

Memorandum of Understanding between the Iraqi Province of Al Muthanna and Multi-National Division (South East)

Introduction

The Participants to this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) are and His Excellency Mohammed Al Hassani, the Governor of Al Muthanna Province and Major General John Cooper DSO MBE, representing Multi-National Division South East (MND(SE)) as a subordinate command to Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I), (hereafter referred to as "the Participants").

This MOU is not intended to, constrain, obligate or bind the Participants beyond the current MNF-I obligations, in particular those laid down in the MOU between the Government of Iraq (GoI) and MNF-I concerning assumption of Security Responsibilities (known as "The Implementing Arrangement"). All terms and definitions in this MOU are as defined in the Implementing Arrangement. Nothing in this MOU will contradict the authorities given to the province of Al-Muthanna according to the Iraqi constitution and effective laws. Furthermore this MOU does not restrict MNF-I freedom of movement or action or its authorisation to take all necessary means to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, as provided in United Security Council Resolutions 1546 and 1637 and subsequent relevant resolutions.

This MOU is in two parts. The first sets out an understanding of the relationship between the Participants and the activities they will conduct in partnership with one another during Provincial Iraqi Control. This section has been negotiated and arranged between the Participants. The second contains those elements of the Implementing Arrangement, already arranged by the Government of Iraq and MNF-I, that set out the relationship between, and activities of, the Participants.

In the event of any dispute, the Participants undertake to seek a resolution in a spirit of goodwill and the Arabic text will be the authoritative version. Notwithstanding the rights given to MNF-I under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1546 and 1637 and subsequent relevant resolutions, changes to the first part of this MOU can be made by mutual understanding between the Participants in writing at any time.

Part 1 - MNF-I Presence in Muthanna Province during Provincial Iraqi Control

1.1 As soon as possible after the assumption of security responsibilities by Al Muthanna Province, MNF-I will withdraw all permanent presence from the Province. The current MNF-I bases in the Province will no longer be occupied. Ownership of the materiel remaining in Camp Smitty will be transferred to the Iraqi Security Forces, through the Governor of Al Muthanna and a provincial committee assigned by the Governor. The details of this transfer are outside the scope of this MOU. The General Officer Commanding the 10th Iraqi Division, on behalf of the Iraqi Army, will use Camp Samawah and its contents. The details of the transfer of Camp Samawah are outside the scope of this MOU.

1.2 Subject always to the provisions of the Implementing Arrangement and rights accorded in UNSCRs 1546 and 1637 and subsequent relevant resolutions, MNF-I will normally enter the Province of Al Muthanna for the following purposes during Provincial Iraqi Control (other than a declared security crisis, as defined in the Implementing Arrangement and the Annex to this MOU):

1.2.1 to maintain the operational capability of 2 (IA) Bde and any other assets of 10 (IA) Division permanently or temporarily located in the province of Al Muthanna and provide further training (including joint exercises) as requested by either participant and coordinated with Commander 10 (IA) Div and Commander 2 (IA) Bde;

1.2.2 to maintain the operational capability of the Iraqi Police Service (including the PEB) and provide further training as requested by either participant and coordinated with the Director of Police;

1.2.3 to maintain the operational capability of the Department of Border Enforcement and provide further training (including joint exercises) as requested by either participant and coordinated with the Provincial DBE Commander;

1.2.4 to enable the joint selection, development, monitoring and completion of MNF-I funded reconstruction projects in Al Muthanna Province in co-ordination with the civil authorities;

1.2.5 for routine transit through the Province of Al Muthanna using routes designated by the Cooperative Zones (see paragraph 7.2 of this MOU);

1.2.6 to visit the political and security leaders of the Province as required and arranged between the Governor and MNF-I Commanders;

1.2.7 for Force Protection where the lives of MNF-I personnel are (or could be) under threat and those operations that are deemed essential for Iraq's national security;

1.2.8 to visit community and tribal leaders of the Province as required and arranged between those leaders and MNF-I Commanders, keeping the Governor informed of such meetings.

Mentoring and training of the Iraqi Security Forces

2.1 Mentoring and training will include MND(SE) elements involvement in operational legal and associated matters training (including Rules of Engagement, LOAC, incident investigation and referral, and detainee management processes), as may be required. Mentoring and training may include discussions and joint exercises in preparation for any MNF-I and ISF operations that may be necessary during a declared security crisis as defined in the Implementing Arrangement and the Annex to this MOU.

Mentoring and training of the 2nd Iraqi Army Brigade

3.1 For the purposes of mentoring 2 (IA) Bde, MNF-I will visit 2 (IA) Bde HQ, Camp Samawah, Western Bks and Eastern Bks. MNF-I intend to visit these locations in coordination with the Governor or the Brigade or Battalion Commander or a designated liaison officer in advance of any visit. However as time progresses, the need to visit these locations is likely to decrease.

3.2 MNF-I and Commander 2 (IA) Bde will determine the nature and duration of further training, mentoring and reporting in order to maintain 2(IA) Bde's operating capability. As part of this understanding, MNF-I will continue to supply equipment and train 2 (IA) Bde in its use.

3.3 The Participants will maintain an up-to-date list of people who will act as points of contact, including phone numbers and e-mails, where available.

Mentoring and training of the Iraqi Police Service

4.1 For the purposes of mentoring and training the IPS in Al Muthanna province, MNF-I will visit police stations and police facilities (including the Provincial Joint Coordination Centre, Provincial Police HQ, Samawah District Police HQ, Al Khidr Local Police Station, Rumaytha District Police Station, Salman Local Police Station and Samawah Court House) in coordination with the Governor or the Director of Police or a designated liaison officer. As time progresses, the need to visit these locations is likely to decrease.

4.2 MNF-I and the Director of Police will determine the nature and duration of further training, mentoring and reporting in order to maintain the IPS operating capability. As part of this understanding, MNF-I will continue to supply equipment and train the IPS in its use.

4.3 The Participants will maintain an up-to-date list of people who will act as points of contact, including phone numbers and e-mails, where available.

Mentoring and training of the Department of Border Enforcement

5.1 For the purposes of mentoring and training the DBE in Al Muthanna province, MNF-I will visit the Provincial DBE HQ, the three Sector HQs on Iraq/Saudi Border, and the DBE Cdo Bn in Salman. MNF-I intend to visit each location in coordination with the Governor or Director of Border Enforcement or a designated liaison officer.

However, as time progresses, the need to visit these locations is likely to decrease. MNF-I may also occasionally visit the remaining Border Forts.

5.2 MNF-I and the DBE will determine the nature and duration of further training, mentoring and reporting in order to maintain DBE operating capability. As part of this understanding, MNF-I will continue to supply equipment and train the DBE in its use.

5.3 The Participants will maintain an up-to-date list of people who will act as points of contact, including phone numbers and e-mails, where available.

Routine transit through Muthanna Province

6.1 MNF-I retain the right to use as a matter of course all main roads, including the roads running from Basra to Baghdad, and to conduct any activity in the immediate vicinity of these routes necessary for Force Protection purposes. Whenever possible, MNF-I will only transit Ar Rumaytha, As Samawah and Al Khidr by prior arrangement and with an IPS escort

6.2 Cooperative Zone Arrangement. MND(SE) have arranged with the Governor and Provincial Council of Al Muthanna that MNF-I forces will not transit the suburban areas of As Samawah without prior approval by the IPS, unless absolutely necessary.

Contact with the Provincial Security Committee

7.1 MND(SE) will continue, on a regular basis, to liaise and share information with the Provincial Security Committee.

Visits to Political Community and Security Leaders

8.1 The Australian BG Commander, senior MNF-I commanders or other officials from coalition countries may visit the Province of Al Muthanna to meet with political, community and security leaders. MNF-I will agree timings and locations of such visits in advance in compliance with Part 2 of this MOU. However as a matter of courtesy and in recognition of Provincial Iraqi Control MNF-I will inform the Governor of such visits.

Joint Exercises with Iraqi Security Forces

9.1 For the purposes of training, MNF-I may participate in joint exercises with the IA, IPS or the DBE. This will be by prior arrangement with the appropriate ISF Commanders.

9.2 The security of Iraq's national borders remains the responsibility of the Gol. In order to assist the Gol, and at their request, MNF-I may conduct exercises/operations, in coordination with the Provincial DBE Commander, in and around the border areas of Al-Muthanna, with or without DBE forces.

Monitoring of Reconstruction Projects

10.1 MNF-I will continue to identify, develop, monitor and complete reconstruction projects in Al Muthanna after the transition to PIC. In order to achieve this, MNF-I teams will attend meetings of the Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committee (PRDC) and visit the Chairman of the PRDC, projects sites and potential project sites.

10.2 For most projects, regular visits will be made by local civilian sub-contractors. However, MNF-I forces will occasionally visit to monitor the work of these subcontractors. MNF-I will co-ordinate any planned visits with the PRDC.

10.3 The Participants acknowledge and welcome that the international community, through the National Coordination Team (NCT), will establish a team of Iraqi subject matter experts to develop the province of Al Muthanna after the transition to PIC, as part of its commitment to supporting in the enhancement of local governance capacity in Iraq. A team of Iraqi nationals working closely with the local Governorate will coordinate and, where appropriate, fund further economic and governance development in the Province. The NCT will recruit, train and equip these persons to carry out these activities. The team will be supported by an international staff based outside the province who will travel to Al Muthanna from time to time, supported by MNF-I. The team will coordinate its activities with the Governor and Provincial Council.

MNF-I Re-intervention into Al Muthanna

11.1 The arrangements governing MNF-I re-intervention into Al Muthanna in the event of a security crisis are set out in the Implementing Arrangement, arranged between the Government of Iraq and MNF-I and set out as they apply specifically to Al Muthanna in the Annex to this MOU.

Part 2 - to MOU between the Iraqi Province of Al Muthanna and Multi-National Division (South East)

1. Purpose

The purpose of this Annex is to describe the procedures that will apply after the transfer of full security responsibility in Al Muthanna. In accordance with UNSCR 1546/1637 and subsequent relevant resolutions, this MOU does not restrict the authorisation of MND(SE), as a subordinate command to MNF-I, from taking all necessary measures deemed to be in the interests of the security and stability of Iraq nor does it restrict the Iraqi MoD, Iraqi MoI or any of their subordinate security units from fulfilling their responsibilities as prescribed by Iraqi law. Nothing in this MOU will contradict the authorities given to the province of Al-Muthanna according to the Iraqi constitution and effective laws.

2. Parameters

This MOU neither obligates nor binds MND(SE) (or MNF-I and other subordinate units) beyond the current obligations arranged by MNF-I and contained in other arrangements including arrangements between MNF-I and troop contributing nations. The Participants agree and acknowledge that this MOU is only intended to confirm the respective status and authority of the Participants. This MOU also establishes relationships between the Participants and the MoI and MoD in specified circumstances after the assumption of security responsibilities in Al Muthanna. Al Muthanna has been assessed on its ability to assume security responsibilities, and the endorsement by the JCTSR that Al Muthanna is ready to assume full security responsibility has been approved and reviewed by the Ministerial Council for National Security (MCNS), chaired by the Iraqi Prime Minister (PM).

3. Definitions

- a. Security Crisis. An incident or situation that exceeds the capabilities of the provincial police and requires national security assets or MNF-I forces to contain or control it.
- b. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). All security forces, headquarters and formations, either belonging to the MoI or MoD.
- c. Iraq National Police Forces (INP). INP refers to all Iraqi Police in the First and Second National Police Divisions. These organisations are organised separately from the regular Iraqi Police.
- d. Iraqi Police Service (IPS). All regularly constituted police units administered by the Iraqi MoI. For purposes of this MOU, the term IPS specifically refers to those policing units operating in the Al Muthanna IPS Headquarters, District IPS Headquarters, and designated IPS stations.
- e. Command. The authority and responsibilities lawfully vested in an individual by virtue of their rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effective planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling subordinate and attached organizations and personnel for the accomplishment of assigned missions or tasks.

f. Lead/Supported Command. The Commander or the unit or formation that has primary responsibility for accomplishing the assigned mission. For a given security crisis, there will be only one lead command.

g. Assisting/Supporting Command. The Commander(s) of unit/formation(s) that aid(s), protects, complements or sustains the lead command. There may be multiple supporting commands.

h. Control. The authority that is less than full command by a commander over part of the activities of supporting or other organizations. For the purposes of this document, the Lead commander will control supporting commands by requesting the supporting commander(s) perform missions or tasks which aid in the resolution of the crisis. The Supporting commander(s) are obligated by this MoU to issue orders to his unit which would satisfy the Lead commander's request.

i. Coordination. Those with responsibility for co-ordinating the functions or activities of two or more forces have the authority to request consultation between the agencies involved, or their representatives, but do not have the authority to compel them.

4. Roles and Responsibilities

a. Al Muthanna Provincial Security Committee (PSC). The PSC is responsible for planning, coordinating and monitoring security operations in Al Muthanna. The PSC will routinely convene to monitor the implementation of its provincial security strategy. The Al Muthanna COP is the executive agent of the PSC responsible for implementing routine security operations. If a security crisis occurs, the PSC will assemble to determine the best solution to the security problem and, if appropriate, the Governor, or designated representative, will declare a security crisis and request national assets to resolve the crisis. The PSC will then continue to monitor the crisis and work under the direction the Provincial Council to prepare for post-crisis operations. This council will operate under the direction of the Governorate Council. Members of the PSC will include the following members as a minimum.

- (1.) Governor of Al Muthanna
- (2.) Al Muthanna Director of Police
- (3.) An MND(SE) liaison officer will attend meetings as a guest in coordination with the PSC
- (4.) 10th Iraqi Army Division Commander or a designated representative
- (5.) Department of Border Enforcement Commander
- (6.) Facilities Protection Service Commander(s)
- (7.) MoI representative
- (8.) Director of Civil Defense
- (9.) Representative of the Provincial Council security committee

b. Al Muthanna Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC). The PJCC is responsible for the continuous monitoring of the provincial situation, and maintaining a constant link with the National Joint Operations Center (NJOC) as well as local

Joint Coordination Centers and PJCCs in other provinces in order to coordinate, facilitate and de-conflict operations involving MND(SE) (and other MNF-I forces), Iraqi MoI, MoD and Al Muthanna assets. The PJCC is the center of intelligence collection and dissemination activities within the province and for de-conflicting operations. It shares intelligence with all agencies within the province and with the NJOC, as applicable. Located within the PJCC is the Joint Operations Room (JOR) where the PSC will convene to plan security operations and address emergency situations. The PJCC reports intelligence to and coordinates requests for national assistance through the NJOC. The following agencies will maintain permanent representatives to the PJCC:

- (a.) Iraqi Police Service
- (b.) Iraqi Army
- (c.) Department of Border Enforcement including Customs officials
- (d.) MoD Intelligence Section
- (e.) MoI Intelligence Section
- (f.) Facilities Protection Service
- (g.) Civil Defense Agency
- (h.) An MND(SE) liaison officer will attend as a visitor in co-ordination with the PSC

The MND(SE) representatives will be administered from the Over Watch Battle Group.

c. Joint Coordination Centre (JCC). JCCs will be formed in districts when deemed appropriate by the Governor. JCCs will perform duties similar to the PJCCs, but only for areas designated by the Governor. The JCC will be staffed as required and maintain representatives from those agencies deemed necessary.

d. National Joint Operations Centre (NJOC). The NJOC is responsible for the continuous monitoring of the operational situation throughout Iraq, maintaining a constant link with the Prime Minister's Situation Room (PMSR), and PJCCs and updating the MNF-I chain of command on Iraqi activities in order to coordinate, facilitate, and de-conflict operations involving Iraqi MoI and MoD and MNF-I assets. Their responsibilities include:

- (1.) Coordinating with other Iraqi Ministries, as the operational situation requires.
- (2.) Ensuring critical time sensitive information is forwarded immediately to the PMSR and other appropriate ministries.
- (3.) Maintaining continuous communications with the MoI Operations Chief at the National Command Center (NCC) and the MoD Joint Headquarters (JHQ) to ensure continuous intelligence dissemination and sharing among the security ministries.

(4.) Disseminating intelligence information to the appropriate PJCCs and coordinating requests for support and information from the PJCCs, Iraqi ministries or MNF-I.

e. Joint Operations Room (JOR). The JOR, located within the PJCC, is where the PSC will convene to discuss security matters. The JOR is a separate area where the PSC may receive and discuss reports, conduct planning and maintain situational awareness without disturbing routine PJCC operations. During crisis situations, the PSC will use the JOR to coordinate activities with the responding agencies. During routine operations the entire PSC may assemble, however in crisis situations a smaller cell may convene to quickly assess the situation and decide on a course of action. This smaller group will include as a minimum:

- (1.) Governor of Al Muthanna
- (2.) Al Muthanna Director of Police
- (3.) An MND(SE) liaison officer will attend meetings as a guest in coordination with the PSC
- (4.) 10th Iraqi Army Division Commander or a designated representative

5. Security Framework for Al Muthanna

a. General Command and Control Principles. The Participants understand that the following principles apply to both normal and crisis security conditions:

- (1.) MND(SE) as a subordinate unit of MNF-I will operate under UNSCR 1546/1637 or its successor mandate and will not transfer command of MND(SE) assets to the GoI.
- (2.) While CPA Order 67 remains valid the 10th Iraqi Army Division units, located in Al Muthanna, will remain under the operational control of MNF-I and TACOM* to MND(SE) until MNF-I transfer control of 10th Iraqi Army Division to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command.
- (3.) The Minister of the Interior maintains command over all MoI Forces.
- (4.) The Governor of Al Muthanna will not assume direct command or control over any Iraqi Armed Forces that fall under the MOD, or any such forces that may operate in Muthanna, unless directly ordered to do so by the PM.

* TACOM is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority (Allied Administrative Publication -6).

b. Command and Control Under Normal Conditions.

- (1.) Al Muthanna provincial authorities will ensure the security and domestic order of their area through the employment of the provincial and local police. The Provincial Director of Police will maintain operational control over all the provincial and local police services/forces.
- (2.) The Governor of Muthanna shall not raise forces or collect material to form an armed force or militia. The Governor may not expand the Provincial Police

or build reserve forces that are over what is specified in Iraqi law. The Governor may not directly or indirectly support the activities of the militias in the province. The Governor may not assume direct command or control over local police forces, National Police forces (MOI), or the forces of the border patrol located in Muthanna, or any forces that may be operating in the area, unless directly ordered by the PM. The Governor may not assume direct command or control over the any Iraqi Armed Forces that fall under the MOD, or any such forces that may operate in Muthanna unless directly ordered to do so by the PM. As long as this does not contradict the authorities given to the province according to the constitution and effective laws, the Governor may not impede or limit the movement of MNF-I elements operating in, or passing through Muthanna.

(3.) No formal command and control relationship exists between the Al Muthanna Police, National Police and the Iraqi Army; however the Prime Minister (PM), the Ministers of Interior and Defence, the Governor of Al Muthanna and the Provincial Director of Police have the authority to coordinate unit activities at the provincial level that contribute to the overall security of Al Muthanna. This coordination should be conducted by the PSC at the PJCC which reports through the NJOC. Once coordinated and approved, MoI and MoD forces may operate in a supporting role to the Al Muthanna DOP. In accordance with CPA Order 22, however, the MoD forces will not undertake domestic law and order functions. It is also essential that coordination of operations occurs between provinces, especially when operations involve administrative boundaries. The duty of the PJCC is to establish lateral methods of communication between PJCCs of other provinces so that these centres are informed about events and to facilitate coordination between them when needed.

(4.) The Participants understand that the National Police shall retain freedom of movement and the capability to conduct discrete counter-terrorism operations within Al Muthanna. Such activity will be coordinated with Al Muthanna's PSC.

c. Command and Control Under Crisis Conditions. Either upon the request of the Governor of Al Muthanna, or after consultation with national security officials, the Iraqi PM may state that a security crisis exists. This is defined as an incident or situation that exceeds the capabilities of the provincial police and requires national security assets or MND(SE) forces (or other MNF-I forces) to contain or control it.

(1.) Deployment of National Security Forces. When a security crisis has arisen deployment of national security forces may be initiated, in response to a security crisis, in one of two ways:

(a.) By Request. The Governor of Al Muthanna, in consultation with the Provincial Council, may request assistance through the PJCC to the NJOC. The NJOC will forward the request to the Prime Minister's Situation Room, where the PM, after consultation with the appropriate ministers, will direct and specify the proper national assets to resolve the situation.

(b.) By Direction. The Prime Minister, if the situation warrants, may direct intervention/assistance using the Iraqi National Police, the Iraqi Army (in coordination with the CG, MNF-I) or request MNF-I assistance under the

authorities granted in UNSCR 1546/1637 and any subsequent relevant resolutions.

(2.) Command and Control Relationships. To facilitate operations between MoI, MoD and MNF-I during a crisis situation, a lead and supporting relationship must be established between the different forces. The PM will designate one command to be the lead command with responsibility to resolve the security crisis; all others agree to support the lead command. The PM, in consultation with the appropriate ministers and MNF-I, and in coordination with the PSC, will determine the lead and supporting commands to resolve the crisis. The PM designates only one organization with authority and responsibility to command operations aimed at resolving the security crisis; all others are required to support the lead command. As a crisis situation changes, the PM, after consultation with appropriate Ministers and MNF-I, may designate the lead and supporting commands. Each crisis situation may be unique in nature, size and location necessitating the need for the PM to maintain the flexibility to adjust the command relationships; however, the normal model will be as outlined in paragraphs below:

(a.) Deployment of MoI National Police (INP) forces. Upon a decision by the PM to deploy Forces to Al Muthanna or As Samawah, the PM, in consultation with the Commanding General, MNF-I, directs the Minister of Interior to deploy INP in accordance with agreed recommendations. The PM will designate either the INP unit commander or the Al Muthanna DOP as the lead based upon the nature of the crisis and the size of the national forces deployed.

(b.) Deployment of Iraqi Army forces. If required in a crisis situation, the PM, in coordination with the Commanding General, MNF-I, will direct deployment of Iraqi Army forces to Al Muthanna or As Samawah. When deployed, the Iraqi Army unit commander will normally be the lead command and have the responsibility to resolve the security crisis; all previously deployed MoI national forces and provincial police forces will support the lead command in resolving the crisis, based on the size and nature of the crisis and the size of the national forces deployed.

(c.) PM's designation of Governor as lead for security during a crisis. After evaluating the nature of the crisis, the size of Iraqi national forces required, or the need to respond quickly, the PM may designate the Governor of Al Muthanna responsible for resolving the crisis with his Director of Police as the lead commander. MoI National Police and Iraqi Army forces in the area would support the Al Muthanna DOP to resolve the crisis.

(d.) Deployment of MND(SE) forces or other MNF-I forces. Either at the request of the PM, with the concurrence of the Commanding General, MNF-I; or at the discretion of the Commanding General, MNF-I, in coordination with the GoI; MND(SE) forces (or other MNF-I forces) and Iraqi Army forces may be deployed to resolve a security crisis. Upon the decision to deploy MND(SE) forces to resolve a security crisis, the MND(SE) commander will be designated as the lead command and may further delegate command to the Commanding Officer of the relevant Over Watch Battle Group or other appropriate Unit. Any provincial police forces, deployed MoI national forces,

or deployed Iraqi Army forces within Al Muthanna or As Samawah will support the lead command in resolving the crisis.

d. Returning to Normal Conditions. The Participants understand that following the PM's announcement of the resolution of a security crisis, and as conditions permit, Al Muthanna or As Samawah will return to normal conditions.

(1.) If Iraqi National Police or Iraqi Army units have been employed, the lead commander will transfer security responsibility back to the Al Muthanna DOP. The decision regarding the timing of this transfer rests with the PM, in consultation with the appropriate ministers and the CG, MNF-I.

(2.) If MND(SE) forces (or other MNF-I forces) have been utilized, the MND(SE) commander (or other MNF-I unit commander) will transfer security responsibility back to the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi MoI Force commander or the Al Muthanna DOP, as conditions warrant, after the security crisis is resolved. The CG, MNF-I in consultation with the PM, will determine the appropriate time and responsible party.

(3.) Upon the return to normal conditions, MNF-I will continue to conduct activities in accordance with the provisions of the main body of this MOU.

6. Over Watch

a. After Iraqi civil authorities take full security responsibility for a province or provincial capital, MNF-I will posture forces to provide assistance, if necessary. In accordance with the conditions established by the Joint Committee, MNF-I forces will remain positioned to perform the following requirements:

- (1.) Maintain training and mentoring relationships with Iraqi forces;
- (2.) Provide MNF-I support capabilities in the support of training and exercises, which may diminish over time, to mentored Iraqi Forces;
- (3.) Provide force protection to MNF-I personnel;

b. Under crisis conditions (explained in paragraph 5.3), and following national approval, MNF-I will:

- (1.) Assist Iraqi Army and Police forces if required;
- (2.) Provide additional support, as necessary, to MoD or MoI units and any remaining MNF-I forces to conduct required operations.

7. Dispute Resolution and Applicability of the MOU

a. Dispute Resolution. In the spirit of cooperation, all participants will commit to resolve issues that may arise at the lowest possible echelon. The JCTSR is the appropriate forum for dispute resolution. The participants also undertake to meet with sufficient frequency, to review these arrangements, command relationships, assess the overall progress toward meeting the transfer conditions, and the planning for taking full security responsibility.

b. Applicability and Effective Date.

(1.) This MoU provides a guideline for cooperation. It may be modified jointly in writing as necessary.

(2.) Upon approval, this MoU remains in effect until the UNSCR mandate is complete and Coalition Forces have withdrawn or is superseded by another memorandum, arrangement, treaty, or Iraqi national legislation.


8. References

- a. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546, 8 June 2004.
- b. UNSCR 1637, 8 November 2005.
- c. Transitional Administrative Law, 8 March 2004.
- d. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 17, Status of the CPA, MNFI, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq w/ Annex, 27 June 2004.
- e. CPA Order 22, Creation of a New Iraqi Army, 18 August 2003.
- f. CPA Order 67, Ministry of Defense, 21 March 2004.
- g. CPA Order 71, Local Governmental Powers, 6 April 2004.
- h. CPA Order 100, Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives, 28 June 2004.
- i. MOU between MNF-I and MoD, State of Iraq, Iraqi Army Lead, 23 December 2005.
- j. MOU between MNF-I and Mol, State of Iraq, Police Partnership Program and Transition Teams, 24 January 2006.
- k. The Iraq Constitution, ratified on 15 October 2005.
- l. MOU between the Government of Iraq and the Multi-National Force- Iraq Concerning Assumption of Security Responsibilities (implementing Arrangement).

This Memorandum of Understanding has been agreed on behalf of the Iraqi Province of Al Muthanna and Multi-National Division (South East), as a subordinate command to Multi-National Forces Iraq by:



The Governor of Al Muthanna
His Excellency
Mohammed Al Hassani



The General Officer Commanding
Multi-National Division (South East)
Major General John Cooper DSO MBE

On 13 July 2006



MNC-I Unattended Ground Sensors – Omni Sense II-E (McQ)




Role and Mission: Unmanned Ground-based Persistent Surveillance System. Provides short range detection capabilities with short range day and night imaging target identification capability.

External Sensors: Internal seismic and magnetic sensors with external passive infrared and acoustic sensors provide detection capabilities.



(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4c, (b)(1) 1.4g



(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4c, (b)(1) 1.4g




MNC-I Unattended Ground Sensors – SILENT WATCH (Harris Corp)

Role and Mission: Unmanned Ground-based Persistent Surveillance System. Provides close range detection capabilities in situations where imaging systems are not required or not feasible.

External Sensors: Two adjusting seismic sensors and two Passive Infrared sensors provide detection capabilities.



(b)(1)-4a, (b)(1)-4c, (b)(1)-4g



(b)(1)-4a, (b)(1)-4c, (b)(1)-4g



MNC-I Unattended Ground Sensors – SCORPION (Xetron/Northrop Grumman)

Role and Mission: Unmanned Ground-based Persistent Surveillance System. Provides close range detection capabilities with medium to long range day and night imaging target identification capability.

External Sensors: Two Combined Adaptive Sensor Transceivers provide seismic and magnetic detection capabilities.



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g



MNC-I Unattended Ground Sensors



OmniSense II-E Emplaced



Silent Watch Emplaced




Scorpion Emplaced





Sensor to PED Timeline

Iridium Constellation



NIPRNet  

SIPRNet  



(b)(1)-4a, (b)(1)-4c, (b)(1)-4g



Product Exploitation Dissemination (PED) Site

HQ INSCOM UGS CELL HOME PAGE

Dynamic Site classified up to ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



HQ INSCOM
UNATTENDED GROUND SENSOR CELL



Search



Sign In

Omnisense Database

Last Updated:
030605ZJAN07

Sensor Trend Analysis

Omnisense Training Video

Omnisense User Manual

Silent Watch

Documentation

Scorpion Documentation

RFI Request Form

UGS CELL TTP

Team Portal (Restricted)

Contact Us

MISSION STATEMENT: HQ INSCOM Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Cell conducts continuous monitoring of *Omnisense* sensor activity; provides immediate unevaluated alerts of specific sensor events to supported commands; maintains and updates activity database(s); integrates information gleaned from sensors with single source and all-source reporting to create analytical intelligence reports; and assists supported commands with integration of *Omnisense* sensors into *Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance* (ISR) planning to improve supported commander's situational awareness and aid in decision making.

02:41:23

06:41:23


10:41:23

11:11:23

The current browser does not support Web pages that contain the IFRAME element. To use this Web Part, you must use a browser that supports this element, such as Internet Explorer version 5 or later.

Sensor Database Links

- NEW Sensor Submission Form
- All Active Sensors
- Current Status - All Active
- Afghanistan Sensors
- Current Status - All Active
- Iraq Sensors
- Unclaimed Sensors - Afghanistan
- Unclaimed Sensors - Iraq
- Compromised Sensors
- CCJ2
- 385th MP BN
- 2nd Intel BN
- MND-SE
- 5-73 CAV
- 1-66 AR BN
- 4-31 INF, 2 BCT
- 1-505th, 3 BCT
- 2-505th, 3 BCT
- 1-319th, 3 BCT
- 2-82 FA, 3 BCT
- 3-8 CAV, 3 BCT
- 1-89 CAV
- 6-9 CAV



(b)(1)1-4g, (b)(1)1-4e, (b)(1)1-4g

MND-B

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

RTE Blackhawk

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

RP

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

MND-B



(b)(6)

(b)(1)14a, (b)(6)

- There has been a decrease in attacks along RTE Crush. This is likely due to the disruption of the cache found in Qudas and the subsequent detainees.
- 2-8 recently detained a Red Lion HVI [redacted] He was carrying a fake identification when found.
- Cross communication with 2-8 was key to the [redacted]
- The recent capture of two IED emplacers on RTE Crush by TAC-A included one BN HVI.
- [redacted] is reportedly an AQ leader in the area that is responsible for the IEDs IVO of Rashadiya Lake [redacted] was previously detained for aiding AIF in emplacing IEDs along RTE Crush.
- Recent information obtained about the cell in Waqf suggests that emplacers are using the East-West unimproved road in the palm groves to emplace the IEDs on RTE Crush.
 - The report states that they take a vehicle into the palm groves, dismount, and emplace the IED.
 - After detonating the IED, they egress back to the vehicle and flee through the palm grove to Waqf.
- Previous reports suggested [redacted] was killed in Tarmiyah by CF. We now believe that to be a disinformation campaign. He was seen four days ago in Qudas by a contact.

The Way Ahead:

Continue to develop the Sumawra, Waqf, and Qudas cells. Continue targeting key cell members IOT disrupt the IED hot spots on RTE Crush.

Images from UGS – 15AP07



10APR07: DIIR-1CD-33-334-07-0082 LEADERS AND MEMBERS OF AN IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE CELL ARE IDENTIFIED IN RASHIDIYAH, IRAQ

15APR07: DIIR-1CD-37-370-07-0331/SUNNI INSURGENTS CONDUCT KIDNAPPINGS AND ATTACKS AGAINST COALITION FORCES IN AL-SUAMRA VILLAGE, RASHIDIYA

15APR07: DIIR-1CD-33-337-07-0023 WEAPONS CACHE AND LOCATIONS OF MEMBERS IN AN AL QA'IDA IN IRAQ CELL

15APR07: DIIR-1CD-33-334-07-0085 AL-QAIDA IN IRAQ MEMBERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECENT SURGE OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES ALONG ROUTE CRUSH IN

MND-B

UGS- A Force Multiplier and Force Protection Enabler



22 Mar 07
 Snipers emplace one Scorpion system in order to identify AQI elements emplacing IEDs vicinity Agr Quf and confirm data.



Snipers
 12 March 07
 Task: Destroy insurgent IED emplacers and AQI in area.
 Purpose: Prevent attacks on Americans.
 Endstate: 3 AM personnel digging by the road wounded and unable to place IED.

06 Mar 07
 Snipers/2-5 CAV ICW D Co/2-5
 NLT 070001MAR07 in order to develop the pattern of life in the mostly uninhabited and high IED threat area of Agr Quf.

Scouts/2-5 Cav
 19 Mar 07
 Task: Destroy insurgent IED emplacers and AQI in area.
 Purpose: Prevent attacks on Americans.
 Intel Source: Increased Sensor activity
 Endstate: 1 pressure plate IED with 16-19 LBS of HME found and destroyed.

Snipers/2-5 Cav
 23 Mar 07
 Task: Destroy insurgent IED emplacers and AQI in area.
 Purpose: Prevent attacks on Americans and Iraqi local populace.
 Intel Source: Increased sensor activity in area.
 Endstate: Vehicle destroyed. IED materials consisting of; 1X122MM round, 1X 155MM round and 1X Propane tank filled with HME. Additionally, facilitated the clearing of the area where additional IED materials were found; 200 lbs of HME, Pro-Masks, and IED making material.

Scouts/2-5 Cav
 19 Mar 07
 Task: Destroy insurgent IED emplacers and AQI in area.
 Purpose: Prevent attacks on Americans.
 Intel Source: Increased Sensor activity
 Endstate: Found cache consisting of 3 x 55 gallon barrels of hydrochloric acid in abandon building.

Summary: Prior to UGS platoon patrols would conduct search and attacks in this area hoping to find the enemy based on route/enemy analysis and a gut feeling; with the UGS they now maneuver with more confidence and awareness.
UGS = Increased battlefield situational awareness!

MNF-W

152mm

Endstate:
EOD located (1) AT Mine, (2) 152mm,
and (1) 155mm projectiles attached
with detonation cord. EOD destroyed
the ordnance with a controlled
detonation. The unit consisted of (23)
CF personnel and (5) vehicles with (2)
operational Chameleons, and (2)
operational Hunter ECMs. No
casualties or damages reported.





Omni Sense II Image Examples





Silent Watch

Activity Data IZHB0157

SE	Detection Time	Type	Image ID
	5/20/2007	Seis. [Veh.]	---
	5/20/2007	Seis. [Veh.]	---
	5/20/2007	Seis. [Veh.]	---
	5/20/2007	PIR RL	---
	5/20/2007	PIR RL	---
	5/20/2007	PIR RL	---
	5/20/2007	PIR RL	---
	5/20/2007	PIR RL	---
	5/20/2007	PIR RL	---
	5/20/2007	PIR RL	---
	5/20/2007	PIR RL	---
	5/20/2007	Seis. [Veh.]	---
	5/20/2007	Seis. [Veh.]	---
	5/20/2007	Seis. [Veh.]	---
	5/20/2007	Seis. [Veh.]	---
	5/20/2007	PIR LR	---
	5/20/2007	PIR LR	---
	5/20/2007	PIR LR	---
	5/20/2007	PIR LR	---

(b)(1)4a



Scorpion Image Examples



(b)(1), (1.4a), (b)(1), (1.4c), (b)(1), (1.4g), (b)(6)

Approved for Release



Concealment Examples



Classification	Date Occurred (C)	City	Province	MGRS	Summary	Target(IZ)		Event(IZ)	
						Type	Details	Event Type	Event Category
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY	May 10 2004 11:00:00	AS SAMAWAH	MUTHANNA	38RNV62806390	A NLBG patrol stopped a car heading westwards with 4 pax. After search 7 x RPG's were found. Individuals were arrested and transported to Camp Smithy for TQ. Later on, 3 x persons were released because they were not involved and the fourth person was handed over to the IPS. Imported MND-SE Report Event ID:2021 Number of Rounds: Number of Blinds: Number inside the Wire: IDFDetectMethod: IDFType: IDFVelocity: Route: Target2: N/A IED Init Type: Location: Al Muthanna BC District: Nationality: EnHits: WISREP: SINCREP: Keywords: WarningMessage:			Friendly Action	Arrest
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY	Dec 02 2005 16:20:00	AL UMNAYTHIR	MUTHANNA	38RNV7066	AT 1620, PJOC REPORTED TRIBAL FIGHTING 50KM EAST OF AS SAMAAWAH, INVOLVING SAF. 14 X IPS WERE DISPATCHED AND THE FIGHTING QUIETENED DOWN. UNK INJ / DAMAGE.			Non-Combat Event	Tribal Feud
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY	Dec 10 2005 09:50:00	AS SAMAWAH	MUTHANNA	38RNV54006900	At 100950CDEC05 SLB reported a crowd of 100 pax at the SLB Main Gate, GR NV 54 69. The protest, with Iraqi Media present, was about the detention of internees held at the DTDF. 2 documents, addressed to the 'Commander of SLB Concentration Camp', are currently being reviewed. The protest dispersed peacefully at 101137CDEC05. (SINCREP 3590) Imported MND-SE Report Event ID:5617 Number of Rounds: Number of Blinds: Number inside the Wire: IDFDetectMethod: IDFType: IDFVelocity: Route: Target2: IED Init Type: Location: Shaibah Log Base BC District: Nationality: EnHits: WISREP: SINCREP: Keywords: WarningMessage:			Non-Combat Event	Demonstration
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY	Sep 03 2006 10:00:00	ATH THAWIH	MUTHANNA	38RNV5767	AT 1000D, THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (USACE) GULF REGION SOUTH (GRS) REPORTED AS FOLLOWS: CONTRACTOR - FUTURE FOR CONSTRUCTION AND TRADE CO: CONTRACTOR AND WORKERS WERE EN-ROUTE TO WORKSITE GR NV 57 67. UNKNOWN PERSONS IN A PICK UP TRUCK PURSUED AND STARTED FIRING AT THEM. GUNMEN FOLLOWED FOR A SHORT DISTANCE WHILE ENGAGING THEM WITH SAF AND TURNED AROUND WHEN THE CONTRACTORS REFUSED TO STOP. INCIDENT OCCURRED 3 SEP 06 EARLY MORNING. GRS NOTIFIED 051003SEP2006. CONTRACTOR NOTIFIED POLICE AND CONTINUED TO WORK.	Civilian	Host Nation Civilian	Enemy Action	Direct Fire

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY	Jun 08 2007 13:00:00	AS SAMAWAH	MUTHANNA	38RNV53806490	<p>At 091151DJUN07 OBG (W) reported that at 081300DJUN07 2 x IZ contractors were ambushed at GR NV 538649 while working on the RRP 6. The IZ contractors were assessed to be 1 x T1 and 1 x T2 and were given first aid by a US C/S. The IZ casualties were evacuated to civilian hospital at DOWANIYAH. The IZ contractors indicated that they were attacked by 4 x AIF in a white TOYOTA Pickup Truck. At 091130DJUN07 the USLO passed the information to OBG(W). The USLO was informed that both civilians were stable and would probably survive.</p> <p>No MNF casualties or damage were reported.</p> <p>Imported MND-SE Report</p> <p>Event ID:9559</p> <p>Number of Rounds: 0</p> <p>Number of Blinds: 0</p> <p>Number inside the Wire: 0</p> <p>IDFDetectMethod:</p> <p>IDFType:</p> <p>IDFVelocity:</p> <p>Route: N/A</p> <p>Target2: Iraqi Civilian</p> <p>IED Init Type:</p> <p>Location:</p> <p>BC District: None</p> <p>Nationality:</p> <p>EnHits:</p> <p>WISREP: 0</p> <p>SINCREP: 7613</p> <p>Keywords:</p> <p>WarningMessage:</p>	Civilian	IZ civilian	Enemy Action	Direct Fire
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY	Feb 05 2010 10:00:00		MUTHANNA	38RNV664682	<p>WHO: 1ST BBN, 39TH IA BDE, 10TH IA DIV</p> <p>WHAT: CACHE</p> <p>WHERE: 38RNV664682</p> <p>WHEN: 051000FEB2010</p> <p>SUMMARY:</p> <p>CONDUCTED A SEARCH AND RAID IN AL WARKAH (NV 664 682) AND FOUND 11X ARTILLERY ROUNDS OF VARYING TYPES AND 2X MACHINE GUNS</p>	Enemy	Property	Friendly Action	Cache Found/Cleared
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY	Feb 17 2010 10:00:00		MUTHANNA	38RNV663704	<p>WHO: 1ST BN, 39TH IA BDE, 10TH IA DIV</p> <p>WHAT: SEARCH AND RAID</p> <p>WHERE: 38RNV663704</p> <p>WHEN: 171000FEB2010</p> <p>SUMMARY:</p> <p>CONDUCTED AN INTEL-DRIVEN SEARCH AND RAID IN AL WAER AREA/AL KHIDR DISTRICT (38RNV663704) AND FOUND 9X ARTILLERY ROUNDS OF VARYING CALIBER.</p>			Friendly Action	Raid
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY	Aug 18 2010 00:00:00		MUTHANNA	38RNV6450063200	<p>WHO: 39 IA BDE</p> <p>WHAT: CACHE FOUND AND CLEARED</p> <p>WHEN: 180000AUG10</p> <p>WHERE: 38RNV 64500 63200</p> <p>HN REPORTS</p> <p>SUMMARY: 39TH IA: 1BN FOUND A CACHE CONSISTING OF NINE ARTILLERY ROUNDS (VARIOUS SIZE), TWO KATUSHA ROCKETS, AND ONE LAUNCHER. THE CACHE WAS LOCATED IN THE KNEEIF AREA NEAR AL KHIDR. ADDITIONALLY, THE REPORTED GRID OF THE CACHE IS 38R NV 645 632. THE G2 REPORTED THAT THE LAUNCHER WAS HOMEMADE AND CONSISTED OF MULTIPLE TUBES. WHEN FOUND, THE ROCKETS AND LAUNCHER WERE NOT SET UP TO FIRE. HE ALSO RULED OUT THAT THE WEAPONS MAY HAVE BEEN DISCARDED BY LNS, AS IS OFTEN THE CASE IN PREVIOUS FINDS. THE G2 HAS YET TO RECEIVE PICTURES OF THE CACHE, OR THE FULL REPORT.</p> <p>BDA: 9X ARTY ROUNDS</p> <p>2X KATUSHA ROCKETS</p> <p>1X LAUNCHER</p>	Enemy	Property	Friendly Action	Cache Found/Cleared

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~