SWORN STATEMENT

Black My name is (b)(3), (b)(6) My current unit is HHC, 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team, and Vicenza. I am currently a Captain in the U.S. Army and my occupation is Military Intelligence Officer. I have been assigned to 173d since December of 2006.

In July 2008, my unit was 2-503rd Airborne Infantry Battalion, 173d, Camp Blessing, Afghanistan. I was a First Lieutenant and the Assistant S-2 Officer. I participated in the work-ups in January and the MRE rotation in April before my unit deployed to Afghanistan. As part of the workup, I practiced intelligence preparation for the battlefield; recommendation for specific area jointly with the S-3, sit down and complete IPB, terrain, enemy, HLZ's, LOC's, line of sight analysis, imagery of objective areas along with human intelligence and define HLZ specific objective areas within a village that we wanted to target. I would work up the analysis and present the information to the Commander. At Camp Blessing, I had access to enough assets and reachback capability to conduct an analysis.

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I believe in June 2008, it became pretty clear that we were going to pull out of Bella and attempt to put a vehicle patrol base at Wanat. It was my understanding that Wanat was going to be a vehicle patrol base. The location of the COP in Wanat was mainly planned by the S-3 and S-2-actual. I believe it was more the S-3 that hammered out the details of the base, location of OP's and getting the land leased from the local villagers to build the base. I didn't really have my hand in the actual location of the base. My impression was that we were going to stay in Wanat for a sustained period.

We continued to gather more information on the enemy activity in the area which there was a steady increase. From three weeks out, there were probably 30 -40 enemy reported in the area; to a week out, 100 plus enemy reported. We sensitized our sources that had placement access to the Wanat area and to the Waygal Valley to gather information on the enemy in that area. We also got ISR several days before to monitor any communications that were occurring in the area and to develop what the enemy course of action was. We also had a lot of FMV in the area checking out historical safe havens and trying to spot enemy maneuvering in the hillsides and around the village of Wanat. The HUMINT reports started increasing about three weeks prior to the attack, specifically the amount of significant Anti-Afghan Forces (insurgents) that were actually moving into the area. All of the information was reported via our INTSUM and in our CONOP covering the most likely & most dangerous COAs and addressed the validity of the reporting. Some of the information came from recruited sources that we had actually established long term relations with for several years.

My main job was to handle all ISR requests and the synchronization of ISR assets. I requested general SIGNIT and FMV capabilities for certain tasks because you request a

capability and not a specific asset. (b)(1) 1.4 a, c

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On the night of the 12th, everything just got pulled. We lost the Predator sortie within 12 hours of the attack. I called my
India counterpart at Brigade, Sgt (b)(3), (b)(6) chewed his ass out and demanded my assets back. This was not the first time I had called higher headquarters requesting more support. Sgt
India (b)(3), (b)(6) then called Division and whatever took place, we didn't
Magenta get the assets. I went to inform Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) Magenta
Foxtrot called up Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and was demanding we got our assets back. We shared the same office. It was a very heated
Magenta conversation as Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) was demanding back our ISR. I requested three-four days past when our coverage stopped. Our S-3 would have notified Chosen's CP about the loss of assets; that was the normal procedure. Our S-2 Ops would also relay the loss of an ISR asset. I believe my original request was for 10 - 12 days submitted around mid-June. It should be floating around the CMT system in Afghanistan. The initial request was immediately approved.

At the time, we were monitoring the area and everything was working great. I was ecstatic with the coverage we had. We were getting tons of coverage, and I was happy. We weren't able to detect any specific enemy in the area, but perhaps that's because they weren't talking or moving around. They knew we were listening and watching. Prior to the attack, there was some movement, but no mass movement or confirmed enemy movement. It was my understanding when the platoon went up to establish the emplacement, the platoon would still have all the ISRs requested, 8 to 10 days. But when it got pulled, we tried everything we could to get the ISR coverage back. The enemy had established movement in small groups; they knew we're watching as the enemy had established good TTPs and FMV assets to include Predator could be heard in the area. In the end, we were a Battalion in the grand scheme of CJTF, which had how many priorities and needs? I'm not sure if the CONOP was briefed all the way up to CJTF, I assume so. They would have had the

initial enemy situation and then the updated versions through our INTSUM.

Everyone knew that we were in a dangerous area. Our most likely COA was probing attacks on the new COP to determine vulnerabilities. The MDCOA was a "Ranch House" style of attack including a well-coordinated attack with supporting fixes and assault forces. We inherited Ranch House, a base that was very poorly constructed; the location wasn't the best, just on high ground from a village called "Aranus", which is a location where all the local insurgents were from. They had a very well orchestrated attack as if according to an Operations Order (OPORD) for the attack, with maps and diagrams. If the enemy wants to, they can mass and come up with a very good and well planned attack and possibly overwhelm a COP, it's their Modus Operandi in Nuristan. They would usually conduct small probing attacks to get a handle on our capabilities and exploit those using a mass attack. Chosen Company was one of our more experienced Companys and had been out there awhile.

If I had actually seen where they were going to put the Wanat base, my analysis would have been affected, I would have been more apprehensive about moving there. On 13 July, I went to the Wanat location with the Brigade and Battalion Commanders. I felt the location was not conducive for a COP location. It was in the low ground surrounded by the local populace, several homes, and a bazaar that was literally within a stone throw. There was high ground all around and right across the river, cliffs, and to the East, two giant spurs that kick down—just an undesirable place to even consider putting a base. Once you get down there, you realize you're in a bowl with about a six foot depression. We all knew this area was very hostile.

At times, the enemy would go silent because they knew we were collecting information. The enemy would go to ground; do face to face or courier exchange of information trying to avoid CF intercepting their communications. Having assets available was necessary and crucial in establishing a good perimeter and allowing the platoon to fend for themselves. When the ISR got scratched, we knew it was imperative to get it back. I'm not sure if our S-3 requested Apache support. It's not ISR, so S-3 would have had to request that type of support.

Prior to the attack, the village elders seemed very cold. The people really didn't want us there. We had been attacked on two previous occasions in well-organized attacks. The second attack was a complex attack following IEDs and a close ambush with one RPG gunner about 50 meters away, an intense, close attack. We knew there was a very credible enemy threat up there. In one report, Rock Six was inquiring whether or not they were going to get attacked when they left a Shurah in Wanat, which was confirmed they would be shot at by a village elder.

I don't recall if we had a formal Combined Arms Rehearsal for Rock Move; it may have happened, but I can't remember. We had probably 70% of all ISR assets the Brigade ever got over the course of our deployment in Afghanistan. Predator was scheduled for the operation, received it six days prior and then it got pulled on 12 July 2008. Once they pulled the Predator, it was really damaging and that's why we fought so hard to get it back. Magenta Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) told the Battalion Commander about it. I believe he contacted the Brigade Commander, but I'm not really too sure.

The term "COP" is more permanent than the term "vehicle patrol base". After it was determined that we were not going to have a permanent base there is when the terminology changed, and we referred to it as VPB. It's really just semantics, but definitely after the battle it was referred to as a vehicle patrol base.

AFFIDAVIT

Black

I (b)(3), (b)(6) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTI TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED TH EAT OF STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHO PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Black

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 16 day of October 2004 at Caserma Ederle Vicenza, IT

Lemon

WITI (b)(3), (b)(6)

MARFOR COM

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Owl

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

Owl

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Iota

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MARFORCOM

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Judge Advocate

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

Black INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)