

SWORN STATEMENT

Red

My name is Major (b)(3), (b)(6). My current unit is the 5th Ranger Training Battalion, Dahlonega, Georgia. I am an Infantry Officer since 1994.

Diamond

I was assigned as the Executive Officer of 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry from Vicenza, Italy in February 2007 commanded by LTC (b)(3), (b)(6), call sign Rock 6. I participated in deployment train-up in Germany to include the MRE rotation in March 2007.

To refine my verbal testimony, I deployed with a 5 person pre-ADVON team to Afghanistan in late April 2007. Once we TOA'd with 1-32 Infantry from Fort Drum, 2-503 was known as Task Force Rock. Our area of operations were in Kunar and southern Nuristan Provinces in northeastern Afghanistan. I was the Task Force Rock Executive Officer. I was involved in all aspects of daily "running" the battalion so the commander could command it. This included tracking current operations (pushing resources during troops in contact that included clearance of indirect fires and CAS, CCA, and MEDEVAC, ISR, etc) and daily logistical support and requirements that included local national contracts that supported daily operations, synchronizing the logistical resupply of the battalion thru the Pech Resupply, the TF Rock Forward Support Company ground resupply, Supreme Air for Class I, and fuel and ammo. I prioritized the vertical engineer efforts in AO Rock with guidance from the commander.

Diamond

When I arrived in Afghanistan I immediately integrated with the 1-32 IN staff in Bagram, Jalalabad, and Camp Blessing and toured our battle space about three weeks prior to the arrival of LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) to Camp Blessing. Until LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) arrival, I (Diamond) battlefield circulated with the outgoing task force commander, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

Hawk

To correct my verbal testimony, throughout my battlefield circulation, I was amazed by the austere living conditions and mountainous terrain 1-32 was fighting and conducting their operations. I immediately knew that an early priority would be to improve the force protection and quality of life and survivability of all our locations once TOA was complete with 1-32

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I recall after Rock 6's return from his PDSS with 1-32 that he was very uncomfortable with some of these combat outposts we were going to inherit from 1-32. Some were air eccentric and hard to reinforce if attacked.

Oscar

I recall Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) did several visits and recons up at Wanat and determined the best location where he wanted to establish the combat outpost

Delta

To correct my verbal testimony, I do not recall if TF Bayonet tasked us to move to Wanat. However, I do recall Rock 6 submitting requests to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and it was eventually approved by him. Establishing COP Wanat was an approved CONOP, battalion C2'd operation with synchronized air and ISR assets in support of the company's mission to establish the initial occupation of the Wanat combat outpost. Establishing Wanat became a priority since we did not want to have 1-26 IN, our incoming replacing unit, to occupy Bella Outpost due to all the inherent risks associated with the up-tic in enemy intent to attack Bella and the air centric reality of that location.

Since there were nine land owners, we preferred to properly lease the land to avoid future issues with land compensation after we occupied it. We wanted to do it right. We knew that co-locating with the Wanat District Center would allow us to connect the population with the GoIRA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan). Our ability to bring in a well-trained and partnered ANA platoon/unit would assist us in this as well. As I recall, the Wanat land agreement was signed in April 2008 and we didn't physically occupy it until July.

The combat outpost established by Able Company along the Pech River Valley called Honaker-Miracle was an initiative by the Able Company Commander in order to co-locate with the Watapur District Center and to provide him the stand-off needed from direct and indirect fires the AAF would shoot at close range at his other combat outpost called Able Main. Since it was an immediate requirement and a company initiative, the battalion resourced the company with Class IV requirements, fought for Hard-Huts to be funded by CJTF-82 and to be built by the Bayonet engineers. The long term plan was to build hard-stand buildings and a permanent retaining wall with the funding and JFUB process required to do such projects which we eventually had approved

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and began to construct with local national contractors. I do not recall what actions we took to compensate the local national land owners for the land Able Company occupied. I do recall that we needed and wanted to have the land agreed to before we occupied Wanat. That is why we engaged the CJTF-101 CRST team to assist us in the Wanat land transaction. I do not think we conducted the same deliberate, lock-step planning for Honaker-Miracle since it was an unanticipated requirement - unlike Wanat. I do recall we learned a lot of lessons from building Honaker-Miracle and applied those to the planning and resourcing for Wanat.

If the platoon was short on water and an emergency resupply of water was required, I would have likely been told about it if battalion resources were needed to get the water to Wanat. If there was a shortage of water, I was never told about it. We could have easily assembled a plan to address this issue.

I was unaware of any problems with fuel. If they had problems extracting fuel from the blivet, that's an issue that should have been PCI'd before they moved to Wanat. To me that wouldn't have been a Battalion level inspection, that's something you expect the company to take care of. What was flown out to Wanat was very carefully coordinated with the company. I don't ever recall them saying they couldn't download fuel. I do not recall any immediate supply shortages during the first few days prior to the attack.

To clarify my verbal testimony, I heard second hand some of the weapons broke down because the weapons had been fired so much. It is my understanding that some of the platoon's weapons broke down because of the extreme intensity in which they needed to be fired, not because the platoon deployed to Wanat with broken weapons. From my understanding of the intensity of the AAF firing on 1LT Brostrom's positions, it is most probable that some friendly weapons were rendered inoperable. I say this only because it happened in other AAF attacks throughout the deployment.

To refine my verbal testimony, planning for COP Wanat was very detailed and included all aspects of force protection, survivable living areas, power generation, showers, a platoon TOC and aid station, MWR site, and HLZ for resupply or MEDEVAC.

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Oscar The planning was in concert with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (Chosen Company
Papa Commander), CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (Chosen Company XO) MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6), LTC Gray
Diamond (b)(3), (b)(6), MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF Bayonet engineer) the 62nd Engineer November
Falcon Company Commander, the TF Rock engineer (CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)),
Copper and the TF Rock contracting officer (CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)), and the TF
Brown Rock S4 (CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)) and myself. It was understood
Falcon that to reach the final endstate for this COP it would take up
to 17 weeks to complete. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and I worked on resourcing
the building of COP Wanat IAW guidance from the commanders - CPT
Oscar (b)(3), (b)(6) and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) - That included an extensive GPS survey of
Diamond the area, analysis on the quantities of materiel required, and
overall costs as was required for the Joint Facilities
Falcon Utilization Board (JFUB) at the CJTF level. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) worked
with the CRST team, the 62nd Engineers, and eventually drafted
the final document for signature between Rock 6 and the Wanat
district sub-governor.

To refine my verbal testimony, in order to obtain funding from
CJTF-101 for construction or general labor contracts, we had to
submit our requirements, gain the CJTF funding approval, and
then work with the Joint Contracting Office (JCO) throughout the
bidding process. The JCO would award the final contract to the
awarded Afghan contractor. I do not recall the final details of
the heavy equipment contract for Wanat. I do recall my
Copper contracting officer, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) working directly with the
contractor and with the contracting office when there was a
delay moving the heavy equipment up to Wanat and I do recall
that it was resolved and the equipment arrived I believe a day
or so prior to the attack.

I do think the AAF would have attacked regardless of the
presence of local national heavy equipment. I do not know why
the driver did not want to drive his equipment to Wanat.
Perhaps he had been intimidated or had never been in the Waygul
Diamond Valley. I do recall LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) great concern Oscar
over the delay of that equipment and that is why I immediately
Copper got with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and the JCO to get the issue resolved
immediately. I think the delay was about a day. It was not
possible to preposition any heavy equipment prior to the initial
occupation of Wanat.

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To refine my verbal testimony, throughout the deployment, vertical engineer platoon "combat power" was at a premium. I would have loved to have had an engineer company task-organized to the battalion throughout the deployment but that was understandably not possible due to other TF Bayonet priorities. We typically had an engineer platoon operating in AO Rock building hard huts, fixing electrical issues, etc... but once their work was complete, they would be re-tasked to work somewhere else in the brigade AO (AO Bayonet).

I recall that engineer assets from Task Force Rugged, Engineer Brigade, CJTF 101 asset, were going to build the COP. It was going to be about a 17 week project. The project was phased with all the resources brought to Blessing and then moved forward. The initial hescos for that perimeter were moved in contracted jingle trucks and I think some were slingloaded as well. As I recall, the engineers who went to Wanat belonged to the 62nd Engineer Company, DS to TF Bayonet. The 62nd Engineer Company Commander provided the engineers who went to Wanat and conducted the surveys and I believe it was TF Pacemaker, the engineer battalion, who had a CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) who helped determine all the BOM (Basis of Materiel) required to complete the project. I believe the Engineer Company Commander went to Wanat with Captain (b)(3), (b)(6). There were some drainage and other problems that needed to be fixed as part establishing this base. TF Rock and Chosen Company were responsible for establishing the initial perimeter and TF Rugged, specifically the 62nd Engineers, were responsible for building the COP.

Royal

Oscar

To correct my verbal testimony, I do recall that Chosen Company had had the mission, with the attached engineer squad and contracted heavy equipment, to build the initial perimeter and to establish an initial operating capacity to be able to C2, fight, defend, and operate from the under-construction combat outpost. The 1-26 IN leadership understood they were falling in on probably 2-3 weeks of a 17 week project. I am confident the 1-26 IN Battalion Commander, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6), was aware of this fact; the battalion S3 and XO were aware of it. As I recall, the day LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived to Camp Blessing to begin his left seat/right seat ride with Rock 6, the Wanat attack occurred. I do not know the hard date that Wanat was to have 1-26 Soldiers manning that perimeter and when Chosen's platoon

Citrus

Citrus

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would be off the line. TF Rock TOA'd on 30 July. It is my guess that somewhere between the 20th - 25th, 1-26 would have occupied Wanat.

To clarify my verbal testimony, the battalion was responsible for moving the equipment and personnel by helicopter and other supplies by ground via jingle truck. All supplies were as required by CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and his executive officer, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6), for the initial establishment of Wanat combat outpost. However, this was largely a company mission with battalion synchronization and C2. We knew we had all the initial supplies to begin establishing and building the perimeter. I do not know how much BOM had been delivered to Camp Blessing to support the remaining weeks of construction.

Oscar

Papa

Due to the Relief in Place (RIP) with 1-26 IN in July, it afforded us an opportunity to close Bella Outpost permanently. As I recall, up to this point, resources had been unavailable to support a closing of Bella sooner. The RIP enabled us to establish the recommended footprint for 1-26. The RIP was a forcing function to permanently close Bella Outpost and transition into our long-term strategy and recommendation to establish a combat outpost at Wanat. With several weeks of retrograding equipment and supplies from Bella using our regularly scheduled aerial resupply called the Pech Resupply, Chosen Company was able get probably 90 percent the accumulated equipment and supplies off Bella and back to Camp Blessing. As I recall, Major (b)(3), (b)(6) had a coordinated air CONOP to move the last 4-5 lifts of equipment, ammo, and personnel from Bella safely back to Camp Blessing.

Gray

To correct my recorded testimony, it is only through second and third hand conversations and from the completed 15-6 by COL (b)(3), (b)(6), I learned Wanat would be attacked. The Afghans didn't tell us we were going to be attacked by 200 to 300 fighters; they just said we were going to be attacked which was not unusual throughout AO Rock. We were attacked multiple times a day throughout any given week.

Hotel

To correct my recorded testimony, it is my understanding that there were up-tics in SIGINT and that an attack on Bella Outpost

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was in the preparations. There was no direct intelligence linked to a planned attack on Wanat. From the AAF's usual TTPs, they would conduct probing attacks with indirect or RPGs which was the most likely AAF COA for Wanat as stated in the CONOP ROCK MOVE intel assessment. I do not think any of us assumed that the enemy would or could mass 200-300 fighters to attack a single location. There were no tangible indicators that a major attack was ready to be executed.

Delta

To refine my verbal testimony, I will assume CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) TF Rock S2, requested as much ISR as possible to support our OPERATION ROCK MOVE. If he had had issues, he would have either directed

Gray

them to MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) or LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) directly. It was understood

Diamond

during the CONOP brief that Predator was the only ISR asset that could support the CONOP since Shadow UAV was unable to fly north of Camp Blessing. I do not know the circumstances of the gap in ISR either before or during the CONOP. I do not recall. It was understood by all of us that Predator was a finite resource and at any time, CJTF-101 could reposition it to cover a higher priority. That was inherent risk associated with this CONOP and any of the previous CONOPS we executed throughout the

Delta

deployment. I did not manage ISR requests, but I'm sure CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) requested ISR to cover the operation during those times when risk to mission was highest. I do not recall or know what ISR was actually supported.

To refine my verbal testimony, it is my understanding that privately, the Wanat elders wanted coalition presence in Wanat and wanted a base established but publically, they wanted plausible deniability with the AAF and would not support coalition presence in Wanat. The elders always wanted to be able to save face and could say that, "Hey, the Americans did this on their own, don't kill my family. I had nothing to do with it."

I physically never visited Wanat but the commanders had numerous times. I only saw satellite imagery and the surveys used by the engineers for the planning of the construction of the COP.

To refine my verbal testimony, it is my understanding that we knew there was some risk with building a combat outpost at Wanat due to the proximity of the bazaar and district center to the outpost. However, this wasn't unusual since most of our combat outpost were aligned near a district center. And not unlike our

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other outposts, mountains also surrounded Wanat which dictated where we could physically construct the COP. So, if the AAF (Anti-Afghan Forces) chose to attack from the high ground, then we'd defend ourselves and the population and return with direct and indirect fires. The land where COP Wanat was surveyed was the best available. All arable farm land was terraced and that didn't afford us a good location either. We did not have many good choices. Bulldozing somebody's house to occupy an ideal location was not a feasible COA either. If we put the COP on high ground, we would become another air centric COP which was one of the many reasons we needed to close Bella combat outpost. There was no way to reinforce Bella by ground since it could only be reached by air - Wanat could be reached by both ground and air and that was key.

To refine my recorded testimony, it's doubtful we could have moved from Bella and established Wanat in the winter. Weather was much more of a factor in the winter. Besides, the engineering priorities were to winterization, at that time, not new construction. Additionally the environmental effects farther north in the Waygul Valley were much different than in the Pech River Valley where Camp Blessing was located. Often, there was snow at Bella when at Blessing there was none. Remember, Bella Outpost was generally quiet with AAF attacks throughout the deployment. However, it was still our most vulnerable outpost in AO Rock since it could not be reinforced by ground. In my opinion, the way we closed Bella retrograding the equipment and personnel and pushing equipment and personnel to establish Wanat was the only way it could have been done.

To further clarify by verbal testimony, my understanding of the end state with Wanat was a fully functional, completely defendable platoon-sized combat outpost, co-located with Afghan National Army soldiers within close proximity of the local population of Wanat. The immediate priority was to establish fighting positions using sandbags and terrain to the platoon's best advantage. It is my understanding that the initial occupation of Wanat was to be a "vehicle patrol base" which by my definition is a very mobile, temporary and static position capable of defending itself for a short period of time. It is my understanding that as Lieutenant Brostrom maneuvered to Wanat, he had his vehicles, heavy weapons, mortars, TOW/ITAS and I will

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assume he occupied places where he could best defend from. This is all I know since everything else about how he occupied OP Topside and prepared defenses are not my personal accounts. They are only from the 15-6 and second and third had discussions. As we pushed the assets into Wanat, it was going to become a COP so I would further define it as a COP under construction - something more than a VPB but something less than a completed COP.

Overall, I believe that the TF Rock and Chosen leadership were very optimistic that establishing a committed present vicinity of Wanat was best for the future of the Waygul Valley and connecting that population with the GoIRA. It was certainly a better COA than maintaining Bella Outpost. It was only after the attack that we learned of the deliberate collusion of the Wanat district sub-governor and perhaps others (Afghan National Police in Wanat) in facilitating the AAF attack on 13 July 2008.

The decision to pull off Wanat after the attack was made by the commanders and finally by the CJTF-101 Commander. I do not recall LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) opinion at the time but given the circumstances, he most likely thought it best to leave Wanat and allow future units the opportunity to reengage if the opportunity presented itself.

Diamond

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AFFIDAVIT

Red

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 9. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Red
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 30 day of October 2009 at FORT BEND CO, TX.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Owl
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

Lemon

WITNESSES (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
MARFORCOA

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(6)
HQ MARFORCOA NOYOL, TX
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6) Owl
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
Judge Wilcocks
(Authority To Administer Oaths)