes of HESCO. This
16 is what we are working on now. So it wasn't
17 necessarily a standard log pack, yellow 1 report. It
18 was more talking and letting him know what I needed,
19 what we were going through, and what I was working on
20 next.

Beta 21 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): After helo was down on the 9th, when did the next
22 sling come in?

Yankee 23 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): The next day. We did have helos everyday before
24 the attack. I couldn't give a definite "how" number;
25 how many each day. But we were definitely getting
26 stuff in plus the civilian Afghanis were bringing up
27 water and HESCOs by the third day.

Beta 28 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): So was there ever a time the helo was landing
29 that you were thinking; okay, here comes my water or
30 here comes my Class IV, and it wasn't what you
31 expected?

Yankee 32 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6): No. Usually, when we got the stuff, it was what
33 I was expecting. He would then call up and say; hey,
34 this next one coming up is this stuff, and then the
35 one after that is going to be this, should there be
36 anything else; that kind of thing.

Beta 37 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): When he said that, would you say; next time I am
38 going to need..

Yankee 39 SFC (b)(3),(b)(6) Roger.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3),(b)(6): So at least a sling a day?

Yankee 2 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. That definitely is safe to assume at
3 least a sling a day.

4 **LtGen Natonski:** I have some questions on the water. The
5 shortage of water caused you to back off on your
6 ability to improve the position because you were
7 sucking down too much water and you would have gone
8 into the red, I guess. So you throttle back in the
9 middle of the day in fortifying the position because
10 you didn't have water?

Yankee 11 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. We still had water. It was just the
12 way we were going through it --

13 **LtGen Natonski:** Yeah. Umm, would you have--if you had
14 water, sufficient water, would you have continued
15 fortifying during the day?

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** You would have?

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

19 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. When you called back to the company
20 that you were short of water, did you specifically say
21 that you were in the black?

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

23 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. And when you said that, how long was
24 it until the resupply of water came?

Yankee 25 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The following day. I want to say when I said it,
26 definitely saying that we were black and below 49% and
27 we were definitely talking about pulling out the
28 iodine tablets, it was the evening or late afternoon
29 of the second day.

30 **LtGen Natonski:** The 9th or----

Yankee 31 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): The 10th.

32 **LtGen Natonski:** That's when you called in the black report?

Yankee 33 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. And previously before that, I was
34 informing him that we were rapidly approaching that
35 and that we were working the issue. And then the
36 following day is when we got some water but not a

1 sufficient amount. The third day was when we had the-
2 ---

3 **LtGen Natonski:** Were you still--and were these daytime
4 resupplies?

Yankee 5 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Yes, sir.

6 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. So the following day, a supply of
7 water came in, but it was insufficient for you to
8 crank up your force protection measures----

Yankee 9 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

10 **LtGen Natonski:** ----because you still didn't have enough
11 water?

Yankee 12 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I made the call based on the fact that I knew
13 that we still needed to be in 100% combat ready with
14 guys not going down.

15 **LtGen Natonski:** In terms of other supplies, food was okay?

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Food was okay. I never had an issue.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** And ammunition was okay?

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

19 **LtGen Natonski:** Fuel you got, but you had a problem with the
20 bladder. Were there any other short falls that you
21 had; engineering equipment, concertina?

Yankee 22 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Umm.

23 **LtGen Natonski:** Something that would have put--something
24 that you would classify in the black or red category?

Yankee 25 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): I would say--I mean, we definitely could have had
26 more concertina wire, but at that point, with what I
27 needed and as far as what we were getting as far as
28 lifts--in my mind, probably what was going to happen
29 like what happened on the first day, the concertina
30 wire wasn't a priority as----

31 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you request additional--did you say----

Yankee 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Concertina wire was part of it.

33 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you categorize it at all? Or did you
34 just say; hey, when you get a chance send up this
35 stuff?

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): In not so many words, but yes, sir. That is kind
2 of the impression I would come up with. Or that was
3 my intent.

4 **LtGen Natonski:** I mean, if I were listening on the other
5 end, I would say; well, we'll get it up there when we
6 can. But it is not an emergency.

Yankee 7 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right, sir.

8 **LtGen Natonski:** But water, you said was black. And that
9 should have clicked off in someone's head. And you
10 should have had all the water you needed the next day.

Yankee 11 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** But you only got enough to kind of sustain
13 yourselves. And then the following day, the rest of
14 it got there. And when the battle kicked off on the
15 13th, you had sufficient water.

Yankee 16 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We had more--we had a lot of water, sir.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.

Yankee 18 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): We were good.

19 **MG Perkins:** Umm, the yellow 1 is the normal, sort of,
20 preformatted log report. Correct?

Yankee 21 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

22 **MG Perkins:** Now, how did you usually send that? Would you
23 voco it in and someone would write it down? Or did
24 you guys have any connectivity; SIPR or anything like
25 that?

Yankee 26 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. TACSAT and the ASIP. And usually, it was
27 around 1700 when we would send that up on a normal
28 operation. With this one it was we needed the direct
29 talk.

30 **MG Perkins:** Right. And so you were more of a continual
31 assessment rather than waiting 12 hours?

Yankee 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

33 **MG Perkins:** So, for lack of a better term, a formalized
34 yellow 1 isn't really how you reported the water. It
35 was Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6) at the time, I guess----

Papa

Yankee 1 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

2 **MG Perkins:** And the term you used is "we're black?"

Yankee 3 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

4 **MG Perkins:** Umm, was your assessment that the water problem
5 was that the company had plenty of water, say, down at
6 Blessing, it just wasn't at Wanat?

Yankee 7 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger.

8 **MG Perkins:** Okay. So it was sort of an internal distribution
9 within the company? So, in other words, the company--
10 and you probably have no idea--but the company were
11 reporting to higher--the company my report the word
12 water, because the company has all its water. The
13 problem is it's not where you are? In other words,
14 did you get the assessment, in talking to Lieutenant
15 **Papa** (b)(3), (b)(6) saying; hey, look. I am trying to get your
16 water. I am calling to higher; there is just none
17 here. We don't have any water. Or was he like; hey,
18 I'm working the birds.

Yankee 19 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That's what I got the last part, sir. It was
20 that the bird issue was getting the stuff to us is
21 where the issue was.

22 **MG Perkins:** So it was more of a distribution issue than a
23 supply--I mean, at your end it's a supply end.

Yankee 24 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Correct, sir.

25 **MG Perkins:** Like when my boss used to say, if a Soldier's
26 canteen cup is empty, you have supply problem. Okay.
27 And then, just following up on what the general said,
28 the other classes of supply--there were no other
29 classes of supply that you had to use the word black
30 on. It was like; I could use this part, etc., like
31 that. But water, the term you used was "black."

Yankee 32 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. Yeah. The rest of the stuff, the
33 Class IV, I was getting it as I needed. The rest of
34 that stuff was working perfectly according to how the
35 things were running. When I needed it, it was there.
36 We had no issues with Class IV.

37 The overhead cover would have been next. And
38 that would have been my next thing to start hitting up

1 because we were at that point now where some of the
2 spots----

3 **MG Perkins:** But the thing that you really--and that's what
4 leaders do is make a priority--and look, you can only
5 focus on one thing. Get me--I need my water.

Yankee 6 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): That is it, sir.

7 **MG Perkins:** Okay. All right.

8 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. I think we are done. And as we have
9 told you before, don't discuss your testimony with
10 anyone.

Yankee 11 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** We appreciate you coming back just to answer
13 these questions.

Yankee 14 **SFC** (b)(3),(b)(6): Whatever you guys need, sir.

15 **LtGen Natonski:** All right. Thanks, very much.

16 [The testimony closed at 1807, 28 October 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Yankee

Subj: TESTIMONY OF SFC (b)(3),(b)(6), USA, GIVEN ON 28
OCTOBER 2009, AT FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify
that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

(b)(3),(b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel Beta
U.S. Marine Corps
Staff Judge Advocate

9 November 2009
DATE