

1 [Investigation opened at 1352 hours, on 14 October 2009.]

2 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), as I said, Kilo
3 I am Lieutenant General Richard F. Natonski, United
4 States Marine Corps. I have been appointed by the
5 Commander of U.S. Central Command to conduct an
6 investigation into the facts and circumstances
7 surrounding the combat action at Wanat, Afghanistan,
8 during July 2008. Major General David Perkins, United
9 States Army, has been assigned as the deputy
10 investigating officer; Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), Beta
11 and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), Sigma are Judge Advocates
12 assigned to the investigation team.

13 The testimony that you provide today will be
14 recorded, transcribed, and included in our report of
15 the investigation. Based on your testimony, we may
16 also prepare a separate written statement for your
17 review and signature.

18 Prior to coming on the record today, you signed a
19 privacy act statement. Is that correct?

20 **LTC** Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

21 **LtGen Natonski:** Your testimony will be made under oath. You
22 will now be sworn.

23 [The witness was sworn.]

24 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Please state your full name, spelling your last.

25 **LTC** Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6): It is (b)(3), (b)(6) Kilo.

26 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): What is your current unit and that unit's
27 location?

28 **LTC** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): I am with Operations Group, Joint Multinational
29 Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany.

30 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Are you currently a Lieutenant Colonel in the
31 U.S. Army?

32 **LTC** Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6): Correct.

33 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): In July 2008, what was your unit and that unit's
34 location?

1 LTC [Kilo] (b)(3), (b)(6) : I was with the 173d Airborne, I was the chief of
2 operations, Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

3 LtCol [Beta] (b)(3), (b)(6) : And in July 2008, what was your rank?

4 LTC [Kilo] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Lieutenant Colonel.

5 LtCol [Beta] (b)(3), (b)(6) : And the Chief of Operations, can you explain what
6 that is, please?

7 LTC [Kilo] (b)(3), (b)(6) : The chief operations, the way we had a broken
8 down for the brigade is that I had the current fight
9 from about the current day out to as far as 30 days.
10 As the chief of operations, I would manage assets and
11 provide enablers to subordinate task forces, make
12 recommendations to the Commander, and assist in the
13 coordination of those assets.

14 LtCol [Beta] (b)(3), (b)(6) : How long had you been with the brigade before
15 deploying?

16 LTC [Kilo] (b)(3), (b)(6) : I have been with the Brigade upon transformation;
17 we join the Brigade in July of 2006 or June 2006 on
18 activation as a reconnaissance--select reconnaissance
19 squadron for the brigade. So I'd been the squadron
20 executive officer from that time through December 2007
21 and December 2007, I came up to be the Brigade Chief
22 of Operations.

23 LtCol [Beta] (b)(3), (b)(6) : And that was in Afghanistan?

24 LTC [Kilo] (b)(3), (b)(6) : In Afghanistan.

25 LtCol [Beta] (b)(3), (b)(6) : And that's the first time you worked on the
26 Brigade staff?

27 LTC [Kilo] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Correct.

28 LtCol [Beta] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Are you familiar with the CONOP for a move to
29 Wanat?

30 LTC [Kilo] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes.

31 LtCol [Beta] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Called operation Rock-Move, how are you familiar
32 with that CONOP?

33 LTC [Kilo] (b)(3), (b)(6) : The way we process the CONOP's in the brigade,
34 most of them are bottom driven, the task forces
35 developed them based on requirements and

1 identification of opportunities or challenges in their
2 battle space. They usually provide the brigade a draft
3 prior to execute came through ion and then we work for
4 refinements and actually securing enablers that will
5 assist them in the operation. As the Rock-Move CONOP
6 came through we were working with CJTFA-82--
7 correction, 101 at that time, to say this is what rock
8 is going to be executing, timeframe to which they are
9 going to be doing it, and then the list of assets that
10 are gonna be required to actually execute the mission.

11 **LtCol** Beta
(b)(3), (b)(6): You recall what the first time you saw the CONOP
12 or that you were made aware of task force rock to move
13 to Wanat?

14 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): The move to Wanat really started-it began
15 properly about 3 to 4 months after we got into theater
16 so the end of the summer of 2007, it was identified
17 that we wanted to reset our positions across the
18 brigade battle space and consolidate further closer to
19 the Pesh Valley. We had a large dependency on FOBs
20 that were air only supportable. So, the FOBs of --
21 COP Ranch House initially and then COP Bella which was
22 the direct link to the Rock movement to Wanat happened
23 then or began in its genesis then. The Rock Move
24 CONOP that I received probably was a week prior to the
25 execution of the actual move.

26 **LtCol** Beta
(b)(3), (b)(6): Okay, you mentioned a brigade-wide shifting of
27 forces, was the brigade commander driving that?

28 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): Right. Some of the locations--we fell in on the
29 battle space of 3-10 Mountain that occupied small unit
30 locations further up in some of the terrain north of -
31 - specifically Rock is north of Camp Blessing which
32 was the battalion's headquarters, the two locations
33 which were platoon positions was the Ranch House and
34 they had a COP, which is a company minus location,
35 Bella. Identified--some of the locations that we had
36 our challenging terrain in the Hindu-Cush, very
37 difficult to defend and resupply, especially if
38 weather became a challenge. The brigade commanders
39 desire was to establish--was to consolidate the gains
40 along the Pesh and push, make sure we are interdicting
41 along the border by the Konar River Valley so that the
42 initial guidance was given to consolidate and
43 reallocate forces and close down to the further
44 outpost, Ranch House and Bella.

Beta

1 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Were there any other outposts, after the summer
2 of 2007, and the brigade commander gave his guidance,
3 for there any other outposts consolidated or brought
4 in?

Kilo

5 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): There are a number of smaller outposts, vehicle
6 patrol bases along the Pesh that were consolidated in
7 Rock's AO. I am not as familiar with the initial
8 consolidation since at that time I was there with Task
9 Force Saber. But vehicle patrol base, I think,
10 California, some locations along the Pesh River Valley
11 were consolidated and the larger. And we are looking
12 to see how we could take either consolidate or
13 transition to ANSF Forces to allow them to occupy and
14 then move to a larger consolidated base where we could
15 act as a QRF on the Pesh. They did prior to leaving
16 task force Saber is my own area considered the
17 consolidation from another--their only FOB, Camp
18 Libert which I think the 3-1, 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry
19 Division, closed down before they left. He mentioned a
20 vehicle patrol base-California, for the record; can
21 you describe what a vehicle patrol base is?

Beta

22 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): A vehicle patrol base is kind of a warm basing
23 location that provides force protection, some security
24 that is either occupied for a durational period that
25 could be a week on that patrol, it could be for 5 to 6
26 months; it could be a year. We have some enduring
27 vehicle patrol bases that we continue to improve, but
28 really non-permanent in nature, so the buildings would
29 either be reinforced that can be torn down or
30 transitioned to ANSF forces. But basically a place
31 where you can go in and occupying and refit or
32 continue the operations were extended operations from
33 that position, like a fortified ORP prior to going out
34 on other patrols.

Beta

35 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): ORP?

36 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): Objective rally point prior to going out to
37 Kilo regular dismounted patrols.

38 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): At how a vehicle patrol base differ from a combat
39 Beta outpost?

40 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): A combat outpost is that we are going to
41 Kilo occupying and we know that we are going to be there
42 for duration. A combat outpost is, also, going to be a

1 Company Level Headquarters, there is some platoon
2 level, but normally are COPs were company level, you
3 had some platoon COPs that you really have to move in
4 and out by air. The point was to provide flexibility
5 be occupied or not occupied.

6 **LtCol** Beta
(b)(3), (b)(6) } Would a vehicle patrol base have HESCO barriers?

7 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6)
8 Kilo } It would have HESCOs or have some type of rock
9 walls, some type of Afghan structures as well that
10 provide a level of force protection probably that is
11 capable of defeating or protecting from small arms,
.50 Cal additional level or higher.

12 **LtCol** Beta
13 (b)(3), (b)(6) } Billeting, how the billeting area differ between
a vehicle patrol base and a combat outpost?

14 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6)
15 Kilo } I am not quite--I have not been at a different
16 vehicle patrol bases because those are mainly in
17 Rock's battle space. The locations that we had in
18 Saber were more stationary in point in nature; we did
19 not have the ability to have vehicles. I would say
20 that the structures initially would be reinforced B-
21 Huts, sandbags, HESCOs, we can get some Jersey
22 barriers, it is difficult or other elements that we
23 had, we created ROCK walls, that is another blast type
protection at those locations.

24 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)
25 Beta } Generally speaking, what was the relationship
with the Battalion 3s, how did you work with them?

26 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6)
27 Kilo } I work with the battalion 3s pretty closely and
28 they would-- I would talk to them probably 2 to 3
29 times a day specifically Rock and Saber, our lowest
30 active patrolling units. The other units King and
Raptor, I would interact with them at least daily.

31 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)
32 Beta } And how did information from your shop, your
current op shop, get down to the battalions?

33 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6)
34 Kilo } We had a weekly meeting where we had to sync us
35 all of the 3s that was run by either myself or the
brigade 3.

36 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)
37 Beta } Did they come to you or----

38 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6)
Kilo } It would be collaborative over Adobe connect. It
would show what we have asset-wise and then the other

1 way is that I interact with the battalion's is with a
2 daily current ops sync meeting where we had battalion
3 reps, their LNOs, talking about their patrols, their
4 requirements, and that is looking between 24 and 96
5 hours out.

6 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : From those two different sync meetings, did you
7 **Beta** feel that you had a pretty good idea of what was going
8 on in the brigade's battle space?

9 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I think I had a pretty--pretty good situational
10 **Kilo** awareness of what was going on across the battle
11 space.

12 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : In July of 08, in the Waygal, were you familiar
13 **Beta** with any combat action that took place prior to Wanat?

14 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : There is a combat outpost Bella which was the
15 **Kilo** location for Chosen Company, one of the -- it was a
16 platoon plus position. It was the second of two
17 positions that we were looking to consolidate and move
18 back closer within the footprint of Rock and as Task
19 Force Rock began to gradually reduce the force
20 structure or the infrastructure there began to get a
21 lot of reporting, a lot of threat reporting, HUMINT
22 and----

23 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : And how would you get that reporting up in the
24 **Beta** Brigade 3?

25 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : We would see the daily in either the shift change
26 **Kilo** brief, the commander's update briefs -- the three main
27 sources, I would say, is the shift change brief, the
28 commander's update in the morning, and then the
29 commander's conference call with the task forces which
30 went every other day. I am not sure exactly because
31 we reported to CJTF the other days that is where there
32 is a direct line of assessment on the integrated
33 level. On the S2 level, there is a daily S2 syncs,
34 threat reporting comes up through, the task force, the
35 THT-tactical HUMINT teams, if it is about the reports
36 that they have from their actions. So, the reports
37 that we have of the threat reporting in Bella was both
38 HUMINT and SIGINT.

39 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : What was your understanding of that situation?
Beta

1 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Bella, the task force had attempted to work with
2 Kilo the civilian populace and let them know that to ease
3 the transition coming out of Bella but the threat
4 reporting because of our pending withdrawal or
5 repositioning, there were a threat reporting that the
6 insurgents would like to overrun a U.S. position. So
7 we had threat reporting of up to 150 insurgents or so
8 that were looking to either interdict the withdrawal
9 or move them back from Bella or overrun the FOB when
10 it got to the point that it had minimal force
11 structure to defend itself.

12 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) How did they know that Bella was going to be
13 Beta reduced? How would the enemy have known that Bella
14 was going to be reduced?

15 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : There are a couple of different ways, I think
16 Kilo that one of them would have been working with our
17 local Afghan security guards. It is hard to just to
18 start pulling stuff out there and kind of not tip your
19 hand, especially the amount of equipment and supplies
20 that you're going to reposition unless you're going to
21 just leave everything in as is. So, the ASG that work
22 on the post and go back to the town is a way. And I
23 think that there was a concerted effort by the task
24 force to work with the locals that we're not leaving
25 Bella, we are going to get to the district center
26 which was at Wanat for the Waygal. It is actually at
27 the southern point of the district, but a part of the
28 thing is to be close to the local population, be also
29 close to and support the government in their daily
30 interactions.

31 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Based on your role as the current ops at the
32 Beta brigade level and then having seen the threat
33 reporting, what role, if any, in a kinetic over watch
34 of what is going on with the battalion?

35 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) My role, first of all, is to be predictive of
36 Kilo resources required to assist and then responsive as
37 the system changes. Says we talk about reports and
38 talk about the threats getting, the challenge,
39 especially in the area, is ISR. The only thing that
40 could fly up there was theater level assets, it was
41 beyond the range of our shadow, it was beyond the
42 range of our KWs, so the only rotary wing aircraft
43 other than the support aircraft was the Apaches. So,
44 it's either CAST or Gear level ISR that can support

1 them as well as a SIGINT. So how do you manage that,
2 intense threat reporting why you have threat reporting
3 across the rest of the battle space and limited assets
4 in competition with other units within RC-East and
5 other high area that 4th Brigade had occupied P2K plus
6 Coast and Logar where they had recently had activity
7 in May or June and it went to--he consumed a lot of
8 the assets that were available for a major operation
9 down at that time.

10 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): At the brigade level, what aviation assets did
11 **Beta** you owned that you could task right out of your COC?

12 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): We had the 2/17 Cav which was a DS aviation task
13 **Kilo** force, had, I think, about 5 AH-64 Apaches, usually
14 enough to have-- to have two and two mix plus one
15 potentially escort for medical, so you could have 2
16 day and 2 night potential insurgent when the pilots
17 went, we have 4 CH-47s, and then I think we had 16, or
18 so, OH-58 Delta Kiowa Warriors that could cover the
19 battle space and assist in potential economy of force
20 missions in other locations in order to leave assets.
21 Our biggest challenge in some of our hottest areas in
22 the Korengal up in the Waygal, up in the -- deep in
23 the water pour and North of the Nuray, we were limited
24 to only using AH-64s in close combat attack.

25 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Why was that?
26 **Beta**

27 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): The capabilities of the Kiowa warriors and the
28 **Kilo** elevation we had a red line of what they could do
29 without overthrowing with the power ratios but they
30 cannot go to some of our hottest areas. They could
31 patrol and interdict in areas outside so that we could
32 keep in reserve for manage our 64s for the areas that
33 were in the more deeper capillary valleys that we
challenges with.

34 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Then external aviation assets, but could you
35 **Beta** request from division?

36 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): We could request, and the way that we managed and
37 **Kilo** assisted with getting additional AH-64s was during the
38 combat resupply, the different ring routes that they
39 had--we had two major combat resupply routes coming
40 through, we had the Pesh resupply which supplied Task
41 Force Rock and we had the Camea Resupply which was
42 mainly Saber and one, depending upon where they were

1 based out of, the Kamgal which was based out of
2 Jalalabad used 2-17 assets. Now the Pesh since it
3 came from Bagram would use Bath Aviation assets, so 2
4 AH64 would mainly would come and give us additional
5 capabilities. So I actually had two CH47s flying you
6 would have escort, especially some of the higher risk
7 valleys of two AH-64s to enable the operation.

8 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6); Did you ever use your AH-64s for ISR?
Beta

9 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6); Yes, what we -- always during the -- in addition
10 Kilo to the combat resupplies we would task and provide
11 NAI's for the -- or locations for the Apaches to look
12 at while they were in the battle space. But as we
13 started getting near the end of the crew day, if we
14 did not launch the aircraft and a QRF role and working
15 with 2-17 and they need to get the pilots up, we may
16 burn the last four hours of that aircraft time to go
17 either to a--to respond or be further up on QRF or
18 actually to provide some type of reconnaissance for
19 either looking for a specific act or just as a
20 deterrent; they know that the Apaches are up then the
21 likelihood of activity is lower.

22 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6); You mentioned the QRF aviation assets, so where
23 Beta would they be positioned?

24 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6); Our QRF aviation was based out of Jalalabad so
25 Beta our QRF were our Apaches. Now, challenges when you
26 say QRF, the flash to bang of when they are going to
27 get to the areas of the fight. To have you cut down
28 on time if you see a threat or a fight that is going
29 to escalate to that and that was a little bit of a
30 battlefield calculus of how do you manage the
31 potential of a fight where they were going to need
32 external assets and cut down the time. The time to a
33 Korengal, which is one of our most active valleys, was
34 about 38 minutes, the time to Waygal was probably
35 about 40 or maybe 35 as well and to Task Force Saber
36 it was about 45 minutes to the Lotay Sin Valley where
37 we had most of our contacts.

38 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6); And you would have at any given time, two
39 Beta aircraft sitting?

40 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6); And as we were not going to have two aircraft
41 Kilo available then we would push the information forward
42 to the task forces so that they could adjust their

1 patrols and their force posture to either respond or
2 limited their activities that they are not putting
3 themselves into an area where context is more likely
4 or they are going into an area of resources may not be
5 available or know that they may only have CAST respond
6 to them. So for example, if we had ARCANGAL, our two
7 AH-64s going to support up in Task Force Saber, the
8 first response for the guys in Rock is going to be the
9 CAST on station. And we were very successful after
10 the summer of 2007 of cutting the time of CAST to
11 arrive and be on station and to provide effects.

12 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6); And just generally speaking, what was that time
13 **Beta** for CAST?

14 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6); The initially when we came to theater the flash
15 **Kilo** to bang for CAST was 40 minutes from contact support
16 to the nine line being passed by the fall and during
17 the period of time that we are talking about it was
18 between 5 and 8 minutes.

19 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6); What had changed?
20 **Beta**

21 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6); The way we actually executed business. The way
22 **Kilo** that we work with the KAOK having-- having aircraft
23 forward understanding when we could put ourselves and
24 when did we put ourselves into greater likelihood of
25 coming in contact said the aircraft was more rapidly
26 available and in standard con ops of having increased
presence of CAST overhead.

27 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6); Who did KAOK work for?
28 **Beta**

29 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6); KAOC is the theater level air component command.
30 **Beta**

31 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6); So the CJTF was the command----
32 **Beta**

33 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6); CJTF was the subordinate--well not, was supported
34 **Beta** by the KAOC.

35 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6); And would the brigade or the division pass that
36 **Beta** operational information over to KAOC so that they
37 could adjust?

38 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6); We would work with CJTF to request these assets.
39 **Beta**

40 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6); At the brigade level, what indirect fire assets
41 **Beta** did you have?

1 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): At the brigade level, the indirect fire assets
2 **Kilo** were pushed forward to the task forces. So supporting
3 task force rock they are raid with two sections of
4 155, 777, when a Blessing-- one section a Blessing and
5 one section at Asadabad. And then the brigade was
6 also-in multiple areas-multiple FOBs provided--
7 internally and potentially in excess of their TO&E
8 mortar sections, or at least a mortar position of a
9 120, Task Force ROCK also had 81 millimeters and some
10 60 millimeter mortars.

11 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Lower your understanding of the capability of the
12 **Beta** 155s in relation to the terrain?

13 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): It depends upon the target that you are engaging
14 **Kilo** and the elevation in which you are engaging. It is
15 targeted dependent because of the terrain and the
16 projectile is returning to back to the target, it may
17 or may not be effective for the target. The mortars
18 were more effective because of the high angle
19 trajectory so when called and when engaged they would
20 provide more optic-- in more situations than others a
21 greater effect at--and--in being able to eliminate
22 targets. The 155 still had an effect of some
23 suppression, depending on what it was. But it depends
24 upon the specific target that you are engaging and
25 where they are and the angle in which the section is
26 engaging.

27 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Is there a particular type of munitions that is
28 **Beta** more desirable for a 155?

29 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): It depends upon the target and their location we
30 **Kilo** use HE, we also used white phosphorus descending upon
31 if we have CAST overhead to identify the target to
32 synchronize the efforts but predominately I think HE
33 was the round. The other one that was new to the
34 theater was the Excalibur, but that really was not for
35 a area target that was more a precision munitions for
36 usually for a building that we want to limit the
37 amount of collateral damage, you're looking at a point
38 target.

39 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Were there areas within your battle space,
40 **Beta** whether or not I am you are sure or not, or the areas
41 that could not be arranged by indirect fire?

1 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, there were--the question is areas where we
2 Kilo normally operate in--no, there were the exception of
3 various within the brigades AO that you could not
4 engage with indirect fire. An example of that is, the
5 farthest extent of their range for the guns at Task
6 Force Saber was just north of Task Force Keating or
7 COP Keating was, they probably had about a 2 kilometer
8 or 3 kilometer buffer, but if you were to do a trip up
9 to BarjaMatal then you are strictly dependent upon Air
10 for your fire Support. In Rock's AO the guns at
11 Blessing would be able to cover anything in the Waygal
12 bur if they were doing anything out of sector--well,
13 not out of sector, but a mission up to Paruntz, which
14 is the capital-- provisional capital of Nurastand.
15 Again they would be outside of the indirect fire
16 capabilities and be depended upon either CCA or CAST.

17 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) : Switching back to the Wanat plan, you said that
18 Beta you heard about a potential move to Wanat 6, 7, 8
19 months earlier before the move was executed.

20 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : The task force was in coordination and
21 Kilo negotiation with the elders and Wanat.

22 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) : When did you learn of that?
23 Beta

24 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : I learned about that for reports and CONOP's from
25 Kilo when I first got the battle space, I did not realize
26 that they were going to Wanat, but I knew that after
27 Rock 6 has been out on a patrol to one not talking to
28 the elders that their Gack had been engaged before. So
29 he has gone up there a couple times to negotiate with
30 the elders and to let them know that this a good
31 thing, that we want to help, we want to work with the
32 AMP, but there will be an issue with us having to
terrain to have our forces up there.

33 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) : You mentioned that the normal course of business
34 Beta would be for the battalion to float a draft of a CONOP
35 up to you, or a plan to the brigade and subject matter
36 experts would review and then provide some feedback.
37 Do you recall that taking place with the CONOP for
38 Wanat?

39 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : The CONOP for Wanat, I think, was a shorter in
40 Kilo duration than depended upon what we have--again, we
41 try to forecast 30 days out for rotary wing support
42 because we had a limited amount of assets and task

1 forces were competing for operations. So normally I
2 would have a 30 day rotary wing sync to say as we have
3 a chunk of time for Night Con Ops, all right, we have,
4 for planning purposes, ROCK look at 8 days that could
5 be 2 air assaults or it could be 4; Saber look at four
6 days and then come back to me with your drafts and we
7 will go to the commander and see how we carve it up
8 but for planning purposes. Now, for the Wanat piece it
9 was more of a retrograde from Bella initially than the
10 occupation of Wanat.

11 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Could you explain that please?
Beta

12 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, the first piece was, we are going to need
13 Kilo to--we need to move out of Bella and the reason it
14 became--it is something that we had wanted to do,
15 something that Task Force Rock has had on its plate
16 but the overriding factor for everything going on is
17 how do we set conditions so that 3d Brigade, 1st
18 Infantry Division takes over they have a better plan,
19 they have a better situation, and they are not in a
20 fight when they get into the battle space. So the
21 consolidation into an area that is more supportable
22 and more able to be linked by ground was that. So it
23 was more of a retrograde out of Bella than an
24 occupation of Wanat--than just the occupation of
25 Wanat. My main focus, at least initially, was that we
26 have to--then it became more critical as the threat
27 reporting of--they are pouring into Bella, that it
28 execute in the time line.

29 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Had there been a shift in a campaign plan from
30 Beta the time that you had arrived in country to the time
31 that you had left? The appearance is that there was a
32 desire to pull back and consolidate some of these
33 outposts.

34 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): I am not sure of the genesis of it but the--what
35 Kilo the Brigade produced was 90 day with the intent on how
36 we have greater effect across the battle space.

37 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Were they driven by something from Division?
Beta

38 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): I don't think so. I can't--I can't say what the
39 Kilo driving force was, but again, we recognized coming in
40 that we were fixed operationally. We did not have the
41 ability to do multiple operations without pulling

1 forces from other areas to execute. We identified, it
2 was probably----

3 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): If I may a bit--was that because your forces were
4 **Beta** so spread out----

5 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Our forces were spread out. The number of FOBs
6 **Kilo** and COPs that we had occupied initially, I think that
7 we were at 36 and we were down to 27. I am not sure
8 of the exact number, I think that we ended up with
9 about 27. But that is the number that consolidated
10 to.

11 But we started to see effects--we started looking
12 at how do we impact the battle space and the fight in
13 Terah-Konar, which was our hottest area. As opposed
14 to being in the fight, how do we prevent the fight or
15 cut down their capabilities and what we looked at was
16 a potential shift of forces, more along the board--
17 working with the Afghan border police and interdicting
18 as they crossed the natural obstacle of the Konar
19 River. And I think that one of the 90 days later--I
20 know that it had conversations of ROCK repositioning
21 to have more of a focus along the border to indict
22 that. Because with the introduction--the impact with
23 the introduction of the KWs in March, we started to
24 see a far greater effect on the ability--especially in
25 the Korengal, supplies and weapons to be able to
26 engage with us in the fight. So we wanted to
27 capitalize on that as well. We have the aviation
28 asset to do basically the screen and being able to
29 push additional forces to potentially interdict those
30 valleys that fed the interior Konar, Sheriak, and
31 Korengal valleys.

32 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): In July of 2008, was brigade preparing to
33 **Beta** retrograde?

34 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, we were doing--we prepping our transition
35 **Kilo** with 3/1 and doing our plans to do the left-
36 seat/right-seat hand over RIP TOA.

37 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And when you were-- you mentioned before that you
38 **Beta** try to do a 30 day window error. I'm assuming that as
39 part of that RIP TOA you had to rotate fresh Soldier
40 up and then after the left-seat / right-seat bring the
41 outgoing Soldiers back.

1 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Right.
Kilo

2 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) : How much of that--how much of the error that you
3 Beta had-- the rotary wing that you had to move forces was
4 tied up with the RIP TOA aspect?

5 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : We-- we had forecasted most of our rotary wing
6 Kilo assets would be supporting the RIP TOA in July as
7 elements ADVON and main bodies of 3/1 came on the
8 ground probably in mid-June and then the propensity of
9 the handover would happen between 1 and 15 July.

10 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) : So you were doing this air planning some point in
11 Beta June?

12 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, we had thought about it before hand knowing
13 Kilo what assets would have available but--knowing because
14 of the air flow and what is coming into monist and the
15 task force's actual plan for how they were going to
16 conduct the left-seat/right-seat, seeing what is
17 coming in from the 3/1 task forces, that would drive
18 how much time they have on the ground, how many PAX --
19 how many 3/1 PAX come forward and how many 173d PAX
20 are retrograded. And it is probably 10 come in and
21 two come back, 8 stay on the ground, and later 10 more
22 come in, 8 from the previous amount come out, and a
23 flow of that.

24 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) : Did you plan external aviation assets to help you
25 Beta do that?

26 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : We needed additional aviation assets to
27 Kilo accomplish that. So, we had assistance from the
28 aviation brigade to assist in that movement.

29 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) : Additional CH-47s?
Beta

30 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Right, the majority were CH-47s and some with
31 Kilo additional CHs--correction, AHs to assist, if they are
32 going into the areas that required escorts.

33 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) : So, as early as 1 July, were you starting the
34 Beta transfer of the new Soldiers out to the different
35 outpost?

36 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : I would say that that is likely; I think the way
37 Kilo we flowed in that was probably the last two to flow in
38 were Saber and Rock, or the counter parts, 6-4 CAV and

1 1-32, so I would say that they are starting to make
2 the change at that time.

3 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): You mention at some point early July that CONOP's
4 **Beta** came up from Task Force Rock for operation Rock
5 Movement?

6 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes.
Kilo

7 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): You remember the date?
Beta

8 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): I--what I have--I really did not look at the
9 **Kilo** illum cycle, which was the driving force for some of
10 aviation, but I believe----

11 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Would it help you if you took a look at the
12 **Beta** CONOP?

13 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yeah, I think so--what we knowing that this is
14 **Kilo** kind of our last illum cycle to actually execute the
15 mission was -- and Rock had been doing a little bit at
16 a time, so as a combat resupply came in to Bella, they
17 would take-- okay, we are going to take this container
18 back out, this ISU 90, we will sling load that back
19 and when something else comes back in, but the level
20 of fidelity that they were actually executing that was
21 not clear to brigade. Right so, we were getting
22 pinched on the timeline to which we could execute the
23 ex-fill from Bella the 7-10 July.

24 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Why was that?
Beta

25 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): You got the--I don't think the level of briefing-
26 **Kilo** is everyone secret in here?

27 **LtGen Natonski:** It is secret.

28 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Our operations are tied to the illum cycle. The
29 **Kilo** nighttime operation of aviation aircraft and the
30 percentage of illum available and not just the
31 percentage but the angle of illum, so green, amber,
32 red illum. The further that we went in the month,
33 the less green or amber going into higher risk illum
34 we had. So we did not want to--we could not conduct
35 operations in high risk illum.

36 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What is high risk illum?
Beta

1 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) High risk illume is what we considered is that
2 Kilo the percent, it is some equation, but the percent of
3 the angle--the percent of illumination is below 20%
4 and the angle is also such below that it would impact
5 the visibility on the ground. So, even though you
6 have 20% illumination, if the angle of the moon is
7 low, especially in the Hindu Kush, you are in a far
8 grade of darkness and less capability under knots.
9 So, what we were looking at is to execute and complete
10 the Bella one prior to the--getting out of Green
11 Illume, which was 10 July.

12 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Would you normally move those aircraft at night?
Beta

13 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) If we're doing combat resupply or higher risk
14 Kilo missions, air assaults, those would be executed at
15 night. Bella was--especially with threat reporting,
16 you don't execute that during the day, if you've seen
17 the pictures of Bella but Bella is at the bottom of
18 three mountains, it is just high risk. And as the
19 CONOPs kind of talks about in the significant amount
20 effort that we used was how do we execute the
21 retrograde from Bella with assets available, do we go
22 daylight once just to mix it up to give a different
23 look to potential insurgent forces that may look to
24 shoot down a 47; which was our biggest fear? And how
25 do you layer assets to be able to provide early
26 warning and that is SIGINT, that is ISR, that is CAST,
27 do you have an over presence with a patrol so that you
28 have a show of presence with F15s or A10s so that they
29 know that we are ready for a fight as a deterrent
30 effect to assist in the retrograde. But on intent was
31 to either execute this at green illume, early part of
32 the evening, or move up there at first light so that
33 we are hitting the objective are hitting the COP and
34 retrograding at the EN&T or BE&T.

35 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) And do you recall how many aircraft are how many
36 Beta sorties it would take?

37 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Probably--I think that we were talking in the
38 Kilo neighborhood of about 16 different aircrafts--16 turns
39 with the aircraft ourselves, it was a significant
40 amount.

41 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Just to get out of Bella?
Beta

42 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Just to get out of Bella.
Kilo

1 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And would that be on one night, two nights?
Beta

2 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): I think that we were doing it over three nights.
3 Kilo And it depends on how quickly and rapidly you can do
4 your turns to see how many-- how many aircraft you can
5 actually execute that with.

6 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Now were these the same aircraft that you were
7 Beta using to move Soldiers to and from the other positions
8 throughout the Brigade's AO?

9 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): It would have been, right. And we did is
10 Kilo capitalize, okay, it's well, how do we back all people
11 and how do we use people on the front end to maximize
12 the lift. So we would do--for example, we would do a
13 RIP flight going into the day, knowing that we are
14 transitioning tonight, push Soldiers up to, say, Able
15 Main or up to Asadabad and then continue on to do the
16 Bella--where you do the Bella retrograde, those guys
17 back the Blessing. And then while at Blessing, either
18 pick up PAX or pick up PAX at Korengal pick up PAX at
19 Abad and come back down.

20 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Who made the call were those aircraft went? The
21 Beta particular aircrafts; is that the brigade level?

22 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): For?
Kilo

23 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Let's say you planned a resupply mission up to
24 Beta Bella and then another need came up----

25 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes.
Kilo

26 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Was that you who would re-task or someone else?
Beta

27 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): The --it depends upon the mission or the event.
28 Kilo Often I would re-task, I would check with the Aviation
29 Task Force to see what they had available, or I would
30 give the Task Force, they would have their Pesh
31 resupply and I said, Okay, guys, you can have those
32 Apaches that are supporting the Pesh right now but the
33 risk is that you may not be able to complete your
34 Pesh, you may hit crew day, but if it is--you know, we
35 have an event right here, we will try to make up the
36 Pesh on another turn, maybe if you use CHs from
37 Brigade to assist. But if it is urgent that you need
38 those guys, then got it, and however long you need the

1 Apaches and when that cuts down on the turns of the
2 Pesh then that is what we do.

3 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): You mentioned the focus for Operation Rock Move,
4 Beta at least in your mind, was to get out of Bella.

5 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes.
6 Kilo

6 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Now the Wanat piece, what was your understanding
7 Beta of how that would be established?

8 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : What came up during the CONOP brief was that as
9 Kilo part of the retrograde out of Bella, one of the turns,
10 or one of the turns of two aircraft would drop either
11 personnel or equipment that had been at Bella at Wanat
12 as a ground forces are coming up from Blessings to
13 secure the HLZ. So, retrograde, retrograde,
14 retrograde, start moving your ground forces, secure
15 the HLZ at Wanat, and then a shorter turn to Wanat,
16 drop capabilities so as we brought a mortar up
17 Blessing, I believe, to support the position at Wanat,
18 and the mortar at Bella went back to Blessing. So, we
19 are moving a couple pieces like that and that
20 position--that mortar came up, I think it was a 132
21 mortar because their equipment was starting to flow
22 into theater. So, it was a significant coordination
23 measure as we are not only moving people, but we are
24 starting to move equipment from two different units.

25 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Recall how many total turns were going to be
26 Beta required to get Wanat the equipment it needed?

27 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Um, no, not without looking. And the other thing
28 Kilo is that we were using, as you can see here, outlined
29 here, we were using pieces of the Pesh, so it may not
30 have been a strictly a occupation or retrograde
31 operation as rock has been doing previously is pulling
32 pieces of Bella back with the Pesh that they -- it
33 looks like here, you can see ----

34 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): By the Pesh, you mean the resupply?
35 Beta

35 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : The resupply--the COP--the standard combat
36 Kilo resupply which is potentially daylight and later on it
37 would come a day late resupply because the loom cycle.
38 If it is at night, if the illum cycle supports it
39 then it is a night time resupply where you focus on
40 the areas that are higher threats. And then later a

1 combat resupply by day, you may limit the amount of
2 turns so -- to mitigate the risk instead of going into
3 Bella twice during the day, it is only going to be
4 once during a combat resupply. But it looks like here
5 from using the Pesh resupply that they were moving
6 PAX, equipment, supplies, a bobcat, some other pieces,
7 to Wanat with the lifts from Blessing. And it looks
8 like 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 aircraft on the Pesh going to
9 Wanat. That was on the 9th. So out of the initial 18
10 or so that would be at least 5 going into Wanat as
11 part of something else and then maybe 2 from the
12 retrograde of Bella could have been going to Wanat, as
13 well. Because they start retrograding capabilities, I
14 mean the big things and challenges were weapon systems
15 and signal systems, so the S-POP, Signal Point of
16 Presence for SIPR and NIPR and other electro
17 equipment, generators and then ammo.

18 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)

Beta

If Chosen Company or Task Force Rock required
additional aviation assets to move equipment up beyond
that initial list there was for the 8th of July, if
they required additionally assets to move supplies or
people up how would they go about that?

23 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6)

Kilo

Initially, it would have been listed in the
CONOP, if not the CONOP then they would have contacted
myself in the BAE and said, we are short this or we
have a challenge with this. But one of the issues
with--or one of the proposed benefits of going to
Wanat is that we had a ground lock, a ground route to
get to there, so the ability to move some equipment,
some heavier equipment that we could not move by air
was to be able to go up by ground as well. But if
they needed additional aircraft, depending upon if it
was routine resupply, or emergency resupply they would
contact us. If it was routine resupply they would
likely plan into the regular combat--combat resupply
so as to say every 3 to 4th day that the Pesh was
going to happen this is what their load plans would
be, this is where they want to go, this is what they
want to take, okay, and usually that is straight
through the aviation task-force. Emergency resupply
something different that comes up and usually gets--
and that is where I would get involved with something
and I will be briefing daily, hey, we are going to
execute this because it will take additional assets.

1 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : During Operation Rock-Movement, did you get any
2 **Beta** emergency resupply requests?

3 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : umm----
4 **Kilo**

4 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Or did you have to re-task aircraft to support
5 **Beta** Wanat?

6 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : For supplies?
7 **Kilo**

7 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : For supplies?
8 **Beta**

8 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I don't remember. It does not stick out as
9 **Kilo** something that I had to do. Truthfully, actually, in
10 reading the different reports and everything else that
11 watching post reporting, you know running low on water
12 or fuel, that was something that I don't-- that
13 would've triggered something in my head, but I did
14 not--I was not tracking that but it was critical on
15 that.

16 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : And if had you received such a report, did you
17 **Beta** have the assets available to provide the supplies that
18 they needed?

19 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I had the--at a cost, right, there were assets
20 **Kilo** available, what the impacts were going to be to the
21 RIP and at that point, beyond normal operations
22 because of the RIP and there would have been second
23 and third order effects, that is something that I
24 would likely push up to brigade commander. Sir, we
25 need to do this, it is going to impact this, it is
26 going to delay this by 2 days, here is what we have.
27 And that would be my interaction with him, either at
28 the point or as we are developing that depending upon,
29 you know, if it is not an emergency, if it is the next
30 day. That would be something that I do in the nightly
31 meeting. We are looking to change this up, it is
32 going to impact this and here is what we need to do.

33 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : You do not recall that taking place with Wanat?
34 **Beta**

34 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : No.
35 **Kilo**

35 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) : From the time----
36 **Beta**

36 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : And again, it could have, but I think I would
37 **Kilo** have been sensitive to that--hearing that.

1 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): From the time that the CONOP came up from Task
2 Beta Force-Rock to the time of execution, you recall about
3 how many days that was?

4 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): I think they had initial CONOP draft and then a
5 Kilo week----

6 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Was that normal timeframe?
Beta

7 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): It is usually time for us to react. And in this
8 Kilo time frame we were not planning any deliberate
9 operations, so the flash to bang on that is not as
10 much of a challenge. We had finished our really
11 deliberate shaping operations in June timeframe and we
12 really cannot have anything else scheduled for the
13 aircraft other than the RIP TOA moves.

14 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): What was the brigade's focus during the early
15 Beta July? Was it the RIP TOA?

16 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): Initially, we were looking at RIP TOA, right.
Kilo

17 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): And then what? You said, initially?
Beta

18 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, then it shifted to the main contact.
Beta

19 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Once the battle took place at Wanat?
Beta

20 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): No, prior to that. I mean, our focus shifted to
21 Kilo this once the reports of the temp reporting of threats
22 again Bella--have shifted to this. And significant
23 conversations at the--at every level, as well as when
24 we briefed this and how we briefed the CJTF-82 in
25 about what we had to do. And again the focus--the
26 focus initially when we did this we had to have the
27 assets to be able to get out of Bella and make sure
28 the conditions were set at Wanat. But the threat was
29 initially at Bella.

30 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Okay, thank you, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)
Beta Sigma

31 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): Kind of backing up what we initially started talking
32 Sigma about. You said CONOP's were normally driven by--from
33 the bottom driven by the battalion and then the SMEs
34 at the brigade staff would review the CONOP's, ID
35 issues, etc. and then identify the brigade fight, if
36 you will. Was part of the brigade fighting joint
37 fires?

1 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) Correct.

2 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) And then ISR, medevac, did you guys have any role in
3 [Sigma] say the logistical aspects of a battalion CONOP with
4 respect to like--this particular one involved civilian
5 construction company providing civilian construction
6 equipment?

7 LTC [Kilo] (b)(3), (b)(6) No, umm, no.

8 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay.

9 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) Most of the contracting, in my experience down as
10 [Kilo] a task force XO, we executed even down at the company
11 level.

12 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay.

13 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) Establishing contracts and making sure that we
14 [Kilo] have services available. But it depends upon the
15 operation, the one thing I would say is that if it
16 requires material from brigade said the brigade
17 engineer would look at potentially HESCOs or sandbags
18 or anything else that they need in that nature.

19 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) And then the battalion would take your recommendations
20 [Sigma] and eventually at some point during brief back to
21 Bayonet 6.

22 LTC [Kilo] (b)(3), (b)(6) Correct.

23 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) And then that process would be repeated up to
24 [Sigma] division.

25 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) Writes.
[Kilo]

26 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you recall whether or not Colonel [Delta] (b)(3), (b)(6) actually
27 [Sigma] briefed this CONOP to CJTF-101 or was it someone else
28 from the brigade staff?

29 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) The way that this is executed is, the task force
30 [Kilo] briefs brigade, the brigade approves it, and the task
31 force then again briefs it to CJTF as the brigade
32 monitors and provides its input.

33 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay. So it would have been Rock-6 briefing?
[Sigma]

34 LTC [Sigma] (b)(3), (b)(6) Correct.
[Kilo]

1 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Were there to your memory any planning or rehearsals
2 Sigma that the brigade was involved in with respect to this
3 CONOP?

4 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Not rehearsals. The flash to bang on this--other
5 Kilo operations that we have done gone out in the 30 day
6 model, for example Rock Avalanche then brigade had
7 gone down because it was actually four or five
8 different air assault missions, multiple companies,
9 AACANDAC, ANP, and other pieces. The flash to bang on
10 this, I'm not tracking the brigade had gone down to do
11 a CARR.

12 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay. So was there a rock drill or anything that you
13 Sigma remember?

14 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Again, there may have been at the task force level, I
15 Sigma am not sure, I am not tracking.

16 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) But not at the brigade staff?
Sigma

17 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Right.
Kilo

18 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) So it is not unusual, even though there were brigade
19 Sigma enablers involved, it is was not unusual that there
20 were not a rock drill or rehearsal given if I am
21 tracking what you are tracking, it is essentially a
22 company mission----

23 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Well--it--yes, there were rehearsals that we did
24 Kilo go attend. I am not tracking that we attended this
25 one.

26 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay.
Sigma

27 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) And it may have been because the flash to bang on
28 Kilo when it had to be executed.

29 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) But you guys were comfortable obviously at the brigade
30 Sigma staff that you had provided the requisite support
31 input and analysis for it.

32 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Rock had been one of our also most experienced
33 Kilo task forces conducting air assault operations and
34 going through the CONOP and the purpose of the CONOP
35 is an enforcing function to ensure that they identify
36 the requirements and it is a QATC that they had gone
37 through the MDMP required to execute the operation.

1 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Going to the Apaches, use of the Apaches for ISR, if
2 Sigma you use the Apaches for ISR then obviously they are
3 taken away as a CAST platform for somebody else; is
4 that normally the case?

5 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : I mean, you are limited----
Kilo

6 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : To resource constraints. So, it was pretty rare, if
7 Sigma ever, that your Apaches were idol, they were an asset
8 that everybody wanted for something?

9 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : It is something that--they were idol, the was a
10 Kilo period that we were getting--I would say the April
11 timeframe, we were really starting to get tight on
12 going into phase maintenance where we had limited
13 contacts where we could use KWs in support, we really
14 held off and really needed to have the Battalion 3 or
15 commander to say that we need this additional asset to
16 handle the fight. But at that point, no, the Apaches
17 flew a lot.

18 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : And they were part of what we are generally referring
19 Sigma to as the Air--air piece of the QRF for this?

20 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : For this it would have to be because it was the
21 Kilo only thing that could actually reach out to and beyond
22 Blessing. I think we push the threshold on the KWs
23 once, but they still went south of Wanat.

24 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Okay. And the actual mechanics of how they would spin
25 Sigma up and launch in a QRF situation is something that is
26 going to be coordinated with the brigade--I mean the
27 battalion task force?

28 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes.
Kilo

29 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Not something that you get involved with the brigade
30 Sigma level?

31 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, we are the launch authority for the QRF.
Kilo

32 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Okay. So if the----
Sigma

33 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : If there was a threat, if there was a contact
34 Kilo that was either assessed that it was going to be more
35 intense or greater duration or something beyond what
36 they could handle internally, positions in Redmond for
37 example, if we were able to identify the AAF before

1 and have an offensive engagement likelihood of sending
2 up the Apaches is low. If there is a threat, for
3 example, when Rock would go up in the Waygal, I am
4 getting the QRF spun up, they are spinning up before
5 hand, they are stopping other operations because they
6 make contact every time they get up there. And if
7 there is significant contact again, there are times
8 when we had pushed near--we are getting near the end
9 of the day, there is a contact, they don't need them
10 but we may push them up to Abad so that they are
11 closer to respond--cut the response down to 10 minutes
12 versus 40 minutes. In this case, obviously, we
13 launched the Apaches at some point; I think they got
14 there within 38 - 40 minutes or something like that.

15 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you recall kind of what their status was as far as
16 **Sigma** their level of readiness for this particular
17 operation?

18 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : They were on the regular QRF piece, actually,
19 **Kilo** when the contact at Wanat had happened I was woken up
20 by my battle captain who had already got the QRF
21 spinning. I think they were lifting off as I got into
22 the TOC and CAST was already moving on station.
23 Everything was--the response from the brigade staff
24 was immediate once the call is made to brigade.

25 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) That is a good segue, it leads into my next question.
26 **Sigma** Can you tell us a little bit about what you remember
27 with respect to the brigade staff and the brigade
28 staff actions that they took on the 13th once it
29 became clear that this was hitting the fan at Wanat?

30 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Once we--I literally remember waking up, I think
31 it was Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) who woke me up, he said "Rocks
32 in contact" and I said, "Shit". But I am like, I get **Charlie**
33 in there and everything was launched and we were
34 working. Hadn't got the word on any casualties yet,
35 but it was because we were there we had everyone spun
36 up pretty quickly. We had the brigade commander up,
37 CJTF--my main role was then okay, task force is
38 fighting initially Sig conditions kind of come back
39 with what they need, I go immediately to CJTF-101 to
40 see if I can start stacking assets. I don't know what
41 the situation is--due to location, we are probably
42 going to need to make sure we have at least the CAST
43 backfield and potentially how long it goes, if we are
44 going to need a day QRF aircraft from Abad to assist.

1 Because I knew it was beyond our individual
2 capabilities, if it was--it was hot, they have to go
3 back to Abad to be able to refit or top off or re-
4 armor.

5 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you remember what the brigade commander was doing
6 **Sigma** during the actual-- kind of the critical first aspect
7 of this thing?

8 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I think I went and got him and I think he was in
9 **Kilo** the back of the TOC, his normal position was a
10 significant action happens and he is the next row back
11 on the TOC and then he is on the phone usually with
12 the task force commander trying to find out, "okay,
13 give me an assessment, you may reading." And we talked
14 battle drills, we are seeing our asset trackers going
15 up, 2 Tank is doing their thing, TAXAT is up and one
16 of the TTPs that we did often had a hot line going
17 through to the task force TOC, hear what is going on,
18 get a sense of what is going on, that is where the 3
19 or I would also go back to one of our offices and
20 usually talk to the XO or the 3 in their office
21 outside of the TOC to try to get an idea of what is
22 going on and all.

23 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you remember if the brigade that any type of AAR or
24 **Sigma** lessons learned at any point subsequent to the Wanat
25 fight?

26 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I know that--other than the 15-6, we appointed
27 **Kilo** the DCO, wanted to have someone who was a senior
28 officer with experience so the DCO, I think, was
29 appointed as the 15-6 officer.

30 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) But there wasn't any formalized lessons learned
31 **Sigma** summation or anything like that?

32 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) No, I don't think that we--I don't think we did
33 **Kilo** that. I did not take part in it, so I don't think we
34 did it.

35 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay, that is all I have, sir.
Sigma

36 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : And again that may have been, I don't know if
37 **Kilo** they did anything back here, I don't know what--I went
38 back to Schweinfurt, so as part of the brigade staff--
39 even as part of the brigade staff, I was disconnected

1 and the new 3 took over upon return, so he may very
2 well have but I don't know if he did.

3 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Okay. General?
Sigma

4 **LtGen Natonski:** The CONOP was approved at the Brigade level.

5 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.
Sigma

6 **LtGen Natonski:** And was also briefed at the Division level?

7 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.
Kilo

8 **LtGen Natonski:** Who does that?

9 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): The DCGO, Brigadier General Milley, would receive
10 the CONOP from a--the process is it comes from the
11 task force to Brigade----

12 **LtGen Natonski:** Is that the Battalion Commander?

13 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): The Battalion Commander, the 3 in his
14 individually war fighting function, SMEs would brief,
15 and then we--the brigade commander would provide
16 feedback, he'd query the staff "what do you think
17 about this?" I think of a one challenge here, look at
18 adding this limitation. Okay, they will go back and
19 refine--okay, this is approved or approved for
20 planning, if not, then what I brief tomorrow to
21 division. As CHOPs, I would push it up to division so
22 that they can go through, scrub it, and then provide
23 other comments and recommendations.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** The CONOP covers the period 8 to 10 July?

25 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.
Kilo

26 **LtGen Natonski:** Which is the move?

27 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): The move, yes, sir.
Kilo

28 **LtGen Natonski:** What happens afterwards? In terms of fire
29 support or resupply?

30 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, they would be integrated into the task
31 force's plan. The a fires----

32 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you have a copy of that plan?

1 but you didn't know whether the next incoming unit was
2 going to roll in on top of that position?

3 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Well, part of, the question was, it transitioned
4 **Kilo** because 3d Brigade was going to come up with the full
5 brigade set. 2-2 Infantry was cut back down to RC
6 South in Kandahar. So initially, they were going to be
7 able to have a brigade in the interior Konar--
8 correction--a task force in the interior Konar, and
9 then task force arrayed along the Konar River Valley.

10 **LtGen Natonski:** So when second platoon, Chosen Company,
11 went up to Wanat, you don't know whether they were
12 going to be relieved by the incoming brigade, which
13 was 3d BCT?

14 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : They were planning to be relieved. They were
15 **Kilo** going to fall in our positions and we were going to
16 establish that and build as strong a position as we
17 could, sir.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** A COP?

19 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
20 **Kilo**

20 **LtGen Natonski:** Which is what it was referred to?

21 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
22 **Kilo**

22 **LtGen Natonski:** In terms of VPB--vehicle patrol base--which
23 is a non-doctrinal term--do you see that as
24 interchangeable or does it grow from a VPB to a COP?

25 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I think the VPB is the intermediate step, sir.
26 **Kilo** As you continue to improve your defense it is
27 established. For example, COP Seray, in the Chow-K
28 Valley, is a vehicle--was a vehicle patrol base--that
29 continued to grow and is a COP. I think it was
30 planned that we would go deeper into the valley and
31 leap frog positions--a position that we would either
32 leave or handover to ANSF.

33 **LtGen Natonski:** In the brigade, did you refer to it as a VPB
34 or a COP?

35 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I think back and forth, sir. When we saw it, we
36 **Kilo** said COP, we said VPB.

1 LtGen Natonski: At what point does it transition from a VPB
2 to a COP?

3 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I am not sure it is clearly defined.
Kilo

4 LtGen Natonski: But the 15-6 referred to it as a VPB.

5 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
Kilo

6 LtGen Natonski: And yet the CONOP refers to it as a COP.

7 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
Kilo

8 LtGen Natonski: The timing--we have heard about the RIP that
9 was ongoing at the time. This thing had slid because
10 of the negotiations with the elders over the land that
11 was going into--the COP was ultimately established and
12 then Bella took precedence and then at the end of
13 Bella was the establishment on Wanat. But there was a
14 RIP going on?

15 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
Kilo

16 LtGen Natonski: Which took away from those CH-47 assets.

17 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
Kilo

18 LtGen Natonski: Which were also critical to the
19 establishment of the COP; was there ever any thought
20 given that maybe they should wait to establish this
21 COP until the winter season and there is no fighting
22 or was there a press from the Brigade or the Battalion
23 to get it in there so the new unit could fall in on
24 it? Did those discussions take place?

25 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, during the CONOP
26 Kilo brief, I personally recommended to the brigade
27 commander that we just retrograde to blessing. The
28 Brigade Commander--we had a small discussion there and
29 the Brigade Commander asked the Battalion Commander
30 Topaz "Hey (b)(3), (b)(6) what do you think about this? Why don't
31 we just fall back to Blessing and make sure we are
32 set?" Rock responded that they have had the
33 negotiations and had worked with the population there
34 and failure to establish the position in Wanat would
35 cede the Waygal to the AAF and put pressure on
36 Blessing because we did not have a position forward of
37 that.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** Did 3BCT get involved in any of these
2 discussions?

3 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6) : I know they monitored, sir. I am not sure how
4 much Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Delta and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Sunset discussed. My
5 counterpart was there, as part of the left-seat/right-
6 seat.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** He didn't have anything one way or another
8 to say with respect to Wanat?

9 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6) : I don't know if he would have, sir. He was in a
10 bad position because the new guy coming in kept RIPing
11 with a senior but I don't know if he would have said--
12 I know his focus as the incoming CHOPs was the flow in
13 of his PAX and learning what my job was.

14 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6) : You had mentioned the interdiction, especially
15 along the border, establishing these COPs out there to
16 interdict traffic between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
17 Wanat, was that a shift in philosophy, or strategy, to
18 more counterinsurgency piece?

19 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I think we were doing simultaneous. We were
20 doing--elements were doing counterinsurgency focus. It
21 had them gone to the border, it was still a
22 counterinsurgency focus but with a task of
23 interdicting the movement across the border.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** So were they doing engagement with the
25 people?

26 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. I mean, that is part of what we are
27 doing across the two companies that we had along the
28 border from Rock was Destine Company as well as Able
29 Company, I think based out of Asadabad, the were based
30 out of there.

31 **LtGen Natonski:** Were they in population centers?

32 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6) : They would move to population centers. We also
33 had the PRT in Asadabad and we had a base in Asadabad
34 so there was, I think a company there. We had--as
35 part of the counterinsurgency doctrine--we worked very
36 closely with, or task force rock worked very closely
37 with the provincial governor, Governor Waheeni, and
38 they did have a very active provincial reconstruction
39 team that would compliment and synchronize their

1 actions to conduct SURAS and projects and other
2 meetings along with the SURAS in multiple population
3 centers.

4 **LtGen Natonski:** That was the intent of Wanat?

5 **LTC** Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. The intent of Wanat was to link in
6 with the district center for the Waygal. With the
7 district center and the ANP Headquarters there, the
8 interior valley further in--Bella and in the Ranch
9 House had been non-permissive and uncooperative, not
10 part of the process--what I believe their intent was
11 going to be was work with the district center which is
12 very close to the Battalion FOB and provide an example
13 of a cooperative situation with the government, with
14 ANSF, and coalition forces to bring projects and tried
15 to spread back up the valley from the district center.

16 **LtGen Natonski:** Because Bella was really just an
17 interdiction type.

18 **LTC** Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6): Bella was a bad location, yes, sir.

19 **LtGen Natonski:** You had mentioned Apache's and use of
20 Apache's on occasion for ISR. When the CONOP's went
21 into effect there is actually a predator dedicated for
22 the establishment of Wanat. That fell out--yesterday
23 we heard--around the 12th. We also heard that at the
24 time they were very very concerned. They had been
25 receiving indications and warnings of a pending
26 attack. There were individuals, groups, spotted in the
27 hillsides, people that were in the village had said
28 "You are going to be attacked", that women and
29 children had left. There were, I guess, some
30 intercepts--forces that had fought up in Bella were
31 going to migrate down. There were definitely some
32 indications and warning of an attack that had filtered
33 from Wanat up through the company and into the
34 Battalion. Were you getting those?

35 **LTC** Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6): I'm pretty sure we were getting some of the
36 reports, sir. The challenge with enduring CONOP's and
37 one of the things I brought up was the ability to
38 maintain constant support on it. As I talked about
39 the nature of the environment up there, there are a
40 couple of areas that only theater level ISR can
41 support. So, knowing that, the competition for assets

1 with the other brigade in our battle space and across
2 all of theater was a significant challenge.

3 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you know if there are other requests
4 for ISR the evening of the 12th?

5 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): I am not sure about the evening of the 12th,
6 sir, but I know they're always other requests for ISR.
7 For example, we denied a request for ISR and division
8 actually denied a CONOP for Task Force-Saber during, I
9 think, the early part of this time period. Where they
10 had indication and then the FOB Bostic took 17 rounds
11 of indirect. The challenge in the environment here
12 also is, how do you maintain sustained ISR with the
13 conditions? I know for one time during this period, I
14 don't know if it was Bella, I don't know if it was
15 Wanat, that the, I don't know if it was the Predator
16 or Warrior Alpha was pulled off because you are only
17 looking through clouds--holes in the clouds. So, it
18 was not an effective use of what we had, so trying to
19 weigh--how do you give them the capability to provide
20 for their defense and flip-flop assets to make sure
21 that they have some type of coverage. Do you - okay,
22 the predator is going to come off, can you get them a
23 POD capable aircraft that can fly over top or do you
24 replicate or supplement with a SIGINT based platform?

25 **LtGen Natonski:** I guess there were some heated discussions
26 with the 2s between the battalion and brigade over
27 ISR; were you aware of any in the 3?

28 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, I mean, there is always heated discussions
29 especially coming from Rock, Rock was very emotional
30 about this piece--it is hard tell over this period
31 because we are really talking from the 7th through
32 about the 14th, I guess. There really wasn't a
33 question after the 13th. But the 7th through the 13th
34 of sustained ISR over that period--over that area as
35 the threat reporting for Bella and then Wanat was
36 going on.

37 **LtGen Natonski:** So the threat reporting wasn't enough to
38 justify ISR or flying an Apache over there; which you
39 said Apaches had been used before.

40 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): It is not just that, if there was-- if it is
41 imminent threat, we need to launch the Apaches, again
42 you have to look, sir, do we--if we launch that do we

1 lose the capability across the rest of the battle
2 space. Now if there is imminent threat, I have across
3 queued HUMINT, SIGINT, something is happening right
4 now, then----

5 **LtGen Natonski:** You could not cross a level SIGINT because
6 you do not have any.

7 Kilo
8 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Unless they had ground base or hydro or anything
9 else.

10 **LtGen Natonski:** They did not have it. And then Red Ridge----

11 Kilo
12 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Red Ridge is only----

13 **LtGen Natonski:** That was off at the time. So all you had
14 was the reporting from the unit that they thought that
15 they were being threatened. But you do not do anything
16 to diverge or request a ISR at the brigade level----

17 Kilo
18 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, we requested a ISR, if the task force
19 request to ISR, we're going to go up to CJTF and fight
20 for and make our case.

21 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you do that?

22 Kilo
23 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I am sure we did.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** Where would that be recorded?

25 Kilo
26 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I am not sure if it was recorded.

27 **LtGen Natonski:** Would it be verbal?

28 Kilo
29 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : It would be verbal. The first thing that I would
30 do is that I would get on the phone. It may be
31 recorded on the J2 sync and ISR sync drills at CJTF
32 that they held nightly. But verbally as anything
33 comes up, I go up to the CHOPs, who is really one of
34 the key decision makers are influencers on CJTF. It
35 is just like, I have to make my case and the purpose
36 of the CONOP is to continue to make your case of how--
37 --

38 **LtGen Natonski:** Were you making a case for ISR for Wanat?

39 Kilo
40 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I am sure that I was. I do not know how--I
41 do not know what else the pushback was, if there was
42 pushback but----

1 LtGen Natonski: Predator was a division asset?

2 LTC Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Well, actually, sir, it was theater.
3 So, ISAF determines the priority of who it goes to, so
4 it could has been going to RC South, it could have
5 been going to RC East and then priority within RC East
6 to 4th Brigade. It could have been dynamically re-
7 task organized to support OCF or SeaJaSoda.

8 LtGen Natonski: However, a personal call from a brigade
9 would not necessarily get it shifted.

10 LTC Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): Not necessarily, sir. I mean, we have shifted in
11 the past but if it is going against a named operation
12 against a threat, again I did not do the autopsy of
13 after-the-fact who it was supporting.

14 LtGen Natonski: What was the main effort in the brigade's AO
15 during this unit of time?

16 LTC Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): Rock was the main effort, sir.

17 LtGen Natonski: Wanat was?

18 LTC Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. And Rock--to tell you, sir, Rock was
19 almost daily the main effort for enablers, there was--
20 and that was understanding the challenges that task
21 force Saber had but because of the level of contact
22 that--the number of contacts that they had and the
23 challenge of terrain. Almost daily, I would say "the
24 priority of effort today is going to Rock" unless I
25 knew that there was a specific patrol going someplace
26 else.

27 LtGen Natonski: What was the battlefield circulation for the
28 brigade commander? Did he get out and about?

29 LTC Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, he got out and about, I would say either--
30 depends on the period of time----

31 LtGen Natonski: During the Wanat period?

32 LTC Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): During the Wanat period, I think he was doing a
33 lot of the RIP piece with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) But a lot Sunset
34 of his--I think he had--he was not out as often during
35 that period as had been.

36 LtGen Natonski: He did not make it to Wanat?

1 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir.
Kilo

2 LtGen Natonski: So the RIP was using some of his time during
3 this period?

4 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir, but its--our focus was trying to also
5 Kilo get as much of the 3-1 PAX out to see the battle space
6 as well.

7 LtGen Natonski: During the battle at Wanat, there were some
8 problems with M4s and SAWs, did you hear about that?

9 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : I did not hear any of that, sir.
Kilo

10 LtGen Natonski: Did you have any inclination during your
11 tour in Afghanistan with problems with M4s overheating
12 or----

13 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : No, sir.
Kilo

14 LtGen Natonski: Okay. In the 15-6--after the battle, they
15 directed the 15-6, what is the criterion for the
16 investigation-- why was that done?

17 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Any 15-6 is going to be investigated if there is
18 Kilo a loss of life, not to a Soldier.

19 LtGen Natonski: So, any loss of life clicks a 15-6?

20 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. And then depending upon the complexity
21 Kilo or level of the 15-6 then who the IO is going to be.

22 LtGen Natonski: But that is automatic?

23 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
Kilo

24 LtGen Natonski: Thanks.

25 MG Perkins: yes, you recount the discussion about timeline of
26 setting up for Wanat prior to 1-26 coming in versus
27 before or after and all of the competing requirements
28 for that time. It sounds like Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) in the Delta
29 end, in conjunction with Rock-6, made that decision--
30 instead of just pulling out of Bella to Blessing that
31 they would establish Wanat; correct?

32 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
Kilo

1 **MG Perkins:** about when would you say that that decision was
2 made?

3 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, that had to be during the CONOP brief.
4 Kilo

4 **MG Perkins:** so this discussion came up during the brief?

5 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. I mean, that's--that's--that's the--
6 Kilo after the task force briefs, the commander would
7 usually turn to the staff to see if they had anything
8 am looking at him I said, "Sir, why don't we pull back
9 to Blessing?" And I know that we're trying to set
10 conditions, set 3-1 up for success, he asked the
11 question of Rock-6 and Rock made the case that it was
12 imperative that we do it now.

13 **MG Perkins:** so this was a deliberate discussion and therefore
14 a conscious decision after we weighed the pluses and
15 minuses, opportunities and costs, etc. like that.

16 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes.
17 Kilo

17 **MG Perkins:** It got staffed input--staff recommendations.

18 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : And of course the overriding factor is the
19 commander to the commander on the ground who has
20 better----

21 **MG Perkins:** I understand, but it was a deliberate discussion
22 and decision, not a----

23 **LTC** Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6) : And all the factors, I'm not sure if we lay out--
24 but I would say one of the things that we could have
25 laid out--I was going through this, how is this going
26 to affected the additional details of what the
27 challenges would be.

28 **MG Perkins:** I got it. And in the task and purpose again for
29 Wanat was to better be able to really than Bella or
30 Ranch House, not only provide interdiction, which it
31 would, but also provide an ability to better execute
32 COIN operations basically co-locating with the
33 district?

34 **LTC** Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

35 **MG Perkins:** So it was an additional capability than what we
36 had at Bella?

1 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6) : It was far better Bella, sir, as well the main
2 driving force that it provided for us a ground lock
3 that they can move personnel and equipment to and not
4 depend upon air and the threat of air going into that
5 horrible valley.

6 **MG Perkins:** So, we laid out all of the pluses and minus and
7 the decision was made to go ahead and establish Wanat.
8 Who made the decision after the 13th to pull back from
9 Wanat?

10 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I think it's a discussion between Brigade
11 and CJTF-101.

12 **MG Perkins:** And what had changed at that point versus before
13 because honestly there still was--the benefits
14 existed, I know what this physically had changed but
15 how has that changed perspectives?

16 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6) : I think part of it was that they looked at prior
17 to the operation--prior to the retrograde that the
18 northern part of the Waygal was non-permissive and had
19 no--nothing to do with what was going on there. I
20 think what had changed is that the persistent threat
21 because of the contact and, and this is just my
22 opinion, the potential--if not the assistance or lease
23 the permissive nature of the local supporting the
24 attack made staying continue invulnerable.

25 **MG Perkins:** So then would you say that there was then maybe
26 in understanding that the previous goal or task of
27 sort of co-locating with the district center are
28 working with them now may not be a viable task as it
29 looks like they are not of the mind to want to do
30 that?

31 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6) : I think the conditions have changed, sir, and the
32 ability to partner with the government at that
33 location and our strategy of "okay, we will isolate
34 the northern part of valley," and give an example,
35 which is translated to "okay, we'll really have to
36 focus on Naglum and the Pesh and isolate the Waygal to
37 show them."

38 **MG Perkins:** So, in other words, the original task and purpose
39 would have been desirable but now it is apparent that
40 is probably unattainable?

1 LTC Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir, with the change in condition.

2 MG Perkins: Do you know did Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or the 3d Brigade Sunset
3 folks have any discussion or input to that after the
4 13th, as far as staying there permanently, you know,
5 did they way in at all?

6 LTC Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): Again, sir, if that was part of the discussion I
7 was not-- I was not part of the discussion.

8 MG Perkins: you had talked about the threat stream that you
9 all have been receiving, experience at the ranch
10 house, etc. then the concern for Bella, the threat
11 reporting that AAF was looking towards massing forces
12 and overrunning an American COP, etc., was one of the-
13 -sounds like motivations for pulling out of Bella, so
14 she started putting together a CONOP and you talked
15 about the illum cycle and the CH-47s in there and
16 coming out. Would you say that as you did Rock-move,
17 the primary concern was the possibility of Bella being
18 overrun as you can do to reduce forces versus the
19 threat to Wanat?

20 LTC Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I think the-- I do not feel that there was
21 a-- as much of a possibility of overrunning Bella but
22 the interdiction of the movement back. I know they
23 want to overrun, they always want to overrun, that's
24 why you hear the threat report often. And Bella is a
25 bad decision as it is, it's just tough to get to a
26 position where you can make the final assault to have
27 the effect. And I think the other piece for Wanat is,
28 in my mind, it was going to be a better defensive
29 position and I know that Rock had been up there to
30 look at the area and be able to set up. And you are
31 not literally sitting at the bottom of a mountain. I
32 mean, they are around, but some of our COPs and FOBs,
33 it is sheer cliff behind you and you are just--I mean,
34 they can throw rocks at you and kill you, not just
35 RPGs.

36 MG Perkins: So, in your mind, the main concern is the
37 interdiction of the retrograde from Bella?

38 LTC Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): I thought the greatest threat was going to be the
39 interdiction of an aircraft under retrograde from
40 Bella.

1 **MG Perkins:** You were talking about the number of FOBs and
2 COPS that the Brigade had responsible for, I guess you
3 said at one point it peaked at 36.

4 **LTC**

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : Sir, I think we fell in at 36 and the ONIs that
5 we initially had might be able to show that and I
6 think that we capped out at 27.

7 **MG Perkins:** So at this time in the June / July, would you say
8 that you were sort of hovering at the 27?

9 **LTC**

(b)(3), (b)(6), Kilo

 : Yes, sir, I would say they were right around 27.

10 **MG Perkins:** About how many of those were you unable to cover
11 ISR with organic assets and required theater assets?

12 **LTC**

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : Initially that would be Wanat, Bella, Libert, COP
13 Low, Checkpoint-Delta, COP Keating which is recently
14 in the news, and Richie.

15 **MG Perkins:** so little over a half a dozen in your AO where
16 competition, when I say that in other words for the
17 theater level ISRs.

18 **LTC**

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : And FOB Nerray, as well, and Montay, too.

19 **MG Perkins:** It is wise to say that there were a number of
20 COPS or FOBs in your brigade alone that required
21 Theater level assets, let along outside there were
22 theater requirements.

23 **LTC**

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : And the theater, the one task--one CJTF asset was
24 a Warrior Alpha.

25 **MG Perkins:** Yes.

26 **LTC**

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : But it gets clumped into that and the challenge
27 with Warrior Alpha was to be able to--to actually be
28 able to launch, it is much more susceptible to high
29 winds at Bagram, limiting it to our launch.

30 **MG Perkins:** We talked earlier about resupply and things like
31 that, to your knowledge then Brigade is not tracking
32 any criticality with regards to water, barriers,
33 supply, contractors, I mean any of this stuff that
34 would be required to establish Wanat?

35 **LTC**

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : No, sir, from my perspective, I was participating
36 the bulk of that equipment be moved by the ground

1 resupplies, they have--and the PAX that they have
2 moved up there. I was not tracking the status reports
3 on what they had on the ground.

4 **MG Perkins:** Do you know that as the CONOP was briefed to
5 division headquarters was any specific guidance given
6 with regards to execution of the CONOP or were there
7 any specific requests for assistance from the Brigade
8 to division with regards to the executing this?

9 **LTC**

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : Usually at the end of the CONOP--limits if they
10 have it here-- this is usually what we call the bill
11 slide, the bill slide war fighting function summary--
12 what we need.

13 **MG Perkins:** Yes.

14 **LTC**

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : And then you go back to war criteria of what they
15 have and when they need it. So it is some of the--we
16 always say that to execute the mission, no for the
17 move peace, we were looking at having a --having the
18 ISR, having the CAST, either -----

19 **MG Perkins:** I don't recall, on the --turn back to the abort
20 Criteria, does it say thing in there about ISR?

21 **LTC**

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : Task Force Fight CTSR Supply, events in the AI,
22 no --resource threaten--a threaten resource stack at
23 CJTF loss personnel aircraft, events in AO, loss of
24 control of C2 Node, minimal force per objective, no
25 CAST or CCA for it, projected ISR for four hours or
26 longer loss of standard--non-standardized are
27 effective----

28 **MG Perkins:** So, if you had lost the ISR sometime on the 12th,
29 would that have met one of those abort criteria?

30 **LTC**

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : Yes, sir, but we had already completed the move.

31 **MG Perkins:** so the abort criteria would've been prior to the--
32 ---

33 **LTC**

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : Prior to that----

34 **MG Perkins:** even pulling out of Bella?

35 **LTC**

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : No, sir, not part of Bella--prior to--when you
36 hit the threshold of, do I have--am I committed. I
37 have to get the rest of the force out----

1 **MG Perkins:** I understand.

2 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : And that would be that piece. An example of abort
3 **Kilo** criteria, sir, I tell you how we executed that: Task
4 Force Rock had an air assault going in to HLZ, east of
5 Konar, had a company on the ground, we had ISR
6 supporting it and everything, we had the Kamgal-- we
7 had a CH 47 shot down up and saber, know that that is
8 going to be a resource intensive operation, we pulled
9 the company off ground, we did another lift in, did an
10 ex-fill of that, and shifted assets going towards
11 Saber because we knew that would affect ISR for the
12 next 24 to 48 hours, however long it's going to take.
13 So it was deliberate and the purpose of that is to
14 have deliberate decision-making process in place, too.

15 **MG Perkins:** But you don't recall, as the General asked
16 earlier, or you don't know, whether there was a
17 discussion say via the command channels or operation
18 channels on the loss of ISR, The Predator, sometime on
19 the 12th?

20 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, if they--if they lost the ISR that I know I
21 **Kilo** went--it was either conditions on the ground or I went
22 back to CJTF to say, here is her case, we have threat
23 reporting. We lost ISR for myriad reasons across time
24 whether it is weather between Kandahar base out of
25 there and where we are, higher mission--higher
26 priority mission, weather on our site, a little
27 monitor to see what is happening, incoming weather,
28 and if incoming weather, we may have and we have in
29 the past, request a chariots direct call to Cav to
30 force the ISR to stay. So, if it was the weather
31 impending then that would have been the decision also
32 at the CJTF level. But we do not--Rock does not lose
33 ISR without making noise and we did not lose ISR
34 without making noise to CJTF, specific site I cannot
35 remember.

36 **MG Perkins:** You say at this time the Rock was brigade's main
37 effort and therefore this COP was the brigade's main
38 effort. How many within your--you know the 27 FOBs
39 and COPs and things like that would talked exclusively
40 about this, the threat reporting arrow, as you can
41 recall, what other sort of ongoing high-priority or
42 top-priority operations were going on possible
43 significant threat streams, etc., like that would you
44 say, about the same time?

1 LTC

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : It is hard, sir, there are some locations that we
2 always have our antenna up for, obviously when this
3 was going on, our antennas were up and focus, but
4 contacts in the Korengal dependent upon the nature of
5 how they are reported. If they were reported 2 to 6
6 PAX, okay, anything kind of over 10, something is
7 happening. Rock going up into the Waygal, if they are
8 going up there they always get into a fight, we need
9 to figure out how do we put constraints on the other
10 task forces not to go and do extended patrols where
11 they can gain contact. Up in Task Force Saber's AO,
12 if you went north of checkpoint Delta, a patrol was
13 going north of there, it is an ambush corridor where
14 the flash to bang for enablers is something that you
15 would have to plan for, patrols outside of COP Lowel
16 or COP Keating were threat reporting on those were
17 other high priority to be attuned to, you know if
18 we're getting reports, ICON intercepts, HUMINT
19 reporting, movement in those areas then the ability to
20 shift fires on potential ISR could make the difference
21 in the fight.

22 **MG Perkins:** If we wanted to sort of reconstruct, say a one
23 week period of a common operating picture for the
24 brigade, in other words take a look at a one week
25 period around here and everything that was going on,
26 reports, etc., how was your common operating picture
27 portrayed--what----

28 LTC

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : CPOP, sir.

29 **MG Perkins:** And CPOP.

30 LTC

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : Yes, sir.

31 **MG Perkins:** And so, I assume that those were all maintained
32 or the hard drives with CPOP so that you can go back
33 and take a look from day to day?

34 LTC

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : I would think so, sir, I am not, again, the
35 problem is that I plugged out of brigade----

36 **MG Perkins:** I understand but CPOP was your-----

37 LTC

Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6)

 : Depository, sir, those efforts were pushed up to
38 CJTF as well, so that might be another location where
39 you can see the SIGINTs that were effort to higher.

1 **MG Perkins:** Okay, good, thanks.

2 **LtGen Natonski:** Do you know if there is a lot going on at
3 this time because of the RIP TOA? I mean it seems to
4 me----

5 **LTC** Kilo
(b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, we had no--we had no planned operations.

6 **LtGen Natonski:** This is the only one?

7 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Deliberate operation, yes, sir. Now there were as
8 Kilo part of the RIP TOA local patrols, familiarization
9 patrols, and again, as you would push PAX up, I think
10 timing wise, Saber was before Rock, so, they were
11 probably receiving aircraft during that high illume
12 period because especially COP Lowel, one of our real
13 high risk FOBs had to do their RIP at night. So prior
14 to Bella or simultaneous to Bella we may have been
15 conducting that, post that they would be doing their
16 local patrols. Keating as well, a higher risk FOB as I
17 would call it or COP. But no deliberate operations,
18 the last deliberate operation we did as a brigade was
19 either a Rock operation or we attempted to get
20 SeaJaSoda to assist to give us some space But it was
21 not effective in Nagahar, I think it May.

22 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Was that--was your understanding of the threat
23 Beta level that it was likelihood that the Chosen unit
24 would get attacked?

25 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): I know that was a possibility but I am not saying
26 Kilo likelihood. Again, I think the one thing that was not
27 clear in brigade's mind, and definitely my mind, was
28 the conditions on the ground at Wanat and what level
29 of initial preparation had been made to execute that.
30 I would say one of the shortcomings obviously this is
31 not having the occupation plan and in what PIR wise
32 how they set the conditions for occupation of this
33 position. But, I was also, you know, thinking--just
34 looking at the analysis of the map that they moved to
35 a more defendable terrain and I know that they had
36 been up--Chosen6 and Rock-6 had been up on that ground
37 multiple times. And the one focus up--after--post--
38 Ranch House, in August, it was a --Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Delta
39 was--his one sustained drumbeat was a force protection
40 at FOBs. It was a mantra coming up after a
41 significant impact, he came to--he did a force
42 protection battlefield circulation specifically

1 looking at how the units were arranged, how do they
2 have the ground-based ISR set to support the most
3 likely avenues of approach and how they were set now.
4 Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Delta did not go up to Wanat from I am
5 tracking. I think there was every concept for him but
6 I don't think they went. They were going to have--I
7 want to say it was June, but it is going to be a joint
8 meeting up at Wanat but, I don't know if something
9 happened where Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Delta did not go by I know
10 that Rock went probably 3 times and he got shot at
11 twice upon the retrograde back to Blessing. Their
12 Gack got shot at. But it was definitely--it was
13 painful staff level of resourcing everything else
14 across--it was one of our focuses during our winter
15 timeframe as we went across and made sure that the
16 battle space and the locations that we occupied were
17 well established--one example is that they looked at
18 moving a location up in Longman Province because of
19 its position and they did engineer work to assist in a
20 OP but a significant piece of how we are arranged
21 across the battle space.

22 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): After the unit executed their movement on the 8th
23 Beta July, were you receiving the information regarding
24 continued threat reports that was coming out of the
25 platoon?

26 LTC Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6): I am sure that we were receiving them and I'm
27 sure that most of the 2 was probably very attuned to
28 that overall situation again we would--if the 2 got
29 something hot, he was right across the JOC from me,
30 and we talked multiple hours every day. And then
31 briefing-wise during the shift change brief in the
32 morning, the commander's update in the morning, and
33 then either the nightly commander's update for the
34 task forces every other night and the CJTF update the
35 other nights and then the final close out would be the
36 3, the XO, the 2 and myself and the DCO and then bring
37 the JBB in. So those are multiple times during the
38 day where we were kind of put together, sympathize,
39 what is going on. There is one other battle rhythm
40 that we had weekly was kind of our fusion meeting with
41 SeaJaSoda looking at the threats and personalities
42 across the battle space.

43 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): During the--from the time of the 8th up to the
44 Beta 13th, did anyone request or did you consider moving

1 the QRF aircraft closer? And if you had, where would
2 you have moved them?

3 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): No, there is a couple things utilizing the QRF, I
4 **Kilo** would have moved them to Abad if I had that--if had
5 requested. But there was a--we had a signif--one of
6 pieces not kind of talked about, is the significant
7 piece of air we had flying over Bella, initially we
8 were keeping CJs--corrections, AHs over Bella during
9 some of the threat reporting as well, utilizing some
10 of the aircraft from actually Bagram when we thought
11 the initial attack at Bella was happening on about the
12 3d or the 4th. So, we did a lot of the yo-yo
13 operations, RA-Hs, Bath-CHs, QRF piece. But that was
14 in response to actual contact.

15 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): When you authorize the rotary wing Kure have to
16 **Beta** head off to assist someone in contact, who de-
17 conflicted the airspace assuming that there is
18 indirect fire going in as well?

19 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Once aircraft is launched from brigade, it is
20 **Kilo** passed down to task force, they do the AC2C piece.
21 They are the ones that have the best SA, eyes on, Coms
22 locally with the aircraft either controlled by the
23 task force C2--task force--a FOB and their TOC, more
24 from the company, so as you integrated the aircraft,
25 you would have to be able to carve up the airspace and
26 we would talk--we have a little bit in here about
27 difference elevations and everything else, but for
28 ROCK, they did a lot from their TOC, depending upon
29 where they were, especially at Wanat, it was probably
30 from their because it had not had their SPOP or any
31 type of Coms package set up there, so other than FM
32 comes with the aircraft or TAXACT, I would imagine the
33 majority of that came through the Task Force TOC.

34 **LtCol** **Beta** (b)(3), (b)(6): Thank you.

35 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) How far was the ground lock between Blessing and
36 **Sigma** Wanat?

37 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) It--probably 15 K, maybe. It is not the
38 **Kilo** distance; it is the challenge of getting there.

39 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Is that the same road that the GACKs were ambushed?
Sigma

1 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Where the GACKS were hit, yes. And usually the
2 (Kilo) Gacks were hit; I think 2 clicks south of Wanat
3 itself.

4 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : So there was a pretty common knowledge that there were
5 (Sigma) issues with security along that ground line?

6 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : And there was the assumption, I am not sure it
7 (Kilo) was assumption or anything confirmed from Rock-6,
8 himself, that the--one of the meetings with the elders
9 was, specifically targeted and enabled a TTP for the
10 AAF was post-SURA, Post-Scheduled meeting to be able
11 to establish the ambush. He felt after one of those,
12 I think, this is just my recollection, that the
13 meeting was purposely delayed to enable the ambush.

14 **Lt Col** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Major (b)(3), (b)(6) ? (Owl)
Beta

15 **Maj** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. Just to clarify this, on the ISR
16 (Owl) allocation, do you know the time period that the ISR
17 allocation was actually requested for and actually
18 approved for? Specifically, I have heard that it was
19 the--was the support just for the task force--Rock
20 Movement? In other words, to observe the Bella move
21 or did it cover some of the Wanat occupation or stand
22 up?

23 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : The only thing that we can actually CJTF for it
24 (Kilo) is on the CONOP, so we can always go back and say DCGO
25 approved this, you have to go back to him, if you are
26 going to change it for this time period. So after
27 that, I think the ISR was allocated based on the
28 threat and our ability to make a case, "look we just
29 did this major operation, you know the threat, you
30 know what we went in through 10 days ago or 8 days
31 ago, the threat there. We need ISR." And the
32 challenge is you always have to justify, you can't cry
33 wolf, you really have to discern what capabilities are
34 absolute central and what do you have to say that
35 you're going to go to the mat for and I am not saying
36 that we--I am sure we pushed back, whether we went to
37 mat, whether the DCGO was made aware of the decision,
38 I don't think that we got to that level.

39 **Maj** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. And again, I might have missed that.
40 (Owl) Do you know at what point it was mostly cut off
41 because we have heard from other--or we have heard a
42 little bit that at some point ISR was pulled. You

1 know, was it pulled because it was just literally
2 addressing a threat or was it pulled from CONOP that
3 you were dedicated for from the state to the state,
4 hey, we got that, you know, it was ran out, it was not
5 pulled. I am just trying to clarify that.

6 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : I do not think that it was pulled, I do not think
7 **Kilo** it was reallocated to the mission. And again, knowing
8 your conditions, you have to understand, that as the
9 unit is operating in the battle space, the constraints
10 on your environment. We understand very well what the
11 constraints are in how far the shadow can fly. So we
12 are not covered there. We understand that we have
13 QRF, we have the ability aircraft to launch internal.
14 We are competing across the theater for 5 predator
15 platforms but really were only competing for about 3
16 because the other 2 are dedicated to OCF. So, they
17 are only going to fly about 12 hours to 14 hours at a
18 period. And of that, if you are saying that you have
19 24 ISRs, you are getting 2 platforms dedicated to one
20 to battalion or company location. So the threat
21 streams across the entire battle space are being
22 considered because we really not--we really don't have
23 any assets although we have in other areas with
24 requested assistance through OCF on some of their
25 platforms, some of their capabilities to cover some
26 areas as well. And actually, I think they covered
27 other areas of ours because we knew they were doing a
28 surveillance or something, so, we assume the risk in
29 other areas when that is not dedicated to us.

30 **Maj** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir. I guess it ended on--it would've ended
31 **Owl** on the 9th?

32 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Officially, this would've ended on intent,
33 **Kilo** according to this as a dedicated; the DCGO said that
34 you were going to be supported with ISR for this.
35 Okay, come back and we don't have an approved CONOP to
36 put towards it, but we have a threat stream that is
37 credible to reporter to--tied to a former CONOP and a
38 previous threat

39 **Maj** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Thank you, sir. Nothing further.
40 **Owl**

40 **LtGen Natonski**: Okay, I am going to give you an order here,
41 Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6). You are ordered not to **Kilo**
42 discuss the testimony that you provided today with
43 anyone other than members of the investigation team.

1 You will not allow any witness in this investigation
2 to talk to you about the testimony that he has given
3 or which he intends to give. If anyone should try to
4 influence your testimony or attempt to discuss your
5 testimony, you are instructed to notify Lieutenant
6 Beta Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6). Do you
7 understand that? Sigma

8 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
 Kilo

9 **LtGen Natonski:** I just want to thank you for your service to
10 our country, and to the U.S. Army, and thank you for
11 what you did during your tour in Afghanistan. I
12 appreciate you coming all the way down from Germany
13 for this. Thank you very much.

14 **LTC** Kilo (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.

15 [Investigation closed at 1554 hours, on 14 October 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Subj: TESTIMONY OF LTC [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6), Kilo, USA, GIVEN
ON 14 OCTOBER 2009, AT VICENZA, ITALY

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify
that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

[REDACTED]
(b)(3), (b)(6), Sigma

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Judge Advocate

25 NOV 2009
DATE