

1 [The investigation opened at 1340, 28 October 2009.]

2 **Brown** LtGen Natonski: Captain (b)(6), (b)(3), I am Lieutenant General  
3 Richard F. Natonski, United States Marine Corps. I  
4 have been appointed by the Commander of the U.S.  
5 Central Command to conduct an investigation into the  
6 facts and circumstances surrounding the combat action  
7 at Wanat, Afghanistan during July 2008. Major General  
8 David Perkins, United States Army, has been assigned  
9 as the deputy investigating officer. Lieutenant  
10 **Beta** Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) **Sigma**  
11 (b)(3), (b)(6) are the judge advocates assigned to this  
12 investigation team.

13 The testimony you provide today will be recorded,  
14 transcribed, and included in our report of the  
15 investigation. Based on your testimony, we may also  
16 prepare a separate written statement for your review  
17 and signature.

18 Prior to coming on the record today, you signed a  
19 Privacy Act Statement; is that correct?

**Brown** 20 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

21 LtGen Natonski: Ok, your testimony will be made under oath.  
22 You will now be sworn.

23 [The witness was sworn.]

**Beta** 24 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Please state your full name, spelling your last.

**Brown** 25 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Full name is (b)(3), (b)(6) **Brown**  
26 (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Beta** 27 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): What is your current unit and that unit's  
28 location?

**Brown** 29 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I am currently enrolled in the Captain's  
30 Career Maneuver--Captains Career Course, Fort Benning,  
31 Georgia and graduation day of December of 2009.

**Beta** 32 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): You are currently captain in the U.S. Army?

**Brown** 33 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

**Beta** 34 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): In July 2008, what was your unit and that unit's  
35 location?

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**Brown** 1 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : My job, sir, or the location?

**Beta** 2 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : The unit and the unit's location?

**Brown** 3 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : We were at FOB Blessing, Afghanistan.

**Beta** 4 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : And what unit were you assigned to?

**Brown** 5 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : 173d, sir.

**Beta** 6 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : The 173d brigade? Which battalion?

**Brown** 7 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : 2d of the 503d.

**Beta** 8 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : And what was your duty assignment with the 2d of  
9 the 503d?

**Brown** 10 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I was the battalion S4.

**Beta** 11 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : What is your Oc-Field? Infantry?

**Brown** 12 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

**Beta** 13 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : How long had you been with 2d of the 503d as of  
14 July of last year, how long had you been with them?

**Brown** 15 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I arrived there in June of 2005, I did OEF-6  
16 with Chosen Company and then continued with OEF-8 with  
17 Chosen Company for the first--over half of the  
18 deployment, and then with Headquarters Company, HHC,  
19 for the S4 position.

**Beta** 20 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : When you deployed to Afghanistan in 2007, what  
21 was your duty assignment?

**Beta** 22 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I was battalion executive officer--I'm sorry,  
23 company executive officer for Chosen Company.

**Beta** 24 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : And at what point did you come--go up to the 4  
25 shop?

**Brown** 26 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Around October or November timeframe of 2007.

**Beta** 27 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : When was the first time that you heard the  
28 possible emplacement to be set up at Wanat?

**Brown** 29 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Early in the deployment, as the Company XO, again  
30 Warning Orders start coming in for plans. We were  
31 throwing plans around possible designs of a FOB / COP

1 in that vicinity. Working through some schematics  
2 looking at possible land locations in that area.

**Beta** 3 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What is the--let me take you back a step here, as  
4 a Battalion S4, what are your duties in the 2d of the  
5 503d?

**Brown** 6 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Maintain the maintenance and logistical  
7 resupplies of all of the companies and to push forward  
8 with the battalion.

**Beta** 9 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): How do you do that?

**Brown** 10 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Work close-hand with the FSC, Distro Platoon and  
11 Company Commander.

**Beta** 12 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And FSC stands for?

**Brown** 13 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): The field support elements for our--which was--  
14 basically we had our Fusion Company, they ran all of  
15 our distribution and they also had riggers attached to  
16 us out in the field to assist with any resupplies,  
17 sling loads for the area.

**Beta** 18 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): So if a company needed something, would they  
19 submit a request to you?

**Brown** 20 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. They would go through me and that  
21 would be submitted--we had our evening logistical  
22 update meetings, the Battalion XO was involved with it  
23 and myself--it was actually the Battalion XO's  
24 meeting. I ran the meeting. We forecast out up until  
25 about 72 hours out in advance of any needed supplies  
26 and we try to either coordinate that with air assets  
27 in the area or the ground convoys coming up through.

**Beta** 28 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Who would attend that meeting--that nightly  
29 logistical meeting?

**Brown** 30 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Each company executive officer, the battalion  
31 executive officer, and myself.

**Beta** 32 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Would they physically attend the meeting or was  
33 it----

**Brown** 34 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, it was all through the net because of our  
35 decentralized locations.

**Beta** 1 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And coming out of that meeting, what was the end  
2 result of that meeting?

**Brown** 3 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Normally I would cover the day's prior log stat,  
4 any updates that have to be taken care or any  
5 additional shortcomings that were not identified the  
6 night prior, air sequence that is going on for the  
7 next 48 hours-72 hours so that they could expect what  
8 air is coming in for bringing packs out or equipment  
9 out or back to the rear. Also for convoys, any  
10 additional needs for any of the convoys coming out for  
11 the distro platoon. Stopping at FOBs along the way to  
12 drop off or pick up maintenance parts, and we also  
13 went over obviously battalion maintenance, any  
14 deadline equipment and the status of that equipment.

**Beta** 15 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): You mentioned the use of air, what role did you  
16 have in coordinating air?

**Brown** 17 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): A work closely with the air specifically since I  
18 had--even as the Company XO, I had air centric FOBs.  
19 I had (b)(2)High as well.  
20 Literally all of the resupplies, I got really familiar  
21 with working with our--his name is Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) **Astro**  
22 he was our Air NCO. Keeping track of what was going  
23 on daily, what was coming in and going out, what type  
24 of assets it was, was it Blackhawks or 47s coming in.  
25 We would reconfirm the priority of deliveries, what  
26 FOBS, what locations, what classes of supply to going  
27 out there. And then any last-minute missions or  
28 changes to the missions or available air he would let  
29 me know, we were--like I said, we work really close  
30 because of my working as the Company XO.

**Beta** 31 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Who prioritized loads? Was it you or was it  
32 someone else?

**Brown** 33 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): We would look at it with the Battalion XO, we  
34 would look at what--where our shortages were at and  
35 predominantly the priority went to our air centric air  
36 FOBs first. That was because of limited air,  
37 especially during the winter months. I try to--we try  
38 to keep them up to over 30 days of supplies of Class  
39 I, Class III Class IV, Class V, just to get them above  
40 the level so if we do lose air assets they can sustain  
41 themselves until the next possible and rotation.

**Beta** 1 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And then did you have ground assets to move  
2 logistics as well?

**Brown** 3 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): From (b)(2)High, Yes, sir, up through the  
4 Kurngal back down along the Pesh Valley, nothing going  
5 north. The only additional----

**Beta** 6 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Why not North?

**Brown** 7 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Prior to going to COP Kahler, again was--the two  
8 FOBs that we had north was air centric would just  
9 take--we didn't--the road was not able to move such a  
10 large piece of equipment up the Wanat Valley. The  
11 only--we did have a contract and this was when I was  
12 still the Company XO literally as a transition over,  
13 we contracted a local to assist in any Class I water,  
14 six (b)(2)High contracts, it took a little while to get  
15 through but we go that pushed through to help out  
16 Chosen Company with water resupply and spare part  
17 resupply to the (b)(2)High location.

**Beta** 18 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Talk to us about the contracting process from  
19 your S4 perspective, what role did you play?

**Brown** 20 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I had--I was fortunate, I had a really  
21 outstanding captain in the shop that was--worked  
22 strictly with the resources and the contracting, all  
23 of the contracting, whether it was man-power or  
24 services or building contracts, myself and Major  
25 **Red** (b)(3), (b)(6) we would review it and we would work hand and  
26 hand with that--his name was Captain (b)(3), (b)(6). **Copper**  
27 And an excellent job at tracking, resourcing, and  
28 making sure that we were on time with the contracts.  
29 The timeframe for contracts was--and I don't remember  
30 the actual times, but I know that they were--to make  
31 it to the next financial--the monthly meeting, it was  
32 two months prior to getting initially turned in and  
33 reviewed and sent back for any corrections.

**Beta** 34 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): So you would submit a request two months before  
35 you wanted to execute.

**Brown** 36 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, for any long term projects. They had  
37 additional--again, worked really well with resource  
38 manager at brigade and was able to push contracts  
39 through--as long as they were legally correct at an  
40 expedient rate.

**Beta** 1 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And then at the end of that process, the  
2 contracted for services would show up?

**Brown** 3 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Hopefully, sir.

**Beta** 4 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And how did you know what was coming--on the  
5 contracting side, how would know that your request had  
6 been approved and a contract had been written?

**Brown** 7 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): We had the resource meetings once a week and that  
8 is when they would approve and show on slides--brigade  
9 would show what contract has been approved, when to  
10 expect and, they had I believe, it was seven days  
11 after the signing of the contract--I believe it was 7  
12 to 10 days to actual start work once that contract was  
13 signed and approved by the actual contractor.

**Beta** 14 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you mean the contracting officer?

**Brown** 15 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, Yes, sir.

**Beta** 16 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Regarding, you mentioned COP Kahler--the planning  
17 for COP Kahler, do you recall when that started?

**Brown** 18 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Several months prior, warning orders came out,  
19 started looking at what type of facilities that were  
20 needed up there--the biggest piece was land, we had  
21 identified the parcel of land that we were going to  
22 put this FOB in to begin with--or this COP in to begin  
23 with. So that was, first and foremost the priority,  
24 recons were sent up looking for land, engineer went up  
25 a couple times looking at different locations and then  
26 he centered on that location. Again, when I was still  
27 the XO earlier in the deployment, we threw around some  
28 preliminary plans of construction of what would need  
29 to be out there.

**Beta** 30 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): To the best of your memory, what were those?

**Brown** 31 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): When I was still the XO, sir, it was real  
32 rudimentary, it was basically establishing, first off,  
33 force protection barrier, we wanted stone walls, that  
34 is what we had wanted from the get go. Again, but a  
35 lot of push back from contracting from higher that  
36 they did not want to show a presence there--a  
37 prolonged presence and so stoned walls were basically  
38 owning the land rather than renting the land out. So,

1 they tried to always have us go to the (b)(2)High barrier  
2 approach.

Beta 3 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): You know if a formal request went up for the  
4 stone walls?

Brown 5 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): No, I believe that the final--when we finally  
6 decided to move up there that that was the contract  
7 which were stone walls. That was the request, I  
8 believe, by Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), basically, he demanded Diamond  
9 that level; he wanted a stone wall built.

Beta 10 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you ever go to Wanat?

Brown 11 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, I was there twice on two recons.

Beta 12 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And what did you see when you were up there?

Brown 13 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Basically went up there and it was really dealing  
14 with the land piece----

Beta 15 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Is this as the S4 or the XO?

Brown 16 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): I was up there as the XO--I am sorry, as the S4,  
17 I went up there with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) along with a task Diamond  
18 force engineer, Captain (b)(3), (b)(6). We were up Saint  
19 there, I believe, a week prior for our final  
20 assessment, making sure--we had a leadership panel, a  
21 little bit of a shura going on, talking to the locals  
22 again, making sure that this was the land that we  
23 want. While that was happening, myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) Saint  
24 (b)(3), (b)(6) were out looking at the land, identifying some  
25 areas that are going to be hazards, having to  
26 basically bring the land down to level to be able to  
27 do proper drainage area and proper building it had to  
28 be brought down to a certain level. Identified water  
29 locations, there was a creek out to the western side  
30 of it, small little creek going through it, that can  
31 have a problem because our LZ was going to be south to  
32 affect that flooding as well. So, we did look around  
33 the area in the general vicinity of what might be  
34 needed out there on the ground.

Beta 35 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And then when you came back from that site  
36 survey, did you work up any plans with the engineers?

Brown 37 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Basically, again, we submitted plans, plans were  
38 set back from higher, changes, recommendations--they

1 had basically their boot prints already established  
2 for what would be a tower and what would be for a  
3 wall.

**Beta** 4 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Is this the brigade 4 or brigade engineer?

**Brown** 5 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Brigade engineer.

**Brown** 6 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Gave you kind of a 'here is how to do it'?

**Brown** 7 **CPT** (b)(3)(b)(6): Yes, Yes, sir. Again, the engineers worked hand-  
8 in-hand, it became a high observation so there was a  
9 lot of help on the engineer's side, we received a lot  
10 more help for this project and we did previous  
11 projects.

**Beta** 12 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): From higher headquarters?

**Brown** 13 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, on the engineer side and partially that  
14 is our previous task force engineer did not have the  
15 knowledge and we finally did get an engineer, he  
16 really did a real good job in working for our  
17 battalion.

**Beta** 18 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And how was the advice from up above received?  
19 Getting the brigade engineer trying to help out, was  
20 his information welcomed?

**Brown** 21 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): I believe so, sir, I sat in a couple--again they  
22 had their engineer log-sync meetings and a lot of  
23 times they were synched up the same time that we had  
24 our battalion--as you were, our brigade 4 meetings.  
25 And I would sit in, he was in the same office as I was  
26 and he would--we would kind of sit in each other's  
27 meetings to get a feel to make sure that we are  
28 synched up. And yeah, once brigade started to roll  
29 with this--higher brigade, they supported it as much  
30 as they could.

**Beta** 31 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): At the battalion level, what did you determine  
32 you would need as far as equipment in order to prepare  
33 the position and to build the position?

**Brown** 34 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Again, a lot of that came straight from the  
35 engineers resourcing, they knew by their matrix that  
36 whatever--how many thousand feet of wall needs this  
37 much or (b)(2)High wall, seven foot by seven foot, they  
38 knew how much they actually needed. We had a lot of

1 stash from a lot of supplies already pre-staged at  
2 (b)(2)High that was there for winterization the previous  
3 year, so we were using that to push out to FOBs as  
4 well with the engineers. We had teams of vertical  
5 engineers on (b)(2)High that were working on other  
6 projects. So, we had ample Class IV to add to any of  
7 the shortages that were--that they were forecasting.

**Beta** 8 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Okay, so you had in preparation for either the  
9 next winter or from the previous winter, you had extra  
10 Class IV supplies that were used to reinforce  
11 positions?

**Brown** 12 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, for building, more for, especially in  
13 the COP area to rebuild-- harden in some of the  
14 structures up there, buildings, the dining facility up  
15 there in the Kurngal Valley. That was a priority at  
16 that time for the Class IV equipment. Also, I  
17 believe, also, Able Company building Able Main with  
18 their stone wall, again reinforcing some of their--  
19 some of the buildings from attacks.

**Beta** 20 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you recall was there any difference between  
21 what the engineers said, this is what we need in order  
22 to build this and what they could contract for and  
23 what you had prepositioned at (b)(2)High ?

**Brown** 24 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. The majority of the contracts that I  
25 remember correctly were for labor that is what they  
26 focus really on the labor piece, gain the labor  
27 assets. Again, the area did not--our immediate area  
28 did not have a lot of earth moving equipment, a lot of  
29 big equipment, so they had to come out of--from  
30 different areas. Which is where the contracting piece,  
31 making sure that--because we were not choosing our own  
32 contractors for us we were getting outside  
33 contractors. So we did not know these people  
34 personally and so--yeah, but the equipment--the Class  
35 IV side, yeah, we had--we were building up surplus and  
36 we actually had--I believe we had already started--we  
37 had many slings already prepared on a drop zone for  
38 starting to move stuff up North.

**Beta** 39 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Specifically for Wanat?

**Brown** 40 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

**Beta** 41 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you have to request additional Class IV?

**Brown** 1 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir, that was the engineers, once they did  
2 their forecasting and knew how much we need to build  
3 each item, they already started moving that stuff  
4 forward. Any opportunity to air moving up to (b)(2)High  
5 and I believe also a couple of the ground convoys also  
6 brought up additional Class IV. Actually that was  
7 escorted up, that was usually through a jingle truck  
8 contracted through us, and they brought additional  
9 vehicles to drop off Class IV with our FSC distro  
10 team.

**Beta** 11 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Do you recall when--are you familiar with  
12 operation Rock Move, do you recall when it was  
13 initially supposed to go? What were you planning for?

**Brown** 14 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I believe they were looking at a month or two  
15 months prior and honestly I don't remember how far out  
16 we started looking at that more seriously, I do know  
17 the times kept getting pushed to the right.

**Beta** 18 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Do you know why?

**Brown** 19 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir, no I don't.

**Beta** 20 **LtCol** (b)(3)(b)(6) : As the time started getting pushed, did you  
21 already have your supplies pre-staged?

**Brown** 22 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Well, we were--a lot of the pushing up, not a lot  
23 of it, some of the pushing to the right was because of  
24 the contractual piece. They weren't--contracts were  
25 being--not disapproved, but "Ay, is this thing really  
26 going to happen before we get it signed off on?"

**Beta** 27 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Can you explain that please?

**Brown** 28 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Again, there was no definite, hey this is going  
29 to happen, therefore pushing a money asset towards a  
30 project at that time, they were not sure if it was  
31 going to happen or not.

**Beta** 32 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Is this the JFUB who is asking these questions?

**Brown** 33 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir, yes, sir, Yes, sir, yes, sir.

**Beta** 34 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : So at this point the JFUB had a request from the  
35 battalion that went up to the brigade for this amount  
36 of funding essentially, in order to let contracts?

**Brown** 1 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, it was broken down by labor and by  
2 construction as well, again a lot of construction we  
3 were not doing--the construction was going to be done--  
4 --as you were, I am sorry, engineers, so that was not  
5 going to be contracted out through civilians it was  
6 mainly the MN--the heavy equipment that was going to  
7 be contracted out.

**Beta** 8 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Let's go back some, you said that the  
9 construction was going to be done by engineers?

**Brown** 10 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Well, they were going to assist--the vertical  
11 engineers were going to--the team that was out there  
12 on the ground was going to help with the construction  
13 of it.

**Beta** 14 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : They are U.S. Army?

**Brown** 15 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

**Beta** 16 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : But they did not have their own equipment?

**Brown** 17 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : They had their individual equipment, I believe a  
18 container or whatever the normal Sapper equipment  
19 would be or the engineer equipment, compressor, and  
20 their normal tools they would have to start the  
21 project.

**Beta** 22 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : And then the heavy equipment from the local----

**Brown** 23 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

**Beta** 24 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Do you recall, at some point, of getting  
25 confirmation that the contract for heavy equipment had  
26 been approved and executed?

**Brown** 27 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir, I do remember that because again it was  
28 again one of those issues were that was a very  
29 decisive point, need to make sure this contract is  
30 approved--it is a high visibility contract. And I  
31 know that there was a lot of back-and-forth between  
32 the resource manager being sure that we get the  
33 proper--again you get a contract with a person and  
34 they are supposed to have five trucks or an earthmover  
35 or a bulldozer and he will show up with one, so it was  
36 literally making sure that we matched-- married up the  
37 right guy with the right piece of equipment.

**Beta** 1 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And what, to the best of your recollection, was  
2 contracted for in the heavy equipment for Wanat?

**Brown** 3 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I really don't remember. I know typical--  
4 and I don't know how to describe some of the pieces of  
5 equipment, I know--I think--I believe a bulldozer  
6 because I believe that was a problem trying to get an  
7 adequate sized bulldozer up that road, a crane--if I  
8 am not mistaken, a crane because that was again, it  
9 takes time to move that piece of equipment up that  
10 narrow road and I honestly don't remember what else, I  
11 know those were two pieces of equipment that we  
12 worried about--just the pure--just the size of it  
13 trying to get up the road.

**Beta** 14 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you know if any of the equipment ever made it  
15 up?

**Brown** 16 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Not to my knowledge, no sir.

**Beta** 17 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): If you're expecting a piece of equipment to show  
18 up on day one and it doesn't, what is the process?

**Brown** 19 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Since it is an off-site contractor, our  
20 contracting officer would--we would run it through the  
21 brigade or whoever the contracting officer, they would  
22 have to have interaction with the actual person doing  
23 the contract, and I believe they have a certain amount  
24 of days to react to doing the job before a contract is  
25 void and you have to reestablish another contract. Do  
26 you recall issues with contracting equipment for  
27 Wanat?

**Brown** 28 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, we were getting really close and again,  
29 they did not want to go up into that area. Literally,  
30 it was in hours or days or day when we were occupying,  
31 it was like, they don't--they don't want to go up  
32 there or first of all, they were like AWOL, did not  
33 know where they were at and find out that they were  
34 not going to go up there.

**Beta** 35 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And these folks were from out, maybe down in  
36 Kabul or somewhere?

**Brown** 37 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): I believe so, I believe next to the (b)(2)High area or  
38 further south, I think they were Kabuls men is where  
39 this contract--again because of just the amount of

1 equipment that was needed. There wasn't a contractor  
2 in our vicinity that had that equipment.

**Beta** 3 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you know if they even made it up as far as  
4 (b)(2)High ?

**Brown** 5 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, they did not make it to (b)(2)High . They were  
6 supposed to go straight up from the (b)(2)High Road,  
7 Pesh Valley Road and go straight up to Wanat.

**Beta** 8 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): When did you first learn that they were missing?

**Brown** 9 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I don't know exactly when--I know--I am not sure  
10 it was before they were supposed to move and they  
11 refused to move or it was--I believe that is how it  
12 was, I think the contractor had contacted the--I don't  
13 remember, sir.

**Beta** 14 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): The timing-wise, based on the planning with the  
15 platoon moving up late on the 8th, or early 9th. Do  
16 you recall when the construction----

**Brown** 17 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I believe it was later that day or the next day,  
18 yes, sir.

**Beta** 19 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Some point on the 9th it was supposed to arrive?

**Brown** 20 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

**Beta** 21 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Is it fair to assume that you were alerted at  
22 some point?

**Brown** 23 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I think what it was is that the platoon that was  
24 up there or--I am sorry, Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6), the **Papa**  
25 Company XO, came down in the office because we were  
26 co-located, and asked me if I had any of the stats for  
27 the assets or for the contractors and I believe that  
28 we had called back then to our FSC XO to find out if  
29 he knew anything on his end because, again, they would  
30 go through his location. And he had not seen them at  
31 that point in time.

**Beta** 32 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you know what action was taken after that?

**Brown** 33 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : It was the COR that was pushed through the  
34 channels to brigade to contact this contractor and  
35 find out where he was at.

**Beta** 1 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you recall how long it took to get the word  
2 that they were not going to show?

**Beta** 3 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir, I don't remember, I just know that  
4 Kindaman was looking for his guy to show up there and  
5 just refused. I think that it was back and forth.  
6 They were going to go, they were not going to go, they  
7 were only going to come half way and then they just  
8 did not come at all.

**Beta** 9 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you brief the Battalion Commander?

**Brown** 10 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): No, Major (b)(3), (b)(6) **Red**  
11 he was basically, during this  
12 whole process we reacted like constantly on this  
13 whole--on everything that was happening on this  
mission.

**Beta** 14 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): When the platoon moved up into Wanat, did--were  
15 you aware if they experienced shortages of anything?

**Brown** 16 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. Again, I had a really good rapport that  
17 was my platoon, my company, co-located in the same--on  
18 (b)(3), (b)(6), and I would go up there and stop by daily.  
19 Just to get the feel, to say, hey, to the guys. I was  
20 unaware of any--of any--if they were short of  
21 anything--I know that--again, we had a lot of stuff  
22 prepared on the LZ, prepared to move up there--sling  
23 up there, but I was unaware of any shortages.

**Beta** 24 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): That they were black on water?

**Brown** 25 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Never, sir. No, sir.

**Beta** 26 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Would you normally--if a unit was short on  
27 something like that, would it normally come to you?

**Brown** 28 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Actually, I--again, I review the LOGSTATs and I  
29 go line by line and if I have missed something, Major  
30 **Red** (b)(3), (b)(6) was even worse than I was reviewing that stuff.  
31 Again, the people in brigade look at this and that is  
32 all they do, and they would call back down and say  
33 hey, you're reporting red, how are you going to fix  
34 this? Why are you red in the status? It is never--I  
35 don't think we ever got to, even in the winter time,  
36 red on most any class supply. It means that we are  
37 always pushing that far in advance.

**Beta** 1 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): You recall any request for additional concertina  
2 wire? Any other----

**Brown** 3 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Nothing--not that wasn't already pre-positioned,  
4 ready to go to move up there, again, we had all of  
5 that stuff rigged and ready to go up there that was  
6 going to move up there by air on the drop, on the LZ.

**Beta** 7 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): What was the sustainment plan after the equipment  
8 was moved up there?

**Brown** 9 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Again, sir, they were going to be part of the--  
10 they were going to be put into the mix with the air--I  
11 believe for the operation move, there was dedicated  
12 air already established for that mission that was not  
13 connected to the RIP birds that were coming in and out  
14 of the area. I don't know the number, don't know the  
15 size, don't know the flights by memory, but I do  
16 remember that we did get additional assets--  
17 additional turns to be able to support them in  
18 bringing up the Class IV and the rest of their  
19 equipment that they needed up there for the engineers.

**Beta** 20 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): You mentioned the RIP, as the S4 what were your  
21 duties in relation to the RIP?

**Brown** 22 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, we started RIP briefing and planning and  
23 preparation almost immediately after I took over, I  
24 think it was the January timeframe, so by the time  
25 that this was going on, that was already moving  
26 without any--any--any real widgets in there and it was  
27 already on basically cruise control everyone was  
28 executing what they needed to do, the plan was already  
29 being worked. At that point in time, the emphasis was  
30 more on the moving of Soldiers in and out than it was  
31 for the equipment piece because the equipment was  
32 already being taken care of at that time.

**Beta** 33 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): What do you mean by equipment?

**Brown** 34 CPT (b)(3)(b)(6): A/B bags, personal--the MIL-Vans that had their  
35 individual equipment, excess stuff, TVs, stuff like  
36 that that they had to move out of the area or sell.

**Beta** 37 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you participate in the preparation of the  
38 CONOP for Rock Move?

**Brown** 39 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): I believe that I was for some of it, yes.

**Beta** 1 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And I am placing that in front of you, now does  
2 this look familiar?

**Brown** 3 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

**Beta** 4 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Would you like to take a moment and look?

**Brown** 5 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

**Beta** 6 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): I see you reviewing the air movement table up to  
7 Wanat there and the number of slings required.

**Brown** 8 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes.

**Beta** 9 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Can you explain how that determination comes  
10 about that X amount of pallets are needed?

**Brown** 11 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Um, again, as the forecasting of what is the  
12 priority to get up there by what the company requests  
13 to send up there. Again, the boots on the ground and  
14 through their planning-- the company's planning of  
15 what they would need up there, we laid out on the LZ--  
16 I don't remember how many--how many pre-bunned bundles  
17 already that were down there--again, force protection  
18 and then Class I and Class III had to set up there.

**Beta** 19 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Is it the engineers or the company that says we  
20 need 4000 meters of concertina?

**Brown** 21 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, the engineers with their assessment but the  
22 guys on the grounds up there, we also had a team--part  
23 of that platoon was still on (b)(2)High itself and they  
24 assisted with a--this is what needs to be front loaded  
25 when it comes to force protection and the Class IV  
26 pieces.

**Beta** 27 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): At that point, are they advising the company and  
28 then the company says yes that is what we want and  
29 then they submit the request for the actual material?

**Brown** 30 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, yes, by the time it got to me, I know that  
31 the XO and that PL for the engineers, they were  
32 working on making sure that the proper stuff go out  
33 there again so they could start to build as soon as  
34 they can.

**Beta** 35 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): I guess the question, does the Company XO, most  
36 likely an infantryman, where does he get his advice

1            regarding what he needs to establish a COP? Does he  
2            get it directly from the engineer platoon leader?

**Brown** 3    **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

**Beta** 4    **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : So when the Company XO submitted we need this  
5            amount of material that is having received advice from  
6            the engineer, and came up to the battalion, and then  
7            the S4 shop, you then sourced that request?

**Brown** 8    **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Looked at it, yes, sir. What air assets are  
9            available, how many slings, how many turns we get, and  
10           then from there I would get with the actual--the  
11           riggers are my team down there in the LZ, make sure  
12           that proper--early on in the deployment, still the XO,  
13           slings were going through rollercations in two weeks--  
14           that is--that was--we did our RIP. By the time that  
15           this was going out, we already had predetermined  
16           locations and what was going where and what order it  
17           was in, rehearsed over and over again, plenty of times  
18           we moved vehicles, CONEX's, equipment, big 40K  
19           generators, off and on FOBs all over the air--our  
20           location.

**Beta** 21   **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : At this point with the RIP going on, based on  
22           speaking to some other witnesses, it appear that ROCK  
23           had a lot of moving pieces; moving some equipment back  
24           and some of the Soldiers had already started to move  
25           back to get on the lift back to Italy. What was the  
26           focus in the battalion? Was the focus the RIP?

**Brown** 27   **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : For some companies--some guys were moving out--  
28           RIPing sooner, their movements were happening sooner,  
29           their equipment was moving sooner, I know in the  
30           southern Pesh--the southern of Pesh Valley, Able  
31           Company, they were already into the RIP moving more of  
32           their guys out than moving in. I know up in our--the  
33           Wanat area, again, we did not have much of a  
34           transition yet because we were one of the last ones to  
35           be doing a RIP up in the North Area. So there was--the  
36           focus on our end was making sure that since it was  
37           just a high visibility move, making sure that this was  
38           in our focus.

**Beta** 39   **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Why was it a high visibility move?

**Brown** 40   **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Again, with new guys coming--we were trying--the  
41           conditions were trying to be set so that new Soldiers

1 coming in with the RIP would already have some place  
2 occupied ready to set up a radio to operate out of--  
3 And so, we were making sure that we were trying to  
4 push as much as we can into this to make sure that  
5 this was something that they would be able to fight  
6 from and operate from.

**Beta** 7 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Go back to the resource request that comes up  
8 from the company, the company request comes up and it  
9 says that we need (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High to establish a COP. So  
10 you go to Source (b)(2)High and get ready for  
11 movement. What if, in reality, they needed (b)(2)High  
12 and (b)(2)High but they did not request the (b)(2)High How does that--  
13 does the S4 play any role in looking at that request  
14 and saying that that is not sufficient.

**Brown** 15 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Again, I would look at their LOGSTAT, and if  
16 everything is jiving there--there were times that I  
17 would call a company, including Chosen Company, and  
18 say, hey, you are reporting this, what is your no-crap  
19 on the ground, what is the status of this? When (b)(2)High  
20 was occupied and (b)(2)High was occupied, we literally had  
21 (b)(2)High chat between the two. So, I would be able to go  
22 right to that FOB and say, hey, check this out, how  
23 much do you have of this and do you need more of this.  
24 Again, especially with Chosen Company with the guys  
25 that are out there, I had a direct connection with  
26 those guys, so I had an open line really when they did  
27 have communication to my office and my computer.

**Beta** 28 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): They were requesting food, water, ammo----

**Brown** 29 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): We would actually send--if we had--if we had  
30 available birds, if I had additional turns or  
31 additional air assets, if a VIP or someone would come  
32 out, we would put together a quick package to send up  
33 to the guys at FOB--opportune air, anytime I got air  
34 into the area, we used it, we maximized that air.  
35 Again, getting the air up there was just hit or miss,  
36 elevation, cloud cover, it was just, if I did get air,  
37 if did get additional airtime, we used every minute  
38 of that.

**Beta** 39 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): As the Battalion 4 and the Company XO, had you  
40 ever been involved with establishing a COP before  
41 Wanat?

**Brown** 1 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. I--I--I believe Able Company was  
2 establishing Able Main, I believe, but those were--  
3 that was already in the works when I took over as the  
4 S4.

**Beta** 5 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Did they have a template that they used for this  
6 is the amount of supplies that we need or?

**Brown** 7 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, this was--this was--again, this was something  
8 completely new. Trying to get as much up there as we--  
9 -in a short period of time. So, there was no formula  
10 at this point in time.

**Beta** 11 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you--from brigade, did they provide any  
12 assistance--you mentioned the engineers are ready, was  
13 there anyone or anything that came down from brigade  
14 saying this is how you do it?

**Brown** 15 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Other than the engineers, actually they came up  
16 several times from brigade level engineers; they  
17 actually came to (b)(2)High to make sure the plan was  
18 working right--physically touch face-to-face with  
19 **Saint** Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) our task force engineer; making sure  
20 that there were no missing pieces in this. And that  
21 is not just this mission, all of the--especially the  
22 land pieces, he came out to check out the land pieces  
23 as well as making sure that--there was a lot of  
24 building going on, a lot of winterization progress  
25 going on, a lot of--again hardening of locations that  
26 were originally when we took over there was living in  
27 tents.

**Beta** 28 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): There had been assertions by some that the  
29 equipment needed to establish a COP, -supplies- did  
30 not arrive up at Wanat. Now, that is an assertion, at  
31 any point after that platoon went up there, did you  
32 receive any additional requests for supplies?

**Brown** 33 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. Again, I would touch base with the  
34 company at least once maybe twice a day. Up there with  
35 the company, I would go through their CP and see how  
36 they are going. We had our LOG Sync meeting directly  
37 before the commander's update in the evening. Major  
38 **Red** (b)(3), (b)(6) had his thumb on the pulse, every moving piece  
39 of this thing or daily operations. He was really big  
40 into logistics, making sure that the company----

**Beta** 1 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Was the Company XO at that Log Sync meeting,  
2 Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)? **Papa**

**Brown** 3 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

**Beta** 4 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) **Papa** would attend that meeting?

**Brown** 5 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

**Beta** 6 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you recall him requesting anything during that  
7 time?

**Brown** 8 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Nothing out of the ordinary--nothing out of the  
9 ordinary, again, any type of--I mean, there were other  
10 instances where either contact or even not that a  
11 generator would go down and I would get one sling out  
12 in the middle of the night, opportune air or actually  
13 reserved birds coming from (b)(2)High that was going up to  
14 (b)(2)High north of us and I would have them swing up  
15 there--up through the Pesh Valley, take a generator up  
16 to (b)(2)High and move back and that was not even part of  
17 their flight plan, it was just A-that was relationship  
18 with our Air--with our aviation assets. If we needed  
19 something and if they were able to do it, they would  
20 do it. That happened many times; mainly for  
21 equipment, but Class III, I believe there were several  
22 times, even in (b)(2)High, when they had some big contact  
23 the--I had birds come up, I think at O-dark-30--I  
24 believe it was 0200 in the morning and I would get up  
25 and they would bring Class--an unspecified amount of  
26 Class III in the middle of night.

**Beta** 27 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): So, for Wanat, other than contracting of heavy  
28 engineer equipment and the operators to use that  
29 equipment, was there any other contracted for services  
30 or supplies?

**Brown** 31 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I believe-- I believe the normal service  
32 contracts were put in but they were not the focus,  
33 what I mean by that is the cleaning-- all of the  
34 normal day-to-day operational services that we were  
35 using at other FOBs, those contracts were put in as  
36 well, but they were low priority on the list. And I  
37 don't know if any of those even were approved because  
38 we were looking at the building phase and more worried  
39 about getting equipment up there. It happened--there  
40 were other times, even on (b)(2)High trying to a piece  
41 of equipment--a contractor to do something was pretty



**Beta** 1 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): So, in the CONOPs, the portion with the movement  
2 to Wanat, for the air movement piece, the slings  
3 listed below each of the aircraft that is what Chosen  
4 requested to move to Wanat?

**Brown** 5 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, this is directly through the engineer  
6 to the company, again, the company would do the  
7 forecasting to me but the engineer, I remember, was  
8 giving me, hey, this is what we need up here. And  
9 this is all of the engineer stuff going up there for  
10 these flights to make sure that they got started on  
11 that.

**Beta** 12 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): The request--who actually submits a request; the  
13 Company XO?

**Brown** 14 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): The Company XO submits the request.

**Beta** 15 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And then how did the engineer get involved with  
16 you?

**Brown** 17 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): I had our task force engineer which basically did  
18 the--helped with construction piece, I only met that  
19 PL, again they were there for a short period of time--  
20 I think touched base 2 or 3 times, there were several  
21 teams in and out doing the--doing the construction  
22 pieces. So, touched base introductions, this is what  
23 we are going to do for you, this is where I am at.  
24 These are the guys that are going up here, introduced  
25 them to the company and they worked hand-in-hand.

**Beta** 26 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Who prioritized the slings?

**Brown** 27 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Again, through the company through the engineer,  
28 this is--we looked at it--I am sure we looked at this  
29 during a Log Sync meeting, made sure they were  
30 tracking, any tweaking going on. Again, they are  
31 scheduled for five turns and I don't remember, but  
32 again, if they show up on the ground that day, we do a  
33 face-to-face with the bird--with the pilots--the crew--  
34 a--the load master, hey we can only do three turns  
35 today, we would then relook to prioritize and lacing  
36 those up. I don't know if all five got turned that  
37 day, I just don't remember.

**Beta** 38 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you recall if there was ever a need to get  
39 additional aircraft to move up slings that were  
40 planned?

**Brown** 1 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir, I know that we did use, I believe, I  
2 believe, a flight that was somewhere thrown in there  
3 **Oscar** to get Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) up there, but I don't believe was  
4 part of the original CONOP and again, we used  
5 opportune air to move what we can up there. I am not  
6 sure if that was actually one of the turns that was  
7 scheduled up there, again, any air opportunity, we  
8 would send stuff up there. This--this--I am looking  
9 at this right here and it is all engineered to get  
10 force protection up there.

**Beta** 11 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Can you tell from reading that chart how many  
12 times a helo was to touch down in the LZ up in Wanat  
13 in order to move up the requested supplies?

**Brown** 14 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : A lot of times--we are forecasting here only one  
15 sling per, but a lot of times--the majority of times,  
16 if they--if they--if they were coming up, we would  
17 maximize lift and throw two slings, three slings, as  
18 long as we don't break the weight requirement for that  
19 aircraft. And they were good with it, as long as a  
20 probed--we would submit--hand it right to the load  
21 master and again these are just showing--this one here  
22 is showing two slings--bobcat and quad-con may have  
23 gone up in the same lift, I don't--like here it has  
24 three slings. Again, so that we could--this is a  
25 template, but more or less, according to the flight  
26 that day.

**Beta** 27 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : The planning document could show that there would  
28 be five aircraft that should be touching down in an  
29 LZ----

**Brown** 30 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

**Beta** 31 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : But in reality three could touch down with all of  
32 the equipment----

**Brown** 33 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Or six, if we had more airtime, more blade time.  
34 A lot of it had to be who this was rehearsed on the LZ  
35 and the majority of the time, we had additional turns  
36 because we had worked that fast--we had worked out  
37 that much on the LZ that, hey, you have additional--  
38 and again with the Pesh Resupply, it was also mail day  
39 as well. We would sometimes consolidate the mail on  
40 one bird and then we would just use one bird that  
41 would be unloading doing the mail thing and that other  
42 bird would be just dedicated to just moving additional

1 turns up. Again, like my folks, it is not because I  
2 was part of that company, Air Centric FOBs, that was  
3 literally my focus from the get go because I  
4 experienced the pain of that through winter, as a  
5 Company XO and I knew how difficult it was to get  
6 resources up there. That was the driving force of  
7 getting that contract, that (b)(2)High driver to bring up  
8 there. I remember a water pump broke up at (b)(2)High and  
9 they had--it was really more for a, I believe, a  
10 shower / latrine system in a CONEX that we set up  
11 there and the water pump broke and I had the Company  
12 **Papa** XO, Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) call his contractor, and say,  
13 hey, we need your vehicle, and again, he was not on a  
14 specific time, we did not want to do a pattern of  
15 every Wednesday or Thursday you show up. So, beyond,  
16 they call him up or an interpreter would go find him  
17 and he would show up with his trucks. We would load  
18 up water or whatever and they would go up there.  
19 Parts, if all it was was parts, throw some parts in  
20 his truck, send it up there and had it fixed within 24  
21 hours.

**Beta** 22 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): You mentioned earlier about stone walls being  
23 placed and were planned for COP Kahler.

**Brown** 24 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): I believe so, yes sir.

**Beta** 25 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): So that would have been contracted for?

**Brown** 26 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

**Beta** 27 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you recall that portion being approved?

**Brown** 28 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): I believe so, that was the first, again there was  
29 a lot of pushback at higher and I don't recall where,  
30 I don't know if it was the JFUB because they weren't--  
31 again, the presence piece, they didn't want to have a  
32 permanent presence there, so they preferred to put  
33 (b)(2)High barriers. And that was including (b)(2)High. We  
34 fought to get our stone wall placed around our LZ. So  
35 when Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) wanted to have a stone wall **Diamond**  
36 around this COP up there. I remember there was  
37 pushback but eventually it did get approved through  
38 JFUB. They were really big on that because you put a  
39 stone wall up and there was no room for expansion and  
40 that was their problem. Where most of our FOBs, are  
41 already at the limits of our--actually, I could find  
42 space. So, in order to put a--to expand your FOB, you

1 were going to tear down this wall that you just spent  
2 all of this money on to put another wall up and then  
3 again you are taking more land from the locals.

4 That was the JFUBs and I remember this--I like I said,  
5 we did this, we did try a contract for (b)(2)High to get  
6 a stone wall up. It got rejected back, hey, you are  
7 going to go with a (b)(2)High wall, this is early, early  
8 on, but it was resubmitted again with a magic wave  
9 that, hey, this is going to be done. So, it came  
10 back, I believe, as the stone wall.

**Beta** 11 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): In your experience with LZ stone wall, how long  
12 did that take--once the contract was approved, how  
13 long before----

**Brown** 14 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, they work fast. You get the actual hand  
15 labor, it's a hand labor piece, they will have a wall  
16 up--a 100-yard wall, a week, not even, I don't even  
17 think. It is miraculous once they got--as long as  
18 there are rocks, which there are plenty of rocks there  
19 and you had the labor force, the man power to do it,  
20 it can go up in no time.

**Sigma** 21 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) If I can interrupt real quick, just so we understand,  
22 when you say stone wall, are you talking about that  
23 they would mix up mortar and then use local stones or  
24 were they doing brick and mortar or was it----

**Brown** 25 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Local stones, sir, local stones.

**Sigma** 26 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) And then they were actually mix-up the mortar?

**Brown** 27 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Their normal mortar, yes, sir, their construction  
28 was amazing up there.

**Sigma** 29 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay, thanks.

**Beta** 30 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Initially (b)(2)High were up in Wanat?

**Brown** 31 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): I believe so, yes, sir; just an intermediate  
32 positions just to try to start some kind of force  
33 protection.

**Beta** 34 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Was it your understanding that the (b)(3), (b)(6) would  
35 be temporary?

36 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, again, or for, again, all individual  
37 **Brown** positions inside would be at least the minimum of

1 Hesco wall as our other FOBs, everything else had for  
2 RPG attack, had (b)(2)High walls lining all of our  
3 buildings, including some of our stone buildings, but  
4 again, the exterior wall was going to be the stone  
5 wall itself.

**Beta** 6 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What was the standard for height, do you know?

**Brown** 7 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I do not know. I don't know. I know that our  
8 standard--our standard--that we tried to do with the  
9 (b)(2)High was the minimum of 7 foot (b)(2)High wall. Again,  
10 the engineers explained this to me. A seven foot wall  
11 double think with a three foot (b)(2)High orgamia basket on  
12 top for an additional layer on top to hold it  
13 together. I did not get it--it took me a while to get  
14 that, so that is why I remember that piece and explain  
15 it over and over again.

**Beta** 16 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): After the platoon moved up to Wanat around the  
17 8th or 9th of July, had they called back for  
18 something, had they called back for water or  
19 concertina or stakes to put the concertina--to hold  
20 the concertina wire or any other supplies, could you  
21 have resupplied them and how?

22 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Again, sir, against--a lot of it had to do with  
23 **Brown** working relationships with the units. We needed  
24 something, we would resource it to the end to find out  
25 a way of getting up there. Again, that is why we were  
26 looking at getting that civilian contractor to bring  
27 water up because I could not rely specifically on air  
28 during the winter months. Again, there were times  
29 when I got a call----

**Beta** 30 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Remember contracting a civilian at all when the  
31 platoon was up there to do anything like that?

32 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): I believe we tried to contract him--contact him,  
33 **Brown** again, he was already, the contract was still in  
34 service--that water delivery service he was still  
35 working, matter-of-fact, I believe we just renewed his  
36 contract, it was a six-month rotating contract, I  
37 believe he just got re-up'd on that one. And from my  
38 experience working with this guy, when he first  
39 started, when I was still the XO, he did--I did a lot  
40 of help trying to get stuff up there.

**Beta** 1 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you have a supply area on (b)(2)High where you  
2 would have water?

**Brown** 3 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. I had half of mine on the backside of  
4 the LZ behind the gun line; I had all of my class I  
5 established on the left hand side for it was easy for  
6 the riggers to move the stuff directly over to the  
7 slings. The equipment was on the right hand side,  
8 which all of the Mil-Vans I had to move over there to  
9 CONEX row for the companies and the whole backside of  
10 the gun line was all of the Class IV which is closer  
11 to the road that the--the locals would have, sir.  
12 Really no equipment would be over there to get  
13 destroyed or anything like that.

**Beta** 14 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): If you didn't have air available to move  
15 something up to Wanat, if requested, how would you get  
16 it up there?

**Brown** 17 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): We would look probably to try again--well, we did  
18 not have that issue at that time, to have to move a  
19 convoy up there, but I believe--we had a platoon that  
20 was still on (b)(2)High, we had the Tact still on  
21 (b)(2)High, we had to RCP which was making routine  
22 routes up from (b)(2)High, we could have got stuff up  
23 there, maybe not as fast as I could if I got air  
24 assets, but we could make it happen.

**Beta** 25 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) **Sigma**

**Sigma** 26 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Kind of on that particular point, some of the FOBs or  
27 COPs were air centric, meaning that there was no  
28 ground LOC----

**Brown** 29 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

**Sigma** 30 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): What was the plan for medevac or resupply if air was  
31 prohibited by weather or?

**Brown** 32 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): a--a--a----

**Sigma** 33 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): I don't mean to put you on the spot, but is that  
34 something that you guys ever discuss?

**Brown** 35 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

**Sigma** 36 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Hey, there is no ground LOC, what if weather comes in  
37 or a medevac is needed?

**Brown** 1 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir, that is why--and this was a lot of help  
2 through brigade 4 on this, playing out--I mean  
3 literally, I--I--I--I even had a contract for firewood  
4 so if we could not get fuel up there warm the Soldiers  
5 on the mountain. I had wood contracts, I had guys  
6 going chopping wood on top of the mountain and the  
7 Kurn would bring wood up to the other FOBS. So we  
8 were looking outside of the box making sure that 30  
9 days is the minimum, 45 days is where I wanted to be  
10 for your Class I, I mean, again, numbers--I would  
11 always estimate a higher number, a 30-man platoon, I  
12 would estimate a 40-man platoon is always at 10% loss,  
13 whatever spoilage, we always try to err on the side of  
14 caution.

**Sigma** 15 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) I presume that that was something that was on the  
16 commander's mind?

**Brown** 17 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir, Yes, sir.

**Sigma** 18 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you know that the engineers that were sent up to  
19 Wanat, that was a vertical engineering unit; correct?

**Brown** 20 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I believe so, sir, I believe so. Again they were  
21 different elements coming and going, they were already  
22 doing their RIP, I believe, or just finished their  
23 RIP. We had a warrant officer that was working on  
24 (b)(2)High, helping with the prioritizing, pushing the  
25 Class IV, getting ready for slings, that is who was  
26 really helping out with that aspect and that guy was  
27 awesome and I don't remember his name, but I believe  
28 that he had Ripped out prior to the start of this  
29 mission here. A lot of lessons learned from this guy  
30 when it comes to what needs to go out there first.

**Sigma** 1 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) You don't remember what unit the engineers were from?

**Brown** 2 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, I don't, sir.

**Sigma** 33 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Did the battalion have any organic, like ROWPU or any  
34 type of water purification stuff at your level or was  
35 that all at the FSB?

**Brown** 36 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : More medical, that is more medical, I do remember  
37 we were getting out there, the little backpacking  
38 water purification kits and they were disseminated to  
39 the--actually, that was when I was still the XO of the

1 company, we had received them and distro'd them out to  
2 the platoons.

**Sigma** 3 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) You mentioned a couple times that this was a high  
4 visibility contract or high visibility operation I  
5 just want to clarify; you feel that it was on  
6 brigade's radar screen or high visibility because it  
7 was the battalion's main effort?

**Brown** 8 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I would get calls from Brigade checking on  
9 stuff three or four times, again, the Battalion Log  
10 Sync meeting would turn into, and I had a good working  
11 relationship with the brigade 4 as well. Again, I  
12 would actually fly--I would--I actually flew down  
13 there to touch bases with the brigade staff to make  
14 sure that, this was, there was no missing pieces on  
15 this and I had sent, I think that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) flew **Copper**  
16 down there one time to make sure that the contracts  
17 meet up with, I forget her name, but our resource  
18 manager, was awesome. She would walk things through  
19 as fast as possible.

**Sigma** 20 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) And when we say on this, we mean, this being Wanat was  
21 high visibility?

**Brown** 22 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

**Sigma** 23 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) And you may have covered this with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), **Beta**  
24 apologize, but with respect to the contracting for  
25 equipment, how far in advance of actual--the actual d-  
26 day, if you will, for these guys to send the  
27 construction equipment up to Wanat, did we learn that  
28 they were not going to go? Do you have any  
29 recollection of that?

**Brown** 30 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I just--I just--I just remember, I do  
31 remember that there was tension again, this is  
32 something that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) and task force engineer, **Copper**  
33 I remember some heated debates, phones slamming trying  
34 to figure out what in the hell was going on with this.  
35 This was weeks even prior to that, again, we were  
36 trying to get the right guys, we were trying to get  
37 our guys--our FSC, company down in (b)(2)High, they had a  
38 great working relationship with this contractor and I  
39 don't remember his name. He was the do anything guy.  
40 I mean, you needed vehicles, matter of fact, in  
41 support of Wanat, we were actually pulling out, this  
42 guy came up with, I think, 30 some--unreal number of

1 vehicles to support this, so that is the guy that we  
2 wanted. There were other instances where we would  
3 have a guy in mind, but again, it had to go through  
4 the bidding process and that whole piece.

**Sigma** 5 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) I guess what I am getting at is was it a surprise when  
6 this happened, was it like Holy Crap, these guys are  
7 not going to go forward, they are saying that they are  
8 not going to go, or is it something that you guys  
9 could, kind of worst case all long that this might  
10 happen?

**Brown** 11 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : It was worst case that this may happen, but we  
12 had--it was done and I don't have the contract, I just  
13 knew--I knew this was one of the ones that was--again,  
14 the finger was on the pulse making sure that  
15 everything single portion of this was taken care,  
16 matching pieces of equipment, time table, trying to  
17 get the RCP to coincide with this, I think they moved  
18 there the day prior. But just all of those little  
19 things to try to make sure that this does happen.

**Sigma** 20 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) And ask you kind of a tough question here, as the  
21 Battalion S4, and what you have kind of testified so  
22 far is that you were not aware of any shortages at  
23 Wanat?

**Brown** 24 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir, nothing that--again, I am a very  
25 resourceful person and that is just from my experience  
26 in the Army. There is a way, any way, if I have to  
27 give a guy outside the gate \$30 to put his mules out  
28 there and he takes it up top to my Re-Trans Site, it  
29 would happen, it is just, we would find a way.

**Sigma** 30 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Any thoughts or speculations as to--we have had guys  
31 that testified who said, we did not have x, y, and z,  
32 where the disconnect would be in that process?

**Brown** 33 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Again, sir----

**Sigma** 34 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Having been a Company XO, you know how things----

**Brown** 35 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Exactly, sir, again, I am not--I would be up in  
36 the company, I tried to stay out of company business  
37 up there, it was not that I was blind to it, again,  
38 their planning period, I don't know what their--I  
39 mean, 35 guys, I believe the guys was at least 4 or 5  
40 days, I mean, whatever they could carry up there plus

1 and then with the sustainment birds going up there.  
2 Sustainment birds were scheduled, I would--again, I  
3 don't know that moment, but if I am looking at this  
4 again right now, I know that within 72 hours, I have  
5 to have just by what they can bring up there in their  
6 HMMWVS, 72 hours, that is all they have, if they need  
7 it earlier than that, then again we would find a way  
8 to work around that.

**Sigma** 9 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Again, I am not implying that it was a disconnect at  
10 your level, I am just curious as to--because the truth  
11 of the matter is that some guys said that we did not  
12 have x, y, and z so you are saying that I never got  
13 any pull from the Company, so----

**Brown** 14 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Again to that, sir, my normal day routine, not as  
15 glorious as before and did not want to be there, made  
16 the best of it----

**Sigma** 17 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) I have been there----

**Brown** 18 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : My daily routine, though, sir, I would touch base  
19 with the radio, go into the TOC, my office is in the  
20 back, I go in the morning, touch base, again, if I had  
21 air movements, I would check out my air for that day,  
22 I go look at the Blue Force Tracker for my convoys  
23 moving around, so I spend a lot of time in the TOC  
24 area itself because I don't want to be in front of the  
25 computer all day. So, I made sure that I kind of had  
26 feels going on, my little pieces of the puzzle.

**Sigma** 27 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay, sir?

28 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you get involved at the establishment at  
29 the COP at Honaker-Miracle?

**Brown** 30 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir, I was not.

31 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. You mentioned that the establishment  
32 of the COP at Wanat was the main effort for the  
33 Battalion----

**Brown** 34 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

35 **LtGen Natonski:** Did the RIP TOA that was going on at the  
36 same time you feel distract from the focus that was  
37 going on at Wanat and the establishment of the COP up  
38 there?

**Brown** 1 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, my opinion at the Battalion level, no.  
2 Again, everyone smelled the--they are looking at the  
3 barn door ready to get out, but we-- the command  
4 climate was stay focused and it was made sure that the  
5 focus was on the mission.

6 **LtGen Natonski:** And of course the RIP TOA involved Helo's as  
7 well----

**Brown** 8 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

9 **LtGen Natonski:** And as you said, you had yours staged so  
10 whenever a Helo came, some of that was pre-planned and  
11 went as scheduled, the building supplies for the COP--  
12 --

**Brown** 13 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

14 **LtGen Natonski:** And if not you got it up with the lift of  
15 opportunity?

**Brown** 16 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** The engineer support, what was the engineer-  
18 -what was the size of the engineer unit in your AO?

**Brown** 19 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, going up there, I believe it was a squad-  
20 sized element. We did not have much engineer----

21 **LtGen Natonski:** No, I mean, what was its--was it a company,  
22 a battalion of engineers?

**Brown** 23 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I believe in our Battalion----

24 **LtGen Natonski:** What did the Brigade have?

**Brown** 25 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I do not know their size. Again, they were  
26 rotating in and out----

27 **LtGen Natonski:** No, I am not talking about that--what is the  
28 normal organic support for the Brigade?

**Brown** 29 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : For a Brigade, a Company, sir.

30 **LtGen Natonski:** A company?

**Brown** 31 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** So there would have been a Company of  
2 engineers in the 173d Brigade's AO?

**Brown** 3 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

4 **LtGen Natonski:** And in terms of what was supporting the COP,  
5 it appeared to be less than a squad, I would think?

**Brown** 6 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Just about a squad, yes, sir.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** About a squad of troops. But you said that  
8 that was going through the RIP/TOA, as well you  
9 mentioned Warrant Officer was a great guy but was not  
10 available.

**Brown** 11 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I believe that they did their RIP prior, I  
12 believe so.

13 **LtGen Natonski:** So you probably the engineers that were at  
14 COP Wanat when they attacked the place were probably  
15 new guys?

**Brown** 16 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** That had never established a COP before or  
18 anything.

**Brown** 19 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. The--you mentioned that they had  
21 contracted a bulldozer and a crane, you think, from  
22 the Afghans?

**Brown** 23 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : At the minimal a bulldozer, sir.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you hear anything--I understood a  
25 backhoe eventually showed up after the attack, was  
26 that part of the contracting?

**Brown** 27 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I believe so, yes, sir. Again, I don't remember  
28 what equipment specifically--heavy--I guess a backhoe  
29 can be used for all of that equipment--again, that  
30 was, whatever the package was, I don't recall, sir.

31 **LtGen Natonski:** We talked about how critical engineer  
32 support was for a COP. We had a squad of engineers  
33 that went up--that flew up right after the vehicle  
34 patrol base was established and then we had Afghan  
35 engineers slated and contracted to go up and support

1 the establishment of the COP, but they did not show  
2 before the attack. Was there any go or no go criteria  
3 if they did not show given the importance of having  
4 engineers there?

**Brown** 5 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : I don't recall, sir.

6 LtGen Natonski: You don't recall----

**Brown** 7 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : I just don't remember if there was ----

8 LtGen Natonski: And when did you find out that the civilian  
9 contractors were not coming?

**Brown** 10 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I believe the day before or that day.

11 LtGen Natonski: Of what?

**Brown** 12 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Of their move, when they were supposed to be  
13 moving up there--when they, meaning the contractors  
14 were supposed to be----

15 LtGen Natonski: Was that around the 9<sup>th</sup> of July?

**Brown** 16 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : I believe the 10<sup>th</sup>, again, sir, I believe it was  
17 the 9<sup>th</sup> or 10<sup>th</sup>, I believe they were supposed to get up  
18 there and the next day was when the----

19 LtGen Natonski: you were getting the word their push back  
20 that these guys don't want to come?

**Brown** 21 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

22 LtGen Natonski: So, what actions were taken by the battalion  
23 to mitigate that? Was any provision made to request  
24 some of those engineers out of the company that is  
25 assigned to the brigade, even though it might had been  
26 an incoming company of engineers?

**Brown** 27 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I believe the folks were trying to get  
28 equipment because you could not--that is what we were  
29 trying to get the equipment, if we could not get from  
30 that location, we were trying to get it from other  
31 locations.

32 LtGen Natonski: Afghan?

**Brown** 33 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. The pressure was trying to get this  
34 contractor or anyone with equipment to move up there.

1           And I believe that they were partially worried about  
2           getting ambushed and we were going to send an RCP up,  
3           we were trying to compensate, we were trying to make  
4           up, if I remember correctly, trying to get them to go  
5           up there.

6   **LtGen Natonski:**       But you were getting resistance from the  
7                            Afghans?

**Brown** 8   **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) :   Yes, sir.

9   **LtGen Natonski:**       So there was no provision to get our  
10                           engineers?

**Brown** 11   **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) :   And I recall that when they did receive the word  
12                           that the RCP was going to go up there and I think that  
13                           is when they decided that they were going to go up  
14                           there which was too late in the game.

15   **LtGen Natonski:**       But no contact was made through Brigade to  
16                           say, hey----

**Brown** 17   **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) :   No, Brigade was well aware of it, sir.  Brigade  
18                           was----

19   **LtGen Natonski:**       So, what action did the Brigade take?

**Brown** 20   **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) :   Working through the contractor and COR trying to  
21                           get this guy----

22   **LtGen Natonski:**       We already know that the Afghans did not  
23                           want to come.  So what about Army Engineers?

**Brown** 24   **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) :   Sir, I don't know about that time period right  
25                           there.

26   **LtGen Natonski:**       And that RIP TOA may have had an effect on  
27                           the ability to get----

**Brown** 28   **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) :   Sir, I don't know what equipment they had as----

29   **LtGen Natonski:**       There have been some insinuations of  
30                           shortages at the COP.  Water has been one and I  
31                           believe that one of these contractors brought a truck  
32                           full --a (b)(2)High truck full of water up there.  Is that  
33                           one of those guys that you work with?

**Brown** 34   **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) :   Yes, sir, that is that contractor, I believe that  
35                           he was----

1 LtGen Natonski: What about fuel for the Bobcat?

Brown 2 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): On the sling only, sir. That would have been the  
3 only way.

4 LtGen Natonski: Do you recall hearing a shortage of fuel?

Brown 5 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

6 LtGen Natonski: Or a shortage of parts that allow you to  
7 take fuel from a bladder and put it into a can or into  
8 a vehicle?

Brown 9 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

10 LtGen Natonski: So, none of that reached through, now, if  
11 they had a requirement for supplies--what would you do  
12 for emergency resupply?

Brown 13 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Again, sir, I would--we would, the ready birds,  
14 they generally had ready birds that flew out in the  
15 evening timeframe.

16 LtGen Natonski: So, you could have, if they had gone red  
17 with water and you had known about it, you could have  
18 gotten water to them.

Brown 19 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Probably, sir, within a good 18-hour period the  
20 latest. I mean, before they were ready for the next  
21 day, we would get--again, it had a lot to do with what  
22 was flying that night. But a lot of times, if we  
23 needed flights, we would get the turns.

24 LtGen Natonski: Okay. There could have been a break down  
25 because the information on shortages of supplies would  
26 have come through the company TOC and who ran the  
27 company TOC? Was it the XO of the Company?

Brown 28 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): When I was there as the Company XO, yes.

29 LtGen Natonski: And then he would have had to come to the  
30 battalion and if it was anything to do with supplies,  
31 he would have come to you?

Brown 32 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

33 LtGen Natonski: But no one came to you?

**Brown** 1 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir, either myself or directly through Major  
2 (b)(3), (b)(6). **Red**

3 LtGen Natonski: But you don't remember any shortages of  
4 water or fuel?

**Brown** 5 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir.

6 LtGen Natonski: Supply, weapons parts, did you do that?

**Brown** 7 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

8 LtGen Natonski: Did you in your experience and not  
9 specifically Wanat, did you see a great demand for  
10 parts to M4s or SAWs or M16s, did weapons hold up?

**Brown** 11 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Again, sir, I worked hand to hand a lot, the  
12 majority of the weapons that we had--that we did have  
13 go down would be the larger caliber weapons, not much  
14 for maintenance went down, and it was not tracked as  
15 more of a critical piece of equipment.

16 LtGen Natonski: But you did not go out of your way for a lot  
17 of parts to small arms weapons?

**Brown** 18 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : We had stocks on--we had stocks on--we had stocks  
19 on (b)(2)High we had a small weapons repair team.

20 LtGen Natonski: But in your experience as the S4, I am not  
21 talking Wanat, did you see a great demand other than  
22 the normal wear and tear?

**Brown** 23 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir.

24 LtGen Natonski: So the weapons--the troops were keeping them  
25 clean and were not having problems with weapons except  
26 perhaps combat damage.

**Brown** 27 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

28 LtGen Natonski: Okay, thanks.

29 MG Perkins: You were talking about reconns that had taken  
30 place where the engineers to go up and look for land.  
31 Were you on any of those reconns?

**Brown** 32 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Just one with Captain (b)(3), (b)(6), **Saint** which was our----

33 MG Perkins: Were you still the XO or the S4?

**Brown** 1 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : I was the S4, sir.

2 MG Perkins: And they went to Wanat to look for land?

**Brown** 3 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

4 MG Perkins: And what were they looking for? What in their  
5 mind was this is good and this is bad?

**Brown** 6 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : I believe, I was up there for the recon looking  
7 for land, I went up there and by the time that we had  
8 gotten involved, we, meaning at the battalion, myself  
9 and the task force engineer, the land was already  
10 selected by the company and don't know what the  
11 selection criteria was. I know that there was not  
12 much land around there, I know they want to have it  
13 within close proximity of the district center and the  
14 population node. We had only gone up there after the  
15 land was selected just to go through the final  
16 processing of the contracting because if the parcel of  
17 land was owned, like everything else in Afghanistan by  
18 like 15 different families with multiple people that  
19 are in different providences, it was just trying to  
20 identify all of these people, and that is why really  
21 myself and the task force engineer went up there, look  
22 at the land, making sure there was no surprises for  
23 equipment that is needed. And that is why I believe  
24 at the time, again I know that an excavator was  
25 needed, I remember that because land had to be brought  
26 down for drainage, I remember that piece, but the  
27 recon, sir, we already had--we were more up there for  
28 the final assessment.

29 MG Perkins: The assessment.

**Brown** 30 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

31 MG Perkins: Did you recall any discussions as they were  
32 trying to get the land like boy, we really wish we  
33 could had gone there but we couldn't get it, we had to  
34 settle for this. Or did it appear that they got the  
35 land that they wanted?

**Brown** 36 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : I believe that they got the land that they  
37 wanted, sir.

1 **MG Perkins:** So, you went up there sort of after it was a done  
2 deal, we got this land and then you went up with  
3 engineers and what are we going to do with it.

**Brown** 4 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, one thing, I remember now, when I was still  
5 the XO, we were looking at land that was more south of  
6 Wanat and off to the east, again, this is something  
7 that we were looking at early on the deployment to  
8 move up north. I don't know if that was nixed----

9 **MG Perkins:** Is that down the (b)(2)High where that ambush was  
10 when they were coming back from----

**Brown** 11 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, it was off to the east. And again that  
12 was early--way early on the deployment and I was  
13 still----

14 **MG Perkins:** Okay.

**Brown** 15 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): And as I recall that was the only place that we  
16 were looking at differently, and I know Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) **Oscar**  
17 was, early on, had sent Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) when he was  
18 the PL for that platoon, to go look at certain **Papa**  
19 locations up there and I do remember that one  
20 location, unfortunately they did not get the grids for  
21 the four corners that I needed for that piece of land,  
22 so they had to go back up there again with that squad.

23 **MG Perkins:** So, after it's sort of decided that this was  
24 where we were going to go and you would go up there  
25 with engineers to take an assessment of what we need,  
26 what was your personal opinion when you saw the land  
27 and they said, okay, this is where it is going?

**Brown** 28 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): My personal opinion, sir?

29 **MG Perkins:** Yes.

**Brown** 30 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): I just did not like the land, it was really  
31 contained and I just did not like that piece of land.

32 **MG Perkins:** Because of its topography, its location and  
33 things or what?

**Brown** 34 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): A little bit of everything in there.

35 **MG Perkins:** Too close to the village?

**Brown** 1 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I understood their necessity of being close to  
2 the population node but for resourcing-wise it was  
3 going to be a nightmare to make sure that place--and  
4 this is even after it is built, getting resourced  
5 again. Here we go again with another FOB that I could  
6 not send my FSC up to unless that last one kilometer  
7 of the road was reinforced, so it was going to be  
8 another--until they finished that portion of road to  
9 get heavier pieces of equipment up there or another  
10 access in there, I was almost going to have another  
11 air centric FOB to deal with after the establishment.

12 **MG Perkins:** So your concern was with the status of the  
13 remaining portion of the LOC?

**Brown** 14 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. I was--yes, that is what I was looking  
15 at, sir.

16 **MG Perkins:** More than the relationship within Wanat?

**Brown** 17 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. How was I going to support this?

18 **MG Perkins:** Sounds like a good logistician talking.

**Brown** 19 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir, just a nightmare coming on.

20 **MG Perkins:** You had said earlier then that with regards to  
21 the engineers system and things like that you had  
22 received more help on this project than previous  
23 projects?

**Brown** 24 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Contracts-wise.

25 **MG Perkins:** Contract-wise?

**Brown** 26 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

27 **MG Perkins:** Because the requirement was greater, because the  
28 priority was higher? Why?

**Brown** 29 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, all buildings--any permanent structure it  
30 had to go through the engineer side first and then it  
31 goes through J-FOB. Engineers were real, I am there,  
32 their area of looking at projects was always, "Is this  
33 a necessity? Can this? Any other--like contracts for  
34 servicing, those went straight through the J-FOB, we  
35 could easily get that through the resource manager,  
36 but again with buildings, it seemed like there were a  
37 lot detailed analysis.

1 MG Perkins: Just because of the scope of the project.

Brown 2 CPT Tompkins: Yes, sir. We had to make sure that basically  
3 every nut and bolt is really----

4 MG Perkins: counted for and needed and stuff like that.

Brown 5 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

6 MG Perkins: You said that there was an engineer plan and they  
7 had a matrix to determine this and how many yards of  
8 concertina wire and everything based on it, etc. So,  
9 there was a--for this CONOP there would be the  
10 engineer annex sort of speak that would have that laid  
11 out, in other words, somewhere there was a plan, you  
12 take that plan and bounce it off the matrix and then  
13 you take that matrix that generates requirements which  
14 then generates pallets, etc like that?

Brown 15 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

16 MG Perkins: Do you know, would that plan still exist someway  
17 electronically somewhere or somehow?

Brown 18 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I don't know if it was more of a plan or  
19 more of--what I believe what they were using was pre--  
20 pre-done blue printed designs----

21 MG Perkins: I understand, like templates----

Brown 22 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): So for this guard shack, this one guard tower it  
23 would take so many sandbags, so many--and I don't know  
24 how they--I don't know what kind of gee-whiz math they  
25 did to--and that comes to the old engineer thing, hey  
26 I need a-- or infantry thing, I need a front line of a  
27 100-yards of concertina wire----

28 MG Perkins: So, Major (b)(3), (b)(6) November, he was the Brigade Engineer?

Brown 29 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

30 MG Perkins: He might have an idea on that thing?

Brown 31 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): He may, sir, that sounds familiar, yes, sir.

32 MG Perkins: The General asked you earlier about go and no go,  
33 at all when they were putting this plan together for  
34 the COP was there ever a go or no go brief or any--not  
35 just a logistical piece, but a overall here are the

1 red lines and if we don't meet this--you know, it  
2 could be any number of things. Do you remember?  
3 Going through the process and then you get to a  
4 decision where the chain of command says yes, we are  
5 going to go forward.

**Brown** 6 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I don't recall any no go criteria. But I  
7 did sit in all CONOP briefs to higher and there was  
8 always the risk mitigation aspect of it, but I do not  
9 recall any no go or go criteria for this.

10 **MG Perkins:** And I think you said that while you were the S4,  
11 the battalion had not setup any other COPS; correct,  
12 from scratch or built them?

**Brown** 13 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir, I came in when Able Main was already--  
14 those contracts were already put through and they were  
15 already in the build process.

16 **MG Perkins:** We discussed already about how, you know how this  
17 was sort of overlapping on the RIP TOA with 1-26 in  
18 competing demands, you seem pretty emphatic that there  
19 was a pretty clear focus on the battalion that this  
20 was a priority? Do you recall from a logistical point  
21 of view, ever having to make a decision, here is  
22 something that I need for Wanat and here is something  
23 for the RIP TOA and the RIP TOA is going to win out.  
24 Do you know what I am saying?

**Brown** 25 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, my focus, my personal focus and maybe  
26 because this was my company, but it was to CONOP.  
27 Maybe because the RIP was already well rehearsed and  
28 well gone through and the majority--the RIP--the  
29 trouble that we were having is making sure that the  
30 proper equipment is in the proper locations, that is  
31 TP equipment and therefore my focus was still on the  
32 fight and again it was touching base with the unit  
33 that was coming in and finding out what they had and  
34 there was equipment that we actually had already  
35 packed up which the company had deemed a non-  
36 sensitive piece of equipment had not been use for 15  
37 months but for some reason this company had put an  
38 operational need statement in; now they want it. Go  
39 back through reopen and get that piece of equipment  
40 out. As minute as it might have been, so the focus  
41 was again mission focused.

1 **MG Perkins:** And is it clear to say, I don't want to  
2 overstate this, as the key logistician in the  
3 battalion that nothing that was needed logistically  
4 for Wanat whether it was air, sling loads, or anything  
5 like that was not available due to the ongoing RIP?

**Brown** 6 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : From my perspective, no, sir. Again, maybe again  
7 the tunnel vision was specifically on that----

8 **MG Perkins:** I just want your opinion as the logistician.

**Brown** 9 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I remember not having any conflict getting what  
10 I needed to----

11 **MG Perkins:** because of the RIP?

**Brown** 12 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

13 **MG Perkins:** You talk about the LOG Stats, and it is an  
14 automated thing that comes up over you guys tracked it  
15 every day and looked at it and from your recollection  
16 there was never a critical shortage of any class of  
17 supply at Wanat as they went through this?

**Brown** 18 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Not Wanat, no, sir.

19 **MG Perkins:** Where are those archived, logs? Are they daily?  
20 Twice-a-day? How often do they come up?

**Brown** 21 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : It was every day, I'd get stuff from the  
22 companies, myself, and actually dual people, myself  
23 and the FSC XO--Company XO, Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6). We **Grape**  
24 get them at the same time, the Company XO would send  
25 it to both of us. I would review it, he would review  
26 it, and make sure that there is no--nothing that we  
27 are missing between and if there is, it was hey, can  
28 you support this?

29 **MG Perkins:** So are they archived? What kind of database were  
30 they on? Were they PowerPoint?

**Brown** 31 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : They were on a secret hard drive, it was an  
32 Excel spreadsheet, so was it literally--literally you  
33 what put the data in and it would automatically  
34 update-- color-coded.

35 **MG Perkins:** So it's a spreadsheet that would do all of the  
36 math and automatically up----

**Brown** 1 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : That would color-code it, too, so even if you  
2 were not paying attention to the numbers----

3 **MG Perkins:** So that would be on a hard-drive that was like in  
4 the S4 shop?

**Brown** 5 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

6 **MG Perkins:** Which is in (b)(2)High now or did you leave it?

**Brown** 7 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : I left an external head-- there was an external  
8 hard drive that was left at (b)(2)High ----

9 **MG Perkins:** Left in Afghanistan?

**Brown** 10 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. And all of the stuff that was on the  
11 computer was sent to or in files, I believe maybe in  
12 (b)(2)High, I don't know about the secret hard drives.

13 **MG Perkins:** You said Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) **Diamond**  
14 wall when you--the whole discussion that we are going  
15 to have--- (b)(2)High were going to have this or that?

**Brown** 16 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

17 **MG Perkins:** And he won that battle as you recall?

**Brown** 18 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

19 **MG Perkins:** And so would you say that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) **Diamond**  
20 was pretty focused on making sure the material that you  
21 needed was there, force protection and so on?

**Brown** 22 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. I have many trips to my office from  
23 Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) just pounding me up making sure that--  
24 -- **Diamond**

25 **MG Perkins:** Speaking of that then, when we get to the point  
26 then that we know that the contractors--the equipment  
27 is not going to show, you obviously went to brigade;  
28 right?

**Brown** 29 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. I did not fight that at my level.  
30 Major (b)(3), (b)(6) would fight it.

31 **MG Perkins:** **Red** Did you have discussions with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) **Diamond** do  
32 you know what he did?

**Brown** 33 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, again, I went to Major (b)(3), (b)(6) **Red** and----

1 **MG Perkins:** So, you went to the XO?

**Brown** 2 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : And right to him and he fought that battle and  
3 again, our daily sit--our commander's updates daily,  
4 which was after the LOG Sync meeting and so--if there  
5 were issues----

6 **MG Perkins:** Do you think it was about the 10th is when it was  
7 determined that we are not going to have some of the  
8 equipment that we want?

**Brown** 9 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I would believe so; I can't recall the date, sir.  
10 I know that it was early on.

11 **MG Perkins:** And at that point, was the understanding at the  
12 battalion that it was never going to show up or that  
13 it was delayed?

**Brown** 14 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : It was delayed, I think that they were trying to  
15 make criteria or trying to--I believe that they were  
16 trying to--umm--provide additional assets--whatever  
17 this contractor needed to get them up there whether it  
18 be route clearance or escorts, I can't remember at  
19 this point.

20 **MG Perkins:** So, at that point, the conclusion was not that we  
21 were not going to get the equipment; the understanding  
22 was that it was not going to be there when we want it.

**Brown** 23 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

24 **MG Perkins:** Which is different--when it finally showed up, I  
25 think as the General said, I think on the 13th a  
26 backhoe or something like that? Do you know if that  
27 was from the original contractor or was that a  
28 different contractor?

**Brown** 29 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I don't know, sir, I don't know where it came  
30 from.

31 **MG Perkins:** Okay, but again, so the battle drill back at the  
32 battalion, when we determined that we are not going to  
33 get the--mainly it was the equipment that we needed--  
34 engineering equipment, was it--you went to the XO, go  
35 to brigade, we go through contracting and then the  
36 COR, or whatever, obviously he starts putting pressure  
37 on the contractor and do you know exactly how it

1                   resulted in getting the backhoe up there? I mean,  
2                   what did they have to do then?

**Brown** 3   **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I believe that we--with--I believe this was  
4                   literally a three pronged attack; I let Major (b)(3), (b)(6) **Red**  
5                   know immediately, once it was identified through the  
6                   **Red** engineer. Major (b)(3), (b)(6) started doing his calls, and I  
7                   had called the brigade 4, saying, can you help me out,  
8                   are you sure on this? And at the same time, I know  
9                   **Copper** that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) was literally on the phone for  
10                  hours with resource manager and the COR and every one  
11                  trying----

12 **MG Perkins:**     Put pressure on the contractor----

**Brown** 13 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir, so it was literally it was multiple--  
14                  this was not something lai'zae fair that we were just  
15                  going through.

16 **MG Perkins:**     Understand. Do you recall or did you have a  
17                  conversation with either the Company XO or the Company  
18                  Commander when it was determined that we are not going  
19                  to have the equipment that we want to let them know  
20                  that, hey, you are not going to get the crane or the  
21                  bulldozer or something like that?

**Brown** 22 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir, I believe that it was never told to them  
23                  that they were not getting it, if anything it was that  
24                  it's delayed.

25 **MG Perkins:**     Okay, were they informed that it was not going to  
26                  be there on the day that they thought it was going to  
27                  be there?

**Brown** 28 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I believe so, yes, sir. I believe so and I  
29                  believe that was through an update--the evening  
30                  update.

31 **MG Perkins:**     And then do you recall what their response was  
32                  when they were told that it was delayed?

**Brown** 33 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir, I don't remember the response.

34 **MG Perkins:**     You know, did they say, again that this a mission  
35                  ender?

**Brown** 36 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, I----

1 **MG Perkins:** Or okay, we will fill it with e-tools or  
2 something, or you don't know?

**Brown** 3 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir, I don't remember their response.

4 **MG Perkins:** For--if there had been--if you had got a Log  
5 Stat or something that said, okay, we have a shortage  
6 of water or pickets or something like that, what would  
7 sort of be your battle drill or your possibilities  
8 that you go through to fulfill that to quota?

**Brown** 9 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, the Log Stats are due to me one-hour prior  
10 to my meeting and they generally forecast--give  
11 reports the day prior. It was in the early evening,  
12 prior to my meeting which was, I believe, 1600 would  
13 be the local timeframe. That was really mission  
14 complete for any air assets, no air missions that day  
15 so they would be able to have time to update their  
16 logs like that for that meeting. Anything that did  
17 not fly during that round, if it was critical, we  
18 would try to find out--try to find another way to make  
19 it happen.

20 **MG Perkins:** Were there specific Log Stats that were literally  
21 CCIR for the Battalion Commander?

**Brown** 22 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I know the weapon systems, I think they were  
23 50 cal and above was an automatic----

24 **MG Perkins:** What if you had a report that they were black on  
25 water?

**Brown** 26 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, if they got to black, I was done; that was  
27 unacceptable.

28 **MG Perkins:** That would not be for them to fill out a little  
29 sticky and put it in someone's inbox. In other words,  
30 if you got a report that someone was black on water--  
31 -

**Brown** 32 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I got a report once of a black status at  
33 3:30 in the morning by Major (b)(3), (b)(6) almost throwing me **Red**  
34 out of bed. Which turned out to be a false report,  
35 but again, he had received a report from Brigade that  
36 hey, this FOB is black, what are we doing about it? I  
37 said, let me go back and do a check. And it wasn't  
38 black, but there were so multiple eyes on this.

1 MG Perkins: So that left an impression on you that the one  
2 time you got a black report?

Brown 3 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I take it personal----

4 MG Perkins: You remember to this day----

Brown 5 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): I took it personally after that day.

6 MG Perkins: So, it would be safe to say that if you had  
7 gotten a black report between the 8th and 13th that  
8 you would remember?

Brown 9 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, yes.

10 LtGen Natonski: How would brigade had gotten a black report  
11 before you?

Brown 12 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): They--they--they, sir, I received my Log Stats at  
13 the same time as Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) did, Lieutenant Grape  
14 Grape (b)(3), (b)(6) would then do a compiled report which is the  
15 same thing, he would just take those numbers, throw  
16 them in, and automatically update the numbers and  
17 color-code it. And that would be sent to the SPO.

18 LtGen Natonski: So it was simultaneous reporting?

Brown 19 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

20 LtGen Natonski: Coming from the FOB both of the battalion  
21 and the brigade?

Brown 22 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): No, to battalion, through two means, myself at  
23 (b)(2)High and the FSE--our distro platoon and XO down  
24 at (b)(2)High

25 LtGen Natonski: But the brigade would get it at the same  
26 time?

Brown 27 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): No, once the FSC--my company would get it, the  
28 XO, he would then compile it and send it to the  
29 brigade.

30 LtGen Natonski: So, brigade got it but it was sustained?

Brown 31 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Generally that is why they would get it late  
32 evening timeframe.

1 LtGen Natonski: So, the mistake was somewhere in their  
2 computation or something?

Brown 3 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, yes, sir.

4 LtGen Natonski: That's all.

5 MG Perkins: How reliable were then Afghan contractors?

Brown 6 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): In my experience, sir, getting them to do  
7 something when you want them to do it. You got to  
8 always expect at least 2-3 days before they get to it.  
9 If you had your hand on them and they worked routinely  
10 with you, we did not have much issues, it was the ones  
11 that we just start the contracts up with---

12 MG Perkins: The contracting was out of your hands it went up  
13 a day a go?

Brown 14 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. That is why we try to do local, again  
15 there was a lot tension between the different valleys  
16 even, and so therefore if we want to--we would always  
17 try to get a contract with an area, we would try to  
18 get bids, literally three bids from the same--  
19 vicinity--same valley so when we sent our three bids  
20 up to compete on.

21 MG Perkins: Where were the contractors for Wanat? They were  
22 not in the city?

Brown 23 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): They were not local, sir, because they just did  
24 not have the machinery.

Beta 25 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): You mentioned, when General Perkins was asking  
26 you a question, about the LOC, the ground LOC. And  
27 you said that you were concerned that Wanat would be  
28 an air-only resupply because of the last thousand  
29 meters. Can you explain that?

Brown 30 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6): Just wide enough to get--Sir, I was ambushed  
31 under twice--on two different occasions on that road--  
32 once we went to that first location and coming back  
33 that day we got ambushed --with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Diamond  
34 Knowing that, you can almost expect every time that we  
35 send a--my distro platoon up there that they were  
36 going to get hit. The road was not, I believe, in my  
37 opinion, in the winter time, be able to support a

1 larger vehicle unless that last section was re-  
2 enforced or built up, sir.

**Beta** 3 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): So it would not be passable by a large vehicle.

**Brown** 4 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

**Beta** 5 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): thank you.

6 **LtGen Natonski:** Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) **Brown**  
7 you are ordered not to  
8 discuss the testimony that you provided to day with  
9 anyone other than members of the investigation team.  
10 You will not allow any witness in this investigation  
11 to talk to you about the testimony that he has given  
12 or in which he intends to give. If anyone should try  
13 to influence your testimony or attempt to discuss your  
14 testimony, you are instructed to notify Lieutenant  
15 **Beta** Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you  
understand? **Sigma**

**Brown** 16 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** I just want to thank you for service to our  
18 country, to the army, for what you did on multiple  
19 deployments and wish you luck in school. What is next  
20 on your assignment list?

**Brown** 21 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Fort Carson, Colorado, Sir.

22 **MG Perkins:** Alright.

**Brown** 23 **CPT** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** There you go.

25 [The investigation closed at 1511, 28 October 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Subj: TESTIMONY OF CPT Brown (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, GIVEN ON  
28 OCTOBER 2009, AT FT. BENNING, GEORGIA

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify  
that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel Beta  
U.S. Marine Corps  
Staff Judge Advocate

5 Dec 09  
DATE