CONOP ROCK MOVE

2/3 ANA, C/2-503 IN (ABN) and 2-17 CAV

Level 1 CONOP

8 JULY – 10 JULY 08

Enclosure (9) PAGE 1 OF 36



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TF CONOP Matrix

CONOP LEVEL	Level 0	Level 1	Level 2
DEFINITION	Unit operations that are less than a battalion size, with an overall mitigated risk of moderate	Unit operations that are battalion sized or have an overall mitigation risk of high (both operations and aviation operations) or a moderate risk of negative political, press or IO impacts or resources required exceed the capabilities of the unit's task or capability	Unit operations that are larger than a battalion or have an overall mitigated risk of Very High (both operations and aviation operations) or a high risk of negative political, press or IO impacts or requires resources from OCF/OGA or from outside the capabilities of RC-E
THESE CONDITIONS ARE PRESENT:	•BN CDR's mitigated risk assessment is moderate •Pre – planned ordnance drops less than 155mm •Any patrol (mounted/dismounted) in a village or population center conducted during limited visibility. •Use of non – up armored vehicles •Operation conducted w/o ANSF •Level 1 Combat Logistics Patrols:* –BSB BAF/JAF CLP w/5T Trucks thru Kabul –BN CLPs crossing unit boundaries	•BN CDR's mitigated risk assessment is High •Aviation mitigated risk is high (AVN only) •Pre – planned ordnance drops that exceed 155mm •Require resources from outside the task organization but within CJTF-101 •Use of non – standard HLZs that do not meet the minimum standards* •Deliberate Limited Visibility Operation involving a search •Objective contains known MVTs •Any "red" assessments on the 12 criteria established by CJTF-101 •Any operation not tied to the CJTF-101 Lines of Operation •Less than a company – sized force inside 10km zone in the east; 10km zone in west	•BN CDR's mitigated risk assessment is Very High •Aviation mitigated risk is Very High •BN Task Force, ODB, or larger operation •Requires resources from outside the task organization and outside CJTF-101 •Deliberate Pre – Planned Forced Entry •Intent is kill/capture individual HVT/HVI/MVT •Objective contains known HVTs •Establishes a CJSOA •Multiple "red" assessments on 12 criteria established by CJTF-101 •Afghan IRoA official involved as potential target •Company size force or larger within the 10km zone in the east; 10km zone in the west
APPROVAL	**B6 APPROVAL REQUIRED** **•DCO receives all CLP CONOP briefs** •Submitted to BCT DCHOPS 72hrs prior to execution •Briefed to B6 48 hours prior to execution •Courtesy copy sent to CJ3 CHOPS & CJTF101 BAYONET LNO 48 hours prior to execution •AMR & ISR requests submitted to BAE and S2 Collection Manager 96 hours prior to execution •ASR & EW Burn requests submitted to BCT FS NCOIC 44 hours prior to execution	**AA7 APPROVAL REQUIRED** •Submitted to BCT DCHOPS 96hrs prior to execution •Courtesy copy sent to CJ3 CHOPS & CJTF101 BAYONET LNO 72hrs prior to execution •Briefed to B6 72hrs prior to execution •Briefed to AA7 48hrs prior to execution •AMR & ISR requests submitted to BAE and S2 Collection Manager 96 hours prior to execution •ASR & EW Burn requests submitted to BCT FS NCOIC 44 hours prior to execution	**COMISAF APPROVAL REQUIRED** •Submitted to BCT DCHOPS 96hrs prior to execution •Copy to CJ3 CHOPS, & CJTF101 BAYONET LNO & DCG-O 72hrs prior to execution •Briefed to B6 72hrs prior to execution •Briefed to AA7 48hrs prior to execution •AMR & ISR requests submitted to BAE and S2 Collection Manager 96 hours prior to execution •ASR & EW Burn requests submitted to BCT FS NCOIC 44 hours prior to execution

BELLA EXFIL 4-DAY FORECAST

VALID 1100 HRS LOCAL 06 JUL 08

	Mon 07 Jul 08		Tue 08 Jul 08		Wed 09 Jul 08		Thu 10 Jul 08	
FORECAST	HAZE	HAZE	HAZE	HAZE	HAZE	HAZE	HAZE	HAZE
TEMPS	LO: 63F/17C	HI: 88F/31C	LO: 63F/17C	HI: 88F/31C	LO: 63F/17C	HI: 88F/31C	LO: 63F/17C	HI: 88F/31C
WINDS	12 KTS	15G30 KTS	12 KTS	15G35 KTS	12 KTS	10G30 KTS	12 KTS	10G20 KTS
SKY/VIS/WX CONDITIONS	00-12 HRS: 5 MI / 11000FT HAZE	12-00 HRS: 2 MI / 2000FT THUNDERSTORMS	00-12 HRS: 5 MI / 11000FT HAZE	12-00 HRS: 2 MI / 2000FT THUNDERSTORMS	00-12 HRS: 5 MI / 11000FT HAZE	12-00 HRS: 2 MI / 2000FT THUNDERSTORMS	00-12 HRS: 5 MI / 11000FT HAZE	12-00 HRS: 3 MI / 2000FT THUNDERSTORMS
FIXED WING CAS		CV		CV		CV		C
HELO OPS		TU		TU		TU		TU
PREDATOR	CC	CC P TU	CC	CC P TU	CC	CC P TU	CC	CC P TU
PERSONNEL		P		P		P		P
SHADOW	CC		CC		CC		CC	

JALALABAD — LIGHT DATA — Jul — 2008

Date	BMT (UTC)	SR (UTC)	SS (UTC)	EET (UTC)	MR (UTC)	MS (UTC)	1400	1430	1500	1530	1600	1630	1700	1730	1800	1830	1900	1930	2000	2030	2100	2130	2200	2230	2300	2330	2400	0030
7-Jul	2308	0012	1433	1538	0443	1729	-40.5	-35	-29.2	-23.3	-17.3	-11.3	-5.3	-0.9	-7	-13	-19	-25	-30	-35	-40	-45	-49	-52	-54	-55	-54	-53
LUNAR ILLUMINATION % OVER TIME							25	25	25	25	25	26	26	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
8-Jul	2309	0013	1433	1538	0545	1756	-42.8	-38.2	-33.2	-27.8	-22.1	-16.3	-10.4	-4.5	-1.7	-7.8	-13	-20	-26	-32	-37	-43	-48	-52	-58	-59	-61	-61
LUNAR ILLUMINATION % OVER TIME							34	34	35	35	35	35	35	36	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
9-Jul	2309	0013	1433	1537	0645	1822	-42.8	-38.5	-35.5	-30.9	-25.9	-20.6	-15.1	-9.4	-3.7	-2.5	-8.5	-15	-21	-27	-33	-38	-44	-50	-55	-59	-63	-66
LUNAR ILLUMINATION % OVER TIME							44	44	45	45	45	45	45	46	46	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
10-Jul	2310	0014	1433	1537	0744	1849	-40.7	-38.8	-36.1	-32.6	-28.5	-24	-19.1	-13.9	-8.5	-3	-3	-8.9	-15	-21	-27	-33	-39	-45	-51	-56	-61	-66
LUNAR ILLUMINATION % OVER TIME							54	54	54	55	55	55	55	55	56	56	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Pages 4 through 5 redacted for the following reasons:
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(b)(1) 1.4 a, c, (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1) 1.4 a, c

ROCK MOVE (Wanat) – Enemy Situation

• **Target:** **AAF attempting to disrupt the construction of CF base in the village of Wanat.**

• **Assessment:** Wanat is located approximately 7.5km to the north of FOB Blessing. Wanat also is the location of the District Center for the Waygal District. The IRGoA in the Waygal is very weak and not able to provide basic needs for the people in the Waygal Valley as the security bubble around Wanat is very limited.
• The AAF have traditionally sought sanctuary in areas such as Kownd Kalay and Qal eh-ye Gal. These areas are nearly due east of Wanat, but are masked from the LOS of Wanat. The AAF freely move around these locations as the ANP has little influence to stop the AAF.
• The areas of Walo Tangay and Chenar Naw have long been reported to be AAF staging areas where AAF harass local nationals, et up illegal TCPs, and conduct ambushes on CF vehicles from these areas.
• The AAF have begun to stockpile weapons and place forward caches in and around the high ground surrounding Wanat in anticipation of CF moving there and placing a base. The AAF have also likely started to construct fighting positions and determine hide sites to visit after engaging CF in Wanat.
• Many of the AAF from this area have actually gone north to participate in the attacks on COP Bella but will return within 24-48 hours of CF establishing a presence.
• AAF will likely attack CF in Wanat from the high ground to the southeast and southwest.
• OPs also exist giving other AAF warning of CF A/C entering the area and information on CF Patrols.

Air Threat: **Low.** No history of RW being engaged in this area.



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ROCK MOVE (Wanat) – MLCOA & MDCOA

MLCOA (Red):

- AAF conducting visual observations from established OPs will alert other AAF over ICOM radios to the aircraft coming into Wanat to drop off sling loads.

- AAF will establish near ambush positions to the south of the Wanat base away from the population and engage from within 20 meters of the road on the eastern side.

- News of the CF arrival will be sent to AAF who have pushed north to reinforce AAF in the Bella who will begin movement back to the south.

- Once AAF are in position, they will attempt to emplace IEDs in the road to target CF patrols coming to Wanat from Nangalam in the south.

MDCOA (Yellow):

- AAF are already in position in anticipation of the CF movement to Wanat. Broken down in small groups, they have already retrieved their weapons and ammunition from their forward caches.

- CWIED ambush south of Wanat is already established and being overwatched by a near ambush position.

- Heavy weapon position established on the western side of the valley is already oriented on the site of the future VPB.

- AAF have established positions from within the Bazaar in Wanat and begin engaging CF from those positions.



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(b)(1) 1.4 a, c

Chosen Task Organization



Out Front Task Organization

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Mission Statement

ANSF and C/2-503 conducts air movement and ground assault convoy (GAC) from 8-10 JULY 2008 to realign US and ANA forces in Nuristan Province IOT deny freedom of movement and consolidate US Forces for upcoming RIP with 1-26 IN.

Intent

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c

TF Out Front Mission Statement

Beginning 081535JUL08, TF OUT FRONT conducts aerial movement of C/2-503 IN from COP BELLA IOT to relocate coalition forces and equipment to COP WANAT.

TF CDR's Intent

Key Tasks:

- Integration of tactical RSTA assets to set the conditions
- FOB BELLA area reconnaissance and security
- Efficient PZ and LZ operations to reduce the risk to CF

Endstate:

- F: Successful aerial movement of C/2-503 IN with no loss of personnel, weapons, equipment, and aircraft
- E: AAF unable to influence the establishment of FOB WANAT

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

BELLA – 08 JUL- Aviation Concept

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

Rock Move - Landing Plan 08 JUL 08



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OPN ROCK MOVE

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

FOB BELLA

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8 JUL (PM) Chosen Movement Table

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

BELLA – 09 JUL- Aviation Concept

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

Rock Move - Landing Plan 09 JUL 08

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OPN ROCK MOVE

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

HLZ WANAT

9 JUL (AM) Chosen Movement Table (PECH RESUPPLY)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

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9 JUL (PM) Chosen Movement Table

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WANA I: TF 2-503, 8-10 JUL 2008
Concept of Lethal Fires

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

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AIRSPACE DECON PLAN

ALT FT MSL	AIRCRAFT	FREQUENCY

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

Operation Rock MOVE: C/2-503, 8-10 JUL 2008
Concept of Non-Lethal Fires

Key Tasks

T: Conduct KLE with local elders
P: To disseminate BN IO themes and encourage patriotism
E: Create divide between villagers and AAF - build ANSF Capacity

T: Engage w/ village elders, identify future projects for Waygul Valley
P: IOT improve the village's quality of life and build ANSF capacity
E: Village supports

T: Disseminate information that separates civilians from AAF
P: To establish parameters in which AAF can be easily distinguishable
E: Villagers adhere to the parameters/ AAF identified

T: Divulge SRP and PTS information
P: To reduce AAF munitions and attacks against ANSF / CF
E: Locals inform ANSF / CF of AAF activity and location of IED/UXO in surrounding area

T: Conduct HIIDE enrollment
P: to gather HUMINT for AO continuity
E: HIIDEd individuals added to BATS data base

AAF IO MLCOA: AAF will threaten local villages about cooperation with ISAF and GIRoA. They will also push IO themes about US coming to their country without being asked and disrupting the lives of the people of Afghanistan and causing needless casualties. They will call independent media and make false claims of collateral damage at fault of ANSF / CF.
AAF IO MDCOA: AAF are able cause collateral damage and document it in a way that puts responsibility on US Forces.

IO MESSAGES: Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) assist foreign financiers to target LN economic/social progress and use LNs and their property to protect themselves from ANSF/CF. Supporting the GIRoA and ANSF will bring economic progress and social advancement to Afghan communities. The recent failed AAF attacks and reckless use of IDF and DF weapon systems are the cause of many LN casualties – be it collateral damage or young Afghan recruits getting paid a slave's wage. AAF attacks on ANSF/CF and LNs have proven to be ineffective in recent weeks. The ANSF are now able to PID and engage at will. AAF have little effect on CF but impede progress of Afghanistan.

IO OBJECTIVES: ANSF will take the lead on all KLE and gain the trust and support of local key leaders IOT influence the community's perception of ANSF and GIRoA capability. Establish the concept that Afghan pride leads to security, security leads to progress.

EFFECTS: Separate AAF from the population. LNs prevent AAF from using their villages as safe-havens and provide tangible information to ANSF/CF concerning AAF activity – AAF and foreign financiers are deterred from entering Afghanistan due to non-acceptance from LNs. Young Afghan men seek jobs with construction companies, schools, media etc. vice joining the AAF and leading a lost life.



Operation Rock MOVE: C/2-503, 8-10 JUL 2008
IO Way Ahead

Konar PCC:
- Nucleus for ANSF / GIRoA / LN / CF flow of media information
- Prepared to conduct 24H operations

Public Service Announcements:
- Developed by Rock FECC with assistance from PSYOPs and PRT IO
- Air / Ground infil will be simultaneously compliments with a relevant PSA
- CONOP related SIGACTS are immediately relayed to Konar PCC and recorded by a GIRoA or ANSF official

SIGACTs:
- Each CONOP related SIGACT will be briefed in as much detail as possible to the Konar PCC to ensure that LN leadership is fully integrated.
- "IO Way Ahead" emails will be pushed up through Bayonet IO to provide situational awareness and "top cover" for ongoing ANSF / CF operations in Konar.

IO Themes & Messages:
- OSC throughout the battlespace will spread BN IO themes during pre-planned KLEs and opportunity KLEs
- Themes will remain flexible – we will be ready to implement a proposed theme from an OSC via our radios and the Konar PCC.

Provincial Governance / Konar PCC Key Tasks:
- ALL PSAs will be recorded by Konar Province Government Officials – all will highlight AAF missteps and ANS success.
- Integrate updates and intelligence with all ANSF / GIRoA agencies to include – ANA, ANP, ABP, NDS, Anti-Terrorism, District Governors.
- Konar PCC conducts 24H operations.
- Konar PCC will provide soldiers and participation on the key tasks listed to the left.



Operation ROCK MOVE: C/2-503, 8-10 JUL 2008
Concept of Medical Support

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ROCK MOVE: 8-10 JUL 2008- Risk Assessment

Overall Residual Risk: Moderate

- **Overall Moderate risk due to controls implemented to mitigate Tactical, Accidental, and Aviation Risks.**
- CCA, CAS provides over watch during RW movements through Waygul Valley.
- US forces establish overwatch positions on dominant terrain and use GBISR to observe likely attack positions.
- LLVI teams to monitor potential AAF reinforcements
- CCA, CAS to destroy AAF during RW movements.

Residual Aviation Risk: M

Hazard: SAF at LZ
Controls: Clear HLZ with AH-64 support prior to LZ operations. **Secure PZ** with maneuver forces.

Hazard: Brownout and Blowing Sand or Debris at LZ.
Controls: PC will brief duties and responsibilities for brownout, Conduct thorough LZ recon to identify safe escape routes

Hazard: HLZ's 6600 TO 1000 FEET
Controls: Flight crews will pre-plan with PPC's and will **use Tabular Data for Power Mgt**

Hazard: Unimproved HLZ
Controls: Flight crews will utilize proper mountain flying techniques

Residual Tactical Risk: M

Hazard: Fratricide

Controls: Joint **planning and rehearsals** with ANSF. Staggered air movement of equipment times and exfiltration time from Bella. **Positive communications** with all elements on the ground to JCPs/JTOC and defined sectors of observation and fires (NCOs assign sectors of fire)..

Hazard: Enemy direct/indirect fires
Controls: U.S. forces establish positions in **over watch** of OBJ on dominant terrain. **UAS and CAS** on station during the operation. **MEDEVAC Assets** – illum not a factor – and **FST w/in 15 minutes** of operational area (**Abad**)

Hazard: Enemy ambush of CF
Controls: identify likely **ambush locations** and **utilize over watch** element when moving through areas that are likely for enemy contact. **LLVI positioned to assist over watch** – advanced warning of AAF moving into ambush positions.

Residual Accidental Risk: L

Hazard: Negligent Discharges
Controls: Muzzle awareness and proper weapons posture. Ensure correct clearing procedures and **checks by key leaders. Joint rehearsals/Static Load** with ANSF focusing on muzzle awareness and keeping weapon on safe when not engaging targets.

Hazard: Terrain/Weather Hazards
Controls: Ensure use of appropriate **PPE** – ACH, ballistic glasses, gloves, body armor, knee pads, and NVDs – during [limited visibility] operations. Proper terrain analysis and preparation for movements and static locations.

Hazard: Heat / Cold Weather Casualties
Controls: Leaders **inspect loads**. All Soldiers **hydrate prior to mission**. Squads carry additional IV bags. Leaders ensure all Soldiers **consume adequate amounts of water during operation.** Coordinated **resupply** bundles prepared prior to mission execution – speed ball resupply pre-positioned at Abad, Blessing, Fortress, Honaker-Miracle

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RISK ASSESSMENT

Overall Residual Risk: L -(M)- H- VH The overall residual risk is MODERATE. All risk mitigations have been partnered with the command element, unit, or individuals responsible for the supervision of the specified task (s).

AVIATION RISK ASSESSMENT

Initial Aviation Risk: L -(M)- H – VH
Residual Aviation Risk: L -(M)- H – VH

Risk: Personnel injured while boarding/embarking aircraft
Mitigation #1: Personnel will conduct static load training on board/embark aircraft
Risk: LZ Conditions requiring dust landing causing brownouts.
Mitigation #1: PCs will brief all crew duties during brownout conditions.
Mitigation #2: LZ/PZ recon identify safe escape routes, should a brown out condition occur
Mitigation #3: Select the right aviation crews and leverage experience
Risk: Small Arms Fire/Forced Landing
Mitigation #1: Intel update, Go/No-Go Brief and Conditions Check
Mitigation #2: AWT & CAS will provide security
Mitigation #3: Varying routes if multiple lifts are necessary
Risk: Power Management
Mitigation #1: Use Tab Data
Mitigation #2: Validate Performance Planning Card
Mitigation #3: Plan Escape Routes
Mitigation #4: Confirm WX Data (Temp, PA, Winds)
Risk: Airspace Deconfliction
Mitigation #1: AWT will deconflict with Lift aircraft during insertion with altitude and terrain features
Mitigation #2: Positive Communication with all aviation assets on ABN (UHF) and all aircraft will monitor VHF ATA for transitioning aircraft situational awareness

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Abort Criteria

Task Force Fight – C2, Fires/ISR, MEDEVAC, Emergency Resupply, IO

- **Event in AI – AO Bayonet/RC-East – threatens resource stack**
  - CJSOTF/Other Fight
  - Loss of CF personnel in AO ROCK/AO Bayonet
  - Loss of Aircraft in AO ROCK/AO Bayonet

- **Event in AO threatens TF Fight**
  - Loss of controlling C2 node – JTOC or GFC
  - Less than Minimum Force per objective
    - Less than two IDF systems in support of objective
  - No CCA/CAS for infil – ground based sensors and shooters not set
  - No projected ISR for 4 hours or longer – loss of standard or non-standard ISR
    - Affects early warning/force protection and pursuit/destruction of the AAF
  - MEDEVAC A/C unavailable

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Warfighting Function Summary

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c

CONOP Conditions

CONDITION	STATUS	COMMENT
1) COMCFC-A approval required before the arrest, apprehension, or detainment of a current or former member of parliament or president appointed government official. Gain COMCJTF-76 approval before the arrest, apprehension, or detainment of a district-level government official.		Green: Not a government official Red: Pending COMCFC Approval for a current or former member of parliament or president appointed government official; or COMCJTF-76 approval for District official
2) Conduct coordination with local government officials and tribal leaders when conducting searches		Green: Coordination conducted with village / District / Province leadership Red: Coordination not conducted
3) Ensure the return of materials / documents taken during searches, unless the owner is detained and the property becomes evidence		Green: Material not required for exploitation will be returned Red: All material will be retained until further disposition
4) Ensure personnel receive training on local customs and courtesies prior to conducting authorized searches		Green: All soldiers on mission trained Red: Deficiency / soldiers not trained
5) Ensure soldiers conducting searches ask for doors to be opened by occupants rather than soldiers forcing entry		Green: Leaders / ANSF/ GOA will ask occupants to open doors Red: Will not asked to open doors; a hard-knock pending COMCFC approval
6) Avoid the cuffing or binding of hands, unless required for security		Green: Target will not be bound unless a threat to CF Red: All targets will be bound
7) During low risk operations, use a local person to enter the home or business of the person to be searched to explain what is happening		Green: Locals / ANSF / GOA will enter all buildings first Red: CF will enter first
8) Conduct of night searches, hard-knock or soft-knock, will require prior approval by Commander CJTF-101		Green: No night search Red: Night Search pending CG approval
9) Ensure there is an infusion of reconstruction funds to areas where local people were detained and subsequently released		Green: Planned CMO follow-up and/or CERP Funds will be utilized in area Red: No planned CMO / CERP follow-through will be spent in area
10) Sustain the use of interpreters for direct interpretation while conducting raid or detaining GOA personnel		Green: Interpreters will be used for entire mission Red: No interpreters
11) Kill or Capture operation		Green: Not a Kill or capture mission Red: Intent is to kill or capture
12) Within the 1km zone along the Pakistan border or within the 10km zone along the Iran border		Green: Less than a company executing security or reconnaissance operations within 1km/10km zone Red: Offensive Operations or more than a company is within 1km/10km zone

CONOP Conditions

CONDITION	STATUS	COMMENT
Weather		Green: Does not prevent the required combat multipliers from supporting Red: Planned combat multipliers can not support
Illumination		Green: Does not prevent the required combat multipliers from supporting Red: Planned combat multipliers can not support
Intelligence		Green: Updated intelligence disseminated to executing unit Red: Dated intelligence or not disseminated.
ISR	Assets requested	Green: All required systems in place. Red: Systems not available or out of place.
Maneuver		Green: Sufficient forces available and in position Red: Shortages in forces available or out of position
Fires – Artillery/Mortars		Green: Artillery and mortars positioned to cover op Red: Operation occurs outside of Artillery range or without mortars.
Fires - CAS	AC-130/Assets requested	Green: CAS available to support op Red: CAS Not available
Information operations		Green: Synchronized themes support operations. Red: IO themes are counter to the ops objective or do not support them.
Combat Service Support		Green: Sufficient supplies, and services available to support op. (MEDEVAC, CL IV, etc) Red: Shortages in critical support.
Communications		Green: Primary and redundant communications systems established. Red: Single communications method.
Command and Control		Green: C2 node established and manned Red: No C2 node or inadequately manned.

Bayonet 6 Comments