

1 [The testimony began at 0908, 20 November 2009.]

2 **Diamond**

3 LtGen Natonski: Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6), I'm Lieutenant General
4 Richard Natonski, United States Marine Corps. I've
5 been appointed by the Commander of U.S. Central
6 Command to conduct an investigation into the facts and
7 circumstances surrounding the combat action at Wanat,
8 Afghanistan in July of 2008. Major General David
9 Perkins, United States Army has been assigned as the
10 Deputy Investigating Officer. Lieutenant Colonel
11 (b)(3),(b)(6),Beta and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) are **Sigma**
12 judge advocates assigned to the investigation team.

13
14 The testimony you provide today will be recorded,
15 transcribed, and included in our report of the
16 investigation. Based on your testimony, we may also
17 prepare a separate written statement for your review
18 and signature.

19
20 Prior to coming on the record today, you signed a
21 privacy act statement; is that correct?

22 **Diamond**

23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir, I have.

24
25 LtGen Natonski: Okay. Your testimony will be made under
26 oath and you will now be sworn.

27 **Diamond**

28 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.

29
30 [The witness was sworn.]

31 **Beta**

32 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, would you please state your name spelling
33 your last?

34 **Diamond**

Diamond

35 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, it's (b)(3),(b)(6)

36
37 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) **Beta** And, sir, you're currently a Colonel in the
38 United States Army?

39 **Diamond**

40 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I'm a frocked Colonel, yes.

41 **Beta**

42 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And, sir, what is your current unit and that
43 unit's location?

44 **Diamond**

45 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I'm in the Regimental Headquarters of 75th Ranger
46 Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia.

47
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1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) **Beta** And, sir, in July of 2008, what was your unit and
2 that unit's location?
3 **Diamond**
4 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) My unit was 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, The
5 Rock. We were located in Kunar Province, Afghanistan.
6 **Beta**
7 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And were you the Battalion Commander for Task
8 Force Rock, sir?
9 **Diamond**
10 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, I was.
11 **Beta**
12 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Alright, sir, prior to coming on the record
13 today, did you have an opportunity to review a
14 transcript and several emails with the Combat Studies
15 Institute?
16 **Diamond**
17 COL (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, I did.
18 **Beta**
19 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And, sir, you've requested some additional time
20 to go through and make any pen and ink changes you
21 desire?
22 **Diamond**
23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Right. And I'll go on the record. I have
24 nothing that's--that I have consternation with. There
25 were a couple of items that I'll add clarification to.
26 **Beta**
27 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) : Thank you, sir. And when you do, sir, we'd ask
28 that you sign the bottom of the first page and date it
29 for today. And when that's done, sir, would you adopt
30 that as part of your sworn testimony?
31 **Diamond**
32 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, I will.
33 **Beta**
34 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Thank you, sir. And, sir, also before coming on
35 the record today, I advised you of your rights under
36 Article 31(b) under suspicion of dereliction of duty.
37 **Diamond**
38 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Correct.
39 **Beta**
40 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And have you had a chance to read the Rights
41 Advisement Form, sir?
42 **Diamond**
43 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) : Yes, I did.
44 **Beta**
45 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And do you care to speak with us today, sir?
46

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, I would like to make a statement or answer
2 questions. If I'm uncomfortable, I'll make that note
3 at that time.

Beta

4
5 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Thank you, sir. Sir, when did you first discuss
6 the possibility of going to Wanat, sir, with anyone in
7 the chain of command?

Diamond

8
9 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): To the best of my recollection, it was, it was in
10 January, January, February timeframe, specifically,
11 moving into Wanat. We had had general discussions
12 about moving in there really from the time that we
13 conducted our PDSS and then TOA'd into Kunar Province.
14 But the specifics started January, February timeframe.

Beta

15
16 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And why? What was the driving force, sir, to go
17 to Wanat?

Diamond

18
19 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, the driving forces are inextricably linked
20 to where we were at the time. And to put it in
21 context, you're very well aware that the largest
22 portion of CONOP Rock Move was moving our force from
23 Bella, which was approximately 10 kilometers further
24 North than Wanat. I know you're all well aware of
25 this but I'll bring out our map. So--

Beta

26
27 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, if you could lean forward so the gentleman
28 could see?

Diamond

29
30 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) So we did our PDSS, we looked at the PDSS in
31 March of 2007. We went to the Ranch House. We went
32 to the COP--

Beta

33
34 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, could I ask you to stand, sir, and lean
35 forward a little bit so the General can see?

Diamond

36
37 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, it would be easier to see this way.

38
39 We went to the Ranch House. We went to Bella.
40 And we were stationed down here at Camp Blessing, of
41 course. I took over from 1-32 Infantry. A very, very
42 good unit, that very much understood COIN. They had
43 located up into these areas under the assumption we'd
44 be able to push roads up here and get these areas
45 connected to the government fairly quickly.
46

1 It's important to note the demographics of the
2 Waygal Valley. The Waygal Valley has a population
3 from Wanat, indicated by this COP Kahler icon right
4 here, to the South, is not densely populated but
5 populated like most of rural Afghanistan in that there
6 is population all along that road. North of Wanat--
7 and it is HMMWV trafficable to this area. Relatively
8 open around Wanat where we could put in a multi-ship
9 HLZ and echelon to the South and have hasty HLZs put
10 in, in extremis.

11
12 North of Wanat is not HMMWV capable. Most of the
13 time it's Hilux capable, and that's how our ASG and
14 population really supplied themselves. So, up to COP
15 Bella is not HMMWV trafficable. You've seen in--like,
16 I'll show additional pictures of COP Bella, is very
17 much in the bottom of three valleys that come together
18 and that's why 1-32 had chosen it. It was more or
19 less, more of a counterterrorism interdiction based to
20 interdict that confluence of valleys right there. And
21 there is a small population; a Swedish health clinic
22 and a couple of structures right outside of Bella.

23
24 Over to Aranus, which most of the time is not
25 even Hilux road capable, there is a larger population.
26 Estimates are up to 7,000 people up there, and I think
27 that estimate is probably fairly high. And that
28 includes the whole Aranus area.

29
30 The Ranch House was on the side of a mountain,
31 very isolated. And although they were connected to
32 the population, we opened a school up there that had
33 been started by 1-32, bought bread there, and employed
34 ASG guards. It really had limited affect. The enemy,
35 shortly after that, was established, was able to walk
36 around it based on the terrain and that was similar
37 with Cop Bella. Of note, these were two of the three
38 air centric COPs that I had at the time. Meaning, I
39 had to resupply them, reinforce them, and MEDEVAC
40 completely bought by air. They had limited population
41 that they were influencing. They had no central
42 government, meaning district governors, in that area
43 and no ANSF other than the ANA that we brought with us
44 into those COPs. So, I thought they were largely
45 irrelevant. And we started--had a plan to move the
46 Ranch House before we got on the ground but started

1 making that a priority effort. We started the IO in
2 the August timeframe and shortly thereafter--

3 **Beta**

4 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) That's 2007, sir?

5 **Diamond**

6 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) In 2007.

7
8 Approximately 90 days into our tour--and, at that
9 point, the only thing that had had any contact at all
10 up at the Ranch House was one of their ANA OPs. We
11 shot some illumine, dropped some flares for them, and
12 that was really the only contact at the Ranch House in
13 that first 90 days.

14
15 On 22 August, that post was nearly overrun. The
16 ASG was culpable. 13 RPGs hit one position. The
17 enemy breached in through the wire. And I've got a
18 good video of that, good propoganda video of that
19 called "Destroying the Cross"; how they conducted that
20 attack.

21 **Cypress**

22 The platoon leader, Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6) and some of
23 **Yankee** the people you have met Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6) Sgt (b)(3),(b)(6) were **Cherry**
24 in that, in that fight, did a fantastic job. People
25 inside the wire, they ended up repelling the attack
26 and breaking the attack. When the platoon leader
27 called A-10 strafing runs on his own position, it
28 broke the attack. We're able to get up there and
29 reinforce approximately three to four hours after the
30 initial fight. That's how long it took us to get
31 helicopters and get a force up there, obviously, very
32 disconcerting.

33
34 We ended up pulling out of there in about August.
35 And really, the casualties on that were 11 Americans
36 wounded. And I think it was one ASG killed on that
37 and no Americans killed; again, very valorous actions.
38 We turned that back over to the people of Aranus.
39 Burned down our plywood shacks, but we had some harder
40 structures that we turned over to them, really
41 limiting the supplies there. We located those people
42 back down at Camp Blessing. And they would rotate,
43 that platoon would rotate between Bella and Camp
44 Blessing.

45
46 Well, that was closed down in October. It took
47 an incredible CONOP very similar to this, incredibly

1 resource intensive. And immediately after closing
2 that in October, we started talking in general sense
3 about, "Now when are we going to move Bella? Well,
4 where are we going to move it to?" It made sense to
5 move it Wanat.
6

7 Specific reasons of moving to Wanat is we had,
8 and I don't remember the opening day of it, but
9 towards the end of '07, we opened the new, it was
10 about December of '07, we opened the new District
11 Center in Wanat; very nice structure adjacent to a
12 police station. It had a little market there and a
13 population. And it was acknowledged as the District
14 Center of the Waygal Valley. Which some people in
15 this valley consider themselves in Kunar, some people
16 consider themselves in Nuristan. We've got the border
17 on here where the Army sees the border. But
18 regardless, it is acknowledged as the Waygal District
19 Center located in Wanat. And they had a district
20 governor that was subordinate to the Nuristan Province
21 Governor, to mean Nuristani, a dual citizen, American,
22 U.S. English speaker. So, we started looking at that
23 in the fall, late, late fall of moving to Wanat.
24

25 Well, in August '07, it was widely publicized,
26 widely acknowledged we could no longer seize terrain.
27 You know, in extremis we could seize terrain. But we
28 were to negotiate this, and it had to be approved
29 through the Ministry of Defense, Afghan Ministry of
30 Defense. And CREST teams had to come out and survey.
31 They'd plot the land and determine who were the land
32 owners. I think 26 land owners were involved in this
33 piece of land.
34

Beta

35 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, if I could interrupt you real quick. While
36 we have the map out, sir, if you could just tell us
37 from Blessing the air-travel time to both Wanat and
38 Bella and then vehicle, as best you can? And did you
39 ever foot patrol, foot move between the two?
40

Diamond

41 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, we--I think Chosen Company did do one foot
42 patrol between here, but I'd have to verify that.
43 There's no population here, so there's a couple of
44 villages to the North that we would go to. A number
45 of villages to the East of Wanat, because we would
46 come up there and go to those villages or invite them
47 down to Wanat. Likewise, there's a couple of

1 population centers to the South of Bella, so they'd
2 range down there. I'm not positive if they ever road
3 marched on that road right there.

4
5 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Do you know the distance, sir, between those two?

6
7 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, it's about eight kilometers I think. **Diamond**

8
9 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) From Wanat to Bella, sir?

10
11 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Seven, eight kilometers. **Diamond**

12
13 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And then, from Wanat down to Blessing, sir?

14
15 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) About eight kilometers, 7.2, 7.2 in some kind of **Diamond**
16 straight line.

17
18 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And I know you've made the trip a couple of
19 times, sir.

20
21 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Quite a few times. **Diamond**

22
23 **Beta** LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) How long did it take to you road march up from
24 Blessing up, sir?

25
26 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, we'd take vehicles up here. So, to get **Diamond**
27 from Blessing up to COP Kahler is about a 45 minute
28 drive, probably about a three or four minute flight
29 from lift off at HLZ up to COP Kahler. To fly up to
30 Bella, because the terrain and stuff and you're coming
31 up incredibly increasing altitude quite a bit, it
32 takes about 10 to 15, probably about 15 minutes, 10 to
33 12, 10 to 15 minutes to get up to Bella.

34
35 But after June 9, 2008, when we had a supreme air
36 helicopter disabled on there by enemy fire and it
37 closed down that HLZ for three days, routinely, we
38 would have to leave, and as we did in Rock Move, we
39 would go well out to the West, come up to the North
40 over the high ground into Bella which added--the route
41 then became, you know, 20 to 25 minute route. Because
42 we were receiving a lot of small arms fire and RPG
43 fire coming up here, so then we started having
44 alternate routes. And they'd modify them a bit.
45 Sometimes they'd come in from the North or swing all
46 the way around and come in from the East. We'd call
47 that basically our Western route in.

1 **Beta**

2 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Thank you, sir.

3
4 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) So, to the--that's a long explanation on when we
5 **Diamond** started looking at that. But fall of 2007, in a
6 general sense taking into effect how we had to acquire
7 land, we started working that, had numerous Shuras
8 talking about that, key leaders' engagements. And
9 then, in detail, we started looking at it in January,
10 February. And it's important, why we were looking at
11 it in detail in January and February, there's a sense
12 of urgency. I don't like the term but, you know,
13 there's views that there's a fighting season and a
14 non-fighting season in Afghanistan. I don't subscribe
15 to that too much but there is lower Ops going on. So,
16 if we were going to move this, it would be good to
17 move January, February, March, April timeframe. We
18 generally acknowledge May is about the kick off time
19 for the fighting season when the influx of fighters
20 start coming through the mountain passes.

21
22 Couple of other things that happened in December;
23 December was our first contact with 3/1 Infantry,
24 **Sunset** Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6). That's when I gave him--he was on his
25 first PDSS. He kind of knew what we were doing up
26 here. And that was our first acknowledgment that they
27 were very concerned about coming in less capable than
28 The Rock. They were coming in less capable in
29 training, in his view, quality of personnel and
30 numbers of personnel. And to that end, General
31 Perkins, I think you'd be able to appreciate, we sent
32 on a reverse PDSS to their NTC rotation; FSO, former
33 scout platoon leader, former scout platoon sergeant,
34 and mortar platoon sergeant to go to their NTC
35 rotation, to help them out, and make observations.
36 And for a number of reasons, they helped that
37 battalion and then went over and helped the sister
38 infantry battalion learning some TTPs. But they also
39 got a pretty good read on where that battalion was
40 five, six, four or five months out from coming in to
41 this AO.

42 **Beta**

43 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, can you take us through the Shuras that you
44 participated in, in order to get the land, to get a
45 piece of land?
46

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6)

2 **Diamond**

Yeah, the primary KLEs that I went to, I went to one in November up in Wanat, one in May, and one in June. But as I found and have in this binder, the record through '07 of how Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) and his force **Oscar** conducted, I think it was 40 KLEs on all these dates with the specific notes; and these are all the Waygal District KLEs that we had. For some reason, I don't have the record of '08, '08 forward at this time. But the general tone in the Shuras when we started talking to them, was we wanted to come in, we wanted their advice on where to go, and we'd work on that conversation on wanting to be connected to the government, near the government, work with their ANSF. Because a number of different folks were going into the valley to mentor the police, and there's different mentorship teams that had different roles and responsibilities over the course of the 15 months. So we wanted to be co-located with the population, near the district center with the police. And through negotiations, they recommended this piece of land. And it's the same land that we'd always drive up and secure when we'd have the Shuras. We would do HA-distros there. And it seemed pretty, well comparatively, it had standoff from the mountains, the ridge lines, it obviously doesn't have standoff from the population.

33 **Oscar**

There were different discussions about being located, you know, away from the population up in the mountains. You know, kind of away from the village. For a number of reasons, we didn't want to do that and kept having Shura after Shura about these with the platoon leader and (b)(3),(b)(6) Then, I'd come in, and they'd come down to Wanat or down to Nangalam to talk about the land. The reasons we didn't want to go up in the high ground is empirically you're disconnected from the population. And we had examples like the Ranch House where'd you have to walk down to Aranus to meet with the population. It's not effective if you're disconnected from the population. It's easy for the enemy to isolate you and just shoot at you and go down into the village and talk about how they're having effects on the infidels. And then it would also make it another air centric COP, which we didn't want to do, because we did have to resupply or reinforce by ground. We would have to fight up to that organization. And we would be gaining little

1 COIN advantage and little tactical advantage by being
2 on the high ground.

3
4 It's important to note, not only in the Waygal,
5 but throughout Kunar and Nuristan Province, there were
6 several times when we were going to relocate COPs.
7 And I'll use one in Chowkay Valley for example. I did
8 two different air assault operations where I went in
9 on with the Company Commander for two days. And we
10 would look for the ideal piece of high ground that we
11 could move this COP off of the road and move it up
12 into the high ground. But the fact is over there,
13 there's always higher ground. And it's always higher
14 ground within 500 or 800 or 1,000 meters that the
15 enemy will always be able to get the higher ground
16 until you're on the top of the Hindu Kush mountain
17 ridge line; that's a fact that we have to deal with.
18 So, what we try to do is maximize standoff. Like a
19 base like Honaker-Miracle, it's got incredible
20 standoff. But it's in the middle of a field, you
21 know, certainly it's surrounded by mountains, but it's
22 got standoff. Wanat, in the Waygal Valley
23 comparatively, has standoff. And it's got room for
24 HLZs or HLZ, multiple HLZs. And, again, it's got the
25 road right through it.

26 **Beta**

27 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Could you explain "standoff", sir?

28
29 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, standoff has to do with the distance between
30 **Diamond** enemy weapons--I view it as the distance between us,
31 friendly forces, coalition forces, ANA and ASF, and
32 the enemy's ability to put effects on us. It's that
33 distance. And it's, you know, not minimum effective
34 range. It's not maximum effective range for a
35 particular weapon's system. It's: Can the enemy
36 stand on top of an 8,000 foot mountain and put
37 plunging machine gun fire on you from three clicks
38 away? They can do that, okay. So, it's not a
39 doctrinal stand--doctrinal distance, because of the
40 elevation of terrain that circles every piece of
41 ground there.

42 **Beta**

43 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, can you reconcile the standoff concept with
44 the actual location selected and the fact that almost
45 270 degrees had buildings around it or at least a
46 portion of that, sir, the actual site selected?

47

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah. And again, we weren't seeking standoff
2 from the population. In fact, we were seeking to grab
3 them by the belt like enemies have done in previous
4 conflicts. We had no expectation, no historical
5 record that the enemy would shoot at the population.
6

7 Over the course of the year, the enemy had really
8 been separated from the population. And there, you
9 know, we had SIGINT throughout that the enemy was
10 cautious about civilian casualties. And we had no
11 belief that the enemy would attack the population or
12 attack the population's structures from the Mosque, to
13 the bazaar, to the motel that were very close to that
14 perimeter. Of course, it's a 14 week build-plan for
15 the COP. So eventually, we're going to have HESCO
16 barriers and then rock walls around that kind of give
17 us that separation from the enemy. But we had to
18 seize the ground first, if you will, or occupy the
19 ground after we negotiated for it and defend that and
20 then start building up from there.

Beta

21
22 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) You talk about a 14 week build-plan, sir. Why do
23 you say 14 weeks?
24

Diamond

25 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, when I look at the statement of work in the
26 JFUB packet, we look at that, I mean, you can see what
27 the timelines are and how, you know, here is our land
28 final authorization on 20 April--
29

Beta

30 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) That 20 April, that's from the locals, sir, that
31 20 April document?
32

Diamond

33 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) That was--yeah, that was with them when we
34 finally got them to--
35

Beta

36 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) That's the locals agreeing--
37

38 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) To agree and say that they're good with the land.
39 **Diamond** And then, right immediately after that, we put in our
40 operational need's statement that we already had
41 constructed, but then submit that up. It goes up to,
42 simultaneously up to--now that's the locals agreeing
43 to it, then we've got to get land request up to the
44 CREST Team so they can come out and survey. And we
45 continued to work through that. Again, I think it was
46 26 individual land owners. Some lived in Pakistan.
47 Some had titles from the Taliban Government. Some had

1 them from the Kings. So, that's what the CREST Team
2 does. And really, it's important for the CREST Team
3 to sort out who does the local population believe owns
4 that plot of land. That's what the CREST Team does,
5 but they're woefully under manned. So they're doing
6 this all over the country.

7 Beta

8 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Do you recall when they completed their task,
9 sir, the CREST Team?

10 Diamond

11 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) No, I--

12
13 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And said, "You're good to go?"

14
15 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) : Well, when they took it on--and we brought them
16 up there several times. Before we got the land
17 approved by the locals, we took them up and showed
18 them what we were looking at. So they were kind of
19 working on it. But I don't recall the date when the
20 final approval for the land came through.

21 Beta

22 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Aside from the agreements required for the elders
23 and then getting the CREST Team involved, sir, when
24 you decided you wanted to go to Wanat, when did you
25 initially want to execute?

26
27 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, again, there's not a date. There was a
28 timeframe from January to really April to execute;
29 that was the ideal timeframe and there's competition
30 for resources. You know, in that valley, you've got
31 about 20 days where you can fly because of low illume.
32 Then you couple that with the 1-91 CAV, which was our
33 sister and adjacent unit, nearly all their bases are
34 air centric. So any helicopter coming off that
35 resupply of 1-91, were coming off. Because as long as
36 I've got people in Bella, I've still got to resupply
37 them. You know, it's not a definitive cut to say,
38 "Okay, on Monday, the 1st, we're going to go ahead and
39 close Bella and then it's done." It's numerous
40 sorties of aircraft to go in there and only so many
41 cycles can be done in one period of darkness. So it's
42 a very intricate prioritization of resources by
43 Brigade in RC East to ensure that they've provided
44 enough supplies to all the other bases so that they
45 can sustain. We've got, literally we've got excess
46 supplies in Bella so that they can be sustained. And
47 then, we work that in to get as many lifts as we can.

1 But we can't get all--we could not extract all of
2 Bella in one period of darkness. So, I mean, it was a
3 lot of synchronization on: What are we pulling out of
4 Bella so that it can still defend itself? Because I'm
5 very cognizant that, again, they can follow that HLZ,
6 and they can prevent us from coming up there and
7 isolate that base. So, even before we had Intel of
8 200 to 300 people surrounding Bella and putting
9 effective pressure on there, we were cognizant that
10 this was a pretty complex operation. So the windows,
11 you know, January to April is when we'd like to move
12 it. And then, it's about, you know, competition for
13 resources from then on.

14 **Beta**

15 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): The agreement with the elders was in the end of
16 April, sir. Was the CREST Team done in May, sir, or
17 was it done in June?

18 **Diamond**

19 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I don't know. I'd have to look and get some
20 resources on that. From talking to the CREST Team and
21 talking to the elders is--when we got the resources
22 lined up, we'd be able to move. We'd be able to
23 pressure the elders. And there wasn't an official
24 stamp coming from Ministry of Defense that's, I mean,
25 eventually there is, that says, "You own this land and
26 everything's approved." But, from talking to the
27 CREST Team, we were doing good faith. The biggest
28 thing is the population was good with it. They knew
29 we were working it out. They were going to get paid
30 for the land. So, because we went through the process
31 and we had negotiated for the land, we had the CREST
32 Team looking at it, the government was involved, the
33 Minister of Defense, the province governors were
34 talking, and everybody knew the base was going in.
35 The process was working. So, you know, again, there's
36 no rule of law in the country. There's kind of
37 policies and guidance. We were within the intent of
38 the CREST Team policy and negotiation. And we're not
39 just going up there and grabbing the land, but we're
40 doing it in accordance with, you know, kind of culture
41 and central government guidance.

42 **Beta**

43 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): What if you grabbed the land, sir? Just gone up
44 and taken the land you wanted, what would have
45 happened?
46

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I think we would have really pissed off the
2 locals with that. I think--well, we made a lot of
3 head way on, from over our time up there, is all the
4 Shuras, all the KLE's that were ongoing up there. It
5 wasn't a contested area. You know, and I just got
6 another call from CSI, and I won't digress about the
7 number of contacts. And that valley, over the course
8 of our tour to include Wanat, had 45 contacts in it.
9 Some of those contacts were 4 July 2000 or 4 July
10 2007. One RPG near Bella, that's one contact. One of
11 the contacts was, I think 2 August, illum rounds
12 fired over top the ASG OP, that's one contact. Okay,
13 so that wasn't--other than the Ranch House, the 9
14 November ambush and then Bella, that was not, day-in
15 and day-out, a valley that we were fighting in. There
16 were long periods, weeks, and sometimes over a month
17 where there would be no shots fired there. So there
18 wasn't an enemy threat at--in the April, May timeframe
19 that would even drive us to go seize that land. We
20 could go up there any day we wanted to. We'd drive up
21 there. They'd road march up there. Brostrom road
22 marched his platoon up to Wanat from Nangalam just to
23 do HA-distro and meet with the people. So, there
24 wasn't a contested threat that would drive us to go
25 seize that. The threat came towards, you know, about
26 May timeframe in--up in Bella and up in Wanat. But
27 now we're getting into a whole, whole other set of
28 conditions. We know the people coming behind us can't
29 or won't go into Bella. We know that there's an enemy
30 surrounding Bella, at that time, and dialing in their
31 indirect fires like they normally do before, you know,
32 a significant contact. And now we're in competition,
33 and we're still in competition for resources to move
34 to Wanat. And there's getting to be a sense of
35 urgency because of the enemy, because of the weather.
36 It's warming up. We know more enemy, there's a lot of
37 enemy now, more coming in, and we're getting, you
38 know, an element that's following in behind us that,
39 you know, self proclaims they're less capable.

Beta

41 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): With the RIP, sir, pending, how did that impact
42 the decision to go or not go?

Diamond

44 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, with the RIP, again, with the knowledge
45 that we had of the element 1-26 coming in--I'm not bad
46 mouthing them. They're just coming in less capable.
47 They're coming in with 130 people, I think, less than

1 us or 140 people less. Us seeing them in training,
2 their PDSS coming out, we knew that they did not have
3 the capability to go up to Bella. We knew--we were in
4 pretty routine contact in Bella towards the end of our
5 tour.
6

7 My greatest concern in that whole Rock Move was
8 safely extricating from Bella. And of course we
9 discussed, "Well, why go to Wanat? Why not just pull
10 back to Blessing?" Okay, if we agree we have to come
11 out of Bella--because I think to this day that a 200
12 man plus attack would have been on Bella, and would
13 have isolated it. They would have killed or captured
14 those Americans and many more coming up to reinforce.
15 And I won't come off that piece. We had really a
16 couple of choices. We could pull back to Blessing, or
17 we could pull back to Wanat and set up the incoming
18 unit to continue on progressing in the Waygal Valley.
19 And, again, we could routinely go up to Waygal.
20 Albeit, we got ambushed a couple of times, but the
21 elders were coming down. The governors were coming
22 down to Blessing. We were continuing to have
23 conversations with them. But, I mean, it was on the
24 fence. We were having a hard time getting them to
25 really connect to the government and believe in it.
26 There was some corruption, but I don't know if it was
27 corruption because of greed or corruption because of
28 intimidation.
29

30 The overriding issue was if we don't have
31 something up in Wanat connecting the government,
32 connecting the ANP, still pulling that road and
33 bringing those projects, because we had 1.4 million
34 dollars worth of projects going in there, that that
35 money and those projects would be intimidated and
36 stopped. The Taliban would be siphoning money off
37 from those projects. And that force that was up at
38 Bella if, you know, had they been able to come past
39 Wanat, then they could come and hit our OPs around
40 Blessing, disrupted our economic center in Nangalam
41 and, you know, attacked Blessing and the guns and
42 everything else. So I did not think, you know, that
43 the enemy had the capability to quickly move from
44 their focus on Bella, and I know they had a split
45 focus and they were kind of watching Wanat, but to
46 mass and come up with that attack plan as they did.

1 There were not indicators that they could do that
2 and--
3 Beta
4 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And what do you mean there weren't indicators,
5 sir?
6
7 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) There weren't indicators that they had the
8 Diamond capability to bring that force together. They had
9 been up at Bella for six or eight weeks trying to dial
10 in their fire. On 2-3 July, they finally hit the OP.
11 We thought that was an indicator that, you know, they
12 were getting pretty close to a large scale attack on
13 Bella.
14 Beta
15 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) If I may, sir? For six to eight weeks up at COP
16 Bella, you suspected that they had 200, some AAF?
17 Diamond
18 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Umm-hmm.
19 Beta
20 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Was there any consideration given to doing a
21 deliberate Op to clear that area?
22 Diamond
23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) You can't clear that area.
24 Beta
25 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And why is that, sir?
26 Diamond
27 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) You can't do it, because of the terrain. You
28 just cannot clear that force. When you put a large
29 force in there--and there's a couple of things at that
30 point in time, we're also, you know, going wide open
31 across the spectrum in our area with KLE's, government
32 Shuras, and working all other LOOs throughout the
33 battle space. We don't have the resources. The
34 resources it takes to move Bella are, you know, quite
35 a bit more to do a deliberate operation in that area.
36 You start putting Soldiers, groups of Soldiers all in
37 those mountains all over like we did on several Ops
38 and that takes even more resources than Bella to
39 sustain that. But it's mountainous terrain, you put a
40 large force in those mountains, those people, you
41 know, if they think that you're a potent force,
42 they're just going to become civilians. You can't do
43 large conventional, clearance operations really in a
44 counterinsurgency environment. But in a mountainous,
45 unsupportable environment, a counterinsurgency
46 environment, you cannot do clearance, clearance
47 operations.

1 **Beta**

2 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, could you explain--you saw a threat at Bella
3 from a couple, potentially a couple hundred AAF.
4 Wanat is about eight kilometers to the South down to
5 Waygal. Why you didn't have the same assessment down
6 at Wanat? Why couldn't this same force just simply
7 walk down the valley?

8 **Diamond**

9 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Because--those dots to the South of the Korengal,
10 down there--here's Blessing, here's Wanat, and here's
11 Bella. Okay. Probably six--in all of these, might as
12 well be different countries. Okay. On this map, it
13 looks like they're pretty close. And really, I can
14 drive to here in 45 minutes, and I can drive up to COP
15 in probably an hour, hour and a half. But they're
16 worlds apart. Okay. Up to about six clicks in Waygal
17 Valley, these people are connected to the economic
18 center, right here.

19 **Beta**

20 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) So that's just North of Blessing?

21
22 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Just North of Blessing, right here. So six
23 **Diamond** clicks from Blessing, six clicks North into the Waygal
24 Valley projects are going in. The people along the
25 road are connected. It's routinely a very, very
26 amicable, very nice. At about six kilometers past
27 North into the valley, right about where the school
28 was, their school, it becomes kind of, in our mind, a
29 Nuristan environment up there. And it's just a lot
30 different feeling there. I mean, you can feel it soon
31 as you come in.

32
33 Now, you know, I've got our photos and our KLE
34 from the 26 of April where everybody is standing
35 around passing out HA and smiling and have the kids
36 with Beanie Babies and school supplies. On that day,
37 it was very amicable up there; when we're up there,
38 when we had that Shura. A month later, on the 26 of
39 May, was completely contentious environment, very
40 strange atmospherics. So it changed, every time we
41 would go up here.

42
43 Back to your question about, "Why couldn't they
44 move here?" Because they didn't demonstrate that they
45 could move in mass like that at any time. It seems,
46 "Well, could they just walk down the valley?" Well,
47 they could, and that's why we wanted to go ahead and

1 put all these enablers up here. And I could
2 reinforce, have multiple QRFs, both by ground and air
3 up here. But we had the enablers, we had the
4 priorities of fire, we had engineers, we had an
5 engineer plan coming in. And we figured that just
6 like an American, a 200 man American force would have
7 a hard time moving from one objective to another
8 objective, picking up and conducting a complex
9 deliberate attack in this--we figured they would too.
10 And they had demonstrated that they would watch and
11 see our set up for quite some time and were very
12 patient, patient people. So when we added the
13 enablers to the task organization--

Beta

14
15 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) As part of their TTP, sir, they had demonstrated?

16
17 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Well, yeah. Over observation, over 14 months,
18 **Diamond** very few times were they able to mass that kind of
19 force. So we were watching it. We know up in Aranus
20 that we think that they had about 100 to 150 people up
21 here. We started getting indications--we never saw a
22 group of 200 people. We never saw a group of 20
23 people up here. I think that the largest that they
24 ever saw was like 14 up here and we did some fire
25 missions on them. But we'd get, you know, SIGINT and
26 HUMINT that (b)(6) was trying to bring all
27 these people together. And he's got to do all the
28 negotiations with these people as well. So when he
29 negotiates with them to come and attack Bella, that's
30 a whole other negotiation for him to move down here,
31 generally, because that's not his 200 man organic
32 force, that's a lot of forces coming in to get under
33 his umbrella.

Beta

34
35 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Now, you mentioned, sir, 26 May when you went up
36 there, there was a difference in atmospheric. And,
37 arguably, because you had to negotiate for the land,
38 you had tipped, tactically, that you were coming to
39 this particular location?

Diamond

40
41 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah.

Beta

42
43 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Is it possible that--

44
45 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) And, again, we'd been talking about this, this
46 **Diamond** land over multiple Shuras and KLEs. And, you know, by
47 this point in 26 May, it was kind some particulars of

1 the land agreement. They were still looking for the
2 folks that lived in Pakistan. But in that Shura, it's
3 with certainty, there were Taliban in that Shura. And
4 I'm almost positive on the ABC news--

Beta

5
6 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): That's the 26 May one, sir?

7
8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): On the 26 May one. I'm almost positive the guy
9 that is talking on the ABC news report, that was
10 **Diamond** released this week, is in there. I mean, I've got
11 pictures of him; is in that particular Shura. And,
12 you know, we're talking everything, I mean, we've got
13 pictures of me holding up kids. The party line that
14 we'd say is: "We're all fathers here, and we want to
15 have a better future for our kids. We're bringing in
16 1.4 million dollars worth of projects. You've got a
17 school. You've got a clinic. The road's coming in.
18 What else do you need? You know, you've got the
19 District Center. You've got the police. We're
20 putting in OPs up on the mountains for your police.
21 We're going to employ people." But still, it just
22 wasn't a good Shura.

Beta

23
24 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Did you consider, sir, that possibly (b)(6) or
25 one of his compatriots had already conducted a
26 negotiation with the local elders?

Diamond

27
28 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Oh, absolutely, that's ongoing all the time. I
29 considered (b)(6) had people in the room. I
30 mean, it's with certainty he had people in the room.
31 But, with certainty, there were Taliban in nearly
32 every Shura we conducted from platoon level to
33 battalion. So, absolutely, he was there. It was a
34 contest for wills at that time with the population.
35 It was trying to sort out the--is the population
36 Waygal--or Wanat population, do they not want us, not
37 want us to connect them to the government? Do they
38 not want the benefits the government is bringing in?
39 Or is it the Taliban intimidating them? Well, here's
40 some other atmospheric and indicators, offline they
41 want to talk about all the projects that were going
42 in. They wanted to negotiate about who was going to
43 get to work on the base. In the larger groups, they
44 wouldn't do that. In larger groups, you know, they
45 would say, you know, "Yeah, we got to talk more about
46 the base. We don't want the base in," in this larger
47 group. In smaller groups, they'd say, "We can't admit

1 that we want the base in. We can't say that in the
2 Shura. Just come up and grab the land." Well, in
3 effect, we kind of did do that, you know, we had all
4 the negotiation going on. But, we didn't say, "Hey
5 we're coming up tomorrow," in coming into the base.
6 We came in under the cover of darkness, Vehicle Patrol
7 Base. They got up in the morning and there we were,
8 after a rainy night.
9

10 So with that, you know, what are some indications
11 of an uncomfortable Shura there? I've never had a
12 Shura that the elders kind of went off by themselves.
13 They went off by themselves. Asked to take a break;
14 they went off. And I think that's when the Taliban,
15 you know, when you talk about, "Did they already
16 negotiate with them," that's when they put some final
17 intimidation into these folks.
18

19 We're monitoring the SIGINT. At this time, we're
20 starting to get indications that the enemy are moving
21 in. And then, we were asked to stay for a lunch, you
22 know, culturally that's the right thing to do. I
23 said, you know, "We went well over because you took a
24 break I need to leave." And the District Governor
25 told me, "That the elders would be angry if you leave
26 now." I said, "Well, I'm a little angry that the
27 elders left me in a room too, but we got to get
28 going." And, he said, "Just stay for lunch." So I
29 stayed for lunch. And the only people that were there
30 that I ate with were the Police Chief and the people
31 from the Task Force Rock. The Shura and the Governor
32 were in another room, never happened, ever happened
33 before.
34

35 As we were walking the 100 meters up to our
36 HMMWVs, we got SIGINT, "Prepare for the attack the
37 Americas are coming." So we knew we were going to get
38 ambushed going through there. But, again, you know,
39 had I had nine people killed on that ambush, we might
40 be talking about well, you know, "Why didn't you air
41 assault out or something?" But, you go, have the
42 route clearance package, clear, and fight through the
43 ambush. And once we got there, we stayed there in
44 contact for an extended period of time with the enemy.
45 And then, we announced we were coming back up on 6 or
46 7 June. I told them I was coming back up on the 8th.
47 Had the resources to protect us coming up and had

1 another Shura with them. But just to show them, "Hey
2 the intimidator's right there, they don't intimidate
3 us. Don't let them intimidate you." And when we went
4 back out on 8 June, we got ambushed again. But we had
5 the resources lined up to help break that ambush.

6 **Beta**

7 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Did you think that you could still influence that
8 population, sir, at that point?

9 **Diamond**

10 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Absolutely.

11 **Beta**

12 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Why is that, sir?

13
14 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Because, again, we were getting a mixed, not
15 **Diamond** mixed messages; I think we were getting a consistent
16 message from the population that they had problems up
17 there and they wanted support from the coalition, from
18 the ANSF. And, again, it remains impossible to read
19 whether the Police Chief and the Governor were corrupt
20 because they were greedy or they were corrupt because
21 they were intimidated. We know with certainty,
22 empirically, that Americans are hard to dislike once
23 we get up in an area and are interacting with the
24 population day in and day out, and we're delivering on
25 those projects that they asked for. That they, you
26 know, we had negotiated with them that they will
27 connect, not to the Americans, they will connect to
28 the other Afghans, to the central government. And
29 once we're up there, the roads will just finish faster
30 because there will be more pressure on the road
31 company, more security for the road company that'll
32 come up there. And then, there will be more commerce
33 and the COIN snowball starts rolling. I mean, we had
34 examples of where that happened in other valleys.

35 **Beta**

36 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, we have a map here. Sir, you mentioned
37 before that there might be, there'd be little tactical
38 advantage going up on higher ground?

39 **Diamond**

40 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Umm-hmm.

41 **Beta**

42 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And we'll go further out back too, sir, did you
43 consider any other locations than right in with the
44 village, sir?

45 **Diamond**

46 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah. This is the area up over here--
47

Beta

1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): That's to the East, sir?

2
3 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Over to the East, where they were proposing. And
4 Diamond it was, if I remember, 1.5 or 2 clicks outside of the
5 village on some very high ground. And, tactically,
6 some people thought that would like pretty good
7 ground. When we'd over fly, we could see that it was
8 exactly like everywhere else in the Hindu Kush. If we
9 are right here, then you've got ground over here, you
10 know, that rings it, and you're still--the enemy still
11 got an advantage on you. But what you don't have up
12 here is, you know, you're separated from the
13 population, and you're separated from the enemy if
14 they're ringing your base right here like they ended
15 doing. Yeah, you're separated from them, but now,
16 they wouldn't have been down there. They would have
17 been up here around the base. But the difference with
18 having 70 guys up here is now if, even if they don't
19 block this road, if I come up here, I get the
20 opportunity to fight up to this base to reinforce. Up
21 here, I may have a challenge in that area to find an
22 HLZ, a base that has a suitable HLZ. So now, if I
23 have an HLZ, it's likely a one-ship HLZ. So to
24 resupply or reinforce becomes an impossible task. So
25 then what I do is I have to reinforce and resupply
26 from up here and walk down because I can't fight. So
27 really what I'm going to have to do is go in higher
28 and fight through the enemy that's attacking the base
29 to get in to either reinforce or resupply. And then,
30 day in and day out, if there is no enemy in the
31 equation, my connection with the District Center down
32 here is much less. My connection with the economic
33 center down here is much less. My influence on this
34 road right here is much less, because now I'm on an
35 air centric COP, or I'm bringing in supplies here and
36 having a donkey train come up to this base up here.

Beta

38 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, there are several--there are folks who will
39 look at map like this and say, "Putting a COP right
40 here, right next to these buildings creates a
41 significant disadvantage."

Diamond

42
43 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay.

44
45 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you see that as an advantage to be in there?

Beta

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) On this particular piece of ground, all things
2 being considered, given this land--because when you
3 look at this, this looks like it's fairly flat. We've
4 got better pictures of it. Again, this land right
5 here is slopping up like this. Okay. It's sloping up
6 away from--it goes down here and then slopes up this
7 direction. This is kind of a river bed right here.
8 When I look at this, I think this is the best thing we
9 have around the population. And again, a false
10 assumption was that the enemy was not going to put
11 significant amounts of fire. We anticipated that they
12 would shoot indirect fire probably down in this area,
13 maybe in this field to try to hit this.

Beta

14 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) That's to the South, then Southeast to the
15 position?
16

Diamond

17 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, to the South, basically to the South in
18 this area. Might hit it anywhere, but we did not
19 think that they would intentionally target the
20 population.
21

Beta

22 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And why is that, sir?
23

24 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Again, after a year of SIGINT and Shuras and
25 intelligence that the enemy was becoming as cognizant
26 as we were about civilian casualties. Because anytime
27 they had a misstep, we would immediately have it on
28 the radio, immediately. It wasn't they were shooting
29 at Blessing down here. They were shooting at
30 Nangalam. It wasn't--they were shooting, shooting at
31 Wanat or they weren't--if they hit in here, we'd
32 immediately have it on that, "Hey, they weren't
33 shooting at us they were shooting at Wanat. They were
34 shooting at the economic bazaar." That's not me
35 saying that, that's an ANA, ANSF commander, a
36 government commander on the radio. I mean, literally
37 within minutes sometimes while the attack was going
38 on. So I did not think that a large force would, in
39 effect, destroy Wanat to fight us.
40

Beta

41 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, you mentioned a 14 week build-plan for the
42 COP. What was your understanding of what the COP
43 would entail and then would there be OPs out
44 throughout the valley?
45
46

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah. Again, the police who were, you know,
2 questionable at best, had OPs up on the high ground.
3 And we had already contracted for I think it was three
4 totals, at least two, but I think it was three OPs to
5 be constructed for the police.

Beta

6
7 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) The COPs up, sir, or two of the OPs up?

Diamond

8
9 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah. They had OPs somewhere up on this ridge
10 line. Up here--

Beta

11
12 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Excuse me, to the North and West, sir?

13
14 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Right, and then one--this is probably it right
15 here. It's not the house, these are the houses. It
16 was somewhere on this ridge line and then one on this
17 ridge line. They primarily focused to the North. So
18 they had little rock, rock structures up there. And
19 we were going to build like permanent hard OPs for
20 them, and I think it was these, on these three. Not
21 part--that was just a separate project; that was part
22 of the 1.4 million dollars of projects that were going
23 in. I talked to (b)(6) about funding those and
24 building those OPs. But again, we know they're of
25 questionable virtue. So, so what--how are we going to
26 come in here and build this base? Well, again,
27 Paratroopers, Marines, Infantrymen, we seize ground.
28 We drive up here, and I use the term "seize" in the
29 context that yeah we've negotiated and we're seizing
30 it in a sense that we're not pissing off the
31 population, but we're seizing it in a sense that we're
32 coming up here, they don't know exactly what our
33 footprints going to be. So I'm looking at this as an
34 enabled platoon mission, because I'm pulling folks and
35 I'm pulling Wanat down at the same time. Didn't do
36 them sequentially and had elements of them going on at
37 the same time to keep the enemy's focus split. And I
38 think that part was effective. We went ahead, seized
39 it with a platoon plus a TOW. So a total of five gun
40 trucks up there; enabled them with a company mortar,
41 60 millimeter, a battalion mortar, 120 millimeter
42 mortar. Enabled them with TOW truck, enabled them
43 with an LRAS, the ground based ISR that we had.

Beta

44
45 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Why did you give them those enablers, sir?

46

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Because, again, we figured that they would be
2 probed over a period of time. And the LRAS and the
3 ITAS-TOW are two very good systems for picking up
4 enemy forces in the mountains, in all weather
5 conditions. We gave them priorities of fire from the
6 155s at A-Bad, priorities of fires from the 155s at
7 Blessing. We had a good fire's plan. We gave them
8 priorities of fire from the 120 mortar at Blessing
9 that could hit targets to the South. And then, you
10 know, there's questions about, "Well, where was the
11 company C2?" Again, we went through a fairly
12 sustained orders process. Overtime, we'd all been up
13 there in effect on a terrain walk a couple of

Oscar

14 different times. And (b)(3),(b)(6) and I had just been up
15 there May 26 and June 8 in that area. And again, I
16 can't remember if John Brostrom was on the 26th or the
17 8th, but I know he was there on the 26th of April when
18 we were talking about the land and how we needed to
19 lay that out in a general sense and what land we were
20 going to have. One of the biggest points is this
21 structure right there, the civilians did not want us,
22 the population did not want us to include that in the
23 COP. So, you know, that was a long discussion up
24 there on the HLZ.

Beta

25
26 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) That's the "C" shaped building, sir?

Diamond

27
28 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah. It's the "C" shaped; it doesn't have roof
29 but it'll be a good bazaar building or would've been.
30 I mean, it would've been adjacent to the perimeter. I
31 mean, within meters of the perimeter, rock wall would
32 have came around that.

33
34 So when we came up there, again--infantrymen,
35 going to seize that, they're going to start building
36 defendable positions. The consternation over is it a
37 Vehicle Patrol Base? You know, is that doctrinal
38 term? You know what, all along the Pesh--how my
39 predecessor established COPs--and how you do it, you
40 find a piece of terrain with the right equipment that
41 you can defend it and then you start building up. You
42 know, so in effect, those gun trucks become kind of
43 mobile pill-boxes. Although, they're not used that
44 way, but having a total of five heavy weapons up there
45 gives them--gives an Airborne platoon a significant
46 advantage. Then, you couple that with the mortars;
47 then they start building their perimeter. They got

1 their wire in very quickly. And you've got to
2 remember, at this time, 8 through 12 I've got ISR over
3 top, not only looking at, you know, ISR you don't use
4 it to look at what you're doing, you use it to look in
5 the mountains, but I could see that, could get
6 consistent reports. The reports that I didn't get
7 and, I mean, there's--in my heart I didn't get them
8 and empirically I didn't get them, I mean, no record
9 of getting them and that I just missed them, were
10 these concerns and calls for resupply. Okay. And,
11 because--again, we are only 45 minutes from there--

12 **Beta**

13 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, if we could pull this up.

14
15 Gentlemen, any questions on site selection?

16
17 LtGen Natonski: Was there any consideration to put the COP up
18 in this general area on the high ground overlooking
19 and then ultimately building the road?

20 **Beta**

21 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And that's about 150 to 200 meters to the East,
22 Southeast.

23
24 MG Perkins: Yeah, Southeast.

25
26 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): And there was, and it was very contested that they
27 **Diamond** did not want to lose this farm land. They didn't farm
28 this land, if you see the pictures; it's terraced.
29 But, sir, they didn't farm it. This land they did
30 farm and that was very contentious to talk about that.
31 But we did have that conversation to kind of build up
32 here, would have been a lot more significant engineer
33 effort. But the point of coming up here, again, was
34 the farm land. And it would--I mean, concur that that
35 would be--that would have been an adequate, adequate
36 place, tactically a better place, but adequately. We
37 would have still had to use this for an HLZ which was
38 a concern. But, you know, we could mitigate anything
39 about that; that was close enough that we could
40 secure. It just would have taken more guards for it.

41 **Beta**

42 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): If you could have seized the ideal piece of
43 land, sir, for both COIN and tactics, would that have
44 been it?

45
46 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah. I mean, we would have had the same spot,
47 **Diamond** right here. I still think, I think this is the ideal

1 piece given that it was contiguous. And had we built
2 it up, we would have been--had we'd got it in, this
3 would have been a contiguous piece of land that we
4 could use and work with the population. This wouldn't
5 have been a big enough footprint for everything that
6 we eventually wanted to do there. If you look the
7 structures, again, we would have had to bleed over
8 onto this side. I think the tactical advantage of
9 this--because, again, there's high ground and wooded
10 ground here that we're not going to cut down. I think
11 the tactical advantage of being located here would
12 have been off set by, you know, having these trees
13 which they were adamant about us not cutting down,
14 these trees initially.

15 **Beta**

16 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): So even if you had moved to the Southeast, sir,
17 you would have had additional tactical considerations?

18 **Diamond**

19 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah. I mean, it would have been a different set
20 of problems. But for the Wanat battle, had we been up
21 here, it would have probably afforded the enemy a
22 better tactical advantage initially, because they have
23 a lot more micro terrain here. I mean, it's hard to
24 believe that they could get a better tactical
25 advantage, but this is the area that they came through
26 in large respect.

27 **Sigma**

28 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): During the site selection process, sir, was there any
29 discussion as to where you would put, you know, an OP
30 for the COP itself? I know we ended up putting OP
31 topside up, which I think was, if I recall, was
32 intended to be somewhat of a temporary position.

33 **Diamond**

34 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah. We were going to look at finding the best
35 place along--up on this ridge line, but the constant
36 discussion of this was we were, again, we were going
37 to have ANP OPs in and bolster them, train them with
38 ANA. And again, you know, it's kind of a long term
39 build-plan. So, as we're professionalizing the ANP,
40 get our ANA out there, we would have been looking at
41 either ensuring that the ANP and ANA were strong
42 enough up here or put our own OP up here.

43 **Beta**

44 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): That's off to the East, sir?

46 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): This one's off to the East of the ridge line.

47 **Diamond**

Beta

1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) So that you could over--

2
3 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): This is the complicated ridge line that you always
4 Diamond have higher ground on. I mean, you're going to see,
5 what the OPs on here do, primarily is look up and down
6 the valley. And obviously, they can look; they can
7 look about 270 degrees. But on every OP, in short
8 order, you're going to be in dead space from one
9 direction, at least one direction.

Sigma

10
11 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Was the selection of the location for OP topside, was
12 that something that you discussed or was that
13 something that Lieutenant Brostrom made a decision on
14 once they got there, if you know?

Diamond

15
16 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah. Lieutenant Brostrom sited that OP. And my
17 greatest concern, when I told him--when he--setting in
18 an OP, I said, "You have to be able to see to the
19 North." Yeah, because, you know, to me, if the enemy
20 were going to come, they would screen themselves, you
21 know, they're not going to walk over top of these
22 ridge lines unless they have to. So, if he's--if he
23 can look down the road, look up across in that kind of
24 dead space, which OP topside had a hard time looking
25 in to that dead space; but my point, you know, with
26 Lieutenant Brostrom when he looked at all these
27 things, he met the intent of being able to look to the
28 North as he was. He made a wise tactical decision not
29 to get this up here or up here.

Beta

30
31 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) That's further to the East, sir?

32
33 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Further to the East. Because had that OP been
34 Diamond isolated, we'd be having a completely different
35 discussion right now, and, you know, we all know what
36 happened at the OP. But the bottom line is, is people
37 could reinforce the OP. And to include the ground
38 mounted QRF that got up there, could immediately go to
39 the OP and help break the attack by fires and
40 everything as they came up in that area. So, you
41 know, I did not site the OP for Lieutenant Brostrom.
42 Had I done that on one of my PDSSs, it certainly would
43 not have been within 75 meters of the perimeter. And
44 I think we'd be having a different discussion right
45 now on that.

46

1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) **Beta** Sir, because the COP location is on a plateau,
2 there's some significant dead space, especially going
3 up the spur. Did you consider that, and did you take
4 any steps to mitigate?
5 **Diamond**

6 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) The fires plan was intended to mitigate the dead
7 space. They had claymores up there, they had
8 grenades. You know, they moved a lot of grenades up
9 there. And, you know, that's how we mitigated the
10 dead space. But, I mean, this place has a lot of dead
11 space, as does this one, as does Blessing, as does
12 Honaker-Miracle. You know, as do the other 15 places
13 that we're at. They're all--every one of them
14 surrounded by high ground, every one of them has dead
15 space; and that's a fact of the environment.
16 **Beta**

17 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, when it came time to gather resources for
18 execution, specifically for the buildup of Wanat--
19 **Diamond**

20 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Umm-hmm.
21 **Beta**

22 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Supplies that would be needed and equipment; what
23 steps, if any, did you take to assist in that process,
24 sir?
25 **Diamond**

26 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah. Here's our statement of work and, you
27 know--
28 **Beta**

29 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And that was part of your JFUB package, sir?
30 **Diamond**

31 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, that's part of the JFUB package. And,
32 again, part of the timing of moving this was air, ISR,
33 and Class IV. And to take you back to June, all of my
34 briefings focused on three things. And this is June
35 of '07: Is force protection, barrier material. When
36 I got there, I could count the HESCOs on my hand.
37 When I got up there into Kunar, not on my hand, but I
38 could physically count the HESCOs because they were in
39 such high demand and short supply, connectivity and
40 acclimatization. Meaning, I initially couldn't talk
41 on TACSAT to all my posts that I had, rely on FM in
42 the mountains which was spotty at best at times and
43 had to relay. So it was force protection,
44 connectivity, and acclimatization; acclimatization
45 meaning power to run anything from a platoon CP, to
46 having hot and cold water, and things like that.
47

1 So as we built through that to about November, I
2 could--in November of '07, I said, okay, now that we
3 have, and I have this is briefings conversations, now
4 that we have adequate force protection, we've got
5 connectivity with everybody, and we have some
6 semblance of acclimatization, now it allows us to get
7 out much more, work with the ANSF, train on our bases,
8 train off, a lot more partnership operations. And not
9 that we weren't doing them, but it allowed us to put a
10 lot more focus on the partnership--partnered
11 operations and really economic development and things
12 like that, the other lines of operation. Okay. To
13 that end, Class IV was very much centrally managed.
14 Okay. So, as the JFUB package and our engineer went
15 up there, RC East engineer came out, you know, they
16 talked about it, and they put together the JFUB packet
17 of what we were going to need to build up Wanat. It
18 was approved. So, you know, the assumption that
19 followed was that we were going to get all that Class
20 IV.

21 **Beta**

22 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And did you get the Class IV, sir?

23
24 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Well, the Class IV was coming up on the trucks
25 **Diamond** that were coming up, but we had no shortage of Class
26 IV. It was the heavy engineer equipment to level the
27 ground and fill the HESCOs. I did not have concerns
28 about the Class IV that was up there.

29 **Beta**

30 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Before Rock Move, sir, did the Class IV get
31 staged at Blessing?

32
33 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): I can't remember. I know we had some of it
34 **Diamond** there. We didn't have it all, but we had some of it
35 slung right there because we were slinging it in. But
36 there was no concern raised to me about the Class IV.
37 We were ready to go and had it approved. There were
38 the sling loads out at the HLZ, and we were slinging
39 it up and moving some up by truck.

40 **Beta**

41 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Who would have raised a concern if they didn't
42 have the proper building material, the stage ready to
43 go, sir, who would have raised that concern?

44 **Red**

45 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) The Battalion XO, Major (b)(3),(b)(6) would have. The
46 **Diamond** engineer was leaving at that time. He was RIPing out,
47 because I don't have an organic engineer. So he

1 actually left before Wanat, a couple of days before.
2 **Red** But Major (b)(3),(b)(6), the S-4, Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) would have
3 raised it, if we had an issue. **Oscar**
4 **Beta**
5 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And no one raised that issue, sir?
6
7 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Not that we had an issue with any Class IV. In
8 **Diamond** fact, on one of the days about the 10th of July, the
9 engineer, by chances, BSMV was upgraded to a Silver
10 Star, which led to the conversation about Wanat.
11 Because when I brought him into my office, there was
12 kind of information operations campaign going that he
13 was in trouble, so he came in and reported. And told
14 him tell me everything he knows about Wanat, because
15 I'm not going to release him, because I've got
16 concerns about Wanat. He went through gravel cost
17 more money; he was good. In fact, thinking about
18 this, he was good with Class IV, the engineers were
19 lined up. So, and a number of people will remember
20 that conversation, because it was all under the
21 premise he wasn't going to get released because Wanat
22 wasn't squared away. And he spent 5-10 minutes
23 talking, emphatically, "There's no problems with
24 Wanat," the Class IV. And then we said, "Well, you've
25 got to read this. This is the problem with Wanat."
26 And he got his Silver Star and read it and I said,
27 "Okay, obviously we'll have an official thing when you
28 get back." But, to that end, had there been a
29 concern--and we'd been talking about it up to then but
30 under that pressure and under that, you know,
31 fortuitous event we'll say--is he would have said,
32 "Well, you know, we have Class IV concerns; we have
33 this or that," but there were no concerns. His
34 largest concern I remember him talking about was
35 gravel was coming at a higher cost.
36 **Beta**
37 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And that was **Saint** (b)(3),(b)(6) sir?
38 **Saint**
39 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): That was Will (b)(3),(b)(6) correct. **Diamond**
40 **Beta**
41 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And did your S-4 ever mention any issues with
42 Class IV, sir?
43
44 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) No. **Diamond** **Saint**
45 **Saint**
46 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) You mentioned (b)(3),(b)(6) had left?
47 **Beta**

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Right.

Beta

2
3 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) RIP'd out?

Brown

Diamond
4 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) : And (b)(3),(b)(6) was the S-4, and I don't recall
6 him bringing up any issues about Class IV.

Beta

7
8 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, what engineer equipment--engineer equipment,
9 when you initially were considering Operation Rock
10 Move, what engineer, heavy engineer equipment was to
11 go up there?

Diamond

12 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) : I know there was a contracted, heavy construction
14 company was contracted to come up not--civilian
15 company was to come up. Do the site prep. And by
16 type of piece of equipment, I don't know. I don't
17 have that knowledge. But that was going to come and,
18 again, help with the leveling the land and filling the
19 HESCOs. And there were no concerns about that. As we
20 had--as time progressed and there were delays with the
21 engineer equipment, again, that wasn't a real red
22 flag. We're tracking, where are they? Things were
23 delayed in Afghanistan routinely. Where are they?
24 Okay, he's got blown out tires. The next day, okay,
25 where is he? Well, now, you know, he's delayed in
26 some town. Then, you know, afterwards it's well now
27 he's intimidated and he won't come up, come up the
28 valley on like the 12th unless we have escort. Okay,
29 get the RCP over there. And we didn't get it up in
30 time to move him up there. And--so there were
31 concerns about that but, again, it was a 14 week
32 build-plan. You know, getting off schedule by a day,
33 two, three, a week was something that was routine in
34 Afghanistan. I did not see the heavy engineer
35 equipment, that construction, as being abort criteria
36 for holding that land.

Beta

37
38 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And why not, sir?

39
40 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) : Because they were part of the build-plan, they
41 **Diamond** weren't part of the, you know, force protection,
42 initial force protection plan. I thought we had
43 enough combat power and enablers there, and they got
44 their positions in, that we could defend that as we
45 built. Because even when they came up, if they came
46 up on the 12th, you know, they would have had, you
47 know, started leveling the HLZ and been building up

1 the HESCO barriers around. The infantry was there to
2 secure the engineers. The engineers weren't there to
3 secure the infantry. And, you know, as I made a
4 comment to people before, it's not West Omaha. You're
5 not driving out there and putting in a subdivision.
6 Then when it's all built, you go in and move in. So
7 we have to go in there and understand that the
8 infantry were securing the engineers. And the
9 engineers weren't going to come in and, you know,
10 wiggle their nose and have the base done and then we
11 occupy. It was going to be, you know, stages of force
12 protection built. And it wasn't going to be done and
13 the whole wall wasn't going to be done before 1-26
14 came in. You know, ideally we'd have the perimeter in
15 a contiguous environment, turn that over to them.
16 But, you know, I told them that that's not a
17 reasonable expectation, to have that. So you're going
18 to have to fall in on this footprint.

19 **Sigma**

20 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) If I could? Your estimation that there was enough
21 combat power and enablers to defend that location was
22 based on the enemies traditional course of action over
23 the time prior to the establishment of the COP; based
24 on what you guys knew to be the most likely course of
25 action?

26 **Diamond**

27 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Right. That their inability to mass, to move
28 from Bella, mass on that--their general desire, and
29 we'd get indicators that they were conducting
30 reconnaissance. We'd see them with the LRAS, we'd see
31 them with the ITAS if they were moving around. Their
32 desire to dial in fires and do probing attacks to see
33 how we'd react; again, we thought they'd IED the roads
34 pretty heavily, so we'd watch that. Send up RCPs or
35 plant RCPs, show a signature of an RCP coming up. We
36 did not figure, I did not figure that they would mass
37 that force and conduct a deliberate attack within four
38 days of us getting there, sir.

39
40 MG Perkins: To follow up on that point then: When you take a
41 look at the assessment of adequate combat power then,
42 your assessment was there was adequate combat power
43 for that unit to defend itself from scratch? I mean,
44 obviously there's a plan for engineer efforts and all
45 that, improve quality of life and stuff like that; but
46 as you stated, that engineer effort was not essential

1 for adequate force protection and therefore was not a
2 go or no go criteria?
3 **Diamond**
4 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.
5
6 MG Perkins: In other words, that platoon can go up there with
7 a--as it was a blank sheet of land?
8 **Diamond**
9 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.
10
11 MG Perkins: And it can defend itself?
12
13 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) With those enablers and priorities of fire that
14 **Diamond** we had, that they can do that. And again, an example,
15 albeit, shorter periods of time, you know, a day long,
16 24 hour period, we had put--
17
18 MG Perkins: Understand you continued to improve your position.
19 But I just do want to clarify that the engineer
20 effort, in your calculation, when you do correlation
21 of forces and all that, the engineer effort was not
22 essential to the basic security requirement of that
23 platoon?
24 **Diamond**
25 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): That is correct, sir. Again, to emphasize to
26 that, again, they're civilian engineers--
27
28 MG Perkins: Understand.
29
30 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) So, you know, they're not adding to the combat
31 **Diamond** power. They're adding to the force protection.
32
33 MG Perkins: Understand.
34
35 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): And I can't be more emphatic, you know, again not
36 **Diamond** doctrinally or, you know, using commander's
37 visualization to say the infantry was there to secure
38 those engineers. If the engineers were delayed, the
39 infantry is still going to be there to secure them.
40 When the additional requirement came up, that, "Hey
41 now we need security to get from Nangalam up there,"
42 you know, we're ready to do that. So they were not,
43 go, no go criteria.
44
45 MG Perkins: I just want to be very clear on that because there
46 are discussions that somehow that's a requirement part

1 of a go, no go criteria. And from your point of view,
2 it is not?
3 **Diamond**

4 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): It was not. If there would have been indications
5 that the engineers, "Hey they're not going to come,
6 and you're not going get them--"
7

8 MG Perkins: Ever.
9

10 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Then, we would have had to go back into
11 **Diamond** negotiations of, "Okay, are we going to stay up here?
12 Now we've got a lot of stuff up there."
13

14 MG Perkins: Understand. You've clarified the point.
15 **Beta**

16 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): But you knew, sir, when you sent them up there on
17 the 8th, that the engineers were going to be there for
18 at least several days?
19 **Diamond**

20 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah.
21 **Beta**

22 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): The heavy engineer equipment, sir?
23

24 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. Until they got the HESCO walls built and
25 **Diamond** the initial force protection, and then the plan has
26 part of the walls being stone walls, which would take
27 a long time. But we're going to have initial force
28 protection with the HESCO barriers.
29 **Beta**

30 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And did you anticipate, sir, that the initial
31 force protection, provided by the platoon, would be
32 Soldier labor?
33 **Diamond**

34 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Correct.
35 **Beta**

36 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And what did you envision it would be, sir? What
37 level of protection would they be able to build to?
38

39 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Well, I figured that they'd have their fighting
40 **Diamond** positions in. And as you well know, we brought a
41 bobcat up there. You know, after the fact heard about
42 the issues that we had; but that's the first time it
43 ever put equipment in. I mean, you know, people talk
44 about filling HESCOs with shovels, that's what OP
45 Restrepo did. You know, with Dallas we brought in
46 some pre-FAB barriers because we could get there. You
47 know, it was very, very short--

1 [Beta]
2 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Did you add that HESCO, sir, after you learned
3 [Diamond] the engineers weren't coming up?
4
5 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Did I add what?
6 [Beta]
7 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did you add the bobcat after you learned that the
8 [Diamond] engineers wouldn't be up there right away?
9
10 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): No. I think it was, I think that was part of the
11 original plan on that. I'd have to look, but I think
12 that we were putting that up there.
13
14 MG Perkins: It's in the CONOP.
15 [Beta]
16 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): What I mean by--when you originally were planning
17 to perform the final version of the CONOP--yes, sir, I
18 realize it's on the final version of the CONOP. But
19 as you were planning to do Rock Move, did you
20 envision--did you have a bobcat, you know, it's
21 [Diamond] pretty--
22
23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I can't remember when we started talking about a
24 bobcat. I mean, you know, as we refined the plans,
25 tweak the plans, whatever, you know, that's not the
26 end of good ideas right there either. I mean, it's,
27 you know, that's briefed on the 7th, I think, to
28 General Milley. And there's probably additional good
29 ideas that aren't captured in that power point show
30 that went up there.
31 [Beta]
32 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): For the initial force protection that was to be
33 built by Soldier labor, sir, did you envision overhead
34 [Diamond] cover?
35
36 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): I would have expected that we would have put in
37 overhead cover and utilized some of the resources that
38 were there. And I know that was a detrimental
39 shortcoming that we didn't get all that in. I didn't
40 give specific guidance to Lieutenant Brostrom. I
41 never told him, "And ensure you put in overhead cover
42 on your position." Okay. What we did talk about is,
43 you know, the probing attacks will come, with RPGs,
44 and they're eventually going to get their indirect
45 fire in there. So, you know, again, I will not put
46 anything off on the Lieutenant. Whether it was a
47 false assumption on my part that that's an implied

1 task when you're going into that environment based on
2 the experience he had, you know, I'll take that. But
3 I know we were woefully short on indirect--or on
4 overhead cover.

5 **Beta**

6 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, would you expect a unit, whether
7 establishing an initial force protection, to conduct
8 security patrols?

9 **Diamond**

10 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): It really depends on the situation. And on, you
11 know, the enemy threat and would like to have--ensure
12 that they are conducting security patrols, but
13 sometimes we're going to be able to get the
14 intelligence by talking to the local population,
15 sometimes by the ANP. But, you know, through
16 observation, but most of the patrols that are security
17 patrols, but from the bases, stay within 800 to 1,000
18 meters, depending on terrain; they will be very local
19 patrols. But I would expect them to do security
20 patrols, and I know they were somewhat overwhelmed.
21 You know, I know this after the fact, they were
22 somewhat overwhelmed by their tasks, if you will, or
23 put a lot more emphasis on building their positions
24 than having any form of security patrol. And that
25 day, I know, they were planning on doing a security
26 patrol because they got to an adequate force
27 protection level where they felt comfortable enough to
28 do the security patrol.

29 **Beta**

30 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, we've seen, we've seen the CONOP for Rock
31 Move that deals with the movement out of Bella and the
32 initial movement into Wanat of supplies. And we have
33 your JFUB document that has the materials needed and
34 the end state of the plan.

35 **Diamond**

36 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Umm-hmm.

37 **Beta**

38 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, was there a CONOP or a plan that addressed
39 the actual build? When you mentioned that your
40 engineer RIP'd out, who was driving the train as far
41 on day, "On the 15th, we're going to have this done.
42 On the 20th, we're going to have this done;" who was
43 driving that, sir? Was it the Battalion driving that
44 or was that someone else?

45 **Diamond**

46 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): That was really between the XO and the S-4 and
47 then the engineers that we had on the ground up at

1 Bella. So they were put up there to supervise the
2 engineer company. They weren't put up there to build
3 individual fighting positions. They were put up there
4 to kind of be the foreman of the building of Wanat up
5 there.

6 **Beta**

7 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, the question--was it the engineer squad
8 leader, the U.S. Army engineer squad leader--

9 **Diamond**

10 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): On the ground, he was going to be the person that
11 was going to be controlling the primary build. And as
12 we starting bringing up assets, of course, you know,
13 the XO and the TAC, you know, people say, "Well, you
14 didn't go there the 8th to the 12th, maybe you
15 wouldn't have been there forever." Well, we would've
16 been there to check on, you know, if the XO is trying
17 to locate where the engineer equipment is and get the
18 engineer equipment up there, if the engineer equipment
19 had made it up there and was filling HESCOs and, you
20 know, on the 13th, we didn't have nine people dead,
21 but we had the initial probing attack, you know, we
22 would've been up there; just like we put a TAC up
23 there afterwards with the S-3.

24 **Beta**

25 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, one of the things that we look at when we
26 conduct the investigation is how other units
27 constructed COPs.

28 **Diamond**

29 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Umm-hmm.

30
31 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And your sister battalion, 1st of the 503d down at
32 Margah and Malekshay did full-up battalion CONOPs to
33 establish COPs where they had serialized load plans
34 and brought the construction--civilian engineers into
35 their convoys, that they surged additional forces so
36 that there could be security while Soldiers were
37 building the initial COP. Did you consider doing,
38 surging additional forces in support of this CONOP,
39 sir?

40 **Diamond**

41 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah. I think you have to look at--they had that
42 combat power to surge. And if you look at what their
43 footprint was how--where they were based at and how
44 they had flexible combat power and would rotate
45 platoons out to COPs to occupy and then come back,
46 they had an element of additional combat power. We
47 had 15 places where we were occupying at the same

1 time. Okay. So to surge combat power is accepting
2 incredible risk on other bases. And we can do that;
3 but how we offset that risk was by having QRFs. But
4 that QRF is also--in case another, in case Michigan is
5 getting hit, or in case our ANSF are getting hit along
6 the base. And we have echelon QRFs, but the initial
7 take is that they're able to defend themselves in that
8 area. We offset it again with enablers.
9

10 If you look at how we collapsed bases Narang,
11 California, and Florida, ground mounted ones, we got
12 no additional help. We were told that, you know, if
13 you're going to move them, you've got to do it
14 internally. So we'd have, you know, CONOPs to move
15 them internally.
16

17 When you look at how we set up Honaker-Miracle,
18 that was a four Vehicle Patrol Base, in the middle of
19 the field, with a pallet of water and a blue tarp is
20 how it started off. And that's how we ended up
21 building Honaker-Miracle. Okay. And, you know, very
22 similar, but to build Honaker-Miracle, we had to
23 collapse Florida, which was in such a precarious
24 position that, I mean, the risk to stay there was so
25 much higher. Very similar to Bella, the risk to stay
26 at Bella was so much higher than going to Wanat.
27

28 On, you know, the CONOP with the construction
29 plan, had we had additional forces so we could secure
30 with the company, I would have loved to use a company,
31 we didn't have it. We had to scrape and find
32 additional combat power to go find the engineers to
33 bring the engineers up to Wanat. So, I mean, it's a
34 different circumstance where 1st Battalion's at and
35 where we're at. You know, we put together a CONOP.
36 We put together CONOP based on the resources and
37 realities that we were faced with in our area and 14
38 months of experience in that area.
39

40 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): To that point, sir, you--Sigma

41
42 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Well, let me finish here too. Diamond

43
44 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Alright. Sigma

45
46 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Because, another important point, that might
47 Diamond resonate well with Marines, is we were a peripheral

1 island in the Pacific in 1942. It does not mean it
2 wasn't a tough fight. But it does mean that in RC
3 East who has priority of effort, it wasn't us. It was
4 my sister battalion--brigade that he was attached to.
5 Because you're aware I'm sure, that he wasn't in the
6 173d.

7 **Beta**

8 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Correct.

9
10 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay. That was the main effort for RC East. So
11 **Diamond** RC South is the main effort. I'm in RC East. Within
12 RC East, the other brigade is the main effort, and I'm
13 in 173d. Within 173d, we were never the main effort.
14 Okay. We were supporting effort all the time, never
15 declared the main effort on anything. Not to say we
16 resourced or weren't resourced and we're ignored, but
17 that's just the reality, is. You know, and the
18 Theatre was a supporting effort to Iraq. So, you've
19 got RC South, you got Colonel--I can't remember his
20 name, his brigade, you got 173d, and then you've got
21 2-503. But that was a reality we worked with all the
22 time. Is we were four echelons removed from the main
23 effort. Or, I should say, from the decisive effort of
24 any one of those areas.

25 **Beta**

26 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, one of the things we look at is command
27 attention or supervision of a particular operation.
28 And those with the sister battalion, you had a
29 battalion CONOP with an S-3 driving the actual build
30 of the COP.

31 **Diamond**

32 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Umm-hmm.

33
34 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): It sounds like with Rock Move you had the initial
35 **Beta** movement, then you had an engineer squad leader who
36 was in charge of the build? So, the level of
37 attention appears to be different. Can you explain
38 that?

39 **Diamond**

40 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Yeah. At that point in time, we have the
41 engineer squad leader out there that's going to do the
42 site prep. Okay. To equate him as being the sole
43 focus of building that post that is going to be there
44 for 14 weeks is kind of a simplification. He's going
45 to do the site prep for it. And then, as 1-26 is
46 rotating in, they're going to be taking over, you
47 know, the complete construction of that. We're two

1 weeks out. And everyone's concerned about that, but
2 we talked about why we're doing this at this time.
3 Our engineer squad leader--and we're going to come up
4 and visit them and see where they're at and make sure
5 everything's on track. And if we identify any issues
6 up there or the engineer squad leader, the company
7 commander calls down and says, "We've got some
8 issues," we will have a TAC up there or we'll put more
9 emphasis up there. There were no indications that
10 there were. I'm not sure how many in my sister
11 Battalion Commander, a fantastic guy, I'm not sure how
12 many posts he was on all the time, but when you look
13 at Kunar and where we were fighting--

14 **Sigma**

15 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): That was my question, how many, in your Battalion
16 footprint, how many COPs, et cetera?

17 **Diamond**

18 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay, I had 14 districts; it's oriented. Here's
19 Camp Blessing, here's COP Kahlar, here's Bella, up
20 here, Bella, COP Kahlar, Blessing. We go out to
21 Chapeh Darreh District, and we were going out there at
22 this time, here's the Korengal where we had about 400
23 of our 1,100 contacts. Along the Pesh, we had about
24 300 of our 1,100 contacts. In Chowkay, COP Narray
25 called Chowkay or Narray, in this area and in Destin's
26 area, we had about 200 contacts. In this, we had
27 about 50 throughout our tour, in this area. But we
28 were going ahead and had heavy contact going on or
29 routine contact going on here. We had contact along
30 the Pesh River Road. We went up as far as Monti, up
31 here, I was given three additional districts and MP
32 squad taken away in about January. So we had to go up
33 to Monti and come down to Surray, and nearly every
34 day, my TAC was on a road. Either seeing these patrol
35 bases--at this time, were doing heavy KLEs. On, I
36 think it was on the 10th of July, we had the Chairman
37 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff out at the COP. We got
38 air pulled I think to support 1-91. I'm not sure why
39 it was pulled, but we got out air pulled. So what was
40 supposed to be--

41 **Beta**

42 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): By the COP there, you mean Korengal outpost?

43
44 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Korengal outpost. So we got that air pulled. So
45 **Diamond** what was supposed to be about a two day venture or two
46 hour adventure ended up being about an 18 hour
47 adventure, because we had to put together patrols,

1 waited until night because the command wire came down
2 here, got onto (b)(2)High. We took Able Company's folks
3 back down to Able Main here and came back up. So,
4 again, anomaly there, that took time. We're still
5 meeting at the JCC, our province coordination center,
6 the PCC, meeting with the Governor and all the
7 security forces while we're out there. And, you know,
8 also bringing in the initial elements of 1-26 and
9 getting them settled in. So--

Beta

10
11 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, from the 8th to the 12th, sir, where were
12 you located, the 8th through the 12th of July?

Diamond

13
14 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): I was stationed out of Blessing, but I was going
15 all over the battle space. For example, on the 10th,
16 I was up on the COP. I can pull up my journal and
17 tell you where I was, doing what every day. But it
18 had to do with KLEs and, you know, meeting other
19 leaders and everything and continuing on the business
20 that we did on a daily basis there.

Beta

21
22 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Were you at the COP, specifically, because the
23 Chairman was coming, sir?

Diamond

24
25 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes. Well, and because we had, more importantly,
26 because we had Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6) getting a Silver
27 Star for another battle. So that was the primary
28 reason to be there, but he was giving it to him.

Beta

29
30 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): From the 8th--

31
32 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): But if I would have been giving it to him, I
33 would have been at the COP regardless.

Diamond

Beta

34
35 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): From the 8th to the 12th, sir, what was the
36 Battalion's focus of effort, sir?

37
38 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Well, the decisive effort of the Battalion
39 remained consistent throughout and that was our
40 arteries, A-Bad, J-Bad, freedom of action on A-Bad,
41 J-Bad and the Pesh River Road. Our supporting efforts
42 were always the valleys. And the enemy got a vote,
43 we'd change where our supporting efforts of focus
44 were, that was the main effort by doctrine. The main
45 effort, decisive effort don't need to be the same
46 thing, but that was the main effort and everything was
47 focused on that but that didn't mean everything else

1 could fall off the plate. You know, and that's a
2 frustration that I very much have: Is people like to
3 look in Wanat through a soda-straw like I got to put
4 everything else on hold in Kunar and a couple of
5 province of Nuristan that I had, and it's not the
6 case. I mean, everyday you're out doing key leader
7 engagements, meeting with people. You know, there's
8 concern that the 1-26 RIP-in, you know, detracted
9 focus. If it wasn't that, it would have been
10 something else. I mean, everyday we're prioritizing
11 tasks, resources, and allocating both combat power to
12 include C2 notes throughout.

Beta

14 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, did the Battalion have an SOP regarding
15 water load for Soldiers? Like, when they'd go out and
16 patrol, was there a Battalion SOP that dictated how
17 much water they should take with them?

Diamond

19 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Other than their camel pack, no, that's what
20 people took. But they--unit SOPs, I mean, we're very
21 good at PCCs, PSIs, they'd usually carry multiple
22 additional bottles of water with them, but everybody
23 carried their camel pack. I know when Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) Yankee
24 went up there, they all had filters. They all had
25 iodine tablets, because it's very--the resupply in
26 that area is very tough and is unreliable because
27 aircraft can get weathered in. So they had water
28 filters, and they had iodine tablets.

Beta

30 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Can you describe the water filters, sir?

Diamond

32 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I can't describe it, but you can go ahead and
33 purify the water through the--any water and--

Beta

35 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Is it a hand-held device, sir?

Diamond

37 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes. It's hand--they carried it, and they had it
38 with them. I mean, I've asked Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) this, Yankee
39 and he said he's got--had his filters with him.

Beta

41 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And was that something to be issued to every
42 Soldier or every squad, sir? Do you know?

Diamond

44 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): No. They were allocated to every squad. I know
45 not all of them were issued out. I found out
46 afterwards, but they were allocated to every squad.

Yankee

1 And I know Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) said he had his with him and
2 his iodine tablets.

Beta

3
4 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And the iodine tablets, sir, was that a standard
5 procedure to go out with iodine?

Diamond

6
7 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, it's--yeah, I'll say it is a standard
8 procedure to go out with iodine tablets in that way.

Beta

9
10 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Is that part of the first aid kit, sir, or is
11 that something separate?

Diamond

12
13 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) They come in the first aid kit but then you've
14 got to replenish them.

Beta

15
16 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you have any idea, sir, how many tablets it
17 takes to purify a quart or a gallon?

Diamond

18
19 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Well, for that, we'd put two in for a quart, in
20 the water that we were drinking there.

Beta

21
22 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And did you personally ever use the iodine, sir,
23 during that deployment?

Diamond

24
25 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Not while I was there, no.

Beta

26
27 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay, sir.

Diamond

28
29 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) But used it plenty of other times.

Beta

30
31 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, between the 8th and 12th, how are you
32 getting--at least on the 10th, you said you were out
33 at the COP, sir. Did you get back to Blessing before
34 the battle?

Diamond

35
36 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, because the battle was on the 13th.

Beta

37
38 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): When you were out, out at COP, sir, how were you
39 receiving information from your Headquarters?

Diamond

40
41 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Via TACTSAT through both my RTO and back up is
42 the Battle Company CP because that's where Battle
43 Company's CP was. They have ISR feeds, the rover
44 feeds, and everything inside their CP.

45

1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) **Beta** Did--while you were out at the COP, sir, did you
2 ever get any reports that there were issues at Wanat
3 regarding supplies?
4 **Diamond**
5 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) No. I didn't get any reports about Wanat when I
6 was up at Battle Company.
7 **Beta**
8 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) How about, sir, when you returned to Blessing?
9 Did you return on the 11th, sir?
10 **Diamond**
11 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) It was late night the 11th or early the--late
12 night the 10th or early the 11th.
13 **Beta**
14 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Did you receive any reports, sir, that there were
15 issues with construction supplies, water, any
16 equipment, sir?
17 **Diamond**
18 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Not that I'm aware of, no. You know, it would
19 have stuck out in my head.
20 **Beta**
21 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And who would have reported that to you, sir?
22 **Diamond**
23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): It would have been the XO or the Three.
24 **Beta** Oscar
25 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And did you talk to Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) at that time at
26 all, sir?
27 **Diamond**
28 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Not that I remember, no, because he was still up
29 Bella on the 10th.
30 **Beta**
31 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Do you recall him coming back to Blessing, sir,
32 because of the 15-6?
33 **Diamond**
34 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, he was coming back to Blessing because we
35 had closed Bella. So he came out on the last or one
36 of the last lifts from Bella to Blessing. And he had
37 heard the conversation between Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) and I **Delta**
38 on the radio about sending him up to Bella as soon as
39 he got back or sending him back up to Wanat as soon as
40 he got back.
41 **Beta**
42 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) What was that conversation like with Colonel
43 (b)(3),(b)(6) **Delta**
44 **Diamond**
45 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) He asked something to the effect, "Do you have
46 Company C2 up there right now?" And I said, "No, but
47 I'm going to put it up there when (b)(3),(b)(6) comes up. He's
Oscar

1 going to go back up with Chosen 6." And it stuck out
2 when people talked about it, because he'd said
3 something about, "Well, why doesn't (b)(3),(b)(6) go up there Salt
4 tonight;" and this was on the 10th or the 11th.

5 Beta
6 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Who's (b)(3),(b)(6) Salt sir?
7 Diamond Salt
8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): (b)(3),(b)(6) the Alpha Company Commander that had just
9 come out of command a couple of months prior. And I
10 Oscar said, you know, (b)(3),(b)(6) coming out here on the 11th,
11 and we'll send him up on the first thing on the 12th;"
12 and he was good with that.
13 Beta
14 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And that conversation, sir, was that before Rock
15 Move started or after Rock Move?
16 Diamond
17 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): No, that was during--towards the end of Rock
18 Move. It was--because we had intended on putting up
19 C2 up there. But for a number of reasons up at Bella
20 (b)(3),(b)(6),Oscar --we kept (b)(3),(b)(6) up there that was kind of the Oscar
21 primary focus. Main effort of Rock Move was moving
22 that, getting people out of Bella. That's where (b)(3),(b)(6),Oscar
23 was at, and it continued to have complications. We
24 had to adjust the tadpole and stuff. It was good to
25 have him up there. Him pushing, us pulling; and then
26 as soon as he got back, then we put him back up with
27 his other platoon.
28 Beta
29 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you recall him being at Blessing for a few
30 days, sir, after Rock Move was under way?
31 Diamond
32 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): No, I don't.
33 Beta
34 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): You don't recall any conversations with him?
35 Diamond
36 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): I don't recall.
37 Beta
38 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And, sir, he was--
39
40 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): And, I need to clarify, the Chairman came out on
41 Diamond the 11th. So, I came back either on the morning of
42 the 12th, late night of the 11th or the morning of the
43 12th.
44 Beta
45 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay, sir. So, before you went to the COP or
46 while you were there or then got back, you never

1 received a report of any issues with water, engineer
2 equipment, supplies, sir?

3 **Diamond**

4 COL (b)(3), (b)(6): No, not that I recall, at all.

5 **Beta**

6 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): Around the 4th of July, sir, there was incident
7 up around Bella where the fire mission was executed by
8 some Apaches.

9 **Diamond**

10 COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Okay.

11 **Beta**

12 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6): There was a 15-6. Were you subject to that 15-6,
13 or did you convene that 15-6, sir?

14 **Diamond**

15 COL (b)(3), (b)(6): I think--I can't remember who was the convening
16 authority on it; if I was or it was in conjunction
17 with the brigade. So I don't know if Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) **Delta**
18 signed the letter or if I did. I would have to look.
19 But, yeah, I was part and parcel of it. Because,
20 again, on the 2d, the OP up on, up at Bella was hit
21 with indirect fire. Signature, was a truck came in,
22 the ground forces associated that truck with the
23 indirect fire. They were hit at their OP. The FO was
24 severely wounded, MEDEVAC'd off the OP. On late night
25 the 3rd, early the 4th, the OP was hit or they saw the
26 trucks, wasn't hit again. They saw the trucks. They
27 got indirect fire. (b)(3),(b)(6) cleared the FO
28 to--he was up there, (b)(3),(b)(6) cleared the FO to
29 engage one of the trucks. FO, between the FO and the
30 aircraft, they engaged both the trucks. And I think
31 the FO who was FO RTO cleared them on both of them.
32 And, you know, we know we got some insurgents but we
33 know there were civilians mixed up into that. And we
34 had EVAC'd the people. A number of them came down to
35 our aid station. We brought the trucks back down to
36 the police station which is adjacent to Blessing. As
37 a matter of course whenever we have casualties or
38 suspected enemy casualties, we do gunshot residue. At
39 least two of them came up hot with gunshot residue.
40 And then, you know, we got a lot of SIGINT information
41 that said, you know, we have mortars and I think
42 you've probably seen the CONOP on that. So, but as a
43 unit, we were confident that we had civilian
44 casualties in that. And, you know, started talking to
45 the Nangalam District Governor and doing Shuras with
46 him in a really key leader engagements with him. And,
47 you know, ask him what do we need to do; we need to

1 sort it out, get the names. And--so that was kind of
2 an ongoing process that was going on at that time as
3 well.

4 **Beta**

5 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Did that change the dynamics up in the Waygal,
6 sir?

7 **Diamond**

8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) A lot of people ascribe to that, you know, and it
9 probably had a bit of a coalescing effect to what was
10 going on there, but I don't have or I don't lend
11 complete credence to the enemy being able to use that
12 as a sole motivating factor. And the reason being is
13 culturally, vadal or revenge or vengeance, it's a
14 series and Pashtoon-walley and, you know, Nuristani
15 and Poshtoons are different but there were--are
16 Poshtoons up in that area and they subscribe a bit to
17 the culture is vadal is built up over time. And it's
18 over numerous meetings and threats and, you know, what
19 we call off ramps where they can go ahead and get
20 talked off. We should have had a number of Shuras
21 with the Waygal people before there was a huge, huge
22 attack. They came down to the government. We met
23 with them. And it seemed that they understood that we
24 were remorseful. They understood that there was bad
25 guys there. They didn't want to admit it, but they
26 would agree that there were bad guys. The Governor
27 and the ANP Chief would talk to them. My counterpart,
28 Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6), would talk to them or did talk to them.
29 And, you know, everybody admitted that there--or came
30 to the consensus there were bad guys there but good
31 people were hurt, and we were remorseful for the good
32 people that were hurt. That's kind of how that was
33 left there.

34 **Beta**

35 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, when you developed CONOP for Rock Move, you
36 did your risk assessment and risk mitigation, and I
37 believe, Rock Move was initially slated to execute
38 end of June and then there was a push to the right.
39 In between that initial plan time and then the actual
40 execution, you had that incident up on the 4th of
41 July, did you consider that and reassess the risk in
42 mitigating steps that needed to be taken?

43 **Diamond**

44 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Well, really in the time that we completed, we
45 did. And you notice we really completed the CONOP on
46 about the 5th or 6th. So we had those discussions as,
47 you know, does this matter, and the decision was even

1 more so we need to get up and connect with the
2 population. That, again, we were worried about the
3 population's perspective not, you know, really the
4 enemy's perspective. If it makes sense, that we need
5 to push up there, we have a plan, we've got the
6 resources and everything's lined up. We push forward,
7 we connect. This will allow us to have a continuous
8 engagement with the population. A population that,
9 you know, is sitting on the fence. And if we're not
10 engaging them, they're going to be on the enemy's side
11 because the enemy is engaging them. So there is some,
12 you know, we talked about it, didn't blow it off;
13 thought that was yet another urgency factor to let's
14 go forward with this.

15 **Beta**

16 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, ISR coverage for Rock Move, what was your
17 understanding when Rock Move started, sir, how much
18 ISR coverage would you have?

19 **Diamond**

20 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I thought we were going to have ISR every time we
21 had air up in the, up in the Bella area. That we
22 would have ISR coverage for that until we got Bella
23 collapsed and we're established at Wanat. Established
24 meaning, we've got our ground force up there, we're
25 building. And we would ask for it all the time, and
26 ask, and make the argument and fight for ISR.

27
28 But after 14 months of dealing with the realities
29 of about two lines of ISR available, that when we're
30 not in contact on day four and the ISR goes away, it
31 doesn't mean we just quit. It means we ask and plead
32 the case for it. But fully knowing, you know, if I
33 had ISR overtop of me when we were in contact, I was
34 going to divert to our own internal contact. So it
35 perfectly makes sense to me when RC East has it and
36 they're looking at it, they see what's going on in
37 Wanat: "Okay, we closed out of Bella. Okay, they've
38 got some engineer issues. They've got it seized.
39 They're building their positions." And, again, I'm
40 not hearing about the water concerns. And, you know,
41 I've talked about this till nauseam, try to think
42 through, you know, what other concerns; and had that
43 came to our level, just like when we pulled up the QRF
44 with the First Sergeant, we would have launched him up
45 there and would have resupplied them. You know, we
46 could have done it with RCP. We could have done it
47 with the First Sergeant. We could have done it with

1 my TAC, if it would have been acknowledged at our
2 level.

3 **Beta**

4 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Indicators and warning, sir, did you get any up,
5 out of the platoon of things--dynamics in the village
6 itself?

7 **Diamond**

8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): You know, when--I remember that they said that it
9 was strange, kind of like, that it was a strange
10 environment. That there wasn't--initially all the
11 young men were there. They were reporting that.
12 They're right outside the wire. They're watching us
13 and stuff, but that was what they did at Wanat. I
14 mean, I've got pictures of other Shuras up there and
15 they just stand around in the bazaar. You know, and
16 now, we're right in the bazaar. We're right
17 co-located with them. So, I'm like, "Yeah, that's
18 what they do up at Wanat." You know, I never got the,
19 "Hey, they've evacuated out." In fact, nobody got
20 that until they realized it afterwards. But the
21 atmospherics were just Wanat atmospherics, to me. And
22 that's not to say that it was, you know, business as
23 usual or they were good atmospherics, it's just
24 different atmospherics in that town. And when you
25 have a condition change like the force staying there
26 for an extended period of time, of course, you're
27 going to have a different atmospheric.

28
29 But I do want to highlight on to--just put this
30 in context as we're talking about water in this
31 particular time. Because I've got a vision in my
32 head, 100 degrees right now, building their positions;
33 legitimate concerns about water had been raised, and
34 not raised to me. But raised in the context of
35 reporting an investigation; is they had their filters
36 with them. They had iodine tablets. They had a
37 river, and they had the well between--about 15 meters
38 outside the perimeter is the village well. We know
39 that because that's where all the young men would be
40 standing around. And the well is between the OP and
41 the perimeter. If given the discipline that that
42 organization has, coupled with the experience that
43 they have, had they had an overwhelming feeling of
44 threat to them, I think a couple of things would have
45 happened, and it would have spiked. One, they would
46 have been calling and reporting that they feel an
47 overwhelming threat, and they would have raised that;

1 and we would have had decision points about
2 reinforcing with combat power or enablers, because we
3 could have reinforced with the First Sergeant and the
4 platoon that ended up being there, had they reported
5 that. I don't think they didn't report it because I
6 don't think they felt that and maybe some of them felt
7 it in retrospect or knew it or whatever. Had they had
8 this overwhelming feeling, again, given their
9 experience, and what that platoon had been through,
10 that they would have had higher emphasis on
11 resupplying water out of that well, that would have
12 been a task that, you know, that they would have been
13 doing and water would not have been an issue. And I
14 don't think that water was an issue. I think bottled
15 water was an issue. I think their comfort factor of
16 being on Bella and other bases that we have where they
17 have 30 days of supply right there because that's a
18 minimum that we kept is certainly a security blanket.
19 But, again, knowing how disciplined that element is if
20 they thought, "Hey, we're going to get attacked in the
21 morning. We're going to get attacked shortly;" that
22 they would've, one, reported it; two, they would've
23 done everything they could have been--to have their
24 water. They would have done everything they could to
25 be filling bags and HESCOs and everything else, which
26 I think they did do. But given the threat, you know,
27 just like if you're out here in July, 100 degrees,
28 they moderated their work based on the threat, based
29 on the timeline. They knew it was an extended
30 timeline, and they worked in accordance with what they
31 perceived. I don't think they were lazy. I don't
32 think they were dumb. I don't think they did anything
33 wrong. I think that that's just the perception they
34 had, and they moderated it based on the conditions
35 that they felt and the experiences that they had.

36 **Beta**

37 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Did you know that they had reduced their
38 **Diamond** workload, sir?

39 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I didn't know that, no.

40 **Beta**

41 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And did you ever receive a report that they were
42 **Diamond** black on water, sir?

43 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) No. Not that I, I do not recall ever hearing a
44 report about their water being--and being black on
45 anything. Because when that happened--if you look at
46
47

1 what I consider my Task Force fight is C2, ISR, fires,
2 MEDEVAC, emergency resupply, and CERP, okay, the word
3 "black" get's my attention very quickly. And we would
4 come up with a resupply plan. I'm certainly not going
5 to have them out there--and it wouldn't be, "Willy-
6 nilly, hey, you got your filters, go ahead." If the
7 element calls me and says I'm black on anything, I am
8 pushing resources and stuff. Like I said, I had no
9 fear of going up into the Waygal with my TAC or
10 dragging anybody else with me up there. So had that
11 reached me, we would've taken action.

12 **Beta**

13 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And how would that have come to you, sir?

14
15 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): It would have come through the TOC. I lived in
16 **Diamond** the Blessing TOC. So when I'm there, it would have
17 come to me. If I'm out on the road, it'll come
18 TACTSAT. And if it comes to the TOC--the thing is
19 though--I mean, and if I'm out on the road just like
20 when they're clearing fires or they're authorizing
21 MEDEVAC, emergency resupply, the TOC, the S-3 or the
22 XO, whoever was in the TOC, would have been going
23 through the same procedures that I went through. And
24 that is figuring out how to resupply and getting that
25 resupply to that element ASAP. I mean, we did
26 emergency resupplies on ammo, water, food on a number
27 of occasions.

28 **Beta**

29 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, your unit had a log stat report?

30
31 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): It was up to the Company. The Company fills it,
32 **Diamond** Company doesn't--and then they have a consolidated
33 Company log stat that they put up to Battalion.

34 **Red**

35 Everyday (b)(3),(b)(6) on, everyday, he's on his headset
36 doing the Adobe Breeze meeting with the company XOs.

37 **Beta**

38 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And does, if you know, sir, what drives, I mean,
39 sometimes those reports are not necessarily accurate.

40 **Diamond**

41 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Right.

42 **Beta**

43 **Red**

44 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Is (b)(3),(b)(6) conversation with those company XOs
45 that drives the log replenishment?

46 **Diamond**

47 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, they have a log stat that they submit.
But, he, himself, the most diligent XO I know, was on
the headset with them in asking the second and the

1 third order questions. I mean, everyday, from day one
2 until we RIP'd, he was on the headset with them. The
3 XO would also routinely be razzing in on other
4 peoples' Adobe Breeze. Like at Brigade, that he
5 wasn't invited to, to listen in to what the logistics
6 status was throughout the Brigade. So, I mean, on a
7 daily basis, he had contact with the company XOs or
8 the company XOs' rep. And only when he was on leave,
9 was somebody other than him taking that Adobe Breeze
10 XO meeting. He was emphatic about that. He was
11 rarely out of the TOC, that's where he lived. So I'm
12 **Red** confident had (b)(3),(b)(6) heard about that, that I would
13 have heard about it, or he would have fixed it, one of
14 **Beta** the two.

15
16 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, some of the documents we had forwarded to
17 us, sir, are some log stat reports for the Battalion.
18 What I have here is the log stat reports for 12, 13,
19 and 14 July. So, the day before the battle, day of
20 battle, and the day after for the Battalion, reporting
21 for COP Kahler.

22 **Diamond**
23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay.

24 **Beta**
25 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And, sir, if you would take a moment to take a
26 look at that, sir?

27 **Diamond**
28 COL I haven't seen them for some--

29 **Beta**
30 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) It appears, when you go through the three days,
31 sir, there's really no information. The ultimate
32 question is, you know, who's reviewing these log
33 stats? This one's specifically set up for COP Kahler,
34 and there's no indication of any log support that they
35 have or require, sir.

36 **Diamond** **Red**
37 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, so it's a conversation--it's (b)(3),(b)(6)
38 reviewing these. But, you know, I don't know if it's
39 because that they're not officially up and they're
40 talking about it all the time. I'd have to ask him
41 why that, you know, this is, obviously, it is set up
42 for him, so that they're going to have a log stat and
43 they've got it done. But, you know, it's obvious
44 conversation with the XO, with Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) on a **Papa**
45 daily basis, on the daily Breeze that would highlight
46 what they're doing. So I don't have an answer for why
47 the COP Kahler log stat isn't there. I do know that

1 (b)(3),(b)(6) and Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) and all the XO's--but, (b)(3),(b)(6)
2 Papa and Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) had not only daily Breeze sessions
3 and conversation, but outside of the daily battle
4 rhythm, had conversations about COP Wanat.
5 Beta Papa
6 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And (b)(3),(b)(6) was co-located with your--
7 Diamond
8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) At Blessing.
9 Beta
10 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir. And, sir, just to reiterate, you had
11 no--from the 8th to the 12th, no indications of any
12 issues with supplies up at Wanat, sir?
13 Diamond
14 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Not that I remember, no.
15 Beta
16 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay, sir. And then, on the ISR, sir, on the
17 12th, did anyone approach you, sir, and say that,
18 "We're having--we've lost ISR?"
19 Diamond
20 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): I remember the S-2 coming up and letting me know
21 that we lost ISR, told him, "You go ahead and hit the
22 Two. You talk to Major (b)(3),(b)(6) about hitting the three Gray
23 channels and trying to get us ISR back on there."
24 But, again, this wasn't--this was a daily conversation
25 that we had.
26 Beta
27 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Did he come to you, sir, you know, almost pulling
28 his hair out?
29 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) No. It's not as emphatic as every--and he did
30 not need to. I mean, he didn't have to do that. I
31 mean, you have this picture that, "Oh, my God, you
32 lost ISR, come and pull your hair out;" that's not how
33 our organization operated. I mean, we're in contact
34 almost every day. So the crisis meter, even when we
35 had them, I mean, you probably heard the
36 conversations, the radio conversations between (b)(3),(b)(6) Oscar
37 Oscar (b)(3),(b)(6) and I when we're talking and he's saying, "Hey,
38 I've got four KIAs," and I'm more calm on the radio,
39 Oscar as (b)(3),(b)(6) was, than I am right now. Okay. We didn't go
40 into crisis mode in the pulling your hair out sense.
41 What are the facts, "Okay, you talk to the Brigade
42 Two. You talk to the Three. We'll go through three
43 channels until we got it." And he comes back, "Hey,
44 it's been pulled for a higher priority target," that
45 happens all of the time. We're not in contact. We
46 hadn't been in contact for four days up there.

1 There's no indications, to me, at my level, that we're
2 under imminent threat; that they have an imminent
3 threat or an impending threat, two different things,
4 or an impending threat that they cannot adequately
5 address at that time. So the conversations that the
6 **Foxtrot** Two had with Major--or Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) at the time and
7 **Foxtrot** Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) had, you know, I've seen the reports
8 and heard how emphatic and distraught they were, I
9 appreciate that, that's what they're supposed to do.
10 Okay. And I appreciate that they put that level of,
11 you know, concern in. But at 14 months, and it is not
12 complacency, it is reality, that we didn't have ISR on
13 most of our operations. Quite honestly, I was very
14 thankful that we had ISR for as long as we did over
15 COP Kahler. And we're going to continue to ask for
16 it, we are going to put in the request, but that's
17 what we do. And people allocate and resource based on
18 the priorities and all of the conditions and
19 everything that they had. Had I had ISR, it would
20 have went up to Wanat. If we got in contact, I would
21 have been pulling it from Wanat and putting it down to
22 the COP or over to Chowkay or to one of my other bases
23 and that's what Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) does and that's what
24 **Beta** General Milley did. **Delta**

25 **Magenta**
LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) On the 12th, sir, after Captain (3),(b) reported back
26 that it had been pulled for higher priority, did you
27 take any specific actions with higher Headquarters to
28 **Diamond** try to get additional ISR?

29 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): No. I talked to the Three and said, "Have you
30 talked to the Three, why not?" And he said, "It's
31 been prioritized for a unit in contact or a higher
32 priority." I said, "Okay, keep trying to get it. Try
33 to get it back. When that contact's done, keep trying
34 **Beta** to get it back."

35 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Were there at times, during your deployment, that
36 you personally called the Brigade Commander and
37 **Diamond** requested assets?

38 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Assets? Yeah. I don't think I ever personally
39 talked to him about ISR one time. I talked to him
40 about kinetic platforms. You know, to get bombers, to
41 get AH64s or kinetic effects that would come with ISR
42 of some sort of eyeballs on it. But, you know, for
43 the ISR, how resource poor we were and how few ISR
44 platforms, they're generally allocated to the unit in

1 contact. Okay. So unlike rotary wing and fixed wing,
2 although there's so little of that, comparatively,
3 there's a little bit, but there's comparatively more,
4 so there's routinely untasked Kiowas, AH64s, and fixed
5 wing air in the air. Or they've completed a TIC, and
6 it can get pulled. So, emphatically, I have talked to
7 him about that.

8 I may have on Rock Avalanche, when we were in
9 contact and got ISR pulled when we were in contact,
10 probably had talked to him or the Three about that.
11 When we're in contact and we would lose resources,
12 like that would happen routinely as well. We're
13 physically in contact or just did an air assault into
14 the mountains and we're on the ground for 15 minutes
15 and not in contact yet, my ISR gets pulled for an
16 element in contact, an aircrafts down, MEDEVACs
17 on-going, and that would occur. And then, I'd be
18 talking about that resource.

Beta

19 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, full motion video and the value of full
20 motion video in the Waygal specifically; I'm assuming
21 at some point that you have seen the full motion video
22 feed in Waygal?

Diamond

23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Right.

Beta

24 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Can you describe what those feeds looked like?

25 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I mean, we'd see Predator shots of Waygal. My
26 emphasis to my TOC is to prevent--is not to get target
27 fixation or friendly fixation and to be looking in the
28 high ground avenues of approach. They knew that by
29 this time, so, you know, on the MERC, they'd be
30 MERCing in to where we should go, what we should be
31 looking at for the Predator. But I did not stand in
32 the TOC. Again, I was gone much of this time around,
33 about--I didn't sit and stare at the Predator feed.
34 Okay. The Battle Captain, the Three, the XO, they're
35 running the TOC, are doing that. The Two is watching
36 it but that's it.

Beta

37 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) During your tour, sir, whether in the Waygal or
38 elsewhere, did full motion video ever, on its own
39 without being cross-cueued with another INT platform,
40 come across bad guys and give you actual intelligence?

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Very, very few times, very few times. Probably,
2 if I had to guess, probably less than 20 times in 15
3 months. I mean, we've got a very good Predator film
4 of picking up people. And really, I don't know if we
5 have any examples of it picking up, aerial based ISR,
6 picking up enemy before contact. I can't think of an
7 example. But when we'd get contact and we could get
8 it over, I mean, we got a very good video of a DISHKA
9 position and them hauling. And what we could really
10 see is them hauling a hot DISHKA to an area and then
11 the Predator ended up engaging them. Other time, when
12 Blessing was attacked, picking up three people, again,
13 moving out carrying more hot weapons. But, as a
14 further example, different platform, but a Shadow was
15 over top of a platoon movement, Bravo 1-6, on 25
16 October, we're watching them. And I just made the
17 comment, "That's a pretty disciplined road-march
18 formation." They're coming off of a five day hard
19 fight, had lost a great squad leader in it,
20 transformed the Korengal Valley, and they're moving
21 very well tactically down this mountain trail. It was
22 Hilux capable, very good dispersion, and all of the
23 sudden I saw them taking action. But we could not,
24 they were in a near ambush, we could not see where the
25 enemy was. There was Apaches immediately over the top
26 of them and there was three RPGs and three RPKs, 10
27 meters away from this force, and we couldn't see any
28 enemy firing in to the point where the lead, the lead
29 team leader was shot six times and ended up dying but
30 that's where Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) is being awarded--well,
31 not awarded, he's recommended for the Medal of Honor
32 for IMTing through that ambush, getting his squad
33 leader out of way, getting--recovering, Sergeant
34 **Money** (b)(3),(b)(6) was getting carried off by enemy. We could
35 see none of that. And they're on a mountain, you
36 know, right on the sides of a mountain trail because
37 of the vegetation and everything. So that was yet,
38 again, we were using the ISR in that case purposefully
39 to screen the road ahead of them, and we didn't see
40 them.

Beta

41 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): From the 8th to the 12th, sir, the ISR coverage
42 you had, did you feel it was sufficient?

Diamond

43 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, for the Waygal, it was sufficient. And I
44 say that because the Predator, very high visibility or
45 very high demand platform, is the only thing that can

1 fly up there. Now Predator, Warrior Alpha and fixed
2 wing aircraft, but the Brigade Shadow can't fly up
3 there; can't make it up there. These Ravens talked
4 about in Cubbison's report can't fly into mountains
5 anywhere. They're probably great for Iraq. They
6 don't work where we were at. So that one platform,
7 ISR specific platform, and I don't know how many lines
8 RC East had available to it, I think that it was two,
9 might have been less than that, might have been one, a
10 line being 24 hour orbit of ISR, but to have that for
11 the preponderance of the time, 8-12, was, I thought
12 was surprising to me. I'll put it that way,
13 surprising to me that we had it. If we would have
14 been in contact every four hours, six hours, if we
15 would have been in contact like where Restrepo was
16 when we put that in, contact 13 times in like 24 hour
17 period, I would have expected that to stay there and
18 would have been much more adamant about that being
19 pulled away and much more personally involved. Having
20 not had any contact and hearing and knowing my
21 elements in contact and knowing that the rest of
22 Brigade and RC East is in contact, it wasn't
23 surprising to me that it was pulled.

Beta

Oscar

24 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, when Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) made it up to Wanat before
25 the battle, did you speak to him at all on the radio?

Diamond

26 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I talked to him a couple of times. I don't
27 remember what the context of the conversation was.

Beta

28 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Do you recall, did he ever mention going to a
29 dinner with one of the local leaders?

Diamond

30 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I don't recall him talking about that because I
31 don't think that I talked to him after that Shura.
32 Now, I've had so many conversations about that dinner
33 since. I mean, I know about the dinner, but I don't
34 think that I heard about that dinner when he concluded
35 it at 2200 or whatever. I don't think he called me
36 and said, and he may have, I just don't remember.

Beta

37 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, when you directed the execution of Rock Move
38 on the 8th, you had a sense of the risk in Wanat. Did
39 you receive any information on the 9th, 10th, 11th or
40 12th that caused you to change your assessment of the
41 enemy threat in Wanat?

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) No, I didn't. I had conversations but there was
2 nothing outside of what the parameters, I thought
3 Wanat was going to be like from talking, you know,
4 routinely to the Two, talking to the Three, having
5 been up there, having been talking about moving to
6 Wanat, you know, for six, seven months and really
7 focusing on moving to Wanat in the last couple weeks
8 with things going on, all of the reports that I got
9 did not sound anything different than what we kind of
10 expected to feel in Wanat. Population, on the fence,
11 they're going to be watching us. If we look back and
12 link now all the pieces, like I say, I don't think
13 anybody acknowledged that the population had moved out
14 until after, certainly after that meeting with, I
15 think it was (b)(6) I think that is what his name
16 is. And he kind of gave some ambiguous warnings. But
17 they're only ambiguous warnings now, because (b)(6),
18 **Beta** I think that' his name, I can picture him.

19 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

20 Col (b)(3),(b)(6) I mean, when he came to Blessing, he was very
21 **Diamond** adamant about what he was saying and was very clear.
22 He wasn't deceptive, he wasn't, "Hey, there's enemy in
23 here. They're threatening the ANP. We know--we
24 can't", you know, he was very open and direct. So,
25 this, "Well, he kind of had some mass warnings,"
26 that's not how he acted. That's not how (b)(6)
27 heck, on some of these KLEs, I've got KLEs just with
28 (b)(6) listed, and he was very--he didn't talk in
29 analogies or maybe, perhaps, and kind of cloaked what
30 he was saying. And he didn't and a lot of Shuras
31 either. He was a guy that was pretty straight
32 forward. If you look at the Shura pictures, from 26
33 May, he's the guy I'm sitting right next to in there
34 and bullshitting about our families and stuff like
35 that. And so, to me, to look back and say, "Well, (b)(6)
36 (b)(6), in his own house, with only his son had some
37 cloaked warnings," okay, maybe when we look back
38 they're cloaked warning. I don't think (b)(3),(b)(6) **Oscar**
39 **Oscar** (b)(3),(b)(6) took them as imminent threat in that meeting,
40 unless he told you something different. I haven't
41 heard him, you know, do anything but reflect back and
42 say he was probably thinking, or he probably knew, or
43 he may have knew and did not tell us; and all of us
44 kind of surprised if he did know, he didn't tell us.
45 And I think that the element even thought--was very

1 surprised that fire came from (b)(6) house when it
2 did.

Beta

3 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Why is that, sir?

4 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Because he was like the friendliest guy in that
5 village. And there's kind of a--you know how the
6 layout is of the village. How close he is, how close
7 his house is to the perimeter. It's right on the
8 perimeter. And to have no definitive early warning
9 from (b)(6) is somewhat surprising I think to
10 everybody. And you can look back and maybe with
11 wanting to believe (b)(6) would give us early
12 warning and say, "Well, you know what he did is when
13 he had dinner, he was trying to tell us that this
14 threat, this imminent threat, this attack is going to
15 happen." But I am not confident, at this point, that
16 (b)(6) knew that, because I think he probably would
17 have said something. He probably would have said
18 something, either come in the perimeter and left, or
19 done something. But I am not confident, and maybe I
20 believe in that guy a little too much. But I think if

Oscar

(b)(3),(b)(6) would have come out of that Shura and
22 thought, "Hey, I'm going to get attacked in six
23 hours," he would have got on the radio and done a hell
24 of a lot more. I think he also, when they picked up
25 that element with the TOW, they would have blasted
26 them. I mean, we shot 108 TOWs. It wasn't like a
27 restricted supply item or anything. So if (b)(6)
28 tuned him in that, "Hey you're going to be attacked
29 tomorrow," or, "All of the young men left," I think
30 their trigger that next morning in stand-to probably
31 would have been a little tighter instead of wanting to
32 believe in a population like they did, you know, it
33 was a separation of seconds of who was going to shoot
34 first and we didn't. And I think it's because all
35 things considered, building up there, that they did
36 not perceive an immediate threat at Wanat. And so,
37 when I look at it from my perspective knowing that
38 platoon and I see--while when you look back, like we
39 have to and we should, and try to look at where are
40 the indicators that we missed, I'm just--I'm not sure
41 that--you know, I know we missed them. I'm just not
42 sure where they were at. I just don't know. Because,
43 again, if (b)(3),(b)(6) especially when (b)(3),(b)(6) is up there,
44 he knows his First Sergeant is six kilometers away, 45
45 minutes away, and he can call with another platoon,

Oscar

1 "Hey man, this is jacked up area up here. You know, I
2 don't know why we did not know this or anything but
3 this is what we need, we need you, get the Battalion
4 Commander, get the RCP this and that," none of that
5 expressed concern came up. And I refuse to believe it
6 was because of negligence of Lieutenant Brostrom,
7 **Yankee** Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6), or (b)(3),(b)(6) just completely oblivious **Oscar**
8 to indicators, if they felt them and perceived them.
9 And I think our relationship across our unit between
10 that Company Commander, the Battalion XO, Company
11 Commander, me, the Company XO, Battalion XO, I mean,
12 just every dot you draw, the relationships were such
13 that everybody would have been busting their ass to
14 **Beta** help that organization or do what we could.

15 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, I'd like to take you back to the movement
16 itself on the 8th and 9th for Rock Move up to Wanat.
17 Was there any--there were some airlift schedules, sir,
18 to move some people and equipment up on the 9th. Was
19 **Diamond** there any issue, sir, with that air that you recall?

20 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah. We were continuously monitoring the
21 TADPOLE and had to make adjustments other--that's the
22 plan right there and then we have to adjust off of the
23 plan. And I know that some of the loads didn't go in,
24 some of them didn't get in for whatever reason. And
25 again, what's the second and third order effect?
26 Nothing, this is what we're going to do, we're going
27 to take a Bella re-supplier and we're going to get in
28 another leg. And they'd talk me through what our
29 **Beta** off-set is for that, what's our backup plan for that.

30 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Was that tied to the aircraft availability, sir?

31 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): I don't remember why we lost legs. But again,
32 **Diamond** every--we call them Pesh resupply, when we resupplied
33 Bella, resupply the COP in Vegas, it's called Pesh
34 resupply. Every Pesh resupply through, at that time,
35 14 months, had a change, every one of them. You know,
36 when I say, "every one", I think there was literally
37 two or three that did not, and it was a big deal. You
38 know, "That went just as we planned, that went just as
39 we planned." We'd have at least two a week or try to
40 have two a week. And it was the rare one, I'll say
41 emphatically, that went as planned. So we have the
42 TADPOLES, we're still doing the resupplies, and we're
43 working in extra legs in amongst the resupplies and,
44 umm-hmm--

1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) **Beta** The extra leg to get up to Wanat, sir?

2 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Right. And trying to work that balance of what
3 **Diamond** is focused air on Wanat and what is cycling in to do
4 other things.

5 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Did you personally have to get involved with
6 **Beta** getting any additional aircraft, sir, or ensuring that
7 the aircraft stayed to do the turns?

8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, just in the getting it in the CONOP, and to
9 **Diamond** emphasize, that once we start, we can't be half
10 pregnant on this. Once we start, I start taking
11 combat power from Bella. So we have to--have to
12 complete this. So, on the 8th and 9th, I was looking
13 pretty hard at what our air was. I don't remember
14 getting personally involved in the sense of talking
15 to, you know, anybody at Brigade or what. Internally,
16 we were having discussions about what was making it in
17 and what's not making it in, but I don't remember what
18 **Beta** those conversations were.

19 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, part of the CONOP called for a significant
20 amount of Class IV to move up by ground convoy, jingle
21 trucks. Are you aware of whether that convoy ever
22 **Diamond** made it up to Wanat?

23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I know it didn't make it up there. And
24 initially, the question was, because we had slung some
25 stuff up there, they had that, I think again, we're
26 talking about flat tires and mechanics, but it was
27 going to come back and get refitted at Blessing. But
28 **Beta** I don't remember that being a significant event.

29 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) It was reported to you, sir, at some point on the
30 **Diamond** 9th or 10th or 11th?

31 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I remember, I think it was early on that the
32 loads of jingle, the first loads of jingle trucks did
33 **Beta** not make it up there.

34 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay. Did you personally give any directions,
35 **Diamond** sir, on how to--

36 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I remember having a conversation, "How we are
37 **Beta** going to get it up there?"

38 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Was that with Major ^{Red}(b)(3),(b)(6), sir?

Diamond

Red

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) That would have been with Major (b)(3),(b)(6) We may,
2 at that time, have had the S-4 there as well.
3 Usually, the Three was in on those conversations
4 because of, you know, the air piece of it. And he'd
5 be involved in that on the HLZ. But what the off-sets
6 are for other organizations or what other moves that
7 we have. So I don't remember--I remember having a
8 conversation, I don't remember the content of that
9 conversation.

10 [The testimony broke at 1130, 20 November 2009.]

11 [The testimony continued at 1139, 20 November 2009.]

Beta

12 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay, gentlemen, we are back on the record.

13 Sir, on the day of the battle, on the 13th, can
14 **Diamond** you describe your actions please?

15 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah. By chance, very early, that I was in the
16 TOC at that time, and I remember the call. The
17 **Oscar** initial call from (b)(3),(b)(6) got on the phone--or got
18 on the radio, very short order. I could tell he was
19 in heavy contact. He was very calm. And in a very,
20 very brief time, he said, "We got four KIAs," which
21 obviously was kind of put a different level of urgency
22 even in the TOC. I said, "Okay, do you have everybody
23 on your OP and everybody inside the wire?" "Yes," and
24 he did. Turned to the Fire's desk and told him to put
25 protective fires around them, pick the targets for
26 them, obviously safe distance, and got a couple fire
27 missions pretty quick; a few rounds out really quick
28 to show the enemy that we could hear them and see
29 them. And then we just started stacking up assets on
30 top of them.

31 **Oscar** Talking to (b)(3),(b)(6) shortly thereafter, I think that
32 he reported six, seven, eight, and we didn't hear
33 about the ninth KIA for quite some time until after
34 the QRF came up. Part of that, as the Fire's
35 discussion, I mean, in the same conversation, told
36 Three to alert the QRF or somebody in the TOC, alert
37 the QRF, get the First Sergeant in here. He came in
38 and told him what we got and told him to keep it
39 together and get his QRF out and ensure that they
40 bring--they were already loaded up, and I said, "Make
41 sure you bring extra water and ammo up there because
42 they're going through a lot of ammunition right now."

1 So, the QRF launched. And then, I mean, it was an
2 extended battle all day. We had a pretty good
3 practice for alerting our TAC, so I told (b)(3),(b)(6),Gray
4 "I'll put you and the FSO up there to augment him,"
5 and made the conscious decision to stay where I could
6 **Blackhawk** best C2. I called (b)(3),(b)(6) the Alpha Company
7 Commander, and told him to get his CP and a platoon
8 moving. He started moving down the road. And we're
9 also calling for air to get an air QRF from Bravo
10 Company to come in and, I mean, that was--I don't want
11 to say our norm, but it was pretty close to our normal
12 reaction as we could feel a very intense battle
13 building. It takes so long to get assets in to move
14 in that battle space that we've got to have an
15 immediate reaction, that was the QRF. So those were
16 the primary methods. And then in later conversations
17 with Brigade, they were going to push the ODA with the
18 commandos, the Afghan Commandos who were phenomenal.
19 They came in quite a few hours later.

Beta

20 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) With the aviation QRF, sir, did you form an
21 opinion? Did they get there quickly? Did they take
22 **Diamond** too long?

23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I thought that they were ahead of where we
24 normally would have them. And I know that there's
25 concern about crossover and NODs and when they got
26 there. But, the routine--probably norm for them
27 getting into our area was, you know, 30 to 45 minutes
28 getting to the Northern tiers of our area into a
29 complex fight. When they got there in an hour or so,
30 I thought they were pushing, they were pushing hard.
31 But I think that they got there as fast as they could.
32 The B1s, surprisingly, they were already in the air,
33 so they were able to push quickly. Our JTAC did a
34 super job passing 9-lines so they could come in pretty
35 hot. I think the first bombs off were about 30
36 minutes from the time of our initial report, which is
37 a lot faster than we normally have bombs off. To have
38 bombs off and on target in 30 minutes was pretty good.

39 LtGen Natonski: Where was the JTAC?

40 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) He was located in the TAC--in our TOC, sir, and
41 **Diamond** we would always, almost always use Type II CAS up
42 there.

1 LtGen Natonski: Who was calling the JTAC to tell him what to
2 target?

Oscar

3 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) was, the Company Commander was, sir.

Diamond

4 And we were talking to him, but our Fire's desk was
5 doing an awful lot of backside support for him. Once
6 we knew the--once we knew where--that everybody was on
7 the Vehicle Patrol Base, he didn't have his patrol out
8 and was on the OP, we could target the areas when he
9 wouldn't have to give--we could do the 9-line mission.

10 LtGen Natonski: Who controlled the Apaches?

Oscar

11 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) did, sir. And we've got very good

Diamond

12 voice cuts of that I think. You might have heard
13 those, but yeah, he was controlling them. And then
14 when Dewayne Mantle came up there, my FSO with the
15 TAC, he helped (b)(3),(b)(6) at that time. Oscar

Beta

16 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, at some point, you went up to Wanat. Was
17 that on the afternoon of the 13th?

Diamond

18 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) No, it was the morning of the 13th. I was--I
19 think it was about 11, 1120, or something like that,
20 we got there. (b)(3),(b)(6) was up there by that time.

Blackhawk

Blackhawk

21 (b)(3),(b)(6) is the Alpha Company Commander. I went
22 up, did an assessment of (b)(3),(b)(6) walked the terrain with
23 him at that time and--- Oscar

Beta

24 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): When you walked the terrain, sir, and you saw the
25 position, the defensive positions that were in place
26 where the OP was located, what were your thoughts?

Diamond

27 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I was actually surprised at that time that the
28 positions were done as well as they were. I thought
29 they had done an awful lot of work. I looked at the
30 sighting where they were at, was comfortable with the
31 sighting knowing the conditions and everything that
32 went into the plan and where they were going to be and
33 where there vehicles were. I'd asked (b)(3),(b)(6) where some Oscar
34 of the vehicles were; if the vehicles were still where
35 they were and how they augmented and moved their
36 vehicles. And I was comfortable with that.

Oscar

37 The OP, (b)(3),(b)(6) and I had a conversation about that.
38 He said, "Initially I wasn't real comfortable with
39 this but it's kind of like we had, had to select the
40 less bad solution on that." We talked about, you

1 know, could have we went here, should it have been
2 here, should it had been up on here. And I was
3 comfortable that out of many bad choices that they had
4 that no good--no real obvious better choices, that
5 they had done the best that they could. And again,
6 tying into the boulders that they had, again, maybe
7 they could have been five meters forward but maybe
8 they would have a lot less force protection at that
9 time as well. So we went up through the different
10 areas where the enemy had fired from. And I remember
11 just being absolutely amazed that the enemy had
12 occupied the house to the East of us, and that they
13 had been all through the bazaar and fired from the
14 Mosque. And, I mean, it's not unheard of to have them
15 fire from a Mosque, but it just really caught me by
16 surprise that they actually fired from that Mosque,
17 **Beta** just the culture of that area and how the people are.

18 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Why did that surprise you, sir?

19 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Just because of the culture of the people of
20 **Diamond** being pretty proud and being, how should I say, being
21 kind of in control, kind of possessive of their area;
22 just like they were with us. I was surprised that
23 people shot from the Mosque because, in my mind, these
24 are outsiders, people from outside of Wanat coming in
25 there. So it was surprising to me that people who I
26 perceived as kind of abrasive, kind of tough, very
27 possessive, kind of controlling people, would
28 basically just abandon their village to the people and
29 that--I don't know, for some reason, it sticks out in
30 my mind that it was just odd that people were able to
31 shot from the Mosque. I didn't have the same feeling
32 about the motel which is kind of a possession. I
33 didn't have the same feeling about the bazaar area, I
34 got that, but just that and from (b)(6) house. So
35 **Beta** those two, two areas were kind of surprising to me.

36 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, you mentioned you were somewhat surprised by
37 the level of defensive measures that the Soldiers had
38 been able to take. From the 8th to the 12th, had you
39 **Diamond** been given updates as to the status of the build?

40 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, but not--I had been given--I knew it was
41 **Beta** progressing, again--

42 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): And who would give you those updates, sir?

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): From talking to the Three because, again, a lot
2 of times I was out, I'd come out and say, "Where are
3 they at, any concerns," when I'd get back in. And,
4 "No, they're getting into their positions. The OP is
5 about done," and just as we talked about, we're having
6 problems with the engineer, "Who had this," but I'd
7 get those updates. I just thought that they'd done a
8 lot of good work in a comparatively short period of
9 time.

Beta

10 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, within a day or two--

Diamond

11 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I was thankful that they had.

12 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Within a day or two there was some discussion and
13 then eventually a decision to withdraw, did you
14 participate?

Beta

15 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Absolutely. And it's instructive for you to see
16 and maybe have it as an exhibit, "Post Wanat Courses
17 of Action", is went through, with my staff in the
18 timeline, because I was getting asked the question,
19 and I said, "We've got to do mission analysis on this.
20 I don't want to make an emotional decision on this."
21 So we came up really, really with four different COAs.
22 And, like I meant to say and I told you yesterday, I'm
23 emphatic that that area is known as AO Rock and that
24 is my area, Rock-6's area as part of other areas. And
25 I adamantly said that we went and we put a lot
26 emotional energy into this, but we need to step back
27 and make the right decision because everybody is going
28 to be questioning whatever decision we do, and we've
29 got to make the right one.

Diamond

30 We looked at what was our purpose for going up
31 there? Was to connect with the Governor, mentor the
32 ANSF, bring economic development, kind of went in--all
33 of those together would win the IO fight and when the
34 population. Well, prior to the morning of the 13th,
35 we had a good district building, and we knew a
36 questionable Governor. And we had a questionable
37 Chief of Police in the police station, and we had an
38 economic bazaar, and we had a population that we think
39 was sitting on the fence, and we just needed more
40 contact with them, more engagement with them,
41 nonlethal engagement with them.

1 Sometime late the morning of the 13th, we
2 realized our Governor was culpable in that there were
3 no bullet holes in the District Center. Nobody
4 attacked the District Center. There was no damage to
5 the new District Center. Our Governor was culpable.
6 And feeding in 26 May and 8 June ambushes, SIGINT
7 received with that, the Governor was culpable. The
8 Police Chief was culpable. I know you've read,
9 afterwards, when the Commandos came in and they
10 cleared those structures, a lot of dirty weapons and
11 ammunition and everything there, police all in fresh
12 new uniforms. They were never in new fresh uniforms
13 up there. The economic bazaar, for the most part, was
14 destroyed through the fighting. The population, in
15 our kind of time of need, it abandoned us. They were
16 no longer around there and it doesn't matter, even if
17 they had been still there, it was going to take a lot
18 of work to win over that population or get back to a
19 baseline with that population. It would take an
20 incredible amount of combat power that the incoming
21 unit did not have to now secure this area. Now that
22 there's this known, credible threat here, it will take
23 a lot more combat power.

24 But we knew we had a tactical victory at a very
25 high cost based on the SIGINT and the casualties that
26 we knew that we inflicted on the enemy. And it was
27 transforming like the similar battle in Watah Pur and
28 a similar battle in Korengal. So my recommendation
29 was that we pull back to Blessing, not invest
30 additional resources at this time. We pull back to
31 Blessing. We build what we call a castle-like OP;
32 they've got a number of them around Asadabad. A
33 castle-like OP North of Blessing, kind of as a last
34 line of defense to Blessing and Nangalam, our economic
35 center, and we put renewed effort into building the
36 road and pushing the road to the District Center. But
37 we cannot abandon the people on this one. We've got
38 to keep pushing the road and get it to the District
39 Center.

40 The commandos arrested the Governor so we thought
41 we were going to get a new governor. The commandos
42 arrested the Governor and the Chief of Police. And we
43 thought that was the beginning to the transformation
44 of that valley right there: The battle, huge loses,
45 step back, push the road, push the projects, major

1 Shuras. And when I say push the projects, you'd have
2 to go back and renegotiate everyone. All of them will
3 now come out and renegotiate but go through that
4 culturally right thing to start connecting individuals
5 to the Shura, the Shura to the central government, and
6 start building it up; but it will be based on pushing
7 that road. And that was my recommendation is to pull
8 back. And forwarded that up, it was a decision at--I
9 think we briefed that on Adobe Breeze to General
10 Milley. I cannot remember, maybe to General
11 Schloesser, or I just pushed it up. I cannot remember
12 how we conveyed--well, I might even have it on the
13 timeline. Yeah, this is all of our internal timeline
14 that--but then we pushed that up and made that
15 recommendation.

Beta

16 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Did you consult, sir, with the incoming unit?

17 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, and I should have mentioned that,

Diamond

18 absolutely. I mean, Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) my replacement
19 from 1-26 showed up the morning of the 14th. He had
20 the forward elements there. They had, had an
21 interesting time watching, watching that. We could
22 tell that it was hard on him. His S-3 was one of the
23 five majors in the Army that had not been on a combat
24 deployment yet. In fact, he was up at the COP with me
25 at some point in time, not in these previous few days
26 but on another time, and there was a TIC going on in
27 the Korengal, a complex TIC. And, this goes to the
28 level of training, the COP was not taking any fire but
29 about three other bases in the COP were taking fire
30 simultaneously. And I was sitting in the TOC, FSOs
31 doing great work, our Company Commander is doing great
32 work deconflicting ISR, ground maneuver forces, and I
33 had just repositioned 105s. I looked over at the FSO
34 and I said, (b)(6) " I said, "I know those 105s can hit
35 your southern targets." And he smiled, and he goes,
36 "Yeah, you're right, sir." He goes, "I've got targets
37 for them," and cranked up calls. And the S-3's eyes
38 were wide open and he said, "This is the first time
39 I've been in combat, what do I do, what do I do?" I
40 said, "Well, you don't get to come down here at 10
41 o'clock on a sunny day and start fighting the company
42 commander's fight. You make sure he's resourced. You
43 make sure he's applying and synchronizing and
44 deconflicting his resources. And that, that's all you
45 can do. This is the company commander's fight"; but

Citrus

1 that's an analogous to Wanat. It is an analogous to
2 Chowkay, to all of the other bases, is you don't get
3 to insert like that. You make sure you can get all
4 the resources you can get and push them to them.

Beta

5 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, there has been some discussion about the use
6 of the term "Vehicle Patrol Base". The CONOP was
7 designed to build a COP.

Diamond

8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Right.

9 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Beta Occasionally, on the CONOP, "VPB" is listed. It
10 appears after the battle, the 15-6 is initiated,
11 there's almost a lock-step use of the term "Vehicle
12 Patrol Base" versus--and COP is not used at all. Did
13 you participate in the discussion of that terminology,
14 sir?

15 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah. My point on the Vehicle Patrol Base is
16 that's the initial--what we were building is COP
17 Kahler. Okay. It's a deliberate action to build COP
18 Kahler with JFUB resources, and we talked about that,
19 that's the COP. The initial piece that went up there
20 was a vehicle patrol that had to self-secure in a
21 patrol base and then they improved their positions.

Diamond

22 But I think the discussion, and I know some are
23 on the record trying to maybe revise this, but the
24 Vehicle Patrol Base is, like when we'd go to Chapeh
25 Darreh or we'd go to other areas, the principles
26 associated with any patrol base apply. You secure,
27 you improve your position, you put your OPs out.
28 Ideally, you'd have security patrols out if you're
29 going to occupy it for an extended period of time.
30 But that is initially a Vehicle Patrol Base.

31 As we brought in the resources and over the 14
32 week build and it probably would have ended up being
33 20 weeks or 26, Honaker-Miracle was dang-near 10
34 months, it evolves into COP Kahler, into a combat
35 outpost. And I don't know if I can be more clear
36 about that. I don't think, at our level, we
37 understood what Vehicle Patrol Bases were. Okay.
38 Initially, secure a piece of ground, secure
39 yourselves. And if you're there for an extended
40 period of time, improve your position. You know,
41 combat outpost or fire base, there's not a clear
42 delineation and the terms are kind of used

1 interchangeably throughout there, combat outpost and a
2 fire base. That's not what it was, that's what it was
3 going to grow-to be or evolve to be, was to be a COP.
4 That's why, I mean, we have COP Kahler on there but
5 obviously COP Kahler never, never came to fruition.

Beta

6 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) After the battle, sir, did you have a
7 conversation with Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) where either he
8 directed or you discussed and agreed that you would
9 only use the term "Vehicle Patrol Base" to describe
10 Wanat? Delta

Diamond

11 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) We talked--for clarity, exactly we had a
12 conversation similar, similar to that. I don't
13 remember the whole content. I explained what Vehicle
14 Patrol Base meant to me, just basically like I
15 explained it just now. Is, that that's what that is;
16 is, it was a Vehicle Patrol Base. And the issue
17 was--is COP, when you go COP Kahler, COP Wanat, or it
18 was, I think, the three terms at the time were Vehicle
19 Patrol Base, COP, and Wanat, just Wanat thrown out
20 there, is people were talking about, "Oh, that COP or
21 Wanat was overrun."

Beta 22 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Was that the media, sir?

23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) In the media, but also in conversations. And for
24 clarity and thematic unity, not to hide any facts,
25 it's talk about Vehicle Patrol Base is what it is.
26 It's a Vehicle Patrol Base, like I explained. And the
27 COP is a future thing that was never there. That is
28 why we were going there is to develop a COP.

Diamond

29 LtGen Natonski: In your mind, can a Vehicle Patrol Base
30 move?

31 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) It can. But, sir, in that area--if I can use an
32 example, in Fire Base California and Florida, Florida
33 and California, East and West along the Pesh were
34 established and Able Main, were all established as
35 Vehicle Patrol Bases. They were picked because of the
36 land that they were on, not the most tactically clear
37 pieces, but they had a lot force protection. They had
38 the right ravines and big boulders and rocks that the
39 vehicles could come in and they could secure
40 themselves and 1-32 would routinely occupy them. As
41 they pushed up, then they'd built them up with HESCOS.

Diamond

1 And that was a model in my head that we were doing,
2 Narang was another one.

3 LtGen Natonski: But they could come and go as required?

4 **Diamond**
COL (b)(3),(b)(6) They could come and go based on their task and
5 purpose.

6 LtGen Natonski: And if they became a more permanent
7 **Diamond** position, then they would become a COP?

8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) A COP or a fire base, yes, sir.

9 LtGen Natonski: There is an issue here. And in my mind--and
10 there is no doctrinal definition of a Vehicle Patrol
11 Base. However, my idea was on the 8th, 2d Platoon
12 went up there with five vehicles and established a
13 Vehicle Patrol Base. But on the 9th, they flew up
14 some CH-47s with additional people, engineers, an ANA
15 platoon, a bobcat. At that point, they no longer had
16 the capacity to pick up their vehicles and leave
17 without leaving people on that position, so--

18 **Diamond**
COL (b)(3),(b)(6) That is a great point, sir, I mean--

19 LtGen Natonski: I am just trying to, you know, and I don't
20 think that it was a complete COP in the mindset that
21 it's got the entire barriers, guard towers, sleeping
22 quarters. But there's also some thought that was the
23 term "Vehicle Patrol Base" used because people did not
24 want this to be assumed it was a permanent base that
25 it was overrun? Were we using the Vehicle Patrol Base
26 to deceive individuals and press that, "This wasn't a
27 COP yet? There wasn't a COP yet. It was a temporary
28 facility." I think that no one has denied the fact
29 that this was going to be a COP. And it's the
30 selection of the word "VPB" and the fact that there
31 really isn't any terminology and everyone knew that it
32 was going to be a permanent facility, so why are you
33 calling it a Vehicle Patrol Base?

34 **Diamond**
COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, and, sir, I think, I mean, that's a great
35 question, is, "Where is the line?" I mean, Vehicle
36 Patrol Base California, and I guess intuitively, we
37 had the same line of thought many, many months or
38 weeks earlier--many, many, many months earlier,
39 because Vehicle Patrol Base California and Florida
40 that were HESCO'd and had hard stands or plywood

1 shacks in them now were still called VPBs. And I had
2 the same conversation that, "Well, they're not VPBs
3 anymore."

4 LtGen Natonski: Well, how many people did they have at
5 those?
6 **Diamond**

6 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) They had a platoon at each one, sir.

7 LtGen Natonski: And how many vehicles did they have?

8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Four, they had the four vehicles assigned to
9 **Diamond** them.

10 LtGen Natonski: So the fact that those vehicles were not
11 enough to move--
12 **Diamond**

12 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Not all the people, no, sir, no, sir. Because
13 you'd leave half the platoon securing it while the
14 other half would go out. I guess, along the same line
15 of thoughts is, almost a year earlier, I'd said, you
16 know, "They don't move anymore," or that, "They're
17 fire bases. They're fixed facilities." On this
18 point, at least at my level, the Vehicle Patrol Base,
19 COP discussion, just Wanat, was for thematic unity not
20 for deception.

21 LtGen Natonski: Well, it's the perception that's come out
22 that's led to the questioning--
23 **Diamond**

23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Right.

24 LtGen Natonski: Was this really a Vehicle Patrol Base or are
25 they trying to cover up the fact that it was going to
26 be a base, it was a base?
27 **Diamond**

27 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Right. Well, I think, as we all know, an article
28 came out a week afterwards that emphatically stated it
29 was never intended to be a COP and that's problematic.

30 LtGen Natonski: Well, no one we've talked to has denied the
31 fact that there's a CONOPs for a COP.
32 **Diamond**

32 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) And there is a JFUB packet and about 1,500--

33 LtGen Natonski: And there was never a decision made to
34 evacuate until after the battle. I mean, there was,
35 for all intents and purposes, there was a platoon that
36 was coming in behind 2d Platoon.

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Absolutely. I mean, the intent for months was to
2 make that permanent. I think, you know, and as you
3 ask, that may be a great definition. Hey, at the
4 point that you cross, it is kind of a RIP/TOA
5 definition, at the point that you cross, when you
6 can't move 100 percent of your force with the
7 equipment that you have, organic, it's no longer a
8 Vehicle Patrol Base.

9 LtGen Natonski: But we don't have a doctrinal definition and
10 that's the issue here.

Diamond

11 COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Right.

12 LtGen Natonski: Okay.

Diamond

13 COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

Beta

14 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, I know that you've spoken to Mr. (b)(3),(b)(6) **Green**
15 (b)(3),(b)(6) on at least two occasions, if not more, and had **Green**
16 some email exchanges. After you had finished an
17 interview with, I believe, a New York Times reporter
18 earlier this year, you called Mr. (b)(3),(b)(6) to have a **Green**
19 discussion. And during that discussion, and I'll **Green**
20 paraphrase from what Mr. (b)(3),(b)(6) told us, sir, is that he **Green**
21 brought up a question to you regarding: You're **Green**
22 getting ready to leave Bella; you're trying to setup
23 Wanat; you're getting ready to RIP; his son senses
24 they were going to be attacked; and he asks, did you
25 have any concerns or did any red flags come up? You
26 responded, and just quoting Mr. (b)(3),(b)(6) "It came down to **Green**
27 communication," that perhaps you did not have the
28 information, sir. I'm just trying to figure out--

Diamond

29 COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Yeah. There's has been two things, and I love
30 (b)(3),(b)(6) for the record, this was post- (b)(6) **Green**
31 Washington Post interview that I did in Bagram. And **Green**
32 Mr. (b)(6) brought up a point, he said, Mr. (b)(3),(b)(6) told him **Green**
33 that I had called him, which I did, when I got to
34 Georgia. And we had a good conversation about his
35 son, (b)(6). And allegedly, Mr. (b)(3),(b)(6) had **Green**
36 recorded the conversation and says that I had said
37 something about Wanat had about broke me and that I
38 was looking at getting out of the Army. Well, okay,
39 he hasn't produced that. I'm not sure what, in that
40 conversation, led him to paraphrase that to (b)(6) But
41 I said, "On the contrary, Wanat only steeled me more.
42 That's why I came to the assignment I'm in. And I'm

1 going back to Afghanistan really as fast as I can vice
2 going to War College or anywhere else that would have
3 been a more logical choice to go to." So there was
4 that piece that (b)(6) asked, "Well, will you call him
5 and ask him if he'll release that tape to me." And I
6 Green talked to Mr. (b)(3),(b)(6) again, and I said, "For the life of
7 me, I can't remember." I said, "I remember we're
8 talking about the poker house," because he's a very
9 wealthy guy, "the poker place that you had set up and
10 about (b)(6) and what a great wrestler he was," and I
11 said, "I don't know what I told you or could have
12 conveyed to you that would have given you the
13 impression that I was seeking to retire now and all of
14 this." I said, "But that's really the furthest thing
15 from my mind right now." I said, "I think that we've
16 got a lot of unfinished business to do over there."

17 Now, in that conversation, you know, if I said
18 communication--I didn't know what they know, if his
19 son told him that that report did not get to me.
20 Okay. There's a lot of information after the fact.
21 Some of it from statements, some of them from casual
22 conversations that, you know, now after the fact,
23 everybody had impending dread that this was going to
24 be a bad mission and everybody just wanted to go home.

25 A couple of things on that, and then I'll get
26 back to communication of the probably 9,500 patrols
27 that we conducted, there was probably always somebody
28 that didn't want to do, at least one person, that
29 didn't want to do every one. And there might have
30 been quite a few that everybody in the element didn't
31 want to do; but we still do them, that's what we do.
32 I would doubt very seriously, had I been up at Wanat
33 on the 10th or on the 11th and been talking to the
34 guys, I doubt very seriously I would had one guy, not
35 in contact, out of Bella, glad they're out of Bella,
36 because again that was a platoon that rotated through
37 Bella and they're in Wanat, that I doubt they would
38 have had conveyed to me any sense of dread that has
39 been after the fact proposed. I just--I doubt it.
40 You know, if there's a mistake or regret, I wish I
41 would have went up there, you know, for that time. I
42 don't think that it would have changed anything, but I
43 think it would have stymied a whole lot of questions.
44 And that's a great lesson for me, you know, put that
45 on the record. You know, at the time, I thought I had

1 more important places to be because all of that was on
2 track to Afghan standards. Now, you can ask, "Oh,
3 about the several things you have to ask about, have
4 asked about," but after 14 months in Afghanistan,
5 everything was on track to Afghan standards right
6 there.

Beta

7 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, if I could, you said that another item you
8 mentioned to Mr. (b)(3),(b)(6), according to Mr. (b)(3),(b)(6), was that
9 you said, "Mistakes were made." You just said, Green
10 "Perhaps going up there--not going up there was a
11 mistake." Was there anything else, sir?

Diamond

12 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) You know, I've looked through all of this. I've
13 read statements. And I think that the only--and
14 that's for secondary or after the fact review, that's
15 the largest mistake. The other one similar to that
16 is, you know, putting either a TAC up there or that,
17 you know, checking what (b)(3),(b)(6) C2 was up there. Oscar
18 And I think, you know, we had competing priorities at
19 that time, looking back on it is, I think, that would
20 have not changed the outcome. It would have changed
21 the perception of what happened and would have given
22 me and my organization more credibility under the
23 scrutiny that we're facing right now.

Beta

24 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) And, sir, "Checking (b)(3),(b)(6) command and
25 control," what do you mean by that, sir? Oscar

Diamond

26 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, when he went up there, he made the
27 decision, much like I made the decision not to go up
28 there, he made the decision not to take his FSO up
29 there. He and his RTO went up there, and he made that
30 decision. You know, again, he had been in combat for
31 quite a long time in that valley, for 14 months, the
32 whole tour. And he was very comfortable with his
33 ability to call for fire. And again, everything that
34 happened or failed to happen is on me and not on that
35 Company Commander for sure. But he made that
36 decision, I don't think it would have changed the
37 outcome based on how fast (b)(3),(b)(6) got effective Oscar
38 fires in support of them, but it lends people to
39 question. But I'd think you'd be hard pressed to say
40 if an FSO was there, that he would had indirect fires
41 hitting faster than six minutes, CAS hitting faster
42 than 30 minutes, and AH64s faster than an hour or so.

1 But as I talked about, you know, if you want to
2 focus on just this time period, on 8 July, "Why wasn't
3 I up there on 8 July when they were doing this?"
4 Well, we started doing it at night; and that night I
5 had--or that day on 8 July, the (b)(6) with
6 (b)(6). Again,
7 maintaining my lines of operation of governance,
8 security, economic development, I escorted (b)(6)
9 (b)(6) to A-Bad, because bringing him out was pretty
10 significant. (b)(6) is the Province
11 Commander, I escorted him back to A-Bad. And then the
12 PRT got into a TIC, and my TAC responded to that in
13 Barcanda, so all of these things kind of take time.
14 It was a pretty substantial TIC.

15 We returned to Blessing. The RCP that had come
16 in that replaced ours, and again, we were there 15
17 months, 9,500 patrols, and had complete movement on
18 every HMMWV capable road, and we had one person
19 injured by an IED, lost both legs on December 27th.
20 And it was because of persistent presence, to include
21 my TAC out and about, RCPs out and about. But these
22 guys came in, and after doing the transition, and our
23 guys said, "They're going to be challenged." You
24 know, before they even TOA'd, they had a KIA and four
25 wounded in there. So the Sergeant Major and I, when
26 we went on 9 July out there to the PCC, I don't have
27 it written down, but we went into Asadabad then and
28 talked to that platoon. That platoon leader was like
29 a broken young man. The heart and soul of their
30 platoon got taken out, about a 250 pound E5, and he
31 was just basically liquefied. So we talked to them,
32 bolstered them up. Just as a side note, that platoon
33 leader and the three people in his vehicle were killed
34 before we left Afghanistan. So I highlight that
35 because, again, my concerns about the competency of
36 that element coming in behind us did play--
37 consistently reinforced why we were doing what we were
38 doing at the time.

39 On the 10th of July, we went to the Kandagal
40 Community Center opening with (b)(6) and
41 Colonel (b)(6). Again, forwarding the governance and
42 economic development, our other lines. The Kandagal
43 is at the mouth of the Korengal, our most contested
44 valley in there. A big hit right before we bring the
45 Chairman in out to the people out there. Again,

1 talked about that day, on the 11th actually, losing
2 air, so we spend about 18 hours getting back.

3 On the 12th of July is when I wrote--I received
4 an email from General Petraeus about writing lessons
5 learned. I had known him as a Battalion Commander. I
6 wrote down four pages of lessons learned, and was
7 going back and forth to the TOC, talking about (b)(3),(b)(6),Oscar
8 (b)(3),(b)(6),Oscar coming, we'd closed Bella. There's a lot of
9 moving pieces that we were doing at that time and
10 working in the TOC. And that's why I was in there on
11 the 13th instead of, you know, had the 13th actually
12 happened earlier or a little bit later in the day, I
13 would had been out on the road at another Shura
14 somewhere.

15 And then as we continue on, I didn't get to stop
16 Citrus at that time. (b)(3),(b)(6) arrived the next morning. We
17 started going out, and I had to make the decisions, go
18 through this about Wanat, and right back out to the
19 PCC meeting that I had been to on 9 July with Colonel
20 Citrus (b)(3),(b)(6), introducing him to all of the government
21 folks.

22 On the 17th of July, the Battalion had 10 troops
23 in contact. I had a kid in Chowkay, a medic, shot,
24 and he goes, "I'm leaving in three days so I'm good."
25 Six hours later, he was shot in the neck and paralyzed
26 from the belly-button down.

27 But that's about a week of kind of normal daily
28 business. And as I was telling Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) on our Beta
29 break right here, I understand the charter of the
30 investigation, but I very much get the impression
31 that, I mean, that we're being forced to look through
32 a straw like we are. You know, and it's kind of like
33 looking at the Twin Towers and not the whole country
34 or the whole world. But we're looking through there
35 and to get to fourth order of detail on a platoon COP,
36 albeit the main effort at that time, it's not the
37 decisive effort. I mean, it's really not in one of
38 those supporting effort valleys right there. It will
39 be once it is established and we're connected. But
40 there's a lot of stuff going on in the Rock on the 15
41 other bases that we have going on. And this right
42 here, is what we call our TIC tracker. And when you
43 look at, again, what's going on in the rest of the
44 battle space, it was, there was a lot going on.

Beta

1 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, was there any time between the 8th and the
2 12th, you were out on the road for some of those days,
3 was there any time that you were out of communication
4 or contact with your Headquarters?

Diamond

5 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, any time we're moving, we're out of
6 contact. Shortly after we leave Blessing, we lose FM
7 COMS. When we've got our counter IED measures on, we
8 are out of TACTSAT COM. So you go from one location
9 to another and then you get up on TACTSAT; the RTO
10 gets up on TACTSAT, gets any updates, and then informs
11 me if there is anything significant.

Beta

12 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) So when you arrived at a location, sir, the
13 standard procedure would be for your TOC to push any
14 updates to you?

Diamond

15 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Correct. I mean, it's just standard procedure;
16 The RTO as soon as we secure the vehicles. The RTO
17 gets up on TACTSAT, gets any updates from the TOC.
18 And that is, I mean, that's why we have to train,
19 trust, and support our subordinates. My two field
20 grades, Major (b)(3),(b)(6) and Major (b)(3),(b)(6), I think you've
21 met, have, I mean, they ran the TOC routinely when the
22 TAC was out, when my TAC was out and did so
23 throughout.

Beta

24 LtCol (b)(3),(b)(6) Thank you, sir. Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) Sigma

Sigma

25 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, just to reiterate. The number of COPs, et
26 cetera, that were within your Battalion footprint was
27 15?

Diamond

28 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, 15 and, I mean, it changed overtime. But
29 on that day, the way I'd count them--because like I'd
30 count OP Restrepo--

Sigma

31 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

Diamond

32 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) As, I mean, it's a permanent base occupied by
33 Americans, permanent OP, and I'd count OP Dallas down
34 there.

Sigma

35 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) And with regard to the mission itself, not to put
36 words in your mouth, but it was your understanding
37 that Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) and Lieutenant Brostrom understood
38 their task and purpose going up to Wanat? There's no
39 question in your mind about that?

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) There is no question in my mind they understood
2 the task, purpose, and my intent of what they were
3 doing at Wanat.

Sigma

4 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) And obviously, you have an opinion with regard to
5 **Oscar** Captain (b)(3),(b)(6). If you can, could you please tell us
6 your impression of him as a Commander with regard to
7 his abilities and competence?

Diamond

Oscar

8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3),(b)(6) exceptionally competent. I think,
9 consistently, the most calm under fire. We've got the
10 most--I got the most personal data about him under
11 fire, but empirically in my mind, the most calm under
12 fire. Very competent, very Christian based guy and
13 that is important to me because our number one thing
14 is discipline, standards, ethics, and values. That's
15 kind of what we have as number one and Big 6. And
16 very sure of his targets before he engages, and I
17 think that's really attributable not only to
18 discipline and standards and proficiency, but I think
19 his Christian base supports that.

20 When we did the body recovering in 1-91, he was
21 the Company Commander that did that. Had a TAC on a
22 hill, on a mountain, and he took, you know, talk about
23 operations that are hard to plan in, you know, very
24 short period of time, we took his CP, 2d Platoon from
25 Able, Battle, and Chosen Company, and he road marched
26 them in under an AC-130 over watch, and secured a body
27 there, completely calm. I talked to him there,
28 completely calm under fire. In the ambush, he was in
29 both ambushes the 26 May and 8 June, you know, a
30 competent, proficient. And I know a requirement, a
31 trait that I look for in subordinate leaders, I always
32 list calm as number one. And I try to emulate his
33 example more than he tries to emulate mine.

Sigma

34 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) So as a Commander, it was your expectation that with
35 regard to the construction piece or the ongoing
36 priorities of work at Wanat, that while you were out
37 doing battlefield circulation, your S-3 and your XO
38 were monitoring what was going on at Wanat?

Diamond

39 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) At Wanat and the other 14 places and my TAC and
40 the RCPs and everything else.

Sigma

41 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay. Kind of the same general area of discussion,
42 difficult to kind of see yourself, but with regard to

1 command climate, do you feel that there was a command
2 climate where your subordinates were able to bring up
3 problems to you, issues to you or was there a
4 reluctance to talk to the boss about that kind of
5 stuff?

Diamond

6 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I think that from the time I as a young Hooah,
7 how I command is kind of command by walking around,
8 and that's why it's so important to me to be out all
9 the time. It's sharing the risks. It's another
10 patrol, counter IED, but it's talking to the Soldiers,
11 talking to the leaders. And my Sergeant Major would
12 almost always travel with me. We'd go to the same
13 places, talk to two different audiences. Sometimes
14 switch and see if we hear the same thing but that's
15 what we did as a matter of course.

16 And for the record on this, with Lieutenant
17 Brostrom in particular, he was purposefully targeted
18 into our Battalion because of the relationship between
19 Colonel Retired (b)(3), (b)(6) and Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6),Delta

Delta

20 Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) told me, "Hey, there's a friend of
21 mine's son coming in;" just like I had the Sergeant
22 Major's son who was killed six hours into--after our
23 TOA. He said, "John Brostrom's coming. He's coming
24 with his buddy (b)(6), (b)(3). You know, (b)(6) has kind of
25 been sponsoring him back there." And I'm like, "Hey,
26 sir, got it." Had him working, had about five of them
27 at that time working their tasks, and they rotated in.
28 But every time I was out, and Brostrom spent a lot of
29 time on Blessing, you know, we talked a lot just
30 because of that. And I've got my little photo album
31 here, of every time I was around him, I'm like, "Okay,
32 Johnny, we've got to take a picture for (b)(6)..." (b)(6)

Sierra

(b)(3),(b)(6),Delta

33 "...to send back to your mom;" and I called
34 him "Johnny-Boy".

35 On the 7th of July, in my office, in front of my
36 Nebraska flag we took a picture of Johnny Brostrom,
37 all smiling and giggly; just like I took a picture of
38 him 26 April '08 out at Wanat. You know, and then you
39 see that guy, he's an Airborne Ranger Infantryman.

Sierra

40 You hear (b)(6) statement about how he is very
41 competitive. Okay. In the gym, he's always got to be
42 a one ups man. You've been an Airborne Ranger
43 Infantryman, so to after the fact, say that somehow
44 they sat around and lamented about not getting this
45 mission or that, and you think about the infantry

1 platoon leader that's going to be the main effort of
2 the battalion with all of the assets that I gave him
3 and the conversation that we had 7 July in my office,
4 you know, approachability, any concerns, this or that,
5 and you know, there were no concerns. He was fired up
6 about it, the last mission. And then we sent him out
7 late that night into--in there.

8 So again, after the fact, in this case, John
9 Brostrom, surfer, SCUBA qualified, Airborne Ranger
10 Infantryman getting the main effort task, I do not
11 think he was sitting on his cot, after he talked to
12 me, lamenting the mission; I don't.

13 But the command climate, that's but one example.
14 Another example is the 300 Rock paratroopers I have on
15 a face book account so I can keep helping them out,
16 the telephone call I got the night before from Staff
17 Quarter Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) out at NTC, asking for a letter of
18 recommendation, the medical platoon leader earlier
19 this week asking for a letter of recommendation by
20 today for some MEDCOM award, I think that after
21 leaving there, what, 18 months and I still have weekly
22 interactions from previous subordinates, I think the
23 command climate was pretty good.

24 LTC Sigma (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir. Last question and you've already covered
25 this a little bit, but I just want to make sure we
26 kind of touch base on it one more time. With regard
27 to your location during the fight, I mean, what you
28 saw as the most important thing for you to do as the
29 Commander was to handle the Task Force fight which was
30 fires, MEDEVAC, et cetera. So based on your
31 experience, do you think that it would have made any
32 difference had you gone forward or would you had been
33 Diamond an impediment, do you think, to what was going on?
34

35 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I don't think I would have been an impediment. I
36 don't think I would have been able to more adequately
37 do what I did. And two things would have happened had
38 I been there on the ground in the fight: Is, when I'm
39 in my TOC, I can call landline to the Brigade, I can
40 give updates, I can be called by General Milley at the
41 time and paint the picture and have a lot of
42 credibility with that. I think my Three and XO can do
43 that too. It's just a different connectivity. I'm
44 the one that can make a decision, like I did, in 30
45 seconds to fire those rounds. Okay, non-doctrinally

1 calling for, "Hey, yeah, I'm going to take this, this
2 fire mission and I own everything here. And if you're
3 on your OP in there, I'm going to fire it." Okay, and
4 get the JTAC to do, get the 9-line pushed now so we
5 get the fires but have that urgency. Empirically,
6 people will say there's a difference when I'm in the
7 TOC of synchronizing and that level of energy.
8

9 And just like with Rock Avalanche, I was--huge
10 operation. You know, would it have been great to be
11 under a poncho with a TACTSAT up on top of abascar,
12 hey, it was great to do that. Now, what's the
13 difference? Why did I go on Hill 1696? Okay.
14 Another example, because I just want you to get a
15 sensing this isn't "Willie-niley" go to the TOC, we're
16 going to a body recovery. And I had said we can go in
17 there and get him. As soon as I saw that there were
18 missing in action, I'd always email up, "Hey we got a
19 TAC, Company CP, and 1, 2, 3 platoons on the PZ
20 Posture," because I could always get people in PZ
21 Posture faster than they could get me aircraft. It's
22 just--distance. And on that one, Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) was Delta
23 letting 1-91 figure it out, figure it out, figure it
24 out. Finally, and we kept planning with what's it
25 going to be, what's it was going to look like; and we
26 kept working just in case we got the call.
27

28 About 24 hours later, we got the call, "You need
29 to go in and get him"; "Too easy, sir," we're in PZ
30 posture. We're going to go up to one of their FOBs up
31 there, plan with them. And to get on there, I said,
32 "The only thing that I need is a piece of high ground
33 within three kilometers of the body so I could
34 over-watch it. You give me that and we'll own that
35 area." And, you know, the initial push that I got for
36 hours was, "We can't find anything. We can't find
37 anything." Chief Wilson came in and said, "I can get
38 you on Hill 1696, give me a two wheel landing, one
39 ship at a time. I'm going to have to fly all of the
40 CHALKS up there. So it's going to be 10 minute turn
41 in-between." So I said, "Okay, we'll go." While I
42 was going in on the second CHALK a B1 was coming in to
43 hit, hit the hill that had three enemy positions, and
44 we thought some of them were occupied. Six GBU-31s
45 were coming in but wind and everything else made him
46 have to hit a tanker, so he could not come in. If we
47 waited for him to hit the tanker, then I'd lose the

Oscar

1 AC-130 that was going to cover (b)(3),(b)(6) and two
2 platoons walking three clicks down the road.
3 So I said, "Okay, well, we're going to go in and have
4 the AC-130 look at it." Already had great knowledge
5 that ISR couldn't see things under trees; so, there
6 was some risk, but I said, "Go ahead and fire, blow
7 that tree off our HLZ and maybe see some scurrying
8 around." They did that shot, instead of 12,000 pounds
9 of bombs, we had two 105 rounds hit the hill.

10
11 I changed the order, now my TAC's going in first
12 instead of the security element, because I was
13 absolutely sure we were going to get shot at or shot
14 down going in there. So, we went in coming off the
15 helicopter I slipped. I fell forty feet off a cliff
16 with my RTO and JTAC. We were so damned euphoric we
17 weren't dead that, I mean, we crawled our ass up the
18 hill and set up our TAC.

19
20 Why did I have to be there going into another
21 battalion commander's area, okay. I said, "You carve
22 out AO Little Rock because I want to control all the
23 fire. I want to see this." That was a decision where
24 I couldn't be in the TOC and out do another battalion
25 commander or out kind of muscle him. I could be on a
26 piece of high ground in basically his area overlooking
27 the objective, and I called fire all day long as they
28 walked in and walked out. There's a lot more to that
29 story, but my point being is it's not a, "Hey, big
30 operation go hit the TOC." You know, it's a
31 deliberate decision.

32
33 Rock Avalanche, you know, I knew we were going to
34 have some issues there and needed to be there. Wanat
35 was, you know, this was more of a, "Hey, you've got
36 other things to do. There's a platoon mission--this,
37 you're not getting into contact and you've got a lot
38 of engagement, key engagements," which I get blasted
39 for never doing but that's the reason why I'm not
40 sitting up under a poncho up there. And during the
41 fight, once we were locked, I was going to stay in the
42 TOC until we got the requisite fires and the
43 casualties.

Sigma

44
45 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Roger. Well, I mean, there is the concept of "the
46 Battalion fight" and that's something that a lot of
47 people don't understand.

Diamond

1
2 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, yeah. And I think it's important to
3 realize when we went out to JMRC, I mean, I came back
4 and, sir, I don't know if--you remember this, but we
5 came back from our PDSS, I came back and got it in
6 here within 90 minutes, on 17 March, laid out my first
7 briefing to my leaders from the PDSS. Prior to us
8 going into LTP, being away from the Battalion, but I
9 had to get that in--next morning we're going to LTP
10 maybe that day going to LTP and going to miss the lane
11 training and stuff. Came back, saw two days of lane
12 training with the Sergeant Major. And on the 23rd of
13 March before going into the box, kind of tweaked that
14 a little bit based on what I heard in our LTP, kind of
15 some COIN expert guys, JMRC, lane training, kind of
16 tweaked it. Now we're going in the box. And, you
17 know, (b)(6) was my OC, we walked out there,
18 and we were lined up at the gate. Soon as the box
19 turned on, we locked our area down, and we started
20 doing our COIN stuff. I say that because it was--one,
21 I had a great OC, but it was a lot of discussions
22 about, "Where do you need to be?" And just like our
23 Battle Command talks about now, "It's not always in
24 the TOC. It's where you can best visualize." And
25 Beta Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) had to endure some of his, sir, it is
26 not a real live doctrine there anymore, but at the
27 same time I'm going, "Okay, what, what should I--what
28 should the platoon leader do, and what should I do?"
29 And back to that is in that briefing--and really, in
30 January '07 was our first time that we started talking
31 about defining, "What is the Battalion fight?" And
32 the PDSS solidified it, and I'll repeat it forever:
33 C2, fires, resupply, MEDAVAC, IO, and CERP. "Whose is
34 the fight? When we go into--where should the infantry
35 battalion be?" And I can give you these digits I
36 pulled out, you can look at them. "Where is the
37 location of the commander and is it to control every--
38 guess which platoon fight he should be in?" No, it's
39 not, no. The difference between shaping decisive
40 efforts, shaping efforts, main efforts, okay, our
41 static, static security posts, "What should they be
42 doing?"
43

44 Go through our operational doctrine, it talks
45 about uncertainty, chance, and friction. But more
46 importantly, I'll point out and it's important, you
47 know, I don't need to be compared against 1st of the

1 503rd. I need to be compared against Army doctrine
2 and in a place that I've actually been for about 20
3 months now. But this is the thing that most of our
4 leaders, and I apologize for pointing, but is when I
5 was there I saw this and when I went back I saw it
6 with a couple of brigades, is people that would
7 prevent being defeated by sitting on COPS and FOBs,
8 and it was okay to take casualties if you're on there,
9 because you're doing nothing, but if you're out and
10 doing something, you're going to get questioned; and
11 that's nature of our business.

12
13 But, hey, as far as risk, "...using initiative
14 requires training and organizational climate that
15 promotes calculated, discipline risk-taking focused on
16 winning rather than preventing defeat even when
17 preventing defeat appears safer. Mission command
18 requires commanders who take calculated risks,
19 exercise initiative, and act decisively even when the
20 outcome is uncertain." And it goes in and there are
21 other pieces to this. And this isn't cherry picking,
22 this is going to our doctrine, you know, and I just
23 say, you know, "What are we trained to? What are we
24 supposed to know, and what are we supposed to apply?"
25 And you know, rightly so, some of the questions, on
26 the fourth order questions, well, you can go to
27 everyone of the 15 bases and ask me that day, you
28 know, "What were you thinking about Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6),Nike
29 Sunrise action, Lieutenant (b)(3),(b)(6) actions at Monti;" the base
30 way up in the Northeast of my area. "I hadn't seen
31 him for three weeks. I hadn't been up there. And I
32 wasn't thinking anything about it." And if he had
33 been overrun, that's just South of Keating, if he had
34 been overrun, I mean, we would be having the same
35 exact, exact discussion. But I'm aware, and that's
36 what I say, in AO Rock, it's all mine. I'm not, it's
37 Delta not Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6), it's not Milley, it's not,
38 excuse me, General Milley, it's not Captain (b)(3),(b)(6),Oscar
39 that's the way it is. But I could get asked these
40 same questions, and I know why we are doing it, and
41 answers that we owe to very important people, but also
42 the families, who are most important. So I digress.

43 Sigma
44 LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir.

45
46 LtGen Natonski: I'm going to bounce around, because I wrote
47 these questions while you were talking. A number of

1 the Soldiers on Wanat, in the days preceding the
2 attack, had indicated certain indications and
3 warnings. The women and children being gone, that
4 didn't happen on the night of the 12th. There were
5 indications before that. Indications of (b)(6),
6 (b)(6) males standing and watching, which seem
7 to be--

8
9 **Diamond**

COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I'm listening, sir.

10
11 LtGen Natonski: It caught the eyes of certain, of the Soldiers.
12 The fact that there had been a meeting of this where
13 there had been a warning of an attack, and that might
14 have been the Shura that--not necessarily the Shura,
15 **Oscar** but the dinner that Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) went to. There was a
16 group of five up in the hills; but there seemed to be,
17 at least among the Soldiers there, a feeling that
18 there was going to be an attack.

19
20 **Magenta** Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) saw the ISR going away, and there
21 seemed to be a sense of urgency to get it back. Now,
22 I don't know whether that was because of the
23 indications and warnings that had been passed to him
24 but from the position or whether it was just, "Hey, we
25 always fight for Predator or ISR."

26
27 But, did any of that--did you ever get that from
28 anyone on your staff or anyone at Wanat?

29 **Diamond**

COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, packaged in that way even remotely or piece
30 mealed in that way, no. Because if we take all those
31 things, the--and I'm going to pull it up just for
32 emphasis, is the children were only around us if there
33 was an elder, if an elder brought them out is
34 primarily how the children would operate up there.
35 And the young men, as we came out on the 26th of May,
36 knowing that--I took a picture of the bazaar right
37 there, and based on that, young men standing around,
38 is that an imminent attack? Well, maybe you can look
39 at it, "Well, they were standing around and you got
40 attacked." Well, I did not get attacked at Wanat,
41 though. They were standing around, so they weren't
42 shooting at me a click and a half down the road. The
43 young men there, is why I say it's a complete economic
44 argument, it's because they're unemployed and they do
45 stand around, and they are pissed. And they sit and
46 scowl at you. Overtime, at the areas where we were in
47

1 routine contact with them, that breaks down, and then
2 you start having engagement. And if you look along
3 the Pesh, the young men don't stand around and scowl
4 at you. But in this new area, we expected that
5 because we hadn't been and had that persistent
6 presence. So, you know, the five guys up in the
7 mountain, you know, I've got TIC slides here from the
8 folks, and this platoon had been up in Bella, that
9 declared eminent threat from people up in the
10 mountains and engaged them. And you can certainly do
11 that by means of ROE, hidden and engaged, based on all
12 things understood.

13
14 LtGen Natonski: Of course, there was no PID with respect to the
15 weapons on those five?

16 **Diamond**

17 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) You don't need to have that. If you've got that
18 with you ground based ISR, that's great. If you've
19 got an Intel report that says, "Enemy are moving into
20 attack Bella, all things considered," you have SIGINT
21 that talks about, you know, gives you an indication
22 that that's, that's the people that are talking with
23 hostile intent, you can take all the pieces and
24 patterns of life, you know, the elders repeatedly
25 telling you, "Friendly's don't go up there, that's
26 enemy area;" they can piece all those things together,
27 declare positive ID, and, and engage those folks; and
28 we've got numerous examples. My point being, had they
29 seen those five guys up in the mountains, this
30 platoon, I mean, when they did see him, had they felt
31 that imminent threat, they would have engaged them.
32 Just like the previous--
33

34 LtGen Natonski: However, there's some insinuation that Captain
35 (b)(3),(b)(6),Oscar when he saw them, was a little hesitant to
36 engage them as a result of the 15-6 that you had on
37 the 4th of July on a helicopter, so--

38 **Diamond**

39 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Absolutely, sir, and he may have. He may have,
40 again, it's taking all things considered. I mean,
41 that's how the ROE is written. "All things being
42 considered," well, that is. Here he just got done,
43 his Company just got done killing some bad guys but
44 also he is being accused of, and probably did, but is
45 being accused of killing civilians. So that is part
46 of the calculus, so now he is looking at them harder,
47 and he doesn't see the weapons. But that's a reality

1 that we dealt with all the time. I don't think that
2 as Soldiers, we're jumping up and down yelling, you
3 know, "Shoot 'em, shoot 'em," and the Company
4 Commander was having reservations. I think it went up
5 to the approval process, and he said, "No, continue to
6 watch them."
7

8 LtGen Natonski: Now, to get back to my question, the Soldiers
9 at Wanat had certain feelings that had been, as the
10 result of things that they saw, did any of that ever
11 reach you?

12 Diamond

13 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Not that level of concern, not at all, sir.
14

15 LtGen Natonski: And that was my question.

16 Diamond

17 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.
18

19 LtGen Natonski: You mentioned the use of claymores and grenades
20 and fires to mitigate dead space. And you also talked
21 about the LRAS and the Predator--

22 Diamond

23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.
24

25 LtGen Natonski: To pick up on enemy, and you'd talked about, I
26 guess, you had Predator; I don't know, did they have
27 LRAS at Bella?

28 Diamond

29 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) We rotate it up there, sir.
30

31 LtGen Natonski: LRAS?

32 Diamond

33 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) At certain times, and it wasn't up there
34 permanently.
35

36 LtGen Natonski: Was it up there during the withdrawal of the
37 position?

38 Diamond

39 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I don't think it was, sir.
40

41 LtGen Natonski: But you had mentioned that there was somewhere
42 in the neighborhood of potentially 200 insurgents,
43 Taliban. There was a Predator up there, but it never
44 saw any of those 200?

45 Diamond

46 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) No, sir.
47

1 LtGen Natonski: Now, one of the things we discussed is, you
2 know, Predator really needs to be cueued by additional
3 Intel, whether it be HUMINT or SIGINT, because it's
4 like looking through a straw. But in terms of other
5 steps to mitigate--we talked about dead space, but to
6 mitigate or provide additional force protection on a
7 position. Is part of the steps that a commander
8 should take are OP's, patrols? Do you profess to
9 conducting those types of measures to provide
10 additional security on a position?

11 **Diamond**

12 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir. I think that they should, obviously,
13 have OP's. And again, as a situation allows, to have
14 security patrols out there. The--

15
16 LtGen Natonski: And I think you mentioned at one point, maybe
17 only out to 1,000 clicks or so, but that's probably
18 all it would've taken at Wanat because there was a lot
19 of that dead space that was around the position that
20 was selected at Wanat.

21 **Diamond**

22 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) And it very well could have, and that could have
23 also been the isolated squad. They could have walked
24 up to the East around, around behind that house. And
25 like the OP which was in comparatively, comparatively
26 contiguous area to get to it directly from multiple
27 areas. If that patrol, with that level of forces out,
28 had been out a click from there in any of that broken
29 terrain, they could have just as well been isolated
30 out there, and--

31
32 LtGen Natonski: So, it's better to don't take the risk and
33 patrol than potentially see over 100 Taliban come up
34 to a position, infiltrate--

35 **Diamond**

36 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) But they don't do it that way, sir. I mean, you
37 would--

38
39 LtGen Natonski: Well, what did they do at Wanat?

40
41 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) They'd come in small groups, sir, and get into
42 prescribed firing areas and then fire down in groups
43 of two, three, four, or five. So--

44 **Diamond**

45 LtGen Natonski: How many do you think were at Wanat?

46
47 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I think 150 to 200, sir.

Diamond

1
2 LtGen Natonski: Okay. You don't think that a patrol might have
3 detected--

4 **Diamond**

5 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) It, it could have, sir. In retrospect, I wish we
6 would've had the combat power. I wish I would have
7 known they didn't have the combat power to conduct
8 security patrols. And that morning, in fact, again,
9 they had thought that they were at the requisite level
10 of force protection to conduct the security patrol.
11 I think I had two platoons up there, two platoons
12 would have taken roughly the same amount of time to
13 build the force protection to protect two platoons;
14 and then, they probably would have patrolled. Maybe
15 they would have started patrolling 24 hours earlier,
16 maybe they would have identified that they needed more
17 force protection; they had larger forces and more
18 logistics tail.
19

20 LtGen Natonski: Well, and it goes to how many resources they
21 had and people being a resource as well as a TOW or a
22 mortar.

23 **Diamond**

24 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir. Well, and to that end, it goes to,
25 again, how many more air--we thought, in our calculus,
26 given the threat, and the way the enemy operated, up
27 to that time, that an infantry platoon, in a static
28 position with gun trucks and indirect fire could
29 withstand the attack of any force up there. And
30 again, that they would do probing attacks before they
31 would do any concerted attack.
32

33 And to put up, you know, again, another two more
34 platoons or another platoon would have taken more lift
35 and would have taken more resources to sustain. So
36 it's constantly--can this credibly protect itself and
37 defend itself against the threat. And we thought,
38 credibly, that with the weapon systems, again, this
39 was, you know, in 15 months, I think, this was the
40 third HMMWV, second or third HMMWV that we had
41 destroyed in 15 months, 1,100 contacts. So the idea
42 that the ITAS is going to get taken out, that the TOW
43 vehicle is going to get taken out by this initial
44 fire, that the mortar system--we had lost no mortar
45 systems to this time, is going to get taken out, that
46 the 60 millimeter mortar system is going to be in a
47 position that they're not going to be able to utilize

1 it effectively, that, that was not in our calculus;
2 that those four things right there--basically,
3 basically all the enablers that I gave them were
4 destroyed in the first 10 or 15 minutes.
5

6 LtGen Natonski: Well, you had--I think you said, 15 COPs at
7 **Diamond** about that time?

8
9 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

10
11 LtGen Natonski: I don't think any of them were bigger than a
12 **Diamond** platoon, were they?

13
14 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, there'd be a company headquarters on them
15 with a platoon, sir.
16

17 LtGen Natonski: But that's about the norm?

18 **Diamond**
19 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir. There was no--
20

21 LtGen Natonski: But those were COPs throughout your AO?

22 **Diamond**
23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.
24

25 LtGen Natonski: Established COPs or whatever we want to call
26 **Diamond** them, Vehicle Patrol Base?
27

28 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) It's a right term, sir. The COP, they were fixed
29 positions. And the two of those that I'm counting,
30 because I had squad plus on them, are OP's. And when
31 I say 15, that's also including Asadabad where, I
32 mean, that is a large defended--
33

34 LtGen Natonski: And you would always work fires? I mean, one
35 of the points you made was the fact that fires were
36 important in terms of defending at Wanat. You had two
37 triple sevens down at Blessing, I believe, as well as,
38 **Diamond** I think, target registrations?
39

40 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.
41

42 LtGen Natonski: So putting a platoon on a COP, it was certainly
43 defensible but of course--I guess the question I would
44 ask is did--that's a position that's established.
45 Wanat was not established when you move the force up
46 there, and it pretty much--I think they were limited
47 engineer assets. There was the bobcat, I guess, a

1 squad leader and a couple engineers that were,
2 essentially, told to start fortifying this position
3 and the wait for the Afghan engineers that were
4 delayed, so that meant the rest of the Soldiers there
5 were pretty much tied to doing their own defensive
6 positions as part of this installation, and at the
7 same time, try to do the force protection necessary.
8 And I know the first patrol we've been told, aside
9 from the walk down to the District Center, the AP
10 station and I think Lieutenant Brostrom did, was
11 **Diamond** scheduled for the morning of the 13th.

12
13 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

14
15 LtGen Natonski: And that was when they were going to take a
16 hike up to the Southeast, up on that hilltop to look
17 at a potential site.

18
19 Do you think there was sufficient resources on
20 that position to do, not just the construction of the
21 outpost, but the force protection that is inherent in
22 that position?

23 **Diamond**

24 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, I think that, again, my analysis on what
25 combat power enablers we were going to put up there
26 with an infantry platoon and harkening back to
27 my--the infantrymen there are to seize and secure that
28 ground for the engineers to come. And throughout
29 history, infantrymen have had to develop their own
30 fighting positions and improve their fighting position
31 and that is what they did. And, umm--

32
33 LtGen Natonski: But at a cost of being able to do patrolling or
34 OP's or whatever?

35 **Diamond**

36 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, they did do the OP and that was one of the
37 positions. But in any defense that we do, there's
38 going to be a surge of engineering effort, whether
39 it's individual or Afghan or an attached company.
40 There's going to be a concerted engineer effort before
41 you get to priorities of work of--priority task of
42 patrolling.

43
44 Now the security, you're always going to maintain
45 security. And they did that, local security; but and,
46 you know, you're going to get to a certain level of
47 force protection before you go out and do your

1 security patrols. And could have they made that
2 decision on a 12th and done it, they probably could
3 have. But if we would have had another platoon out
4 there, that same calculus would have to go on is that
5 we've got to develop our own--and they are not
6 individual fighting positions, but we've got to
7 develop our own collective positions that we can move
8 to if we're attacked. And if I had another platoon
9 out there, they'd still have to build those platoons
10 whether they're a team, individual, or platoon
11 positions.
12

13 LtGen Natonski: But, wouldn't there have been more Soldiers
14 then to do the patrolling that might have been
15 required?
16

Diamond

17 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, but again, sir, I think that these people,
18 they built their individual positions and got their
19 force protection to an adequate level where they felt
20 secure enough that they can go out and patrol and come
21 back to a prepared position. If they had to break
22 contact and come back to the COP, the Vehicle Patrol
23 Base, if they had good contact and come back, they had
24 a position to go to. But if there was 40 more people,
25 they would have had to make those additional positions
26 as well.
27

28 LtGen Natonski: But then you would ask, well, why would did
29 they have to wait until the morning of the 13th to
30 start doing what most people will consider is local
31 security? Granted, some people could be digging in
32 and because of the temperatures, because of the lack
33 of water at this site, they reduced their workload.
34 But couldn't more people have been, at least while
35 some were digging, others could be--I mean, it was
36 kind of every man for himself, get into some positions
37 and dig in. And it just seems to me for a position
38 that was, essentially a platoon position, that, that's
39 about all they had, the TOW and the mortar were
40 certainly some means to mitigate the potential threat.
41 But couldn't that have been mitigated too by
42 additional Soldiers to have provided security while
43 the position was being built?
44

Diamond

45 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I think we can look back and suppose that. But I
46 think there's a heck of a lot more second and third
47 order effects associated with that supposition than

1 just, "if they had more people". If they had more
2 people, they would have been carried up on more
3 aircraft then they would have had less supplies of
4 some sort.

5
6 LtGen Natonski: That would have meant going outside of the
7 Battalion for a request for additional assets. Do you
8 think the RIP/TOA might have effected the ability to
9 provide additional assets like helicopters because of
10 the--

11 **Diamond**

12 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Oh, I--yeah. I think absolutely the TOA had an
13 impact on the resources that were available. But when
14 it wasn't the RIP/TOA, then it was Operation Mountain
15 Highway that basically went from January to April that
16 prevented us moving. When they were putting in, you
17 know, their OP's and their COPS and resupplying them.
18 And before that, it was all these seasonal,
19 winterization tasks to move everything up using those
20 assets.

21
22 And, again, I think the driving factor on moving
23 Bella--I think we would have still had our guys on
24 Bella, if we didn't have all the Intel reports that
25 200 people were circling Bella, we had Soldiers hurt
26 and wounded on there, I do not think it would have
27 reached the urgency threshold to pull out of Bella.
28 And if we had not been attacked, 1-26, they would of
29 had to come in and occupy, and they wouldn't have had
30 near as many people as we had to occupy or had the
31 relationships and had the, you know, the situational
32 awareness in that area, and they would have been
33 attacked and had to go through this.

34
35 LtGen Natonski: And part of the reason I think you withdrew
36 from Bella was the fact that under a COIN mission,
37 **Diamond** Bella didn't much return?

38
39 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) No, sir. Sir, it was--

40
41 LtGen Natonski: Very little population?

42 **Diamond**

43 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah. And we really refer to that is like it was
44 a counterterrorism.

45
46 LtGen Natonski: And you were stuck with that position as well
47 as Aranus when you assumed that AO from the battalion

1 before you.
2

3 The whole purpose, I think, that I understand
4 Wanat and I think it legitimate is District Center,
5 population, police, part of a counterinsurgency. And
6 putting it near the--and that's why, you made the
7 point, why it was located where it was, and I
8 understand that.
9

10 So I just think with respect to Bella, it was
11 probably a good idea to move it out when you did
12 before the new battalion coming in would have had to
13 do it, would have had to go in and then move out. So
14 I think from a tactical perspective, setting up Wanat
15 and pulling out of Bella made all the sense in the
16 Diamond world before you left.
17

18 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) But, sir, if I could? I think, going back though
19 to your question about the combat power calculus: Is
20 if--and when you look at the different bases that we
21 had and complex TICs along the Pesh shortly after
22 that, shortly after 13 July, had we committed another
23 platoon to that and anchored that and not had it as a
24 QRF and had those two platoons there, we may have
25 prevented the Wanat attack. We may have invited
26 another attack. I mean, it's a zero sum gain and--on
27 the resources that we had. And we're talking, you
28 know, trying to influence on a very, very margins and
29 that could have been the difference. But again, the
30 sole focus on Wanat in, you know, would I have liked
31 another platoon up there, absolutely. But the risk of
32 taking it off of another mission--and you say, "Well,
33 maybe you had to go outside of the Brigade," again, I
34 was well outside the main effort of the Brigade. They
35 didn't have any other combat, we had one infantry
36 battalion.
37

38 LtGen Natonski: Was Bella and Wanat your main effort as a
39 Diamond Battalion Commander?
40

41 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) The Wanat--Wanat was my main effort not decisive
42 effort. The decisive effort was the artery. So for
43 that time--
44

45 LtGen Natonski: The decisive was through--for your entire tour
46 over there, wasn't it?
47

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yeah, but it was on that day as well, sir. I
2 mean, on that day, had Wanat had not been in contact,
3 all things being equal, we're watching Wanat.
4

5 LtGen Natonski: But didn't you have different main efforts
6 throughout your 15 months?

Diamond

7
8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, we certainly did. And in COIN, yet, you
9 may have a main effort--the decisive effort again is
10 keeping our arteries open. Anything that effects the
11 arteries, those two hardball roads I mentioned, will
12 get attention first. The supporting efforts, the
13 valleys immediately off that have a lot of our
14 population and that directly effect that, those were
15 our supporting efforts. I could shift my main effort
16 around. But it would also shift routinely within the
17 loop: "Who's the main effort for government security,
18 economic development, and information operation?" And
19 largely, the enemy got a vote on how I shifted that
20 main effort. But my main effort for Wanat, right
21 then, was--or for the Task Force was Wanat.
22

23 LtGen Natonski: And it was with Bella before that; the
24 withdrawal of Bella, that was combined?

Diamond

25
26 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): That was the main effort.
27

28 LtGen Natonski: And then it shifted to Wanat?

Diamond

29
30 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) And then we overlapped them. They weren't
31 exactly simultaneous, but they were pretty close to
32 simultaneous operations. The largest concern within
33 the CONOP was extraction from Bella. I thought that
34 was the greatest threat, threat to force, threat to
35 mission.
36

37 LtGen Natonski: And as you said, you had some indications that
38 the enemy was massing in that area?

Diamond

39
40 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) For weeks and weeks; and they had demonstrated
41 proficiency with indirect fire.
42

43 LtGen Natonski: But you never saw 200, I mean, I think you
44 mentioned that the largest number you ever saw was 15
45 on a full motion video?

Diamond

46
47 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir. And there was a few times that we'd,

1 basically, see squad plus of the enemy, but you just
2 did not see them.

3
4 LtGen Natonski: Talking about battlefield circulation, you
5 certainly laid out a busy schedule on the days leading
6 up to the battle, did your XO do battlefield
7 circulation?

8 **Diamond**

9 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) No. My XO ran the TOC, Blessing, S-1, S-4 stuff.

10
11 LtGen Natonski: How about the Three?

12
13 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Occasionally, the Three would either cover down
14 on a meeting if I had something else, if I was doing,
15 **Diamond** if I got, basically, called out of a sector, he would
16 do battlefield circulation with my TAC. But, by and
17 large, the Three did not do that. And the reason for
18 that is you've got to develop the relationships. And
19 the units that impose or suppose that one field grades
20 interchangeable with another have issues.

21
22 I adamantly understand Afghan culture. I've
23 studied it. You know, was very interested in this,
24 had a passion for doing that and was good at it and
25 was good at meeting with the people. And I would
26 have, consistently, better effects than anybody else
27 in my task force, at my level. You know, and I
28 certainly didn't supersede even squad leaders, platoon
29 leader, or company commanders. But out of our field
30 grade and out of our TOC, we had a very set TAC and
31 would have those effects at the right level. And a
32 lot of that's, you know, personal knowledge of who the
33 people are at the right levels.

34
35 LtGen Natonski: You know we talked about some of the
36 indications and warnings that the Soldiers picked up
37 on the site. We also have heard, in some of our
38 interviews, about the water shortage. You never heard
39 **Diamond** from--about the water shortage?

40
41 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) No, sir.

42
43 LtGen Natonski: Okay. We've tracked it to the Company TOC and
44 Captain (b)(3),(b)(6),Papa

45 **Diamond**

46 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

47

1 LtGen Natonski: I think that indications seem to indicate that
2 he had, one, sent up a Hilux with some water. But he
3 had the water, he was just trying to get the lift to
4 get it up to the position. I've never been able to
5 connect any indications that he notified anyone at the
6 Battalion level. And you--
7 **Diamond**

8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) And I've asked, again, when the (b)(3),(b)(6) report, **Garnet**
9 draft came out and I pulled out some of the things
10 that really caught me by surprise and that the water
11 **Oscar** one I asked Captain (b)(3),(b)(6), Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) **Papa**
12

13 LtGen Natonski: Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) actually came up with the water **Oscar**
14 on the 12th.
15 **Diamond**

16 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir.
17

18 LtGen Natonski: And water was not a problem on the battlefield.
19

20 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes, sir. And I asked Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) about the **Yankee**
21 **Diamond** water, and all of them sent me emails about their take
22 on the water. And as you've laid-out, Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) **Papa**
23 said, "I knew they were short, you know, and I had a
24 plan to get it up;" but, you know, he didn't view it
25 as a critical issue. And I'm not sure if that's how
26 it was--not critical enough I'll say to come up
27 Battalion.
28

29 LtGen Natonski: I don't know whether "black" is considered
30 critical but Sergeant (b)(3),(b)(6) reported black.
31 **Yankee**

32 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Right, but I'm not sure--I haven't--I'm, you
33 **Diamond** know, remain, you know, just disappointed that I
34 didn't know about that, because like I say--and
35 everybody knew what the Battalion fight was. There
36 wasn't consternation or ill feelings amongst anybody,
37 and I think there was definitely an approachability.
38 There were means to convey that information. You
39 know, if for some reason, he just gotten his ass
40 chewed by the XO, by the Battalion XO, which I don't
41 have an indication he did or got any push back, I was
42 100 meters away him, you know, routinely.
43

44 LtGen Natonski: He was at Blessing instead of--
45

46 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): He was at Blessing, yes, sir.
47 **Diamond**

1 LtGen Natonski: The Company TOC was probably--
2 [Diamond]
3 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) 100 meters from us, sir, less than that.
4
5 LtGen Natonski: Okay. And as you mentioned, the Bella
6 withdrawal and the establishment of Wanat was the main
7 effort. It was your Battalion's main effort or the
8 [Diamond] Company's main effort?
9
10 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, my main effort, so it was certainly the
11 Company's main effort.
12
13 LtGen Natonski: But you also indicated the XO or the Three
14 [Diamond] didn't do battlefield circulation.
15
16 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.
17
18 LtGen Natonski: The fact that you were establishing a new COP
19 down the valley from Bella, I'm just wondering, was
20 that more important than going to see a governor and
21 doing the key leader engagement in your mind? I'm
22 just thinking that maybe had someone visited Wanat
23 sooner, some of these indications and warnings would
24 have been bumped up to a more senior level. Because
25 here you have Lieutenant Brostrom out there alone and
26 unafraid, but he's getting feedback, I think, from his
27 Soldiers that they were seeing these things, were
28 running out of water and--although they're calling
29 back to the Company TOC, they're not seeing the water
30 come right away. They did get, I think, the fuel
31 bladder for their bobcat, but there was no one there
32 [Oscar] until Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) came literally the day before the
33 attack, because he was distracted by his own 15-6.
34 When he came up, was it your intent to leave him there
35 [Diamond] until the RIP/TOA?
36
37 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, I'd be getting reports from him and, you
38 know, again, I was going to put him up there. And,
39 again, I was going to be up there as well, so we would
40 have had a--
41
42 LtGen Natonski: Was he just up there for a visit, permanent--
43
44 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) No, he wasn't up there for a visit. He was going
45 [Diamond] to stay there for some period, undetermined period of
46 time. He wasn't going up there and coming immediately
47 back. And I believe he was going to go check that out

1 and, you know, just kind of supervise what was going
2 on up there. Again, get a Company C2 note--and for
3 all of the same reasons that you're indicating. But,
4 **Citrus** in our TAC, when (b)(3),(b)(6) came up on the 14th, is we
5 would have been up there because that would have been,
6 you know, "Hey, this is a pretty big deal," and I had
7 already been talking to his PDSS. So we would have
8 been up there. Yeah, they would have been up there
9 six days, but like I say--mentioned about Monti is,
10 you know, I'd like to say that I could drive to all my
11 COPs every day and see everybody or even every week
12 but that is not the reality up there.
13

14 LtGen Natonski: But Wanat was, I think, you said 45 minutes?

15 **Diamond**
16 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Was about 45 minutes from me, absolutely. But it
17 will take, you know, additional resources, you know,
18 to coordinate and potentially pull off from there.
19 And again, you know, had there been any indication at
20 my level that, "Hey, this is, this is not going well."
21 And I think you're right, in retrospect, had I come up
22 there and like I said early on in this, you know, the
23 one regret that I have of this, potential mistake, is
24 not going up there in that period. I mean, at the
25 time, it looked like there were better priorities. If
26 Wanat--if the battle wouldn't of happened, there would
27 have been better, you know, everybody would have
28 agreed that they were the best priorities and that it
29 went well. But it did happen and that's, you know,
30 kind of--
31

32 LtGen Natonski: Well, you know, this is the CONOPs that was put
33 together. And it primarily covers--the most
34 vulnerable area appears to be as they pull into the
35 position and you had the fires all wired in here and
36 also ISR, I think, through the 12th is when it--
37

38 **Diamond**
39 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) : Yes, sir.

40 LtGen Natonski: And I understand it went away on the 12th.
41 We've had some discussions about that. Were there any
42 other Op plans or Op orders for this evolution,
43 company or platoon?

44 **Diamond** **Oscar**
45 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I don't know what (b)(3),(b)(6) had. I know John
46 Brostrom was on the Adobe Breeze when we were briefing
47 the--I think he was on both, but I know when we were

1 briefing to Brigade he was on. I'm not sure if he was
2 on when we briefed to General Milley.

3
4 LtGen Natonski: I understand why this was put together, more so
5 after some of our interviews yesterday. This involved
6 Diamond assets throughout the division.

7
8 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

9
10 LtGen Natonski: Helicopters and ISR, required approval at the
11 Diamond Division level.

12
13 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) But really, to understand the CONOP process, sir,
14 you've got to understand that in order to get those
15 assets, in order to get air, ISR, it has to be a Level
16 II CONOP. I mean, you have to build the justification
17 for the brief if you can get it.

18
19 LtGen Natonski: Granted. I mean, you certainly built a pretty,
20 pretty good plan here for Wanat. I guess the problem
21 I have is what's the plan for after the 10th of July?
22 I mean, what about--what's that platoon supposed to
23 do? You know, I know we talked about all of why we
24 were going up to Wanat. We were going to build a COP.
25 I don't see a diagram in there; although, there is one
26 on the engineering plan. But, you know, the typical
27 kind of things we do as commanders, leaders, the
28 simple five paragraph order: Why are they going
29 there; you know, what's the plan; what are their
30 tasks, which include the establishment of the COP?
31 But I think the reason you were building the COP was
32 to engage the local populous and district governments:
33 "And oh by the way, two weeks from now, we're going to
34 do a RIP with a new battalion. And by the way, here's
35 some of your coordinating instructions."

36
37 Where--I mean, this was a main effort in the
38 Battalion, deliberative combat operation. It wasn't
39 just drive up, set up a VPB for 24 hours, and move on
40 to another site. Where is the rest of the planning
41 that was supposed to be, that was going into COP
42 Wanat?

43 Diamond

44 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, I think--you have to understand, sir, that,
45 you know, we were doing parallel planning throughout
46 this. This is my plan to the Battalion Commander or
47 to the Company Commander, and he is going to go into

1 establish COP Wanat. He has the engineers, he has the
2 diagram of the, of Wanat is going to be. We've walked
3 the ground to Wanat. We've been talking about this
4 for, you know, four months. We understand what the
5 end state of the Wanat COP is going to look like, and
6 we've got the engineer plans, and we've got the
7 engineers with him. And we are going to go ahead and
8 go up there and seize the land so the engineers,
9 secure the land so the engineers can begin prepping
10 that land in accordance with the JFUB packet that we
11 have that is very precise of what's being built,
12 where, and how. His initial task is to go up there
13 and secure that area, secure himself. And then, the
14 assets are to be flown up there and--
15

16 LtGen Natonski: Well, but this only goes through the 10th of
17 July. What happens after the 10th? You know, your
18 intent was to get them up there to establish a COP,
19 but was that all he was supposed to do? I thought
20 part of the purpose up there was to engage the--
21

Diamond

22 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) But, sir, this is month 14. When John Brostrom
23 road marched, physically road marched, from Blessing
24 to Nangalam to engage the elders in accordance with
25 the KLE's that I have in here some of that--on that
26 he's written, I didn't give him specific instructions
27 on the lines of operation, because everybody knew what
28 the lines of operations were. He was very experienced
29 in conducting key leader engagements. A couple of
30 them that I had been on with him, one back in November
31 up at Bella and, you know, that one per se, he was at
32 an impasse on it, and I ran--ended up running the
33 Shura for him. We talked about that kind of AAR. To
34 expect in a battalion CONOP that he knows and we've
35 been talking about conducting this task, that I would
36 go back through and give him detailed instructions on
37 our lines of operation that he personally has been
38 executing now for nine months maybe is--I think that's
39 an unreasonable expectation. He knew that he was
40 going to go there. We had several conversations about
41 that.
42

43 In our plans, in our doctrine, it consistently
44 talks about mission orders, keeping plans simple,
45 giving them their intent, and having them operate
46 within that. He knew he was going up there to secure
47 the land that was going to develop into a base. He

1 had seen the JFUB packet. He knew what it was going
2 to look like. He knew the particulars of it, and his
3 job was security. And we would bring up the engineers
4 up there, and they would do the engineering work; and
5 there was going to be some friction points. The
6 engineer, the battalion engineer was leaving, but we
7 got augmentee engineers that could do the site prep as
8 1-26 was coming in.
9

10 LtGen Natonski: So you didn't require a comeback from the
11 Company or whether the platoon was to--how they were
12 conduct this because it was 14 months into your tour,
13 and you thought they knew that? What about the
14 Diamond incoming unit that was coming in two weeks later?

15
16 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, when the Battalion Commander came on, again,
17 on the 14th, when we would plan on going up, and you
18 can see our RIP/TOA slides, when we would plan on
19 hitting every HMWWV, capable road together, which we
20 did do, the majority of them except for this one is,
21 you know, we would be up there and talk about the same
22 things that I had talked to my platoon leaders and
23 company commanders, company commander about, and how
24 we had laid out and the history of Wanat, and how it
25 was progressing. I think it's a mischaracterization
26 to say, "Well, because you've been there 14 months,
27 you didn't expect a back brief on the lines of
28 operation." I don't think that's what I said. If
29 that's what I said, to clarify--
30

31 LtGen Natonski: No, and I'm not looking at the lines of
32 operation. But, I mean, how were you planning on
33 executing the lines of operation? What are you going
34 to do--at least in my own mind, I would have wanted to
35 make sure that he was maybe going to put patrols out.
36 He would of have, at least, maybe covered that. Sure
37 we can take it for granted. But, one, how do we know
38 his troops knew all of that? They certainly did a
39 great job digging in. I think that's evidenced by the
40 defenses that were built on the morning of the attack.
41 But I still wonder how much--was he just thrown up
42 there and said, "Okay, start a COP, and you're going
43 to be relieved in two weeks and go home"? I just--
44

45 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I don't think that was the case at all, sir. I
46 really don't. I'll have to ask--
47

1 LtGen Natonski: I haven't seen anything that indicates that,
2 you know, I think there was a diagram of fire support,
3 fire plan, a layout of the position that Lieutenant
4 Brostrom put together that was on the back of a MRE
5 box or something that was lost during the battle. But
6 I wonder if there's anything, any more other planning
7 done at the platoon level or at the company level as
8 they went into, what was considered a pretty, big
9 major evolution, the construction of the COP in a new
10 location, you know, which was part of the COIN
11 strategy; and yet, you know, as I say, hey, great plan
12 to get them up there but what happens afterwards?

13 **Diamond**

14 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Again, after walking the ground with them, the
15 26th, and I'd have to ask (b)(3),(b)(6) or the 26th of April,
16 **Oscar** having been up there with (b)(3),(b)(6) on the 26th and the 8th **Oscar**
17 of June, Lieutenant Brostrom doing dismounted patrols
18 or mounted and dismounted patrols in that area, us
19 building the plan in parallel to include the JFUB
20 packet, and understanding and having a clear
21 understanding of how the orders are--how the COP is
22 going to be established, how we're going to secure the
23 land, how it's going to be established, you know, I
24 think it's incorrect to go ahead and say, "Well I
25 don't have a power point slide," and I don't have the
26 words that you said. Because by our own doctrine, we
27 can go ahead and issue out orders verbally, get back
28 briefs, and do everything--

29
30 LtGen Natonski: You can do frag orders and all of that. But
31 what happens if the Lieutenant gets killed when he's
32 on his way up there? What does the platoon sergeant
33 know? How much of this was passed to the platoon
34 sergeant? How much down to the squad leader or the
35 section leader? You know, they went up there and,
36 "Okay, let's start establishing, you go here, you go
37 here," in accordance with the diagram. But how much
38 more--and what about force protection, and what about,
39 you know, engagement? Because this is the platoon
40 that's going to be out there like any other COP. And
41 if they're going to follow those lines of
42 communications, but you also have a new platoon that's
43 going to be coming in and the whole purpose of, you
44 know, and I thought it was good initiative on the part
45 of the Battalion and the Company to put this in for a
46 relatively inexperienced, new battalion after, you
47 know, 14 moths of experience. I thought--and there's

1 been some criticism. "Why do this in the last two
2 weeks?" I understand why it was done, but, by the
3 same token, you had a new unit that was coming in
4 that, at this point, you know, I would have thought
5 right about the RIP/TOA, they didn't even have a guy
6 on the position when they started building it. Maybe
7 you could have started to turning over but, you know,
8 were they going to just flat fall into this position
9 of, "Well, okay, here's our position"? I just think
10 there should have been some detailed planning to make
11 sure everyone knew they were on the same sheet of
12 paper; whether it's a Rock drill or--was there a Rock
13 drill for this?

14 **Diamond**

15 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): There was not a Rock--

16
17 LtGen Natonski: A rehearsal or--

18 **Diamond**

19 COL [redacted]: There were back brief rehearsals on this.

20
21 LtGen Natonski: For this?

22
23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) For this. And (b)(3),(b)(6) back briefed me, and **Oscar**

24 **Diamond**

25 again, Johnny Brostrom, Brostrom was in my office on
26 the 7th, and we talked about what he was going to do
27 on the 7th of July before he went up. And we--how we
28 do the Adobe Breeze orders is everybody's at their CP,
29 we're briefing to higher, and--

30 LtGen Natonski: And I'm not expecting anything like this for a
31 platoon or a company. I would have thought that
32 there'd be something that laid out what happened after
33 the 10th of July at this position.

34 **Diamond**

35 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, I guess I'm missing with, you know, what more
36 detail do we need than diagrams, satellite pictures,
37 conversation--

38
39 LtGen Natonski: How about dates, dates of the RIP? How it's
40 going to ---

41 **Diamond**

42 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, this isn't the RIPOP order. I have a
43 different Op order. We have another RIP plan for
44 that.

45
46 LtGen Natonski: For Wanat?
47

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Just for the Battalion, I put out a Battalion
2 RIP/TOA plan that we had, and that we briefed, and
3 that we executed. One of the things I fought for
4 adamantly is throughout history in Afghanistan 30
5 people get off of a CH-47 and 28 get on, because we've
6 got to maximize the air. And something I adamantly
7 fought about is that it can only be 50 percent
8 degradation. So a platoon leader or a platoon
9 sergeant is going to stay, an FO, FORTO, two squads,
10 the key positions are going to be there. And I said,
11 you know, "We're not going to do this," and I briefed
12 this all the way up. General Milley knows it, because
13 I was fighting with him about air and Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) **Delta**
14 does. We're not going to say we're going to leave
15 couple of squad leaders and do it, because the squad
16 leader doesn't know what the SAW gunner knows, the
17 squad leader does not know what the 203 gunner knows
18 and what everybody is on individual positions. But
19 this is--and if the assumption that this covers it
20 through RIP/TOA, that, that's an incorrect assumption.
21 Because I've got our RIP/TOA that we went through, and
22 I put a lot of energy into training that element
23 before turning it over to him.

24
25 LtGen Natonski: Well, I see this as covering it, basically, for
26 **Diamond** the movement up to the position.

27
28 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) It was for the movement up, and the JFUB packet
29 coupled with discussions, and terrain walk with (b)(3),(b)(6),Oscar
30 (b)(3),(b)(6),Oscar is covered--what my intent and how we were
31 setting up that, umm--

32
33 LtGen Natonski: When did that terrain walk take place?

34
35 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) On May 26 is when we--or April 26 we did the
36 **Diamond** initial one. And that's when they said they didn't
37 want the building inside of the perimeter. On May 26,
38 when we came back up for the Shura, looked at it
39 again. On 8 June, we did the Shura. The Shura's 100
40 meters away from the--that's where the District Center
41 is. So we meet up on the Wanat, you know this is
42 where we are going to be. And there was just
43 institutional knowledge, and I don't want to confuse
44 that with the tone that, "Yeah, institutional
45 knowledge and 14 months equals complacency," that's
46 not it. I think that there was a firm understanding
47 of how we were going in there. Is there a detailed

1 timeline which sandbag is going to go where? No,
2 there is not. And that's why I say when the engineers
3 didn't show up, it's a 14 week build-plan. If they
4 hadn't shown up within a week of the time, that would
5 have been, you know, very critical to probably say, "I
6 don't think that they're going to come here, and we
7 need to get the assets to get these guys out. And we
8 are just not going to be able to do this. We are out
9 of Bella. We're not going to be able to get this
10 done. It's not working." But, you know, the surprise
11 that this happened on day four of this operation, you
12 know, obviously the friction, the chaos, uncertainty
13 changed a lot of things.
14

15 LtGen Natonski: And I agree with you there; although, it was
16 your most dangerous course of action in your plan
17 there.
18

Diamond

19 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir. Similar to it, the most dangerous
20 course of action also had command and wire IED's going
21 up to, up the road, and those, you know, didn't occur.
22 The cache's, they did occur. They did have support by
23 fire positions figured out. But again, that probably
24 fed into why guys were so concerned about having some
25 force protection before they started patrolling
26 around.
27

28 LtGen Natonski: Okay. Thanks.
29

30 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Sorry if I'm defensive about some things. But I
31 **Diamond** just--and I feel that I'm failing to convey, sir, all
32 the inputs and everything that were going on not only
33 in the AO, and I want to pull up the RIP/TOA.
34

35 LtGen Natonski: Well, was there too much going to be
36 establishing Wanat? Was attention distracted because
37 of the RIP/TOA?
38

Diamond

39 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Again, sir, I don't believe that. Because if it
40 wasn't the RIP/TOA, than would it have been all of the
41 KLE's and the governance line of operation? If it
42 wasn't the RIP/TOA, I mean, we were always operating
43 at, you know, the 95 to 105 percent level all
44 throughout. There was never a time where we got to
45 vote to just let's just sit back for a while. It just
46 was not in that environment due to dispersion, the
47 austere, undeveloped infrastructure that we had, the

1 enemy votes, the, you know, requirements to train
2 ANSF. At this time, I mean, a big thing that was off
3 of our table was how much calories we were putting
4 into partnering and training our ANSF. By this time,
5 we'd really tripled up the number of ANSF that we had
6 in our area and professionalized them, uniformed them,
7 and they were conducting independent operations. So
8 that gave us, you know, a little bit of a respite.
9 Had we done this a little bit earlier maybe we would
10 have been distracted with, you know, the training
11 tasks, the in-out of sector mission or something like
12 that.

13
14 LtGen Natonski: Well, and combat is--and it's unpredictable. I
15 grant you that.

16
17 (b)(6)

18
19 MGen Perkins: What was your perception of the relationship with
20 the ANA folks that went up there with the platoon?
21 **Diamond** Was it like about an ANA platoon?

22
23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

24
25 MGen Perkins: Had you worked with them or had that worked with
26 Brostrom and his guys before?

27
28 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) They had worked, and they had done dismounted
29 patrols with those guys. And I know that there were
30 dismissive comments attributed to Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) or **Oscar**
31 **Oscar** Captain (b)(3),(b)(6), but, you know, on Blessing early on we
32 established a joint TOC in there. My partner was
33 adjacent to our JOC. And, you know, we truly did
34 partnered in combined operations and planning and had
35 a good take and honest discussions about which one of
36 his leaders needed help and which ones didn't and, you
37 know, or didn't need as much supervision and stuff.
38 I had no indications that this platoon, I mean, they'd
39 go outside the wire and patrol with them and had no
40 indications that this platoon was going to be anything
41 other than like the rest of that Battalion.

42
43 MGen Perkins: Sort of like however you define an average ANA
44 unit?

45 **Diamond**

46 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

1 MGen Perkins: Its strengths, pluses, minuses?
2 **Diamond**
3 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, within this Battalion.
4
5 MGen Perkins: Right.
6
7 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Because I had two, the one what we called "East
8 **Diamond** of the River" was very good. It was an echelon above,
9 and that was because of the unit leadership, but for
10 this element that was in Central Kunar, it was like
11 average.
12
13 MGen Perkins: Average. Again, based on after the fact
14 discussions and Intel, you estimate on the size of the
15 enemy you're saying is about a 150 you think?
16 **Diamond**
17 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, I'd estimate based on everything between 150
18 and 200.
19
20 MGen Perkins: Right. And enemy KIA, WIA, I know that's an
21 estimate?
22 **Diamond**
23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) From SIGINT, we gathered 21. We said 21 to 53
24 and that was based on--
25
26 MGen Perkins: KIA?
27 **Diamond**
28 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Of KIA. And at one point in time, we got SIGINT
29 that listed 53 names, but they couldn't confirm that
30 those were KIA's.
31
32 MGen Perkins: So 20 to 50, something there?
33 **Diamond**
34 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) 21 to 53 is what we wrote down.
35
36 MGen Perkins: Unknown WIA, I guess?
37 **Diamond**
38 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Right. And between that 21 and 53 was--and up to
39 100 WIA. Now, go ahead and put all that--
40
41 MGen Perkins: I understand, yeah, yeah.
42 **Diamond**
43 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) And where we got 100 is we got HUMINT reports
44 that up at Bella, at the Swedish clinic, they had all
45 of these wounded in action were being moved up there.
46 And we had ISR over top of that and didn't see
47 indications that that was the case. But up at Bella,

1 it's a Swedish medical clinic there, up at Bella, that
2 that was overflowing and they started bringing them
3 out to Pakistan.
4

5 MGen Perkins: Yeah, and it just kind of--getting this in
6 perspective, because as you said as you did your
7 initial sort of troop to task, correlation of forces,
8 or whatever, the assessment based on the Intel that
9 you had before that, which was significantly less than
10 this, was that, again, a U.S. Army Platoon was capable
11 of defending itself, from anything they would run into
12 in the Waygal. And quite honestly, even though nine
13 heroes gave their lives, they did that, all right. I
14 mean, it was a tactical victory for your guys. I
15 mean, correct? I mean, is that--do you see it--I
16 mean, again, very unfortunate but tactically--
17

Diamond

18 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, I think it was a tactical win and a
19 strategic defeat up there, I really do. I think,
20 tactically, they accorded themselves well.
21

22 MGen Perkins: I mean, tactically, they held their ground on the
23 battlefield against 100 to 200 enemy?
24

Diamond

25 COL (b)(3),(b)(6): Right. I mean, the enemy was up to wire, but
26 they didn't overrun the position, empirically. You
27 know, they didn't overrun the COP. And we had had
28 people on the Ranch House. But, yeah, tactically, I
29 think they were positioned and resourced to win. I
30 just think that, you know, the loss of the enablers
31 that we had right off the battle--
32

33 MGen Perkins: No, I understand. And then again--and we never,
34 again, the loss of nine lives is not to be minimized.
35 But again, when you're taking a look at assessments
36 that are made resourcing and all of that and the
37 decisions that have to be made, you can sort of take a
38 look at the outcome and say, "Well how close was the
39 outcome to our predicted ability to do something?"
40

Oscar

41 You obviously--captain-- was Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) the
42 Company Commander the whole time for Chosen while you
43 were there?
44

Diamond

45 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) The whole time, sir, through training and through
46 deployments, sir.
47

1 MGen Perkins: Yeah, so you had seen him for a long time.
2 You're his rater?
3 **Diamond**
4 COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.
5
6 MGen Perkins: So, you talked about his--your personal
7 assessment of him. How would he stack up--I'm sure
8 you had to talk to his senior writer, the Brigade
9 Commander, et cetera. Was he like your best company
10 commander? One of the top two, I mean, how would you?
11 **Diamond**
12 COL [redacted]: Yeah, I'd put him in the three, three--I had six.
13 And I put him--I think he's rated the third in ours
14 **Chi** with [redacted], at this time, he was now second; but,
15 **Chi** you know, (b)(3),(b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and then (b)(3),(b)(6) **Oscar**
16
17 MGen Perkins: But at this time in the Battalion, he was the
18 second, number two guy?
19 **Diamond**
20 COL (b)(3), (b)(6): No, he was probably the third.
21
22 MGen Perkins: The third guy, okay.
23
24 And you were Lieutenant Brostrom's senior rater,
25 so obviously you had to rate him. How would you rate
26 him, you know, within the Battalion of lieutenants,
27 top "X" percent, you know?
28 **Diamond**
29 COL (b)(3), (b)(6): At this time, he would be in the top 25 percent.
30
31 MGen Perkins: Top quarter?
32 **Diamond**
33 COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Top quarter, top third. And as you know, that's
34 hard to slice.
35
36 MGen Perkins: I know. I know it. I'm just--
37 **Diamond**
38 COL (b)(3), (b)(6): And really, his distracter or why others would be
39 rated higher is because they had more opportunities to
40 integrate many more fire assets.
41 **Papa**
42 MGen Perkins: Okay. And how about Captain (b)(3),(b)(6) you were his
43 senior rater, the XO?
44 **Diamond**
45 COL (b)(3), (b)(6): I thought very highly of him. In fact, I
46 recommended--he did take command at Chosen Company.
47 We didn't have another commander, so I held him in

1 high regard. He had progressed very rapidly as a
2 platoon leader. He wasn't--I put my best platoon
3 leaders in as company XO's without fail. Scout
4 platoon, mortar, but the best went into the XO
5 positions and that's how I rated them in the
6 Battalion.

7 **Yankee**

8 MGen Perkins: Sergeant First Class (b)(3),(b)(6) platoon sergeant, how
9 **Diamond** would you sort of rate him?

10 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) New platoon sergeant, he was very good. Very
11 solid under fire, was in the Ranch House. He got a
12 BSMV out of that. All of the reports about him very
13 calm under fire, detail oriented, disciplined, not a--
14 just a compassionate--
15

16
17 MGen Perkins: So this group of leadership the company
18 commander, XO, platoon leader, platoon sergeant, I
19 mean, they were sort of among the best in the
20 Battalion?

21 **Diamond**

22 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) They were, sir. But, you know, there's only a
23 couple of, you know, in truth in lending, we could
24 have this discussion really about, just about every
25 platoon sergeant saying they were among the--
26

27 MGen Perkins: I know. But I guess what I'm getting at is, you
28 had a hot--they had a history of doing very difficult
29 things and doing them well?

30 **Diamond**

31 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) They did, sir. And the ability and because (b)(3),(b)(6),Oscar
32 (b)(3),(b)(6),Oscar was the Company Commander--
33

34 MGen Perkins: Right.

35 **Diamond**

36 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) It was easily accessible. When I had an out of
37 sector mission or a QRF type, when I'd say I got a
38 TAC, a company CP, that's who I was talking about.
39 When the SF unit that's been in the press lately was
40 in a heck of a battle just to our West in I think it
41 was April, he would have been--
42

43 MGen Perkins: So you had a long experience of watching these
44 guys up close and personal in combat. You had a long
45 experience of seeing their capability. Because one of
46 the things we get at is sort of the reasonable prudent
47 person, you know, in other words, in your experience,

1
2 MGen Perkins: Right.

3 **Diamond**

4 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) And what is the Task Force fight? Because I knew
5 it would be easy for me to get sucked in to being the
6 best company commander in the battalion, God forbid,
7 the best platoon leader or the most active one. But
8 what is the Task Force fight? And I had great company
9 commanders even, you know, the two that I changed out
10 were replaced with very solid guys, but spent more
11 time with them. You know, (b)(3),(b)(6) the guy who, **Blackhawk**
12 that came up and helped him out from Able Company,
13 just replaced in March, spent more time along the Pesh
14 **Moon** with him. (b)(3),(b)(6) replaced the Destined Company
15 Commander. Took a little time and he was--
16

17 MGen Perkins: This was really a, a continuous assessment you
18 had to make with each subordinate commander you worked
19 with, with each situation. Sometimes, as you said,
20 you being there made a difference other times you had
21 to be at other places.
22 **Diamond**

23 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir, and the point on that too--
24

25 MGen Perkins: But it was always a deliberate decision on your
26 part?
27 **Diamond**

28 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir. I mean, that's exactly--is whether we
29 are going on Destined strike, was a search for a COP,
30 a COP location, is we were going to pull Chowkay
31 Valley up onto a piece of high ground. Okay. I went
32 in on both of those air assaults to look at that piece
33 of ground. I trusted the Company Commander, but
34 again, the spotting of the COP is pretty important. I
35 had felt I met that level by the numerous times I had
36 been up to Wanat that I was comfortable--
37

38 MGen Perkins: Okay. I'm just trying to get some insight into
39 your decision making process and your experience and
40 why you would do that.
41

42 Back to this, I think, you said, I think you had
43 the ISR from the 8th to about the 12th sometime or
44 whatever it got moved?
45 **Diamond**

46 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.
47

1 MGen Perkins: I believe, in our discussions with Division and
2 others, it was moved to a TIC in Tangal area, I guess,
3 it was the ISAF Commander's priority. What, what--how
4 much time did you spend, obviously, maintaining
5 situational awareness in your Battalion, but
6 throughout the Brigade and the Division area? You
7 know, trying to maintain situational awareness left
8 and right flank?

Diamond

9
10 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, if you look in this CONOP, right here, short
11 answer, a lot. And one of my abort criteria
12 consistently throughout there is any event that
13 happens in the AI that will adversely effect resources
14 and that was a consistent theme.

15
16 MGen Perkins: Did you see that as one of the task force fights?
17 And one of your jobs, that's sort of unique, is
18 maintaining overall situational awareness not just AO
19 Rock.

Diamond

20
21 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes. Sir, not overall situational awareness but,
22 again, I thought as part of my C2 role is to
23 understand the AI, and understand what would, you
24 know, what event in the AI, which I didn't just
25 include AO Bayonet.

26
27 MGen Perkins: Right.

28
29 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) In the RC because the resources were controlled
30 at that level.

Diamond

31
32 MGen Perkins: Right.

33
34 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) What events would trigger a loss of resources?

Diamond

35
36 MGen Perkins: And speaking of that, so you had considerable
37 ISR, I guess, from the 8th to the 12th? In fact,
38 would you say it was more than you were usually
39 accustomed to?

Diamond

40
41 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, I don't think at any time--I don't think I
42 had four day--well, I know I didn't have four days of
43 continuous ISR.

44
45 MGen Perkins: So in fact, that was the most you'd ever received
46 in 15 months?

Diamond

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

2
3 MGen Perkins: You had never received that before?

4 Diamond

5 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Not the continuous--

6
7 MGen Perkins: The continuous?

8 Diamond

9 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes.

10
11 MGen Perkins: And during that time, did the ISR pick up any
12 indicators of imminent attack, or did you have any
13 engagement or did--what was the result of this, by
14 your own admission, the most intense ISR you had ever
15 had in 15 months?

16 Diamond

17 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, I thought we were pretty good at using ISR.
18 We had effects with it throughout the battle space
19 after TICs primarily. We rarely, again, I think, it
20 was probably less than 20 times that ISR picked up--

21
22 MGen Perkins: Right.

23 Diamond

24 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Even an indicator of an impending attack. And
25 then, we would really be forced, in almost all cases,
26 to watch it until it was--

27
28 MGen Perkins: So what did you get after four days of the most
29 intense ISR you had ever seen?

30 Diamond

31 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Sir, I didn't get indications that the enemy were
32 moving out. I did see movement in the mountains.

33
34 MGen Perkins: Okay. So you had four days of the most intense
35 ISR you had ever seen and you really had no
36 significant indicators coming out of it. That ISR is
37 then moved on the 12th to--I think as we determined,
38 it was a TIC in another area.

39
40 One of the things, probably, that you have to do
41 is determine again how hard you push for resources to
42 you higher. And, I assume, you do that taking into
43 account the situational awareness that you maintain
44 across your AO, somebody else. One, I guess, could
45 say when we talk about the decisions of a prudent
46 person, that if a commander realized there was a
47 higher need some place else for a resource and he

1 continued to push, I mean, we all want to our own
2 advocate for our area.

3 **Diamond**

4 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

5
6 MGen Perkins: But one could argue that continuing to be an
7 advocate for your area when you know there's a greater
8 need someplace else, that in and of itself, could be an
9 imprudent move, correct?

10 **Diamond**

11 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, yes, sir. And I've got plenty of examples
12 of that, of--if not having situational awareness early
13 on, you know, the initial TICs that we'd have was a
14 big deal to us, and we'd be calling for everything and
15 just could not understand why we weren't getting CAS
16 in the Korengal.

17
18 MGen Perkins: Umm-hmm, right.

19
20 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Rotary wing and to call the FRO, need call ISR and
21 **Diamond** all this stuff. And, you know, when it was available,
22 we'd get it. And if it was a complex attack, it be
23 more adamant calling for it and, "Do you understand
24 that we're getting hit by 10 different positions.
25 There're moving on this element right now." Or, "This
26 element's out on the abascar, and they've got movers
27 on them right now," that would be more adamant. But
28 if we're not under that imminent threat and we get
29 told whether I get told by the CHOPs of the Brigade
30 Three, "Hey, the B1's not coming. CAS is not coming."
31 I got it.

32
33 MGen Perkins: You could argue that one of your jobs as the
34 Commander, again, uniquely your job, is that you have
35 to make your higher commander understand what's going
36 on in your area.

37 **Diamond**

38 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

39
40 MGen Perkins: But, conversely, you have to understand what's
41 going on in the big picture so you can put yourself in
42 perspective. So first of all, you know what you can
43 expect and then you also, in essence, you have to help
44 your higher commander help make his decisions as well.

45 **Diamond**

46 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

47

1 MGen Perkins: It's not, "Okay, I got it."
2 [Diamond]
3 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) I mean, and I think after this amount of time,
4 that people had a professional understanding of
5 norming in here for resources. And again, at this
6 period of time, I knew there were big TICs. And this
7 is our TIC tracker, it's probably at the 90-95
8 percent, probably 95 percent accuracy, but I started
9 running numbers for another thing. But on 8 July, you
10 know, Able Company was in small arms fire; Delta
11 Company had the IED which had the KIA; Bravo Company
12 on 9 through 11 July was in four contacts.
13
14 MGen Perkins: So there were other TICs going on even while
15 you--all the ISR--during the period, the ISR was still
16 over Wanat?
17 [Diamond]
18 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir. And that's why I make the point--
19
20 MGen Perkins: So it's interesting somebody else who was at that
21 location actually could make the case that keeping the
22 ISR on Wanat from the 8th to 12th was imprudent?
23 [Diamond]
24 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Well, sir--
25
26 MGen Perkins: From that point of view, if you're down at that
27 TIC?
28 [Diamond]
29 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir. But--and that's why I say on
30 this--and I know on, like on the Bravo Company, on
31 some of these Bravo Company TICs, that I moved the
32 ISR.
33
34 MGen Perkins: Well, I got--I think it gets back to the point
35 you do have to avoid looking at Wanat in a silver
36 straw.
37 [Diamond]
38 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) But the--and throughout, you know, in HHC, in our
39 TOC, was hit with indirect fire on the 10th. You
40 know, not the building but Blessing right there. And,
41 I mean, when we go through this, what the activities
42 are and the level of contact that was historically in
43 the Waygal about 45 contacts, and again, some of those
44 were one RPG round off of the base, compared to Battle
45 Company in the Korengal, here, that had about seven to
46 eight times as many contacts. They had about 400
47 contacts in the Korengal. And some of those were one

1 RPG too, but there were an awful lot of them that were
2 complex attacks. And then along the Pesh was about
3 300, and then Destin Company in the Chowkay took up
4 about 200 and, you know, we sliced those up a little
5 differently and how you can count them. But, I mean,
6 and those things again were going on and decisions
7 were being made to allocate those resources and
8 changing, obviously, changing the priorities of fire
9 to the support; but then, it would come back to Wanat
10 for that.

11
12 MGen Perkins: Okay. Thank you.

13 Diamond

14 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir.

15 Diamond

16 LtGen Natonski: Okay, Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) you are ordered not to
17 discuss the testimony you provided today with anyone
18 other than members of the investigation team. You
19 will not allow any witness in this investigation to
20 talk to you about the testimony he has given or which
21 he intends to give. If anyone should try to influence
22 your testimony or attempt to discuss your testimony,
23 you are instructed to notify Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6),Beta
24 and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) Do you understand that?

25 Diamond

(b)(3),(b)(6)
Sigma

26 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes, sir. And just to clarify, I mean, I got
27 about the testimony, and I think that probably goes to
28 Wanat in larger context, and I think everybody's
29 fairly prudent, very prudent on that. But, I do have,
30 I mean, your daily interaction with a lot of these
31 people. And I don't, you know, I'll be full
32 disclosure on that and talk--my guidance to people--
33 and I knew an order similar to this must be coming out
34 because the number of people--

35
36 LtGen Natonski: Everyone we have interviewed has been told
37 exactly that similar--

38 Diamond

39 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) And I think in good conscience, sir, they've done
40 it. Because when they get notified, people come up on
41 the net, "Oh my God." I'm like, "Hey, it's a full
42 disclosure deal. Tell them what you know. Tell them
43 what you don't know." And I think--I hope people have
44 demonstrated that. But then right afterwards the
45 conversation dropped off. You know, just all contact
46 together. So I know, especially the younger guys, you
47 know, are concerned about that.

1
2 My only concern about that, and especially a
3 couple of guys in 2d Platoon, is I have, I've
4 literally gotten social media, face book account, to
5 keep track of these guys. Not to post how many beers
6 I drink on Friday night, but to have a forum that they
7 email me that, (b)(3), (b)(6) having a hard time. Sergeant **Raider**
8 (b)(3), (b)(6), Phillie at Benning is getting jerked around by the **Diamond**
9 Warrior Transition Unit." "PFC (b)(3), (b)(6)" my amputee,
10 "is having a problem getting discharged." And I do--I
11 don't know how long this will go, sir, but I do worry
12 that--I'd feel bad if I missed something.
13

14 LtGen Natonski: I think the specific warning I give is
15 specifically what was discussed here and not to
16 influence someone else who is scheduled to testify.
17 So I think in terms of interaction with members of
18 your Command that were over there, I don't think that
19 should preclude any of that unless it has to do
20 specifically--
21 **Beta**

22 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) With the investigation, sir.
23

24 LtGen Natonski: Yeah.
25

26 COL (b)(3), (b)(6) And, sir, I'll be, be very cautious. But I do
27 **Diamond** want to--and I'll put out a well worded message on my
28 board about if anybody has any issues to include those
29 interviewed that have concerns, you know, not about
30 the interview--but I'll be clear, because I've got a
31 couple of the wounded guys from here that I've dropped
32 contact on. And I don't want--God forbid one of them
33 commit suicide.
34

35 LtGen Natonski: No, and I don't think you should have to drop
36 **Sigma** contact.
37

38 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) No, no, not at all.
39

40 LtGen Natonski: We're just talking strictly what was discussed
41 **Diamond** about today.
42

43 COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.
44

45 LtGen Natonski: Taking care of a Soldier, this does not
46 preclude any of that.
47

Diamond

Beta

1 COL (b)(3),(b)(6) In good faith, I'll let Colonel (b)(3),(b)(6) or Colonel
2 (b)(3),(b)(6),Voice know, you know, if any of those issues come up
3 that and just to tell you so that there's not, "Hey,
4 this is the guy. I think you've interviewed Sergeant
5 (b)(3),(b)(6),Yankee This is the issue that came up and this is
6 what we're working on," and keep the integrity of the
7 investigation. But I just wanted to raise that
8 concern.
9

10 LtGen Natonski: And, in closing, all I would say is we thank
11 you for your service to our country and also to the
12 Army for everything that you have done. So we
13 appreciate you coming up today. I know it's not been
14 easy. I don't think it's been easy for anyone that
15 has appeared before us, but we appreciate you being
16 here today. So good luck and thanks very much.
17

18 [The testimony was closed at 1354 hours, on 20 November 2009.]

CERTIFICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Subj: TESTIMONY OF COL [REDACTED] (b)(3),(b)(6),Diamond USA, GIVEN ON
20 NOVEMBER 2009, AT NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

In accordance with section 0214 of JAGINST 5800.7E, I certify
that the subject transcript is an accurate verbatim transcript.

[REDACTED]
(b)(3),(b)(6),Sigma

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Judge Advocate

4 DEC 09
DATE