

29 Oct 09

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2851; E.O. 8387 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Camp Blessing
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2008/07/16
3. TIME: 0900L
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3), (b)(6)
6. SSN: (b)(2)High
7. GRADE/STATUS: CPT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: C2/503D (ABN) TN, Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, APO AE 09354

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) Oscar, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

A. I arrived at COP Kahler with my RTO, SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) 12 July from Camp Blessing at 120900z JUL08 on a CH-47 that also brought in fuel. When I arrived I walked the perimeter with 1LT Brostrom checking all the positions. I remember checking the OP Topside and stating it needed to be improved and that we would move an armobile bunker from JAF there in the next couple of days. I suggested moving it higher on the hill but all the paratroopers and the PL said it would be too exposed on the hilltop and they would rather have the force protection of the rocks. I agreed we would move it when we had more force protection. I looked at the other positions and the TCP including the ANA sector of fire to ensure they would have good fire control measures to keep them from firing at US forces. I also talked to SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) about the way ahead with building the COP. I told him the local national heavy equipment would be there the next day. The platoon CP fighting position was already prepared and was three holes dug in about 2 feet deep with 3 bascoes protecting the south end of the position and sandbags about 3 feet high. The UAH was parked next to the bascoes for protection with a .50 cal mounted. The fighting position was not improved any the day I arrived other than adjusting the camouflage net that was above the position. We did discuss filling more bascoes when the local national heavy equipment arrived the next day. The day I arrived (one day prior to the attack) there were a few shops open in the bazaar, but not as many as there usually would be. A few locals had said they had moved their families away because they now there would be an indirect fire attack on the COP. I talked with Haji Juma Odi, a local elder, in his home (the house just west of the COP) the night before the attack and he had moved all of his family to another village. He said that he would be there to ensure that there would be an attack in the next week and it would most likely be enemy shooting from the mountain with indirect fire. His son was also there along with another elder, (b)(6) from Nishigram. His son was an interpreter from Jalalabad and we shared a meal in his home. His son also asked if we had "UAVs" and I replied I didn't know what he was talking about. This was strange to see a local (even an interpreter) to ask about such things. I told them that I could talk to them in the morning and left. I definitely suspected an attack on the COP but usually probing attacks first, then gauging indirect fire, before deliberate assault. I suspected the locals that had left the area were waiting to see how the first week would go with coalition forces there before moving back in.

B. The morning of July 13, I got up at about 0345L and packed up my mosquito net. I put on my IOTV over my t-shirt and my helmet to go talk to the Dragon element. The Dragon element (SSG (b)(3), (b)(6)) was up scouting with the ITAS and TOW. They said they saw about 5 PAX about 1500m up the mountain in a group of 3 and a group of 2 about 20m apart in the trees. I was discussing possible PID with SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) 1LT Brostrom, and SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) and yelled over to the mortar pit to get ready to fire to give up a TOW shot with a TOW team member minimum. As I was walking back to the CP the enemy initiated fire with RPGs and PKM fire from the west onto the mortar pit and the TOW truck. I ran into the CP to the radio to report contact. I visually saw 1 RPG hit underneath the TOW truck with little damage and several other RPGs went over the CP and toward the other trucks on the north side. The initiation was well coordinated because it was a lot of fire all at one time. I saw the fire onto the mortar pit and saw the mortars firing back and throw hand grenades. I grabbed the radio from SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) and reported to Rock 33 that this was a "Ranch House style attack" and we "need immediate support with CAS and CCA". I then started to look at the map for immediate suppression fire missions and called them up to the west and east of the COP. I saw the mortars still fighting and realized that they could not fire. After receiving reports of OP Topside in heavy contact I looked into the dug out CP positions and saw the mortars. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) with two casualties (Abad and (b)(3), (b)(6)) remember there being a lot of people in the CP. There were engineers as well that had moved from the mortar pit. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) told me they received heavy fire and I saw PFC Abad laying in the first dug out hole and SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) the second hole with injuries to the inside of their legs. SSG Abad began to treat them as well as the engineers. At this time OP Topside was sending reports of heavy contact. I remember talking face to face with 1LT Brostrom and he said we needed to reinforce them. I told him to take a few guys up there to help them out and continued to work fires. I never heard him on the radio after that. I remember next two RPGs fired volley fire at the TOW truck that impacted into the engine block. The whole front end of the truck lit on fire and the three soldiers inside (b)(3), (b)(6) ran to the CP while (b)(3), (b)(6) continued suppression. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) they hit them from right behind their bascoes from the west and they threw hand grenades and moved back here. I told him we need to try to get the 60mm firing and he said the fire was too heavy right now.

10. EXHIBIT:
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3), (b)(6) Oscar
PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Oscar

Baldwin

Ixia

Yankee

Ixia

Cherry

Pepper

SGT

x-ray

Maple

Ivory

Cherry

Pepper

Khaki

Chicago

Cherry

Portland

(b)(3), (b)(6)


Enclosure (16d) PAGE 1 OF 9







8740



29 Oct 09

### SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

**TITLE:**

Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:**

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**ROUTINE USES:**

Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

**DISCLOSURE:**

**1. LOCATION**

Camp Blessing

**2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)**

2008/07/17

**3. TIME**

0900z

**4. FILE NUMBER**

**7. GRADE/STATUS**

CPT

**5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Oscar

**8. SSN**

(b)(6)

**8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS**

C/2/503D (ABN) IN, Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, APO AE 09354

**9.**

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

The following is an interview of CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) by the investigating officer, COL (b)(3), (b)(6) "Q" represents questions by COL (b)(3), (b)(6) and "A" indicates answers by CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) Oscar Hotel Hotel

**1. Why occupy Wanat? Why now?**

Three main points drove the occupation of a base in Wanat. First, in order to couple with the GoA on the district level a base at Wanat was necessary. Bases near district centers in Nangalam and Watapour districts have proven successful in supporting the local population. This would allow daily interaction with District Government. Second, the new area would allow ground resupply to the COP. Bella was only accessible by air and created a logistical strain on the task force. Third, Wanat was closer to a larger population center allowing more interaction with the population. More interaction helps the ANSP/CF/GoA separate the population from enemy forces. *Wanat, intersection of two valleys, would disrupt the enemy's freedom of movement from the Watapour valley to the east.*

**2. Did you kill any non-combatants or have any fratricide?**

No, not to my knowledge. During the entire fight the only civilians were in a stone house just west of the base. They were the only civilians that did not leave and because of that there wasn't much enemy fire coming from their house. *U.S.C.*

**3. Who chose the COP site? Why? Was there more defensible land?**

Who chose the COP site because it was an area that would be close to the district center (within about 100m) and close to the population. It was right across the street from a bazaar which is culturally a meeting area for Afghans. This close interaction with the population would allow us to separate the area from the enemy. There is always more defensible land but that would require CF to occupy local national living area or create a COP that wasn't accessible by vehicle. All these reasons went against the principles of putting the COP in the area.

**4. 02 JUL 08 the ASG commander in Bella was fired? Did this guy come see you at Wanat?**

Yes. The ASG commander from Bella, (b)(6) came to Wanat. He was a former intel officer in the Afghan Army during Russian occupation. In my opinion he worked both sides and routinely gathered intelligence for the enemy.

**5. Intel that district government and elders didn't want CF in Wanat? Is this true? Did we try to push too hard?**

The situation is truly ambiguous. Meeting with small groups of elders they would tell me that they fully supported the base. When meeting with elders as a collective group they would take a neutral stance and not pledge support but they wouldn't deny that they didn't want the base. The population in Wanat wanted the base but didn't want to take any responsibility as leaders in their community. Many elders privately told me to put in the base without anyone's permission. In my opinion we didn't push the base hard enough. By negotiating with local people about the location and trying to gain support it allowed the locals to plan with the enemy to attack the base.

**6. How did you mitigate the risks for COP Kahlor?**

At my level the risk mitigation was getting the right weapon systems in place while the base was only a patrol base and not a fully built COP. I put a TOW missile there and a 120mm mortar system. Both of those were requirements while we didn't have fully built up bunkers. Secondly, I mitigated risk by requiring Bella not to be completely broken down before Wanat was occupied. This would keep the enemy spread out in two different locations. Third, although this was a platoon mission, I moved up there to be on the ground for about 5 days while the COP was being built up. By doing this I could identify additional resources needed. I could guide the platoon leader on additional measures needed for base defense, as well as encourage the guys that were up there in tough living conditions. This allowed the platoon leader to focus on the platoon while I focused on identifying and pulling the resources needed.

**10. EXHIBIT**

**11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT**

(b)(3), (b)(6) Oscar

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

\*ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"

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Oscar

(b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT (Continued)

Were all resources received? Requested? Not requested? Resources for occupation of the COP were received. The original plan was to occupy the COP on the 2 of July. That timeline was delayed due to aircraft resources causing the local national heavy equipment to arrive a couple of days later than we anticipated. Relying on local national equipment was necessary but they do not always follow a strict timeline as we would like. The resources requested were all there and the BN and RDE were fully aware of the increased vulnerability of the VPB until we could build it up more. We were constantly building the 3 days we were on the ground.

8. Why withdraw? Was it worth it? The withdraw has nothing to do with the amount of US casualties, it has everything to do with the change to the area with an attack of that caliber. Withdraw is necessary because of the events of the 13th of July, bottom line. The relationship with the local population has changed and the requirement for more forces has increased because of the large attack. If we stayed I would be forced to occupy local population housing, many of which are tied to the enemy. The population also needs to know that projects and prosperity does not come to a population that is linked to the enemy. There are plenty of population centers in Afghanistan that welcome our help and if enemy forces infiltrate into their community, they let us know. In addition this large scale attack significantly destroyed enemy C2 and fighters.

9. What caused you to call for CCA to fire 30mm gun runs on the bazaar? I remember hearing a radio transmission from the OP stating "they are in the bazaar". Knowing the enemy was in close range to the OP shooting from the cover of buildings put my men at a great disadvantage. I made the call to destroy the enemy in the bazaar since they had maneuvered around the OP and were now on two sides.

10. Future Waygal stance and the way forward? The way forward into the Waygal is a gradual push from the BN main secure area (Fech River Valley) pushing north towards the Waygal. This will allow the local population to remain in close proximity of their homes by way of economic development and basic services. The involvement of ANSF that will allow them to independently build up their population, which is the ultimate goal of the mission in Afghanistan. An autonomous government secured by their own security forces.

11. Is there anything you would like to add? No. NOTHING FOLLOWS

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) Oscar, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. (b)(3), (b)(6) Oscar (Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES: Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 17th day of July, 2008 at Camp Blessing (b)(3), (b)(6) COLIN (Signature of Person Administering Oath) (b)(3), (b)(6) Hotel (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath) INVESTIGATING OPERATOR/PT BAYONET DEO (Authority To Administer Oaths)

29 Oct 09

**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 307; Title 5 USC Section 2261; E.O. 0967 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
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**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Camp Blessing	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2008/07/23	3. TIME 1700z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6) Oscar	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS CPT	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS C/2/503D (ABN) IN, Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, APO AE 09354			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6) Oscar, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. Was there a tactical level (Platoon Level or below) base defense plan for the COP from 08-13 JUL 08? The investigating officer has the base defense plan that you provided earlier, but were there any other products that the platoon used to brief the soldiers (i.e. MRE or notebook sketches)? If so can you describe the product? If not, can you assess the verbal orders that 1LT Brostrom gave to his soldiers in reference to the defense of VPB Wanat?

When I arrived at Wanat VPB on 12 JUL, I asked 1LT Brostrom for his defensive plan and we walked the perimeter. He had a platoon sector sketch on a large yellow notepad that he kept in the CP. I remember the sketch had all the positions with sectors of fire (including azimuths) and where each weapon system was located. It is updated this daily as the perimeter changed and improved. I also remember talking with him about being able to move around the TOW truck to look at different terrain with the ITAS. We also built a berm so the TOW could elevate to the high ground surrounding Wanat, mostly to the west.

2. Can you describe the guidance that you gave 1LT Brostrom in reference to developing a defense plan at his level at VPB Wanat?

I remember telling him to focus on getting the ANA pushed out and having flexibility on the VPB. Flexibility meaning being able to move around weapon systems so the enemy cannot determine one way to attack. I also made him create a detailed fire plan so he could immediately call for fire in event of an attack. Also being close to the buildings and population in the area was a key part of the defense, because it allowed the population to us information and made us accessible to them.

3. If available you can use the tactical level base sector sketch/defense plan, but can you describe how the base defense plan was developed, based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time, and civilian considerations (METT-TC)? If you could discuss the PL's and your assessment of the 'imminent threat' of AAF attack on your defense plans?

The imminent threat from enemy reports in my mind was an imminent attack on the VPB. The enemy is the enemy normally conduct operations by fire (calling out positions) and attempts to gauge IIR on locations before a large attack. My biggest consideration was that the paratroopers there would be able to get cover if I could limited cover. I did not think we had ample overhead cover and protection and I knew it would take time to build that up. Due to the terrain I knew OPs would be necessary to secure the VPB. We had the US OP to secure the immediate area, planned ANP OPs that were never built, and we were in the process of leaving to recon an ANA OP when the attack occurred.

*Nothing Follows*

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) Oscar	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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Oscar (b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Oscar

TAKEN AT Camp Blessing

DATED 2007/07/23

STATEMENT (Continued)

4. Can you discuss the specifics of the defense of VPS Wazir in respect to casualty collection plans, dead space, final protective fires, sectors of fire, engagement priorities, direct fire plans, priorities of work, and specific priorities for CL TV in the OP?

I cannot give the exact plans of all the above, but I know that all of them were implemented. I remember the priority for the engineer assets during the first day was to fill the breaches across the mortar pit for protection. The priority for all positions was to "dig in" and fill sandbags for ample force protection.

5. Did you have any discussions with 1LT Brostrom or SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) in reference to base defense between 08-12 JUL 08? Can you describe the conversations? When you arrived at VPS Wazir on 12 JUL 08, can you describe the measurements and inspections that you made to referment to the defense of VPS Wazir?

Yes, I talked with them about the status of the building of the defense everyday. I remember talking to 1LT Brostrom about digging positions and the amount of sandbags that they had filled. I remember him saying that the bobcat could only fill the 4 foot trenches, so they had cut one in half to build the protection around the mortar pit. When I arrived I walked to each position with 1LT Brostrom. I remember checking each position on the OP and talking with the soldiers about the dead space. They stated they would rather be behind the parapet of the rocks than in a bunker out on the tarmac because they had claymores and hand grenades to cover the dead space. I also remember talking with SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) the mortar section sergeant, and giving him a priority target so they would be able to automatically fire if the VPS was hit by rockets or IDF. I also checked the mortar pit and they had already put the 60mm away from the 120mm so they could use one if the other was pinned down. This came true during the fight.

5. Did the 1LT Brostrom or the PL conduct any base defense rehearsals prior to the start of the attack? If so, when and where?

I did not see any rehearsals but I know they were conducted because I heard the paratroopers talking about where they were supposed to go and what their responsibilities were if the VPS was hit.

6. You and the TF ROCK 53 provided the CJTF 181 approved CONOP, engineer measurements, and construction plans for VPS Wazir? Can you discuss the reality of resources provided for these plans? For example, there was a delay in the heavy construction equipment for constructing the fortifications? Can you discuss your mitigation of this delay?

We had the local national equipment scheduled to arrive at Wazir on 1 JUL, the CONOP was delayed until the 8th and it took a few extra days to get the equipment there once the contractor pulled it back to Kabul. To mitigate this we made it essential to have the Bobcat at Wazir as the platoon occupied the VPS. The resources were there and even after the attack they started to push rocks for the stone and mortar wall and the local national equipment arrived on the afternoon of the 13th.

NOTHING FOLLOWS

AFFIDAVIT

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(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6), Oscar  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(Signature) (b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23rd day of July, 2008 at Camp Blessing

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oath)

TITLE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Oscar

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

AFD PE V1.01