[The testimony began at 0921, 19 November 2009.]

LtGen Natonski: I am Lieutenant General Richard F. Natonski, United States Marine Corps. I have been appointed by the Commander of the U. S. Central Command to conduct an investigation in to the facts and circumstances surrounding the combat action at Wanat Afghanistan in July of 2008. Major General David Perkins, United States Army, has been assigned as the deputy investigating officer. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) are judge advocates assigned to the investigation team. Beta Sigma

The testimony that you will provide today will be recorded, transcribed, and included in our report of the investigation. Based on your testimony we may also prepare a separate written statement for your review and signature.

Prior to coming on the record today, you signed a privacy act statement; is that correct?

MG Schloesser: I did, yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: Ok. Now, your testimony will be made under oath and you will now be sworn.

[The witness was sworn.]

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, for the record could you please state your full name spelling your last?

MG Schloesser: Sure. Jeffrey John Schloesser. S-C-H-L-O-E-S-S-E-R.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And, sir, you are currently a Major General in the U. S. Army?

MG Schloesser: That's Correct.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And, sir, who are you assigned with right now?

MG Schloesser: I am technically the special assistant to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army with duty as Chief of Army Aviation, the Pentagon.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, in July of 2008, what was your duty
2 assignment?
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4 **MG Schloesser:** I had 3 hats. I was Commanding General of the
5 101st Airborne Division. I was also the Commanding
6 General of what is called Command Joint Task Force
7 101, which has been a joint task force as I think most
8 of you know throughout our involvement over the last
9 several years in Afghanistan. And then I was also the
10 national command element technically for all U. S.
11 Forces in Afghanistan in July of 2008.
12
Beta 13 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, prior to coming on the record today, did you
14 have an opportunity to review a 16 page interview--
15 transcript and interview between you and Mr. (b)(6) Garnet
16 from the Combat Studies Institute?
17
18 **MG Schloesser:** I did.
19
Beta 20 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And, sir, did you sign the bottom of the first
21 page?
22
23 **MG Schloesser:** I did.
24
Beta 25 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And, sir, do you adopt that? I understand that
26 we want to address a couple of issues on the record,
27 sir. But, do you adopt this as part of your sworn
28 testimony?
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30 **MG Schloesser:** I do.
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32 **LtGen Natonski:** Thank you, sir.
33
Beta 34 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, what--when did you get to Afghanistan?
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36 **MG Schloesser:** I actually got there I think the last day of
37 March of 2008 or the first day of--it probably was
38 early in the morning of the first day of April.
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Beta 40 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And you had been there on a site survey before?
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42 **MG Schloesser:** Twice, yeah. I had done a site survey in the
43 spring of 2007 and then also in the fall of 2007.
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Beta 45 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): In the spring, sir--excuse me, the fall of 2007,
46 did you have an opportunity to visit any outposts in
47 the Waygal Valley?

MG Schloesser: I did. Now, that one I haven't been thinking as much on. I more clearly recall what I did in the spring of 2007 and what happened almost fairly quickly thereafter, but I did--I do remember flying with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) in the fall of 2008 at least to Blessing. But, I may not have gotten much further--I don't know if I went to Bella on that visit. Delta

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): On the previous visits, sir--

MG Schloesser: --I had gone to Bella. I had gone to Aranus which was called then at that point in time Ranch House.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Ok. Sir, when you were at the Ranch House and Bella, what were your thoughts of those positions?

MG Schloesser: Quite frankly I thought we were a very long ways away from our lines of communication. At that point in time, I was--I believe that there were significant reasons to be there. That Bella was, in fact, interdicting enemy movement and it was worth the cost.

I do believe--I thought at that time forces that were in those 2 areas were not resourced the way that they needed to be resourced if they were going to be that far away from our lines of communication.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): What do you mean by resourced, sir?

MG Schloesser: They just did not have enough troops to be able to do a mission that I had thought we were embracing at that point in time already--that I knew we were embracing either from Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6). (b)(3), (b)(6) New York New York (b)(3), (b)(6) is his formal name, Commander of 3/10, New York during the spring of 2007 or during the fall under Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6). Delta

The mission in the sense was very much the same. Threefold lines of operation and then a fourth which was--well security developing the governance with an IO piece to it. But, the intent was to separate the people from the enemy.

There's a variety of different ways you can do that whether population centric or enemy centric.

But, at that point in time Ranch House was--I thought it was about a 2 hour walk from the bottom of the valley floor where the villagers actually live. It was very high so you could see some things on the approach to Bella.

Bella, itself, was a--both of them were helicopter only types of facilities--outposts. At that point in time, with the numbers of troops that I saw in both locations it did not--I did not believe that they were able to get out into the villages to be able to actually help separate the people from the enemy. You have got to do more than just fight the enemy to do that.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Is that because you have to man the outpost, sir?

MG Schloesser: You have to man the outpost 24 hours a day, you have defend yourself, and as I said there is some part of the resourcing that is just extraordinarily difficult up in that area of Nuristan--the southern portions of Nuristan and the Hindu Kush. Especially, during the winter that makes just survival in an insurgency very difficult.

Beta (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Now, sir, you've made this assessment that you just discussed while--during your site surveys?

MG Schloesser: I did. I actually can't say that I made a formal assessment. Truthfully, I did not do a formal assessment in my mind until--actually 60 days after I assumed command of Regional Command East. That's when I also became the national command element.

I would say that, you know, that's when I would say I made that a formal assessment. I do know that when I was up there that I came back and expressed concern to members of my staff--that those sites that were far up north of the Pech River Valley may not have been as effective as we once thought they were.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Sir, during your site survey, did you discuss with the current commander--Commanding General at that point anything you saw in the Waygal or with either of those brigade commanders, sir?

MG Schloesser: I did talk to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), in fact, in the aircraft going back down the mountains--back down to Delta

Jalalabad in his headquarters and then just asked him for his thoughts.

Now, I'm going to be quite frank. I probably at that point was equally or more concerned about an area south of the Pech River Valley called Korengal. We had established by then--what they had established by then the Korengal outpost and at least 2 more very small combat outposts; really technically operational or outposts, themselves, not really large enough to be even a platoon size.

And, the fighting there had been quite significant and I was very concerned the more I learned about Korengal the more I was concerned that we were not exactly fighting insurgents, but we were involved in a criminal timber trade anti Afghan nationalistic xenophobic type of a fight. It's just very difficult to--if you have the time I could explain it in quite a bit of detail. Now, that concerned me a great deal.

In all those cases, I do not recall if I mentioned General Rodriquez; what his thoughts were at that point in time. You know--I do know later we did discuss on the second PDSS the closure of the Ranch House after the, you know, attack there. And by then there had been that attack as well as an attack on--an ambush basically on a foot patrol that had been very significant. I believe that about 6 soldiers were killed and 2 more ANA were killed and then there were a fair number of wounded in that area--

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): --At that point, sir, was there a discussion about Bella potentially being closed as well?

MG Schloesser: I think all along--I can't tell you they exactly want--Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), exactly when I became aware that the discussion was to close Bella. There were thoughts already and I'm not sure if they were in the 82d Task Force 82--CJTF 82 or if they were on my own headquarters about what was the purpose of Bella originally vise what was happening. Apparently, it was looking--even by then that the enemy when they wanted to could bypass and if you can see the map you can see it's possible to bypass Bella completely and continue either their movement to the west and Beta

eventually along the lines of into Logmen and then into Kapeesa which was another area of huge interest to me at that time or southwards through the Chowkay Valley--through the Waygal Valley to Chowkay. Again, I realize I'm using a lot of words here and I'm not sure if you've heard all of these. I then from Chowkay along the lines of Logmen into--directly into what's called the eastern gate of Khas Konar. So, very important area, you know, one that for good reasons people try to, you know, interdict.

The question was is--was Bella actually doing that and then on the other side of it from an enemy point of view it was a plum ripe for picking from time to time. An aircraft would have to approach in there and we made it--I made it several times in a black hawk. It was even slower in the Chinook or later with a MI-8 or MI-17 that we contracted for support. The approach was even slower and the aircraft is essentially outlined even at night; especially, under some moonlight and very vulnerable.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, when--when was the division's TOA?

MG Schloesser: On the--coming in it was on the 10th of April.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Ok, sir. And, what was your force lay down, sir?

MG Schloesser: I've actually got it. Would you like to--I mean I could--

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Could you, sir--

MG Schloesser: --Ok. I did bring it up here. It's amazing I got this for being able to brief Marines at both of the Expeditionary Warfare School as well as the Staff College.

That is a very significant change over the period of time in force lay down. So, when I'm discussing it we'll have to talk about what was the time frame and that is April of 2008. Largely, what had been inherited and to reiterate at that point as I came in to the theatre I had met with both bosses at the time. Admiral Fallon was just--was just a plug-in, but I met with him and he mentioned that we were clearly an economy of force action at this point of time regards

to Iraq. And then, I also met with General McNeil, my boss under ISAF and he mentioned his frustration in not being able to get more resources period both in coalition aspects as well as from U. S. forces. So, what I inherited is that right there which you can see is essentially 2 very large brigades sectors.

How huge an area this is depends on how you want to measure it. I've seen everything from 46,000 to about 48,000 square miles as far as the measurements go. The bottom sector there you can see is BCT that has got a huge area of very diverse peoples, ethnic groups as well as land. Which at that point, my brigade fourth of the 101st had just assumed, I believe, the day prior the TOA. So, you can see that's called a Curahee based on the regimental name. And then, the 173d was in the N2KL which is what we're really talking about and I'll keep most of my comments there; extraordinarily, mountainous area ethnically very diverse as well with a very different cultural aspect to it. It had been called Kafuristan for several hundred years and it had been the very last area to be made into an Islamic or politically into an Islamic type of structure. Some of the times I pretty much doubted that culturally all of them had completely changed.

Then, you see the area that was an economy force within our own economy of force which was the Bamian, Parwant, Kapeesa, and Pantier area. Some of those provinces because of their ethnic makeup like the Hazarahs and Bamian; essentially, had no troops in them except for police forces. And that's--except PRT and there's even a PRT that reported to me. Others were right smack in the middle of some difficult areas which Kapeesa proved to be and I just mentioned the way it was on a line of communication going towards Kabul. And then in the middle of us was RC Capital which I did not control the security for and nor did we do any of the other lines of communication other than IO. My IO of impact in to Kubul was significant and I knew that although I learned much more day--month by month as I went in there. Go ahead, sir.

MG Perkins: Were there any U. S. troops at all?

MG Schloesser: Yes, sir, you can see that there's a--it's a brigade like structure there. That was called Task Force Cincinatus and it was commanded by a reserve officer now a one star. The primary troop effort at that point in time in that area--now, it's changed significantly based upon my desires to be quite frank and an awful lot of resourcing that's taken place, but at that point in time the primary unit that was there was my division's Special Troop's Battalion which is a battalion of about a thousand people. They made up the back bone of the CJTF headquarters, but as you know, we were fully joined and combined and so I had other force--other NCOs and officers with me. But, for an example, about 500 hundred of my soldiers and my battalion commander made up the combat force for that entire area. There were 3 PRTs as well in there Provincial Reconstruction Teams and they worked for me as well at that point--well they continued to. We had 13 throughout our area, but the 3 there were also very useful for trying to move our impact out. While we were there the situation in Kapeesa because of the forces we were eventually able to put in there with the French battle group that we asked for and got and utilized while I was there as well as I asked for a real brigade in that area and so significantly and I know you're not really trying to look at that, but it changes quite dramatically over this period of time.

This is November when we go to--all the way to when we depart. We departed a month after this and what we've been able to do there is take the brigade structure down here and limit it to only 3 brigades. The Poles we have an entire polish brigade by that time in there in charge of Gahzni. 3d brigade tenth mountains back and they are in Logar with their entire brigade less one battalion that I've moved up into the Konar River valley to reinforce that area because of the very significant amount of movement that the insurgents back and forth to be quite frank and so--

LtGen Natonski: --so, what was it in July of 2008?

MG Schloesser: That's it right there.

LtGen Natonski: This one?

MG Schloesser: Yeah, and that's all. So, if you look at this I can submit that for the record.

LtGen Natonski: Just out of curiosity, in this area--you also according to the (b)(6) interview had some responsibilities in RC South?

Garnet

MG Schloesser: I did. I actually had responsibility. I was responsible as the national command element as well as the national support element; I was responsible for all U. S. military forces in Afghanistan.

LtGen Natonski: And at that time was it the 24th Marine Expeditionary--

MG Schloesser: --24th was there, sir, as well as there was one U. S. Aviation Task Force from our brigade that I put down there almost against the wishes of the senior leadership of the United States as well as there was a U. S. battalion and we were at that point asking for more troops as well. By July I had asked for more troops as well down there, but that is correct.

LtGen Natonski: Off hand, given this area here, do you have any idea how many platoon outposts are there?

MG Schloesser: Absolutely, on the date of--well on the 15-6 I recorded 119 that day.

LtGen Natonski: 119?

MG Schloesser: Those numbers will swap, go up higher, cross significantly as our standards go. So, when you ask questions you really do have to say go back to July because by the time we leave there are about 150 platoon outposts. With 119, that doesn't mean there were only 119 platoons because what we had done is essentially tasked, organized not only our field artillery battalions but also our special troop's battalions. They had MP platoons and stuff and so we were trying--oh, in fact, even my band did combat operations.

LtGen Natonski: I know how that is.

MG Schloesser: That's the answer, sir. You can see the troops to tasks are below in all these sectors here as well

as generally what we thought the population was. The population is important on the question Nuristan later. So, I can talk about that.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Sir, when you arrived what was your aviation lay down?

MG Schloesser: One of my aviation brigades we have 2 in 101st had already come into theatre and had been working there for about 4 months--about 4 months. Well, potentially a little bit longer about 4 or 5 months and we had decided and I had talked to General Rodriguez beforehand that, I believe, that when I had done my PDSS that they were very much lacking in aviation and I thought that Afghanistan to be more affective and cross all the lines in communication we needed more aviation.

So, I went to the Department of the Army and told them up until that point other than that one isolated incident they had not allowed Kiowa Warrior Squadrons which was a reconnaissance inside of a combat aviation brigade. They had not allowed them to operate in Afghanistan and they never operated in RC East and I went to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and said that I was planning on deploying mine and that I would set an altitude limit to--these are small aircraft. They were reconnaissance aircraft and had altitude vulnerabilities in high altitudes because of size, weight, and POC.

To make a long story short we brought in another entire squadron than what the 82d had and then we task organized the way I thought would be best giving aviation to every one of the BCTs. So, initially when you look here we had combat aviation working for Jalalabad--for all of this sector working for the BCT Commander and their direct support, but really even closer relationship than that aviation working for the Kurihis and for 101. A general support capability that also supported these provinces and this command here at Bagram and then I put in an aviation task force as I talked about in Kandihar. I just did that--I just did it. I had been told--I did it. I'll just leave it at that and now I just say at that point in time there was no way I was going to have U. S. troops both soldiers and Marines down there without combat

aviation. So, we gave them a full aviation task force. There had been one prior to that but in the struggle to try and bring good coalition forces to up the helicopter assets essentially we had gone under the table politically and said that we are removing all of ours from RC south and I did not follow through with that and I do not regret that.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): So, when you arrived you brought more airframes--

MG Schloesser: --I did.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): --with you than the 82d?

MG Schloesser: Another complete aviation task force headquarters. I brought 30 more Kiowa warriors, 30 more aircraft, reconnaissance and combat--they were all reconnaissance helicopters as well as that headquarters, itself, which was extraordinarily important for us as we were going to expand.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): So then, sir, you reapportioned a number of Chinooks and the Apaches--

MG Schloesser: --I did. I did, yeah. Although, I left it to the brigade commander of each--or the brigade combat team commanders as well as the aviation brigade. I knew that they had to be flexible and they routinely added or in some cases subtracted but generally they added aviation from this general support aviation battalion to augment for missions or for the resupply. In this area--well in all of the areas the resupply mission was extraordinarily significant.

Logistically, Afghanistan was more difficult than any place that I've worked in my entire career. It required a large amount of what I would have called our combat assault assets our Chinooks to lesser extent even our Blackhawks. And then sometimes they had to be escorted such as in the areas of Nuristan and Konar as well as a few other areas that we were operating in. So, just to get resupply to combat outposts that were isolated was a very significant drain on aviation assets. And each and every one of those missions was a combat operation in its own.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, do you recall the--as you task organized the aviation assets the work up with 173d, sir, was it the same as the other task force you put together or was it heavier on particular types of aircraft?

MG Schloesser: To be honest with you, no, I don't recall. I remember thinking through this with the brigade commander as we were doing planning before hand and we had decided--well we knew--

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): --was that your aviation brigade commander?

MG Schloesser: My aviation brigade commander, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6). That area was going to have some limits to the Kiowa Warrior Squadron up in the north and yet in extraordinarily good terrain in the bottom 1/3 to almost 1/2 for Kiowa Warriors. We knew that we would need to augment or to have a robust CH-47 capability and--but, I do not remember the numbers or keep track. Iron Iron

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Ok, sir. Sir, could you describe how information came into your headquarters and how information was shared with in your headquarters?

MG Schloesser: That's a broad.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): From your commanders, sir--

MG Schloesser: Ok--

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): --your subordinate commanders and then how your staff had informed you of items, sir.

MG Schloesser: Well, we had a routine process as with a bunch of boards and meetings as you would normally expect and then I tried to do 2 different things. One, I had direct line of communication with brigade commanders which probably sometimes made the Chief, you know, frustrated and sometimes I'm sure the DCGO as well as the DCG for development and governance and support. I tried to talk with the brigade commanders almost daily. Some I did talk to depending upon their own style some time per every--you know, every night at say 10 O'clock or something. But, more importantly the process and I'm--have you seen--did you request a copy of the--basically, the OP tempo of the CJTF?

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) We had the brigade's, sir.

MG Schloesser: Ok. I mean there's a formalized process for just about everything that is done inside that area of Regional Command East. A lot of it was adopted from--we took from the 82d and augmented it and some of it is my personal style.

For an example, 5 days a week what I found to be--almost everyday except for, I think, it was Sunday we had a stand-up at about 8 O'clock very quickly in my office. The DCGs, the key players from the 2, the 3, the 5, PAO, IO, our coalition DCG was a Polish one star, my U. S. Air Force 450--he wasn't mine, but the 455th Wing Commander from Air Expeditionary 1 was there every day a one star, my Sergeant Major, my POLAD and we would very quickly in 20 minutes run through what had happened over the evening. Now, I had already--at 0430 underneath my door was delivered an Ops update current as of about 4 O'clock--Ops Intel update that I used to, you know, set the beginning of my day.

At 8 O'clock it was just a personal thing looking around the room. 0830 we had a fusion meeting which involved all those key players briefed by the CHOPs as well as the J2 Ops of what had formally occurred over the last 24 hours and then looked out 72 hours. That was fusion--because we had the CIA Chief to my headquarters there. The FBI Chief to the headquarters, The NSA Chief, the DEA when they chose to show, my political advisor of course and that was my most important part of the day. We--I was very proud of the J2 section.

Eventually, they won the national intelligence award for this past year as well as Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Alpha won it personally and then the whole section won it. But, from it--out of that at the end of it what they would do is present a new area of interest or a new thought or a new something and it was often and aerially we spent a good amount of time discussing things. By about 915 or so we were out. I usually tried to spend most of my time and this is really the only way of getting to the rest of your question is I would spend at least 5 days a week with either brigades, battalions or companies or platoons.

1 Usually, with my Sergeant Major but sometimes I sent
2 him on separate ones so that he could spend 3 or 4
3 days at a site and sometimes with my staff but very
4 rarely the entire staff usually with just about 4 or
5 3, 2 sometimes 1. I mean, you know, the first time we
6 landed at a platoon COP that had about 15 people
7 actually there because it was a squadron platoon, very
8 small from the cavalry squadron. I had brought more
9 people on the ground and 2 helicopters than they had
10 and I'm sure they didn't feel any more safe for sure.
11 I kind of learned my lesson and tried to keep a lower
12 footprint, generally speaking, unless we were there to
13 try to really help from the staff perspective. Those
14 were my--that part was my most important way of
15 getting information to be quite frank. I had a XO
16 whose only job was to basically follow and listen to
17 what I and whoever it was the platoon leader was
18 saying. He would come back and brief the Chief
19 immediately once on the ground and then would type the
20 notes out and send them to the brigade commanders and
21 to the DCGs that evening. 5 days no--3 days a week we
22 had a commanders update brief which began at 1630. To
23 be quite frank I probably missed about 20 or 30
24 percent of those because I was still out. One of the
25 DCGs would take it. We usually made a deal that one
26 DCG had to be there at all times when I was gone.
27 Sometimes that was violated and sometimes the Chief
28 was the only person there, generally speaking. But, I
29 was always within satellite communications. I had my
30 aircraft was completely outfitted with satellite
31 communications. But, that was the formal update that
32 most of us were used to in the combat zone. I found
33 that almost the least useful to be quite frank because
34 I already knew most of what--through just the way the
35 system worked and it was to formal of a way even with
36 CPOF it was--Command Post of the Future, it was really
37 to formal in an area this large where I'm the last
38 tactical commander but I'm also the first operational
39 commander. During this time frame I also have a
40 strategic role. It's just not as useful as it could
41 have been and I never really did adapt any further.
42 It ultimately adapted but it never really became
43 extraordinarily useful for me. In the evening, there
44 were 2 other key meetings or series of meetings that
45 the COPs would brief to the DCG if they were level 1
46 or level 2. I usually--those evenings is when I often
47 had the office calls from a large number of visitors

that we had. I would get a back brief from that usually if they were extraordinarily important right directly from General Milley. Then, they would go from that meeting into the ISR allocation meeting where they would sit for the next 72 hours both the ISRs as well as try to get the TAC gear set for the next 72 hours. At the close of my day, and generally this is between 10 and midnight, I would go through the JOC and the CHOPs or the Deputy CHOPs and eventually there came a learning deal where all of our officers, you know, would try to get it from the CHOPs so it wasn't my staff, Lieutenant Colonel CHOPs. But, we had a large number of Marines Corps Majors and Air Force and even some Navy 0-5s. I'd try to get it so they'd brief me but they would give me an out brief of what had happened at the O and I. In many cases, they were--it was very short, you know, it was not a run through of the entire operation. The requirement was--by then I had a book on my desk of all the operations of all the CONOPs and that would be there as well. Generally, the way it was is after that meeting they would bring the CONOPs up, I would review them before I even went downstairs as I was departing out the JOC and then they would give me a brief about this is where we're at, we're 72 hours out, we're setting the--you know, and we're going to set the conditions for this thing. But, again, that was only about 20 minutes long. I tried to keep it--it could have easily gone much longer. Throughout all that, that was my process in which to get information. Throughout the evening, if something bad happened no one called me when things happened good between those hours, but I had a TANDBERG in my hooch as well as SIPR and NIPR and a vulset phone as well as a red switch back to the pentagon and to my boss.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, was there ever a time that your commanders--you mentioned there's some what of a regular cycle where they would inform you, was there ever a time where they called you requesting a particular item whether it be supplies or additional aircraft--

MG Schloesser: --oh yeah, sure.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) --or ISR?

MG Schloesser: Yeah, well I mean all of them were smart folks and so they knew what kind of theater we were operating in. Generally, at this time I mean the chairman had come over on the 11th of July, 2 days prior to this. In fact, I flew the Chairman within 15 miles of Wanat and I discussed with him the issues up there and I showed him where I wanted to put troops if we could get troops. Anyway, these brigade commanders did not ask for things that they knew that we did not have. So, given that would they ask and say sir I need priority for this tonight--the most common--to be honest with you the most commonly requested ISR piece was the Red Ridge. It's a very sophisticated signals intercept--what level are we talking?

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): We're talking secret.

MG Schloesser: Secret signals intercept platform--fixed wing platform that we did concurrent interpretation in the basement of the JOC and sent out by MERC chat with in 1 minute with a GPS location back down all the way and with the increase in the flow back down to the companies we were actually getting it through brigades to battalions into companies within a space of about 2 minutes. That was the most requested, generally speaking, they did not come to me about the Predator or the Predator alarm. We had one Predator for all of RC East. It flew (b)(1) 1.4 a, c it had a transit time of about 4 and a half hours. There was another Predator--a Predator for RC South and there was a swing line as they call it that we used to swing between CJOSTF at that point in time was also TALON to me. So, I want to say it would have been 3d Special Forces Group with the number of correlations--Special Forces at that point were also taken on. So, I had responsibility for providing them ISR as well and so at any one time we normally were flying one Predator in this area and one Predator in RC South and one Predator wherever we were trying to set the conditions for our CJOSTF operation. So, Predators were not one that they usually did ask for. Logistics, they never came to me about that. I am not aware of any. Although, as an ADCS in Iraq of 101 I was--I thought that I--the CUB, Combat Update Brief, I did use that to make--often make the points of trying to ensure that the reporting that was happening all the way up to my headquarters were accurate. I had--there were

multiple times when I would go to platoon outposts and at that level platoon leaders are going to tell you in a heart beat what they need. I talked to platoon sergeants, I talked to squad leaders, and soldiers and I could see and I would come back and say, you know, do you realize they are going black on water up in wherever and the report would be just fine or amber or something like that because of the delay in moving facts.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And how would you define black on water, sir?

MG Schloesser: With in probably about 24 to 48 hours of running completely out of drinking water.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And you'd relay that back to your headquarters, sir?

MG Schloesser: Oh, yeah. As I said, this is logistically a very difficult area. We made darn sure that everybody knew how to use iodine tablets. When I was growing up as a youngster, no one gave us bottled water we got--we drank out of the streams and creeks and stuff like that if you had them. I have a lot of locations in the south that Marines of the 24th MEU until they got out by Lashgarga did not have any access to water. Now, I mean the water was critical down there as far as, you know, having flowing water much less any kind of clean water. But, from the brigade commanders I did not get that and I know you're going to ask me that. I did not get that in this case here either. I know if I had flown there they would have not been hesitant in talking to me about it and, in fact, you can see it in a heart beat.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, with in your staff with ISR if lets say tonight they approved a particular ISR plan for tomorrow and something took place where it needed to be reprioritized, how would that go, sir, would they come to you and say General we need to chop this asset?

MG Schloesser: Generally not. The CHOPs on the floor and the J2 and maybe the DCGO would reprioritize like that, you know, in a more formal way. But, generally speaking, because of the large number of troops in contact that we had daily and nightly they had the authority and I wanted them to have the authority to be able to

instead of asking for permission to react immediately if they felt and again most of these guys I trusted very, very highly to shift the assets that we had. And I need to go back. We did--by the time we got there we had a warrior alpha which is a preproduction model of what's going to be the extended and range multipurpose air vehicle for the United States Army. It's a Predator like aircraft that flew (b)(1) 1.4 a, c and we had four platforms; one capability at that time to actually fly it. I mean one ground control station that went to 2 and that was an asset that I controlled directly as a Division/CJTF Commander. There were people that, I mean, my commanders would say hey sir look, you know, can I get priority on that and in many cases it made absolute sense. In many cases, I referred right back to the O and J2, but I don't want you to--I did not want to centralize the headquarters. You can not be successful in this case out there like that. I'm not sure how the--at least from my prospective I didn't. I don't know how the--my staff thought, but--or the DCGs. But, I wanted them to be able to react immediately. So, my thought process is by the time they told me of a major TIC say wherever I was or whether I was in hooch or something which is right in the same place. It's collocated there at Bagram inside the same mush and hangar. I wanted things to be moving. I didn't want people to be asking me about hey sir can I move the Predator from this place to that place and that's just the way I operated.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Is that the same with aviation, sir--

MG Schloesser: --absolutely. Very rarely, I mean, when they asked me about something they were asking me about a priority for maybe a 2 week period or something like that. So, the engagement that I had with the brigade commanders and actually my staff was the planners had plans--about 3 times a week I met with my planners and we had a complete plans oriented ETC with all the brigades once a week. It was during there that I was actually allocating large chunks of things at this level for a larger of scale operations. When you had a troops in contact that in some cases went forward then they tended to get a large amount of the capability that we had or resources that we had provided at the CJTF level or we could coordinate.

For example, prior to Wanat--the battle of Wanat there was a task force Phoenix unit that was returning or going to an area in the Logar province and got itself in to an extremely bad fight and we had a DUSTWUN circumstance for about 24 hours. We found a body that had been mutilated etcetera and we had just been there for about 60--70 days. That TIC became a brigade size operation for about 3 weeks to clear out what is called the Tangy Valley and to find the perpetrators, but more so also to send a message as well. It also helped us check the viability of the 203d corps in that sector because we operated with them for the first time in the field for over 2 weeks. That took a large amount of assets.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Is this toward the end of June, sir?

MG Schloesser: Yeah, that is the reason we lost I don't know how much you know--I'm sure you know all of this. The Rock Move was delayed. It originally had been set to take place in the end of June. I don't remember exactly how much the exact assets were, but they did not have enough to do what they needed to do in the Bayonet's area. The only thing I can think of is that we were not able to give them some of the additional assets that we normally would have piled on in both aviation and ISR because they were going to Tangy Valley during that latter part of June. As we were--I think the Tangy Valley incident occurred on the 26th of June. As I said it was a major event in that area. So--anyway.

LtGen Natonski: Did illumination conditions drive OPs during----

MG Schloesser: It could and in this case, I do know that they had to wait back until what is called either green or amber illumination and not a red illumination, especially up in the Hindu Kush. The battle of Wanat occurred--or the Wanat--or the Rock Move was readjusted and it was adjusted into that period of time which we could operate aircraft up there----

LtGen Natonski: As a result of the previous delay requirement for aircraft?

MG Schloesser: Right.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay.

2 **MG Schloesser:** I do not recall the exact original dates to be
3 quite frank because the CONOP, I was never--it never
4 came to my level until after the delay had occurred
5 and we, in my mind, had re-synched everything, the
6 Tangy Valley was starting to come down. Now,
7 unfortunately there was a number of things that were
8 beyond my knowledge, I mean on the 7th of July, we had
9 a major incident inside of Kabul and again, I am not
10 responsible for the security that was blown up in the
11 Indian Embassy there. And well, I am not responsible
12 inherently inside of Kabul, the gates of Kabul, as
13 they called it, goes back to Soviet times as well with
14 Jaha Dean pressured the Soviets. I was responsible
15 for the areas all around it. And the thought process
16 was is that the suicide bomber had come through the
17 eastern--northeastern side through Kapica, which is
18 this area right over here and at which time I had
19 almost--I had put troops in there, partly a Pathfinder
20 Company--no it was not Pathfinders, Alpha Company out
21 of one of my Battalions in a very large valley, in a
22 tough valley and the enemy had reacted to that but I
23 was also trying to react to the situation of the
24 suicide bombing there as well. While there is a
25 number of other things on going, there is about a 450
26 to 600 mile border with Pakistan Federally
27 Administrative Tribal Area as well as the Northwest
28 Frontier Province in my sector--our sector and by that
29 time, we were receiving a large amount of rocketing or
30 shelling from their side, from what they believe were
31 insurgents and we had already had a major incident at
32 Naval Pass, which is right up here that had required a
33 joint investigation. In fact, I wanted them to even
34 investigate my own decisions at that point. And so,
35 there were a number of things that were causing us to
36 have to very much control the resources and the
37 capabilities that we had at any of the BCT levels,
38 much less at the Division and CJTF and then at the
39 ISAF level. That is a long way of answering your
40 question.

Beta 41 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, with the delay, I assume that you were aware
42 that the 173d was preparing to RIP?

43 **MG Schloesser:** Absolutely.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, how did the--with the delay and the pending
2 RIP, how did that impact any decisions that you made
3 regarding Operation Rock Move?

4 **MG Schloesser:** I think that it placed it into a period time in
5 which it was questionable whether it was sound
6 judgment to do that and we had that conversation and I
7 think that General--and I think it was Colonel
8 (b)(3), (b)(6) was the most articulate, he said, you know, Delta
9 we are the most experienced unit that you have here,
10 we have been here for 14 months, Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) knows Oscar
11 that area better than any American alive and at that
12 time, I think that it was true and I think that he
13 went up against Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), the preceding Hawk
14 Battalion Commander, but (b)(3), (b)(6) knew that area very, Oscar
15 very well. And they were battle hardened and I was
16 balancing an incoming unit, 3d BCT from 1st Infantry
17 Division that was a smaller unit. I don't know the
18 numbers total, there were at least 100--in fact,
19 General Milley knows better than I do because it was
20 very much on his mind frequently in our discussions
21 about the absolute need for another Battalion in that
22 area after the 173d has gone over and above what the
23 3d Brigade of the 1st Infantry put in. But I knew
24 that I had less Soldiers and Troopers on the ground
25 with the incoming RIP than I would then.

26 There is a period of time during the RIP also when I often get
27 the idea that pundits think you are at your weakest.
28 The truth is militarily you are at your strongest, you
29 generally have more troops on the ground in most
30 locations than you had throughout the entire period of
31 time and instead of having less assets, you actually
32 have--because you have tried to put your assets
33 towards the RIP, you actually have more assets on the
34 ground. Everybody understands that a RIP is a
35 vulnerable time as far as the enemy goes, we know that
36 they know when we are going to do this. It is quite
37 known, the terps talk, all kinds of folks talk and
38 it's quite evident as they see the hustle and bustle
39 after being there for a number of years. So, it was a
40 calculated decision to go ahead and continue with Rock
41 Move, even after the push into the July timeframe.
42 The TOA in the area, I do not recall when (b)(6)--when Diamond
43 Task Force Rock TOA was, it was towards the end of
44 July, I do--I know the 173d's was in the first part of
45 August. I believe then and I believe now that

Battalion and Charlie Company was the best company to do that and it would take months, probably beyond the winter season for anyone else going in there to be able to do anything in the similar way.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, moving out of Bella and establishing something in Wanat, was that something that you or your headquarters was driving, sir? Or was that something the Brigade was coming to you and saying, "Sir, we need to get out of here and set up an new COP in Wanat"?

MG Schloesser: They had already--that had been discussed before we even set foot there. It had been planned for, I believe, almost a full year. As I said, it was a logical consequence of watching how the enemy reacted to the establishment of Ranch House and Bella and how the people did not. Without going and talking for another 20 minutes, essentially the enemy bypassed those areas except when they decided that they wanted to attack them and the people, they were either not able to impact the people or to the few that were up there--and this area is--this is 27,000 people and there are 13 million in RC East. So, there are 27,000, not just that valley, but all of that sector of Eastern Nuristan and Northern Konar. So, it is a combination of Waygal and Watah Pur Valley, they were not reacting and each and every day that I learned more about that area, I can see how the decision had been made almost a year ago that they were too far north and they were exposed and the need was to get down closer to where the people lived in the Pesh River Valley and the Koreangal Valley.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And with Wanat specifically, sir, you have been up through the valley flying?

MG Schloesser: Yes.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And did you have an opinion as to whether Wanat would be a good location or a bad location?

MG Schloesser: You know, frankly, I wish to God now that I had--that they had landed me there, that is all that I can say.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And why is that, sir?

MG Schloesser: Well, I mean, if you fly over it now you would see that the location makes good sense as long as the people are going to at least sit on the fence or be a supporter. But if the people leave then it is a very vulnerable location because it is co-located with a very small village. And the absolute requirement, as it was laid out in a CONOP and as I think that almost everyone thought was occurring was to seize the high ground using OPs which is how we were able to survive in Bella, in an area that was almost similar to the extent of its exposure to high mountains all around it and plunging fire. But it did not have that--it was across a river from the village and it had distance between the relatively high buildings, again two story mud brick buildings, that was not the case in Wanat. So, you--by moving into Wanat, you were trusting that there had been enough rapport built through building the district center, through working up to that time with the ANP, through a series of, I would say, extraordinary lengthy negotiations to work the land; if any of those assumptions are invalid then you have a real problem on your hands and that is what the case is there inline.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And sir, early July, sir, what was your understanding----

MG Schloesser: Did I answer your question, I guess the answer is that I did fly over the top of it but no one actually said that it is going to be right there and oh, by the way, we are going to put an OP across the street, you know, 5 or 10 feet higher.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): You understand, though, sir, that they had planned further OPs?

MG Schloesser: Yes, well, that was the concept--that is the only way that in some cases, even today the fact--clearly today, that you are able to maintain enough awareness of enemy movement especially if you get yourself up against an insurgent group that is able to do radio listening silence because then it takes a large amount of our sophistication and makes it less important. And both had been very important at the tactical level all of the way down to Platoon leaders using bearcat scanners and the Low Level Voice Intercept capabilities that we have at the company level all of the way up to (b)(1) 1.4 a, c

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c

(b)(1) 1.4 a, c If you don't have OPs--let me just put it in a positive sense, throughout the sector, we purposely put OPs at very high locations that were accessible only by walking or by helicopter or by mule, we brought--I had a mule battalion so that we could support them but essentially this was five or six troopers up very, very high, but they could see the entire area and they normally were outfitted with LRAS and then co-located and cross-qued by other systems either by a TOW system or an ITAS, these are visual things, and then often in synch with the signal's intercepts. The Predator and the Warrior in other locations, the Hunter and the Shadow, their use--to people who don't know this kind of war fight is often way over emphasized, it is like looking through a soda straw, looking for a bad guy and in mountainous terrain you don't even know where to look, so you have to be cross-qued and the best way to cross-que is someone on the ground--I mean, an OP patrolling. So, to make a long story short, OPs are critical in countering this insurgency in the mountainous areas of RC East.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, in early July, what was your understanding of the enemy threat up around COP Bella, sir?

MG Schloesser: The end of July?

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Beginning of July, sir, before Operation Rock Move and I understand on the 4th of July there had been an incident in that vicinity.

MG Schloesser: Actually on the 3d and 4th. I have long been concerned about that when the enemy chose to, they could often attack Bella and they did. Generally speaking it was with plunging fire or indirect fire that was irritating and sometimes could hurt someone and did. There weren't a large scale number of deliberate attacks under any kind of sophistication at Bella, there were some, as you know, at Ranch House and a few other areas in that area. There were some way down in the south by then and so we had already--we had understood that in our sector, although I was not looking at it really to be truthful in Nuristan, but in our sector, which I am thinking about a couple

1 different attacks that we had at Market COP and
2 Malikchay down in this area in Bermel. We saw that
3 the enemy could come together, bring small groups
4 together under radio listening silence and then employ
5 them with supporting fires in very sophisticated way,
6 right out of textbook ranger 101, and so we knew that
7 in some areas we were up against that. I did not
8 think that that was happening in Bella but I was
9 deeply concerned on the 3d and 4th when we had the IDF
10 attacks because it seemed clear that they knew that we
11 were leaving and generally speaking all of us thought
12 they would try to claim that they had pushed the unit
13 out and then have a large IO effect and they would
14 film it and things of that nature. The incident that
15 occurred on the 4th where they believe that, and I
16 have reviewed these tapes over and over again, but
17 they believe that the mortarman that they saw go into
18 a vehicle and consequently were engaged by two Apaches
19 and two trucks were destroyed including, I think that
20 almost everyone on there were killed, that incident, I
21 will admit that perhaps it is (b)(6), I can't Garnet
22 recall, was based upon--I mean, his thoughts on that
23 were based upon not the 15-6 but on what he got from
24 somebody up there plus the governor was pissed off.
25 The governor had a problem with Karzi and got himself,
26 a Nuristani--I can't remember his first name, I think
27 it is (b)(6), was an ineffective governor,
28 one of three that we worked with in Nuristan. He was
29 very upset and so he gave--he basically, I think, you
30 know, said that they were all people from the medical
31 clinic, etcetera. I am convinced and I said this in
32 the interview that some of them were civilians that we
33 killed civilians. I mean, I have my own view point
34 based upon looking at the gun tapes over and over
35 again and listening to the pass between being on the
36 ground and the Apaches. But I was convinced that
37 there was absolutely no negligence and the truth was
38 that we could not even point out why the civilians
39 were on the same truck as what we knew were
40 insurgents. The signals intercept from that time from
41 the two days of collecting on it were two different
42 collects and--I am trying to remember, on one of them
43 the collect was that they had lost, the insurgents had
44 had 14 killed and I think 9 wounded. There was
45 another one, you can't swear in Nuristani by the way,
46 and they said that "the situation was fucked and (b)(6)
47 (b)(6) is wounded." And then I cannot recall the name

of his deputy, was either dead or wounded and from that incident, I was thinking and I don't think that that was my intel guys I don't think would say exactly the same thing, they did not come to me and say, "Hey, that force that's trying to come up here was devastated or destroyed." But I was thinking that they had been disrupted pretty significantly to be quiet frank. And I thought that that had disrupted any kind of deliberate attack on Bella, I was still concerned about Bella, still concerned about Wanat as well as everybody else. But I don't think, and I am sure that you are going to ask me this, but I did not think that that force, or whatever force was still up there was just going to pick up and walk on down to Wanat and be a coherent fighting force to be able to fight on the 8th or the 9th. I am always most concerned on the first two to three days of establishing any COP, to be quite frank.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** And why is that, sir?

MG Schloesser: Because that is when you are extraordinarily vulnerable usually a COP where you have fields of fire, a VPB works the best--a vehicle patrol base, which is the normal way that we move into an area, we can either assault into it--air assault into it, drive into it, or in like the case of Wanat, which is a combination of the both of those, but with fields of fire, the VPB works the best because you actually--essentially you do your security from your vehicles so if you have four or five vehicles, you have a 50 Cal, you have reach out for a 1000 meters and beyond with a MARK 19s and a TOW or any combination thereof. You are a pretty strong fighting force in a area that has fields of fire. If you don't have likely fields of fire, which is in the case of Wanat, you have a period of vulnerability. And so you have to do a couple different things, one, you have to provide the best security you possibility can, two, you have to reach out beyond that and get out your OPs as well as your patrols to understand what is in fact your dead spots; I am not talking about a dead spot 100 meters away, I am talking about a dead spot that maybe 5 or 6 or 700 meters away and truly understand where plunging fire can occur from in your point and register all of your rounds up in that area as well as, in many cases, try to put your OPs up on those areas. So, it is a tough

series of things to do in a couple days. You know the truth is that I probably never really sat down until--the battle of Wanat and said to myself, perhaps two platoons including an ANA is not enough if they don't get along. The assumption is that when you give someone enough force that they are going to use it.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** By not getting along, sir, you mean, U.S. Army and ANA?

MG Schloesser: Yeah, I mean, we did not pioneer this, people before us had pioneered partnering, but we made it one of our key things that we did over 15 months and in Bayonet's area, they will tell you the first briefing that I got from them on day 4, April 14th or whenever I went to the BCT to get their O&I laid out before I go to the Battalions, they said, "Sir, we got something like four or five thousand few folks in the BCT--the numbers are right there--but we actually have a larger number--we have another four thousand that make up the border police and the Afghan National Army Brigade that is up in our sector and we are trying to work with them. We partner with them, we live with them, we don't just drag them around." And I worked diligently, I thought to increase the size of the border police and their professionalism, but the Brigade Commanders worked extraordinary hard to make the Army a part of what they did, they tried to work with the police and increasingly they would incorporate the border police, so you actually doubled your numbers in most cases. And that is how we did a large amount of the operations that we were able to do and a resource possibly--I mean, with the lack of coalition forces and stuff like that.

I am not even sure what you asked me to get to that point. What was the original question? You probably don't even remember.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Sir, yes, sir. Sir, you mentioned the threat up at Bella, and I know in your CSI report that you talked about the enemy possibly massing. Can you describe what you meant by massing to attack Bella, sir?

MG Schloesser: Yes, like I said, we had already had an attack in Margo. This is not what-- (b)(6) talks about something that occurred a year before that and was Garnet

stopped on the other side of the border. We had already seen in our sector the ability to go across the border 10 or 15 kilometers and like I said down in the Bermel area and use radio listening silence bring in like small groups of five or six from a variety of different rat trails or trails over the mountains and then mass for an attack. They had--I knew that they had the capability to do that, we really had not seen that happen in our time since the time that we had been there in the Nuristan area, even in Konar you really had not seen that up until that point. But I did not mean that I was not thinking that they couldn't do it and so that is what I was concerned about. A larger amount of that--well, that is hindsight, that is essentially what happened at Wanat, the ability to use a multitude of different trails in an area that they know better than anyone else on a radio listening silence and when they were identified they were--I mean, no one went out to patrol to figure out, you know, what is this and so I am not pointing fingers at anyone, but I am just saying that you have to figure out if you have groups of men, five men wondering around your area, you're generally going to have to find out what is going on and the way that you do that is you actually send a patrol out. And that is what the Afghans are actually pretty darn good with. So, you have to use all of your assets. So, the idea of massing that is what I was concerned about, sure. I think that I already said that I believe the Signal Intercepts because they had not given us up--I don't believe that we--in my time there, the 15 months, that I received a deceptive intercept on push-to-talk radio, in other words, clearly trying to deceive us into thinking that they were going to do something. They would use code words, they would use all kinds of different things and so the interrupters were very important in this area to try to have Nuristanis or even Korengali speakers, Pashi is a separate type of a language as well as Pashtur, so that added another thing to it. I was not worried as much about massing after the 3d and the 4th, personally. I don't think that I voiced that, I don't know to my staff.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Is that because the leader was wounded, sir, from the SIGINT intercept?

1 **MG Schloesser:** Fourteen dead out of any group is also pretty
2 darn significant. That is pretty high casualties and
3 so I thought that had been--whatever was massing at
4 Bella, if it was, in fact, massing, and there were
5 reports about (b)(6) was one that they were going
6 to do that. I thought that that had been disrupted.

Beta 7 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And the distance, sir, from Bella to Wanat, you
8 mentioned that you did not think that they would
9 simply, if they had massed force, walk down the valley
10 to Wanat. Why is that, sir? Because of the command
11 and control aspect, sir?

12 **MG Schloesser:** It is just that the way that they operate,
13 generally speaking, in that area, and I think that it
14 is still the same now, is that you have to place
15 caches within certain areas, they don't just carry
16 down--as you all know, you cannot--well, in that area,
17 Wanat is at baseline 4000 feet roughly, most of the
18 trails go over the top of passes to stay off of the
19 river area which is where you would normally--well,
20 the main trail is that goes up and it is not vehicle
21 capable and certainly not HMMWV capable unless you go
22 from Wanat towards Bella. But there are plenty of
23 ways to get on through the mountain passes and while
24 almost any Afghan fighters will just walk the pants
25 off any one of our guys with the way we outfit
26 ourselves, they generally would go and they would have
27 a cache with a round, vicinity, where they would move
28 into. It would be a small cache, they would hide it.
29 It was not like a platoon in mass or a company in
30 mass, it would be small like even like a fire team
31 moving into an area. It also made sense in the sense
32 that some of these fighters were local fighters; some
33 of them were more likely than not people that were
34 Lashgrill tribe type of trainers and the Lashgrill
35 Tribe had been involved in this area now for some
36 period of time. Probably some (b)(6) as well
37 that were helping to lead these groups. It just would
38 not have made any sense to just walk right up and down
39 there and that is why your Predator is up and around
40 that and I think that you probably saw that there was
41 a fair amount of support from the ISR, they got 58%.
42 Have you seen the numbers?

Beta 43 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

MG Schloesser: Okay. Of all of our FMV and 58% of all of our SIGINT from the 8th through the 12th but without knowing where to look based upon your ground cues, your cuing devices, it is extraordinary difficult to be able to figure this out and we had already had--not areas up in here but we had killed civilians, shearly by mistakes by identifying what we thought were three, four, five people out what looked like digging in an IED down south, down in this area, and had killed them and it turned out that they were working on their farm field at 3 o'clock in the morning and that is because the sun came up at 4:30, BMNT was at 3 and by noon it was too hot to work and we learned some sad lessons that way. So, I can understand from the ground why seeing some folks going out may have been going up to goat herds and may have been doing some other things and you had to go out and verify. Anyway, I did not think that there was going to be a mass going down. I just did not.

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, in your CSI transcript, you mentioned that the enemy had established a TTP of centrally probing a position, checking a U.S. reactions before they could conduct an attack. Would that analysis change, sir, if, as I am sure that you are aware, sir, if the specific location for the COP at Wanat had been under negotiations for an extended period of time and you talked about them using weapon caches and prepositioning, sir. Their established TTP versus going into a location that we had essentially tipped our hand, hey we want to come to this particular location. How would you balance that out?

MG Schloesser: That is a fair question and I am just going to tell you based on my experience, I would normally say that they would still gauge our reaction by using what you had already described and what we saw throughout the battle space, including in RC South, which was essentially starting off with some indirect fires, some direct fires, potentially then a small probe to gauge what our TTP is for that area were going to be. Even in hindsight, hindsight is pretty good, but 95% of the time, that is exactly what we saw there, there were other incidences where there might have been a larger attack as starting right from the get go but I still think that even as an enemy, I try to pride myself in thinking as an enemy, unless you are really

certain of how things occurred down in wherever you are looking, this COP or this Outpost, it is prudent to gauge it first before you all of the sudden find out that you really did not understand where those guys were walking to yesterday that it was now an OP above you or whatever. They had a great fear of TOWs, extraordinary, which of course in this case you can see why they went after the TOW vehicle almost immediately. I still--it is not that I don't want to learn, I still would say that predominant cases, I think that is what we saw. I think that you will get that from the Company Commander and the Battalion Commander if they sat down here today, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6), I think they would say--if you were asking us from our experience base that is essentially what we saw.

Oscar Diamond

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, in the planning for and the lead up to Operation Rock Move, did your staff or any commander come to you and say, "General, we cannot execute unless we have this particular asset"?

MG Schloesser: No.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): And once Operation Rock Move was underway, sir, did you ever--either your staff or a commander come into you saying, "We need more ISR" or "We are having trouble with engineers or equipment"?

MG Schloesser: No, in fact, that hurts me because, like I said, I try to understand what was going down or happening at that Company at the Platoon level. And no, in fact, I have got to say, I don't know when it was, the day prior, I bet it was the 12th that I was told that we were very close--we were on track. I will say that. They gave me a percentage of where we were.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Percentage for the establishment of the COP, sir?

MG Schloesser: Yes. Have you talked to General Milley?

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) He is coming this afternoon, sir.

MG Schloesser: Ask him, I swear to you, he looked me in the eyes and said this is where we are at and he got it from the system. It was a percentage and I remember thinking at that time that we are on track.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Without any particular issues, sir?

2 **MG Schloesser:** I did not know of any issues at that time. No,
3 I--I did know on the 12th that Warrior never took off
4 because that is the one thing that I do remember. You
5 know, that we did this--it is basically a 100 days of
6 wind in Afghanistan and it is extraordinarily bad in
7 RC South, but then Bagram acts as a funnel coming down
8 from the Pancheer Mountains and so they--it comes
9 right on down and shoot into the airfield and the
10 Warrior was not able to take off because of high
11 winds. I think that that was planned, if you look at
12 the ISR charts that was actually planned to be really
13 the last day of Warrior support for the Rock Move. I
14 think I got it wrong, I mean, I thought, okay, we have
15 had three days--good solid days. We had pretty good
16 ISR over the TOC, way more important in my view point
17 was that we got no reports on the ground, nothing
18 picked up on the Low Level Voice Intercept. And I was
19 not aware, and I have seen it in the 15-6, where there
20 was this sort of constant humdrum in the background
21 that they were going to be attacked--I don't think
22 that they--I am trying to think of the Lieutenant that
23 is out there and his Platoon Sergeant and a Company
24 Commander when he gets out there, I am not sure that
25 that is any different than what they saw in Bella all
26 of the time. So, I don't know where those reports
27 went, if you see what I am saying. But I am not aware
28 that we felt at my staff level or my level or Colonel
29 (b)(3), (b)(6) 's level that we had a situation in Wanat that Delta
30 had been de-synched because of the Warrior being
31 unable to take off or approved to be a logistic
32 problem.

Beta 33 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, when a unit wanted to establish a new
34 position and it came up through the JFUB process, sir,
35 to get it funding and approval. Did you participate
36 personally in that at all, sir?

37 **MG Schloesser:** Yeah, that was painful as all get out, so I tried
38 to limit that as much as I could. Like I said, I had
39 the Chief that did all of the signing of that but the
40 DCG, General McConval, for development of governments,
41 ran--we called it for the lack of any better phrase, a
42 winterization board that met year around that
43 essentially did more than just ensure that we
44 winterized all of these COPs but actually looked at
45 the development of every one of the COPs, what it

would take so that--for example, in Wanat's case, moving from a VPB to a COP which in my belief that happens within days, and a COP is going to be there year around, so the concern of the JFUB is making sure that they got a place where you can actually survive the winter, I mean literally, survive. We are not talking all of this bullshit about Burger Kings and stuff like that, that is for Bagram and stuff. Most of these troopers are not living anything like that especially in this area, so I am just trying to make sure that, you know, that they are not going to freeze to death, that they are going to have Class V and Class I and III. So that process is ongoing and I review that periodically and I don't recall exactly how often I did read the review. I had to sign certain contracts as the National Command Element, at a certain level. I don't recall that is one of the things that I blissfully tried to forget, I guess, was all of that paperwork from that contracting piece of that but there was a very rigorous process.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) What was your understanding, sir, from the time that the platoon would start executing the move to Wanat to when--the time period that the COP would essentially done, sir?

MG Schloesser: About 4 days. I mean, well, I misspoke. The COP will take months to be complete where we will have what I just said and I realized that I was talking about winterization things, B-Huts, things of that nature or in many cases in that area, we used tents until we found out that the snows would just collapse the tents, so the B-Huts--the plywood things work the best. That would take months. Could it protect itself and have OPs out within 4 days? Security is the most important aspect of any of the establishment of any of the COPs and it doesn't take all that long if things are going basically 50% right. I went to plenty of COPs. One COP I fired the entire chain of command, so I mean, to be honest with you, we were pretty demanding, I think, we asked a lot of our folks but the security aspects had to be done within a few days otherwise all you have was the perpetual VPB and that was not accomplishing any of the mission that we were asking them to do.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, you mentioned VPB----

1 **MG Schloesser:** Vehicle Patrol Base.

Beta 2 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Can you describe what you think a VPB
3 is, sir?

4 **MG Schloesser:** Yeah, a VPB can be anything from an interim stop
5 in the middle of the night in an area down out here or
6 clearly in RC South off on the side of the road where
7 you basically pull up and you pull security.
8 Something that most folks would recognized if you were
9 motorized as putting up-armored HMMWVs, which is what
10 they had there, or MRAPS or Bradley's or tanks in an
11 area of being able to protect themselves in the area
12 and being able to understand what is going on down or
13 outside of the match--in other words, not just huddle
14 down inside of a HMMWV and hoping for the best but
15 actually having patrolling and actually having OPs and
16 stuff out, even temporary OPs. That is the most
17 preliminary and in this area here, the expectation is
18 that you would use those vehicles and then build
19 around them and then build your COP up in a pretty
20 rigorous and pretty expedited fashion. Establishing a
21 COP is an exhausting mission that no one wants to do
22 and anybody who has done it once will never volunteer
23 to do it again in Afghanistan because it is at
24 altitude and it is in heat or in RC South it is in the
25 dust and stuff like that, it is just amazing. But it
26 has to be done relatively quickly.

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, one of the items that we have been tasked to
28 look at is before the battle--if you talk to some of
29 the troopers and some of the officers they are talking
30 about COP Wanat or COP Kahler, occasionally there is a
31 smattering of VPB in a document and it seems that
32 after a battle there was essentially a lock step, we
33 will call this Vehicle Patrol Base versus a COP. Did
34 that come from Division level?

35 **MG Schloesser:** That did not come from me. I think that if you
36 go into the CONOP you will see that it almost goes
37 back and forth in between it but the concept is
38 pretty--I think it is laid out on the CONOP. It says
39 that you start with a VPB and the intent is to
40 establish COP Wanat and as I said, my intent was--you
41 never heard me call it VPB Wanat or anything like
42 that, the intent was to establish a COP here, the
43 intent was not to establish a Vehicle Patrol Base and
44 leave. Again, what I did not finish off is that VPB,

1 in my mind, can be a temporary place or I have used it
2 actually fairly effectively in other areas out there
3 as a site where we would go in from time to time and
4 have a VPB and then we would leave and would just ask
5 the locals and they would maintain the area and as
6 crazy as it sounds, we never had a bad time going back
7 into an area. I mean, I know where that came from and
8 I think you just have to ask Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and I Delta
9 think that what he felt was--well, what I am sure he
10 felt like, we were screwing up the IO portion of this
11 thing big time and he did talk to me about that and
12 vented his frustration. And it could not have been--
13 the second person more frustrated with it would have
14 been me. At that point in time, I was still trying to
15 clear things all of the way through, not only ISAF
16 Headquarters and then Brunson, JFC Headquarters and
17 around that time, I just went General Kerns and said,
18 I am going to go and I am going to start doing this
19 stuff on my own and I am going to do it myself, sir,
20 shoot me or fire me.

21 But we were all over the map and as far as what we
22 were saying about Wanat at that point in time, we had
23 already done--I started the 15-6 that day or so--what
24 was your question again?

Beta 25 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) The setup of a VPB----

26 **MG Schloesser:** The VPB business.

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

28 **MG Schloesser:** Yeah, it is screwed up but from Jeff Schlooser's
29 viewpoint and I think that I understand exactly what
30 they intended to do, it was a VPB to establish a COP.

31 **LtGen Natonski:** The VPB, it is something that you can move.

32 **MG Schloesser:** Right.

33 **LtGen Natonski:** In total if you have to?

34 **MG Schloesser:** And in fact, we did, frequently. I mean in other
35 areas, sir.

36 **LtGen Natonski:** And that is one of the questions that
37 Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) mentioned that the issue becomes after Beta
38 the 9th of July, the VPB that went up on the 8th of

1 July was a VPB, I think, exactly in the definition
2 that you used it, although it is not a doctrinal term-
3 ---

4 **MG Schloesser:** No, it is not.

5 **LtGen Natonski:** However, after the 9th, you flew in ANA
6 platoon and additional assets which meant that you
7 could no longer pick up and leave and it became at
8 that point, as you described a COP, if nothing else, a
9 COP under construction.

10 **MG Schloesser:** Yes, sir.

11 **LtGen Natonski:** And in trying to clear up the confusion that
12 apparently arouse as a result of the 15-6 is one of
13 the taskers that we had been assigned.

14 **MG Schloesser:** Right, I think--Sir, I don't think that there was
15 any misunderstanding at that platoon plus the ANA
16 platoon, I mean, at that level of command at Wanat,
17 clearly, I think, if you look at the statements of
18 Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) or Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or even Colonel Oscar Diamond
19 (b)(3), (b)(6), I mean, the Battalion Commander and Company Delta
20 Commander, or my staff, the intent was to put in a
21 Combat Outpost, that is what we had been negotiating.

22 **LtGen Natonski:** And I don't think that there is anyone who
23 doubts that. I think that everyone realizes from the
24 CONOPs to the negotiations that was a permanent COP
25 that was going in.

26 **MG Schloesser:** Absolutely.

Beta 27 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Sir, switching gears a little bit for you.
28 During a CONOP, whether the planning for or the
29 execution of, sir, what do you expect from your
30 Battalion Commanders? That they be doing and they be
31 supervising during the planning phase, sir, first?

32 **MG Schloesser:** Well, there are three different levels on the
33 CONOP and are laid out there on ISAF, there are levels
34 0, 1 and then 2. At the 2, I cannot even approve it,
35 as you probably know, the DCGO approves for in my name
36 the level 1s. But at the level 2 it is done at the
37 ISAF Headquarters. Sometimes those are a question of
38 just of the amount of assets, in fact that is what
39 drove Rock Move was the required assets outside of the

BCT. Sometimes it is the size of the unit, battalion or larger, for example will go from level 1 to level 2. My expectation is that everything that the CONOP says to do, which is that forum that is a rigorous forum, I have seen others by (b)(6) who makes light of what is going on in there and that is because he has never sat through one himself. You know, the bullets are just sparking the actual conversation that is done between the commanders, the Battalion Commander usually brings his 3 to the Brigade and to the CJTF and to the assault force and to the 2 and the 3, the assault force meaning the aviation assault force, all of that is happening real time, either on CPOF or on VTC and there is a certain amount of rigor to it, but when it says something on there, my expectation is that it gets done. I am just going to leave it at that, if it says establish OPs which this one does that is what I believe is being done. There is basically a status check, I think it is a conditions check inside there, it is kind of like a go or no go, that can be widely misunderstood, remember those go and no go decision is made when you start moving and so, when you--you have to have enough sense later on, if the conditions have changed to look back and say, what does that mean for me? But it does not mean that you stop what you are doing. So, if something changes for example on the 9th, you are going to adapt to what you already got rather than to say, I am going to totally pull out of this area because something has occurred during that timeframe. I mean, there I am just responding to some of the notes that I saw in the (b)(6) report.

Garnet

Garnet

Beta

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) And would you expect your Battalion Commander, sir, to be intimately involved in the logistical aspect of the CONOP?

MG Schloesser: I would expect his staff to be intimately involved for sure. And by in large, logistics take place on this battlefield through sheer hard work and a great deal of effort but we have a lot of professional folks doing that. I think that predominately Battalion Commanders because of what we have them doing, don't have enough time, don't have the time to personally check each one of the logistics things, and hence that is why I would often ask questions the way I did about what was the status here

and whatever when I came on back because I was trying to get commanders to pay attention in areas where it means life or death. And clearly Nuristan and Konar are areas of that nature. But he has a staff, he does have an XO that normally works that portion of it, so when you say, "Intimately involved," what I expect a Battalion Commander to do is to check and verify. And the verify is the hard part when you have a lot of things going on.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** During the actual execution of the CONOP itself, sir. What do you see your Battalion Commander doing? His responsibilities or duties during the execution?

MG Schloesser: Well, really the Battalion Commander is the last tactical level where they are intimately involved, I will use your term, with the operation that is ongoing whether it is security heavy which is what the initial establishment of a combat outpost is or as it moves into the other lines of operation and they happen to almost simultaneously after about the first week, in other words, I am not a believer that you have to go into an area, clear it, and then hold it and then you will eventually build, if that is the case then you will never finish in Afghanistan. And so I look for simultaneity of the devolvement in the governance portion very quickly and in many cases you work some of that up front by dangling projects, coordinating projects beforehand and clearly having a relationship with--in this case it was a village, but really a Battalion Commander is working the entire province or in (b)(3), (b)(6)'s case it is a separate--he is one of a couple Battalion Commanders working both in Konar and Nuristan. So, I expect him to divide his time and by in large, they did it very very well. But I mean, there are multiple incidences, if you are asking--if that is where you are going, do you expect him to camp out with those two platoons, one U.S. and one ANA? I do not expect him to do that. But he was 8-kilometers away, so I thought that there would be a fair amount of cognizance of what was happening 8 kilometers to the north. Diamond

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Would you expect him to visit the site, sir?

MG Schloesser: Well, sure, of course.

Beta 1 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): I realize that you got out to many COPs, sir,
2 during your tour.

3 **MG Schloesser:** There is no similarity. I wish I had--in fact,
4 that is--I don't know if it was one of you guys that I
5 had this little conversation with, I had my green
6 notebooks around that unfortunately enroute back from
7 Germany because that is where I was going to go, and I
8 could tell you exactly where I was because that is
9 what I put down. But we flew a thousand hours and we
10 spent about 5000 hours on the ground with platoons and
11 companies. I could do it because I had a dedicated--
12 two flight crews and because as the Division
13 Commander, I also could have Apaches and up in this
14 area that is what (b)(3), (b)(6), the Brigade Iron
15 Commander, had put on as a requirement because of the
16 instances that we had had in Bella and because it was
17 absolutely no way that you could land two aircraft at
18 the same time in any of the Waygal Valley. What I can
19 do, and what a Battalion Commander could do was often
20 very very different, do you see what I am saying?

Beta 21 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

22 **MG Schloesser:** So, I am not going to put judgment on (b)(3), (b)(6) Diamond
23 (b)(3), (b)(6), all of us wish, like I said, I wish I had Diamond
24 been there.

25 **LtGen Natonski:** Did you ever drive to locations?

26 **MG Schloesser:** Sir, it was very hard. I did in--what I would--
27 the answer would be yes, but I would fly to them
28 first. I mean, it took 2 to 3 days to get from
29 Bagram, my headquarters to the southern most of my
30 sector.

31 **LtGen Natonski:** But once you were in your----

32 **MG Schloesser:** We would drive, sure.

33 **LtGen Natonski:** You could drive as part of your battlefield
34 circulation?

35 **MG Schloesser:** Absolutely.

36 **LtGen Natonski:** Which you said was at least 5 times a week
37 that you would get out.

MG Schloesser: And I wish you had the records so you could just see it. But also, what I am missing is when was the last time that I was at Bella. I don't know when it was. I do know that we were in the Pesh River Valley with the Chairman two days prior to that--to the attack. And I mentioned to him, offhand, that we were establishing a COP up in there. The Chairman, I got to just say, so that you know, was not a big believer of what we were doing in that area and usually it was applied to Korengal, an area that he went back to, while I was there, at least three time--I took him there three different times.

So, when do you go is critical. I tried not to go to a COP during the first week to two weeks, I was trying not to get killed and the other part was that I would draw attention. I mean, the word eventually gets out about the Division Commander getting in there and the number of times a COP was shelled an hour after I left was too many. And so, I tried to do different ways of doing things.

LtGen Natonski: But did you try to preempt your subordinate commanders by visiting and----

MG Schloesser: I was a big believer, sir, I mean, my dad did three tours in Vietnam and came back and swore up and down about when he was a troop commander about his Battalion Commander or Squadron Commander above him and then the Brigade Commander and the Division Commander. And later on he was a Battalion Commander, he was pissed off about his boss being up above him and all of the fights that I have been into up until that time, I have been as a Battalion Commander in Haiti, Battalion Commander in Kosovo and before that in Albania operating in Kosovo, I have had the authority to do what I needed to do and my bosses did not come and fly over the top of me or come on down. But with that said, there is an ability to come on in and there is a number of COPs where I went in and would get assets there that they were struggling or they just had the wrong teams. I mean sometimes, I went to one where they had a young logistics officer who was the OIC of a COP that was on a major route line coming in from Pakistan and he had to pick up a team and so, I knew that was not going to work, I knew that they were not going to be successful and would probably get some folks killed, so I changed that up.

I mean, but, there is a time that I do that and I am a firm believer, and let me see if I can answer your question in a completely different way. We did a number of transitions, everyone of those brigades transitioned at least once, the Poles transitioned three times while I was there, the French two or three times, but every Brigade transitioned at least one time and the way that I established this, I told the Brigade Commanders, "I am going to give you a week and then I am coming to your Headquarters, I am going to meet your staff, and who you want me to meet and then I am going to have an O&I and you are going to tell me what you think you have and then any day after that I am going to your Battalions and I am going to go to everyone of your Battalions, but after I finish one Battalion then I am--my contract with you, is that I can go to any Company or Platoon. I will stop if you want, it makes sense, and pick up your Battalion Commander and Sergeant Major because I knew that they did not have the aviation assets to be able to do complete battlefield circulation in these areas.

And there were too many areas that we had in RC East that were not connected by road networks or to give you one, when they were, we had one platoon an RCP that fought its way from--somewhere, yes, Sherona here to Wasiqual here, over two and half days the RCP hit 24 IEDs, now they did not lose anybody. I flew down there to see that unit and they did not have one piece of vehicle, every vehicle was almost essentially destroyed either in route or by the time they got all of the down there with stuff like that. It is hard to explain what the remoteness and the mountains or the sheer complex terrain does as far as limiting your ability to be able to get out and do battlefield circulation if you don't have aircraft ability to do it. And at the Battalion level, every aircraft that he took for his circulation was one less assault aircraft for that night or one less aircraft to be able to use for whatever.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, 5-minute break.

[The testimony broke at 1107, 19 November 2009.]

[The testimony was reopened at 1112 hours, on 19 November 2009.]

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): sir, one of the -- one of the issues which we're looking at was the detailed level of planning for the establishment of the COP. And we've been through the CONOP for the rock move and we've seen the JFUB packet, sir, what we -- what we don't have is anything beyond that, sir, that essentially this is how the COP is going to be built. The CONOP for rock move deals with, effectively, the movement to Wanat. The JFUB packet deals with -- here's the supplies and money -- new SIGINT matrix, sir, ending with that decision of day five, this is what it's going to look like -- day ten.

MG Schloesser: Right.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Was that the norm, sir?

MG Schloesser: Yes, it was. I mean, a synch matrix would normally be a larger scale operation. Clearly, a level II would require a synch matrix.

Now, they could do anything that they wanted to do at the platoon or company level. I know that -- the feeling here that this was, essentially, a platoon plus operation, I think Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) felt that by placing Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) on the scene, plus the amount of assets that he chopped to the unit, that he was mitigating any other risks that he felt were present there but, as far as the requirement to do a platoon level or a company level of synch matrix, there wasn't one at that point. And, I mean, I can be blamed for it but I did not require it.

Diamond Oscar

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. When other COP's were established while you were there, sir, did you see detailed plans that would -- from our perspective, sir there appears to be this -- this gap where there is a lot of material that needs to move to the site, that needs to be put together; would it be normal for that not to be addressed in a planning document?

MG Schloesser: Again, realize what you are seeing right there is what's being briefed all the way out to a division headquarters. And anyone can say that it's actually one -- one step higher, a CJTF headquarters.

I would assume that there was a fair amount of work that's being done that's getting briefed to the battalion commander and then at -- I mean, typically, as I sat through certain sessions, when I will go out to see the company or battalion, and get briefed on their operations, I mean, usually what you have to do is cut out the amount, you know, slides that reflect prudent planning and then try to get to the real important aspects. The coordination, the integration, usually, with the Afghans and with your ISR and your support air is critical.

The -- the idea though that I'm going to see all that at my level, I don't -- that's not going to happen at a platoon or at a company level, generally speaking. It doesn't mean that it's not there so -- I mean, what you have to say is is, I mean, what you have to say -- like for an example, what you just told me, what I would tell you is that the synchronization occurred. All you have to do is look at the TAC air requests that were actually flown that got -- they got out and with different but I think TAC air -- the requests. And it's an awful lot. I don't know if you have those, but I have them all?

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Yes, sir.

MG Schloesser: And oh, by the way, I meant to mention this before, and it needs to be reflected in the record, is that Cubbison doesn't even -- I don't even think he knows what non-standard ISR is. But it is probably as effective -- or even more effective than the Predators are. And I can go over -- if you want to ask me about that and come out of TAC air, I can talk to you about that, but if you all understand what I am saying but it's very much important. But when you look at how that is synced, I mean, that -- as well as what the ISR piece to it, you will see that there is more than meets the eye, there's more than just that CONOP series of power point slides before an operation gets done. Am I kind of making it clear?

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. I concur, sir. I think that, you know, it covers the air movement from the people in the initial supplies up -- the question, essentially, that we've been looking into, sir, is what -- what

beyond the tenth? What is taking place on the fifteenth of July? And what -- what planning has been done -- from a division level, sir, would you expect that it would be planned in a lower-level?

MG Schloesser: Oh yes, absolutely.

I mean, you know, at the division headquarters, again, what you have and then again it's a CJTF headquarters. I mean, so it's a -- the highest level tactical, the lowest level of operational and we had strategic tasks. You're not going to sit there and monitor the planning of a platoon. Plus this is really a company alliance to be completely fair with both the assets that are placed there, as well as, the command and control -- I have plenty of units out there that -- that a squadron level troop of a cavalry squadron was the exact same size as this entire operation, the expectation that they're going to do their job at their level and the guy above them to do their job and we're going to do our job. The key parts of synchronization at the CJTF level are the resources that they do not have or the ones that require cross-coordination that don't have, such as the Predator or things like that.

Again, even though the one Predator line flew for us, I do not own it and have frequently lost it. So there is a lot of work that's being done below that, and I would just caution you just because you don't have it doesn't mean that it didn't occur and what I will tell you is that, you know, when you look at the synchronization, all you have to do is look at TAC air charts and you -- and the ISR charts to see how they are synchronized and how they are planned out over time and then how they change. When, you know, when the feeling is is that things are okay and we have moved on and now we've got a lot of other -- we've got a lot of other -- we got more competing requirements than we can shake a stick at. Then things are going to -- they are going to be altered. So just don't because -- because there is no paperwork in there, being briefed at the CJTF, don't assume that there is not a fair amount of work to integrate, synchronize, and plan below that.

LtGen Natonski: And as you said, this is assets above and

1 beyond the brigade, the battalion that have to be
2 coordinated ---
3
4 **MG Schloesser:** Yes, sir.
5
6 **LtGen Natonski:** -- and work at your level ---
7
8 **MG Schloesser:** Right.
9
10 **LtGen Natonski:** -- at the point that I think (b)(3), (b)(6) was trying to Beta
11 make is, as a commander on the ground that you need to
12 have a detailed plan, what I would call actions on the
13 objective, in terms of everything from the laydown of
14 the combat outpost to your engagement with -- why you
15 are going in there ---
16
17 **MG Schloesser:** Right.
18
19 **LtGen Natonski:** -- in the first place. And then what about
20 the rotation that is scheduled to go down, you know,
21 in two weeks so what you're saying to us is, this is
22 -- that's not the level of detail you would have
23 expected to see in your plan ---
24
25 **MG Schloesser:** That is correct, sir. I do not expect ---
26
27 **LtGen Natonski:** But your assumption is as a command --
28 division commander or a CJTF Commander, you expect
29 your subordinates to do that level of detailed
30 planning in any type of combat operation?
31
32 **MG Schloesser:** Yes, sir, absolutely. Yes, sir. And I think
33 that some was evident here because of the
34 synchronization that you can see happening in the
35 little parts of the operation but that's exactly -- I
36 mean, I may be wrong, but I would never leave my
37 headquarters if I would require every platoon I had to
38 brief me in their -- you know, what they are going to
39 do for the operation and plus two weeks or something.
40
Beta 41 **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, regarding the decision to essentially
42 withdraw ---
43
44 **MG Schloesser:** I am not making light of what you said. You're
45 absolutely right in what you said, General, is
46 externally important, I mean, you know, if it turns
47 out that there was no plan, than we were wrong. I

mean, if there is no concept that I'm going to TOA it here and I have got to have a series of shura's with the people and I am going to have to have demonstrable money moving, before I leave, and help link this next platoon with his platoon.

Now, I am not saying it wasn't planned, I am just saying that it's not evident there, but I think that there was, but I mean, I don't know if it's written.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Thank you, sir.

MG Schloesser: It is important.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6)**:** Sir, regarding the decision to withdraw from Wanat, could you please explain how that ---

MG Schloesser: Yeah, it was my -- it was my decision, totally. The -- the situation had changed so dramatically on the ground -- well, let me put it first and foremost -- that I'm going to tell you how I saw it and what I did, but it does not mean that I did not ask for a staff process -- which I did do from my staff -- in other words, an analysis and then a recommendation and then one from Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6). And I, specifically, wanted him to include and tell me the opinions of both of the battalion commander and Captain (b)(3), (b)(6).

Diamond

Oscar

Again, because I had deep regard for both of them and I -- to this day believe that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) is one of the most knowledgeable people of the area there in Wagal.

Oscar

Now, I do realize though that they were not thinking strategically or even operationally. They didn't need to be, that was the purview of myself and my staff and having to work with that, but I consulted deeply with them if you wanted to know how they told -- what they told me, I will tell you now, but after I got their opinion, which was we needed to leave. I have already in my mind had seen that the circumstances had changed significantly. The whole point of this movement was to become an effective combat outpost that could pursue all the three lines of operation and then you could get credit for with the fourth one, which was the IO STRATCOM piece with it and meeting with the people.

When the people abandoned the village of Wanat, either through intimidation or through willful departure that changed almost everything: but with them not being there; with the village being partially destroyed by a major battle with which up until that point, I thought there was at least a reasonable chance that we would be able to work with them. What we found out was it was a considerable, and I think you seen records of that from the 15-6 a considerable doubt that they had maybe supported or maybe even played a role in the actual battle itself through supplies or whatever. And then finally, the governance portion of this thing. The district sub-governor, the governor which we would call it, his role, his negligence -- I mean, in my eyes, all this was a factor in saying, I no longer have a suitable place for an outpost where I can do anything other than continue to fight and that's what -- that is not what I knew we needed.

I was deeply concerned that the resources it would take if we stayed at Wanat would overwhelm the battalion that was quite frankly in priority -- Wanat -- was hardly the number one priority that I was giving to Colonel Ostlund and then his replacement.

I think this proved to be the single most kinetic battalion area of all of RC East during 2008 and 2009 and the resources I knew were going to be allocated based upon the greatest area of risk and by placing a huge area of risk with almost no payout -- meaning for counterinsurgency effect, I thought was going well beyond what we needed to do and so, I mean, I consulted with my staff, I consulted with the subordinate commanders but I made the choice.

LtGen Natonski: Did -- did you get, I guess it would have been 3rd BCT, 1st ID involved, were the privy to ---

MG Schloesser: Yes, sir. It was. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was on the ground by then. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the office when we did I believe it was a TANDBERG with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), but I am sure it was about this decision. Gemini Gemini Delta

Well, I would just say that I did consult with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6). (b)(3), (b)(6) -- well prior to that, over SIPRNET e-mail had been concerned about his laydown in the Gemini Gemini

area based upon the number of troops that he was bringing in. And I know that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) did not feel that he had the troops to stay in that area as well.

Gemini

Something that I hadn't said is that I often -- when we transitioned -- and part of this I learned from the Battle of Wanat, I mean, it was hugely formative for me as a battlefield commander. The -- what I -- what I -- even before then, I had often wanted staffs and the commanders to think hard about what was -- why were they in a place. Are we, actually, effective in what we say we are doing? Or are we essentially, just defending ourselves -- we have little outreach to the people and we have no impact on the enemy or more are we being effective in either blocking or controlling a border because 30 percent -- at this point in time 30 percent of all outposts were within 10 kilometers of the border because of the weakness of the Army and the border ports.

If any of those caused, you know, a certain COP or a FOB to be called into question, then I wanted the -- I want -- I wanted hard work being placed against it to say what are we--it is worth to stay there and we ended up closing a number of COP's in this area; Libert closed later.

I should have, obviously, closed COP Keating, I mean, but at that point in time -- and COP Keating was probably more dangerous by a long shot but they had not been attacked hardly -- very little in the way of attacks up there when -- while we were there and only later did things get much worse, and throughout the whole sector. And about the same time I was establishing combat outposts quite frequently. It wasn't something that this was unusual to do and my bigger fears, when I did an establishment of a combat outpost, was between a and a coalition partner and we established a fair number in the Polish sector and a fair number in the French sector as we built the French sector and I was deeply involved in verifying what I was being briefed at the brigade level by going to those combat outposts.

LtGen Natonski: Is it fair to say that on the 12th of July that the division viewed the population in the Wanat

in the Waygal as perhaps "fence sitters" as you used that term earlier ---

MG Schloesser: That perhaps too.

LtGen Natonski: -- and then after the battle they had shown that they will longer be fence sitters?

MG Schloesser: That's correct.

I think they had demonstrated throughout that -- and again, I'm going to talk as if this is a coherent -- homogeneous population, it's not -- but nor is it a simple bifurcation between Nuristani's and Safi Pashtuni's, that's -- that's sophomoric.

Every one of these little valleys had people that had elders that went back hundreds of years and they had a very different way in their own values of looking at life and they were, essentially, inbred for a lengthy period of time. But out of any of those groups, what we got was very quiet support as we were planning on going into Wanat -- but pretty much almost covert support in the sense that, don't tell anybody else but I think this would be a great idea. And there weren't that many leaders from what I would recall that would stand up and say, come on in here, this is a great idea and, oh by the way, I am the tribal elder for the surrounding 50 square miles or something like that.

So we knew that there were fence sitters and the whole part of our strategy -- and I don't know if you have ever seen any of our campaign plan but, I mean -- was to move fence sitters into being supporters of the government of Afghanistan. And while we ended up -- what we saw on the 13th, what should've been evident on the 12th and the 11th was is that by the village leaving that we had lost that part -- because it was a district center as well. That we either lost the support or the ability to intimidate versus our ability to inspire was out of whack and the enemy was ahead of us.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) You said it should have been evident on the 11th and 12th, sir. What do you mean by that, sir?

MG Schloesser: Well, reading the 15-6, it was in the statements,

it's very clear if -- all levels of the soldiers, and the Marine ETT that the villagers had walked out and that the males that were there were, essentially, just a military age males this is not like Iraq or another -- and some other place where -- the females the females; you just don't see females and stuff like that.

This is a farming -- pastoral farming village up in the middle of the Hindu Kush and you would see women all the time, I mean, and children. And they would be out playing and all that kind of good stuff like that. Like I said, there are other locations where we are smack in the middle of the village and it works just fine. When all of a sudden that went out that -- that should have been apparent that something was up and I -- I think that the platoon sergeant said that in his statement he knew that that was not a good sign. And I don't remember if that's not evident until the 12th, I thought it was evident around the 11th or so.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, before we came on the record, you wanted to clarify a couple of comments in your CSI transcript regarding ISR.

MG Schloesser: Right. I sure did. I mean, I think for the record, I do see that you had -- I saw that you had ISR tables, SIGINT tables, I assume that you have the one that said previous because what that does is for every one of those -- if not, I will leave them for the record. It tells you exactly what was flown for that for a period of time. And I think Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) did that up for you because he gave it to me, later on, after I asked for a SIGINT chart that shows you the amount of flown -- hours flown. Does this all make sense? Alpha

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

MG Schloesser: Okay. So my comments on, you know, when I spoke to Mr. (b)(6) on -- in August, I was on leave -- again I didn't have any notes -- but I also had no access to anything. Garnet

I was doing it from sheer memory that on the 12th they had high winds that kept one of the platforms down. And that we had other weather that kept the Predator

from its full sortie. What, actually, happened on the 12th was the Red Ridge flew one sortie in support of Rock Move and then it went -- it went on and flew other sorties for other priority targets and the warrior never got off the ground because of the high winds. And so that sortie didn't fly and the Predator went from -- essentially from TIC to TIC to TIC and -- and I think it was -- and I have it here, but it did not fly in support of Wanat.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) And for the record, sir, you did not have the source document in front of you when you were speaking to Mr. (b)(6) --- Garnet

MG Schloesser: To (b)(6) so hence that's -- that is why I said, you know, I want you to go back, Mr. (b)(6) and make sure you are very -- that you are certain about what, actually, occurred there. Essentially, what you did after the time, you know, the Predator flew eight hours out of its complete sortie, but it was elsewhere and the weather kept it down for the rest of the period of time, Red Ridge got 4 hours in. It was a maintenance-down day for the Green Dart/Hunter. Garnet Garnet

And on the 12th, what was most important was as that we -- I mean, it was my staff, my J2 which shifted based upon everything we had heard which was nothing, essentially, off of SIGINT and no reports that we got that I believe at his level that he received of any low level voice intercept or any other ground based system of something that would be an anomaly there. We shifted off of the priority--the ISR priority. Are you familiar with the ---

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

MG Schloesser: Okay. On the left-hand side -- upper left hand side of the charts -- it will show you that our priority -- and Wanat was up there as -- it never got higher than the third priority as we were working through -- our entire sector of RC East, but it dropped on the 12th. And that I think is -- that, you know, that is significant.

Beta **LtCol** (b)(3), (b)(6) Thank you, sir. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Sigma

Sigma

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, I apologize in advance -- I am probably going to jump around a little bit. Starting with the issues of resources, obviously we talked about how this was a resource constrained environment with respect to ISR.

Did you have, in your opinion, a systemic issue with Class IV or was there a enough Class IV available or was that just another resource that was constrained as well?

MG Schloesser: You know, Class IV is one of the hardest things to get in to Afghanistan and I -- again my responsibility is the national support element--to try to get enough in. At this time, the Northern LOC was unproven for Class IV. That is something that we later worked on through the stands into the northern parts through the pass and so everything was coming through the Kaybu, essentially, and including the plus up of the work that we were doing with the 24th MEU. And there was frankly -- just frankly the movement of Class IV on the battlefield -- even when we had it, it was very very difficult; hence, when we went back to this winterization board, was really more a way of being able to ensure that we had not only Class IV, but then everything else that followed after.

We had a joint support element but that was commanded by my sustainment command and the commander and they were very good. So the -- I -- I took great pride in them being able to get Class IV into areas for an example or I or II or V, and again, that's not in clarity its V always there's number one then water and then they can need later. -- I am just being frank with you -- and then some times Class III if they are motorized and then chow. And we had multiple ways of doing this but we had to know that there was an issue, I mean, whether we flew it in with aircraft and and what not there was a plan to resupply that actually occurred -- when you look in the statements of the solders -- the Chinooks came in as they were planned to do, and that is synchronized during the first couple of times -- the eighth of a COP buildup.

Now, when they came in, they have to be carrying the right kind of things I -- in many cases, I was aware when we had to do an emergency resupply. We did not do one in this case. The truth is, I am not sure what

level I did review both Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)'s statement as well as Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s statement and I wrote them down.

Diamond

Oscar

Both of them said that they received what they requested and, so I don't know where the breakdown between the report of what was obviously the statements of the soldiers and the troopers on the ground that they were going black on water or they were out of water like right after they got there, and then not having enough -- whether it was stakes, pickets, HESCOs, et cetera, because that could -- I mean, in cases of that nature, we would just bypass both the brigade and the battalion and fly out there directly.

Sigma

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

Turning to a different subject, a lot has been made about the ISR support in this case and the question I would have -- kind of going back to the statement -- you talked about the importance of cross cuing, was there ever in your experiences as a CJTF Commander, a situation where say, FMV was the resource that thwarted an attack without it being cross-cued with SIGINT or wasn't it always the case normally where it had to be two separate sensors?

MG Schloesser: You know, it -- it's a fact that there is a third sensor, it's called HUMINT and am just going to broach at the edge, I mean, there are human intelligence teams on the battlefield and their classification is a little higher than this. This unit had access to one directly and I gave it another one.

There were two human intelligence teams on the battlefield there. Usually, it took two out of three to cross-cue for FMV and so either -- either work from the HUMINT that would then bring in SIGINT piece then that would really allow us to use the FMV for what it was really good at. Or you know one of the single ones, either HUMINT saying, look at this area because this -- we think something's going to happen or -- or signals intelligence that -- that placed it in time directly where it was triangulated sentiment all right.

Sigma

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. I think there are some assertions that FMV would have been the magic bullet that would have saved the day ---

MG Schloesser: That is incorrect. That just means that people don't have a clue about how to fight -- I mean -- or haven't fought, that's all.

Sigma

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. I just wanted to get your take on that.

MG Schloesser: I am a little more -- let me just say that -- I -- that was emotion, for the record. In my experience, that has not been the case. No matter how good your assets are -- and we did enjoy Global Hawk from time to time -- when we can get national assets of that nature there, in fact, Global Hawk flew right below this area like a day and a half prior. If you don't know what you're looking for down to I would say a hundred meters by a hundred meters, in many cases, you either won't identify what you're seeing or you will pass right on over it because people really do live here, I mean, people up in the valleys.

Sigma

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): And it kind of gets to what we discussed earlier that the enemy probably was not moving shoulder to shoulder at port arms in a large formation.

LtGen Natonski: Along those lines, while we are on the ISR piece, I think you indicated that the enemy was smart enough to use radio silence and also not move in large groups --

MG Schloesser: Right.

LtGen Natonski: They would move in smaller groups so, if they wanted to move undetected and they knew how to do it even if they did not know whether there was any overhead coverage. In your experience as a commander over there, you don't recall any attack being preempted just by virtue of full motion video?

MG Schloesser: The -- before we were over there, sir, there was a major infiltration that was caught inside Pakistan and we are going to go way beyond the (b)(6) mentions that I think, but he doesn't even know or understand how it actually was -- was cued. And I can't say -- discuss how it was cued here, but it was

Garnet

not discovered --

LtGen Natonski: But it was cued, it wasn't discovered --

MG Schloesser: That's right it was not discovered ---

LtGen Natonski: FMV was better to verify something that you had an indication and a warning ---

MG Schloesser: Right.

LtGen Natonski: In fact if you put a Predator over every single combat outpost -- I think you said that numbered at 119 -- you still might not detect anything if the enemy took the proper defensive measures?

MG Schloesser: Right.

Sigma

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay, turning to the specifics of the operation, sir. You had mentioned that, essentially, that Rock Move was something that was on your radar screen and you've mentioned at some point in time you were briefed on the progress. What was the level of fidelity that you would get on something like this -- You mentioned, I think, it's a metric of like 70 percent. Was there a standard methodology or was it just kind of anecdotal by location, hey, we're at 70 percent complete ---

MG Schloesser: Yes, I wish I had been more rigorous to be quite frank with you but, I mean, every morning as I said we, you know, there was two different forms in which we reported back. Both progress on something like this nature, as well as, what had occurred in the previous 24 as we've been in like 72 hours in advance -- that was the eight o'clock and the eight thirty. And so, you know, I also noted that they were preceded by other meetings, that's why they were there at that time because to build into -- they started quite a bit earlier you know but the staff and briefing them and briefing others and stuff.

No. I wish I had been more rigorous and had -- a number of different things, unfortunately I didn't. What would happen to get to the rigor was on the support matrix when a COP was established, it would come up and it was briefed by the joint support

command -- Commander, as it would say -- for an example, COP -- in this case it would be COP Kahler because that was the formal name that the troopers gave to it because of the platoon sergeant they lost from this platoon almost a year prior or some period of time. And it would have a color to it. Now, what it wouldn't do is, it would talk about its Class I through X. It wouldn't refer to, you know, was it 50 percent or 70 percent complete and so I did rely on the staff to say, sir, it's going well. And then, usually, a percentage and then as I said, I recall a percentage being given to I think on the 12th and it was around 70 percent to 75 percent. You know there was -- in my opinion, it was ongoing.

Now, I wish I had more rigor in hindsight.

Sigma **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Who on your staff, sir, would be tracking -- would it be your brigade engineer -- I mean, your division engineer or ADCS or ---

MG Schloesser: No. On the initial part of this phase it was the J3 through the CHOPs and the DCGO I mean, at that point in time, it was a security -- it was, you know, getting the place built for security and then one of the folks that were the operational aspects of it to be the primary players on to it. And to be even fairer, my seven didn't even sit in on the 0800 or the 0830 -- the seven with the engineer and the -- and quite frankly, engineers were -- were in this case, they had planned this, worked this, done the JFUB process and were moving out on things that were two months or three months past that and so it was in the operational realm that I ---

Sigma **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sure. With regard to the 15-6 that was done into Wanat itself, were you satisfied with the results of the 15-6; did you feel like that answered all of the questions that you as the appointing authority had asked them to look into?

MG Schloesser: You know in hindsight, I am not, clearly, I am not satisfied with the 15-6 but, you know, being -- I must have had 125 15-6's while we were there. That was another thing I did in the evenings with my SJA was review all of them and my Chief would initiate them while talking -- after I talked -- in my name.

No. I do know that there were some things that were on my mind. I have no intent of -- like the 15-6 was never looking at myself and my own staff, it looked at -- and I was required to look at our decisions -- but it didn't look at how we should be -- the 15-6 process, as you know, is -- predominantly trying to learn lessons so we can not repeat the same thing. That was my predominant concern rather than placing negligence or -- or that -- that was one of the other things that the 15-6 officer did. But I guess I wasn't smart enough to say, you will -- and it would have had to have been somebody else higher, but again I was the national command element so I -- it would have had to be the CENTCOM Commander that would have had to say, I am going to investigate your decision making at that point in time. And so I placed it at the battalion and below and I said I know that -- we knew that we had moved ISR off on the 12th but we weren't but we were -- was that the cause you know that we didn't understand what was going on, so I saw that was a part of it and it was placed inside there to take a hard look at what -- what was the ISR. We did not know when we initiated it about the issues having to do with Class IV or Class I. Or Class III or the Bobcat, the pump.

There's plenty of stuff I wish I -- I had done differently, but I had no intent on placing, you know, liability against anybody. I was trying to learn from it and I was not rigorous in how hard it looked at certain decisions that were made, I mean, quite frankly, I mean, I didn't even look at my decisions so that I would have helped inform other people as they were trying to figure out why did we do what we did, because as I said admittedly, we lost the IO battle, I mean, there was just no doubt about it and I think that's why Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) said the hell with it if the CJTF cannot get anything cleared through ISAF on this then we will take it on ourselves. I mean, there were decisions that were made at all levels that were not good decisions and -- now that's what happens in combat -- there were decisions made that we could have learned a lot from. Some were actually good decisions, but the enemy votes this is not a ship -- running aground, this is a thinking, living flexible enemy that knows the area better than we do and is

Delta

from the people and so I do wish I had been more rigorous I didn't -- frankly, I mean, we were busy as all get out fighting, I just gotta tell you that -- we were busy and I thought that this covered a large amount of main topics.

I had no intent -- after the 15-6 I think I understood that some amounts and I have always said what I think they are. I expected that CONOP to be carried out and when I found evidence that some parts of it weren't -- or that they weren't carried out the way that I thought that the unit that in place this then again I am not talking at battalion level and I am not talking about the company level or brigade, I had no intent of going in there and lessening the heroism of the folks that fought this thing, I guess. I was not trying -- I was not covering my butt I guarantee you at the 15-6 and so I wasn't trying to place any blame. I learned a lot and it was never written in that 15-6, and I used it every day from then on as I said later on I fired an entire chain of command company down to platoon when I got to a COP.

Sigma **LTC** (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Was there ever any discussion as to whether or not that you recall with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or anyone as to whether or not it was the right IO and what I mean by that is, was there any concern that there should have been somebody outside of the brigade? Charger

MG Schloesser: Yeah, we in fact initially -- we frankly were -- I did not want to have someone that was associated with the brigade initially. And as we went through it, every other name of Colonels that I -- full Colonels -- I wanted to be senior to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6). I did not have -- I wanted them to have combat experience and as we -- when we went through it, what we found -- combat experience meaning operational experience, combat experience -- and more likely you know being an infantryman or an armorer, cavalryman or an artilleryman. It came way down and the factor that -- that and again, I made the decision, the staff came to me you know but they recommended (b)(3), (b)(6) but the reason why I thought it would work the best is that he would not have to spend two weeks learning about an area that was very different than most of the other places in RC East. Diamond Hotel

The Nuristan, Kunar, North Kunar area was so difficult so different that what I did not want was to have to teach somebody about it as they were trying to figure out what was going on. It was in the middle of a RIP that we were not going to stop. You cannot stop the flow of forces going in and out. Given that, I still stand by my decision I think (b)(3), (b)(6) was the -- was, the right one, he was already a full Colonel; I was his direct boss as well, I mean, (b)(3), (b)(6) was his direct boss, but I was his senior rater and I felt that -- and he had been there and knew a lot about it and yet as the DCO, he was not involved -- when you asked him he had not been involved in any of that as the Deputy Commanding Officer the brigade as you know had a three as well as an OX so --

Hotel

Delta

Sigma

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6): Kind of a related question and maybe kind of a tough question, but maybe not. Could you give us a sense of what you feel like the command climate was in the brigade and the battalion?

MG Schloesser: Yeah, I mean, I think that by that time everyone was exhausted. Fifteen months is too long for any troopers on the ground in combat and (b)(3), (b)(6) was in toughest place you could be a battalion commander in Afghanistan in my opinion at that point in time and he had lost a fair number of troopers and had a large number of them wounded just as his predecessor had. I think that by the time that I started working with them in April both (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were at the top of their game as far as battlefield commanders. I think that they were pretty blunt with each other and that's what happens over time. And yet, I think they were very frank and honest with each other. At the top of their game as combat soldiers; commanders in a counterinsurgency -- and I am not just talking about the kinetic piece. Fatigued beyond a reasonable expectation of what we should expect people to be able to put up with.

Diamond

Diamond

Delta

An honest frank communication and so if people -- I have heard more about things that never occurred there -- I mean, I was out there a fair amount and I did not ever see where they fundamentally could not get along. I am smart enough to realize I wasn't the staff and staff have a way of wearing their boss's boots sometimes so I can't speak to that part although I got

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to know the brigade staff better than (b)(3), (b)(6) 's staff but I met with them all. And I spent time with (b)(3), (b)(6) out there as well at Bella.

I don't know if I can lay it out for you any further than that.

Sigma

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay, sir. One last question with regard to lessons learned from this incident, obviously there are always things that you would like to have more of. Do you feel like, from your perspective as the CJTF Commander, that lessons learned were sufficiently disseminated throughout the formations -- because there has been some criticism from certain points that says, you know, we didn't learn from this, we didn't disseminate so I would just like your perspective on that aspect?

MG Schloesser: Well, let me answer a question that you didn't ask first -- what I learned that from with dealing with journalists -- When there are very significant lessons to be learned strategically, operationally, and tactically out there. It pisses me off that those of us that got sent there to do America's strategy in an economy of force -- known economy of force -- where senior leaders were taken by us to the battlefield and shown the problems that we are going to be taken to task for doing the very best we can in combat leadership in an area that's the toughest terrain in the world against one of the toughest counter -- I mean, insurgent forces around. And believe me; people like me and my young commanders are learning something from this. And I hope that is heard at the highest level, sir.

Strategically, I would tell you that I learned a number of lessons about strategic COMMs and IO. In this case I tried to do much better on, and my staff tried to do much better on to the point that I was disobeying the communication rules that applied for media and media releases to ISAF Headquarters even though I told my boss what I was going to do and he said, do it as well as JFC Brunson. I could go on and on strategically about how much a division level CJFT Commander needs to know -- and I'll just say that, I said it several times, you know, you have got to trust and you have got to be briefed on certain things but

you have got to verify it.

And there are times when you just have got to be on the ground to see exactly what is happening. And what I learned in Wanat changed my battlefield circulation and -- for the next remaining year that I was there. But again I already said -- I was already down a platoon but it changed fundamentally how I approached things. It hardened my heart that if we are going to put troopers out in the middle of the ground strategically, that we darn well better understand that we are going to take casualties. That this was not Kosovo, and we were not fighting a war where we couldn't take casualties and oh by the way we couldn't even kill people in that one and I can go on and on.

Operationally, I learned a whole lot that we try -- and again strategic lessons got learned nowhere, I mean, I learned them but they did not--no one ever asked me, no one has ever really tried to really get -- and (b)(6) is all speculation and not a lot of experience. Garnet

Operationally, I think we learned and that General McCristal is executing a great deal about what is the cost benefit analysis just to put it in better terms even though I realize I am talking about blood in some cases between the people and the enemy in areas like Nuristan but they apply throughout all over Afghanistan. There are parts of Helman 1201001 Provence like this. Parts of Kandahar210104, I mean, all over the place, I can go on and on and on.

Tactically, we learned a whole lot of lessons, the Army did not learn those because they relied upon (b)(6) to write about them and because (b)(6), his knowledge is limited about combat and because he really never sat down and talked to somebody other than the folks I think that I mean he used the 15-6 statements as the key and then when he talked he based it in a skewed way off of that and so the fundamentals of tactical operations were not learned. Garnet Garnet

The lessons that you should bang up and down that I would go to other places and say, let me go to your OP and they would say, sir, that's an hour walk with a mule and I say, let's go. I mean, I can go on and on;

the use of ANA, I mean, you know, in all levels we didn't do a good job and I don't mean to preach but we did not learn we don't have a method at this point in time and I have yet to see anything -- any of the three levels that has helped us to learn the lessons. And have got to tell you that that was my business as far as being able to publish them. My lesson -- my business was to try to learn this rapidly -- as fast as I could and get it out. And I probably didn't get it out nearly as well. After this, we published tactical guidance that I actually -- it is on one sheet of paper -- I wish I could give it to you. It was actually a card that we handed out and my guys would hand them out to squad leaders. It basically laid out the fundamentals of what I was insisting you do at squad level so -- and that was one attempt. And also in my trips out I would try to do the same thing and clearly so did -- so did General Milley.

Sigma **LTC**(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

MG Schloesser: Anyway you can see it's got my emotion up. We didn't learn very much on this.

Sigma **LTC**(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: Back to ISR----

MG Schloesser: Yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: I count 14 Provinces, is that about right?

MG Schloesser: Yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: The sum total of your ISR assets were one Predator, one--in terms of your Red Ridge, what----

MG Schloesser: Sir, if you will allow me? There was one Predator Orbit, one Warrior A which is a divisional level Predator-like vehicle that could fly at this time about 8 hours per day and had some limitations but was much better than say the Brigade level Shadow. Those were the two FMV assets, I could request a Predator Line that, as I said, was coordinated--was a swing line that was for the rest of Afghanistan and could support normally either East or South, or CJOSTF, and normally it supported CJOSTF. And again,

1 those decisions were not mine, those were the ISAF.
2 The JIOC-A is a U.S. portion of ISAF, even at that
3 time, that helped control those assets. So, Predator
4 1 line, Warrior 1 line, but again very limited as far
5 as the hours that it was being flown at that point in
6 time. And then the signal platforms, again the
7 division level, Red Ridge, we had one aircraft and
8 when we surged, during this time we did, it can fly
9 three 4-hour sorties per day and then would go in for
10 2 full days of maintenance about every 6 or 7, maybe a
11 little bit longer timeframe. We had Guardrail Common
12 Sensor which was not very effective in the mountains,
13 so we did not often fly it in that area at all. I
14 could make a request of National Assets, but--such as
15 Global Hawk or Rivet Joint and we did, but they were
16 usually used for other requirements. Even during
17 that, they would not normally do a full motion video
18 type, they would do a GMTI type of a thing.

19 At the Brigade Level, we had the Shadow Platoon, the
20 Shadows no matter what could be done here had an
21 altitude restriction of AGL, Above the Ground, so when
22 the MSL was 4-5000 feet, they were not usable in the
23 mountains of--in the upper one half of NTKL and in
24 this case, for them, but every BCT, this one and this
25 one, had their own Shadow Platoons----

26 **LtGen Natonski:** And of course in Wanat that would not work
27 anyway because of the line of sight communications.

28 **MG Schloesser:** No, sir, it would crash.

29 **LtGen Natonski:** So, I guess the point is that you have very
30 limited ISR assets. You had 119 COPs plus a lot of
31 FOBs, et cetera in your 14 Provinces. On average, do
32 you recall what the number of TICs you had each day?

33 **MG Schloesser:** No, sir, I would just have to guess. There were
34 multiples, so----

35 **LtGen Natonski:** But every day, somewhere in RC East there
36 was a Troops In Contact?

37 **MG Schloesser:** Absolutely, sir.

38 **LtGen Natonski:** You have read the 15-6 about the indications
39 and warnings that the troops at Wanat had, everything
40 from the Shura that Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) went to that

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they gave him the cold shoulder to the fact that the women and children evacuated the area, military age males were surveilling the site, there were groups seen up in the hills--five males; did any of that reach you?

MG Schloesser: None of what you just described--I did know, in fact, it was actually in the CONOP, either in the briefing to me or before that that the name (b)(6) had come back up again in conjunction with a potential attack in the south towards Wanat and I truly believe that it was circular reporting and I had thought that (b)(6) had been injured at that point in time; how I go that is again above this level and the truth is that above this level--that was at many times was circular reporting that we would get off those assets; the Human Intelligence assets.

LtGen Natonski: So, nothing came to you with respect to Soldiers on the ground nor anything spotted by the Predator flights previous to the 12th or the Red Ridge flights; there were no indications or warnings that would verify more.

MG Schloesser: That is right. And in fact, out of any move of this nature, I think that I had already said this but the first three days in my mind are critical because, and in fact, they probably even put that there as the most dangerous course of action is that is in the establishment of caches and enemy already being there and any Afghan Forces either going to their caches or moving to their caches. Because we had very robust signals intelligence and what I thought was going in on the ground and then we did have full Predator on the 8th flew 12.5 hours in support of Bayonet and all it did was move back and forth between Wanat and then they had a TIC at Bostic, which is not even a 10 minute flight. We flew full 8 hours at Bella and Wanat and again that is the same area for Red Ridge and then we also had 9 hours during the critical period of 12zulu and 21zulu on the 8th and an additional 5 hours--oh, that is a different place. And then the same thing occurred on the 9th, in fact, exactly the same hours and then there was on the 10th, 6 ½ for Predator which again you have to queue from something and then most importantly we had 8 hours of Red Ridge on the 8th as well. So, you had 8 hours of Red Ridge on the 8th, 9th, and 10th plus more than

adequate FMV; again the FMV is only going to be very good if you can cross-cue.

LtGen Natonski: None of that indicated anything?

MG Schloesser: There were no indications, sir.

LtGen Natonski: During your course as the Commander of CJTF-101, they did setup COPs throughout your AO?

MG Schloesser: Yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: You did not direct Commanders to have a certain format in terms of these are the assets I want--this was not driven at the division level?

MG Schloesser: No, it was not.

LtGen Natonski: Okay.

MG Schloesser: And let me just say, the COPs that would occur in Nuristan would be totally incomprehensible in an area such as Logar or Wardack where you had very adequate fields of fire and you could seize dominating terrain because no one even owns it. Rather than in Nuristan which, I mean, (b)(6) talks about going in and seizing terrain in Nuristan and it just shows such an absolute lack of understanding about the culture there, that would had been an immediate fight when you seize terrain and these are elders who have owned--the land there is a precious thing that--it is hard to explain, flat land is a----

Garnet

LtGen Natonski: Hence the negotiations for it.

MG Schloesser: Yes, sir. Yes, sir and then some.

But anyway, what would look normal in RC South or in a large amount of my sector would not be the norm in Nuristan.

LtGen Natonski: You depended on your subordinate commanders to determine the requirements, the assets, the resources needed to set up a COP.

MG Schloesser: Yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: What do you fly? Aircraft?

1 **MG Schloesser:** Every model of CH-47 including Special Ops, Black
2 Hawk, Little Birds which are Special Ops light, and
3 Huey, sir, I am still proud of flying Hueys, sir.

4 **LtGen Natonski:** On the morning of the 13th, a couple of
5 Apaches responded, are you familiar with their
6 response.

7 **MG Schloesser:** Yes, I am. And I have flown Apaches and shot an
8 Apache in combat.

9 **LtGen Natonski:** And I believe that we were briefed that
10 rather than flying around, they flew the most direct
11 route in response to the attack.

12 **MG Schloesser:** They did, yes, they did.

13 **LtGen Natonski:** Was that responsiveness within the norm? I
14 mean, was it--based on your review of their response,
15 was that----

16 **MG Schloesser:** I think that they went beyond the norm, the
17 aircraft was--I am familiar enough with the Apache and
18 the flight and the armament that they had. They went
19 beyond the norm to be able to get there as fast as
20 they possibly could by going over the top of the
21 ridges rather than flying the valleys. And in doing
22 so, probably saved lives, they were balancing risks as
23 we all did at that point in time, it was relatively
24 cool because it was early in the morning and they were
25 able to do that. Later in the day, they would not
26 have been able to do that----

27 **LtGen Natonski:** Because of their payload?

28 **MG Schloesser:** The payload and the armament that they were
29 carrying, sir.

30 **LtGen Natonski:** So what they did was above and beyond what
31 the norm had been in terms of responding to the call
32 and their time on the ground before launch, was that
33 the norm?

34 **MG Schloesser:** They unfortunately--I don't know this in detail,
35 but I do know that we normally swapped our QRFs
36 roughly about 0430. My guess is that either for good
37 or bad, they caught them exactly at the swap. I
38 think--I was not expecting them to be there than what

they arrived, in fact, I was a little taken back that they got there as fast as they did because I was very familiar with having to fly up the Konar and then take a left at the Pesh and then go down that way. I do not believe that they could have made it there any faster.

LtGen Natonski: There was also a B1 bomber----

MG Schloesser: That was there within about 15 minutes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: Artillery was firing from----

MG Schloesser: In four minutes, but we had one--as you know the 155s and their M triple 7 and just having them----

LtGen Natonski: Just having the Apaches--not Apaches but A10s.

MG Schloesser: A10s and eventually the F15s were there, sir. I mean, the--and I have said this in public to the journalists and I still believe this to the day, even though it is not popular in Afghanistan, but as a Commander, I could do things, allow my units to be decentralized to the point of really discomfort but still do that look-myself in the face and their parents in the eye because I could have a close air support platform over the top of them in about 15-20 minutes anywhere in RC East and about 30 minutes in RC South. And depending upon where they were in what we call CCA, Close Combat Attack, we could have Apaches over them within about 30 minutes to an hour in most areas of RC East. This was the most remote area other than about 3 camps that we had in Keating, Lowell, and Frichie. So, it is the furthest away from any place that we had.

LtGen Natonski: And you have read some of the reports, in your tour--was it 15 months in Afghanistan?

MG Schloesser: 15 months, sir, yes, sir.

LtGen Natonski: Did you pick up a trend in the performance of small arms, M4s, SAWs?

MG Schloesser: Absolutely.

1 **LtGen Natonski:** In terms, are they adequate weapons? There
2 had been some allegations of problems at Wanat. We
3 found that a lot of weapons were damaged by combat
4 action and were not operable and others were fired at
5 the cyclic rate with magazine after magazine but as a
6 trend during your tour, did anything pop-up on your
7 wind screen with respect to this?

8 **MG Schloesser:** Yes, sir. I would say and I still believe, I
9 have read the report of some of the jams and I have
10 read what (b)(6) wrote about it. I found the Garnet
11 weapons systems that we have to be very sufficient as
12 far as fire power, the sniper weapons are being
13 improved, but that did not come into play here. The
14 actual--I did make an ONS request for a lighter
15 machine gun just because of the weight in the
16 mountains. But I do not believe and I still do not
17 believe that the weapons that we have been given,
18 especially the M4, I think is a very good weapon in
19 Afghanistan both in the mountains as well as out in
20 the desert. I do understand that in a fight of this
21 nature with as much shrapnel and incoming rounds that
22 no weapon system will be able to fully operate after
23 it has been hit and in many cases that is what we
24 found. I think that one or two statements in there
25 you will see that such as up on OP Topside, one of the
26 Soldiers that came in a QRF was just astounded by the
27 damage, even in the--these were seasoned-hardened
28 Soldiers, Troopers but the amount of damage to not
29 only the human bodies, the remains but to the weapon
30 systems is, in fact, astounding. It is usually green
31 troops that fire weapons until the barrel basically
32 melts and that is possible, they did not have a
33 problem with Class V that I have been able to see in
34 any of the statements and as I said, that is my number
35 one priority that we set. So, more than likely than
36 not some of the jams were caused by repeated high
37 cyclic rates of fire in a really tough position rather
38 than being a green trooper.

39 **LtGen Natonski:** You never saw any other instances that you
40 would question the performance of the weapons during
41 your tour?

42 **MG Schloesser:** No, sir.

43 **LtGen Natonski:** Okay. Thanks.

MG Perkins: In the discussion about ISR, you said, "I think approximately the 11th or the 12th is where the priority dropped off for Wanat."

MG Schloesser: On the 12th.

MG Perkins: Was that based on the previous analysis and collection of information that they had starting from the 8th or was that preplanned?

MG Schloesser: It was preplanned to drop after several days and whether it happened on the 12th--I think the 12th was still planned to have Warrior fly forward and it did have Red Ridge fly forward, but after then the emphasis was planned to shift off of that. I do believe that in the OP Synch meeting, they moved it one day earlier, in other words, when you look at the 12th, it actually drops off the 12th as far as a priority and clearly was not there on the 13th and as far as the advanced planning, when you look at the---I know you know, the charts what it shows is the next 24 and the follow on 48. And earlier on when you look at those, it goes all of the way through the 13th where Wanat stays as a priority and then drops then. They chose to pull it from the 13th and the weather, no matter what happened on the 12th, they lost priority, the only thing that they got was the most important system which was the Red Ridge.

MG Perkins: And so this sort of deliberate decision based on the fact of lack of INTS previous to that, do you recall when that decision was made of any significance push back up the chain of command?

MG Schloesser: No. No, no one--that had been made either on the night of the 11th or the day of the 12th by the J2 and as I said, normally I probably would not have been briefed on that. It was essentially close enough to the plan and again the discussion that morning, I acknowledge what I had heard and my staff heard me, they said Wanat is going fine, it is at this percentage. They may have even used the term, "nothing significant to report."

MG Perkins: Umm-hmm.

1 **MG Schloesser:** "NTSR". There was no push back from the Brigade
2 Commander to me, at least I certainly do not remember
3 one at all.

4 **MG Perkins:** Okay. Getting back to the CONOP, we talked a lot
5 about Wanat, but a major portion of the CONOP was
6 pulling out of Bella as well.

7 **MG Schloesser:** Absolutely.

8 **MG Perkins:** Do you recall in the briefings since you said
9 that these things really tend to be outlines of
10 discussions that occur during the briefing as to, in
11 your mind or discussions with the Brigade Commander or
12 the DCO, is when did you think that the most
13 vulnerable period was starting from the move from
14 Bella all of the way to establishing Wanat?

15 **MG Schloesser:** Yes, there was clearly a feeling that--actually,
16 Bella would be vulnerable as we--as you saw, there is
17 a small aircraft synch matrix thing inside there that,
18 at least I am pretty sure that there is one.

19 **MG Perkins:** Yes, there is.

20 **MG Schloesser:** That lays out the aircraft. If during that time,
21 the weather had--for example, we had pulled some
22 troops out and some critical capability out and then
23 we could not get the aircraft back in that was a
24 critical vulnerability at that point in time, so on
25 the 8th and the 9th, it was really really important
26 that we need to have the flights--the Chinooks going
27 in and going out of there because Bella would had been
28 very vulnerable, Wanat because it was driven up there
29 with the baseline of the VPB and then everything else
30 was added by flights either from Bella itself the next
31 day, mainly on the 9th, a little bit on the 10th from
32 Bella or from Blessing. Truthfully, I did not feel as
33 vulnerable there as I did at Bella during that initial
34 part.

35 **MG Perkins:** Do you recall during the daily BUAs or BUBs,
36 whatever you have, as that was going on that you got
37 an update, as you said, that at some point that Wanat
38 is whatever, 70% or moving on----

39 **MG Schloesser:** That would had been the 12th.

1 **MG Perkins:** Do you also get updates when sort of Bella was
2 closed? Okay, this part is done, Bella is out, we
3 are----

4 **MG Schloesser:** Yes, in fact, Bella was again the critical part
5 and then--you guys don't want to get into this, but I
6 mean, closing a COP is pretty difficult and what we
7 were trying to do was to ensure that anything that
8 could be usable by the enemy would be taken away, so
9 we spent a lot amount of time thinking that through
10 and paying attention to that, so the answer is yes. I
11 don't want to make it seem like I spent more time
12 thinking about Bella than I did about Wanat. And
13 again, I got to be quite honest with you, I have a
14 hell of a lot of other things happening.

15 **MG Perkins:** Right.

16 **MG Schloesser:** But I was concerned and I wanted to know the last
17 man out of Bella and if I had my notebook, I would
18 tell you when that was because that was important to
19 me.

20 **MG Perkins:** That was sort of a priority point in there.

21 **MG Schloesser:** That was very important.

22 **MG Perkins:** Either as sort of the case of routine business or
23 maybe when the CONOP was being briefed or whatever,
24 was there a discussion of when you get into
25 establishing COPs, normal business, as you said, some
26 of the mitigating actions that would go into a place.
27 For instance, you said, you really survive via
28 Outpost, especially when you have a COP in low land.
29 Was it the same discussion or assumption with regard
30 to security patrols, kind of recon that kind of stuff?

31 **MG Schloesser:** Right. In fact, I regard [looking through the
32 CONOP]. I regard this, the intent and the abort
33 criteria, neither of which are--in the center here is
34 the aviation piece of that. This is the ground
35 commander's contract with me and so when it says
36 things here, I am believing that they are actually
37 occurring. Now, if I fail it is because I should have
38 made darn sure that each and every one of these things
39 were being done to the points--I mean because in a
40 sense, did you establish an OP? Yes, we did. I did
41 not realize that it was across the street and 10 feet

above and in a worse position than even the VPB was. There was planning done, in fact, I have seen that, I don't know--they pulled that in the 15-6, the charts that show where the perspective OPs were going to be and so I thought that those were going to be there and I thought that they were in place. To do that, the concept of patrolling this whole thing is about patrolling, so, yeah, I thought that the patrolling was happening to be quite frank. And I understand how when they told me that patrolling was occurring that they did, they patrolled 100 meters out to the village--it was not even 100 meters, it was 50 meters and went and talked to the Shura and that was a patrol. And then they established a TCP was 50 meters away and that was a patrol. That was not part of the contract that we were doing, okay, and I mean, that part was being carried out and again, I am not placing the blame----

MG Perkins: Understand.

MG Schloesser: I should have--it was my responsibility.

MG Perkins: But if you were to find out that they were not--what we would call routine, really focused security patrols outside of the wire, kind of reconnaissance routinely about that would have been news to you based on the kind of daily updates that you got?

MG Schloesser: Right and I would had been deeply troubled then.

MG Perkins: Okay, that is it.

LtGen Natonski: Alright. You are ordered not to discuss the testimony you provided today with anyone other than members of the investigation team, you will not allow any witness in the investigation to talk to you about the testimony that he has given or that he intends to give. If anyone should try to influence your testimony or attempt to discuss your testimony, you are instructed to notify Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6). Do you understand that?

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MG Schloesser: I do.

LtGen Natonski: We want to thank you for your service to our country and for everything that you have done for the

1 Army and appreciate you coming down today from
2 Washington. So, thank you very much.

3 **MG Schloesser:** Alright, sir.

4 **LtGen Natonski:** Good luck.

5 [The testimony concluded at 1229, 19 November 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Subj: TESTIMONY OF MG JEFFREY JOHN SCHLOESSER, USA, GIVEN ON 19 NOVEMBER 2009, AT NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

Sigma

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Judge Advocate

4 Dec 09

DATE