1 [The testimony began at 1528, 28 October 2009.]

2 **LtGen Natonski:** Major (b)(3), (b)(6) November, I am Lieutenant General
3 Richard F. Natonski, United States Marine Corps. I
4 have been appointed by the Commander of US Central
5 Command to conduct an investigation into the facts and
6 circumstances surrounding a combat action at Wanat,
7 Afghanistan in July 2008. Major General David
8 Perkins, United States Army has been assigned as the
9 Deputy Investigating Officer, and Lieutenant Colonel
10 Beta (b)(3), (b)(6) and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) are Sigma
11 Judge Advocates Assigned to the investigation team.

12 The testimony you provide today will be recorded,
13 transcribed and included in our report of the
14 investigation. Based on your testimony we may also
15 prepare a separate written statement for your review
16 and signature.

17 Prior to coming on the record today you signed a
18 Privacy Act Statement. Is that correct?

November
19 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. Your testimony will be made under
21 oath and you will now be sworn.

22 [The witness was sworn.]

Beta
23 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Please state your full name, spelling your last.

November
24 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): (b)(3), (b)(6), last name spelled (b)(3), (b)(6) November
25 (b)(3), (b)(6) November

Beta
26 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What is your current unit and that unit's
27 location?

November
28 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Bravo Company, AFSOUTH, US Army NATO, located in
29 Madrid, Spain.

Beta
30 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): You're currently a Major in the U.S. Army?

November
31 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): That's correct.

Beta
32 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): In July 2008 what was your unit and that unit's
33 location?

November
34 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I was with the 173d Airborne Brigade. We were
35 headquartered in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

Beta
36 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What were your duties with the 173d?

November

1 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I was Brigade Engineer, sir.

Beta 2 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Is engineer your occupational field?

November

3 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): In July 2008 how long had you been with the 173d?

November

5 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I'd been with the 173d since July of 2006.
6 I had arrived at the brigade and became the S-3 for
7 the Special Troops Battalion. Upon deployment
8 essentially I was given word that I would fill the
9 Brigade Engineer role. After getting the Special
10 Troops Battalion, which is a new unit within the
11 brigade MTOE. After I got them up and running I would
12 transition to the brigade engineer spot.

Beta 13 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What does the Brigade Engineer do?

November

14 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I would say 80 percent U.S. Construction as in
15 construction for our troops and the bases which we
16 occupy, and 10 percent for the Afghan National
17 Security Force, and then 10 percent counter IED kind
18 of other duties.

Beta 19 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): When you deployed with the 173d how long after
20 you were there did you become the Brigade Engineer?

November

21 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): About 3 weeks, sir.

Beta 22 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What U.S. Engineer assets did you have under the
23 brigade?

November

24 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, one Engineer Company that is within the
25 Special Troops Battalion.

Beta 26 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And what does that consist of, that company?

November

27 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Two Sapper Platoons, sir, and a small equipment
28 section.

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): By "equipment" what do you mean?

November

30 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, equipment--bucket loaders, some SEE trucks,
31 some trailers, a very small amount of equipment.

Beta 32 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Was there--elsewhere in Afghanistan were there
33 other U.S. assets you could use to tap into?

November

34 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. There was an engineer brigade. The
35 way they basically aligned their forces that we had an

engineer company that was in a general support to the brigade, so I worked closely with that commander. I didn't task him, but basically you know worked closely to make sure his engineers were working where we needed them the most.

Beta November

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Now, down at the battalions under your brigade were there engineers assigned to those battalions?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Within the Special Troops Battalion, sir, there was the engineer company, and that engineer company was basically a maneuver company for all intents and purposes. There were Soldiers both engineers and other MOS' that came out of Special Troops Battalion and formed a route clearance package that supported generally Task Force Rock, but also would clear other areas in AO Bayonet.

Beta November

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you have a dedicated Task Force beneath the brigade; were they battalion engineers?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): There were, sir. There were--and that was really honestly a fluke because the Special Troops Battalion base unit before it became a Special Troops Battalion it was the 82nd Engineer Battalion. So when that unit reflagged the unit was still full of engineers, and so Cub Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), the Special Troops Commander, basically with these excess lieutenants decided to place them more in conjunction with the brigade, which was a great move to put battalion engineers in I think almost all the battalions.

Beta November

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Would you work with those battalion engineers?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Sure.

Beta November

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): During your time as the brigade engineer other than Wanat were you involved in the establishment of any COPs?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta November

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Which ones?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): COP Goscha, sir; COP Lone Star; two OPs for Task Force Saber and I can't pull the name; and then all of the other construction that we did to expand or increase force protection on all the various spaces we had.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): From an engineer's perspective what needs to be
2 done to establish a new COP?

November 3 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, you have to have a plan.

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Who develops that plan?

November 5 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Well----

Beta 6 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): If the S-3 comes to you and says they want to
7 establish a COP in this vicinity what's your role at
8 that point?

November 9 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I guess part of the question or the answer
10 is what are the requirements? What is needed and how
11 long is that particular base going to be there. So
12 what--and again that can go into a whole explanation
13 of the process----

Beta 14 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Please do.

November 15 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Okay. So in CJTF82 or 101 I guess the
16 construction was managed by the joint facilities
17 utilization board run at the JTF level. And so for
18 construction I had a cost estimate over $100,000 or if
19 it was any brick and mortar type construction as in
20 bricks and mortar, anything then it had to get JPA
21 level approval, which meant then that it had to meet
22 the requirements of the JPA. And generally that was
23 an operational needs statement signed by the
24 commander. It was a cost estimate. It was a designed
25 scope of work and then the signal folks would insist
26 on a communications plan as part of that effort. So
27 part of--a lot of my job was gathering those things up
28 and either building that package itself or taking the
29 requirement and after bidding with the unit sending
30 that to the Engineer Brigade that would fill that
31 package, and that's all in advance of JTF level
32 approval. And at that JTF approval board essentially
33 I would be on the line and be over Adobe Breeze, but
34 able to respond to questions and basically justify why
35 this particular project is needed.

Beta 36 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): From establishing like COP Goscha and Lone Star
37 did you have a template at the brigade level that you
38 kind of thought this package is--this works?

November 39 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. And I mean by "template" meaning every
40 situation is different, every piece of terrain, every
41 type of unit you know it really depended on what the

unit wanted. And so in conversation with the unit, either the engineer but then likely the battalion XO it would be a discussion of what are your true needs and then how long do you think, you know, you can really wait to get it. And again my impression is that everybody wants something now, no later than tomorrow, but in reality if you want to go with brick and mortar building you're talking about 9 months of construction. If you want a brick and mortar wall to put the Afghan face on a base then it's not going to be done right away.

LtGen Natonski: But doesn't every COP require force protection measures?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Absolutely, sir.

LtGen Natonski: So there are common analogies in every construction project?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Whether that's HESCOs or guard towers or it's how much you include in that initial package. And then we literally--some times the cost estimate will be well over 1.5 million and then the JTF would say you know--and I think it's a congressional--it's a law that says you can't do that in terms of military construction, you can't do that much construction. So, you know, we determine what's a back out of the particular project.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Like would the HESCOS roll into that dollar----

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Regarding Wanat when was the first time you learned that Task Force Rock planned to put something at Wanat?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I think in basically April 2008, that's when there was really I guess some momentum and some significant discussion about that. You know, I brought my green book from the deployment so I don't know--I've got some notes that I've put on a separate sheet of paper and I can discover those if that's----

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Please do.

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): It just kind of lays out to me what----

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Would these notes reflect the actions you took?

November

1 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, they basically reflect the notes, you know,
2 specifically out of the green book that I carried for
3 the second half of the deployment. So I guess of some
4 significance, you know, I get back from approximately
5 you know 30 days of being gone from JAF on a mid-tour
6 leave with travel on either end. And on 11 April my
7 notes say Wanat COP with a question mark, and then
8 Wanat land farming 60 percent and drainage. So to me-
9 -that was in a conversation with the Bayonet XO, you
10 November know said "Hey, (b)(3), (b)(6) welcome back, here's what's going
11 on, you know, ROCKs leaning forward on the COP, you
12 know, wants you to dig into it."

Beta 13 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): That's April timeframe?

November

14 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. And then in mid-April basically I got
15 listed a Wanat coordination meeting. The Rock XO,
16 another Rock Captain, a rep from the Engineer Brigade,
17 a rep from the Company, in as I think Chosen-6, Matt
18 Myer, and basically that was kind of the initial
19 discussion. What are the requirements; what do you
20 guys want to achieve out there; what are you doing;
21 how many people do you need to house; do you need to
22 house an ANSF.

Beta 23 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What did they want to achieve?

November

24 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, they wanted to house the ANSF and I think
25 the housing was I would say approximately 40 U.S. plus
26 twenty-five ANSF for ANA. And that's when kind of the
27 discussion of the location in terms of Wanat. But the
28 things we talked about you know the remoteness of if
29 you will Wanat, the conditions of the roads from Camp
30 Blessing up to the Village of Wanat. We discussed
31 land issue and that through the point of discussion,
32 hard huts----

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): When they came to you did they have a particular
34 location or just Wanat?

November

35 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I think at that point they were looking at,
36 you know, where the battle occurred. So they already
37 kind of had an idea of where they wanted to go as in
38 near the district center, near the police station, you
39 know the ability to affect the people. And we talked
40 other engineer details he wanted a stone and mortar
41 wall; they wanted to reuse the shower and latrine
42 container from Bella and then hard huts, and of course
43 we had already done brick and mortar buildings on COP

Honaker-Miracle but basically those are fairly expensive upfront. It will push it right over the cost caps, and so we decided to do hard huts basically B-huts with the ability to put three layers of sandbags on those.

On 22 April, sir, my notes are COP Wanat ONS as in operational needs statement is inbound tonight, and that was probably a note from either a conversation with the battalion XO or you know something I picked up at the Commander's Call between all of the battalion commanders with the brigade commander.

Sir, along this, I guess--the XO pulled me in and basically said that--you know was concerned about the low ground versus the high ground. And (b)(3), (b)(6) Echo had just come from 1st Battalion, and you know my impression was that he was kind of questioning why Rock wanted the base in the low ground. He said they established Goscha Main you know down south and pre-planned fires and they wacked a bunch of bad guys and they had just done a tremendous job of affecting, you know killing the enemy. And so what he asked me to do was kind of a line of sight analysis where you take the grids and you basically on a computer can project what you can see from a certain point on the ground using all of the databases. The lower you got in the valley the less you could see. And we templated another spot that was higher up a certain ridgeline, but with the terrain there the higher you go the more construction effort you're going to have to put in just to get to that spot.

LtGen Natonski: Do you know where that site is; do you remember?

November **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, specifically----

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): If I showed you a map would that help?

November **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): It might, sir, yes.

[Laying out and document.]

November **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I can't pick it out, sir, other than to say that I remember it being 500 meters or so from the valley floor or from this district center type area and more up on a ridgeline.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** There's been some discussion in this area
2 here as you said [pointing to map] involved a lot more
3 construction to establish.

November
4 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

5 **LtGen Natonski:** That's several steps going up into the
6 hillside. You don't recall exactly----

November
7 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir, I don't.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you discuss what it would take to build in
9 that alternate location, the type of assets you would
10 have to use?

November
11 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Generally, sir, I mean you would have to use
12 dynamite and you would have to use equipment, and
13 you're talking a long process because I guess the site
14 wasn't pin pointed because Rock--and again in my
15 impression and talking with the XO that they weren't
16 going to consider that and I didn't do any more
17 analysis on how really long it would take to build the
18 road to----

Beta 19 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Why was it your impression they weren't going to
20 consider the alternate location?

November
21 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, because basically partnering with the police
22 and being close to the district center being able to
23 effect the people was I think Rock's biggest concern
24 and why they wanted to plan on the low ground.

Beta 25 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you communicate at all your line of sight
26 analysis, the results of that?

November
27 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I think I emailed it up to (b)(3), (b)(6) up at Tiger
28 Rock.

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): The XO?

November
30 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta 31 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you recall getting any feedback?

November
32 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): You mentioned some COPs at the first battalion
34 with the 503rd----do you recall transmitting any of
35 that data to Rock or did you have that data?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I think actually Echo (b)(3), (b)(6) and the XO he had the presentation and I think he shot it up to Rock and basically said "here's an example of what we did," and again I think it was FOB Kucheman. But they basically went up to the top of the hill, took off the top, flattened it out and built you know a strong point with great fields of fire, and instead of it being planted in the town they had over watch down to the town and as in (b)(3), (b)(6) words they can do a great Echo job of killing the enemy and really affecting that area.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you recall any discussions with Major (b)(3), (b)(6) Red regarding that?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): About FOB Kuchemon, no, sir.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And you did not recall anything regarding the line of sight analysis?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I think I emailed that up to probably Red (b)(3), (b)(6), maybe (b)(6) and then you know the Rock engineer as well.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): ----do you remember the person that was pretty much set on the location? Was that Chosen?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): In April, sir, just coming off of leave I was getting a handle on, you know, where do we stand, I did that coordination meeting and basically I think we gave them, you know, to think about in terms of you know what do they want to achieve in the new COP. Again the road width constriction--just going from Blessing to Wanat you know a standard U.S. size bucket loader, I think would have to be routed the whole way as opposed to put on a trailer, as large trucks did not go that way because the road was so constricted. So those are the--some of the considerations that we just talked about. Again this is kind of at the early stages.

Let's see, basically in early May, sir, with the Rock engineer I heard again from the Rock engineer that you know when Rock was going to do an on-the-ground assessment on the 2nd of May, and I believe that was pushed back to the 8th of May, and a Shura, they determined that there were nine or ten landowners. And I got in my notes that CRES moved on or about the 10th. CRES is the Contingency Real Estate Support

guys, civilians that are you know authorized to do a lease on the part of the U.S. Government to lease land. So just in short how you do that is you've actually got to go out and validate the land. You figure out what physical--what Afghan owns this parcel; have him sign for it; and then with all of the parcels clearly identified the real estate--the CRES rep can calculate the amount of dollars that U.S. is willing to lease this land to you. You know over the deployment basically real estate or land was a--as we've discovered was a hugely contentious issue. Again if you come in and you get your--your land gets taken by the U.S. and then all of a sudden you're angry at the coalition. So I think that all of our battalions you know encountered that, and so one of the things we tried to do is figure out that process so that we wouldn't continue--"we" as in the large coalition wouldn't continue to screw things up. So we did get a CRES rep out there meeting to Blessing. I don't think he made it all the way out to Wanat in this early short one or 2 weeks, but I think we were able to get a survey team that came from the Engineer Brigade to basically lock in points. I think those related to the individual parcels of land that the Afghan owns as well as Chosen company's saying "This is the land that we want to occupy in the future."

On the engineering note I guess out of that was--and again I don't know if this happened in early May, but a few weeks after, but it was descope the number of hard huts because you can't fit--we couldn't house all of the people we wanted to basically have lived in the hardened huts at the base. So, again I don't remember the exact numbers, but maybe it went from six to four of hard huts.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you recall ballpark numbers of folks they planned to house up in Wanat?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) **:** Sir, I think about thirty or so U.S. and twenty
November to thirty ANA, and I think I said earlier forty, but you know I think it was a platoon plus. But when you talk about I guess people rotating in or a convoy coming and staying overnight and then moving back those are my ballpark guesses. Whatever is in the operational need statement in the database I think would tell you exactly what we put forward in the term so "we need housing for this number.

Sir, in June--in terms of approval again I don't remember or I don't recall exactly how this went, meaning the JFUB, Joint Facilities Utilization Board approval.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What did you send up besides an operational needs statement? What other documentation goes up to the JFUB or was it just the operational needs statement with enclosures?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, in this case the battalion, I believe, sent November up an operational needs statement, and then I created one for Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) signature, and did send Delta that up to the JTF. And essentially we were asking for these specific requirements for the COP as well as a design, an estimated statement of work from the Engineer Brigade. So the engineer Brigade you know upon receipt of the ONS, it basically let them know the operational needs statement that this mission is coming and it's a big mission from Rock, here's what we're looking at doing. I mean they're waiting for specifically what the customer wants, and again I know that's too business like, but they don't want to launch off on one direction and start preplanning and then an operational needs statement comes in and says we actually want this over here. They knew it was coming and they created the entire JFUB package, if you will, that got approved by the JFUB. I believe that was in----

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Who created--who put that package together?

November **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): The Engineer Brigade, sir.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Okay.

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. And then I believe that was approved November in the early or the first of June JFUB which was the first Saturday of the month at the JTF level. I believe again that we did some sort of emergency funding request for--with in terms of this project, meaning the normal cycle would be you ask for the design; you get the approval the first Saturday in the month. Say for instance June and then you request funds for the following month in July. That's the normal process. I believe in this case we asked for basically immediate funds. I don't know if there was an EFR, an Emergency Funds Request, but basically they

1 wanted the ability to, you know, execute it
2 immediately. So that was in June.

3 My notes basically--between the 8th and 13th of
4 June is that the Wanat PR and C's can purchase
5 requests and commitments were submitted to the RM,
6 Resource Manager. For me that was a positive event in
7 that Rock created the PR and C's, signed by either the
8 XO or the commander, and forward them to the
9 administrative contracting officer in Bagram. They
10 did approval; they looked on the fund sheet and they
11 said "Okay, this project does have funds," and then
12 those PR and C's are sent down to the joint
13 contracting office that was on FOB Fantijaf.

14 My notes, I guess 15 June I got a note that says
15 "Wanat equals a Go." On the 29th of June, I get a note
16 that says "Bayonet 6 asked for a timeline for the
17 Wanat COP" from Rock, and that again was at a
18 Commander's Call in the evening that the staff sat in
19 on.

20 And then end of June I --from the 23rd to the 25th
21 I've got a note that says "(b)(3), (b)(6) visits 23rd to 25th; on Copper
22 the 26th it goes back saying "that refers to Captain
23 Copper (b)(3), (b)(6)" who was the Rock guy who generally worked on
24 Camp Blessing. He managed all of the contractors,
25 contracts for Camp Blessing. He had come down I
26 believe to Fanti to work with the JCO to get the Wanat
27 contract, you know, in order. He did not--he didn't
28 stop by which at the time I kind of thought was maybe
29 a bit surprising.

Beta 30 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Why is that?

31 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Just because I figured that you know if he had
32 November concerns about the contractors--I mean he was down on
33 FOB Fanti that he would have just stopped in because
34 it was this big upcoming mission for the Rock.

35 In July, sir, I got a note on the 2nd that said
36 Falcon from Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) the Rock Engineer. It says
37 "Wanat Chosen is going tomorrow." On the 6th of July I
38 get the Bella move CONOP as a note, and then basically
39 got some notes talking about you know the preparation
40 from Rock. And my notes basically say "three trucks
41 with Class IV, four trucks at Blessing, 8x8s and
42 2x12s" which is the lumber that you need to build the
43 hard huts. And in my note is enough to start to build

1 two hard huts. And then engineer squad plus the
2 survey team, two-by equipment operators and their role
3 as planned to be just supervising the local nationals,
4 you know, that were contracted to actually operate the
5 heavy equipment as in the bulldozer, motor excavator.

Beta November
6 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): The assets that you listed right there----

7 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta
8 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): On what date--is this before the move, before the
9 execution?

November
10 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): This is on the 6th of July, sir, and I don't----

Beta November
11 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you attend a CONOP brief on that day?

12 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I did, sir. I believe that was the CONOP brief.

Beta
13 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And what were the assets one more time?

14 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): My note on the 6th of July, sir, was three trucks
15 November with Class IV, four trucks at Blessing in parenthesis
16 8x8s and 2x12s, and the significance for me was Rock
17 has got lumber, they've got enough to start the hard
18 huts, and then also that there is an engineer squad
19 meaning engineer troops that were at Blessing. They
20 also had two engineer equipment operators, U.S.
21 Soldiers, and their mission was basically to supervise
22 local nationals that were contracted to operate the
23 heavy equipment.

Beta
24 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): The trucks you listed, your understanding those
25 were at Blessing ready to move up?

26 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): The trucks, yes, sir, the trucks at Blessing. My
27 November note on the 9th is--and this is specifically with
28 reference to the contracts, it says "MHE is Material
29 Handling Equipment awarded 1 July." It was a contract
30 awarded on those four, a bulldozer, a loader and an
31 excavator, and that's at Blessing, meaning--and I took
32 that to mean they were at Blessing ready to go.

33 Fill, my note is fill contracted 11 July, gravel
34 and dirt, but the delivery window was 18th to the 28th
35 delivery fill. And my note is 85 percent of the wire
36 perimeter up, so I think this was either on the 9th,
37 but trying to clarify what the status of the contract
38 was for Rock. My note is "issues at Wanat: drainage,
39 lack of available fill and dig assets." And then my

note is 11 July, but that's--I'm guessing on the date "Contractor at Blessing just outside Blessing; Rock is documenting the equipment with photos; the contracting office is modifying the contract to show coverage of damage/destruction." So there is a point on the 11th where the contractor had refused to move up because he didn't want his equipment to get shot up, and so Rock went and basically said "Okay, how can we get you up there," and the guy said--you know, I'm guessing, but he said I want coverage for my equipment if it's damaged. So they're working with the joint contracting office to modify that contract. That is generally the end of my notes from that time period, sir.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What was your understanding of the building of a COP and how long it would take for day one when forces arrive? What happens next?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, establish security, start building the
November perimeter, generally all of those things. At some point, you know, Rock would determine sequence, but the lumber would arrive and you know the engineer troops up there would start to work on those hard huts.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): How many days after the unit first arrived to that location do you think the lumber would show up? Does it show up on day 2, does it show up on day 10?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): I did not know in advance when it was going to
November show up. My opinion is as soon as it was okay to build, if you will, and it was the right time then that's when it should have started. I mean as early as possible. In trying to program out you know how long this thing was going to build I was clear and I believe Rock was clear that this is an effort that would last well beyond Rock's time in the Bayonet. This was something that was going to go through the RIP, which again hindsight is not the right call.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Why is that?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, I've only done just a little bit of
November reading, you know, I would say that's an AAR comment from this event. I would say it's somewhat at the brigade level, but certainly at the battalion level, and I don't know what it's like at the company level, but there was a--we were basically starting the RIP.

1 When battle occurred my replacement was on the ground,
2 and I'm not saying that to say that I was distracted
3 by that, but the fact is we were there and it was in
4 our 14th month and naturally you're tired at the end of
5 14 months.

Beta 6 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you go to Wanat?

November 7 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I did not, sir.

Beta 8 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): But you had a team that went up; the battalion
9 sent an engineer team up?

10 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): There was an engineer survey team that came from
November 11 the Engineer Brigade. They were the guys who survey
12 stakes that went up on that mini-recon. I believe
13 they went up with Chosen and then we also had them
14 going back you know during the occupation of the COP,
15 so that we got the initial positions right. Literally
16 if you build a Hesco in the wrong spot it's not
17 reusable and you have to tear it out. So they were
18 going to site in not only the walls of the COP, but
19 also you know where each hard hut would be built.
20 They mentioned the descoping effort that I think we
21 had to go from six or so hard huts and drop that by
22 two just to fit within the walls of the COP.

Beta 23 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Was there a--did you see a plan of the actual
24 building of the COP?

25 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. I mean what that was basically a
November 26 design, and what I mean by that is a schematic that
27 shows the Hesco walls, the location of the hard huts,
28 you know burnout latrines, a parking area, and
29 generally that was it.

Beta 30 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): That was what you saw

November 31 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Correct.

Beta 32 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you see anything day 1 this asset arrives,
33 day 2 this asset arrives, day 3--was there anything
34 like a sync matrix with stuff flowing in?

November 35 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I didn't see one, sir.

Beta 36 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): If there was one, who would do one, if that would
37 be done?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I don't--to me the battalion should have done one. That wasn't briefed at the CONOP. To me my thoughts on the CONOP, I guess, afterwards were was that a lot of helicopters going back and forth between Bella and troops, but there was little or no details on the plan after the troops got to Bella--excuse me, to Wanat.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And after that CONOPs brief what was your sense of how long it was going to take and how it would--Wanat would be built up based on the staff work you'd done?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Months, sir, months. I mean a hard hut I would say a platoon can do that--an engineer platoon in one and under a month, so maybe 3 weeks. So if they were doing four plus others we're talking months to get those hard huts in.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And you understand they'd been approved for stone walls up there?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. Rock initially wanted the stone mortar wall, and that's one of the things that I believe came out because just the cost combined with all the other things they wanted--and obviously I think it came out because of force protection as well because there's no--it takes a lot to build a stone wall as well because it provides force protection whereas Hescos go up a lot quicker.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And then the huts--what else would take a while to build besides the huts?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): **[No response.]**

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): You said you thought months with an engineer platoon building that, a U.S. Engineer Platoon?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. And the hard huts I think were the longest thing that would take. The burnout latrines the guys can only you know use the bathroom, if you will, on a small COP like that in one spot until you need something that's a little better. So that's when the engineer Soldiers can build a good burnout that offers the guys better quality of life than digging your hole outside some perimeter. But the engineers can build that and they do it well and it doesn't take long.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): During the planning phase was there ever
2 consideration given--you talked about having a vehicle
3 drive the U.S. engineering asset up the road versus
4 having it low boyed up. Was there a consideration
5 given to going to the Engineer Brigade and using U.S.
6 only assets to move--

7 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. Not--I don't think there was ever from
8 November my perspective there was never a plan or consideration
9 to build this solely with U.S. assets. As I
10 mentioned, I worked with a company--the engineer
11 company commander to align his troops on our most--you
12 know highest priority missions. So I'm not tasking
13 him, "hey I need ten guys here," but I would tell him
14 "the commander's priorities are one through five; your
15 forces are currently aligned on these bases; when
16 these guys get done here I think it's smart to move
17 them to this base so that they can pick up this
18 project." And there was never a problem with
19 engineers responding to--never, but more often than
20 not they would say "okay, got it, roger, we're
21 following the commander's priorities."

Beta 22 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What was the priority at this time for the
23 brigade in July of '08; was it the RIP?

24 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I don't know, sir. I mean Wanat was a priority
25 November and RIP was a priority. In June for about 4 months we
26 thought 2/2 Infantry was coming to AO Bayonet, so we
27 were looking at building out Fortress Joyce, the PRT
28 at Cidarbon, so I had basically requested survey--
29 force survey support. The guy is going out there to
30 survey the limited space on fortress if we need to put
31 a whole infantry company here as opposed to whatever
32 they had then what can we build quick to make that
33 happen. You know just after the survey team came
34 through, a week later, 2/2 got diverted south to
35 Kandahar. So the effort we put in wasn't needed. So
36 for me that was part of my effort in June, you know as
37 a priority.

Beta 38 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Looking at Wanat--before the move up to Wanat for
39 the platoon you had done some staff work and assisted
40 Rock in marshalling assets as far as engineer assets,
41 providing some--and assisting the package up through
42 the JFUB--the contracting piece. Once the order is
43 "go execute" who is responsible for getting the
44 supplies and the rest of the items, the contracted

services, up to the site and actually digging dirt, swinging hammers? Can you explain that process and who is responsible in each step?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Sure. I mean from my perspective, sir, it's the November battalion absolutely because for this, you know, project--for every other project where the unit wanted to do--to contract the service then the unit had to go solicit for contracts, and they had--or they could either get bids from companies in that area, and that area of a certain base, or they could work exclusively through the Joint Contracting Office on Fanti, so that Fanti, the Joint Contracting Officer would put this certain work out to a certain number of contractors and wait for you know a contractor to bid on the job. So for Wanat again when I talked about Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) Copper coming down you know to Fanti, to me that's what he was doing. He was working with the JCO and he was saying "Okay, where do we stand on these contracts". You know, I'm surprised he didn't pop in, but when he went back, my thought was, you know, things went well. I assumed he's got contractors and he's confident that they were going to be able to do the job.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): The engineer squad leader that comes down from the engineer company is at that site and he needs some wood to start building and it's not there, who does he go to?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, he would go to the maneuver chain of November command because for both air and generally ground, you know, the maneuver guys are the ones that assign what moves on a helicopter, and I guess in this case trucks could get--could move from Bagram all the way to Blessing you know unescorted, but then to go north away from Blessing I think they would need an escort. Again same way in Saber moving all the--excuse me Task Force Saber. With all of the bases and COPs that they had the XO in conjunction with the FOB commander is in a daily--not daily, weekly struggle to figure out what's going to move a helicopter and what's priority, whether it's food, fuel, ammunition, you know or lumber. And so you know sometimes especially in the winter lumber is really not a priority. In this case I don't think that was an issue because they had at least large, you know, lumber in the trucks staged at Blessing. To me that was a good sign, you know, ready to move forward.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Tell me about staging the trucks----

2 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I don't recall, sir. Again, I've got that note
3 November on the 6th of July and that may have been you know--it
4 may have been me calling up to Blessing, you know,
5 after the CONOP brief to say "Hey, I didn't hear any"-
6 -again I would be guessing if I said that. But it may
7 have been me after the brief--the CONOP to say "Okay,
8 tell me what you've got set and what you're going to
9 do in terms of the plan for construction." You know,
10 I didn't hear it during that CONOP brief.

Beta 11 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Who would you have spoken to?
November
12 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Either the Rock engineer or the Rock XO.

Beta 13 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Would it be U.S. or contracted vehicles that
14 lumber was on?
November
15 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Oh, definitely contract, sir, Jingle Trucks.

Beta 16 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): During the time that 2d Platoon, Chosen was at
17 Wanat, did you hear any reports of a shortage in
18 engineer equipment or supplies other than those that
19 were contracted for; were there issues with any
20 engineer equipment that you were aware of?

21 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I think the--the answer is yes, and I
22 November believe that that's why Rock was looking at modifying
23 their equipment contract because the contractors
24 refused to move up to Wanat.

Beta 25 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): But other than that particular--those pieces of
26 equipment were you aware of any U.S. equipment that
27 was taken up there, a bobcat?

28 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. A bobcat, I believe--I don't know if
29 November each company had a bobcat or--but the battalion had
30 some on Blessing, but it's something that I'm sure
31 they had up there.

Beta 32 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Are you aware of any limitation with the bobcat
33 as far loading Hescos?

34 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Surrounding this issue, sir, no. I know that if
35 November the soil is wrong then the bobcat really is almost
36 useless because if the soil is hard packed then you
37 can't dig with a bobcat. I don't know what they
38 encountered up there.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): When the engineer survey team goes up is that
2 part of their survey to check the type of soil?

November 3 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yeah, I would guess so, sir.

Beta 4 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And when you talk about a schematic of what the
5 COP at Wanat was supposed to be, how do you figure out
6 what it takes to build that COP or how many--how much
7 wood and how much of other material? Are there tables
8 you use based on square footage or----

9 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, the Engineer Brigade does that as part of
10 November their design effort. So for hard huts they've got to
11 build the materials from one hard hut and if they're
12 doing four of them then they know exactly, you know,
13 how much lumber needs to go there, yes.

14 Also with fill, yeah--then I'm thinking--and I
15 don't recall from the specific package, but you know
16 sometimes they'll put a line in there that says "fill
17 for Hescos" so that can be contracted out.

Beta 18 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Did they deal with concertina, that type of stuff
19 or were they looking at the bigger picture or would
20 they come back and say "You need 1,000 feet" or is
21 that something that would be done at the lower level?

22 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Generally, sir, I would say my experience is
23 November that's on the unit because only the unit knows dead
24 space and where exactly they want to place concertina.
25 Again, you know if the unit wants to put out--again
26 and once you say Ops then the unit will have to decide
27 here's what we want for concertina, sandbags to
28 surround this particular OP.

Beta 29 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): But at the brigade level they're looking at this
30 many Hescos. Did the brigade engineers tell you that-
31 -or the Engineer Brigade?

32 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, yes, sir. Right, so if this is on the
33 November schematic again to scale, here's the outline of the
34 perimeter, here's the entry control point, here's the
35 plan for where the hard huts are going then there's
36 also a calculation in the amount of Hescos that's part
37 of that plan and that cost us. Like I said earlier
38 it's built into the cost estimate.

Beta 39 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Thank you.

40 Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)? Sigma

Sigma 1 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) The engineer element that went with the platoon
2 up to Wanat was that from the Engineer Company that
3 was organic to the brigade or was that from a
4 different----

5 MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November: It was from a different company, sir. The one
6 that is GS, General Support to AO Bayonet.

Sigma 7 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you know whether those guys were vertical
8 engineers or--

9 MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November: There was, I believe, a vertical engineer squad
10 and two equipment operators all from Charlie, 62nd.

Sigma 11 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) A vertical engineer is just so somebody reading
12 the record and understands; they essentially build
13 things from the ground up; they don't build roads. Is
14 that essentially correct?

15 MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November: Yes, sir; carpenter, plumber, general
16 construction guy.

Sigma 17 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) So when we tend to think of the type of combat
18 engineer that is necessary to dig fighting positions,
19 et cetera, that's not what these guys were?

20 MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November: Correct, sir.

Sigma 21 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) The bobcat operator can do some of that, but
22 these guys were there to advise on the construction of
23 building the COP; is that correct?

24 MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November: No, sir. The engineer squad was there to--you're
25 correct in terms of advise just the general
26 construction that was going to occur, but specifically
27 to build hard huts.

Sigma 28 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay.

29 MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November: And the two equipment operators they are
30 specifically to supervise local nationals contracted
31 to operate the equipment.

Sigma 32 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) But none of these guys were there necessarily
33 there to help the infantry with preparing their
34 fighting positions or were they?

35 MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November: Not to my knowledge, sir.

Sigma 36 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay. I think there may be some confusion about
37 that. And the equipment that was laid on with the

local nationals you said was a bulldozer, a loader and an excavator. Do you know who came up with that equipment list? Was that something that would have been done at the battalion level, you think, or was that part of the operational needs statement, or how do we determine bulldozer, loader and excavator; any idea?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November: Sir, again that's a great question. To my knowledge that wasn't included in the Engineer Brigade's plan. I think that that kind of information would come from the initial recon. And so you have to fill Hescos; you know you got to do some digging; you know you need to move some earth around and a bulldozer is what you need as well as bucket loader I guess to fill Hescos.

Sigma **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Were there--and I apologize if you've already covered this. Were there engineer elements in Afghanistan that would have had--that the 173d would have had access to that would have had a bulldozer, a loader and an excavator?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November: Yes, sir. I mean Charlie, 62nd has an equipment platoon. Its horizontal engineers and road builders that has that type of equipment.

Sigma **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): But for the guys that are part of the 173d, the light infantry engineers those guys were essentially SAPPERs and an equipment section that just has small--they don't have the big bulldozers, loaders, excavators and that stuff?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November: Sir, I think they had a D5, two D5 dozers. I'm not sure on the type, bucket loaders.

Sigma **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Okay. And you mentioned the JFUB packet that has to go up with the operational needs statement. Do you have any idea of where that stuff is maintained? In other words if we were to try to get ahold of the ONS for COP Wanat, do you think that's something that would still exist or is that--do you have any idea, does that stay with the JFUB and their----

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November: Sir, I would check the CJ7 Office at the JTF Headquarters, and then I'd check the--if it still exists, but you know the Brigade Engineer's computer I had a record of all the 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain, you know JFUBs from almost 2 years previous.

Sigma 1 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) And then, last question is, in your time at the
2 brigade do you recall any CONOP where the brigade did
3 a combined arms rehearsal or Rock Drill?

4 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I think for say maneuver Rock Avalanche there was
5 November combined arms rehearsal. For an operation like Rock
6 Move would be unusual for the battalion to do a Rock
7 Drill or combined rehearsal or a brigade to do
8 something like that for a Battalion operation like
9 this.

Sigma 10 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) What I'm getting at was, are you aware of any
11 formalized rehearsals or Rock Drills or anything that
12 went on for this particular time, and if not would
13 that raise any eyebrows or was it business as usual to
14 do this kind of stuff without that?

15 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I don't recall any rehearsal for the Bella move
16 November to Wanat. You know, I do know that our CHOPs and our
17 3 booked helicopters and the movement of PAX, you
18 know, every day, just spoke to kind of the struggles
19 of keeping our remote bases supplied. That was
20 something that they were on top of.

Sigma 21 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) And from an engineer route clearance perspective,
22 I guess, was it your understanding that the route
23 between Bella and Wanat was fairly risky.

November
24 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Risky is you know a good description.

Sigma 25 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Both in terms of enemy activity and just the
26 condition of the road: one more than the other, or
27 about equal?

28 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I would not, just with respect to the condition
29 November of the road, sir. I mean it's a bad road.

Sigma 30 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) So for someone to say there was a ground LOC
31 between Bella and Wanat you would really have to take
32 into consideration how helpful that ground LOC is as a
33 matter of day-to-day movement. Would you say that's a
34 fair statement?

35 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. I mean the route to Blessing to
36 November Asadabad apparently 3 years or 4 years ago now was you
37 know choppy and now it's paved, and so----

Sigma 38 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) I think I may have misspoken, I mean it was
39 between Blessing and Wanat.

1 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I'm just saying maybe the counterpoint, sir, is
2 November if you start using the route then it will get better
3 and better because people will be forced to use it and
4 you'll get some attention.

Sigma 5 **LTC**(b)(3), (b)(6) But one route is not always the same as another.
6 One ground LOC is obviously--some are better than
7 others.

November 8 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, absolutely.

Sigma 9 **LTC**(b)(3), (b)(6) Okay. Sir?

10 **LtGen Natonski:** What base were you at for the brigade?

November 11 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Jalalabad, sir, FOB Fanti.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** So how much interface did you have with
13 battalion? If there was a ROC Drill would you have
14 been there or would they have come to the brigade to
15 do that ROC Drill or rehearsal to brief the brigade
16 commander?

17 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): In terms of ROC Drills, sir, I don't know. I
18 November mean I don't think I would have been invited. I think
19 they may have done one at Camp Blessing.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** But it would be internally?

November 21 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

22 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. At the time of the establishment of
23 Wanat I think that was the main effort within Task
24 Force Rock, 2nd Battalion, and it certainly had the
25 focus on--at the brigade level. But were there other
26 efforts going on simultaneously in addition to the RIP
27 TOA?

November 28 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): In terms of construction, sir, just in general?

29 **LtGen Natonski:** Well, yeah. I mean was this the only
30 evolution--the 173d BCT was on its way out. Were
31 there any other engineer efforts that were going on at
32 the time within the brigade?

33 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Absolutely, sir. I guess what I balanced was
34 November construction projects that were solely contracted out,
35 and just about every base had an ongoing project.

36 **LtGen Natonski:** These would have been improvements more
37 likely and establishment?

1 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Force protection, DFAC, billets, guard
2 November towers.

3 **LtGen Natonski:** To existing structures?

November
4 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

5 **LtGen Natonski:** Would Wanat have been a higher priority than
6 those?

November
7 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

8 **LtGen Natonski:** Because it was new?

November
9 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, it was new, sir, and because it was a new
10 base bottom line. And sir, there was--the other thing
11 I wanted to say there was also troop effort going on
12 and again the company that was in general support to
13 us had troops spread out all over either doing small
14 projects or doing quality control on existing
15 contracts.

16 **LtGen Natonski:** Is that Charlie of the 62nd?

November
17 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** They're the new company--incoming?

19 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. They are the general--the company from
20 November the Engineer Brigade that was in general support to AO
21 Bayonet.

22 **LtGen Natonski:** And so who did they belong to, the Brigade?

November
23 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, they belonged to the Engineer Brigade.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** The Engineer Brigade, did that belong to the
25 101st?

November
26 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

27 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. So, I don't know when the 101st RIP
28 TOA went. Was that anytime around that period or----

November
29 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Late March, sir.

30 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay, late March. So they weren't worried,
31 the 101st was not worried about a RIP TOA in the July
32 timeframe; their own RIP TOA?

33 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. I mean they were----
November

1 **LtGen Natonski:** So Charlie of the 62nd Engineers, the GS
2 Company and GS to 173rd Brigade they were seasoned
3 engineers. I mean these guys weren't just coming into
4 country?

5 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) **:** No, sir. I think they had been on the ground 5
6 November months.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay, yeah, so they had been there a while.

8 Your assessment of the Afghan engineers that
9 worked for the U.S. Forces, what did you think of the
10 Afghan engineers, contractors, the guys that did
11 engineering work?

12 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) **:** Yes, sir. Some contractors did great work. I
13 November say great in the terms of an Afghan perspective in
14 that they did quality work, you always had to--and
15 generally in construction you got to go behind someone
16 and say "hey, here is how I want you to do this; you
17 may do that off the base in your own house, but this
18 is the standard we want to have you know for this"----

19 **LtGen Natonski:** What about reliability?

20 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) **:** Contractor dependent, sir. I mean since the
21 November contracts were managed you know at the battalion level
22 I did not have contractors reporting to me and either
23 being present or missing a meeting or----

24 **LtGen Natonski:** So the battalion, for example in this case
25 2nd Battalion would manage the contractors that were
26 assigned to them?

November
27 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) **:** Yes, sir.

28 **LtGen Natonski:** But they did not contract those contractors?

November
29 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) **:** Yes, sir, they did.

30 **LtGen Natonski:** They did?

November
31 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) **:** Yes, sir, they did.

32 **LtGen Natonski:** So 2nd Battalion would have to go to
33 Jalalabad or wherever to find contractors to build
34 this COP?

35 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) **:** Or right outside Camp Blessing, sir, or in
36 November Asadabad.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** But that was dependent on the battalion, not
2 you or at the brigade or some contracting authority?

November

3 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): They would--let me see----

4 **LtGen Natonski:** I mean this is an infantry battalion?

November

5 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

6 **LtGen Natonski:** Did they have contractors in an infantry
7 battalion?

November

8 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

9 **LtGen Natonski:** So someone had to contract the engineers
10 that were supposed to work on this COP, and who was
11 that?

12 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, the--a unit, and I'll tell you just in
13 November general terms. A unit you know could advertise, if
14 you will, and talk to people in the local village and
15 say "we're going to--these are the plans for this
16 building that we want built and here are the scope of
17 work, here's how we want you to do it, and we would
18 like your proposal"----

19 **LtGen Natonski:** Would this be like in the S-4 Shop; would
20 they be the ones?

21 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, this could be an Infantry Company XO, you
22 November know, as a FOB--in a FOB mayor role, and then he could
23 literally say "look at two proposals." Whatever
24 quality those proposals came in at and say "Okay,
25 we'll go with Contractor A" and I think call up the
26 JCO or send the contractor to go talk to the----

27 **LtGen Natonski:** But the Battalion somehow picked the
28 contractor?

November

29 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

30 **LtGen Natonski:** There was no way to bid unless you happen to
31 know in the battalion who might be a reliable
32 contractor and who might not be a reliable contractor?

33 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): The only way the unit would do that, sir, is
34 November based on prior performance because this unit maybe
35 built two buildings at another base or built a great
36 stone wall at another base, and then "Hey, we want to
37 use you for this particular base".

1 **LtGen Natonski:** I'm just wondering if they had to go outside
2 the AO to get a contractor that had heavy equipment
3 because if there wasn't anyone in the vicinity how
4 would they know who to go to in terms of by rep this
5 guy, this contracting company has done--no one in the
6 brigade--you didn't monitor engineering--Afghan
7 engineers then, the contractors? You didn't have a
8 list of "hey you want this job; these guys they have
9 the backhoes or the bulldozers; this company is great
10 at building wells--digging wells"? You didn't have
11 that?

November

12 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

13 **LtGen Natonski:** I guess on the 11th of July the Afghan--what
14 day did you say the Afghan--per your records there,
15 the Afghan contractors were supposed to show up at
16 Wanat?

November

17 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I don't know that date.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** But on the 11th of July I think you said is
19 when they started inspecting the vehicles because they
20 were afraid of going up there because any damage that
21 was incurred they would----

November

22 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

23 **LtGen Natonski:** They wanted to protect themselves and any
24 damage incurred they wanted the foreign government to
25 pick up. So that happened on the 11th of July?

November

26 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, that's my----

27 **LtGen Natonski:** Ballpark?

November

28 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Ballpark on the date, yes, sir.

29 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. At that point in time were you
30 notified of that?

31 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I heard about it, sir, because I wrote it down in
32 my notes, and you know again I would--I don't know if
33 I called up the JCO and said "hey are you working with
34 Rock on this; is this going to be a problem," but I
35 mean I talked with the JCO. At least once a week he
36 would sit in on our kind of Bayonet Engineer Sync
37 meetings that we brought on on Friday mornings.

November

1 **LtGen Natonski:** I mean this is probably one of the first
2 times an Afghan company would end up in----

November

3 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. I meant it's almost standard.

4 **LtGen Natonski:** So reliability or at least Afghan time
5 versus U.S. time where you have a schedule they
6 couldn't be counted upon necessarily to be there when
7 they were supposed to?

November

8 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Absolutely, sir.

9 **LtGen Natonski:** So what efforts were made to mitigate this
10 in the construction of the COP?

November

11 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No idea, sir.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. You didn't say well, let's go back to
13 Charlie of the 62nd and get bulldozer or a D5 that you
14 mentioned and get it up there so that we have some
15 capability up there because we don't know when these
16 guys will eventually make it up?

17 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I don't recall doing that, sir. Clearly as soon
18 November as the battle occurred and there was this kind of true
19 issue came to light then you know that's what we were
20 looking at doing is basically stopping the work on a
21 major horizontal construction project, which was Route
22 Norlina vicinity beyond where majority of horizontal
23 construction guys from Charlie, 62nd had been----

24 **LtGen Natonski:** Is that like a road they were building?

November

25 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** That was a brigade or was that a division
27 project?

November

28 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): It was an approved project, sir. Horizontal and
29 Charlie, 62nd in conjunction with actually ANA
30 Engineers were working on this route.

31 **LtGen Natonski:** And that was a brigade effort or a division
32 effort?

November

33 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): It was in our zone, sir. It was approved by the
34 JFUB for whatever the cost was.

35 **LtGen Natonski:** Was that a higher priority than Wanat?

36 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

November

1 **LtGen Natonski:** The COP construction plan. You talked about
2 how they lay out the schematics and figure out where
3 they are going; did you ever see the plan?

November

4 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes, sir.

5 **LtGen Natonski:** I mean you saw a piece of paper with this
6 diagram of the--do you know where a copy of that might
7 be?

November

8 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** CJ7, sir, or in the computer that may still be in
9 the Brigade Engineer Office.

10 **LtGen Natonski:** Who would have put that plan together?

November

11 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Engineer Brigade, sir, specific design management
12 section.

13 **LtGen Natonski:** The Brigade that's--is it the Engineer
14 Brigade, they are in support of the division?

November

15 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes, sir.

16 **LtGen Natonski:** They are the guys that figure all of this
17 stuff out, so they would have had the plan?

November

18 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** **[No response.]**

19 **LtGen Natonski:** You've seen--I think you may have seen at
20 one point in time there was a CONOPs for the
21 construction of COP Wanat. In terms of getting
22 materials up there--maybe you haven't seen it if you
23 didn't go to one of the briefings, but does that look
24 familiar at all to you?

November

25 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** **[Reviewing document.]** Sir, if this was the CONOP
26 briefed on the 6th then I was there.

27 **LtGen Natonski:** It talks about moving up the force, the
28 engineers, the helo lift and everything. It covers
29 the period 8 through 10 July. I don't really see the
30 diagram. I thought there would have been a diagram in
31 there, but I guess my question is what happened on the
32 11th of July in terms of planning? Did you know, I
33 mean when they build a COP don't they build it in some
34 sort of order, increments; and who keeps that plan?
35 Would it be the operational commander on the site, the
36 battalion; who is responsible for that plan? Is it
37 brigade----

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I guess you're talking about the sequence of construction or----

LtGen Natonski: Yeah. I mean I wouldn't know by looking at that. I wouldn't know when the Afghan engineers were supposed to show up. You mentioned that it would take about 3 weeks for an engineer to build hard huts for a facility like this.

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: But there wasn't an engineer platoon there.

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

LtGen Natonski: There was an engineer squad.

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: So that kind of means if a squad is one-third of a platoon so it would take 9 weeks to build one hard hut at Wanat?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): With just one squad, sir, in ballpark.

LtGen Natonski: Okay. In your estimation why do you think that there was just one squad assigned to build the main effort for the 2nd Battalion? Could they not get any additional engineers? Were you able to get--did you ask for additional engineers?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, what--all the vertical engineers that we had were committed on current existing projects, and one of the ways that, if you will, helped manage the priorities was to lay out where the engineers should be or are. And so as I recall this effort it was going to be a squad for--just one squad for the first 2 weeks, and when another particular project wrapped up then we bring another squad----

LtGen Natonski: Was that a plan laid out anywhere? Who would have put that plan together? Would that have been you or would that have been the battalion?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. That's something that I basically managed in conjunction with the Engineer Company Commander. So we would jointly track where the engineers are and you know what they're doing.

LtGen Natonski: But this was the main effort at least in Task Force Rock. So I would think that someone doing

work on a FOB might not be as high of a priority as establishing a Combat Out Post especially when there is a certain sense of urgency because there is a RIP TOA going on and a new unit coming in. There was no plan laid out in terms of how far this squad was going to get in terms of the construction of that COP. This was like they were just going to build to what they could in the timeframe they had, and then at some point in time 2nd Platoon, Chosen Company was going to be replaced by the new incoming unit. But you never saw anything that took this whole thing beyond the 10th of July, did you?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November**:** Sir, I think in the copy of the JFUB they lay out the time it's going to take to do--let's say hard huts and the stone wall or in this case the Hescos, and kind of put that together and put it against a generic estimate of truths. So a time schedule is part of the JFUB.

LtGen Natonski: Is that provided to the battalion responsible for the--or is that just resident up at the JFUB?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November**:** I think we sent them a copy of--here is the design package that the Engineer Brigade did and said you know basically I need your comments.

LtGen Natonski: Did you get any comments back from the battalion like "Hey, this isn't enough engineers"?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November**:** I mean no, sir. But again when I talk about the JFUB that's probably you know mid-June or early June to say "here's the overall plan developed by the Engineer Brigade Design Team; here's what the layout looks like; give me your comments; and overall this thing looks pretty tight"----

LtGen Natonski: But they don't oversee the construction, they just send the squad down there and tell them "here's your plan". I assume that the squad leader had this plan, didn't he, because he's building to the schematics that were designed by the JFOB?

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) November**:** Yes, sir. He's building the hard hut, which he probably has experience building before on another base, so he knows how to build it then he knows basically based on the survey the location.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** So he should have had some sort of
2 documentation on the where to build this?

November

3 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

4 **LtGen Natonski:** And he would have gone to the, for lack of a
5 better term, the FOB commander, whoever the senior guy
6 was and say "Hey, I'm short sandbags or Hescos"?
7 Would he do that?

8 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, he might have done that, but to me that's
9 November also stuff that's being done in pre-execution checks
10 before you can even launch the operation and make sure
11 you have the right number and Hescos and equipment.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** So should all of the required Hescos,
13 lumber, sandbags, and equipment be at Wanat when they
14 started the construction?

November

15 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I don't think it would have fit.

16 **LtGen Natonski:** So then what timeline would--someone's got
17 to tell them to bring up the next load or something.
18 Who does that?

19 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Was there a specific plan for that, sir? I don't
20 November think so. The unit basically you know is monitoring
21 supplies that are arriving into Blessing, whether it's
22 a fuel resupply or more lumber.

23 **LtGen Natonski:** So it's still that engineer squad leader
24 that's got to say "Okay, I'm ready for more Hescos"?

November

25 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

26 **LtGen Natonski:** I mean he's the only one. I don't think any
27 of the infantrymen on the COP would necessarily know
28 that the engineers need lumber. The engineers know
29 that they need it and then they would go to the
30 commander of the FOB and say "Okay, now is the time to
31 call for more stuff" whatever it might be.

November

32 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

33 **LtGen Natonski:** I'm just trying to figure out in the chain
34 of command that squad leader would still report to the
35 commander of the FOB or the COP. Is that right? He
36 doesn't work for an engineer platoon commander located
37 at Wanat.

1 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Chain of command, sir, he's not attached to that
2 November to say the FOB commander, but he's working in general
3 support for him. He's there to support that
4 particular mission.

5 **LtGen Natonski:** Is he not in tactical--the COP commander
6 does not have tactical control over the engineers?

November
7 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, I guess he would have.

8 **LtGen Natonski:** And then of course the platoon would have
9 the administrative control and probably help provide
10 whatever might be needed. Okay.

11 You mentioned there's a brigade company of
12 engineers?

November
13 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

14 **LtGen Natonski:** In direct support. They belong to the
15 brigade?

November
16 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** What are they known as, what unit?

November
18 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): They were Alpha Company, Special Troops
19 Battalion.

20 **LtGen Natonski:** Alpha Company, Special Troops----

November
21 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): 173rd STB.

22 **LtGen Natonski:** They--had they RIP'd out about this time?
23 Were they gone?

November
24 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I think so, sir.

25 **LtGen Natonski:** So the brigade itself didn't have its own
26 engineers. It would have had the incoming engineers
27 who were not experienced?

November
28 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I think they were in the middle of RIP, so
29 there was a whole portion of the unit that was out and
30 maybe a portion of the new unit that was in. I think
31 that it would be incorrect to say that all of the
32 engineers from Alpha, STB were gone.

33 **LtGen Natonski:** But they were in the middle of the RIP TOA
34 and not available to support the construction at
35 Wanat?

November

1 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

2 **LtGen Natonski:** Could they have supported that at a
3 different timeframe?

4 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, they could have. The question is what
5 November would it have done to their mission in Kandahar
6 provinces and you know battle space owners.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** Alpha Company, Special Troops had battle
8 space?

November

9 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

10 **LtGen Natonski:** They had battle space?

November

11 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** Is that normal for an engineer unit?

13 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Not 5 years ago, sir, but for instance our
14 November Special Troops Battalion its AO was in the Kandahar
15 Province. And a CAV troop, the engineers and an MP
16 basically platoon----

17 **LtGen Natonski:** So the way the brigade employed Alpha
18 Company really precluded them from supporting the rest
19 of the brigade in engineer operations?

November

20 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): That's fair to say, sir.

21 **LtGen Natonski:** You mentioned stone walls providing less
22 protection than Hesco. From an engineer perspective
23 why is that?

24 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I think what I meant to say was that
25 November stonewalls take a long time to build, so they don't
26 provide immediate force protection, whereas if you
27 have you know Hescos then those can go up a lot
28 quicker than stonewalls.

29 **LtGen Natonski:** When we think of a stonewall--give me an
30 idea of the dimensions, height and width of a
31 stonewall if you were going to build it for a COP?

32 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Like 2-and-a-half feet wide, sir, and 7 feet
33 November tall.

34 **LtGen Natonski:** 7 feet tall?

35 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

November

1 **LtGen Natonski:** I mean this is pretty substantial?

November

2 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

3 **LtGen Natonski:** So it would stop an RPG?

November

4 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

5 **LtGen Natonski:** I mean you wouldn't have to worry about it
6 collapsing because they would build it with mortar.
7 The only problem is it would take longer than a Hesco?

November

8 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. I mean it definitely would take a lot
9 longer, and you would have to rely on an Afghan
10 national contract to build it.

11 **LtGen Natonski:** And they just find the rocks I guess. They
12 don't drag in the rocks.

November

13 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): They find the rocks, sir, and then you just have
14 to watch them so they build it right.

15 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. Thanks.

16 **MG Perkins:** You said when you came back off your R&R Colonel
17 Delta (b)(3), (b)(6) said "hey, what's the timeline for Wanat,"
18 correct? Did you answer that question on your notes?

19 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, he--off of my notes from the 29th of June,
20 November was that you know he asked Rock you know what the
21 timeline is for the Wanat COP, and that's again at
22 Bayonet Commander's call at 1330ZULU.

23 **MG Perkins:** And when he asked for that timeline what level of
24 detail do you think he was looking for when he said
25 "timeline"?

November

26 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I think he was just asking you know when
27 Diamond Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) is going to execute the move and the
28 beginning of establishing this new COP.

29 **MG Perkins:** So at that point in time they had not yet decided
30 on the date that they were going to move out of Bella?

31 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I'm not sure what--I know the CONOP brief was on
32 November the 6th, sir, and I was asking kind of the same
33 question, if you will, "what is the timeline; when is
34 Wanat going to happen".

1 **MG Perkins:** Say again your main responsibilities as the
2 brigade engineer. So you're the senior engineer staff
3 officer in the brigade staff, correct?

November

4 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

5 **MG Perkins:** And you said 80 percent of your time was spent
6 doing what?

November

7 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): U.S. construction, sir, construction on all of
8 the bases.

9 **MG Perkins:** So Wanat you would consider a U.S. construction?

November

10 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

11 **MG Perkins:** And so in spending your 80 percent of your time
12 you'd be on all of the construction going on the COP
13 you're tracking it, I guess?

14 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Tracking it, sir, but I'd say more of identifying
15 November what is needed for the future and what we need to
16 improve on now, and I say that because you know when
17 we took over from 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain and brigade
18 had been in that zone only 2 months. So our guys were
19 living rough and--anyway that was Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Delta
20 guidance, you know "Hey, build out the main battalion
21 bases"----

22 **MG Perkins:** Okay. So in your assignment, I guess, as
23 tracking you would just highlight "we need to do this
24 to whatever COP;" it goes to the JFUB process; it gets
25 approved, and now we're going to do this, we're going
26 to build a tower or we're going to do--then did your
27 office then track the process of that once a project
28 has been approved and they're building it did you guys
29 track that to say "Hey look we're behind"? In other
30 words "I told brigade commander this is going to get
31 done; it's not done." I mean was that sort of one of
32 your CCIRs to him?

33 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I tracked, you know, the progress of not
34 November every project but major projects. Through the Friday
35 Bayonet Engineer sync meeting. We basically talked
36 through critical issues problems on--you know by base.
37 And then we're asking Bayonet or the subordinate
38 engineers just to basically keep me and my team in the
39 loop on what the status of----

1 **MG Perkins:** Yes, that's my next question. How were you
2 updated? Who updated you on the status so that you
3 could update the brigade commander?

November

4 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): The Task Force Engineers, sir.

5 **MG Perkins:** So who in 2/503rd updated you?

November

6 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): They had two Task Force Engineers while they were
7 there. The first one was an LT, the second one was an
8 LT.

9 **MG Perkins:** So whoever the lieutenant was provided you the
10 routine update on this?

November

11 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

12 **MG Perkins:** Did the Task Force Engineer provide you once it
13 was approved their plan for Wanat and then subsequent
14 updates so that you could update Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)? Delta
15 Would that have not been the routine?

November

16 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): That should have been the routine, sir. You know
17 in this case that didn't happen. Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) I Falcon
18 would say----

19 **MG Perkins:** Lieutenant Cromie was the 2/503rd at this time?

November

20 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. And he redeployed on or about early
21 July. I don't know the exact day, but I'd say that's
22 another learning lesson.

23 **MG Perkins:** Did he have an NCOIC or----

November

24 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): The Battalion Staff was authorized an engineer
25 recon NCO, and that guy basically went out on--or was
26 employed in going out with the commander, and he was
27 basically not EOD trained, but similar words that I'm
28 missing----

29 **MG Perkins:** Coming back to this, the general asked you was
30 Wanat the top priority in the brigade, I mean overall
31 as an operational thing? I mean I knew the RIP was
32 going on, but sort of operationally?

November

33 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

34 **MG Perkins:** And so there was a major--I mean engineer portion
35 to this. Did you have any conversations with the Task
36 Force Engineer since it was a brigade priority about
37 what your plan--what your critical timelines--I mean

was there any dialogue about that as far as the plan was coming together?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): He--I know we talked about it, sir. He was also involved in the plan for the 2/2 build out, which was in AO Rock which involved three of Rock bases as well. So he was involved in some of that recon that occurred in June when I guess the Wanat plans coming together.

MG Perkins: In your conversations with him based on your experience previously managing this engineer stuff and understanding generally what Wanat was going to look like, were there specifically any special areas or concerns that were brought up, like you know "if this does not happen Wanat will not happen" of "if I don't get this by this time there will be a problem"? Were any particular points of concern with the overall plan and/or timeline from their point of view?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. I mean there was--I guess my concern was what were the pre-execution checks. You know, what were the conditions that needed to be met before they launched the operation.

MG Perkins: And therefore, did he give those to you or did you get a list of them?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

MG Perkins: Would that not be something that you would want to sort of--if you were concerned about that make sure that they were all checked off before it went forward to update the brigade commander or something that "Hey, look I think we're going to be on the point of no return; I'm not really sure we've got all our ducks in a row"? Was that sort of normally something that would get done before some of these major projects?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, it makes sense, but I'm going to say no because there wasn't--this was a unique operation in that we closing one COP and building--starting one from scratch, and with the other ones that were built Goscha, Lone Star, the engineers that were battle space owners built those on their own.

MG Perkins: And as they were building them were you getting updates and briefing the brigade commander sort of like that how it was moving along?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

1 **MG Perkins:** So that was generally the routine that you would
2 be in contact with the Task Force Engineer getting an
3 update and providing that situational awareness?

November

4 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes, sir, but not down to the detail of----

5 **MG Perkins:** No, I understand, but sort of major milestones,
6 like the pre-execution checks and things like that.

November

7 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Not really pre-execution checks, sir. Again with
8 Goscha--excuse me, with Lone Star the engineers,
9 Alpha, 173d STB massed their Class IV lumber, Hescos,
10 et cetera and launched and did it on their own. So
11 that didn't involve a lot of brigade resources, no
12 helicopters; it was just they were going to go build
13 it and they were going to build it from scratch, and
14 there wasn't so much of a plan.

15 **MG Perkins:** Speaking of Class IV. When this project and
16 others would go to get approved, go to contracting it
17 would generally be an all or nothing kind of thing,
18 right? In other words, okay here's the plan, as long
19 as it's under the MILCON ceiling whatever it is the
20 plan is approved and you know you've got Class IV
21 stuff, you've got contracted equipment, correct? I
22 mean it was sort of one package.

November

23 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** The JFUB was one package, sir, but the contracts
24 did not line up to one contract. I think that was----

25 **MG Perkins:** But the JFUB would be one package which would
26 have like a Class IV piece to it, a contractor piece--
27 I mean it would have the total cost, correct?

November

28 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes, sir.

29 **MG Perkins:** And that would then get approved, and then the
30 contracts would then be left separately I guess.

November

31 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes, sir.

32 **MG Perkins:** To your knowledge then after--so whatever the
33 Class IV plan was for Wanat what was approved in
34 total. They went and said "No, you're only going to
35 get half the Class IV" or something, correct?

November

36 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** No, sir.

1 **MG Perkins:** So to your knowledge it was approved; to your
2 knowledge was it all contracted for, all of the Class
3 IV?

November

4 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** No, sir. Class IV was provided by the Bagram
5 Class IV yard, so the risk of----

6 **MG Perkins:** Well, I guess--yeah, okay. Go ahead.

November

7 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** The JFUB and all JFUBs that had Class IV
8 component----

9 **MG Perkins:** Right.

November

10 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** ----then cost was in the cost estimate, but that
11 stuff was moved forward either by the engineer unit
12 leaning forward and saying "we've got to do
13 winterization; we've got to prep to build this asset
14 on a certain base;" or it was moved forward by the
15 maneuver unit. And again when helicopters are
16 involved in terms of maneuvering or moving that stuff
17 from "a" to "b" you know there's an issue moving 6x6s
18 or 8x8s because that's heavy----

19 **MG Perkins:** Yeah, I understand what you're saying. But to
20 your knowledge was any Class IV not going to be
21 available? I understand it's got to be moved up
22 there, but was it not literally going to be available
23 to be moved? In other words it was all going to be
24 provided, but then they've got to work it into the air
25 route and the air mission?

November

26 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yeah, and the--each battalion had, if you will, a
27 stock of Class IV at their battalion base. By Army
28 regulation were they supposed to do that, but----

29 **MG Perkins:** No, I understand.

November

30 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** It was a smart thing to do. You had it so you
31 had it on hand.

32 **MG Perkins:** So to your knowledge the Class IV availability
33 was not going to be an issue. The main problem would
34 be getting it to Wanat, to your knowledge?

November

35 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes, sir.

36 **MG Perkins:** I think--in your notes, did you say it was--and I
37 apologize if you said it already. Was it the 11th it

was brought up that we were having problems with the contractors?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

MG Perkins: What did you take that to mean, problems with the contractors; no contractors delayed, some of them?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, there's MHE contractors, sir, and again that's--my notes say bulldozer, loader and excavator at Blessing, that's about the 9th.

MG Perkins: So that's equipment.

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): There's also a field contract, and then my note it's contracted 11 July. So when I wrote that note it may have been after the battle----

MG Perkins: Where did you--okay, so that could be after the 13th when you wrote down the 11th. I'm just wondering how and when did you know that information; how did you find it out?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): I could go direct to JCO and say "here are the PRC number, I need to know what the status is of----

MG Perkins: No, but I mean is that how you--how did you know when you wrote the note down, if you can remember, how did it come to your attention that we have a contractor problem? I mean, did it come through engineer channels; did it come through S-4 channels, command channels; do you remember?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): I mean, sir, I don't specifically remember what channel. I just----

MG Perkins: And generally speaking if that information got up to you, got up to brigade that we're having contractor problems, specifically these were engineer contractor problems what was sort of the battle drill in the brigade to "fix the contracts"? Was it you working the engineers; was it the COR? I mean what--because I assume this is not uncommon that we have contract problems. So what is the battle drill? Do we say is there routinely a backup plan "well, okay, we've got other engineers or we've got other Soldiers" or what?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): For this case, sir, of which I would say it's not routine. There clearly wasn't a backup plan. Post-battle, you know, when things were terrible then we

said "what engineers are available that can convoy up there and provide that equipment and support," and that's what Charlie, 62nd was basically getting ready to do with their internal equipment. Before the battle again my notes are MHE contract awarded 1 July, and then fill contract awarded 11 July. I think that was after the fact, but you know clearly there's a problem with that because the contract--again 18 to 28 July is when the delivery time for that contract was scheduled, which it didn't--you know the contract was awarded on the 11th. I don't understand that, and to me that speaks----

MG Perkins: Which contract was this?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): This is for fill, fill.

MG Perkins: It was awarded on the 11th?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

MG Perkins: And you say the delivery date was the 18th for contract?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, which doesn't make sense because then there clearly wasn't a pre-execution check that said "Hey, we've got to have this fill guy lined up".

MG Perkins: But you don't know exactly when you knew that it was not let to the 11th, but obviously on the 10th whoever was tracking this would have known because it wasn't let yet is what you're telling me. If I can find the person that's tracking all of these contracts on the 10th that person would have known the contract has not been let yet because it didn't happen until the next day?

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): Correct, sir. The guy who agreed to be the COR at Task Force Rock he's the guy that's saying okay----

MG Perkins: Is that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)? Copper

November

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6): That is, sir--to my understanding that is, and that's the guy again late June 23-25 he came down to I think work with JCO on JAF, and then on the 26th went back to Blessing, and again I was surprised that he didn't even check in when he was down there, I don't get that.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** So are you saying that the contract for
2 Afghan support at the COP wasn't let or signed until
3 the 11th of July?

November
4 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): For fill, sir. That's what my notes reflect.

5 **MG Perkins:** What's that?

November
6 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sorry, stuff to go inside the Hescos, sir.

7 **MG Perkins:** How about the equipment, the digging equipment?

November
8 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): The equipment signed--I got awarded 1 July.
9 Bulldozer, loader, excavator----

10 **MG Perkins:** And do you know what their sort of due date was
11 when they were supposed to show up?

November
12 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir. And I think those were----

13 **MG Perkins:** But this is not something at brigade that we've
14 got an ongoing project, and here are the things you
15 have to do; we have to get the contract; we have to
16 get the Class IV, et cetera. And we're like "yeah,
17 done, check," you know sort of tracking like that as
18 sort of a macro pre-execution?

November
19 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

20 **MG Perkins:** Not ever really done; that was always done at
21 Task Force?

November
22 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

Aquarius
23 **MG Perkins:** And so Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6), you said his name was,
24 the Task Force Engineer.

November
25 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): (b)(3), (b)(6), sir. Falcon

26 **MG Perkins:** Is that generally what he did at the battalion
27 level, his section?

November
28 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, he did not do the contracts.

29 **MG Perkins:** I understand he didn't do them, but I was just
30 wondering--in your experience was there--okay, we're
31 going to do a project, which is engineering and for
32 lack of a better term sort of a pert diagram. Here
33 are all of the pieces that have to go into it. Here
34 are some major dates that have to occur. Did you ever
35 see that anywhere at either the brigade or the

1 battalions, sort of on a CONOP or a spreadsheet or
2 something?

November
3 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

4 **MG Perkins:** I mean was there a routine tool ever used that
5 you saw anywhere?

November
6 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

7 **MG Perkins:** So how would you say generally people at some
8 level had to make a Go and No Go decision, I mean in
9 your experience who would tell the commander "Hey,
10 sir, we're good; you know, pull out of Bella go to
11 Wanat"? I'm using that as an example or anything else
12 like that because this is a pretty complicated
13 operation, a lot of moving pieces.

November
14 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

15 **MG Perkins:** I mean was the 3 Shop sort of tracking this?

November
16 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, for the other bases that we did it was
17 generally decide on a site first, work the land,
18 occupy the ground, do the initial force protection,
19 and then work the contracts from there whether it's
20 well, water delivery or other----

21 **MG Perkins:** Was that the plan for Wanat, do you know? It was
22 sort of occupy it first and then build after that or
23 develop the plan after that, or was it more
24 deliberate?

November
25 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Based on the lack of--you know the kind of things
26 we're talking about here are pre-execution checks.
27 Based on the fact that they are not there that's where
28 I think Rock was going to do. And is that--were they
29 successful at that----

30 **MG Perkins:** I'm just trying to get the understanding did you
31 know what happened or not happened and what tools were
32 being used to track it?

November
33 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Um----

34 **MG Perkins:** It doesn't sound like you recall sort of that
35 being laid out----

November
36 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Services specifically these for MHE and fill as a
37 pre-execution check were not there. Throughout the
38 month of June one of my notes to the Task Force

Engineers and XOs would list down "after tele-project review on Thursday we'd go through every project in the Task Force sector and say notes basically to the engineer or the XO. And say for instance "send updated status on Project X. I heard there's an issue with this contractor on this project." And you know some cases it was--but on this it was you know for at least 3 weeks in June it was "What is the Wanat timeline; what are the conditions that must be met prior to execution".

MG Perkins: And did you get a response back on that?

November **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, sir.

MG Perkins: Would you have gotten that from Lieutenant Cromie Falcon or would it come from the 3 Shop or----

November **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): To me----

MG Perkins: In other words when you wrote that question who did it go to?

November **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) It went to the engineer and the XO, sir, and sometimes----

MG Perkins: The battalion XO?

November **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, and sometimes I throw the 3's on there as well.

MG Perkins: Do you know--did Falcon (b)(3), (b)(6)--did he work directly for the battalion XO; was he in the 3 Shop? I mean a lot of times they put these guys in the 3 Shop. Do you know like who his boss was?

November **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I believe it was Red (b)(3), (b)(6), sir, the XO.

MG Perkins: The XO, okay.

November **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): I don't know. Each battalion, I'd say, did it differently.

MG Perkins: All right. Thanks.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) How long based on your experience with the backhoes or front loaders how long does it take to fill a Hesco, 20 minutes, 5 hours, 2 days?

November **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, if you have loose fill one seven bravo, 7 foot high Hesco by--I don't know 10 feet wide or

1 something. I mean 15 minutes - 20 minutes, I'm just
2 guessing.

Beta
3 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): If you don't have loose fill and you had to
4 scrape it up or dig it up what----that in?

November
5 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): If you don't fill you can't fill it, sir. I mean
6 if you've got to dig with the loader then you know
7 you're creating holes and they are going to become
8 puddles you know when it rains, so you're not doing
9 yourself any--you're not moving the ball forward.

Beta
10 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): On a site that didn't have fill if the three
11 large assets showed up, the three engineering assets
12 that were contracted for, if they showed up as
13 scheduled and there was no fill there what could they
14 have done to advance the----

November
15 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Send the bulldozer and basically dig a hole, push
16 a big mound to fill up. A bucket loader can work that
17 and use that to fill Hescos.

Beta
18 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): At some point you would have to come back and
19 fill that hole?

November
20 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Or you have a community problem, sir.

Beta
21 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And the bulldozer would just go back and forth
22 for a while building up that pile and just scoop it up
23 into the Hesco?

November
24 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

November
25 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay, Major (b)(3), (b)(6), you're ordered not to
26 discuss the testimony you've provided today with
27 anyone other than members of the investigation team.
28 You will not allow any witness in this investigation
29 to talk to you about the testimony he has given or
30 what he intends to give. If anyone should try to
31 influence your testimony or attempt to discuss your
32 testimony you're instructed to notify Lieutenant
33 Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you
34 understand? Beta Sigma

November
35 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

36 **LtGen Natonski:** I just want to thank for your service to our
37 country, to the Army. I wish you luck up there in---.
38 Have a good time and enjoy the rest of your time in
39 Spain. Thanks for coming in.

November

1 **MAJ** (b)(3), (b)(6) **:** Thanks, sir.

2 [The testimony closed at 1721, 28 October 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

November

Subj: TESTIMONY OF MAJOR (b)(3), (b)(6), USA, GIVEN ON 15 OCTOBER 2009, AT FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sigma

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Judge Advocate

18 NOV 09
DATE