[The investigation opened at 1341, 21 October 2009.]

LtGen Natonski: (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron, I am Lieutenant General Rich Natonski, United States Marine Corps. I have been appointed by the Commander of U.S. Central Command to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the combat action at Wanat, Afghanistan during July 2008. Major General David Perkins, United States Army, has been assigned as the deputy investigating officer. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma are the judge advocates assigned to this investigation team.

The testimony you provide today will be recorded, transcribed, and included in a report of the investigation. Based on your testimony, we may also prepare a separate written statement for your review and signature.

Prior to coming on the record today, you signed a Privacy Act; is that correct?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron: That is correct, sir.

LtGen Natonski: Your testimony will be made under oath and you will now be sworn.

[The witness was sworn.]

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Sir, could you please state your name, spelling your last?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron: My name is Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: And, sir, what is your current unit and unit location?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron: Currently, I am the executive officer to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington DC, Army Pentagon.

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Sir, in July of 2008, what was your unit and unit location?

1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron: I was the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade
2 Commander, Task Force Destiny, we were a task force.
3 My location was Bagram, Afghanistan. I had five
4 battalions-- task forces within my Brigade; two of the
5 battalions were located at Bagram. One of my
6 battalion task forces was in direct support of the
7 173d in Jalalabad, that was 2/17 Cav. I had a
8 battalion task force in direct support of 4th brigade
9 of the 101st that was 1st of the 101st, The Attack
10 Battalion. And then I had an aviation task force in
11 RC South supporting RC South.

12 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, for the investigating officers paint a
13 picture, to the best you can, how many aircraft that
14 is?

15 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron: I had 100 and--roughly 171 aircraft.
16 Aircraft are composed of Kiowa warriors, AH-64
17 Apaches, Blackhawks UH-60s, both for assault
18 Blackhawks and as well as medevac, had CH-47s within
19 the task force, we had fixed wing aircraft as well;
20 UC-35 for VIPs, C-12, as well as all of the special
21 mission aircraft, MI type aircraft. And then we also
22 had Warrior Alpha, UAVs under us.

23 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, from Bagram, your unit assigned to Bagram,
24 did they run the resupply routes?

25 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron: That is correct. I had my general support
26 aviation battalion, 6/101st was located at Bagram, and
27 predominantly they did the VIP missions and the
28 resupply throughout the entire country. But those
29 organizations-- those battalion task forces that were
30 in direct support of each one of those infantry
31 brigades had UH-60s and CH-47s, they too did the
32 resupply in the brigade sec--in that infantry brigade
33 sector.

34 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, do you recall how 2/17 Cav was configured as
35 far as aircraft types?

36 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron: At the time 2/17 Cav was commanded by
37 squadron Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6). His task force Chestnut
38 was composed of an attack--I would call it an attack
39 company minus a platoon plus, four aircraft that we

eventually beefed up to six AH-64s, he had a medevac section with three UH-60 medevac aircraft, he had a lift section with four CH-47s, and he had eight Blackhawks now-- daily we moved Blackhawks all over the country, so normally he had 6 to 8 Blackhawks. And then he had a troop plus--two troops minus of Kiowa warriors, approximately 17.

LtCol Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Were there issues with the Kiowa, sir, as far as elevation?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron: Altitude. They--we restricted them to 6000 feet because of their power limitations on the aircraft. And that was done before going over and so, anything above 6000 feet they would have to go to the Commanding General to get approval to fly above that altitude. And it was purely because a single engine aircraft--power limitations of the aircraft.

LtCol Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, for your general support aircraft--the general support to battalion that you had at Bagram, how did they get their tasking? Did it come through your headquarters?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Well, yes, all of the tasking came through my brigade 3, but for logistics resupply, they had a daily board, if you will, at the division level that runs primarily by the sustainment brigade and all of the different brigades and organizations throughout Afghanistan would submit their request up to the division of what they wanted moved that day. The board met and then they would prioritize what supplies would get moved when and then they would come out with a tasking order, you know, the day before or two days before and then task us for a certain number of aircraft and then what FOBs we went to like a ring route, if you will.

LtCol Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, do you recall--did you ever participate in that process where they established--or decided who would get what lift?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: No, no, no, that was done primarily by staff officers at the division level, working with the brigade and captains within my brigade S3 shop, along

with the general support Battalion S3 section, they were present them as well. But what a--obviously we would tell them, "hey, this is how many based on maintenance, this is how many CH-47s we could put up today for resupply, this is how many UH-60s we can put up for VIP Support and resupply. And then they would come back and basically fill those aircraft. I then, the day before, I would approve that mission. Every mission that they flew, the crews were briefed to me, and I was a medium risk approval authority and I was approving that mission the day before specifically looking at the mission as well as the crews that were assigned to mitigate the risk.

LtCol Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Was it--during your tour, sir, were there times when a particular task force would have a deliberate operation going on that you would surge your CH-47s in support?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Many times, many times depending on who was the priority of effort for the CJTF-101 or CJTF-82 because we were there most of--half the time was with CJTF-82 and the other half was with 101. But depending on the priority of effort was for the division and where air assaults were going on and the location, yes, division would come back to me--I had a battalion task force that task force was in direct support for that infantry brigade. That battalion commander worked with that infantry battalion commander to plan the operation. If he needed additional aircraft, the infantry brigade commander would then go to the commanding general or the deputy commanding general and request additional assets to support the operation. They would then come to me and based on all of the missions that they have given me, the priority of effort, I will either give them aircraft or in some cases-not many cases, not have aircraft available. I would say most-- I would say 90% of the cases, we had aircraft available to support deliberate operations.

LtCol Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): So that would be the DCG officer directly to you in that case?

1 COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: The DCG that is normally who I work with in
2 General Milley, you know, he worked it out, plus the
3 brigade commander would call me as well and we work
4 it. We always work to support the infantry brigade on
5 any type of deliberate type of operation and then I
6 would have to then, and normally it would come out of
7 the -- helicopters are located at Bagram, you know, to
8 support that brigade. Sometimes I would pull from
9 another task force and say, for the 4th Brigade sector
10 to push the 1-73 or vice versa. But we tried to
11 normally support from Bagram with the aircraft because
12 those pilots up at Bagram, they flew in everybody's
13 sector almost, said they knew those sectors. And if I
14 had to take somebody out of Salerno to move to
15 Jalalabad, they would not know the area as well. So I
16 did not like to do that, I primarily if I was going to
17 push down, I would push from Bagram.

18 LtCol Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, did you maintain the aviation QRF at your
19 level--the brigade level?

20 COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Each battalion in support of each Infantry
21 Brigade had a QRF that they maintained. We, too,
22 maintain a QRF, I would call it a general support, if
23 you would, QRF because they were direct support, if
24 something was to happen, that brigade would
25 immediately--the battalion would immediately respond
26 in support of that infantry brigade and I would be on
27 the net find out what is going on and then 9 times out
28 of 10, I would push assets down to them to reinforce
29 whatever was going on in the area.

30 LtCol Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you recall last July 13th, sir, the battle at
31 Wanat?

32 COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: I do.

33 LtCol Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you recall--did you push assets that day, sir?

34 COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: I did.

35 LtCol Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Could you please explain, sir?

36 COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron: I would like to back up because we had Bella
37 that was a big operation and let me make sure that you

understand the aviation operations in Afghanistan because it is different from Iraq and everywhere else that I have been. For any type of deliberate operation, aviation-wise, the infantry brigade or brigade S3, in my battalion, would get on the net and brief a CONOP brief to General--usually it was General Milley. He would approve the mission at that time. I had input into the mission and I would approve from the aviation perspective. So, for a deliberate type operation, we did that. Also, the day before I also approved the crew's, whoever is flying the next day, anything that was medium risk level. For the first 90 to 120 days the battalions did not have medium risk--the battalion commanders did not have medium risk approval authority because Afghanistan the terrain, etcetera, that was just in the, you know, TTP for Afghanistan, so I was briefed on every mission and every crew. After 120 days, they were then given that low risk approval authority.

LtCol Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): After the Battalion Commander had been in country for 120 days, sir?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: That is right. Then it came to me for anything medium and then I had to go to division for high risk approval authority. But prior to Wanat, we had conducted an operation to extract--to close down Bella, which was a Combat Outpost and that was a mission that we had focused, planned, deliberate planning for that operation. I then pushed down assets underneath the Squadron Commander, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Chestnut control to support that operation, Chinooks, Apaches, et cetera, because we had a lot of lifts. For Wanat, and I was briefed on all of these operations anything dealing with aviation deliberate missions, Wanat, as I remember correctly, was not a deliberate operation from an Aviation perspective. We were not doing an air assault; we weren't extracting doing this huge extraction, so that CONOP brief must have taken place between the brigade--infantry brigade and General Milley. Wanat--the first time I was aware of Wanat was I was woken that morning, I was told that patrol base was being overrun, immediately got into the TOC to get a situational update from my squadron commander down there to see what he needed. He has

1 told me that he had launched his QRF, he launched his
2 medevac aircraft, I then supported and reinforced them
3 with additional AH-64s, CH-47s, and medevac because we
4 had listened to the casualties coming in. So, I knew
5 that he was going to need support. I then took the
6 aircraft from 6th Battalion, my general support
7 aviation battalion, pushed them underneath the control
8 of Lieutenant Colonel Lynch.

9 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, regarding the CONOPs for Operation Rock
10 Move. You mentioned that Bella was a--the extraction
11 from Bella was a deliberate----

12 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: It is a deliberate----

13 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: But the move to Wanat was not?

14 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6) Iron: I don't think it was, I mean, I am trying to
15 remember because we were not planning any type of air
16 assault into Wanat.

17 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, if you could review this and perhaps explain
18 that to us.

19 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: That is what we are going to push in to
20 reinforce--to stock up Wanat?

21 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): Check, the LZs were Wanat, sir. One thing that--
22 --

23 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Keep going.

24 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): At this portion, sir, the last extraction out of
25 Bella at about the same time that they're pushing up
26 Wanat.

27 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Okay.

28 **LtCol** Beta (b)(3), (b)(6): And, it looks from reviewing the CONOP's itself,
29 they had planned for this movement for the last out of
30 Bella into Wanat just use the Pesh resupply aircraft,
31 they planned for that.

32 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Yes.

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: And the question that I have for you, sir, is that--would that be normal when you're planning a movement like that many days out----

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Is it a deliberate op because you're using a normal resupply aircraft to go in and resupply and not a deliberate type operation. I do not know if it's normal, I can tell you that it's not a deliberate operation that I am sitting there receiving a CONOP briefs like an air assault or something. But I don't know, at the time, what the enemy situation was, et cetera, et cetera, but it was a move, I think Blessing, or somewhere, to Wanat and they were going to go in and resupply. So, did I get briefed on the crews doing this? Yes. It was normal, I approved those crews at medium risk because obviously because of the crew mix, and that is why I have to go back to the crews and look and see what was medium and what was low because I don't remember the crews for that. And normally, I have the crews in there because what I am looking for it from a medium risk is what is the enemy's situation, is it a high threat environment, to raise that risk level up to the brigade commander or is the crew mix low time aviators, red, which raises the crew and makes it a medium level as well. Sometimes the resupplies become medium risk and sometimes they don't, it all depends on the area, what the S2 is depicted as "this is a high threat environment," and then what is the crew doing the mission. But this is a normal resupply--Pesh resupply.

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Sir, can you describe for us the impact that the lunar cycle or the amount of illumination has on ops for aviation?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: In general?

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Yes, sir.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Okay. Afghanistan is very dark. It is not like Iraq, or back here in the states, so the lunar cycle we have, you know, when it is Red illume, which means, I think that the illumination is below--less than 30%--23 and 30, less than 30 degrees above the

horizon and 23% illumination or 30% illumination or 23% above the horizon, it becomes high risk. And so what we did to mitigate risks during the red illume periods, was we did not--it would have to be higher--elevate the risk level here on the flight, night vision goggles, up to high risk for the commanding general to approve a red illume. Unless you were on a designated recon'd route--resupply route that we have plotted the obstacles along the route, you can maintain a certain heading, a certain altitude, you know, you will be above the highest obstacle. We allowed our crews to fly within 10 nautical miles of the airfields, Bagram, Jalalabad, Salerno, at my level. We allowed out Apaches to fly because they were flying on FLIR, so this did not pertain--red illume really did not pertain to them because the illumination did not matter because of FLIR. Does that make sense?

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: It does, sir, thank you. The--speaking with some folks at the battalion--the infantry battalion S3 shop, the timing of the operation--this particular operation appeared to be somewhat driven by the illume cycle. Would that be normal, sir? Like if you wanted to do it on the 15th of the month but the best illumination was not until the beginning of the next month----

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: That-- that does play into it. Especially if you want, you want, you know aviation to play in it at night. We normally did all of our deliberate type operations during green illume, we did a few during red illume, but it really raised the risk level getting in there. So, yes, we always ask the infantry, "hey, if we are going to do a deliberate air assault, we want it to be during green illume."

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Is it fair to say, sir, if you are familiar with the Waygal Valley or not, but that would not be one of those areas that you would have pre-plotted----

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: No, I tell you, I have flown that valley myself; it is very narrow, especially going up to Bella. It is very narrow and I am an Apache guy, so I fly with FLIR and goggles and it is very, very dark.

And so, many times I have flown that valley as an Apache guy where I was front seat or backseat always flies FLIR, front seater has goggles, I put them down but I would always transition to FLIR because it is just too dark for the goggles.

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, when you have a brigade RIPing, doing a RIP TOA with an incoming brigade and it is associated -- your sub-units. What impact does that have on--did it have on Aviation, sir?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: It has a huge impact because I am-- you know, my aviation, that is how you get around the battlefield in Afghanistan, it is not like Iraq where you drive everywhere. I mean predominantly it is aviation related, so, obviously we are getting all of--the unit that is RIPing that is coming out, we are getting all of--helping to get all of their equipment out with our Chinooks and Blackhawks and we are getting all of the new people and equipment in. And normally how that would be done would be, that was take 2/17 Cav, Jalalabad for 173d, he would use his helicopters to cycle equipment and people back and forth within his sector from Jalalabad out to a FOB, bring the equipment back and then we would either put that equipment on a C-130 or Chinook from Bagram to bring it back up to Bagram. So, during a RIP, during a RIP, you have to manage the aircraft pretty well and manage your maintenance, too, if you are going to continue to support everybody in the fight.

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Did you ever experience or witness, during a RIP, a unit attempting an operation during a RIP, sir, that required aviation support.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: I have, I have-- and you have to remember that people are RIPing out of Afghanistan all of the time. It is just not the brigades, there are the special forces, we supported CJSOTF, you got all of the other organizations, CSTC-A, you name it, there are all different types of organizations out there, we are constantly RIPing somebody, engineers, you know. So, we are constantly RIPing, but I have done operations, my battalions have done operations, I mean, we never did a brigade operation, but the

1 battalions did operations during--limited, very
2 limited operations during RIP. You know, so, for
3 example. If you are RIPing the 173d, I have got my
4 battalion task force supporting the 4th Brigade, they
5 are Ops Normal. So, I am focused with my asset up at
6 Bagram, you know, working with a brigade to do the
7 deliberate op while he is RIPing. That is how we try
8 to do it. But during--did they do deliberate
9 operations during the RIPs? Yes, they did, and we
10 tried our best to support it the best we could.

11 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: And how did you prioritize, sir, with the
12 deliberate ops? A higher priority?

13 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Had a higher priority, normally, they all
14 depend on--you know, they live off the hook in
15 Afghanistan. So, you would have organizations going
16 red on ammo, red on bullets, and then we would
17 automatically that day re-prioritize and send Chinooks
18 with ammo, food, water, whatever it took. But depend-
19 you know, and the division basically set the
20 priorities. If we thought we could not handle what
21 was going on, I went back to General Milley to say,
22 "Okay, what is the priority? What do you want me to
23 do?" And then he would tell me.

24 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Sir, we have heard from several non-aviator
25 witnesses that talk about that there is not enough
26 aviation in Afghanistan, sir, from an aviator's
27 perspective, what are your thoughts?

28 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Well, there are two aviation brigades there
29 now. And is that enough? I don't know. One aviation
30 brigade for all of Afghanistan is not enough. We know
31 that, I think now that they're in the two aviation
32 brigades with the one aviation brigade down south, I
33 think they have the aviation required to support the
34 mission.

35 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: When you were there, sir, there was just one?

36 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Just one, it was just us. So, I had a
37 battalion task force was down in RC South, so I had
38 lost a battalion task force to support RC East. So,
39 you had to do with what you had, obviously we had the

1 Air Force there with minimal, you know, with their C-
2 130s to help us with the resupply. We worked through
3 those issues.

4 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Sir, you also mentioned that you had the UAVs?

5 COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Yes.

6 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Can you talk about that, sir?

7 COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: We had a Warrior Alpha that is like a
8 Predator type UAV that the Army is testing right now.
9 We had the organization that we--I controlled the
10 maintenance, I controlled the standardization, those
11 pilots, making sure that they're qualified to fly the
12 aircraft, they had their flight physical, they
13 maintained their minimums, keep up with their
14 administrative functions, deal with the PM because it
15 was, you know, a prototype aircraft. So I do with
16 that. Division would set the priorities we're there
17 for and so every day, we get--or the night before, the
18 day before, the mission of where the Warrior Alpha was
19 supposed to focus that day and obviously they would
20 brief me on it the day before and what I was looking
21 on was the area of operations that they were working
22 in, the weather, the terrain, and more importantly, a
23 crew flying them.

24 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Okay, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma?

25 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma: Sir, just to follow up on the last point. You did not
26 have any role in the tasking decisions with regard to
27 where those ISR flights----

28 COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: No, no, no, I had none.

29 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma: Okay, and if AH-64 was going to be used for ISR, was
30 that normally like a task force commander's decision
31 at battalion or?

32 COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: For ISR? Yeah, when they are tasked out, DS,
33 those squadron commanders plan operations with the
34 brigade commander. And what I am doing is if the risk
35 goes up to medium risk then they come to me for medium
36 risk approval authority which I am looking now at the
37 mission, the train, the weather, and its importance,

the crew, and the complexity of the mission. So, they would come to me for that but that squadron commander, his staff, in conjunction with the infantry brigade's staff would plan the operation, those operations were not planned at the brigade level.

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma: Switching to a different subject, were there any type of standards for the brigade with respect to QRF? We have heard a lot of discussion about Apache QRF for different missions, is that something that the guys are trained to do as a specific mission profile? How does a pilot know what to do when he is on QRF?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: It is standard QRF, we will say, okay these two Apaches are QRF today and say a Chinook or a couple of Blackhawks and you are QRF. It is a standard that you are on QRF for 24 hours, you go into the TOC, you get the update today, you know the squadron briefs him on what the brigade is doing today, in what areas of operation are they working, you know, and then they are on standby. And when they get launched, they come in very quickly, they get a weather brief, they get a situation update from their TOC, and then they launch and obviously before they come on QRF, it is just like a stand-to whether you are infantry, armor, or whatever, the morning before you come on mission, you go out, you pre-flight your aircraft, you run up your aircraft, you make sure that your aircraft and the crew are squared-away and then you come on and receive your briefing for the day, and then you go back down and you stand by your company CP.

LtGen Natonski: And getting back to the ISR and the AH-64, primary mission, of course, was CAST. How often were AH-64s employed in the ISR role? For example, you had an outpost with a there were indications and warnings of a potential attack, can you fly a couple of Apaches over and have a look down the valley?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Right. Specifically, in Jalalabad and the ones----

LtGen Natonski: Yes. Since that is the focus here.

1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: And that is because we use our Kiowa
2 Warriors mostly to conduct area route reconnaissance
3 with our Kiowa Warriors because they have a limited
4 number of Apaches, to be honest with you, and so when
5 you are going to use those Apaches, you used them for
6 the fight. And, you know, there just wasn't enough of
7 apaches to go around, you had 24 Apaches for the
8 theater, so for the reconnaissance purposes, we used
9 our Kiowa Warriors mostly down in 173d's areas.
10 Because they had a limited number of Apaches, I plus'd
11 him up with a lot of Kiowa Warriors to conduct area
12 and route reconnaissance.

13 **LtGen Natonski:** But of course the elevation around the
14 Waygal Valley excluded the Kiowa Warriors.

15 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: That is true.

16 **LtGen Natonski:** Do you know if you they even used Apaches, I
17 guess if they were--in an escort mission--hey can you
18 swing by while you are doing this--let's say Bella, I
19 think they landed on the combat outpost itself. Is
20 that right?

21 **LtGen Natonski:** The Blackhawks and Chinooks did, the Apaches
22 didn't. They--the Apaches would do the escort in----

23 **LtGen Natonski:** And where did they go?

24 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Well, because--they would just, we usually
25 go with 2 and here is another--you ask a very good
26 question because depending on the threat, is whether
27 we went with 2 apaches or 1 apache.

28 **LtGen Natonski:** You could go with one Apache?

29 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: We could go with one but Bella, since you
30 brought that up, we always went with two because they
31 consistently receive fire all of the time. And so,
32 when we went in, normally what we would do, there was
33 usually Chinooks going in to conduct resupply, we
34 would put an Apache on one side of the Valley and an
35 Apache on the other side of the Valley and we would be
36 either right beside the Chinooks or right behind them
37 and we like to maintain--we like to say behind them

about a quarter-mile--about 5 to 600 feet above them so that we could see if they were going to take fire where it was coming from. And so, as we went to the valley, that is normally how we stack going in and then the Chinooks would come in and land and that we would conduct an area reconnaissance around the FOB looking into the high grounds for anybody to shoot down because Bella, I am not sure if you seen pictures of Bella, it was down and you had this high terrain right down on it. And they use to, you know----

LtGen Natonski: So the Apaches would literally stay inside the valley or were they trying to get up above them?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: No, we would stay inside the valley, above, probably about 2000 feet and tried to look at the high ground.

LtGen Natonski: Were they in a circular pattern?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: That is normally what we do in a circular type, figure 8, circle--we tried not to establish patterns, but----

LtGen Natonski: A figure 8 with two aircrafts is different? How do you de-conflict? By altitude?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: By altitude.

LtGen Natonski: Okay.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: And the focus, when those Chinooks were on the ground is that you wanted to be really a presence, let them know you're there, so we're not out four, five, six km out conducting a reconnaissance. We are conducting reconnaissance in the inner ring if you would, very close to the FOB, where they can take small arms fire because that is normally their TTP. Short, final or just taking off out of the fob is where they like to attack us.

LtGen Natonski: To get back to the morning of the 13th and the response to the attack on Wanat? The attack happened just after stand-to dark, the QRF was launched, I know it is down to the lowest level, but do you know, a couple questions here, Do you know how

responsive those Apaches were that morning? I understand from the air controllers, because of the urgency of the situation, the fact that they were under a heavy attack that the air controllers waved going through the valleys and let them go.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Over-the-top, Over-the-top.

LtGen Natonski: And then, there have been some questions as to whether they had to hold while artillery was firing in support of the attacks?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: I don't know that, I would not be down on that detail. I know that--and you asked a question about QRF, typical, and I have heard this, you know, someone made the point after that it took an hour and five minutes for them to get there or something like that. They--normally, you get called for a QRF, run in the TOC real quick, find out what is going on, get a situation update, run--you know, you are the pilot in command, your co-pilot goes to the aircraft, they did that this morning--I mean, that morning, and honestly, it takes about 15-miutes to crank an Apache--10 to 15 minutes. Apache is not like another aircraft but those guys were off pretty quick and I was surprised, somebody told me that they--because I have flown in that valley, somebody had told me that they got there, from the time that they took off out of Jalalabad to the time they were on, you know, by Blessing in 20 to 25 minutes. And I was told that, I really don't know that.

LtGen Natonski: Did they go to Blessing? Or do you know if they went direct over the top----

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: I think they went direct over the top towards Wanat.

LtGen Natonski: Because we had heard that they were checked at Blessing because the artillery was firing up at high angles down the valley--or up the valley to Wanat.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: That may be the case, I don't know. I don't know because----

1 **LtGen Natonski:** Well, who would know that?

2 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron The pilots-- the pilots honestly because,
3 you know, I know that you got a map, you have probably
4 seen it, you got Blessing is the battalion
5 headquarters there, you have the Pesh River Valley and
6 you have the Konar Valley and you have Jalalabad here.
7 You have the Waygal Valley that goes up and you have
8 Wanat here and you have Blessing on up here. Normally
9 how we flew was up the Konar Valley, took a left, and
10 this was Abad, and then when we came in here, we would
11 go in and we would check in with the battalion TOC.
12 And as we were coming up the Pesh Valley because he
13 had artillery tubes right there and so you did not
14 want to be in the line of fire when he was shooting,
15 so normally we would check in with the battalion and
16 they would then tell us to check, go to a holding
17 pattern, they are shooting, stay out of the valley, or
18 once they stop shooting, they would clear us in, and
19 then you come into the valley, obviously contact
20 become the commander, platoon leader, whoever was ever
21 in charge, and they would hand us down and that is
22 normally how they did it. Because these mountains
23 here or at some points are 10 or 12,000 feet but I
24 know, I was told that that day they went direct.

25 **LtGen Natonski:** Which means they were above 10,000 feet.

26 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron Right. And I can tell you that the pilots I
27 put down-- this was the toughest terrain to fly in
28 Afghanistan. And I put my most experienced pilots in
29 the brigade down there--the Apache pilots; I put my
30 W5, Master Gunner down there with those guys. They
31 had IPs, they had the cream of the crop for the Apache
32 pilots. And, you know I am sure that you have read
33 the accounts of what happened; those were some
34 experienced pilots that were able to go in, and shoot
35 that close to the infantry.

36 **LtGen Natonski:** Yes.

37 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron If I would have had my other crews, I would
38 had been nervous, but we had the cream of the crop of
39 our brigade was in that task force when it came to
40 Apaches.

LtGen Natonski: What would have happened during the medevac? I think they were providing suppressive fire as the MEDEVAC's were coming in. How do they choreograph that? Is it pretty much the same as you would've done in Bella?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Yes, I have done many missions with this task force with medevac operations conducting-with the pilots conducting recovery of the wounded in the mountains and the Korengal Valley; I have never done it in this valley. But normally what would happen is--how we did it and how they did it as well, the pilots did it, is we come down the valley and then I would check in with the battalion to get an update, what is going on? What is the enemy situation? And normally, 9 times--and then make sure the guns were clear. And then 9 times out of 10, they handed me right down to the company commander and the company commander would clear me in and he would give me a situational awareness, if he was in contact you with pot smoke, I would normally hold my medevac out the valley and then like this way was the Kurngal, that is where I did all of my medevac operations, but I would hold him out, I would go in with my two Apaches, and based on the situation, if it was a hot LZ, I would go in and clear, working--conducting close combat attacks with the ground forces, clear the area in order to allow the medevac to come in. And while the medevac was on the ground, I would say over the top--the Apaches would stay over-the-top.

LtGen Natonski: So they were actually-potentially providing fire right in front where the fire was.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Exactly.

LtGen Natonski: And the company commander--what about if there was not a company commander?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Or the platoon leader, many of times I talked to sergeants there doing medevac.

LtGen Natonski: How about close air?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: They ran in close combat attacks.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** What about if there is no J-TAC, do they
2 still have to go through----

3 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: No, they talk directly to me in the Apache,
4 the bottom line is I'm trying to establish situational
5 awareness, where are the friendlies on the ground.
6 And for him to paint a picture of where the friendlies
7 are on the ground and normally he would pop smoke and
8 say, you got the smoke and roger, I got the smoke.
9 Understand that everybody is there. Roger. Where is
10 the enemy? Sir, the enemy is, you know, call sign,
11 they are 200 meters in front of us.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** So you did not necessarily have to have
13 someone J-TAC qualified to call in----

14 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: No, I have never did that, I have talked
15 many times E5s, E6s, lieutenants, captains, whoever
16 the senior guy on the ground is who we talked to.

17 **LtGen Natonski:** Just a question on the Warrior Alpha. Were
18 those Army pilots?

19 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: They are--well, they are civilian, too. I
20 had three warrant officers----

21 **LtGen Natonski:** How's the Air Force like that?

22 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: They did not like it at all.

23 **LtGen Natonski:** Do these have hellfire's?

24 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: No, I did not have hellfire, they have them
25 now. Because ours were the first time that they had
26 produced these Warriors because they were going to
27 something else, (b)(1) 1.4 a, c
28 (b)(1) 1.4 a, c

29 **LtGen Natonski:** (b)(1) 1.4 a, c

30 **LtGen Natonski:** (b)(1) 1.4 a, c
31 (b)(1) 1.4 a, c

32 **LtGen Natonski:** They had full motion video?

33 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: (b)(1) 1.4 a, c

1 **LtGen Natonski:** (b)(1) 1.4 a, c

2 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron:

3 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.

4 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: And so, based--you know we had the down feed
5 in the TOCs, everybody had the rovers and the down
6 feeds in the TOCs and so if that Warrior Alpha was in
7 direct support of 173d, let's say, 173d then drove
8 where that Warrior went with that sector.

9 **LtGen Natonski:** That was the division that determined----

10 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Right, right. I do not have a say in where
11 it went at all.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** And where were they located?

13 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: We were located (b)(1) 1.4 a, c, the Warriors.

14 **LtGen Natonski:** The Warriors were?

15 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: They were underneath me.

16 **LtGen Natonski:** They take off kind of slow, don't think?

17 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Yes, they are very slow.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** Do they do enough flight ops on that
19 aircraft?

20 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Do they do what, sir?

21 **LtGen Natonski:** Do enough slow down and flight operations at
22 Bagram?

23 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Not really, Not really, sometimes we have to
24 hold for them to take off, but----

25 **LtGen Natonski:** But it is nothing----

26 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: We try to take off during the slow periods
27 of the day because they stay up for 16 to 18 hours.

28 **LtGen Natonski:** And from (b)(1) 1.4 a, c down to Blessing?

1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Blessing, how long would it take? They
2 usually run (b)(1) 1.4 a, c
3 it's about an (b)(1) 1.4 a, c

4 **LtGen Natonski:** And at what altitude?

5 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: They are up around (b)(1) 1.4 a, c

6 **LtGen Natonski:** (b)(1) 1.4 a, c
7 (b)(1) 1.4 a, c

8 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: (b)(1) 1.4 a, c
9
10
11
12
13 (b)(1) 1.4 a, c
14
15
16

17 **LtGen Natonski:** What is the Air Force predator? Does it have
18 all the bells and whistles?

19 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: You know, I don't know if they have-- if
20 they are IFR capable. I don't know the answer because
21 I really never went down there.

22 **LtGen Natonski:** If they are not IFR then there is VFR which
23 means the pilot is having to look out----

24 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: That is correct.

25 **LtGen Natonski:** Is there a camera in the front of this
26 thing?

27 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: There is--there is a camera.

28 **LtGen Natonski:** And then there is a camera that looks down?

29 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: That is right. And he flies--you got a
30 pilot, a W3 rated aviator, or a civilian contractor
31 flying it and----

32 **LtGen Natonski:** And he is looking at the forward picture.

1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: He is flying it. He is looking at the
2 forward picture. And then you got on the right seat
3 right into a box is your observer, who is normally
4 enlisted, E5, E6, and he is working the camera, the
5 FMV and he is talking to the ground guys, or whoever
6 is working him on where they want him to look.

7 **LtGen Natonski:** Is he also talking to the pilot, saying:
8 "slew over here"?

9 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: He is--he is because they are sitting side-
10 by-side.

11 **LtGen Natonski:** Great, thanks.

12 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma Did you also support Task Force-714 and the CT
13 mission?

14 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: We--we--have supported them on numerous
15 occasions.

16 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma Was that done out of Bagram as well?

17 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: You know it was--some of it was done out of
18 Bagram, some of it was done with the task forces. We
19 mostly supported those guys with the Apaches because
20 they have the 160th for their lifts to use.

21 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma And who decided how much of that since that is not----

22 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: The Division.

23 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma So did the Division make that call?

24 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: They would come in with a request to the
25 division and then the division would come to me and
26 say, okay, lay out everything, what do you have going
27 on and they need this. They need two apaches or they
28 need four apaches and then we would come back.

29 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma So that went through Division as well?

30 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Yes.

31 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma So again----

1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Everything went through division.

2 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma: At the time you were the only aviation brigade there
3 so obviously everything is coming to you through the
4 division?

5 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: That is correct. And those guys, you know,
6 the 160th supported them and so they would norm--we
7 did not support them that often, sometimes. We
8 supported the white soft, CJSOTF, we supported them
9 all of the time.

10 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma: Again, through division?

11 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Through division. Because they would to turn
12 in their requests because everybody was requesting
13 aviation and there is just not enough to go around,
14 so, the CJTF-101 Commander had to say who had priority
15 because those CJSOTF--those Special Ops Battalions,
16 you know, 3d Group, 7th Group Battalions were located
17 in the battle space of that infantry brigade
18 commander. So, since he owned the battle space and he
19 owned the aircraft--yes, you can do an air assault in
20 my aircraft tonight.

21 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma: And so there is this daily synchronization meeting
22 where all of this input came in?

23 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Right.

24 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma: And then they would just sort through it. And then you
25 may have sat on it, I missed it. And then you would
26 get an air tasking order?

27 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Right.

28 **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma: How far out was that?

29 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: We tried to get in 72-hours, we normally got
30 it at 48-hours, but 24-hours, you know, it changed
31 from 72-hours out it was fluid.

32 **MG Perkins:** And so there are all of these, "hey, all of these
33 requests are coming in, we are kind of going through
34 prioritizing ATOs going, how is that all kept track
35 of? Do you think that there are records today, sort

of archives somewhere that you could say, let me look for this week, so all the requirements are----

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: The G3 aviation at the 101st should have that because they tracked it all. Trust me because there were times when I set out to do this mission and they come back to me and say, "You got the birds to do it."

MG Perkins: So more likely they are than your brigade headquarters?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: My brigade headquarters may have them, we can check, of what happened but if you want to know what went on, you know, in 173d's you would have to talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) Chestnut because he was down there DS'd to them supporting them. Now, we did handle the resupply up at Bagram pushing supplies down to them. My 3 shop may have it, or the division G3 air would have it.

MG Perkins: You were saying that as you look at that CONOP there that Bella was a deliberate mission.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: It was.

MG Perkins: And Wanat was done with, if you want to say the normal resupply process?

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Right, and that is why I am going to go back and look at this because it was the Pesh Resupply.

MG Perkins: Right.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: See this is a Rock Move, the concept--this is the Bella, this is the Bella CONOP.

LtGen Natonski: It is both.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: And the ground part, phase 2, is the Wanat move up. Okay, I wanted to just review really quickly I have not looked at this since then.

MG Perkins: Go ahead, take your time.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Okay, we're bringing them out of--we brought them back to Wanat, we also brought them back to

1 Blessing, so that was the big--the move out. And so,
2 we did Bella--it took us a couple of days to develop--
3 to get them out. You know, I would have to get (b)(3), (b)(6) Chestnut
4 to ask him.

5 **MG Perkins:** Because that was all done with his task force?

6 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Right. So, I don't want to speak for him----

7 **MG Perkins:** I understand. As you look at that, just going on
8 sort of SOPs, as you understand it, say it was done
9 with--say it was done with Pesh Resupply. When that
10 went it, would they have Apache escort?

11 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Yes because--they would have Apache escorts
12 if that area was designated by the S2 as a high threat
13 area.

14 **MG Perkins:** Can you tell from that if when they went in to
15 Wanat they had Apaches?

16 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: From this I can tell you out of Bella the
17 whole entire mission, the extraction out of Bella,
18 they had Apaches.

19 **MG Perkins:** Okay.

20 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: What I do not know is when they were
21 extracting these Soldiers out, were they bringing them
22 to Blessing and Wanat. I can't remember. I thought
23 they drove up to Wanat.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** No, they did both. I think they took them
25 out of Blessing, brought them down for a couple days--
26 out of Bella, brought them down to Blessing for a
27 couple of days, did a motor march with a five vehicle
28 convoy and then early the next morning, they started
29 the Hilo with lift with the supplies and a platoon of
30 the mortar, the 120, so I take it they secured with
31 the vehicle patrol base----

32 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: And then they were going to bring all of the
33 resupplies and everything.

34 **LtGen Natonski:** With the Helo support.

1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Because, you know, because those battalions
2 are DS to the infantry brigade, and they plan that,
3 you know, and I know the general you both will
4 understand this, in Afghanistan as an aviation brigade
5 commander, I DS my stuff out. I am not like an
6 Infantry Brigade Commander that can fight his brigade
7 combat team because I have divvied all my stuff out, I
8 don't have anything left to fight. I am always in
9 general support or reinforcing somebody's fight. So
10 that battalion commander down there is running the
11 fight. You know, so, that is why I always say--you
12 know they always ask about aviation brigade commander,
13 I say it is much--it is a lot--it is fun battalion
14 commander in a aviation versus a Brigade Commander.

15 **MG Perkins:** So you cannot necessarily tell by looking at that
16 that when they brought the lift back to Wanat if it
17 had Apaches?

18 **MG Perkins:** No, I cannot--I do not-- (b)(3), (b)(6) Chestnut would know. I
19 mean the squadron commander would know.

20 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Is he still at Fort Campbell, do you know?

21 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: He is at Leavenworth.

22 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Leavenworth.

23 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Because I was kind of surprised, to be
24 honest with you, if you want the truth, when I was
25 called I was going, I hope you were talking to Colonel
26 (b)(3), (b)(6) Chestnut because he was running the operation.

27 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: Do you know what he is doing there, sir?

28 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: He is at Leavenworth at CAC doing something.

29 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta: He is stationed there, not going to school?

30 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: He is stationed there.

31 **MG Perkins:** Okay, that is sort of the one question I had a
32 sense of what went into Wanat aviation-wise, he is the
33 one that would have that information.

1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: He would know that because he--his squadron
2 did the planning for the infantry brigade.

3 **LtGen Natonski:** Who would know the timing of the fixed wing?
4 I think there was a B1 bomber or some F16s?

5 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: I think the ground brigade commander or the
6 ground battalion commander would know that and then
7 the G3 Air should know that.

8 **LtGen Natonski:** G3 Air at?

9 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: At Fort Campbell.

10 **LtGen Natonski:** 101st.

11 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: (b)(6) should know that.

12 **MG Perkins:** Sort of two questions here, one that the General
13 asked about reference of the reports of the Apache
14 being held up to clear fires? The pilots would know
15 that or maybe the company commander on the ground.

16 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: The command underground would know that, the
17 bat--because they always check in, Blessing is there
18 and that is where the tubes are, when you come into
19 that valley, you automatically check in with
20 battalion. And they're going to tell you whether the
21 guns are hot or the guns are cold. And they are going
22 to be the ones to hold you up and then pass you down
23 to the platoon leader or the company commander.

24 **MG Perkins:** And the specifics of the package going to Wanat
25 are really (b)(3), (b)(6)? Chestnut

26 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Right. (b)(3), (b)(6) would have to tell you this.
Chestnut

27 **LtGen Natonski:** The direction that they came from, the QRF,
28 as you drew on your map; it almost indicates that they
29 would have--that they would have come across the
30 mountains to Blessing but from Blessing----

31 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: You have to come up the valley, it is 3 or 4
32 clicks, I mean it is not far.

33 **LtGen Natonski:** It is 8, I think.

1 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Yeah, it is not far at all, it is like 2 or
2 3 minute flight.

3 **LtGen Natonski:** So they would not have come in from one of
4 the sides?

5 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: No, sir.

6 **LtGen Natonski:** They would have come right up the valley?

7 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Because of these mountains at valley, these
8 mountains are high, I mean, 10, 11,000 feet. So, they
9 would come right up the valley. In fact, I watched
10 the 60 minutes--did you watch that special on Wanat
11 they have of the Apache gun tape. That is the first
12 time that I had seen that Apache gun tape, on 60
13 minutes. But--they did a good job, but it really
14 shows on that tape the valley and how constricted that
15 area is and that is why I used to hate to go to Wanat.
16 Because it is very narrow valley and you are just
17 stuck if you start getting shot at.

18 **LtGen Natonski:** Would the 47s going, so up to Bella, would
19 they have come up the valley or would they come from
20 the plains?

21 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: See they would have to go up the valley as
22 well because they're not going to go without their
23 Apaches and the limitation is the Apache.

24 **LtGen Natonski:** The valley is so high that the Apache cannot
25 come----

26 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Sir, but you have to slow back to 80 knots,
27 you have climb, you know----

28 **LtGen Natonski:** So they are pretty much stuck in the valley?

29 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Now the Chinooks, could they do it? They
30 can do it easily because we can't do it and they are
31 tied to us because we can't keep up, they have to slow
32 down, they have power galore. And you know, their
33 limitation is their Apaches, so we went up to valley
34 every time to do the resupply.

35 **MG Perkins:** All right, thanks.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron, I have to read you one
2 more line here. You are ordered not to discuss the
3 testimony that you provided today with anyone other
4 than the members of the investigation team. You will
5 not allow any witness in this investigation to talk to
6 you about the testimony that he has given or in which
7 he intends to give. If anyone should try to influence
8 your testimony or attempted to discuss your testimony
9 you are instructed to notify Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Beta
10 or Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma. Do you understand?

11 **COL** (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron: Okay.

12 **LtGen Natonski:** I just want to thank you for your service to
13 our country, to the army, for your tours in both Iraq
14 and Afghanistan, and wish you luck in the vice's
15 office.

16 [The investigation closed at 1442, 21 October 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Subj: TESTIMONY OF COLONEL (b)(3), (b)(6), Iron, USA, GIVEN ON 21 OCTOBER 2009, AT NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

(b)(3), (b)(6), Iron

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Judge Advocate

17 NOV 09
DATE