EXHIBIT A

ATTACHMENT 2

(b)(3), (b)(6) **COL MIL USA USA USARCENT**

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A
Sent: Sunday, March 06, 2011 10:29 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA USA USARCENT
Subject: Requests to CSTC-A OSJA (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Stephanie:

1. In response to LTG Webster's query to identify which of those assigned SJA personnel may have or did render advice to the command or staff of CSTC-A on any of the following topics between Nov 09 and Oct 10: administrative investigation into conduct of LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ. (b)(3), (b)(6) I provide the following:

COL
COL
COL (b)(3), (b)(6)
MAJ
MAJ
Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) - I don't believe he provided any advice regarding the investigation, but I list in an abundance of caution.

My deputy, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) , and I reviewed LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) GOMOR rebuttal. I provided advice to MG Patton regarding the rebuttal.

2. In LTG Webster's request for the personnel roster, he also requested us to identify those OSJA personnel that may have or did render advice to the command or staff the following topics between Nov 09 and Aug 10: Joint Visitors Bureau, public affairs, PSYOPS, strategic communications, and information operations, I provide the following:

If any such advice was given between Nov 09 and Jun 10 that advice would have been provided by:

COL
COL
MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)
MAJ
Capt
LCDR (b)(3), (b)(6)

If any such advice was given in Jul and Aug 10, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and I arrived at the end of June. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived in July to serve as Chief, Administrative Law. LCDR (b)(3), (b)(6) is the Chief, International and Operational Law.

3. In LTG Webster's request for a copy of all written opinions, including email, given to any command or staff in CSTC-A dealing with issues involving any of the following topics: Joint Visitors Bureau, public affairs, strategic communications and information operations, there is no time period listed. Could you give me a time frame?

I contacted COL (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding this request and he responded with the following:

'I just did a scan on the topic listed below. It is awfully broad. Just typing in "PAO" and running a scan, I came up with hundreds of emails. I have not looked at each one. As the

below request is worded, it is literally asking for any email to these organizations or the command about these orgs. It would be helpful to narrow the topic of what is requested. Otherwise, there is no way that I can send you all of these emails in an email. If they literally want every email to/from these directorates or the command, I either need a place to go and upload the emails or I can burn to a CD/DVD and mail to them. That will take time. Can you see if they can narrow what they want me to look for?'

Any further refinement would be appreciated.

Thanks,(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
COL, JA
LEGAD/Staff Judge Advocate
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/
Combined Transition Security Command-Afghanistan Kabul, Afghanistan DSN 318 237 1257

NIPR email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil SIPR email:
(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil

More about the Command: www.NTM-A.com

"Shohna ba Shohna -- Ooga-pa-Ooga -- Shoulder to Shoulder"

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

CSTC-A-COS

3 March 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR Record

SUBJECT: Approval of AR 15-6 Investigation: Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s R&R and subsequent whereabouts from 31 December 2010 until she returned to Camp Eggers on 8 January 2011

1. I have reviewed the report of investigation prepared by Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) I approve the following findings:

a. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) departed Camp Eggers on 8 Dec 2010 and returned to Camp Eggers on 8 January 2011.

b. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was on authorized R&R leave per existing regulations from 12 to 29 December 2010, amounting to 18 days. She returned to Kuwait on 31 December 2010 per R&R flight from Dallas Fort Worth Airport that departed 30 Dec 2010.

c. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s voluntary request to remain in Afghanistan for the next 2 AEF rotations consisting of approximately 179 days each was approved by the authorized approval authority. This approval resulted in a projected Afghanistan tour length of 537 days or approximately 18 months and thus permitted her to take 18 days R&R per existing regulations.

d. Prior to Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s departure for R&R, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) discussed that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) would be able to take Dari language tests in Kuwait that are necessary for her entry into the AFPAK Hands program in R&R status while awaiting the return flight to Bagram. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) asked for and was given verbal authorization to take language tests in Kuwait prior to departing on R&R, by her supervisor, LtC (b)(3), (b)(6)

e. When Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived in Kuwait on 31 December following her R&R, she learned of delays at the testing facility, and she decided to state to the Gateway Theater Passenger Terminal Agent that she was on R&R, but needed to conduct official business. The representative at the Gateway then scanned Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) in as a TDY passenger vice R&R passenger. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) notified her supervisor, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) that she would be delayed in Kuwait.

f. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) took a two-part language test in Kuwait on 4 and 5 January 2011. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) delayed no longer than necessary in order to take tests and secure transportation to Bagram. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) departed Kuwait on 7 January and arrived in Bagram on 8 January 2011.

g. Current policy requires that all TDY ICW R&R is staffed to the Army G1 for approval. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) did not have appropriate approval, and was not authorized, per existing regulations,

to be on TDY status in order to take the language tests at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait from 31 December to 7 January.

h. LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) as Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s supervisor, did not take the steps ordinarily expected of a leader of his rank and experience to ensure Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was authorized to be on TDY status per existing regulations. He did not engage in appropriate planning or follow up, and he did not ensure adequate communication with his supervisors and the chain of command regarding the plans and status of an officer under his supervision.

i. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) as acting Director, Command Communications Directorate, did not take the steps ordinarily expected of a leader of his rank and experience to ensure that an officer under his supervision was appropriately authorized TDY and properly accounted by CSTC-A.

j. Command Communications Directorate failed to maintain an accurate account of Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) s leave dates and status.

k. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s chain of supervision should have informed HHC, CSTC-A as to her whereabouts and intentions between the dates of 31 Dec and 8 Jan.

2. I approve the following recommendations.

a. No legal or administrative action be sought with respect to Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)

b. I direct the SJA to refer this investigation to LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) service chain of command. Request that LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) service chain of command ensure he is instructed on the applicable TDY policy for his command; also request that Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) be counseled on his requirements to keep chain of command adequately informed on personnel status.

c. I direct the SJA forward this report to the NTM-A/CSTC-A Deputy Commander for his consideration regarding the actions of personnel assigned or attached to NTM-A/CSTC-A. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) will be instructed on the applicable TDY policy for this command, and will also be counseled on his responsibilities to keep chain of command adequately informed on personnel status – by the undersigned.

d. I direct the Director, Command Communications Directorate, establish an accurate means by which personnel absences within the Command Communications Directorate are tracked, including projected and actual departure and return dates, and a means to inform HHC on changes to their members' leave and TDY plans.

4. Point of contact is LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) , DSJA, at (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, US Army
Chief of Staff

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by CSTC-A COS
(Appointing authority)

on 21 January 2011 *(Date)* *(Attach inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)*

SECTION II - SESSIONS

The *(investigation) (board)* commenced at Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan *(Place)* at 1400 *(Time)*

on 22 January 2011 *(Date)* *(If a formal board met for more than one session, check here* ☐ *. Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.)* The following persons *(members, respondents, counsel)* were present: *(After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)*

N/A

The following persons *(members, respondents, counsel)* were absent: *(Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 5-2 and 5-8a, AR 15-6.)*

N/A

The *(investigating officer) (board)* finished gathering/hearing evidence at 0800 *(Time)* on _____ *(Date)*

and completed findings and recommendations at 2030 *(Time)* on 5 February 2011 *(Date)*

SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES	YES	NO 1/	NA 2/
1 Inclosures *(para 3-15, AR 15-6)* Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: *(Attached in order listed)*			
a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?	X		
b. Copy of notice to respondent, if any? *(See item 9, below)*			X
c. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?			X
d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?			X
e. Privacy Act Statements *(Certificate, if statement provided orally)?*			X
f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered *(e.g., absence of material witnesses)?*			X
g. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?			X
h. Any other significant papers *(other than evidence)* relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?		X	

FOOTNOTES: 1/ *Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.*
2/ *Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.*

SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION *(para 3-17, AR 15-6)*

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. *(If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Recorder) *resident)*

(Member) *(Member)*

(Member) *(Member)*

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT *(para 3-13, AR 15-6)*

To the extent indicated in Inclosure _____, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board.

(In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

(Member) *(Member)*

SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY *(para 2-3, AR 15-6)*

ndings and recommendations of the *(investigating officer)* *(~~board~~)* are *(approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/ ıitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)*

See attached Memorandum For Record (Approval of 15-6 Investigation), dtd 3 Mar 2011

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, US Army, CoS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO THE
ATTENTION OF

CSTC-A-COS

04 February 2011

MEMORANDUM ~~FOR~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) 3 Mar 2011 Chief of Staff, NTM-A/CSTC-A, APO AE 09356

SUBJECT: Army Regulation 15-6 investigation into Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s R&R and subsequent whereabouts from 31 December 2010 until she returned to Camp Eggers on 8 January 2011

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Cap (b)(3), (b)(6) requested, was approved for and executed 18 days of R&R for which she was entitled based on her projected tour length of approximately 18 months. Cap (b)(3), (b)(6) also requested and received from her supervisor to take two language tests while she passed through Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait during her travel back from R&R. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Cap (b)(3), (b)(6)'s supervisor, stated that he notified the Director of Command Communications Directorate, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) of Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s intentions to take the tests, but he stated he could not recall the conversation. The tests in Kuwait took five days longer than originally expected due to technical problems and a holiday weekend at Kuwait. Cap (b)(3), (b)(6) notified her supervisor, LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) of her expected delay and on 5 Jan gave an accurate report to the acting Director of Command Communications, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) notified LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) prior to Cap (b)(3), (b)(6) arriving at Kuwait that Cap (b)(3), (b)(6) intended remain in Kuwait until she took the language tests. The evidence gathered during this investigation indicates that Cap (b)(3), (b)(6) was entitled to 18 days of R&R. However, using the JFTR definition of Temporary Duty (TDY), Cap (b)(3), (b)(6) and her CoC within the Command Communications Directorate failed to ensure that authorization IAW existing regulations was achieved prior to and during the time that Cap (b)(3), (b)(6) was in Kuwait.

2. Findings:

a. Cap (b)(3), (b)(6) departed Camp Eggers on 8 Dec 2010 and Returned to Camp Eggers on 8 January 2011. (Encl 2)

b. Cap (b)(3), (b)(6) was on authorized R&R leave per existing regulations from 12 to 29 December 2010 amounting to 18 days. She returned to Kuwait on 31 December 2010 per R&R flight from Dallas Fort Worth Airport that departed 30 Dec 2010. (Encls 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12,)

c. Cap (b)(3), (b)(6)'s voluntary request to remain in Afghanistan for the next 2 AEF rotations consisting of approximately 179 days each was approved by the authorized approval authority. This approval resulted in a projected Afghanistan tour length of 537 days or approximately 18 months and thus permitted her to take 18 days R&R per existing regulations. (Encls 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12)

d. Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) checked in to the Gateway Theater at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait and stated that she was returning from R&R and had some official business to conduct on base prior to returning to Bagram. The representative at the Gateway then scanned Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) in as a TDY passenger vice R&R passenger. (Encl 16)

e. Cap (b)(3), (b)(6) took a two-part language test in Kuwait on 4 and 5 January 2011. Tests were required for acceptance into the AFPAK hands program to which she is

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation into Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s R&R and subsequent whereabouts from 31 December 2010 until she returned to Camp Eggers on 8 January

applying. Kuwait was the closest and most convenient language testing facility to Kabul, Afghanistan. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) delayed no longer than necessary in order to take tests and secure transportation to Bagram. (Encls 4, 17, 20, 23, 25, 26)

f. The Chairman, JCS, stated in a memo to the Service Chiefs that the AFPAK Hands Program was the "military's number one manpower priority…" (Encl 21)

g. Referring to the AFPAK Hands Program, the SECDEF stated in a Memo to the Service Secretaries that "This is the DoD's top personnel priority." (Encl 22)

h. Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) departed Kuwait on 7 January and arrived in Bagram on 8 January 2011. (Encls 2, 16, 18)

i. Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) asked for and was given verbal authorization to take language tests in Kuwait prior to departing on R&R, by her supervisor, LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) (Encls 4, 20, 23)

j. Existing regulations governing TDY ICW R&R procedures indicate that TDY ICW R&R applies to "Temporary Duty (TDY) that is performed outside the CENTCOM AOR." Since Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait is within the CENTCOM AOR, TDY ICW R&R procedures do not apply. (Encl 19)

k. Prior to Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s departure for R&R, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) believed that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) would be able to take the language tests in Kuwait while awaiting the return flight to Bagram in an R&R status. After learning that due to anticipated delays from the language testing facility's inability to access the test due to technical reasons, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) decided to state to the Gateway Theater Passenger Terminal Agent that she was on R&R, but needed to conduct official business. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was then placed on TDY status by the terminal agent. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) notified her supervisor, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) that she would be delayed in Kuwait. (Encl 4, 16, 23, 26)

l. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was not authorized, per existing regulations, to be on TDY status in order to take the language tests at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait from 31 December to 7 January. (Encls 27, 29)

m. LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) as Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s supervisor, failed to ensure Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was authorized to be on TDY status per existing regulations. (Encls 4, 20, 23, 26, 27, 29)

n. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) as acting Director Command Communications Directorate, failed to stop Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) from conducting TDY in Kuwait that was not authorized IAW existing regulations. (Encls 4, 20, 23, 26, 27, 29)

o. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) upon being notified by LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) of Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s intentions to conduct TDY in Kuwait, failed to ensure Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) received authorization for TDY IAW existing regulations. (Encls 4, 27, 29)

p. LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) believed that his conversation with the Director, Command Communications Directorate, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) over lunch in late Nov/early Dec regarding Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s intentions to take a language test in Kuwait during her return journey constituted tacit approval of the plan and warranted no further notification to the chain of command. (Encl 4)

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation into Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s R&R and subsequent whereabouts from 31 December 2010 until she returned to Camp Eggers on 8 January

q. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) could not recall ever having been notified by LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) of Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s intentions to take language tests in Kuwait during her return from R&R and while awaiting transportation to Bagram. It is likely that LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) simply did not recall having been notified, since at time of notification, he had just returned from being away for an extended period of time and was preoccupied with catching up on a lot of other issues. If in fact LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) mentioned the plan to have Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) take the language tests in Kuwait, it did not trigger LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) to state that the plan required TDY orders. (Encls 4, 28)

r. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) acting Director of Command Communications Directorate during LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)'s absence due to emergency leave from 22 Dec to 8 Jan, was made aware of Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s intention to take the language test at Kuwait prior to Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) arriving in Kuwait on her return from R&R. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) upon learning of Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s intentions to take the language tests in Kuwait, did not indicate that he thought Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s intention consisted of TDY requiring Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) to be in possession of TDY orders. (Encls 4, 23, 26)

s. At no time did Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s supervisor (LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Deputy Director Command Communications Directorate (LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) or Director Command Communications Directorate (LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) indicate that they disapproved of her intentions to take language tests at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait prior to her taking the tests. At no time prior to Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s time in Kuwait did these same officers indicate that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s intentions to take the tests constituted TDY and required TDY orders. (Encls 4, 20, 23, 26, 28)

t. Once Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) realized that she could not take the language tests at Ali Al Salem without being placed in a TDY status, there were two options available in accordance with existing regulations. One was to maintain herself in an R&R status and return to Camp Eggers. At that point, in order complete her application to the AFPAK Hands Program, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) would have had to submit TDY request paperwork for approval by an O-6 in her chain of command in order to execute a second trip to Kuwait to take the language tests. This course of action, if approved, could have subjected Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and approval authorities to DoD Fraud, Waste, and Abuse scrutiny. The reason for this inference is that authorities could question the judgment behind making a decision to authorize Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) to travel back to Kuwait in order to take the language tests. Considering that the taking of these tests would have had a direct positive impact on both the SecDef and CJCS number one priority personnel program, the likelihood of the TDY being approved was high. A second trip back to Kuwait would have been at significant government expense, would have resulted in lost productivity and would have put the Service Member and those transporting her at extra risk due to the risks inherent in movement within a combat zone. The better course of action, once Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) realized that she couldn't take the tests while in an R&R status, would have been for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) to request an exception to policy in order for her to remain in Kuwait to take the language tests without having been pre-approved for TDY per

existing NTM-A/CSTC-A regulations. This COA was not offered as an option by the CoC, was not requested by Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and was not executed by Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and her CoC. (Encls 4, 20, 21, 22, 30)

u. Command Communications Directorate failed to maintain an accurate account of Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s leave dates. (Encl 33)

v. Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) informed her supervisor who in turn informed the acting Director of the Command Communications Directorate of all her whereabouts and expected changes to her itinerary between 8 December and 8 January. At no time was Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s supervisory CoC unaware as to her location due to failure of Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) to keep them aware or due to Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) intentionally deceiving them of her intentions. (Encl 2, 4, 20, 23, 26)

w. Although not specifically stated as a requirement, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s supervisory CoC should have informed the HHC as to her whereabouts and intentions between the dates of 31 Dec and 8 Jan. (Encl 23, 26)

x. NTM-A/CSTC-A policies do not draw a distinction between what constitutes movement within the Afghanistan Theater and CENTCOM AOR and what constitutes TDY travel. Using the JFTR definition of TDY, it can reasonably be inferred that all movement outside the Kabul area would require TDY approval per the processes set forth in NTM-A/CSTC-A TDY policy. (Encl 27)

3. Recommendations:

a. I recommend based on the findings, that NTM-A/CSTC-A Commander take no further legal action against Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) specifically with regard to the number of days Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) was entitled to take R&R leave.

b. I recommend based on the findings, that NTM-A/CSTC-A Commander take no further legal action against Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) for failure to secure authorization to conduct TDY ICW R&R, according to existing regulations.

c. I recommend based on the findings, that NTM-A/CSTC-A Commander take no further legal action against Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s CoC within the Command Communications Directorate for failure to ensure Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was authorized IAW existing regulations to conduct TDY ICW R&R.

d. I recommend based on the findings, that NTM-A/CSTC-A Commander take no further legal action against Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and her CoC for failure to secure authorization for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) to conduct official business in a TDY status in Kuwait during her return trip from R&R.

e. I recommend based on the findings that Director, Command Communications Directorate, establish an accurate means by which R&R leave within the Command Communications Directorate is tracked including projected and actual departure and return dates. Director, Command Communications Directorate shall also establish a means to inform the HHC on changes to their members' leave and TDY plans.

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation into Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s R&R and subsequent whereabouts from 31 December 2010 until she returned to Camp Eggers on 8 January

f. I recommend that NTM-A/CSTC-A Commander clarify local regulations governing movement in the Afghan theater of operations and CENTCOM AOR. Specifically, the instructions must clarify what does and what does not constitute TDY within the Afghan theater and CENTCOM AOR.

4. Narrative

a. I was appointed by COL (b)(3), (b)(6) NTM-A/CSTC-A Chief of Staff, on 21 January 2011. I reviewed the appointment memorandum and then received a legal briefing from MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) on 22 January 2011. I interviewed LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s supervisor), LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Deputy Director, NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Communications and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Director, NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Communications Directorate), and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) 866 AES CC). Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) declined a request to be interviewed. However, a meeting was conducted to review the 15-6 investigation appointment memorandum with Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) I received documents from a number of online references in addition to documents forwarded to me by Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s supervisor), LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Deputy Director Command Communications), Cpt (b)(3), (b)(6) Interim HHC Commander and full time Executive Officer for Command Communications Directorate), and Cpt (b)(3), (b)(6) HHC Commander), Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) Theater Gateway, Inbound OIC), 1Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) Ali Al Salem, Pax Terminal OIC) and Sgt (b)(3), (b)(6) HHC Leave. Documents obtained in the conduct of MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)'s Command Inquiry were utilized in this investigation.

b. Based on the interviews, documents and governing regulations obtained during this investigation, it is clear that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was entitled to take 18 days of R&R during a single R&R period. She applied for and was approved to extend in Afghanistan for two additional rotations of approximately six months each. This extension amounted to a projected 18 month tour of duty in Afghanistan which was 3 months greater than the 15 month tour required to take 18 days. The administrative agent for USAF personnel serving in NTM-A/CSTC-A, 866th AES CC, confirmed that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) had been approved for an extension of her tour in Afghanistan to approximately 18 months, possessed records confirming her extension and approved the leave papers for 18 days of leave. The approving officer expressed no doubt that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was entitled to 18 days R&R. HHC was not in the approval chain for USAF leave personnel and therefore should not have delayed the approval process of Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s leave papers.

c. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was not in violation of any existing regulations pertaining to TDY ICW R&R since she was conducting official business within the CENTCOM AOR. USFOR-A documents clearly indicate that TDY ICW R&R applies to those conducting TDY outside the CENTCOM AOR. However, since the JFTR defines TDY as "Duty at one or more locations, away from the PDS…" it is reasonable to

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation into Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s R&R and subsequent whereabouts from 31 December 2010 until she returned to Camp Eggers on 8 January

assess that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was on TDY while at Kuwait taking the language tests. This is true based on Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s orders assigning her to Kabul, Afghanistan and the JFTR definition of duty station being: "The place at which a member actually is assigned for duty, including a place from which the member commutes daily to an assigned station…" Thus, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) should have requested and been approved for TDY through existing procedures. Verbal approval by her supervisor was not in accordance with NTM-A/CSTC-A and USFOR-A policy. However, using this same logic in the absence of clearly delineated local policy, it may be deduced that all duty outside the Kabul area, but within Afghanistan for those with orders to Kabul would require TDY orders. This lack of a clearly defined delineation between what is considered movement and what is considered TDY may likely have contributed to Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and three senior officers in her CoC failing to initially recognize that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s intentions to take the language tests in Kuwait constituted TDY. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) made no attempt to deceive agents at the Ali Al Salem Air Base Passenger Terminal as to her status. Neither Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) nor her supervisor made any attempt to hide Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s actions. Additionally, they kept the Command Communications Directorate CoC apprised of changes to the leave/TDY timeline.

d. In conclusion, I recommend that no further legal action in this matter be pursued. When using the JFTR definition of TDY, they were in violation of existing TDY regulations. However, her supervisory CoC responsible for tracking Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s whereabouts was informed as to her intentions at all times, no extra risk to service member was taken and no extra cost to the government was incurred by Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)'s actions. Above recommendations are offered in an effort to address deficiencies and prevent any future similar problems.

6. I am the point of contact for this 15-6 Memorandum. I may be reached at DSN: (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CAPT, USN
Senior Air Advisor to MoD

Encls
1. MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6), NTM-A/CSTC-A
2. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) signed leave papers
3. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) (866 AES CC) Statement
4. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Statement

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation into Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s R&R and subsequent whereabouts from 31 December 2010 until she returned to Camp Eggers on 8 January

5. SATOTRAVEL Itinerary for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)
6. Capt orders (Mar 2010 – Sep 2010)
7. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) orders (Sep 2010 – Mar 2010)
8. Capt Personnel Administration Form
9. USAFCENT/CC Policy for Voluntary and Involuntary Tour Length Extensions
10. NTM-A/CSTC-A Newcomers Brief
11. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) Approvals for Extension
12. USARCENT Policy Memorandum (Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program in CENTCOM AOR
13. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (Interim HHC Cdr) Statement
14. Sgt (b)(3), (b)(6) (HHC Leave Mgr) Statement
15. NTM-A/CSTC-A CG R&R Leave Program Policy Memorandum
16. Cpt (b)(3), (b)(6) (Theater Gateway, Kuwait, Inbound OIC) Statement
17. Cpt (b)(3), (b)(6) (HHC Cdr) Statement
18. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) Manifest, Kuwait to Bagram
19. USFOR-A Policy Guidance for TDY ICW R&R
20. E-mail correspondence between Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) (5 Jan)
21. MEMORANDUM from CJCS to Service Chiefs (Career Management of AFPAK Hands Program)
22. AFGHAN Hands Concept Briefing
23. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) (Deputy Director, NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Communications) Statement
24. USFOR-A FRAGO 09-269, Procedures for Requesting TDY ICW R&R exceptions to policy
25. E-mail correspondence between language Test Control Officer and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)
26. E-mail correspondence between LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) (26-27 Dec)
27. NTM-A/CSTC-A COS Temporary Duty Quick Reference Guide
28. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) (Director, NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Communications Directorate)
29. JFTR TDY Travel Policy
30. NTM-A/CSTC-A Exceptions to Policy Memorandum
31. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) response to investigator questions passed by Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) (Area Defense Council)
32. NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Communications Directorate leave tracker
33. DA Form 3881 (LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO THE
ATTENTION OF

CSTC-A-COS

21 January 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) NTM-A/CSTC-A

SUBJECT: Appointment – Army Regulation 15-6 Investigating Officer into Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s R&R and Subsequent Whereabouts From 31 December 2010 Until She Returned to Camp Eggers on 8 January 2011

1. You are appointed as an investigating officer under AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, to assist me in investigating the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s R&R, whereabouts from 31 December 2010 until she returned to Camp Eggers on 8 January 2011.

2. First, you will investigate into whether Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) was properly authorized to go on TDY in conjunction with her R&R. You will discover whether she had any authority and if the authority was properly authorized under existing regulations. Your investigation may lead to others who may have indicated approval. You will determine whether this approval was granted under existing regulations. Your investigation will also include an inquiry into supervisory decisions regarding CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)'s eight day absence. Second, you will determine whether Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) was entitled to either 15 or 18 days of R&R. You will also compile the facts and circumstances surrounding the number of days of R&R taken.

3. You are to conduct this informal investigation using the procedures outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 of AR 15-6. You should pursue any lawful investigative activity reasonably designed and executed to develop relevant information in this investigation. Interview any witness who you believe may possess relevant information. All witness statements will be sworn using DA Form 2823. If circumstances preclude you from obtaining a sworn statement, you may summarize the witness's statement. If in the course of the investigation you suspect that individuals may have violated regulations, orders, or the UCMJ, you must advise them of their rights under the UCMJ, Article 31 and document your rights advisement and the individual's election of rights on DA Form 3881, Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate.

4. No respondent has been designated in this matter. Accordingly, you will use procedures applicable to informal investigations set forth in AR 15-6, chapters 3 and 4. Should you determine in the context of your investigation that a Soldier's status has changed from favorable to unfavorable, as defined in the Service members service regulations, coordinate with the appropriate officials to initiate a FLAG or service equivalent.

5. The Report of Investigation. Your investigation is intended to provide the information necessary to address, as comprehensively as possible, the areas of concern set forth above. Your investigation will ascertain and fully develop the facts relevant to these areas of concern. You will document your specific findings of fact with regard to all relevant issues you identify. You

CSTC-A-COS
SUBJECT: Appointment – Army Regulation 15-6 Investigating Officer into Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)'s R&R and Subsequent Whereabouts From 31 December 2010 Until She Returned to Camp Eggers on 8 January 2011

will make specific recommendations regarding the appropriate disposition, if any, of each of your findings. Your report of investigation will be written. Use DA Form 1574, Report of Proceedings by Investigating Officer/Board of Officers, and attach all required enclosures and exhibits. Document your findings of fact and recommendations on the DA Form 1574. Cite the tab and/or page number of the exhibit that supports each finding and recommendation. If testimony or evidence conflicts, identify that conflict in your report and state who you believe and why.

6. Submit your report of investigation, together with all evidence marked as exhibits, to me (or my successor in this capacity) in two copies within 15 calendar days. Any extensions of time to complete this investigation must be requested from me and approved in writing. Submit any requests for modification of the suspense date or the scope of the investigation to me. If, at any time in the conduct of your investigation, something happens that could cause me to consider enlarging, restricting, or terminating your investigation or otherwise modifying any instruction in this memorandum of appointment, immediately report this situation to me, through the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate together with your recommendations as to the action I should take in response."

7. Within 24 hours of receiving this order, contact Major (b)(3), (b)(6), Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, at (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil. You will consult with MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding all aspects of this investigation, including development of an investigation plan, determining whether witnesses need to be advised of their rights under the UCMJ, Article 31 or the Fifth Amendment, and preparing findings and recommendations.

8. This investigation is your primary duty and takes precedence over all other duties assigned. Unless released sooner by the undersigned, your appointment remains in effect until the investigation is completed and no further investigation is required.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Colonel, US Army
Chief of Staff

Chronology of Events

- 212220Jan11 - Received appointment letter.
- 221400Jan11 - Spoke with Maj (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding duties as Investigating Officer.
- 221430Jan11 - Read through Army Regulation 15-6 and Investigation Guide.
- 23 Jan11- Requested statements from LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)
- Received statements from Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
- 24 Jan11 – Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) e-mailed stating she no longer worked for NTM-A and said that if I had any further questions, I should go through her attorney, Maj (b)(3), (b)(6)
- 24 Jan11 – Contacted Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s and Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) supervisor, CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) requesting an interview or statement from both.
- 241600 Jan11 – Interviewed LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6)
- 24 Jan11 - Received Statement from LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6)
- 24 Jan11 – Received statement from LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6)
- 241900 Jan11 – Interviewed LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
- 260800 Jan11 – Began process of determining Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s eligibility for 18 days R&R.
- 261212 Jan11 – Confirmed Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) eligibility for 18 days R&R.
- 261326 Jan11 – Requested HHC provide leave tracker form for month of December 2010.
- 26 Jan11 – Received e-mail correspondence between HHC and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) HHC and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
- 26 Jan11 Requested and received Command Communications leave tracker form from CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)
- 27 Jan11 – Sent another request for information including a request for all leave forms that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) may have submitted to HHC. Stopped by HHC to contact Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) but she was unavailable.
- 27 Jan11 – Requested information from Maj (b)(3), (b)(6) at Kuwait passenger terminal.
- 28 Jan11 – Compiled findings
- 29 Sent a third e-mail to HHC asking Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) why she is not responding to my requests.
- 28 Jan 11 – Requested of NTM-A/CSTC-A DoS policy guidance on TDY within Afghan AOR
- 3 Feb 11 – Received answers to questions from Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) (Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s legal representation)
- 4 Feb 11 – No reply from NTM-A/CSTC-A DoS for request for information.
- 4 Feb 11 – Completed 15-6.

LEAVE REQUEST/AUTHORIZATION
(See Privacy Act Statement and General Instructions below)

SECTION I

TO: ACTT 20100920

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

CAPT 39.5 INDEF

NO PER DIEM AUTHORIZED
2112020 8A-2084 P135197.00 832QRR 21T1
BYRS367 TRR2HOM 2QRR83 S09076
CIC: 2020RADORR09076 Traveler uses CBA

Orders (A)
Emergency (C)
Accepted Resident (R)
Retirement
Graduation (J)
Other (Specify) / VL
Permissive TDY (T)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) LtCol, USAF
Director, Afghan Outreach
MAJ SANTOSHA DOGG, EFLCC FWD BUDGET OFFICER

18 RS6474 20101207 0001 20101210 11 20101227 29

CONUS OS OS to CONUS [redacted]

(b)(6) NTV6-A STRATCOM [redacted]

CAMP EGGERS, AFGHANISTAN +NCR+R NOK

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

SECTION II (To be completed by leave approving authority)

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C., Chapter 40; 37 U.S.C., Chapter 9; EO 9397, November
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:
ROUTINE USES:
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of SSN is voluntary. However, this form will not be processed without your SSN. Since the Air Force identifies members by SSN for pay or leave purposes.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
(For emergency, reenlistment, convalescent, terminal, expedited review leave, and PTDY, see variations in AFM 177-373, Volume II, Ch 7.)
1. THIS FORM MUST BE TYPED OR COMPLETED IN INK.
2. BEFORE SEPARATING PARTS I, II, AND III, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING BLOCKS
a. Blocks 1 thru 5, 9, 12 thru 21 and 23 thru 26 are self-explanatory.
b. Block 6, current Leave Balance, [illegible]
c. Block 7, [illegible]
d. Block 8, [illegible]
e. [illegible]
f. [illegible]
g. [illegible]
h. [illegible]
i. [illegible]
j. [illegible]
k. [illegible]
l. [illegible]
m. [illegible]
n. [illegible]
o. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]

TIME 2400 DEC 30 2010 CENTCOM R&R USA HRC DFW PAF

TIME 2400 DEC 11 2010 CENTCOM R&R USA HRC DFW PAF

455 EMSS/FSSCO DEC -8 2010 Outprocessed

Space R
10-0703-LOGAKA 8 Dec 2010
OUTPROCESSED
LOGGIE
455/755 LOGPLANS
455 ELRS/LOG PLANS

AF IMT 588, 19910801 PART I - AFO COPY

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) @gmail.com

No alcohol on R+R flight

enclosure (A)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Phoenix, Kabul, Afghanistan	2011/01/24	1230	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	0-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

866 Air Expeditionary Squadron, Camp Phoenix APO AE 09320

9. (b)(3), (b)(6) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

On 11 Sept 2010, the 855 Air Expeditionary Squadron staffed a voluntary extension request for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) up the Chain of Command for consideration. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was in country on AF ULN UA3N1. Her original Required Delivery Date (RDD) was 2 April 2010. Her original Estimated Tour Length (ETL) was 179 days. Her original Estimated End TDY was 27 Sept 2010. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) request was to extend for the next two rotations of eJMAPS position 103439, Air Force ULNs UA8GX and UA2GX. Each of these rotations was for 179 days. Captain (b)(3), (b)(6), the Director of the Strategic Advisory Group at NTMA/CSTC-A endorsed this request for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) on 31 August 2010. This request was approved by Brig Gen Briggs, the 455 AEW/CC on 26 Sep 10. At that time the AEW/CC was the approval authority for such voluntary extension requests. The approved request was for the next two rotations, or for a total of approximately 18 months in theatre. IAW USAFCENT's Rest and Recuperation Leave Procedures dated 18 January 2010 service members serving 18 months are eligible for 18 days of R&R leave

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

TATEMENT OF ___ (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ TAKEN AT Camp Phoenix DATED 2011/01/24

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHIC ; ON PAGE 2 . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

___ (b)(3), (b)(6) _____
tatement)

WITNESSES

_____

_____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

_____

_____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ _____

at _____

_____
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

_____
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

_____
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

NITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.01ES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Chatham House, Camp Eggers	2011/01/24	1600	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		05

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
ISAF HQ

9.
I, ----------, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Summary of Interview between CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6), USN and LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6)

* LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) provided background on Capt (b)(3), (b)(6). He described Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) as a "native speaker" of Dari and that she learned the language while working at an orphanage in Kabul. He stated that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was interested in the AfPak Hands program and that he was working with her and the US Air Force to get her into the training. One requirement was that she have language training. He stated that during late November, both he and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) searched for the nearest language testing facility and discovered that it was At Ali Al Selem Air Base in Kuwait.

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he was aware that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) had been approved for a one year extension to her 179 day orders when he reviewed and forwarded her leave papers requesting 18 days leave.

* LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that USAF had approved Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) request for a one year extension, but that USAF only provided orders extending her 179 days. He said that this was common and that a subesequent set of 179 day orders will be issued extending her tour to approximately 544 days.

* LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that in late Nov / early Dec, he and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) decided that in order to save time and TDY money, the best way for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) to take the language test was for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) to take the test in Kuwait while she was there during her return journey from R&R and awaiting transport to Bagram. LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he was told the wait at Kuwait was typically several days and up to one week during the Dec/Jan holiday season. Based on this expected delay, he stated that the thought of filling out the request for TDY in conjunction with (ICW) R&R did not occur.

* LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he was aware of a NTM-A/CSTC-A instruction regarding TDY ICW R&R, but was not familiar with its contents or requirements. He stated that he was not familiar with the ARCENT Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Policy and Procedures for the CENTCOM AOR (15 Mar 09) version 1.0 which is used as the CENTCOM regulation governing TDY ICW R&R.

* LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he notified LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) "late Nov or early Dec" of the intention to allow Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) take the language test in Kuwait while she was there returning from R&R and awaiting transportation to Bagram . LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he did not specify whether or not Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) would be on TDY ICW R&R status while in Kuwait taking the language test, but stated that LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) verbally agreed with the idea.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

* LtC (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) called the language testing center prior to her R&R departure to confirm that she had met all the requirements in order to take and complete the language test. He stated that it was Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) intention to take the test on 31 Dec at 1700.

* LtC (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) delayed her initial outbound travel to Bagram one day since she did not have approved leave papers in hand prior to her originally scheduled day of departure. LtC (b)(3), (b)(6) expressed frustration with the leave process stating that he believed there was considerable delay at HHC since they were unable to determine whether Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was entitled to 15 or 18 days of R&R.

* LtC (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) started the leave request process in mid to late Sep as her leave papers indicate.

* LtC (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that both he and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) anticipated a 5 - 7 day delay at Kuwait while Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was awaiting air transport to Bagram. Given this expected delay, LtC (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he did not consider the need to have Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) initiate an exception to policy request in order to conduct TDY in conjunction with R&R.

* LtC (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that on 26 Dec, he contacted LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) to state that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was in touch with the language tester in Kuwait and that the language tester stated that she was having problems gaining access to the test and that there might be delays. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) responded that "It's all good".

* LtC (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that his title was Deputy Director for Afghan Outreach.

* LtC (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) intended to apply for the AFPAK Hands program, but need to take a language test before her application to the program could be considered.

LtC (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) originally requested 15 days. He stated that he told Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) to request 18 days based on her approval for a 2 rotation extension that would amount to a tour length of greater than the 15 months required to take 18 days R&R.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

#228

(re-program phone)

A18

12:10

SATOTRAVEL KUWAIT

DATE: 10 DEC 10
PAGE: 01
CONSULTANT: MY
RECORD LOCATOR
CUSTOMER NBR: (b)(3)

ITINERARY PREPARED FOR: (b)(3), (b)(6) O,KWI,RNR

VIEW YOUR RSVN AT WWW.VIRTUALLYTHERE.COM
ENTER SATO FOR CODE OR PASSWORD

FARE USD860.00

11 DECEMBER 10 - SATURDAY

AMERICAN AIRLINES	FLIGHT NO: AA1981	CONFIRMED ECONOMY
DEPART: DALLAS FT WORTH	AT: 1410	MEAL SERVED: FOOD FOR PURCHA 02HR 25MIN
ARRIVE: TUCSON	AT: 1535 NON-STOP	AIRCRAFT: MD-80 REF: (b)(3)

(b)(3), (b)(6) SEAT-17A

30 DECEMBER 10 - THURSDAY

AMERICAN AIRLINES	FLIGHT NO: AA1098	CONFIRMED ECONOMY
DEPART: TUCSON	AT: 0810	MEAL SERVED: FOOD FOR PURCHA 02HR 10MIN
ARRIVE: DALLAS FT WORTH	AT: 1120 NON-STOP	AIRCRAFT: MD-80 REF: (b)(3)

31 OCTOBER 11 - MONDAY

ITINERARY NOTE

@GCA YCA
THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OF THE US
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY REQUIRES US TO COLLECT
INFORMATION FROM YOU FOR THE PURPOSES OF WATCH LIST
SCREENING UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF 49 U.S.C. SECTION 114
AND THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION
ACT OF 2004. PROVIDING THIS INFORMATION IS VOLUNTARY
HOWEVER IF IT IS NOT PROVIDED YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO
ADDITIONAL SCREENING OR DENIED TRANSPORT OR AUTHORIZA-
TION TO ENTER A STERILE AREA. TSA MAY SHARE INFORMATION
YOU PROVIDE WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT OR INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES OR OTHERS UNDER ITS PUBLISHED SYSTEM OF
RECORDS NOTICE. FOR MORE ON TSA PRIVACY POLICIES OR TO
VIEW THE SYSTEM OF RECORDS NOTICE AND THE PRIVACY
IMPACT ASSESSMENT PLEASE SEE TSA WEB SITE
WWW.TSA.GOV
IMPORTANT R AND R TRAVEL PERSONNEL
ALL REQUESTS FOR TRAVEL ASSISTANCE INCLUDING ITINERARY
CHANGES OR LOST TICKETS FROM ALL R AND R PASSENGERS
TRAVELING TO AND FROM CONUS-OCONUS
MUST BE REFERRED BACK TO USARCENT G1 FOR APPROVAL
ALL CHANGES SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION OF ORDERS

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2

Enclosure (B)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
155 FORCE SUPPORT SQ (AZC)
4500 S PHOENIX ST
DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ 85707

SPECIAL ORDER (b)(6) PURPOSE: PARTICIPATE IN OPERATION: ENDURING FREEDOM
[redacted]
SPECIAL MISSION TRAVEL (MSN)

PROCEED D/A: [redacted] FROM: DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ VARIATIONS AUTHORIZED:
DSN: (b)(6) TO: KABUL, AFGHANISTAN TDY ORDERS: CED
TDY LENGTH: [redacted] RETURN TO: DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB, AZ

REMARK:
RPT TO PERSCO TEAM UPON ARRIVAL AT EMP LOC. ACCEPT NO PROMO ITEMS; I.E. GIFTS BONUS TICKETS ETC. PER AFI 24-101, GOVT PROCURED TRANS DIRECTED; CONTACT COMM TRVL OFF(CTO) OR [redacted] ASAP. DOD & AF POLICY PROHIBITS [redacted] FROM SELF-PROCURING OFFICIAL TRVL. UPON RTN TO HOME STATION, MBR MUST IN-PROCESS CSS AND NOTIFY [redacted]/PRP OF DATE RTND. PERDIEM RATE IAW JFTR. RPT TO FINANCE PRIOR TO DEPT. W/CY OF ORDERS IF YOU'RE A [redacted] W/DEPENDENTS & YR PROJ TDY EXCEEDS 30 DAYS. PROPORTIONAL PER DIEM RATE: ALL GOVERNMENT MEALS ARE AVAILABLE AND DIRECTED. PERSTEMPO TRAVEL CODE A APPLIES. WEAR OF BDUS/FLIGHT SUITS WHILE TRAVELING ON GOVERNMENT OWNED OR LEASED AIRCRAFT IS AUTHORIZED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ENTITLEMENTS. OPERATION XXX IS A SECRET DECLARED CONTINGENCY OPERATION. REPORT TO MILITARY PAY AFTER COMPLETING TDY TO DETERMINE ENTITLEMENTS FOR FOREIGN DUTY PAY (FDP), COST-OF LIVING ALLOWANCE (COLA), AND FAMILY SEPARATION ALLOWANCE (FSA). NO AMMO REQ. WILL DEPLOY WITH MODIFIED A 1 BAG. PERSONNEL TRANSITING THRU ETDC AT MANAS WILL BE ISSUED B AND C BAGS WITH IBA, CWDF, AND IFAK'S. FOLLOWING WILL BE ISSUED: AT HOME STATION: LIP BALM, SUN BLOCK, GORTEX JACKET TOP AND BOTTOM W/ COLD WEATHER LINER FOR EACH (1 OCT - 1 MAR). HAND-CARRY ALL REQUIRED ITEMS AS LISTED IN BASE DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST/ REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. MEMBER WILL DEPLOY WITH PRIMARY WEAPON. ALL AF PERSONNEL MUST PROCESS WITH PERSCO AT BAGRAM PROCESS OF MISSION OR UNIT AFFILIATION OR MISSION. POC IS 455 EMSS/PERSCO DSN: 318-231-4409. AMMO WILL BE ISSUED AT BAGRAM. NO FPF PASSPORT IS REQUIRED FOR COMM AIR INTO KABUL IAP. ADDITIOANL COLD WEATHER GEAR NEEDS TO BE ISSUED AT HOMESTATION: GLOVES; WATCH CAP; UNDER GARMENTS; SWEATER/SLEEP SHIRT; WOOL SOCKS; FIELD/GORTEX JACKET W/ LINER; LIP BALM; SUN BLOCK. REFER TO REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE. MEMBER IS AUTHORIZED $3.50 FOR INCIDENTAL PER DIEM. ALL MEALS AND LODGING WILL BE PROVIDED AT NO COST. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. SUBSTITUTE ANY OFFICER AFSC WITH NO STAFF ACTION OFFICER EXPERIENCE. REQUIRES TWO YEARS POL MIL EXPERIENCE. IF CIVILIAN FILLING TASKING REFER TO LINE REMARK CVL. MBR IS TASKED AS INDIV AUGM (IA) DEPLOYING TO AFGHANISTAN/IRAQ OR PAKISTAN AND IS REQD TO ATTEND COMBAT AIRMAN SKILLS TRAINING (CAST). TASKED UNIT MUST IMMEDIATELY DETERMINE TRAINING LOCATION AND DATES USING THE AEF ONLINE (SIPR) PRE DEPLOYMENT TRAINING TOOL (PDTT) HTTPS://AEF.AFPC.RANDOLPH.AF.SMIL.MIL/DEFAULT.ASPX. TRAINING MAY BE UP TO 90 DAYS PRIOR TO RDD. IF ULN IS NOT LOADED IN PDTT, RE CHECK WEEKLY. IF WITHIN 45 DAYS OF RDD AND NO TRNG LISTED, IMMEDIATELY CALL USAF EC/[redacted] IA MANAGER, [redacted] ONCE CLASS DATE IS ASSIGNED IN PDTT, CHGS TO COURSE DATES WILL ONLY BE CONSIDERED USING TEMPLATE/CRITERIA POSTED ON (NIPR) HTTPS://AEF.AFPC.RANDOLPH.AF.MIL/AFRIT/AFRIT.ASPX?CAT=106 ALONG WITH CURRENT COURSE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES TO RQST TRNG EXEMPTIONS. ALL STUDENTS (OFFICER, ENLISTED AND CIVILIAN) MUST BE QUALIFIED ON THE M16A2 OR M4 WEAPON SYSTEM. INDIVIDUALS MUST HAND-CARRY A COPY OF THEIR AF FORM 522 THAT SHOWS THEIR CURRENT QUALIFICATIONS. INDIVIDUALS THAT FAIL TO DO THIS WILL BE SENT BACK TO THEIR HOME STATION. M9: 146,839

LEGEND:
SECURITY STATUS CODES: S-SECRET; PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM: -N/A; GENERAL LEGEND CODES:

AUTHORITY: DCAPES
ISSUING HQ: DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE APPROVING OFFICIAL: (b)(3), (b)(6) CIV, DAFC
INSTALLATION PERSONNEL READINESS

FUND CITE 1: 5704400 [redacted] 7881 290020 01 409 667100 ESP: 7C
CTC 1: 4 4 178 0100 667100
FUND CITE 2: 5713400 [redacted] 7881 290020 01 409 667100 ESP: 7C
CTC 2: 4 4 178 018A 667100

M16 1,259.82

FOR THE COMMANDER
OFFICIAL
(b)(3), (b)(6), MAJ, USAF
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS
DISTRIBUTION: A

DATE OF ISSUE: [redacted]

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF
Certifying Official

PROCESSED IN DTS (b)(3), (b)(6)

Enclosure (M)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
355TH FORCE SUPPORT SQ (ACC)
4500 S PHOENIX ST
DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ 85707

SPECIAL ORDER (b)(6) PURPOSE: PARTICIPATE IN OPERATION: ENDURING FREEDOM
[redacted]
SPECIAL MISSION TRAVEL (MSN)

PROCEED O/A: [redacted] FROM: DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ — VARIATIONS AUTHORIZED
DSN: 228 [redacted] TO: KABUL, AFGHANISTAN — TYPE ORDERS: CED
[redacted] RETURN TO: DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB, AZ

REMARK:
RPT TO PERSCO TEAM UPON ARRIVAL AT EMP LOC. ACCEPT NO PROMO ITEMS; I.E. GIFTS BONUS TICKETS ETC. PER AFI 24-101, GOVT PROCURED TRANS DIRECTED; CONTACT COMM TRVL OFF(CTO) OR TMO ASAP. DOD & AF POLICY PROHIBITS MBRS FROM SELF-PROCURING OFFICIAL TRVL. UPON RTN TO HOME STATION, MBR MUST IN-PROCESS CSS AND NOTIFY MPS/IPR OF DATE RTND. PERDIEM RATE IAW JTR. RPT TO FINANCE PRIOR TO DEPT. W/CY OF ORDERS IF YOU'RE A MBR W/DEPENDENTS & YR PROJ TDY EXCEEDS 30 DAYS. ~~PROFESSIONAL PER DIEM RATE.~~ ALL GOVERNMENT MEALS ARE AVAILABLE AND DIRECTED. DEPSTEMPO TRAVEL CODE A APPLIES. WEAR OF BDUS/FLIGHT SUITS WHILE TRAVELING ON GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR LEASED AIRCRAFT IS AUTHORIZED. FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ENTITLEMENTS, OPERATION XXX IS A SECDEF-DECLARED CONTINGENCY OPERATION. REPORT TO MILITARY PAY AFTER COMPLETING TDY TO DETERMINE ENTITLEMENTS FOR FOREIGN DUTY PAY (FDP), COST-OF-LIVING ALLOWANCE (COLA), AND FAMILY SEPARATION ALLOWANCE (FSA). NO AMMO REQ. WILL DEPLOY WITH MODIFIED A-1 BAG. PERSONNEL TRANSITING THRU ETDC AT MANAS WILL BE ISSUED B AND C BAGS WITH IBA, CWDE, AND IFAK'S. FOLLOWING WILL BE ISSUED AT HOME STATION: LIP BALM, SUN BLOCK, GORTEX JACKET TOP AND BOTTOM W/ COLD WEATHER LINER FOR EACH (1 OCT- 1 MAR) . HAND CARRY ALL REQUIRED ITEMS AS LISTED IN BASE DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST/ REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. MEMBER WILL DEPLOY WITH PRIMARY WEAPON. ALL AF PERSONNEL MUST PROCESS WITH PERSCO AT BAGRAM REGARDLESS OF MISSION OR UNIT AFFILIATION OR MISSION. POC IS 455 EMSS/PERSCO DSN: 318-231-4409. AMMO WILL BE ISSUED AT BAGRAM. NO-FEE PASSPORT IS REQUIRED FOR COMM AIR INTO KABUL IAP. ADDITIOANL COLD WEATHER GEAR NEEDS TO BE ISSUED BY HOMESTATION: GLOVES; WATCH CAP; UNDER GARMENTS; SWEATER/SLEEP SHIRT; WOOL SOCKS; FIELD/GORTEX JACKET W/ LINER; LIP BALM; SUN BLOCK. REFER TO REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE. MEMBER IS AUTHORIZED $3.50 FOR INCIDENTAL PER DIEM. ALL MEALS AND LODGING WILL BE PROVIDED AT NO COST. ALL MILITARY MEMBERS MUST DEPLOY WITH AT LEAST ONE SET OF CIVILIAN CLOTHING. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. ALL ISAF/IJC/NTM-A INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEE'S ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE NATO INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION ADVANCED DISTRIBUTIVE LEARNING (ADL) PACKAGE WHICH PROVIDES UNCLASSIFIED MISSION SPECIFIC INFORMATION ALL PERSONNEL MUST KNOW BEFORE DEPLOYING. IN ADDITION, SPECIFIC ULNS ARE REQUIRED TO ATTEND ONE OR MORE IN-RESIDENT ISAF/IJC TRAINING COURSES IN ADDITION TO THE AFCENT MANDATED COMBAT SKILLS TRAINING. GO TO SIPR AFPC ON-LINE PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING TOOL (PDTT) AT HTTPS://AEF. AFPC.RANDOLPH.AF.SMIL.MIL/PDTT TO DETERMINE TRAINING DATES/LOCATIONS. GO TO NIPR AEF ONLINE PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS AT HTTPS://AEF.APPC.RANDOLPH.AF. MIL/AFRIT/ AFRIT.ASPX?=16 AND NAVIGATE TO ISAF TRAINING FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT LOGGING INTO ADL AND OTHER ISAF COURSE INFORMATION. SHOULD YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING TRAINING CDR CHARLES STAHL, USN, IFCBS/J7, COMMERCIAL (CALLING FROM USA) 001-31-45 526 2423; DSN 314-364-2623 OR EMAIL: CHARLES.STAHL@JFCBS.NATO.INT. IF CIVILIAN FILLING TASKING REFER TO LINE REMARK CVL. MBR IS TASKED AS INDIV AUGM (IA) DEPLOYING TO AFGHANISTAN/IRAQ OR PAKISTAN AND IS REQD TO ATTEND COMBAT AIRMAN SKILLS TRAINING (CAST). TASKED UNIT MUST IMMEDIATELY DETERMINE TRAINING LOCATION AND DATES USING THE AEF ONLINE (SIPR) PRE DEPLOYMENT TRAINING TOOL (PDTT) HTTPS://AEF.AFPC.RANDOLPH.AF.SMIL.MIL/DEFAULT.ASPX. TRAINING MAY BE UP TO 90 DAYS PRIOR TO RDD. IF ULN IS NOT LOADED IN PDTT, RE-CHECK WEEKLY. IF WITHIN 45 DAYS OF RDD AND NO TRNG LISTED, IMMEDIATELY CALL CAST TRAINING MANAGEMENT CELL AT KEESLER AFB FOR GUIDANCE (DSN 591-6351/6354). ONCE CLASS DATE IS ASSIGNED IN PDTT, CHGS TO COURSE DATES WILL ONLY BE CONSIDERED USING TEMPLATE/CRITERIA POSTED ON (NIPR) HTTPS://AEF.AFPC.RANDOLPH.AF.MIL/AFRIT/AFRIT.ASPX?CAT=106 ALONG WITH CURRENT COURSE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES TO RQST TRNG EXEMPTIONS. ALL STUDENTS (OFFICER, ENLISTED AND CIVILIAN) MUST BE QUALIFIED ON THE M16A2 OR M4 WEAPON SYSTEM. INDIVIDUALS MUST HAND-CARRY A COPY OF THEIR AF FORM 522 THAT SHOWS THEIR CURRENT QUALIFICATIONS. INDIVIDUALS THAT FAIL TO DO THIS WILL BE SENT BACK TO THEIR HOME STATION. REQUIRES NATO SECRET IN BRIEF.

LEGENDS:
SECURITY STATUS CODES: S-SECRET; PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM: -N/A; GENERAL [illegible] CODES:

AUTHORITY: DCAPES
ISSUING HQ: DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE — APPROVING OFFICIAL: (b)(3), (b)(6) TSGT, USAF
NCOIC, INSTALLATION PERSONNEL READINESS
5763400 300 763: 2980000 01 409 667100 7C
FUND CITE: [illegible] 2980000 01 409 667100 ESP: 7C
CIC 1: 4 4 178 [illegible] 667181
FOR THE COMMANDER
OFFICIAL
(b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ, USAF
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS
DISTRIBUTION: A

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
USAF
Certifying Official 20161025
PROCE
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Enclosure (L)

☐ Database SIPR - Initials ...

☐ Database NTM-A - Initials .....

NTM-A / CSTC-A PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION FORM (PAF)

- Complete each block if possible. Use "unknown" or "not applicable" as needed.
- Use the "additional remarks" to explain missing data or other cicumstances. For "EMPLOYEE TYPE" choose one: Military, Nato civilian, Defence civilian, ICC, LCH, Non-CE civilian, Contractor.
- For "HOME UNIT INFORMATION" tick the appropriate box.

Bold = required

SECTION 1 - PERSONAL INFORMATION

LAST/FAMILY/SURNAME	(b)(3), (b)(6)	NATIONALITY	US
FIRST/GIVEN NAME		NATO RANK	OF-1
GENDER		Grade	O-2
DATE OF BIRTH (dd-mmm-yy)		Branch of Service	USAF
PERSONAL ID NUMBER (SSN) OR MILITARY SERVICE NUMBER	[redacted]	BLOOD TYPE	B+

SECTION 2 - ISAF DUTY INFORMATION

Date of arrival AOR (dd-mmm-yy)	26-Mar-10	NTM-A O CSTC-A O	
Date of arrival Eggers (dd-mmm-yy)	26-Mar-10	CE NUMBER	
Projected depart. Eggers (dd-mmm-yy)	25-Sep-10	EMPLOYEE TYPE (Civ)	
Projected depart. AOR (dd-mmm-yy)	28-Sep-10	JMD NUMBER	7131
DIRECTORATE	CMO	Others (RFF, VNC, ...)	
		JOB TITLE	
Replacement of: Capt	(b)(3), (b)(6)	DUTY PHONE (IVSN)	

SECTION 3 - HOME UNIT INFORMATION (non US)

NATO HQ	
HOME UNIT CONTACT INFO	

SECTION 4 - US PERSONNEL ONLY (required)

Ethnic background	(b)(6)	State Legal Residence	MN
MOS/AFSC/Rate		Next of Kin Name and Relationship	[redacted] husband
ETS / EAOS / EAS / DOS		Next of Kin Address	[redacted]
Date of rank (dd-mmm-yy)			
Weapon type and number		Next of Kin Phone Number	[redacted]
M 4		Home unit address	[redacted]
M 9	481766		
M 16			
ULN (Air Force only)	UA3N1		
Date of last Eval (dd-mmm-yy)	05-Aug-09	Marital Status	(b)(6)
Evalutation type	OPR	Duty status	active

SECTION 5 - Knowlegde Dari or Pashtu

Dari	☐No ☑Yes →	if Yes	☐Fluent	☑Functional	Validated	☑Yes ☐No
Pashtu	☑No ☐Yes →	if Yes	☐Fluent	☐Functional	Validated	☐Yes ☐No

SECTION 6 - NOTES or ADDITIONAL REMARKS

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCES CENTRAL (USAFCENT)
AL UDEID AIR BASE, QATAR

3 December 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL PERSONNEL

FROM: USAFCENT/CC
APO AE 09309

SUBJECT: Policy for Voluntary and Involuntary Tour Length Extensions

1. Voluntary extensions may be authorized for personnel serving on an AEF rotation. Members wanting to extend must request extension for an entire AEF rotation. Extensions for less than a full rotation will only be granted if considered mission essential. Voluntary extensions are required to be submitted thru the PERSCO team to the USAFCENT/A1 NLT 60 days prior to the member's tour completion date. In addition, members must have home station commander approval (Group Commander or above) and the deployed location's AEG commander (or above) approval. All guard/reserve personnel must have additional man days approved by their parent MAJCOM. PERSCO teams will forward requests to USAFCENT.centralsite@shaw.af.smil.mil USAFCENT A1 will coordinate with AFPC; final approval lies with the MAJCOM FAM.

2. Involuntary extensions, beyond 14 days, are only authorized by the SECDEF as outlined in the 30 Mar 05 Boots on the Ground (BOG) policy at Attachment 1. Per SECDEF BOG policy, active duty and mobilized members can be involuntarily extended up to 14 days past ETL (due to awaiting replacement, travel, and/or overlap). All involuntary extensions beyond 14 days must be processed through the following coordination route for approval: (1) PERSCO, (2) ACCE, (3) AFFOR A1, (4) COMUSAFCENT, and (5) SECDEF. Requests must be submitted NLT 60 days prior to the member's tour completion date. As a reminder, requests should be sent via SIPR in the USAFCENT directed format to centaf.a1.persco@auab.afcent.af.smil.mil. AFFOR/A1 will coordinate requests to COMUSAFCENT.

3. Members volunteering for two 179-day deployments must sign a letter stating they fully understand that he/she is serving two separate 179 day TDYs (not one 365 day TDY). With unit commander approval, the member may take R&R leave after entering the next rotation.

4. As a reminder, members must be released upon arrival of replacement personnel unless overlap is required per the line remarks, and may only be retained for the purpose of completing authorized overlap.

GILMARY M. HOSTAGE III
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

NTM-A
NATO Training Mission
AFGHANISTAN

R&R Leave Eligibility

- Tour length = more than 270 days BOG:
  - authorized 15 non-chargeable days leave
- Tour length = more than 15 months BOG:
  - authorized 18 day leave period
- Cannot take R&R until 60 days BOG or within 60 days of redeployment
- Ordinary Leave is not Authorized – no exceptions

Newcomer Brief

R&R Leave Procedures

NTM-A
NATO Training Mission
AFGHANISTAN

- Approving official is the HHC Commander
- Admin POCs submit leave requests to HHC 90 days prior to the leave start date
- All Services will submit their SERVICE SPECIFIC LEAVE FORM
- Start date for All Services will be the day you want to be in the states/country
- You will be scheduled for manifest 3 days prior to start date
- 14 days prior to leave start, Admin POC will receive leave form from HHC
- Prior to going on R&R you must complete the Chaplain's reintegration training
- Weapon will be turned into the BAF LNO. IBA/IOTV Plates will be turned into Kuwait for scanning.

- Submit Exception to Policy memo, thru CJ1—ARCENT is the approval authority
- Submit memo, DD1610, Service Specific Leave Form
- Submit request AT LEAST 30 days before departure
- A passport and visa is required to travel commercial air out of Kuwait

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
12th Air Force – Air Forces Southern
Davis-Monthan AFB

12 AF (AFSOUTH)/A9L 4 Sep 10

MEMORANDUM FOR USAFCENT/CC

SUBJECT: Approval for Extension – CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) , [redacted] NTM-A/CSTC-A, Camp Eggers, Afghanistan

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to request that the extension of CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) be approved.

2. CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) home station command supports her request to extend her tour of duty in Afghanistan by 365-days. I concur with extending her for an additional 365-days from her original tour end date of 28 September 2010. The unit understands that this officer has a new tour end date of 27 September 2011.

3. The POC for this action is the undersigned at Telephone: DSN (b)(3), (b)(6) Email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @dm.af.mil

//Signed//

(b)(3), (b)(6)
COL, USAF
Director, Studies, Analysis & Assessments, and Lessons Learned

HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTMA/CSTC-A – Commander's Action Group 12 Sep 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR USAFCENT/CC

SUBJECT: Justification for Extension – Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted], Action Officer, Commander's Initiatives Group, NTM-A/CSTC-A, Camp Eggers, Afghanistan

1. I request your support for the requested extension of Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) This extension will begin on 28 September 2010 thru 27 September 2011.

2. Justification: LTG Caldwell and GEN Petraeus have recently emphasized a renewed focus on engaging and communicating with the Afghan people to build mutual trust and work toward transition. During her initial tour, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) has distinguished herself as uniquely qualified and competent to make progress in this critical dimension of NTM-A's mission. She has articulated a vision and designed a plan for Afghan outreach including community and media engagement, and intellectual capacity-building. Her in-country experience (including 9 months immersed in the civilian community), linguistic proficiency, and cross-cultural acumen are virtually unheard-of among the military population currently serving in Afghanistan at any level. These capabilities along with her demonstrated initiative make her an asset that the command cannot afford to lose at this juncture.

3. A replacement has been identified and is inbound for her current billet. She will be moving into a new position in the Strategic Communications division, Afghan Outreach cell. The position she will be filling is JMD # 103439, ULN UA8GX.

4. My point of contact regarding this matter is LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) DSN (b)(3), (b)(6). Email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COLONEL, US Army
Director, Commander's Action Group

HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
MBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTMA/CSTC-A – Strategic Advisory Group 31 August 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR USAFCENT/CC

SUBJECT: Justification for Extension – Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted], Action Officer, Commander's Initiatives Group, NTM-A/CSTC-A, Camp Eggers, Afghanistan

1. I request your support for the requested extension of Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) This extension will begin on 28 September 2010 thru 27 September 2011.

2. Justification: LTG Caldwell and GEN Petraeus have recently emphasized a renewed focus on engaging and communicating with the Afghan people to build mutual trust and work toward transition. During her initial tour, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) has distinguished herself as uniquely qualified and competent to make progress in this critical dimension of NTM-A's mission. She has articulated a vision and designed a plan for Afghan outreach including community and media engagement, and intellectual capacity-building. Her in-country experience (including 9 months immersed in the civilian community), linguistic proficiency, and cross-cultural acumen are virtually unheard-of among the military population currently serving in Afghanistan at any level. These capabilities along with her demonstrated initiative make her an asset that the command cannot afford to lose at this juncture.

3. My point of contact regarding this matter is LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) ; DSN (b)(3), (b)(6). Email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CAPT, US Navy
Director, Strategic Advisory Group

NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

MEMORANDUM FOR 455 EFSS/PERSCO

FROM: NTM-A/CSTC-A

SUBJECT: Voluntary TDY Extension – CAPT, (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. I volunteer to remain in Afghanistan for the next 2 AEF rotations (Ref AFI 10-401, Paragraphs 9.20 – 9.20.24). I understand that I may have to deploy to another location and will get no preferential treatment concerning duty location or rotation date because of my previous tour. I further understand I am not guaranteed to receive short tour credit as it will depend on current USAF policy.

2. My information is as follows:
Grade/Name/SSAN: Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted]
ULN/LNR/SUFFIX: UA3N1/001
Component (AD, ANG, AFRES): AD
AFSC: 16P4
TASKED PAS/Base: Davis-Monthan AFB
Date Required in Place (RDD): 1 Apr 2010
ETL: 179 days
TDY End Date: 28 Sep 2010
Line Remarks: BDF WTG AI WTJ 15

3. Projected Position:

ULN/LNR/SUFFIX: UA8GX/001 and UA2GX/001
Component (AD, ANG, AFRES): AD
AFSC: 17D3B
TASKED PAS/Base: TE1SFJ9T/Tinker AFB and None Tasked
Date Required in Place (RDD): 28 Sep 2010. UA8GX RDD is 15 Nov 2010 will request re-alignment of UA8GX RDD to coincide with current Estimated End TDY of UA3N1
ETL: 357 days
TDY End Date: 19 Sep 2011
Line Remarks: WTI WTF BBI

4. New Requested Start & End Dates:
New combined TDY start and end dates: 1 Apr 2010-19 Sep 2011 requires re-alignment of UA8GX/UA2GX RDDs/EOTs
New combined TDY Length (number of days): 537
Mobilization/Activation Orders Dates **(ANG, AFRES Only)**:
Mandays Extension Approved **(ANG, AFRES Only)**:
Mandays Approval POC:

5. The following justification is provided:

The next 12 to 24 months in Afghanistan are a critical time for the coalition's efforts to train, equip, and build public confidence in the Afghan National Security Forces. A crucial piece of this mission involves engaging with Afghan community and religious leaders, media, civil society organizations, think tanks, and other shapers of public opinion. I have already begun work on initiatives in this vein which cannot be carried to fruition in the short time remaining on my current tour of duty. With proficiency in Dari, the preparation of six months of service in the Commander's Initiatives Group as well as an additional 9 months experience immersed in the Afghan community, I can assist in leading the strategic Afghan outreach team to have a lasting impact on the current mission as well as relationships with Afghanistan and coalition nations in the future.

//SIGNED (b)(3), (b)(6) 31 Aug 2010//
(b)(3), (b)(6)
CAPT, US AIR FORCE

1st Ind, ADCON/CC Info:

Disapprove

//SIGNED (b)(3), (b)(6) 11 Sep 2010//
(b)(3), (b)(6) , Lt Col, USAF
Commander

2nd Ind, Home Station GP/CC Info (ie. 12 AF (AFSOUTH)/A9L)

MEMORANDUM FOR 755 AEG/CC

Approved

//SIGNED (b)(3), (b)(6) 16 Sep 2010//
(b)(3), (b)(6) , Col, USAF
12 AF (AFSOUTH)/A9L

3rd Ind, 755 AEG/CC

MEMORANDUM FOR 455 AEW/CC

Approved/~~Disapproved~~

//SIGN// (b)(3), (b)(6) 26 Sep 10
For: (b)(3), (b)(6) Col, USAF
Commander

4th Ind 455 AEW/CC

MEMORANDUM FOR 455 EFSS/PERSCO

Approved/~~Disapproved~~

//SIGN// (b)(3), (b)(6) 26 Sep 10
(b)(3), (b)(6) , Brig Gen, USAF
Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
355 FORCE SUPPORT SQ (ACC)
4500 S PHOENIX ST
DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ 85707
SPECIAL ORDER (b)(6) PURPOSE: PARTICIPATE IN OPERATION: ENDURING FREEDOM
RDD: 2010-04-02
SPECIAL MISSION TRAVEL (MSN)

PROCRD O/A: 28 MAR 2010 FROM: DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ VARIATIONS AUTHORIZED
DSN: 226 1090 TO: KABUL, AFGHANISTAN TVCM ORDERS: CED
TDY LENGTH: 186 RETURN TO: DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB, AZ

REMARK:
RPT TO PERSCO TEAM UPON ARRIVAL AT EMP LOC. ACCEPT NO PROMO ITEMS; I.E. GIFTS BONUS TICKETS ETC. PER AFI 24-101, GOVT PROCURED TRANS DIRECTED; CONTACT COMM TRVL OFF(CTO) OR TMO ASAP. DOD & AF POLICY PROHIBITS MBRS FROM SELF-PROCURING OFFICIAL TRVL. UPON RTN TO HOME STATION, MBR MUST IN-PROCESS CSS AND NOTIFY MPF/PRP OF DATE RTND. PERDIEM RATE IAW JFTR. RPT TO FINANCE PRIOR TO DEPT. W/CY OF ORDERS IF YOU'RE A MBR W/DEPENDENTS & YR PROJ TDY EXCEEDS 30 DAYS. PROPORTIONAL PER DIEM RATE: ALL GOVERNMENT MEALS ARE AVAILABLE AND DIRECTED. PERSTEMPO TRAVEL CODE A APPLIES. WEAR OF BDUS/FLIGHT SUITS WHILE TRAVELING ON GOVERNMENT OWNED OR LEASED AIRCRAFT IS AUTHORIZED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ENTITLEMENTS. OPERATION XXX IS A SECDEF DECLARED CONTINGENCY OPERATION. REPORT TO MILITARY PAY AFTER COMPLETING TDY TO DETERMINE ENTITLEMENTS FOR FOREIGN DUTY PAY (FDP), COST-OF LIVING ALLOWANCE (COLA), AND FAMILY SEPARATION ALLOWANCE (FSA). NO AMMO REQ. WILL DEPLOY WITH MODIFIED A / BAG. PERSONNEL TRANSITING THRU ETDC AT MANAS WILL BE ISSUED B AND C BAGS WITH IBA, CWDE, AND IFAK'S. FOLLOWING WILL BE ISSUED AT HOME STATION: LIP BALM, SUN BLOCK, GORTEX JACKET TOP AND BOTTOM W/ COLD WEATHER LINER FOR EACH (1 OCT - 1 MAR). HAND-CARRY ALL REQUIRED ITEMS AS LISTED IN BASE DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST/ REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. MEMBER WILL DEPLOY WITH PRIMARY WEAPON. ALL AF PERSONNEL MUST PROCESS WITH PERSCO AT BAGRAM REGARDLESS OF MISSION OR UNIT AFFILIATION OR MISSION. POC IS 455 EMSS/PERSCO DSN: 318-231-4409. AMMO WILL BE ISSUED AT BAGRAM. NO TDY PASSPORT IS REQUIRED FOR COMM AIR INTO KABUL IAP. ADDITIOANL COLD WEATHER GEAR NEEDS TO BE ISSUED BY HOMESTATION: GLOVES; WATCH CAP; UNDER GARMENTS; SWEATER/SLEEP SHIRT; WOOL SOCKS; FIELD/GORTEX JACKET W/ LINER, LIP BALM; SUN BLOCK. REFER TO REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE. MEMBER IS AUTHORIZED $3.50 FOR INCIDENTAL PER DIEM, ALL MEALS AND LODGING WILL BE PROVIDED AT NO COST. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. SUBSTITUTE ANY OFFICER AFSC WITH HQ STAFF ACTION OFFICER EXPERIENCE. REQUIRES TWO YEARS POL MIL EXPERIENCE. IF CIVILIAN FILLING TASKING REFER TO LINE REMARK (VL). MBR IS TASKED AS INDIV AUGM (IA) DEPLOYING TO AFGHANISTAN/IRAQ OR PAKISTAN AND IS REQD TO ATTEND COMBAT AIRMAN SKILLS TRAINING (CAST). TASKED UNIT MUST IMMEDIATELY DETERMINE TRAINING LOCATION AND DATES USING THE AEF ONLINE (NIPR) PRE DEPLOYMENT TRAINING TOOL (PDTT) HTTPS://AEF.AFPC.RANDOLPH.AF.SMIL.MIL/DEFAULT.ASPX. TRAINING MAY BE UP TO 90 DAYS PRIOR TO RDD. IF ULN IS NOT LOADED IN PDTT BE CHECK MONTHLY. IF WITHIN 45 DAYS OF RDD AND NO TRNG LISTED, IMMEDIATELY CALL USAF EC/BOS IA MANAGER, DSN 850-7161/7162. ONCE CLASS DATE IS ASSIGNED IN PDTT, CHGS TO COURSE DATES WILL ONLY BE CONSIDERED USING TEMPLATE CRITERIA POSTED ON (NIPR) HTTPS://AEF.AFPC.RANDOLPH.AF.MIL/PDTT/APRIT.ASPX?CAT=106 ALONG WITH CURRENT COURSE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES TO RQST TRNG EXEMPTIONS. ALL STUDENTS (OFFICER, ENLISTED AND CIVILIAN) MUST BE QUALIFIED ON THE M16A2 OR M4 WEAPON SYSTEM. INDIVIDUALS MUST HAND-CARRY A COPY OF THEIR AF FORM 522 THAT SHOWS THEIR CURRENT QUALIFICATIONS. INDIVIDUALS THAT FAIL TO DO THIS WILL BE SENT BACK TO THEIR HOME STATION. M9: 146,839,

LEGENDS:
SECURITY STATUS CODES: S-SECRET; PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM: -N/A; GENERAL LEGEND CODES:

AUTHORITY: DCAFES
ISSUING HQ: DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE APPROVING OFFICIAL: (b)(3), (b)(6) CIV, DAFC
INSTALLATION PERSONNEL READINESS

FUND CITE 1: 5701400 300 7861 290020 01 409 667100 ESP: 70
DSC 1: 4 4 078 0150 667100
FUND CITE 2: 5713400 301 7881 290020 01 409 677100 ESP: YC
DSC 2: 4 4 078 018A 667100
FOR THE COMMANDER
OFFICIAL
(b)(3), (b)(6), MSC, USAF
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS
DISTRIBUTION: A

M16: 259.82

DATE OF ISSUE: 17 MAR 2010

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
MSgt USAF
Certifying Official

PROCESSED IN DTS (b)(3), (b)(6)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
355 FORCE SUPPORT SQ (ACC)
4800 S PHOENIX ST
DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ 85707

SPECIAL ORDER (b)(6) PURPOSE: PARTICIPATE IN OPERATION: ENDURING FREEDOM
RED: 2010-04 02
SPECIAL MISSION TRAVEL (MEN)

PROCED D/A: 28 MAR 2010 FROM: DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ VARIATIONS AUTHORIZED
DSN: 226 1090 TO: KABUL, AFGHANISTAN TYPE ORDERS: CED
TDY LENGTH: 196 RETURN TO: DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB, AZ

REMARK:
RPT TO PERSCO TRAN UPON ARRIVAL AT EMP LOC. ACCEPT NO PROMO ITEMS; I.E. GIFTS BONUS TICKETS ETC. PER AFI 24-101. GOVT PROCURED TRANS DIRECTED; CONTACT COMM TRVL OFF(CTO) OR TMO ASAP. DOD & AF POLICY PROHIBITS MBRS FROM SELF PROCURING OFFICIAL TRVL. UPON RTN TO HOME STATION, MBR MUST IN-PROCESS CSS AND NOTIFY MPF/PRF OF DATE RTND. PERDIEM RATE IAW JFTR. RPT TO FINANCE PRIOR TO DEPT. W/CY OF ORDERS IF YOU'RE A MBR W/DEPENDENTS & YR PROJ TDY EXCEEDS 30 DAYS. PROPORTIONAL PER DIEM RATE: ALL GOVERNMENT MEALS ARE AVAILABLE AND DIRECTED. PERSTEMPO TRAVEL CODE A APPLIES. WEAR OF BDUS/FLIGHT SUITS WHILE TRAVELING ON GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR LEASED AIRCRAFT IS AUTHORIZED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ENTITLEMENTS. OPERATION XXX IS A SECDEF DECLARED CONTINGENCY OPERATION. REPORT TO MILITARY PAY AFTER COMPLETING TDY TO DETERMINE ENTITLEMENTS FOR FOREIGN DUTY PAY (FDP), COST-OF LIVING ALLOWANCE (COLA), AND FAMILY SEPARATION ALLOWANCE (FSA). NO AMMO REQ. WILL DEPLOY WITH MODIFIED A 1 BAG. PERSONNEL TRANSITING THRU RTDC AT MANAS WILL BE ISSUED B AND C BAGS WITH IEA, CWDE, AND IFAK'S. FOLLOWING WILL BE ISSUED AT HOME STATION: LIP BALM, SUN BLOCK, GORTEX JACKET TOP AND BOTTOM W/ COLD WEATHER LINER FOR EACH (1 OCT - 1 MAR). HAND-CARRY ALL REQUIRED ITEMS AS LISTED IN BASE DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST/ REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. MEMBER WILL DEPLOY WITH PRIMARY WEAPON. ALL AF PERSONNEL MUST PROCESS WITH PERSCO AT BAGRAM REGARDLESS OF MISSION OR UNIT AFFILIATION OR MISSION. POC IS 455 EMSS/PERSCO DSN: 318-231-4409. AMMO WILL BE ISSUED AT BAGRAM. NO FPT PASSPORT IS REQUIRED FOR COMM AIR INTO KABUL IAP. ADDITIOANL COLD WEATHER GEAR NEEDS TO BE ISSUED BY HOMESTATION: GLOVES; WATCH CAP; UNDER GARMENTS; SWEATER/SLEEP SHIRT; WOOL SOCKS; FIELD/GORTEX JACKET W/ LINER; LIP BALM; SUN BLOCK. REFER TO REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE. MEMBER IS AUTHORIZED $3.50 FOR INCIDENTAL PER DIEM, ALL MEALS AND LODGING WILL BE PROVIDED AT NO COST. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. SUBSTITUTE ANY OFFICER APSC WITH NO STAFF ACTION OFFICER EXPERIENCE. REQUIRES TWO YEARS FOR MIL EXPERIENCE. IF CIVILIAN FILLING REFER TO LINE REMARK CVL. MBR IS TASKED AS INDIV AUGM (IA) DEPLOYING TO AFGHANISTAN/IRAQ OR PAKISTAN AND IS REQD TO ATTEND COMBAT AIRMAN SKILLS TRAINING (CAST). TASKED UNIT MUST IMMEDIATELY DETERMINE TRAINING LOCATION AND DATES USING THE AEF ONLINE (SIPR) PRE DEPLOYMENT TRAINING TOOL (PDTT) HTTPS://AEF.AFPC.RANDOLPH.AF.SMIL.MIL/DEFAULT.ASPX. TRAINING MAY BE UP TO 90 DAYS PRIOR TO RDD. IF ULN IS NOT LOADED IN PDTT, RE CHECK WEEKLY. IF WITHIN 45 DAYS OF RDD AND NO TRNG LISTED, IMMEDIATELY CALL USAF EC/ECS IA MANAGER, DSN 650-7161/7106. ONCE PLANS DATE IS ASSIGNED IN PDTT, CHOS TO COURSE DATES WILL ONLY BE CONSIDERED USING TEMPLATE/CRITERIA POSTED ON (NIPR) HTTPS://AEF.AFPC.RANDOLPH.AF.MIL/AFRIT/AFRIT.ASPX?CAT=106 ALONG WITH CURRENT COURSE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES TO RQST TRNG EXEMPTIONS. ALL STUDENTS (OFFICER, ENLISTED AND CIVILIAN) MUST BE QUALIFIED ON THE M16A2 OR M4 WEAPON SYSTEM. INDIVIDUALS MUST HAND-CARRY A COPY OF THEIR AF FORM 522 THAT SHOWS THEIR CURRENT QUALIFICATIONS. INDIVIDUALS THAT FAIL TO DO THIS WILL BE SENT BACK TO THEIR HOME STATION. MR: 196,839

LEGENDS:
SECURITY STATUS CODES: S-SECRET; PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM: -N/A; GENERAL LEGEND CODES:

AUTHORITY: DCAPES
ISSUING HQ: DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE APPROVING OFFICIAL: (b)(3), (b)(6) , CIV, DAFC
INSTALLATION PERSONNEL READINESS

FUND CITE 1: 4701400 FCD /F61 290020 01 409 667100 ESP: 7C
CTC 1: 6 4 178 0100 667100
FUND CITE 2: 5711400 421 7861 290020 01 409 677100 ESP: 7C
CTC 2: 6 4 178 018A 667100

M16,259,82

FOR THE COMMANDER
OFFICIAL
(b)(3), (b)(6) , MAJ, USAF
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS
DISTRIBUTION: A

DATE OF ISSUE: 17 MAR 2010

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
USAF
Certifying Official

PROCESSED IN DTS (b)(3), (b)(6)

PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 APPLIES

ULN	LastName	FirstName	GO	AFSC	UTC	Description	TPAS	TPAS ORG	TPAS GEO	RDD Calendar	ETL	Est End TDY	CMP
UA8GX			03	017D3	6KNX3	IA NTM-A G6 COMM INFO SYSTEMS OFFICER	DF1CFBDL	0012 AIR FORCE AF	DAVIS-MONTHAN	9/28/2010	186	4/1/2011	A

(b)(3), (b)(6)

BASELINE DOC
EIMAPS:103439 AF NTMCTA 0300

(b)(3), (b)(6)

NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

MEMORANDUM FOR 455 EFSS/PERSCO

FROM: NTM-A/CSTC-A

SUBJECT: Voluntary TDY Extension – CAPT, (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. I volunteer to remain in Afghanistan for the next 2 AEF rotations (Ref AFI 10-401, Paragraphs 9.20 – 9.20.24). I understand that I may have to deploy to another location and will get no preferential treatment concerning duty location or rotation date because of my previous tour. I further understand I am not guaranteed to receive short tour credit as it will depend on current USAF policy.

2. My information is as follows:

Grade/Name/SSAN: Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted]
ULN/LNR/SUFFIX: UA3N1/001
Component (AD, ANG, AFRES): AD
AFSC: 16P4
TASKED PAS/Base: Davis-Monthan AFB
Date Required in Place (RDD): 1 Apr 2010
ETL: 179 days
TDY End Date: 28 Sep 2010
Line Remarks: BDF WTG AI WTJ 15

3. Projected Position:

ULN/LNR/SUFFIX: UA8GX/001 and UA2GX/001
Component (AD, ANG, AFRES): AD
AFSC: 17D3B
TASKED PAS/Base: TE1SFJ9T/Tinker AFB and None Tasked
Date Required in Place (RDD): 28 Sep 2010. UA8GX RDD is 15 Nov 2010 will request re-alignment of UA8GX RDD to coincide with current Estimated End TDY of UA3N1
ETL: 357 days
TDY End Date: 19 Sep 2011
Line Remarks: WTI WTF BBI

4. New Requested Start & End Dates:

New combined TDY start and end dates: 1 Apr 2010-19 Sep 2011 requires re-alignment of UA8GX/UA2GX RDDs/EOTs
New combined TDY Length (number of days): 537
Mobilization/Activation Orders Dates **(ANG, AFRES Only)**:
Mandays Extension Approved **(ANG, AFRES Only)**:
Mandays Approval POC:

5. The following justification is provided:

The next 12 to 24 months in Afghanistan are a critical time for the coalition's efforts to train, equip, and build public confidence in the Afghan National Security Forces. A crucial piece of this mission involves engaging with Afghan community and religious leaders, media, civil society organizations, think tanks, and other shapers of public opinion. I have already begun work on initiatives in this vein which cannot be carried to fruition in the short time remaining on my current tour of duty. With proficiency in Dari, the preparation of six months of service in the Commander's Initiatives Group as well as an additional 9 months experience immersed in the Afghan community, I can assist in leading the strategic Afghan outreach team to have a lasting impact on the current mission as well as relationships with Afghanistan and coalition nations in the future.

//SIGNED (b)(3), (b)(6) 31 Aug 2010//
(b)(3), (b)(6)
CAPT, US AIR FORCE

1st Ind, ADCON/CC Info:

Disapprove

//SIGNED (b)(3), (b)(6) 1 Sep 2010//
(b)(3), (b)(6) , Lt Col, USAF
Commander

2nd Ind, Home Station GP/CC Info (ie. 12 AF (AFSOUTH)/A9L)

MEMORANDUM FOR 755 AEG/CC

Approved

//SIGNED (b)(3), (b)(6) 3 Sep 2010//
(b)(3), (b)(6) , Col, USAF
12 AF (AFSOUTH)/A9L

3rd Ind, 755 AEG/CC

MEMORANDUM FOR 455 AEW/CC

Approved/~~Disapproved~~

//SIGNED// (b)(3), (b)(6) 24 Sep 10
For: (b)(3), (b)(6) , Col, USAF
Commander

4th Ind 455 AEW/CC

MEMORANDUM FOR 455 EFSS/PERSCO

Approved/~~Disapproved~~

//SIGNED// (b)(3), (b)(6) 26 Sep 10
(b)(3), (b)(6) , Brig Gen, USAF
Commander

Signed ARCENT Policy Letter will go be scanned and inserted here.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND
1881 HARDEE AVE SW
FORT MCPHERSON, GA 30330-1064

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

USARCENT/CFLCC Policy Memorandum OPL-SUST-10

ACEN-CG

15 Mar 09
Expires: 15 Mar 11

MEMORANDUM FOR All Units in the USCENTCOM AOR

SUBJECT: Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program in the USCENTCOM AOR

1. REFERENCES: See enclosed SOP, appendix A.

2. APPLICABILITY: This policy memorandum applies to all Service Members and DA Civilians in the USCENTCOM AOR.

3. OVERVIEW OF POLICY:

a. This policy memorandum supersedes Third U.S. Army Policy Memo OPL-SUST-10, dated 19 Jan 06 and all previous policy memorandums referencing R&R Leave Program published by Third US Army/CFLCC/ARCENT.

b. USARCENT is the Executive Agent for the USCENTCOM R&R Leave Program in the USCENTCOM AOR responsible for the coordination, implementation, and execution of the program, per Appendix A, reference 1.q.

c. The R&R Leave Program is designed to provide Service Members and DoD Civilians a respite from austere conditions typical of high threat areas, thus allowing them time to relax under more favorable conditions.

d. R&R Leave is a privilege, not an entitlement. Participation in the R&R Leave Program is determined by the unit commander, subject to operational and mission constraints. Participation in the R&R Leave Program does not preclude participation in the R&R pass program.

4. ELIGIBILITY:

a. Service Members or DoD Civilians must be serving in an area that is dependent-restricted or designated for Hostile Fire or Imminent Danger Pay.

b. Service Members or DoD Civilians must be in an area where official or unofficial travel is controlled and where ordinary/annual leave programs have been restricted for reasons of military necessity.

c. The following contingency locations are authorized to participate in the USCENTCOM R&R leave program, if the Service Member or DoD Civilian meets all other eligibility criteria: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

Appendix B: Length of R&R and Number of Authorized R&R for Service Members

1. Service Members are authorized one 15 day R&R leave if projected to serve 270 days boots on ground in theater or one 18 day R&R leave if deployed for a 15 month tour. Requests to deny R&R leave to individual Service Members, whom otherwise would qualify must be approved by the first O6 in the chain of command.

2. R&R must be taken in a single block of time. It may not be broken into separate leave periods. IAW reference 1.d., R&R leave may not be combined with any other funded leave transportation or official travel unless authorized/approved by the PDUSD (P&R). See Appendix G and H regarding approval process and policy for emergency leave and TDY in conjunction with R&R.

3. Extension of R&R leave is not authorized. There are no exceptions to this policy. A Service Member's duty status must be changed by their chain of command at the end of their R&R leave.

4. R&R leave is chargeable leave against the participant's ordinary leave balance. The 15 day or 18 day R&R leave does not include travel days. Chargeable leave begins at 0001 hours the day after the Service Member arrives at the commercial airport closest to their approved leave destination. Chargeable leave ends at 2400 hours the day prior to the Service Members arrival at the Personnel Assistance Point (PAP), Atlanta or Dallas. For OCONUS travel chargeable leave ends at 2400 hours the day prior to their return flight. The designated R&R PAP (Atlanta or Dallas) will process all R&R participants by stamping the start/return date on their leave form.

5. Service Members who voluntarily extend for 12 months subsequent to a 12 month or longer rotation are permitted an additional R&R leave, IAW reference 1.d. This R&R leave period is permitted solely between the termination of the first deployed period and the start of the next 12 month tour. The Service Member is also authorized a third R&R leave during the 12 month extension. This third R&R leave period may not begin until after the first 60 days of the start date of the second set of orders. (Example: During the first 12 month tour, Service Member is authorized one 15 day R&R leave. Soldier extends for 12 months and is authorized a second 15 day R&R leave period between the termination of the first order and the start date of the second order. Additionally, the Soldier is authorized a third 15 day R&R leave period during the subsequent 12 month tour). The authorized R&R leave periods under this authorization cannot be combined into any combination of more than 15 chargeable leave days.

6. All Service Members are encouraged to take the full number of authorized R&R leave days during their deployment. Individuals may request an exception to take less than the authorized 15 or 18 days of leave. This request must be approved by the first General Officer in the chain of command. Request for an exception to policy to reduce the number of authorized days of R&R leave for the entire unit must be endorsed by the first General Officer in the chain of command and approved by USARCENT. If the unit is subordinate to USARCENT, the request to reduce the number of days of R&R for an entire unit must be approved by the Deputy Commanding General, USARCENT; this includes all enabler units (ADCON, OPCON, and TACON).

Appendix D: Procedures for R&R Leave

1. Preparation for R&R Leave.

a. The unit commander is responsible for verifying eligibility of all R&R participants in addition to maintaining an accurate Leave Control Log. When the unit commander approves and signs the leave form they are certifying compliance with this policy and all applicable requirements for participation in the R&R program.

b. The unit commander is the approval authority for the R&R leave destination both CONUS and OCONUS. If the Commander approves R&R leave for a CONUS destination, the Service Member may not, even at their own expense, travel to an OCONUS destination without first obtaining approval from the Commander. The Commander will ensure that all foreign travel requirements are met and that the Service Member can return to their original leave destination before the end of their leave period.

c. Units or sections will identify R&R leave participants NLT 90 days prior to projected departure date.

d. Units will prepare the appropriate leave form and submit to the servicing personnel section for processing 75 days prior to projected departure date.

e. Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) with personnel travelling via Intra-theater airlift will submit an initial consolidated airlift request before the 15th of each month via ITARS for the following month. (i.e. 15 January deadline for February requests). Units will list the number of passengers requiring airlift in the ITARS submission. CENTCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC) will return the requests to MSCs for update and confirmation 96 hours prior to requested movement. Requesting MSCs will review the ITARS request NLT 48 hours prior to the requested date of movement. United States Central Command Intra-Theater Airlift LOI dated 1 Dec 08, Figure D1 depicts the R&R process and projected travel times.

Figure D1



Appendix G: Procedures for Requesting TDY in conjunction with R&R (TDY ICW R&R)

1. R&R transportation may not be combined with any other funded leave transportation program or official travel unless authorized/approved, IAW reference 1.d.

2. TDY ICW R&R must be approved by Headquarters Department of the Army, G1, P&R prior to the Service Member's departure from Theater Gateway to either TDY or R&R location.

3. Commands will submit all requests through their Major Command to ARCENT G1 three weeks prior to the requested date of departure. All ARCENT/Kuwait Major Subordinate Commands will submit their requests to ARCENT Chief of Staff for approval and funding.

4. TDY ICW R&R participants are considered R&R participants and do not fall under Space-Required criteria.

5. Units requesting TDY ICW R&R must use the following process:

a. Complete TDY ICW R&R memorandum providing justification for the TDY.

b. Complete the leave form requesting R&R Leave.

c. Complete the authorization for TDY with fund cite.

d. Send request through chain of command. Units in Iraq will route requests through MNC-I. Units in Afghanistan will route requests through USFOR-A.

e. All requests are then sent from the Major Command to ARCENT G1, R&R Team for interim approval.

f. Final approving authority is Headquarters Department of the Army, G1, P&R.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers, APO AE 09356	2011/01/12	1700	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	[redacted]	O-3

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

NTM-A / CSTC-A CMD Group, Command Communication, APO AE 09356

9.

I, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On or About 26 MAR 2010 Capt. (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived in AFG for an assigned 185 day tour, working as the Commanding Generals Air planner with a departure date on or about 28 SEP 2010.

On or About 9 SEP 2010 Capt. (b)(3), (b)(6) initiated her mid tour leave packet, it was sent to the HHC Admin Clerk SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) The leave packet was sent back to Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) for corrections and a request for hard copies of orders that rated a leave period.

On or About 25 OCT 2010 Capt. (b)(3), (b)(6) was officially extended for a 191 day tour, to work within NTM-A /CSTC-A ommand Communication, Afghan Outreach Directorate. Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) was assigned as the Operations Officer. This extension of 191 days added to her first tour 185 days, totaled (376 days).

On 15 NOV 2010 Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) turned her revised orders into HHC admin , extending her 191 days from her original 185, and rating her 15 days of leave.

On 17 NOV 2010 Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) turned her revised leave form to HHC admin

On 26 NOV 2010 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) assumed command of NTM-A/CSTC-A HHC

On 28 NOV 2010 Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) turned her revised leave form and copy of 191 day orders to SrA (b)(3), (b)(6) USA SRA USAF 866 AES.

On or about 3 DEC CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) reviewed Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) leave request. I noted that she did not rate the 18 days of leave she requested. As her Directorate's Executive Officer I was tracking her leave dates and tour length. I was only tracking a total of 376 days of tour length and as such knew it did not rate 18 days of leave. Her leave form was also not routed through her Director LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) or his deputy LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) , but rather through her Deputy Director LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
However, as the HHC Commander for NTM-A/CSTC-A, I held no authority over her leave authorization, as Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) is the approval authority for all NTM-A/CSTC-A assigned Airmen. For Airman leave forms the HHC Commander signs the side of the

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

enclosure (H)

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Eggers DATED 2011/01/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

form. I noted that her requested leave date was 7 DEC 2010 and it was already the 3 DEC, meaning this leave form was very behind the SOP timeline for standard leave forms. I signed the leave form on the right hand side, signifying that I had indeed processed the request through HHC, in the understanding that if the 18 days of requested leave was truly not authorized it would be denied by the USAF 866 AES by LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) .
At this time there was a lot of ambiguity about whether or not Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) had submitted an additional extension on top of the 25 OCT 2010 191 day extension. These extension forms never came through me as the NTM-A/CSTC-A HHC Commander, or as the NTM-A/ CSTC-A Command Communication Executive Officer therefore I was unable to confirm that she rated 18 days of leave. I was under the impression from both LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) that this extension had been approved and thus the USAF 866 AES would verify her extension and request for 18 days, as they are the approval authority.

5 DEC 2010 LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) signed the leave form I had reviewed with no changes (leaving me to believe that the 866 AES had reviewed Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) unseen additional extension , and thus rating her 18 days leave)

24 DEC 2010 CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) relinquishes command of NTM-A/CSTC-A HHC to CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) , and resumes duties as the NTM-A/ CSTC-A Command Communication Executive Officer.

24 DEC 2010 NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Communication Director LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) leaves on emergency leave. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) assumes Director role

29 DEC 2010 during the update of monthly leave trackers and daily perstats, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) identifies that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) has not notified anyone that she is beyond her return date from RR.

) DEC 2010 - 7 JAN 2011, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) contacts Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) via e-mail and phone. I was told by LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) , that Capt. (b)(3), (b)(6) claimed she was verbally authorized TDY in Kuwait upon her arrival there, in order to take a language test that would begin her process to get into the Afghan Hands program.

I notified LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) that TDY can not be verbally authorized. I do not know who Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) claimed gave her verbal authorization. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) stated LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) was aware Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was going to extend her leave.

I am the section's Administrative representative. I was never asked what the proper procedures were for requesting TDY by Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) or was there ever any mention of TDY extension through me as the HHC Commander. I never processed or was asked to process TDY paperwork for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) or did LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) sign or approve any TDY extension paperwork. I also know that no such paperwork was processed through the NTM-A/ CSTC-A Chief of Staff office, which is the approval authority for all TDY types.

8 January 2010 Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) returned from their leave period.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers, Kabul Afghanistan	2011/01/30	1247	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	[redacted]	E5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NTM-A / CSTC-A HHC

9.

I, SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6)'s leave form was originally submitted to SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) of the 855th AES on 25 SEP 10. The HHC command was not aware of whether her extension had been approved or not. After contact with SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) of CJ1 I was told that the extension paperwork was at AFPC at the time and had not been finalized or considered approved. I alerted the HHC Commander CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) that the extension had not been approved and I was directed to void CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) leave form until we received the approved extension or orders. On 31 OCT 10 at 2238 I notified CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) that we would need her approved orders to accompany her leave form. CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) replied to my e-mail on 1 NOV 10 at 0432 stating that " Working on it-- have not been provided these myself". 15 NOV 10 at 2227 I received an e-mail from CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) with her new orders attached, stating that she was extended for 191 days. On or about 12 NOV 10, I emailed CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) left her know that their were errors on the newly submitted leave form she emailed me and that the from and to dates listed exceeded the number of days she was authorized for leave. 17 NOV 10 at 2107 I received a e-mail from CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) with a leave form attached, the leave corrections that were needed previously had not been made to newly submitted form. 23 NOV 11 at 2321 I received the corrected leave form for CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) emailed SR (b)(3), (b)(6) the 855th on 27 NOV 11 at 1638, CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) leave form as well as 10 other leave forms for personnel assigned to NTM-A / CSTC-A. Ultimately, CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) leave dates were approved for 10 DEC 10 - 27 DEC 10 and she received an Air Force Leave Control number (RS6474) from the 866th. End of Statement

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. (b)(3), (b)(6) OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP Eggers DATED 1 FEB 11

9. STATEMENT (Continued) SGT (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL I

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

1SG,USA
FIRST SERGEANT

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.01ES

HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTM-A/CSTC-A-CG

MEMORANDUM FOR All U.S. Members of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Personnel

SUBJECT: NTM-A/CSTC-A Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program Policy Memorandum

1. References:

a. ARCENT Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Policy and Procedures for the CENTCOM AOR (15 Mar 09)

b. FRAGO 25 to CFLCC OPORD 03-034, Theater Rest and Recuperation Pass Program.

c. FRAGO 12 to CFLCC OPORD 03-035, Request for Personnel, Theater R&R Leave Fully Funded Travel Support.

d. FRAGO 17 to CFLCC OPORD 03-035, R&R Leave Contracted Inter-Theater Plane Seats Utilization.

e. CFLCC Policy Memorandum 4-47, Rest and Recuperation Leave Policy.

f. FRAGO 133 to CFLCC OPORD 03-035, Rest and Recuperation Leave Program Extension of Phase III Commercial Air Travel.

g. Under Secretary Defense Memorandum for Director Joint Staff, Request for Policy changes to current USCENTCOM Theater Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Program.

2. General:

a. The purpose of the R&R Leave Program is to ensure Service Members and DoD civilians have the opportunity to "rest and recuperate" as part of USCENTCOM force readiness.

b. R&R leave is a privilege, not an entitlement. Directors will consider operational missions when deciding on individual/unit participation in the R&R leave program.

c. Participants will submit all requests to NTM-A/CSTC-A HHC at least 30 days prior to the first day of R&R.

d. Commander Coalition Forces Land Component Command (COMCFLCC) is the program manager for the theater R&R Leave program for service members (active, reserve, and national guard) and DoD civilians in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

e. NTM-A/CSTC-A HHC will manage seat allocation and oversee the R&R Leave Program for this command.

f. Once a Service Member's R&R Leave form has been processed, no changes to dates will be allowed without written approval from their directorate and the HHC Commander.

g. Commercial air travel will be used from the OCONUS/CONUS gateways to the traveler's leave address and return. This travel is fully funded by the government. The government will not reimburse individuals who purchase their own tickets.

h. R&R participants who choose to travel to foreign countries for their R&R leave are responsible for complying with those countries' requirements regarding passports and visas. Refer to https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg.cfm for specific country requirements.

i. Each Service has a leave form and process unique to their service. Services will continue to use their existing approval process for R&R leave.

(1) Army - DA Form 31

(2) Air Force – AF IMT 988

(3) Navy – NAVCOMP Form 3065

(4) Marine Corps – NAVMC 1050

(5) DoD Civilian – OPM Form 71

3. Eligibility:

a. All U.S. forces and DoD personnel deployed to the USCENTCOM AOR on a 12 month or 400 day deployment with a minimum of 270 days boots on ground are authorized to participate, subject to operational requirements and program constraints. Requests to deny R&R leave to individual Service Members, whom otherwise would qualify must be approved by the first O6 in the chain of command.

b. Eligibility begins after serving 60 days in the AOR. No exceptions are authorized for participation in the R&R leave program prior to completing 60 days in the AOR. Personnel must initiate travel prior to completion of their tenth month in the AOR. The first general officer in the chain of command may authorize an individual's R&R leave to begin after the tenth month.

c. Service members on initial orders of 179 days and voluntarily extended for an additional 179 days are authorized R&R leave after the orders for the extension are received as long as no ordinary leave was previously taken.

d. Service Members are authorized one 15 day R&R leave if projected to serve 270 days boots on ground in theater or one 18 day R&R leave if deployed for a 15 month tour. R&R leave periods are

limited to one trip of 15 days chargeable leave within a 12 month period or one trip of 18 days chargeable leave within a 15-month period. The first general officer in the chain of command must approve any R&R leave of less than 15 days. Participation in the rest and recuperation pass program (RRPP) (formerly the fighter management pass program) does not preclude participation in R&R leave nor does R&R leave preclude future participation in the RRPP.

e. Units/sections may not have more than 10% of their unit or section on leave (to include R&R leave, emergency leave, and RRPP) at any given time. Requests for an exception to this 10% rule must be approved by the NTM-A/CSTC-A XO.

4. TDY in Conjunction with R&R Leave:

a. TDY may be taken in conjunction with R&R leave if an exception to policy is submitted and approved by the Department of Defense. The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) 4000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC, 20301-4000 is the approval authority for all exception to policy requests.

b. A memorandum and completed DD 1610 must be submitted to the NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ1 at least 45 days prior to the TDY/LV start dates.

c. When approved, NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ1 will notify the requesting service member.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the NTM-A/CSTC-A HHC Commander at (b)(2), (b)(6) .

WILLIAM B. CALDWELL, IV
Lieutenant General, US Army
Commanding General

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Ali Al Salem AB/Camp LSA, Kuwait	2010/01/29	1423	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	[redacted]	O-2/Active Duty

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Theater Gateway, APO AE 09815

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am the Inbound OIC in Tent 4 at the Theater Gateway in Kuwait. My responsibilities include receiving all arrivals to the Theater Gateway and coordinating onward movement back into theater for all RR Returnees.

CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) returned from RR on 31 December 2010. When she scanned in, she informed the clerk that she needed to stay in Kuwait for official business. This is not unusual for us, so we tell the passengers to see their LNO to coordinate any movement necessary.

I have read only access to GATES called GEMS. In GEMS, it shows CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) movment from Kuwait (KEZ) to Bagram (OAI) 17 January 2011. I cannot confirm when she signed up for Space-R, but it is normal to wait for availability which could take a couple days especially as passengers return from the Christmas Rush. In my opinion, her return travel does not sound anything other than normal given her circumstances.

Please see attached screen shot from GEMS.

This concludes my sworn statement.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Longhorn Bldg., Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan	2011/01/12	2000	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	[redacted]	CPT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, APO, AE 09356

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On approximately 5 January 2011, I was asked by CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) to research the dates of CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) s leave period because he believed that she should have returned by that time. I emailed my LNO in Kuwait, SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) to see if CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) had been scanned back into Kuwait yet. My Admin NCO checked with SATO and confirmed that she flew into Dallas on 11 DEC, so her leave started on 12 DEC. With 18 days of leave authorized, she was scheduled to report back to Dallas on 30 DEC, which it appears that she did. SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) the Afghan LNO cell confirmed via email on 12 January 2011 that CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) scanned back into Kuwait on 31 DEC 11, but he is confused why she did not leave Kuwait until 7 January 2011. In the same email, he stated that she scanned in "as a TDY returnee. Not sure what happened here, which put her in a SPACE-R status. If she'd scanned in as a R&R Returnee, she would've been manifested back to BAF as a higher priority than a TDY returnee. BLUF-between 31 Dec - 7 Jan she may have been stuck here due to her scan in status of TDY rather than R&R."

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) forwarded an email to me where CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) listed out her itinerary and reason for staying in Kuwait. She stated that she stayed in Kuwait to take a 2-day language test, with verbal approval from her supervisor. I was never informed of a request for TDY in conjunction with R&R, and we do not have any paperwork to support her stay in Kuwait in a TDY status. All TDY exception to policy packets have to be submitted to USFOR-A, who then forwards them to CENTCOM. A request for TDY was never submitted through proper channels, and thus, TDY in conjunction with R&R was not approved for CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

End of Interview (b)(3), (b)(6)

Nothing Follows (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6) ING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Enclosure (I)

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 2000 DATED 2011/01/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Not Used

Not Used

Not Used

Not Used

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR (

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

GEMS ws Internet Explorer provided by Ali Al Salem Air Base

Report Name:	finding pax	
Report Description:		
Query Family:	Pax	**Qualifiers:**
Type:	Personal	startdate = 30 day(s) ago 00:00 | enddate = Today 23:59 | event = '1' | apc = 'KEZ' | last_name like '%' | queryDB = 'current'
Run Date & Time:	01/29/2011 11:46 Z	
Time to Generate:	6 sec	

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Cancel

Main Results

Action

Rank	Grade	Last_N	Pers_ID_Last_4	PMR_Status	RNLT	UCN	Event_DateTime	APOE_Msn	PMR_Reason	RsvnAPOD	RsvnAPOE
CPT	O3			Arrived	2011-01-07 05:10:00.0	[illegible]	2011-01-07 10:59:00.0	AMVF105VT007	Arrived	OA1	KEZ

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Rows 1 - 1 out of 1 total rows. Page 1 | Show All Max Rows/Page 25 GO

3 Microsoft ... Gateway Tracki... Welcome to Ta... GEMS - Windo... GEMS - Windo... IBM Lotus For... Microsoft Excel... 2:49 PM

TDY ICW RNR instructions - Afghanistan Theater

as of January 25, 2010

JRPOSE: To combine Rest and Recuperation (R&R) leave with Temporary Duty (TDY) that is performed outside the CENTCOM AOR. Eliminate the need of returning to theater at end of TDY before proceeding to R&R or vice versa. Saves time and expenses.

CONDITIONS:

TDY ICW R&R requests will be submitted to USFOR-A R&R team (usfor-a_r&r@afghan.swa.army.mil) for review/assembling and then submitted to HQDA G-1 for approval. **Do not send requests to ARCENT**

Commands must internally establish TDY signature approval. All TDY ICW R&R requests should be received by USFOR-A no less than fourteen days prior to the requested date of departure. The justification memorandum (see Step 1 below) must be signed by the (O-6 or higher) Commander or Chief of Staff.

All TDY ICW R&R travel must be coordinated through the Central Ticketing Office (CTO) at the Gateway (Ali Al Salem). Travelers must fly in and out of Kuwait. Flying commercial out of Kabul is the only authorized exception and only when the TDY is first/in-front of the R&R. This exception has presented difficulties since there is no local SATO office to help coordinate the R&R segment of your travels. Plan according.

RECOMMENDED STEPS:

1. Prepare a TDY ICW R&R memorandum on traveler's Command letterhead providing justification for TDY.

TDY ICW RNR
FOR-A Leave Mem

NOTE: In paragraph 5, ensure the dates and locations match the source documents (DA31/DD1610). For example, if the DD 1610 states proceed on XX, this memo should reflect same XX.

2. Provide the authorization for TDY with a fund cite (DD1610, TAD orders). Even when the TDY/TAD is no cost, there must be a fund cite and final authorization. See your local support team or local J-8, for help with the document. The number of TDY should cover travel days to TDY location and the dates on TDY. It should not include the dates on R&R leave or R&R travel days.

3. Provide authorized R&R Leave form (e.g. DA 31).

Common mistakes: blank start and end dates, no leave control number, no signature(s) and in the type of leave box placing "Special R&R", "TDY ICW R&R". Simply mark the 'other' box and type "R&R".

4. To facilitate the coordination of R&R and TDY travel when authorized to fly commercial out of Kabul, the attached memo must be included with the TDY ICW RNR request. Travel must be deemed mission essential, memo must be prepared on traveler's command letterhead, and authorized by the first O-5 or above commander or supervisor in the traveler's chain of command.

Memorandum for
Record-COMMERCIAL

IMPORTANT POCS/LINKS	DSN	EMAIL
SATO Kuwait	[redacted]	arifjanofficial@alshamel.info
Afghan LNO cell @ gateway	(b)(2), (b)(6)	afghanlno_aas@asab.afcent.af.mil
USFOR-A R&R team	[redacted]	usfor-a_r&r@afghan.swa.army.mil

449-4111

DV Travel Request
Form.docx

5. Optional: DV request (GO/COL/SGM/CW5) send to Afghan LNO cell

CONUS Travel: check official & leave requirement at least 30 days in advance: https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg.cfm or https://www.fcg.pentagon.smil.mil/

TDY ICW R&R Instructions for Afghanistan 02 December 2010

PURPOSE: To combine Rest and Recuperation (R&R) leave with Temporary Duty (TDY) outside the CENTCOM AOR.

CONDITIONS:

1. TDY ICW R&R packages will be submitted to USFOR-A R&R team, for review/assembling and submitted to HQDA G-1 for approval. **Do not send requests to ARCENT**

2. TDY ICW R&R packages must be submitted to USFOR-A R&R Team 14 days prior to travel.

3. Completed TDY ICW R&R packages include the following:
   a. Justification Exception to Policy (ETP) memorandum. {Completed by Unit}
   b. Completed service appropriate leave form (DA31, AF 988, NAV 3065). {Completed by unit}
   c. Completed 1610. {Completed by Unit)
   d. TDY ICW R&R tracker approved by HQDA. {Completed by USFOR-A R&R Team}

STEPS:

1. TDY ICW R&R ETP memorandum (appendix A) on traveler's Command letterhead providing justification for TDY.
   a. Must be signed by the first (O-6 or higher) Commander or Chief of Staff in the chain of command.
   b. In paragraph 5, ensure the dates and locations match the source documents (DA31/DD1610).
2. 1610, TDY/TAD orders, authorization for TDY with a fund cite..
   a. Block 11 Itinerary, should clearly list the complete trip. Depart unit on XX, arrive R&R location on YY, R&R from YY to ZZ, travel to TDY on AA, TDY BB to CC, return travel from TDY location on DD.
   b. All TDY orders require funding for travel. For example, if R&R and TDY are in the same location and R&R is before TDY, R&R funds will pay travel expenses to R&R location, upon changing duty status from R&R to TDY, R&R funds will no longer cover return travel. Therefore Block 14.b must have a dollar amount sufficient to cover the cost of traveling from the TDY location to the PAP (Atlanta/Dallas). If TDY and R&R are in the same location and TDY is first then TDY funds must pay for the trip from the PAP to the TDY location. If TDY is in a different location than R&R then R&R Funds will pay for travel during the R&R and all travel associated with TDY must be accounted for on the 1610.
   c. Block 19, accounting citation must be completed with sufficient funds to cover the total amount in block 14.d.
3. Complete service appropriate R&R Leave form (e.g. DA 31, NAVCOMPT 3065, AF 988).
4. Submit all documents (steps 1-3) to USFOR-A R&R Team 14 days prior to travel. USFOR-AR&RTeam@afghan.swa.army.mil
5. USFOR-A R&R Team will verify all TDY ICW R&R packages and submit the TDY ICW R&R tracker to HQDA for approval each Monday and Thursday.
6. Once approved the USFOR-A R&R Team will send the approved tracker to the unit.
7. When traveling on TDY ICW R&R the Soldier must carry the following documents:
   a. Approved leave form.
   b. 1610
   c. TDY ICW R&R justification memo
   d. Approved TDY ICW R&R tracker from HQDA

AMPN/(U) ARCENT REST AND RECUPERATION (R&R) LEAVE POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR THE USCENTCOM AOR (15 JUN 09) VERSION 1.1.//
REF/F/DOC/JOINT FEDERAL TRAVEL REGULATION (JFTR) U7300
AMPN/ (U) JOINT TRAVEL REGULATIONS//
REF/G/DOC/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION (DODI) 1327.06 OF 16 JUN 2009
AMPN/(U) LEAVE AND LIBERTY POLICY AND PROCEDURES//
REF/H/DOC/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5101.6 OF 11 AUG 2004
AMPN/(U) DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE USCENTCOM R&R LEAVE PROGRAM//
REF/I/DOC/PDUSD(P&R) MEMORANDUM OF 12 OCT 2007
AMPN/(U) EXCEPTION TO POLICY APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR THE USCENTCOM R&R PROGRAM//

ORDTYPE/FRAGORD/USFOR-A/JOC/NOV//
TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/(U) THIS IS USFOR-A FRAGO 09-269 PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING TDY ICW R&R (TEMPORARY DUTY IN CONJUNCTION WITH R&R LEAVE) EXCEPTIONS TO POLICY.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1. (U) SITUATION.

1.A. (U) GENERAL. USFOR-A HAS COORDINATED WITH HQDA G-1 TO PROCESS REQUESTS FOR TDY IN CONJUNCTION WITH USCENTCOM R&R LEAVE PROGRAM. THIS FRAGO PROVIDES REVISED PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING TDY ICW R&R EXCEPTIONS TO POLICY./

1.B. (U) FRIENDLY FORCES. NO CHANGE.
1.C. (U) ENEMY FORCES. NO CHANGE.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/
2. (U) MISSION. NO CHANGE.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/
3. (U) EXECUTION.

3.A. (U) COMMANDER'S INTENT.
3.A.1. (U) PURPOSE. TO ESTABLISH PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING TDY IN CONJUNCTION WITH R&R LEAVE./
3.A.2. (U) METHOD. ALL COMMANDS WILL FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED IN THIS FRAGO./
3.A.3. (U) END STATE. ALL REQUESTS FOR TDY IN CONJUNCTION WITH R&R WILL BE PROCESSED EXPEDITIOUSLY IN COMPLIANCE WITH REFERENCES F AND G./

3.B. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. ALL COMMANDS IN THE AFGHANISTAN AOR WILL COMPLY WITH THIS DIRECTIVE./

3.C. (U) TASKS.
3.C.1. (U) ALL UNITED STATES FORCES COMMANDS IN THE AFGHANISTAN THEATER./
3.C.1.A. (U) THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES SUPERCEDE THE PROCEDURES PREVIOUSLY ISSUED IN REFERENCE C. PROCEDURES FOR REGULAR R&R ARE CONTAINED IN REFERENCE E ARE NOT CHANGED./

3.C.1.A.1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, ALL REQUESTS FOR TDY ICW R&R WILL BE SUBMITTED TO USFOR-A R&R TEAM (USFOR-A_R&R@afghan.swa.army.mil ON NIPR) FOR ENDORSEMENT AND THEN SUBMITTED TO HQDA G-1 FOR APPROVAL. THE EXCEPTION TO POLICY PACKAGE WILL INCLUDE:

enclosure (E)

3.C.1.A.1.A. (U) A JUSTIFICATION MEMORANDUM REQUESTING TDY ICW R&R MUST BE SIGNED BY THE (O-6 OR HIGHER) COMMANDER OR CHIEF OF STAFF (O-6 OR HIGHER). COMMANDS MUST ESTABLISH INTERNAL TDY SIGNATURE AUTHORITY. A SAMPLE REQUEST FOR TDY ICW R&R EXCEPTION TO POLICY MEMO IS ATTACHED./
3.C.1.A.1.B. (U) DD FORM 1610 (TDY FORM) WITH ALL SIGNATURES AND FUND CITE./
3.C.1.A.1.C. (U) LEAVE DOCUMENTS WITH CONTROL NUMBER AND SIGNATURES./

3.C.1.A.2. (U) REQUESTS SHOULD BE RECEIVED BY USFOR-A FOURTEEN (14) DAYS PRIOR TO THE START OF THE TRAVEL. ALL REQUESTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO HQDA G-1 FOR APPROVAL WITHIN THEIR SCHEDULED WORKING HOURS - 0800 TO 1700 EASTERN STANDARD TIME.

3.C.1.B.1. (U) COMMANDS WILL ENSURE LEAVE, TDY AND EXCEPTION TO POLICY MEMO DOCUMENTS ARE COMPLETE TO INCLUDE SIGNATURES, CONTROL NUMBER AND ACCOUNTING CITATION CODE (FUND CITE). NOTE: R&R LEAVE DATES WILL COVER THE PERIOD OF TIME ON R&R AND ASSOCIATED TRAVEL DAYS AND NEVER INCLUDE DAYS MEMBER IS ON TDY ORDERS. TDY MUST BE TAKEN AT THE BEGINNING OR END OF THE R&R PERIOD - NOT IN THE MIDDLE./
3.C.1.B.2. (U) SERVICE MEMBERS MUST FLY OUT FROM BAGRAM OR KANDAHAR (UNLESS APPROVED FOR AN EXCEPTION TO CHANGE THE APOD) ON THE SAME DATE PROJECTED ON USFOR-A R&R PROJECTIONS. ANY CHANGES TO THE FLY OUT DATE MUST BE RESUBMITTED TO USFOR-A R&R TEAM IMMEDIATELY BY EMAIL./
3.C.1.B.3. (U) HQDA G-1 TDY ICW R&R APPROVAL MUST BE OBTAINED BEFORE MEMBER GOES ON LEAVE. COMMANDS WILL NOT ALLOW PERSONNEL TO ARRIVE AT THE THEATER GATEWAY WITH UNAPPROVED OR INCOMPLETE TDY ICW R&R REQUESTS./

3.C.1.C. (U) AFGHANISTAN LNO'S FOR THE VARIOUS AFGHANISTAN AOR COMMANDS ARE LOCATED AT THE KUWAIT GATEWAY AND WILL ASSIST SHOULD ANY PROBLEMS ARISE.
3.C.1.D. (U) PER DIEM IS NOT AUTHORIZED FOR A MEMBER DURING AN AUTHORIZED ABSENCE, WHO IS RETURNING TO HIS PERMANENT DUTY STATION (PDS).

3.D. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
3.D.1. (U) DIRLAUTH ALCON.//

GENTEXT/ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS/
4. (U) ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. NO CHANGE.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/
5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
5.A. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. NO CHANGE.

5.B. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT.
5.B.1. (U) MSGT CARLO RAMIREZ, USAF, USFOR-A R&R REP, DSN: (b)(2), (b)(6) SIPR: CARLOS.R.RAMIREZ@AFGHAN.SWA.ARMY.SMIL.MIL, USFOR-A R&R@AFGHAN.SWA.ARMY.SMIL.MIL.

5.B.1. (U) CW2 PAUL LONG, USA, USFOR-A J1 PLANS AND OPS, DSN: (b)(2), (b)(6) SIPR: PAUL.N.LONG@AFGHAN.SWA.ARMY.SMIL.MIL, USFOR-A_R&R@AFGHAN.SWA.ARMY.SMIL.MIL. //

(U) ACKNOWLEDGE.

MCCHRYSTAL
GEN

OFFICIAL:
GORRY

(b)(3), (b)(6) **MAJ USMC CSTC-A CJ1**

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ USA 27A JAG/SJA Admin Lawyer
Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2011 3:12 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USMC CSTC-A CJ1
Subject: FW: support info to the inquiry into CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6)'s leave (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Casey,

FYI (and a couple of more)

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) US LTC NTM-A CSTC-A SJA
Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2011 3:07 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ USA 27A JAG/SJA Admin Lawyer
Subject: Fw: support info to the inquiry into CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6)'s leave (UNCLASSIFIED)

---- Original Message -----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL USA CJ1 Director
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) US LTC NTM-A CSTC-A SJA
Sent: Tue Jan 11 16:44:11 2011
Subject: support info to the inquiry into CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6)'s leave (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Ma'am,

(b)(3), (b)(6) FYSA.

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) asked me to make sure I provided you any information you need with respect to the pending inquiry into CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6)'s leave.

I am LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)'s deputy, and was also working on his behalf while he was on Emergency Leave (Approx dec 22nd through Jan 8 w/travel), with additional duty to oversea Afghan Outreach in LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6)'s during his leave (approx dec 17th through jan 8th).

I'm not the investigating officer as one still needs appointed, but wanted to make sure you knew what I knew.

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) and CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) are probably not yet aware of this inquiry short of some earlier questions, but I will insure that is done post haste.

My understsanding is that she thought she was entitled to 18 days based on hearing this at the newcomer's brief, and being eligble due to an extension. It was put out during my newcomer's brief when I arrived in October.

enclosure (J)

That came into question right before she left, she thought it was resolved, and then came up again while she was in-route to return. HHC data did not match what she had, but here is the meline I asked her to provide while she was enroute back.

My thoughts were that she just show proof of how she was entitled to the leave, and if it passes muster, then they just drop it. If she wasn't entitled, then just charge her with the extra -3- days of leave. I certainly wasn't expecting them to do a formal inquiry, assuming misconduct when I don't think any was intended.

A separate question is whether she was and if she should have been in a TDY status while in Kuwait. She went through Kuwait to take a language test and had received prior approval verbally from LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) but I don't believe any formal TDY paperwork was rendered or signed.

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan www.ntm-a.com Deputy Director Command Communications Directorate Camp Eggers, Kabul
DSN:
Cell: (b)(3), (b)(6)
@afghan.swa.army.mil
(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
@afgn.centcom.gctf.cmil.mil
"Shona Ba Shona" / Shoulder to Shoulder

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) [mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 05, 2011 11:27 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Immediate reply is requred asap (UNCLASSIFIED)

Sir,

I think your analysis is correct on where the confusion originated (although it should have been easily answered by adding up the days). The change was at SATO, because they originally gave me the wrong dates, as reflected on the earlier itinerary version HHC has. I got that corrected here in Kuwait.

For clarity, here is the exact progression of my trip:

8 Dec - Kabul to Bagram
9 Dec - Bagram to Kuwait
10/11 Dec - Kuwait to Dallas
12 Dec - begin leave: 18 days of leave, inclusive
29 Dec - last day of leave
30 Dec - Dallas to Kuwait
31 Dec/1 Jan (midnight or so) - checked in at Kuwait, put on TDY/transient status, to take test while waiting for flight back to BAF
2-3 Jan - Delay due to holiday weekend and new test control officer getting set up -- verification available as required
4 Jan - Part I of test
5 Jan - Part II of test
6 Jan - I am scheduled for a flight to Bagram, so I should be back to Kabul sometime Friday barring any other delays.

Thank you sir!

'/r,
ıpt (b)(3), (b)(6)

On Wed, Jan 5, 2011 at 10:01 AM, (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM
< (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Your ticket info says Dec 27th, and your travel on the 30th, plus not having hard info on your test lead to the confusion.

Did you have to change tickets or anything? HHC check their datebase out of SATO, and that's where this really took flight.

Can you tell me how you left, and how you are returning? I know you flew out of KAIA. Did you fly to Baghram, or down to Kuwait?

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) told me on the phone that he previously approved this as did CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) when I was asking a week ago.

HHC seems to think you should have been in a TDY status via 1610 (travel order), and the might have a point. Taking the test enroute probably makes sense, but when it lengthened your timeline, you probably needed to be on a travel order or something. It added 3-4 days to your return.

thx

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan www.ntm-a.com
Deputy Director
Command Communications Directorate
Camp Eggers, Kabul
DSN:
Cell: (b)(3), (b)(6)
@afghan.swa.army.mil
(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
@afgn.centcom.gctf.cmil.mil
"Shona Ba Shona" / Shoulder to Shoulder
-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) [mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @gmail.com]

Sent: Wednesday, January 05, 2011 9:26 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Immediate reply is requred asap (UNCLASSIFIED)

Copy that sir. The 27th return would have been for the 15 days as LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) noted. I have an itinerary that shows the 30th, and I will certainly keep all of my documentation.

I asked the test examiner today if she wouldn't mind being available in case we need a memo saying everything was done as expeditiously as

possible... hopefully it won't come that of course.

See you in a couple days or as soon as they can get me on a flight! Let me know if you need anything else in the meantime.

V/r,

Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)

On Wed, Jan 5, 2011 at 8:51 AM, (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM
< (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Thanks... got the info.

HHC was tracking that you were supposed to leave Dallas on 27 Dec.
That's the info they sent me regarding ticketing.

If I am tracking correctly, you travelled to KAIA on 7 Dec (or was I the
8th?).

The 27Dec date below and the delay is what generated the questions.

I spoke to LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) we may need to fill in some blanks on your
return, so make sure you keep a copy of your stamped/annotated leave
form, which you'll need later, anyway.

Thanks.

ELECTRONIC TICKET RECORD

INV: (b)(6) CUST: (b)(6) PNR: (b)(6)

TKT:0012754152648 ISSUED:10DEC10 PCC:0EJB IATA:42210280

NAME: (b)(3), (b)(6)

CPN	A/L	FLT	CLS	DATE	BRDOFF	TIME	ST	F/B	STAT
1	AA	1981	G	11DEC	DFWTUS	1410	OK	GCA	USED
2	AA	1098	Y	27DEC	TUSDFW	0810	OK	YCA	USED

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan www.ntm-a.com

Deputy Director
Command Communications Directorate
Camp Eggers, Kabul
DSN:
Cell: (b)(3), (b)(6)
@afghan.swa.army.mil
(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
@afgn.centcom.gctf.cmil.mil
"Shona Ba Shona" / Shoulder to Shoulder

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) [mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 05, 2011 6:10 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Immediate reply is requred asap (UNCLASSIFIED)

Sir,

Roger on all counts.

My leave began on the 11th and ended on the 29th of December. I began
my travel back to the AOR on the 30th. I was placed on temporary TDY
status upon debarkation in Kuwait, per LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) direction, to be
placed back on R&R returnee status as soon as my tests were completed
(movement is expedited this way because priority goes to R&R returnees).
Because I arrived on New Years' Eve/Day, the testing office could not
get the proper permissions for my test over the holiday weekend, but got
them on Monday. I tested Tuesday (yesterday) and today. I just
completed the second portion of the test and will be at the roll
call/manifest briefing first thing in the morning.

If there is a piece of paperwork we still need to do, just let me know
what I can provide to help make that happen!

V/r,
Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)

On Wed, Jan 5, 2011 at 5:35 AM, (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM
< (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

I need a timeline of when you left, when your leave started, how many days, when it ended, and any info you can provide regarding your time in Kuwait for the language test.

LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) told me you had 18 days leave, and were then to be on TDY in Kuwait for a language test, planned for Tuesday or Wednesday.

CDT (b)(3), (b)(6) told me the other you were in Kuwait which is good, but since you've been gone so long your timelines are being questions, as well as any formal request for TDY.

I also need to know the start and end days of your leave, and how you traveled.

You need to get this to me asap, today, so you don't get marked as AWOL by HHC.

I don't know the formal process for TDY, except to say that there IS a process, so something is either not logged or not completed.

Thanks... the sooner you get back to me, the sooner we can solve this.

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan www.ntm-a.com
Deputy Director
Command Communications Directorate
Camp Eggers, Kabul
DSN:
Cell: (b)(3), (b)(6)
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(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
@afgn.centcom.gctf.cmil.mil
"Shona Ba Shona" / Shoulder to Shoulder

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-0948-09
14 December 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subject: Career Management of Afghanistan Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands Program

1. Thank you for your immediate support in providing candidates for the AFPAK Hands program on such short notice. In many cases, the volunteers have been the right people for this very critical program. However, I am concerned that this is not the case across the board. This program demands the best and brightest leaders our Services have to offer. My intent is that this program be an accelerator rather than an inhibitor to career progression within each of the Services. Management of AFPAK Hands' careers is of paramount concern to me.

2. AFPAK Hands is the military's number one manpower priority and requires your continued attention. Specifically, I ask that you review and modify your Service personnel management processes to ensure that candidates for AFPAK Hands are selected because of their sustained excellence. Candidates should be rewarded for participation and recognized for demonstrated excellence through selection boards for promotion, professional military education, and key assignments. Every effort must be made to protect the careers of "Hands" participants and ensure their progression. This requires continuous monitoring of data on promotions and selection boards for program participants and obtaining feedback on the utility of the program.

3. Thank you again for your sustained commitment to this critical defense program.

M. G. MULLEN
Admiral, U.S. Navy

AFGHAN Hands

Concept Briefing

14 August 2010

USFOR-A Afghan Hands Management Element
CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (3), (b)(6) **, USN, DSN** (b)(2), (b)(6) 2), (b)(6)
Afghan_hands@afghan.swa.army.mil

UNCLASSIFIED

Concept and Mission

The Afghan Hands program is vital to the success of our overall counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. The mission of Afghan Hands is to build long-lasting, positive partnerships with GIRoA, Afghan entities, and civilians, in order to demonstrate the long-term commitment of ISAF to build capacity and capability within Afghanistan and deny support among the Afghan people to insurgents.

In order to do this, Afghan Hands receive sixteen weeks of intensive language training prior to deploying to Afghanistan and are committed to the program for two to five years. Like other military forces, Afghan Hands have other important job-related skills, but the language skills allow them to make inroads where others cannot.

Background

CJCS Memo to Service Chiefs 28 Aug 2009:

- Announced AFPAK Hands program.
- "The APH program will develop and use a cohort of experts who speak the local language, are culturally attuned, and are focused on the problem for an extended period."
- "I expect the Services to support unique assignment practices to protect AFPAK Hands program personnel and ensure the experience and skills continue to be reinvested against this problem."

CJCS Memo to Service Chiefs 14 Dec 2009:

- *"AFPAK Hands is the military's number one manpower priority."*
- "This program demands the best and brightest leaders our Services have to offer."
- " . . Ensure that candidates for AFPAK Hands are selected because of their sustained excellence."
- "Every effort must be to protect the careers of "Hands" participants."

Background

SECDEF Memo to Service Secretaries, CJCS, USD (P&R) 5 May 2010

- Subj: Personnel Resources and Admin Support for APH Program
- *"This is the DoD's top personnel priority."*
- " . . . Necessitates our commitment to dedicate the right number and highest quality of professionals that DoD has to offer".
- Establishes the AFPAK Hands Management Element (AME).
- Directs Services, SOCOM, OSD to provide personnel experts to the AME.

SECDEF Memo to Service Secretaries, CJCS, USD (P&R), COCOMs, COMUSFOR-A 24 May 2010

- Subj: Implementation of COIN Training Guidance to Support Execution of the President's Af-Pak Strategy
- "The Department shall: Institutionalize and provide sufficient resources to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program to develop and deploy a cadre of regionally aligned, language-qualified experts who are proficient in COIN doctrine."

Background



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION

JMCC
DISTRIBUTION: A, B, C, and JS-LAN, S

CJCSI 1630.01
30 May 2010

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN HANDS (APH) PROGRAM

References:

a. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, XX April 2010, "Implementing CDR Writing Guidance to Support Execution of the President's Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy"

b. CJCS Memorandum, 28 August 2009, "Afghanistan Pakistan Hands Program"

c. CJCS Memorandum, 11 December 2009, "Career Management of Afghanistan Pakistan Hands Program"

d. CJCS Instruction 1001.01, 17 March 2009, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program

e. USD (P&R) Memorandum, 11 December 2008, Joint Experience Requirements for Career Senior Service Leaders

f. CJCS Instruction 1301.01C, 1 January 2001, Individual Augmentation Procedures

g. Resource Management Decision 700

h. JCS Instruction 7000.01C, 11 April 2008, Joint Staff Resource Management

i. Purpose. This instruction documents the APH Program and establishes the instructions governing the management of the program

Draft

- Program being codified in CJCS Instr. 1630.01
- At CJCS for sig; target 31 Jul 10 execution
- Topics covered:
  - Responsibilities (JS, Services, CENTCOM, USFOR-A, ODRP)
  - In-theater and Out of Theater Billets
  - Tour Length
  - Selection Criteria
  - Training
  - Property Accountability and Management

UNCLASSIFIED

Background

GEN Petraeus, 11 June 2009: "…adapting to the circumstances in Afghanistan, with sufficient understanding, will be critical…to not only fill the slots that exist there, but to put the best folks we can in and to *build a bench* and then to keep them engaged in it, even when they are back in the United States… and then rotate them back out there."

GEN McChrystal, 24 June 2009: "Being here has reinforced more than ever the importance of the Afghan Hands program – I really hope we don't fail to support this fully. We are going to win here by being smart, experienced, and focused. We will lose here by being obtuse, *always-new-to-this-fight* (inexperienced), and not formed as a team of dedicated professionals."

Develop a cadre of Afghanistan experts

Out of Theater

Out-of-Theater Assignments

National Capital Region

Norfolk VA

Tampa FL

Europe

Carolinas

4 months

Language and culture training

Deploy

12 months
Deployed Assignments

12 months

Transfer to out-of theater assignment

Deployed Locations

- ISAF
- AED
- CJTF 101
- NTM-A
- JTF Paladin
- JTF 435
- JPIO
- JIOC-A
- RC(SW)
- IJC
- CFSOCC-A
- RC(S)

Reception, Staging and Immersion

GIRoA Ministries

CFSOCC

Partner Organizations & Contractors

RECEPTION: (1 Day)

- Receive and welcome at KAIA
- Transportation to Camp Julien (COIN Training Center, Kabul)

STAGING: (5-7 Days)

- In-process at Camp Julien
- Attend COIN Leader's Course
- Conduct language refresher training

IMMERSION: (4 weeks)

- Integrate with Afghan partners to ensure immediate use and enhancement of language, cultural and governance skills

Immersion Guidance

- **Concept**: APH will eat, speak, live, and learn directly with GIRoA, partnership, or other immersive organizations for 4 weeks
- **Goal**:
  - Immediate use and enhancement of language and cultural skills
  - Increase understanding of Afghan governance and development
  - Build partnerships
  - Hands will be assigned to locations outside their ultimate duty assignment
- **Execution**: Speaking in Dari or Pashto 75% of each day (12 hours) is the goal; while 50% (8 hours) is the minimum acceptable standard for language immersion
- **End State**: Create and continue to develop a cadre of culturally attuned experts, who receive specialized training in language, culture and governance, to rotate through numerous tours in designated positions, in order to bring consistency to high-level issues facing the counterinsurgency

Why Support AFGHAN Hands?

- Immersion is the critical link that prepares servicemen for accelerated performance via partnering in Afghanistan
- We must create a core of individuals who can apply appropriate partnering efforts to generate stability

We are going to win here by being smart, experienced, and focused

AFGHAN Hands

Concept Briefing

16 July 2010

USFOR-A Afghan Hands Management Element
CAPT , USN, DSN:
Afghan_hands@afghan.swa.army.mil

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan	2011/01/25	10:10	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	[redacted]	O-5,Active

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NTM-A, Command Communication (Stratcom)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

This is my sworn statement given 23 Jan 2011. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding my understanding of the Leave and TDY issues for CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) between 5 December and her return on 7 or 8 Jan. 2011.
My understanding in early October was that CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was extending from an initial 6 month tour, but to 18 months and that she was planning on end of tour around 28 Sept. 2011. I do not know if she ever was extended for 18 months, but I do know one year was certain.
CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was to take leave on or about Dec 6th and 10 days later Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) The Afghan Media Outreach team (formerly Afghan Outreach) was to get her to Kabul International Airport. For some reason either related to travel or providing a statement for a separate investigation, she was unable to leave on that day but left a few days later, on the 8th or 9th. LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) left for his leave on Friday, 17 Dec 2010. I was to handle oversight of Afghan Outreach until he returned, but also LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) left on emergency leave on Wednesday, Dec 22nd, so I had his mission too. Somewhere between Dec 24th and Dec 26th I questioned CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) when she was getting back and he would check. He reached her via email. She said that she had 18 days of leave and not 15, and that she was also supposed to take some sort of language test. I conferred with Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) Dec 26th, also on leave, and he said she was approved for 18 days leave, and that he also approved her TDY on the way back so she could take some type of language test in order to apply for the Afghan Hands program, and that it could only be done in Kuwait in her situation. I had no reason to question the 18 days thinking she had extended, so that was the end of that. I also knew she wanted to enter Afghan Hands, so that was a no brainer as well.

On or about Jan 4th/5th, questions arose in the Stratcom Office (Command Communication) about when she was getting back and why she was gone so long, and I was directed to get in touch with her via her personal email. She said she arrived back in theater on the 29th of December and was placed on what she called a Temporary TDY status (verses an R & R returnee status). I have never heard of a temporary TDY status, but regardless, she said she arrived on New Year's eve or New Year's Day and because of that could not take the test. She said she took the tests on Tuesday and Wednesday (Jan 4th and 5th) and that she would manifest on the 6th. I learned through CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) that the HHC wasn't tracking the 18 days and wasn't tracking any approved TDY, so I told her to get back to the unit post haste.

(Continued on next page)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Eggers DATED 2011/01/25

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

This is the timeline that she provided to me on 1/5/2011:

8 Dec - Kabul to Bagram
9 Dec - Bagram to Kuwait
10/11 Dec - Kuwait to Dallas
12 Dec - begin leave: 18 days of leave, inclusive
29 Dec - last day of leave
30 Dec - Dallas to Kuwait
31 Dec/1 Jan (midnight or so) - checked in at Kuwait, put on TDY/transient status, to take test while waiting for flight back to BAF
2-3 Jan - Delay due to holiday weekend and new test control officer getting set up -- verification available as required
4 Jan - Part I of test
5 Jan - Part II of test
6 Jan - (b)(3), (b)(6) am scheduled for a flight to Bagram, so I [Dyrud] should be back to Kabul sometime Friday barring any other delays.

Except from Lt(b)(3), (b)(6) statements that CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) confirmed her authorization for the 18-day leave, his notes about approving the TDY for the test, and CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) replying with the same ,I am aware of no other outside authorization regarding the leave. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was the acting HHC CDR at the time of the 15 -day request and he told me that she did not qualify according to their findings, but Lt(b)(3), (b)(6) told me she investigated it further with the air force and he told me that either they did approve it, or that she already had a signed leave request for 18 days. The SATO flight itinerary info HHC had shows it was for 15 days although CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) said it was wrong and got corrected. There is no record of any TDY approvals and I did not grant any in either LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) absence. Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) insisted on the phone to me that he and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) discussed her training, but LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) told me that he has no recollection of that conversation.

Nothing Follows.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Eggers DATED 2011/01/25

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing Follows.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25 day of January, 2011 at Camp Eggers

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Memorandum FOR CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) dated 21 Jan2010
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6) **CAPT, USN NTM-A ANA DEVELOPMENT**

. rom: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA CPT USAF NTMA CSTCA
Sent: Monday, January 24, 2011 5:00 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) CAPT, USN NTM-A ANA DEVELOPMENT
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) US LT COL CSTC-A CMD GRP
Subject: FW: DLPT Test on 31 Dec @ 1700 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Sir,

Below is the confirmation I received from the new testing official in Kuwait before I left from R&R to return to theater. The original scheduling of the language test for Dec 31st was done over the phone.

Very respectfully,
(b)(3), (b)(6) Capt, USAF
NATO Training Mission - Afghan Outreach Branch Camp Eggers, Kabul
DSN: (b)(3), (b)(6)
SVOIP: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(3), (b)(6)

شانه به شانه
Shohna ba Shohna… Ooga pa ooga... Shoulder to Shoulder

www.ntm-a.com

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) TSgt USAF AFCENT 386 EFSS/TCO [mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @asab.afcent.af.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2010 11:22 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA CPT USAF NTMA CSTCA
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: DLPT Test on 31 Dec @ 1700

Ma'am,

I am the new TCO here at Ali Al Salem and I have been aggressively working getting access to administer the DLPT/DLAB tests. However, I still not have access. I wanted to give you a heads up since the 31st is just a few days away. I can leave you on the schedule for now, but if I don't have access by the 30th, I will need to cancel your test on the 31st. I apologize. I will keep you informed as I find out more. Thank you.

v/r

//SIGNED//

(b)(3), (b)(6) TSgt, USAF

6 EFSS/Test Control Officer

(b)(3), (b)(6) @asab.afcent.af.mil

"Under the Privacy Act of 1974, you must safeguard all information reflected on this E-mail and, if applicable, all attachments. Disclosure of information is IAW AFI 33-119, AFI 33-127, AFI 33-129, AFI 37-132 and Public Law 93-579, and it is ~~For Official Use Only~~."

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

(b)(3), (b)(6) **CAPT, USN NTM-A ANA DEVELOPMENT**

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2011 3:56 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM
Subject: Email chain from Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

FYSA - redactions noted where text was deleted as it was unrelated to the investigation

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(3), (b)(6)@yahoo.com]
Sent: Monday, December 27, 2010 1:30 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM
Subject: Re: When do you anticpate returning from leave? (UNCLASSIFIED)

Yeah, you probably heard about the 18 days in the newcomer's brief. They have a slide on the subject, but if you're only here for a year, it probably doesn't register. She is approved to join the Hands by for USFOR-A and the AF, but before they admit her into one of the cohorts they want to know where she shakes out on the language test. So it's a Catch-22: you can join the program, but not until you test, but you can't test in Afghanistan, and if you wait to test until you return, you miss the cutoff for the last cohort of Hands. So the only innovative solution is to take it while passing through Kuwait, but Kuwait won't commit to giving the test on an appointment basis. You have to show up and take a number. Brilliant.

deleted - - unrelated reply about another Afghan Hand]

[deleted - (b)(3), (b)(6) - unrelated reply about a movement policy question]

[deleted - - unrelated comment reply about status of investigations}

Thanks much!

TK

On Dec 26, 2010, at 12:56, " (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM"
< (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
> Thanks for the update on Felicia.
>
> I remember her talking about wanting to become a 'hand', but didn't
> know that's what this was... also didn't know about 18 days vice 15,
> but it's all good [context is that (b)(3), (b)(6) now had an answer - this was not a separate approval from (b)(3), (b)(6) He/I have no approval authority in that lane].
>
> No reason to expect I should have known.. just caught me a bit off
> guard.
>
> (b)(3), (b)(6) begins his return at the same time you do...you stand a good
> chance of running into him depending on your routes.
>

[deleted - (b)(3), (b)(6) - unrelated info about movements and about another afghan hand]

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
> NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan www.ntm-a.com Deputy Director
> Command Communications Directorate Camp Eggers, Kabul
> DSN:
> Cell: (b)(3), (b)(6)
> @afghan.swa.army.mil
> (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
> @afgn.centcom.gctf.cmil.mil
> "Shona Ba Shona" / Shoulder to Shoulder
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: (b)(3), (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(3), (b)(6)@yahoo.com]
> Sent: Sunday, December 26, 2010 6:43 PM
> To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM
> Subject: Re: When do you anticpate returning from leave? (UNCLASSIFIED)
>
> Copy all! Thanks.
>
> I leave here to start coming back on 5 Jan, so some days later depending
> on how crowded Kuwait is.
>
> (b)(3), (b)(6) had a longer 18 day leave since she is on a 365+179 tour. I did
> approve her taking the Dari test for application into the Hands program.
> The only place to take it in theater is Kuwait, and they won't budge to
> help folks take it, so they are making her hold in Kuwait until their
> test team figures it out. I think she leaves CONUS on or around 31 Dec
> and takes however long there to get tested.
>
[deleted - (b)(3), (b)(6) - unrelated personal reply about (b)(3), (b)(6) R & R]

> I hope all is well there!
>
> On Dec 26, 2010, at 6:45, " (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA STRATCOM"
> < (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:
>
>> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
>> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>>
>> (b)(3), (b)(6)
>>
>> Just trying to connect the dots...
>>
>> (b)(3), (b)(6) returns some time after Jan 5th.
>>
>> Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) returns sometime late December or early January, something
>> about needing to take a language test on the return trip according to
>> CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) am trusting she told you... I didn't know anything about this
>>
>> unless she told you prior to departure).
>>
[deleted - (b)(3), (b)(6) - unrelated info about CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and an ammunition topic]

[deleted - (b)(3), (b)(6) - unrelated info regarding (b)(3), (b)(6) billets]

>>
> Thanks,
>
>> I hope leave is treating you well.
>>
>> (b)(3), (b)(6)
>>
>> LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
>> NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan www.ntm-a.com Deputy Director
>> Command Communications Directorate Camp Eggers, Kabul
>> DSN:
>> Cell: (b)(3), (b)(6)
>> @afghan.swa.army.mil
>> (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
>> @afgn.centcom.gctf.cmil.mil
>> "Shona Ba Shona" / Shoulder to Shoulder
>>
>>
>> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
>> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>>
>>
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
aveats: ~~FOUO~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO THE
ATTENTION OF

NTM-A/CSTC-A COS

11 November 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Personnel

SUBJECT: Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Command Temporary Duty (TDY) Program

1. References:

a. PUBLIC LAW 111-118-DEC. 19, 2009

b Joint Federal Travel Regulations (JFTR), Vol. 1, Uniformed Service Members

c. Joint Travel Regulations (JTR), Vol. 2, DoD Civilian Personnel

d. DoD Foreign Clearance Guide ([illegible])

e. USFOR-A Pub 1-06, MAAWS-A, Temporary Duty (TDY) Travel

f. USFOR-A FRAGO 09-269, Procedures for Requesting TDY ICW Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Exceptions to Policy ([illegible])

g. Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Standard Operating Procedure 809, International Duty Travel

h. Travel Regulations and Per Diem Rates ([illegible])

i. CSTC-A Invitational Travel Order Request for Funding Memorandum dtd 15 Oct 09

j. JCS Memo of 9 Mar 10

k. NTM-A/CSTC-A TDY DCOM-Programs Memo of 29 Jul 10

l. NTM-A/CSTC-A TDY Quick Reference Guide of 28 Oct 10

2. Purpose. The purpose of this SOP is to define the process for NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel to request TDY orders. All requests will be generated through the administrative support of the directorate whose member requires TDY orders. Only the Chief of Staff has authority to approve TDY in NTM-A/CSTC-A.

e. Voluntary National Contributions (VNC). Those individuals deployed as Voluntary National Contributions (VNC) must have all TDY expenses paid for by the sending nation, see enclosure 6.

4. Discussion. Due to the volume of TDY orders generated by this command and the administrative support available in each Directorate, it is both essential and practical that each Directorate produce the appropriate paperwork to support the request for TDY orders for their respective personnel. To that end, this SOP has been generated to inform and guide Directorates in the generation and routing of their order requests.

5. Action. TDY requests should be routed for review and approval 30 days prior to the commencement of TDY travel and 45 days prior if travel is ICW earned R&R. *Note: USCENTCOM policy letter #36 prohibits ordinary leave for deployed personnel.* All Directorates will follow the guidance located in the enclosures to ensure the timely and accurate generation of TDY orders.

a. Determine which funding source should be used for the traveler, based primarily on the manning document on which the traveler's position appears.

(1) U.S. JMD – See enclosure 1.

(2) Non-U.S. JMD – See enclosure 2.

(3) ANSF Support – See enclosure 3.

(4) NATO CE – See enclosure 4.

(5) CJSOR – See enclosure 5.

(6) VNC – See enclosure 6.

b. Fill out the forms pertinent to the traveler's TDY and method of funding.

c. Route accordingly with appropriate attention to timeliness to manage expectations.

6. After generation of the TDY travel order, the file will be forwarded thru the Directorate/ Deputy Director or DCOM Headquarters to the Chief of Staff for action. Prior to forwarding for action, the file will be submitted to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for legal review.

7. Under Section U3125B of reference (b), business class/premium travel is only authorized under exceptional circumstances. For example, a documented medical reason or, space is not

NTM-A/CSTC-A COS
SUBJECT: Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Command Temporary Duty (TDY) Program

10. The point of contact for administrative questions is CJ1-HRD at (b)(2), (b)(6) or (b)(2), (b)(6). The point of contact for U.S. funding is USFOR-A J8 (Camp Eggers Cell) at (b)(2), (b)(6). The point of contact for ANSF and NATO funding is CJ8 at (b)(2), (b)(6) and (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Colonel, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

7 Encls:
1. U.S. Travel Requests - JMD
2. Non-U.S. Travel Requests – JMD
3. ANSF Travel Requests
4. NATO CE Travel Requests
5. CJSOR Travel Requests
6. VNC Travel Requests
7. Miscellaneous Travel Documents

TDY DOCUMENTS for Non-U.S. JMD

1. For Non-U.S. travelers that have been assigned to the command through a position on the U.S. Joint Manning Document, the following applies:

- U.S. Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) may fund both travel and per diem – complete the following forms:
  - Staff Summary Sheet
  - CSTC-A ANSF Contact Concept Worksheet (if applicable)
  - Invitational Travel Authorization
  - Invitational Travel Order
  - Defense and Military Contact Budget Worksheet
  - COMAIR travel itinerary and airfare cost estimate (if travel is via COMAIR)
  - AEA Justification Memo (if costs are expected to exceed govt. per diem rate)
  - Legal Review (if required)

2. If funding is determined inappropriate for specific purpose of travel, traveler is requested to contact his/her National Service Element (NSE) for the Nation's approval and specific procedures. The member's nation will fund all TDY expenses.

3. Point of contact for funding is the USFOR-A, CJ8 (Camp Eggers Cell), who can be reached at group E-mail: [redacted] or DSN: (b)(2), (b)(6)

4. Point of contact for U.S. National Service Element (NSE) funding is ISAF NSE at (b)(2), (b)(6) or CENTRIX, ISAF HQ portal, menu for partner nation NSE.

TDY DOCUMENTS for NATO CE

1. If the traveler has been assigned to the command through the NTM-A Crisis Establishment (CE), the following applies:

- Is the traveler from the United States?
  - NATO will fund travel expenses. Per diem expenses shall be funded by the individual's National Service Element (U.S.) as a national responsibility. Member will essentially require two separate sets of orders. Follow the below guidance:
    - ISAF SOP 809 of 11 Nov 09, International Duty Travel
    - ISAF memo of 31 Mar 08, Temporary Duty (TDY) Request Procedures for U.S. travelers.

    Complete the following:
    - ISAF Travel Request Application
    - NATO Travel Order
    - NATO Claim for Reimbursement of Travel Expenses
    - Pax Request for NATO ISAF Air Bridge
    - Commercial Flight Request Procedure/TDY Checklist

- Is the traveler a coalition member from another country other than the U.S.?
  - NATO will fund travel expenses and per diem expenses shall be funded by the individual's National Service Element (Britain, France, Canada, Belgium, etc.) as a national responsibility. Member will essentially require two separate sets of travel orders. Follow the below guidance:
    - ISAF SOP 809 of 11 Nov 09, International Duty Travel

    Complete the following:
    - ISAF Travel Request Application
    - NATO Travel Order
    - NATO Claim for Reimbursement of Travel Expenses
    - Pax Request for NATO ISAF Air Bridge
    - Commercial Flight Request Procedure/TDY Checklist
  - Note: CSTC-A shall fund per diem for lift & sustain countries (Albania, Hungary, Romania, etc.) via an ITA/ITO. For complete listing is lift & sustain support countries see CJS memo of 9 Mar 10.

2. Point of contact for NATO funding is the CJ8 Budget Analyst, who can be reached at E-mail: [redacted] or DSN: (b)(2), (b)(6)

3. Point of contact for lift & sustain nation per diem funding is the USFOR-A, CJ8 (Camp Eggers Cell), who can be reached at group E-mail: [redacted] or DSN: (b)(2), (b)(6)

4. Point of contact for U.S. National Service Element (NSE) funding is ISAF NSE at (b)(2), (b)(6) CENTRIX, ISAF HQ portal, menu for partner nation NSE.

TDY DOCUMENTS for VNC

1. There is no travel funding authorization for personnel assigned to the command through the Volunteer National Contribution. These individuals should not be directed to travel unless they are willing to personally bear all costs associated with travel.

2. Travelers should contact their National Service Element (NSE) for the Nation's approval and specific procedures.

3. Point of contact for U.S. National Service Element (NSE) funding is ISAF NSE at (b)(2), (b)(6) CENTRIX, ISAF HQ portal, menu for partner nation NSE.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO THE ATTENTION OF

NTM-A/CSTC-A COS

17 Aug 10

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Personnel

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty (TDY) Quick Reference Guide

1. References:

a. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Command Temporary Duty (TDY) Program

b. PUBLIC LAW 111-118-DEC. 19, 2009

2. Purpose. The purpose of this Memorandum is to provide a quick reference for NTM-A/CSTC-A Deputy Commanders and Directors concerning the process of requesting TDY orders. All requests will be generated through the administrative support of the directorate whose members require TDY orders. Detailed instructions may be obtained in reference (a).

3. Background. The unique nature of the manning of this command requires funding for TDY to be drawn from different funding sources. The funding source dictates the forms and paperwork that must be completed and the routing and timelines that must be navigated in order to receive the proper completed authorizations for TDY travel. The primary funding sources for NTM-A/CSTC-A travel are:

a. U.S. funding. U.S. funding is used for U.S. personnel assigned to the CSTC-A through the U.S. Joint Manning Document (JMD). For Non U.S. service members serving in Coalition billets on the JMD, the source of funding is Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds.

b. Afghanistan Security Forces Funds (ASFF). This source pays for training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (i.e. ANA, ANP, MOD, and MOI) to include Ministers and Deputy Ministers. According to reference (b), these funds are to be used on behalf of "the security forces of Afghanistan, including the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction." Generally, to qualify for this funding for the purposes of TDY, the traveler must be participating in some form of training. In the TDY request, ensure a thorough explanation of the purpose of the TDY is included. Do not be brief in the explanation of training. The more information provided, the less likely the request will be returned for further justification. Although each TDY request is reviewed on a case by case basis, generally, TDY events for which the traveler is speaking at a conference, attending a graduation, delivering a brief, or attending orientation sessions is not considered a training event.

c. If a Minister is traveling as part of GIRoA business, his travel should be paid by ministerial funds. It may be paid with ASFF if the primary result is training.

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty (TDY) Program Quick Reference Guide

d. NATO funding. NATO funding is used for NATO personnel, to include U.S. personnel, assigned to NTM-A through the NATO Crisis Establishment (CE) to fund travel expenses and authorized miscellaneous expenses (internet fees, course/conference fees, parking, visas). The individual's "National Authority" shall fund per diem expenses (lodging and meals) chargeable to the national budget concerned (i.e., Turkey, Denmark, France, etc).

e. Combined Joint Statement of Requirement funding. Personnel filling NATO CJSOR positions must have all of their TDY expenses paid for by the sending nation. Additionally, those individuals deployed as Voluntary National Contributions (VNC) must have all TDY expenses paid for by the sending nation.

4. Discussion. Due to the volume of TDY orders generated by this command and the administrative support available in each Directorate, it is both essential and practical that each Directorate produce the appropriate paperwork to support the request for TDY orders for their respective personnel. To that end, the enclosed spreadsheet has been generated to inform and guide Directorates in the generation of their order requests.

5. Action. TDY requests should be routed for review and approval 30 days prior to the commencement of TDY travel. All Directorates will follow the guidance located in the enclosures to ensure the timely and accurate generation of TDY orders.

a. Determine which funding source should be used for the coalition traveler, based primarily on the manning document on which the traveler's position appears.

b. Fill out the forms pertinent to the traveler's TDY and method of funding.

c. Route accordingly with appropriate attention to timeliness to manage expectations.

6. After generation of the TDY orders, the file will be forwarded thru the Directorate/Deputy Director or DCOM Headquarters to the Chief of Staff for action. Prior to forwarding for action, the file will be submitted to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for legal review.

7. Per JFTR Appendix A, business class/premium class travel is not authorized. The only exceptions to this policy are those travelers with a valid, documented medical condition which precludes them from using economy class seating or in the event that no other seats/flights are available in time to accomplish the purpose of the travel.

8. The CJ8 will track TDY expenses by Directorate/DCOM and provide a monthly update during the NTM-A CUB.

9. The point of contact for administrative questions is CJ1-HRD at (b)(2), (b)(6) The point of contact for

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty (TDY) Program Quick Reference Guide

U.S. funding is USFOR-A J8 (Camp Eggers Cell) at (b)(2), (b)(6) The point of contact for ANSF and NATO funding is CJ8 at (b)(2), (b)(6) and (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Encl
TDY Spreadsheet

Colonel, USA
Chief of Staff

TDY Quick Reference Guide

	U.S. JMD	Non U.S. JMD	ANSF Support	NATO CE (US)	NATO CE (Non US)	CJSOR/VNC	DOD Civilian	Civilian
Staff Summary Sheet (SSS)	X	X	X				X	X
Contact Concept Worksheet	X	X	X				X	X
DD Form 1610	X			X			X	
Defense and Military Contact Budget Worksheet	X	X	X				X	X
Letter of Justification for COMAIR (if required)	X						X	X
COMAIR travel itinerary and airfare cost estimate (if required)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
NATO Travel Order for Country Clearance (if visiting a NATO country)	X						X	X
AEA Justification Memo (if costs are expected to exceed govt. per diem rate)	X	X					X	X
TDY in Conjunction w/ R&R Memo (if travel involves any leave)	X						X	X
Invitational Travel Authorization		X						X
Invitational Travel Order		X						
Event Invitational Travel Order (ITO) Request for Group Travel			X					
NTM-A/CSTC-A Letter, Appointment as Escort Officer Paying Agent			X					
DD Form 577, Jan 2004, Appointment/Termination Record -Authorized Signature			X					
Memorandum for the Record, Request for INSCOM Contract Linguists TDY			X					
ISAF Travel Request Application				X	X	X		
NATO Travel Order				X	X	X		
NATO Claim for Reimbursement				X	X	X		
PAX Request for NATO ISAF Air Badge				X	X	X		
Commercial Flight Request Procedure/TDY Checklist				X	X	X		
Legal Review	X	X	X				X	X

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
PAO Studio, Camp Eggers	2011/01/24	1900	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		05

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9.

I, ----------, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Summary of Interview between CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6), USN and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) USA

* LT(b)(3), (b)(6) provided a brief summary of the Chain of Command (CoC) for the NTM-A Command Communications Directorate. He stated that CoC consists of NTM-A/CSTC-A CG, NTM-A/CSTC-A CoS, Director NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Communications(LT(b)(3), (b)(6) Afghan Outreach Program Branch Head (Lt(b)(3), (b)(6) Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)

* LT(b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he was on emergency leave from 22 Dec - 8 Jan. During this period, LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6). NTM-A/CSTC-A Deputy Director Command Communications was acting Director.

LT(b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he was not aware of an intention by Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) take TDY in conjunction with R&R during Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) R&R during December.

* LT(b)(3), (b)(6) stated that following an extended TDY period, he had lunch with Lt(b)(3), (b)(6) early Dec to catch up on issues he missed while away. LT(b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he did not recall LtCol [redacted] mentioning, during this luch meeting, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) plan to take Dari/Farsi language tests in Kuwait while she was there during her return from R&R and awaiting transportation to Bagram.

* LT(b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he was a bit surprised to see Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) Bagram on 8 Jan awaiting MRAP transport back to Camp Eggers since she had left on 8 Dec. LT(b)(3), (b)(6) then asked Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and Lt(b)(3), (b)(6) who was also at Bagram awaiting MRAP transport to Eggers, to explain why she was just then returning.

* LT(b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he was not aware of any request for a leave extension.

* LT(b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he did not at any time grant approval for TDY for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

T4005 APPROPRIATE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO FOLLOW JFTR/JTR REGULATIONS

Commands/units are expected to take appropriate disciplinary action when travelers and/or AOs fail to follow the regulations contained in this Volume. Disciplinary action should be for *willful* violations and may be in the form of counseling (oral/written), or non-judicial action (uniformed personnel), or other personnel means (civilian employees). Action must *not* be through refusal to reimburse. See par. T4025-A4 for exceptions when reimbursement is *not* allowed.

T4010 REIMBURSEMENT RATE

Rates for private vehicle mileage reimbursement rates are found in JFTR, par. U2600, and JTR, par. C2500. Government mess food and operating expense rates are found in JFTR, pars. U4149 and U4151 and JTR, par. C2510. Per diem rates by location showing the lodging, meals and incidental expense components are published in website ***https://secureapp2.hqda.pentagon.mil/perdiem/perdiemrates.html***, or provided under separate issuance by the Per Diem, Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee (PDTATAC). These rates also are available from the (Contracted) Commercial Travel Office (CTO).

T4020 TDY TRAVEL POLICY

A. Criteria for TDY Travel. TDY travel is mission support. TDY travel is performed when there is no other means to successfully complete the mission. When the mission can be achieved by another means, such as written correspondence or teleconferencing, AOs must choose that method.

B. Traveler Rights and Responsibilities

1. Travelers are to follow the policies and procedures in this regulation, and use good judgment in incurring official travel-related expenses, as if traveling on their personal money (see JFTR, par. U2010 and JTR, par. C1058).

2. Travelers are provided transportation, lodging, and food, or they must be reimbursed promptly for reasonable and necessary authorized expenses if they purchase them. AOs must authorize reimbursement for other travel-related expenses appropriate to the mission.

3. It is *mandatory* that travelers arrange commercial transportation, rental cars (if authorized), through an available CTO or in-house travel arranger in accordance with TRANSCOM policy. Government and/or commercial lodging should also be arranged through the CTO. The CTO estimates the total cost for the trip (a "should-cost" estimate) forming the reimbursement basis.

4. It is *mandatory* that travelers make their official travel and transportation arrangements through the CTO. Only in extremely unusual circumstances in which the traveler cannot communicate with the CTO should the CTO not be used. Travelers:

a. Who do not use a CTO or the Government travel card to purchase transportation must forward the ticket coupon, and/or the receipt for the excess baggage costs, with the Trip Record for reimbursement.

b. Must use coach-class for all official travel, unless premium-class accommodations are authorized prior to travel by the appropriate level listed in par. U3125-B2a or U3125-B2b.

TEMPORARY DUTY (TDY)

A. UNIFORMED MEMBER

1. Duty at one or more locations, away from the PDS, under an order providing for further assignment or pending further assignment, to return to the old PDS or to proceed to a new PDS.

2. That period spent at a location while processing for separation from the Service, release from active duty, placement on the TDRL, or retirement, when the last PDS is different from the location at which processing is accomplished.

3. There are four types of TDY travel:

a. Business Travel. Conducting business at a location other than the PDS. It incorporates any type of travel not included in schoolhouse training, deployment and unit training or special circumstances travel. It also includes certain local travel, but not leave or evacuation.

b. Schoolhouse Training Travel. Travel ICW TDY attendance at formal course(s) of instruction by a uniformed member (other than a uniformed member who has not yet reached the first PDS).

c. Deployment, Personnel Traveling Together Under an Order Directing No/Limited Reimbursement, and Unit Travel. Includes a unit traveling in support of a combat mission, peacekeeping, and disaster relief. It also includes field/maneuver training and sea duty when troops involved are not permanently assigned to a ship. The GOV'T provides all transportation, lodging, and eating facilities when personnel traveling together are under an order directing no/limited reimbursement.

d. Special Circumstances Travel. See JFTR, Ch 7.

B. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE

1. Duty at one or more locations, away from the PDS, under a order providing for further assignment or, pending further assignment, to return to the old PDS or to proceed to a new PDS.

2. There are four types of TDY travel:

a. Business Travel. Conducting business at a location other than the PDS. It incorporates any type of travel not included in schoolhouse training, deployment and unit training or special circumstances travel. It also includes certain local travel, but not leave or evacuation.

b. Schoolhouse Training Travel. Travel ICW TDY attendance at formal course(s) of instruction by a civilian employee.

c. Deployment, Personnel Traveling Together Under an Order Directing No/Limited Reimbursement, and Unit Travel. Includes a unit traveling in support of a combat mission, peacekeeping, and disaster relief. It also includes field or maneuver training and sea duty when troops involved are not permanently assigned to a ship. The GOV'T provides all transportation, lodging, and eating facilities when personnel traveling together are under an order directing no/limited reimbursement.

d. Special Circumstances Travel. See JTR, Ch 7.

TEMPORARY DUTY (TDY) STATION. A place, away from the PDS, to which the traveler is authorized to travel.

TEMPORARY DUTY (TDY) TRAVEL. Travel to one or more places away from a PDS to perform duties for a period of time and, upon completion of assignment, return or proceed to a PDS.

B. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE. A place designated by the:

1. Commander concerned,

2. Commander's designated representative, or

3. Employee,

for the movement of dependents or HHG when not accompanying the employee.

DESTINATION RATE *(Civilian Employee Only)*. The per diem rate applicable to the next location at which an employee is to perform TDY or at which an employee makes an en route stopover to obtain overnight lodging.

DETACHMENT *(Uniformed Member Only)*. A part of a unit separated from its main organization for duty elsewhere, or a temporary military or naval unit formed from other units or parts of units.

DIFFERENT (OR SEPARATE) DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES *(Civilian Employee Only)*

1. The several departments and agencies of the Executive branch of the GOV'T.

2. Within the Department of Defense, the terms "Different Departments" or "Different Military Departments" means the DoD components separately. ***NOTE: This distinction is necessary with regard to funding for travel and transportation from one department to another.***

DUTY STATION

A. UNIFORMED MEMBER. For the purpose of transportation and storage of HHG and mobile homes:

1. The home of a member at the time of:

a. Appointment to regular Service from civilian life or an RC;

b. Being called to active duty or active duty for training for 20 or more weeks;

c. Being recalled from the Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, or recalled from retirement (including temporary disability);

d. Enlistment or induction into the Service (regular or during emergency);

2. The place at which a member actually is assigned for duty, including a place from which the member commutes daily to an assigned station or, for a member on sea duty, the home port of the ship or mobile unit to which the member is assigned;

3. The place at which a ship is being built or being fitted out is a shore duty station until the commissioning date, at which time the home port assigned to such ship is the new station;

4. The home of a member upon:

a. Retirement;

b. Transfer to an RC, the Fleet Reserve, or the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve;

c. Release from active duty;

NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTM-A/CSTC-A-COS 27 November 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL NTM-A/CSTC-A PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: Exceptions to Policy

1. This memorandum outlines the broad requirements for those requesting exception to policies approved by this command or superior commands.

2. Command policies are maintained by the SJS and accessible on the command's electronic portal. Persons assigned or attached to the command have a responsibility to understand and comply with command policies. Failure to do so may expose that individual to punitive or administrative measures.

3. Command policies are published for important topics that require a written directive applicable to large portions of, or the entire command. The policies have already been through a coordination processes to ensure internal inputs were considered prior to decision. While we generally operate with decentralized execution based on intent, the topics covered by the command policies outline constraints or requirements for which subordinates are not free to make independent decisions based on their own assessments, unless an exception is approved in accordance with this memorandum.

4. Requests for exception that require command group decision are forwarded in writing and addressed thru the SJS to the Chief of Staff at least one week before the exception is required.

a. Requests will include a soft copy memo sent to the SJS that the Chief of Staff can sign approving that request.

b. The SJS will ensure appropriate coordination of the exception request, if not already accomplished by the requestor.

5. At a minimum, exception requests addressed to the command group will include the following:

a. The concurrence of the deputy commander or staff director to whom the requestor reports.

b. A precise description of what the requestor wishes to be approved that represents exception to the current policy. This will normally include who, what, when, and where.

c. The rationale why granting the exception provides greater utility to the command than following the policy already approved.

d. Identification of by when the exception needs to be approved. This needs to be a date or a conditions-based reference with respect to some well known event. Requestors may not use "ASAP" or similar terms to describe the desired approval suspense.

e. A clear outline of any risks associated with approval, how those risks will be mitigated, and what residual risks will remain.

f. Identification of costs of approving the exception, focusing on financial and opportunity costs.

NTM-A/CSTC-A-COS
SUBJECT: Exceptions to Policy

6. Consider the following as you prepare an exception request:

a. Assume that the burden of proof is on the requestor.

b. Recognize that the exception request provides an audit trail that clearly outlines the exception. Be sufficiently comprehensive that a third party will understand the exception and rationale for its approval since the exception request essentially becomes the policy for the circumstances outlined in the exception request, if that request is approved.

c. If the exception is required in less than a week, hand carry the action to those with whom you must coordinate the action so you can secure their recommendations.

7. POC for this memorandum is MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) at (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Colonel, US Army
Chief of Staff

(b)(3), (b)(6) **CAPT, USN NTM-A ANA DEVELOPMENT**

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) Capt USAF AFCENT AFLOA/ADC [(b)(3), (b)(6) @auab.afcent.af.mil]
Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2011 11:03 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) CAPT, USN NTM-A ANA DEVELOPMENT
Subject: RE: AR 15-6 Appointment Memo (UNCLASSIFIED)

Sir,

Please find our response to your questions below.

1. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was notified by CJ-1 in late September/early October, at the same time that she was notified that her first extension was approved, that she would be receiving orders for the additional extension (2nd extension). Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) has received a copy of her orders for her first extension from her IPR representative. To date, she has not received a copy of the second extension orders.

2. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) needed to take the DLPT test versus the DLAB test. Since her Dari DPLT scores were out of date, she knew that she would need to take the DPLT test in order to demonstrate current proficiency to apply for the program. Also, since training would take place in June/July 2011, she understood that by showing current proficiency she could seek a waiver of the language training requirement. After attempting to find a local testing facility, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was directed to contact the testing center in Kuwait to schedule the DLPT test.

3. It is Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s understanding that she needed to take the DPLT test immediately. According to Maj (b)(3), (b)(6) Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s assignment officer, and (b)(3), (b)(6) , Chief, Officer ssignment Policy and Systems at AFPC, Round 3 requirements are in-progress. Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) is ptimistic about placing Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) in the program. In addition, since training is slated for the June/July timeframe, if Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) showed current proficiency she could seek a waiver of the language training requirement.

4. CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) , Director of the Afghan Hands Program at USFOR-A, has expressed frequent and continual support for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s participation in the program. In addition, CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6) at the PACC responded positively to Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s inquiries about transferring into the program. Furthermore, Maj (b)(3), (b)(6) Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s assignments officer, listed the Afghan Hands Program as the number one choice for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) s next assignment.

Should you need additional information or clarification, please do not hesitate to contact me.

v/r
Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)

//SIGNED//
(b)(3), (b)(6) , Capt, USAF
Area Defense Counsel
Southwest Asia
DSN: (b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) CAPT, USN NTM-A ANA DEVELOPMENT
[mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil]
Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2011 11:29 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) Capt USAF AFCENT AFLOA/ADC
Subject: RE: AR 15-6 Appointment Memo (UNCLASSIFIED)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATO TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
APO, AE 09356

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

NTM-A/CSTC-A-HHC

30 June 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR All personnel Assigned/Attached to NTM-A / CSTCA

SUBJECT: Policy 04 – R&R Leave Program

1. Reference: .AR 600-8-10, Leaves and Passes

2. One of the many privileges we have available to us while we are deployed is 15-days of non-chargeable leave (with orders for a minimum of 270 days boots on ground). With the high OPTEMPO, combat environment, and long work-days, everyone should take advantage of this opportunity for Rest and Recuperation (R&R) in order to be able put forth maximum effort towards mission accomplishment.

3. Eligibility begins after serving 60 days in the AOR. No exceptions are authorized for participation in the R&R leave program prior to completing 60 days in the AOR.

4. Service members on initial orders of 179 days and voluntarily extended for an additional 179 days are authorized R&R leave after the orders for the extension are received as long as no ordinary leave was previously taken.

5. Each directorate is responsible to internally manage the R&R program for their personnel. Each directorate will not have more than 10% of their personnel on leave at any given time. This includes R&R and Emergency Leave, so you must plan accordingly to ensure that there is a buffer to allow Soldiers to go on emergency leave if the need arises.

6. Directorates can accept leave requests as early as desired in order to project leave dates and ensure that they will never go above 10% at any given time. However, HHC HQ Section will not accept leave forms more than 90 days prior to the start date of leave. Once HQ receives the leave form and it has been approved by the Company Commander, the person requesting leave will be manifested accordingly. Manifests will be submitted on a first-come, first-serve basis. HHC HQ will notify the service member or civilian if their leave dates need to be adjusted based on flight availability. Once the service member or civilian has been manifested, the leave dates cannot be changed or cancelled.

7. All leave forms will be filled out completely and accurately, to include a valid address and contact phone number for where the service member/civilian will be located on leave. Only 15 days of the actual requested leave period will be annotated on the leave form – DO NOT include travel days. The HQ Ops NCO will manifest you based off of the START date listed on your leave form (normally depart unit three days prior to the requested leave start date). Leave forms will be submitted to HHC with one copy of the service member's deployment orders. Supervisor is required to print and sign their name to recommend approval.

R & R LEAVE ROSTER			STRATCOM MASTER LEAVE ROSTER					
Last Name	First Name	Full SSN	Rank	WEAPON TYPE	WEAPON SERIAL	FROM LEAVE DATES	TO LEAVE DATES	DA31
		[redacted]	CPT	M4	W045730	14-Mar-11	28-Mar-11	12-Feb-11
		[redacted]	LTC	M9	6173167	1-Jul-11	14-Jul-11	1-Jun-11
		[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Protocol								
[redacted]		[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
JVB								
		[redacted]	Maj	M9	1109792	6-Feb-11	19-Feb-11	7-Jan-11
		[redacted]	1LT	P9	H00565	14-Dec-10	1-Jan-11	15-Nov-10
		[redacted]	SSgt	P9	H06450	25-Dec-10	12-Jan-11	26-Nov-10
PAO								
[redacted]		[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
		[redacted]	MC2	M-16	10241165	28-Mar-11	2-Apr-11	28-Feb-11
		[redacted]	MC2	M-16	8363409	10-May-11	25-May-11	10-Apr-11
		[redacted]	MC3	M-16	10241833	1-Mar-11	15-Mar-10	1-Apr-11
AOR								
		[redacted]	SGT	M9/M16	1485265/7232475	15-Apr-11	29-Apr-11	16-Mar-11
		[redacted]	SSG	M9/M16	1485264/7232374	21-Apr-11	5-May-11	22-Mar-11
		[redacted]	MSG	M9/M16	1485263/7232248	14-Feb-11	28-Feb-11	15-Jan-11
		[redacted]	1LT	M9/M16	1485262/7212204	8-Jul-11	22-Jul-11	8-Jun-11
		[redacted]	CPT	M9/M16	1485261/7175072	1-Jun-11	15-Jun-11	2-May-11
		[redacted]	LTC	M9/M16	1485260/6314792	8-May-11	22-May-11	8-Apr-11
		[redacted]	CAPT	M9	1074022	5-Dec-10	19-Dec-10	5-Nov-10
		[redacted]	LT COL	M9	1442602	16-Dec-10	30-Dec-10	16-Nov-10

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE/WAIVER CERTIFICATE

For use of this form, see AR 190-30; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT

HORITY: Title 10, United States Code, Section 3012(g)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your Social Security Number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your Social Security Number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Chatham House Camp Eggers	2. DATE: 24 Jan 11	3. TIME: 1600	4. FILE NO.
5. NAME (Last, First, MI) (b)(3), (b)(6)	8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: NTM-A/CSTC-A Camp Eggers, Kabul		
6. SSN [redacted]	7. GRADE/STATUS: Lt Col/AD		

PART I - RIGHTS WAIVER/NON-WAIVER CERTIFICATE

Section A. Rights

The investigator whose name appears below told me that he/she is with the United States Army _____ and wanted to question me about the following offense(s) of which I am suspected/accused: art 92

Before he/she asked me any questions about the offense(s), however, he/she made it clear to me that I have the following rights:

1. I do not have to answer any question or say anything.
2. Anything I say or do can be used as evidence against me in a criminal trial.
3. *(For personnel subject to the UCMJ)* I have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian lawyer I arrange for at no expense to the Government or a military lawyer detailed for me at no expense to me, or both.

   - or -

   (For civilians not subject to the UCMJ) I have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. I understand that this lawyer can be one that I arrange for at my own expense, or if I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me before any questioning begins.

   If I am now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation, with or without a lawyer present, I have a right to stop answering questions at any time, or speak privately with a lawyer before answering further, even if I sign the waiver below.

5. COMMENTS *(Continue on reverse side)*

Section B. Waiver

I understand my rights as stated above. I am now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation and make a statement without talking to a lawyer first and without having a lawyer present with me.

WITNESSES *(If available)*	3. (b)(3), (b)(6)
1a. NAME *(Type or Print)*	
b. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PHONE	4. (b)(3), (b)(6)
2a. NAME *(Type or Print)*	5. TYPED NAME OF INVESTIGATOR
b. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PHONE	6. ORGANIZATION OF INVESTIGATOR: NTM-A/CSTC-A NATC-A

Section C. Non-waiver

1. I do not want to give up my rights
   - ☐ I want a lawyer
   - ☐ I do not want to be questioned or say anything
2. SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE

ATCH THIS WAIVER CERTIFICATE TO ANY SWORN STATEMENT *(DA FORM 2823)* SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED BY THE SUSPECT/ACCUSED

"Any person subject to this chapter who—

(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;

(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or

(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

Elements.

(1) *Violation of or failure to obey a lawful general order or regulation.*

(a) That there was in effect a certain lawful general order or regulation;

(b) That the accused had a duty to obey it; and

(c) That the accused violated or failed to obey the order or regulation.

(2) *Failure to obey other lawful order.*

(a) That a member of the armed forces issued a certain lawful order;

(b) That the accused had knowledge of the order;

(c) That the accused had a duty to obey the order; and

(d) That the accused failed to obey the order.

(3) *Dereliction in the performance of duties.*

(a) That the accused had certain duties;

(b) That the accused knew or reasonably should have known of the duties; and

(c) That the accused was (willfully) (through neglect or culpable inefficiency) derelict in the performance of those duties.

Explanation.

(1) *Violation of or failure to obey a lawful general order or regulation.*

(a) General orders or regulations are those orders or regulations generally applicable to an armed force which are properly published by the President or the Secretary of Defense, of Transportation, or of a military department, and those orders or regulations generally applicable to the command of the officer issuing them throughout the command or a particular subdivision thereof which are issued by:

(i) an officer having general court-martial jurisdiction;

(ii) a general or flag officer in command; or

(iii) a commander superior to (i) or (ii).

(b) A general order or regulation issued by a commander with authority under Article 92(1) retains its character as a general order or regulation when another officer takes command, until it expires by its own terms or is rescinded by separate action, even if it is issued by an officer who is a general or flag officer in command and command is assumed by another officer who is not a general or flag officer.

(c) A general order or regulation is lawful unless it is contrary to the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or lawful superior orders or for some other reason is beyond the authority of the official issuing it. *See* the discussion of lawfulness in paragraph 14c(2)(a).

(d) *Knowledge*. Knowledge of a general order or regulation need not be alleged or proved, as knowledge is not an element of this offense and a lack of knowledge does not constitute a defense.

(e) *Enforceability*. Not all provisions in general orders or regulations can be enforced under Article 92(1). Regulations which only supply general guide-lines or advice for conducting military functions may not be enforceable under Article 92(1).

(2) *Violation of or failure to obey other lawful order.*

(a) *Scope*. Article 92(2) includes all other lawful orders which may be issued by a member of the armed forces, violations of which are not chargeable under Article 90, 91, or 92(1). It includes the violation of written regulations which are not general regulations. *See also* subparagraph (1)(e) above as applicable.

(b) *Knowledge*. In order to be guilty of this offense, a person must have had actual knowledge of the order or regulation. Knowledge of the order may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

EXHIBIT A

(b)(3), (b)(6) **SGT MIL USA USA USARCENT**

ATTACHMENT 4

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA USA USARCENT
Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2011 8:25 PM
To: Webster, William G LTG MIL USA USA USARCENT
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) CIG USA USA USARCENT; (b)(3), (b)(6) SGT MIL USA USA USARCENT
Subject: FW: Follow up (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Sir -
Here are the answers to the follow up questions from COL(b)(3), (b)(6)'s interview.

(b)(3), (b)(6) -
Please preserve this e-mail. We will need to append it to COL(b)(3), (b)(6)'s statement.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

VR,

(b)(3), (b)(6)
COL, JA
Staff Judge Advocate
Third Army/USARCENT
DSN (Afghanistan)
DSN (b)(3), (b)(6) (Kuwait)
DSN (Atlanta)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A
Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2011 7:42 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA USA USARCENT
Subject: Follow up (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

(b)(3), (b)(6) , I've looked through my email traffic and don't see a request from LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) for a copy of the AR 15-6 Investigation. I checked with the several attorneys in the office and they did not provide a copy of the 15-6 to LTC Stroud.

I sent an email to (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) to see if they recall who spoke with BG Patton regarding MAJ(b)(3), (b)(6)'s GOMOR.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
COL, JA
LEGAD/Staff Judge Advocate
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/
Combined Transition Security Command-Afghanistan Kabul, Afghanistan DSN (b)(3), (b)(6)

NIPR email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil SIPR email:
(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil

More about the Command: www.NTM-A.com

"Shohna ba Shohna -- Ooga-pa-Ooga -- Shoulder to Shoulder"

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by Colonel (b)(6), (b)(3) Chief of Staff, NTM-A/CSTC-A
(Appointing authority)

on 30 November 2010 *(Attach inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)*
(Date)

SECTION II - SESSIONS

The *(investigation) (board)* commenced at Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan *(Place)* at 0800 *(Time)*

on 1 December 2010 *(Date)* *(If a formal board met for more than one session, check here* ☐ *. Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.)* The following persons *(members, respondents, counsel)* were present: *(After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)*

The following persons *(members, respondents, counsel)* were absent: *(Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 5-2 and 5-8a, AR 15-6.)*

The *(investigating officer) (board)* finished gathering/hearing evidence at 1700 *(Time)* on 20 December 2010 *(Date)*

and completed findings and recommendations at 1700 *(Time)* on 21 December 2010 *(Date)*

SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES	YES	NO 1/	NA 2/
1 Inclosures *(para 3-15, AR 15-6)* Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: *(Attached in order listed)*			
a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?	☒	☐	
b. Copy of notice to respondent, if any? *(See item 9, below)*	☐	☐	☒
c. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?	☐	☐	☒
d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?	☒	☐	☐
e. Privacy Act Statements *(Certificate, if statement provided orally)?*	☒	☐	☐
f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered *(e.g., absence of material witnesses)?*	☐	☐	☒
g. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?	☐	☐	☒
h. Any other significant papers *(other than evidence)* relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?	☐	☐	☒

FOOTNOTES: 1/ Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.
2/ Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.

		YES	NO 1/	NA 2/
2	Exhibits *(para 3-16, AR 15-6)*			
	a. Are all items offered *(whether or not received)* or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?	☒	☐	☐
	b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?	☒	☐	☐
	c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?	☒	☐	☐
	d. Are copies, descriptions, or depictions *(if substituted for real or documentary evidence)* properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?	☐	☐	☒
	e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board *(para 3-6b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☒
	f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?	☐	☐	☒
	g. If official notice of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official notice was taken attached as an exhibit *(para 3-16d, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☒
3	Was a quorum present when the board voted on findings and recommendations *(paras 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☒
B. COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS *(Chapter 5, AR 15-6)*				
4	At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment *(para 5-3b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	
5	Was a quorum present at every session of the board *(para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	
6	Was each absence of any member properly excused *(para 5-2a, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
7	Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required *(para 3-1, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
8	If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the inclosure describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence *(para 5-2d, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
C. COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED *(Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6)*				
9	Notice to respondents *(para 5-5, AR 15-6)*:			
	a. Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?	☐	☐	
	b. Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?	☐	☐	
	c. Does each letter of notification indicate —	☐	☐	
	(1) the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?	☐	☐	
	(2) the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?	☐	☐	
	(3) the respondent's rights with regard to counsel?	☐	☐	
	(4) the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?	☐	☐	
	(5) the respondent's rights to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?	☐	☐	
	d. Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?	☐	☐	
	e. If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?	☐	☐	☐
10	If any respondent was designated after the proceedings began *(or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings)*:			
	a. Was he properly notified *(para 5-5, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
	b. Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel *(para 5-4c, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
11	Counsel *(para 5-6, AR 15-6)*:			
	a. Was each respondent represented by counsel?	☐	☐	
	Name and business address of counsel:			
	(If counsel is a lawyer, check here ☐)			
	b. Was respondent's counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?	☐	☐	☐
	c. If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy *(or, if oral, a summary)* of the request and the action taken on it included in the report *(para 5-6b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
12	If the respondent challenged the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality *(para 5-7, AR 15-6)*:			
	a. Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?	☐	☐	☐
	b. Did each member successfully challenged cease to participate in the proceedings?	☐	☐	☐
13	Was the respondent given an opportunity to *(para 5-8a, AR 15-6)*:			
	a. Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?	☐	☐	
	b. Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including written statements?	☐	☐	☐
	c. Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?	☐	☐	☐
	d. Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?	☐	☐	
	e. Testify as a witness?	☐	☐	
	f. Make or have his counsel make a final statement or argument *(para 5-9, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	
14	If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses *(para 5-8b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
15	Are all of the respondent's requests and objections which were denied indicated in the report of proceedings or in an inclosure or exhibit to it *(para 5-11, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐

FOOTNOTES: 1/ *Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.*
2/ *Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.*

SECTION IV - FINDINGS *(para 3-10, AR 15-6)*

The *(investigating officer) (board)* , having carefully considered the evidence, finds:

See attached memorandum

SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS *(para 3-11, AR 15-6)*

In view of the above findings, the *(investigating officer) (board)* recommends:

See attached memorandum

SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION *(para 3-17, AR 15-6)*

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. *(If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Recorder) *(Investigating Officer) (President)* 26 DEC 2010

(Member) *(Member)*

(Member) *(Member)*

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT *(para 3-13, AR 15-6)*

To the extent indicated in Inclosure _____, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board.

(In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

(Member) *(Member)*

SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY *(para 2-3, AR 15-6)*

~~The findings and recommendations of the (investigating officer) (board) are (approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/substitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)~~

See attached Memorandum for Record (b)(3), (b)(6) 25 Jan 11

(b)(6), (b)(3)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO THE
ATTENTION OF:

CSTC-A-CoS

23 Jan 11

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Report of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Movement Control Policy – Mission #331-39

1. I reviewed the investigating officer's AR 15-6 Investigation into Movement Control Policy – Mission #331-39. Based upon this review, I adopt the Investigating Officer's findings and recommendations as indicated below.

2. I approve the following findings as written by the Investigating Officer:

a. The NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy dated 22 August 2010 is a properly promulgated and implemented policy that applied to all the service members who traveled on Mission #331-39.

b. Violations of the NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy dated 22 August 2010.

(1) Pursuant to paragraph 6.c(8)(g), dismounted travel in the KCLZ is prohibited unless approved by the CoS or a general officer/civilian equivalent (SES).

(a) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) and Dr. (b)(6) dismounted their vehicle in the KCLZ and traveled on foot from their vehicle to a pizza shop across a street, down the street to a bread shop to purchase bread, and back to the original pizza shop to pick up the pizzas they had ordered. They were dismounted for approximately 15-20 minutes.

(b) MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) received approval from Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) to dismount his vehicle. MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) dismounted his vehicle and took pictures. MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) was dismounted for an estimated 5 minutes.

(c) No appropriate authority granted approval, waiver, or exception to policy for this dismounted travel.

(d) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) and Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) violated paragraph 6.c(8)(g) of the MCP.

(e) MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) violated the MCP; however, he reasonably believed that he had appropriate authority from Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) the senior member of the convoy and convoy commander, to dismount the vehicle and take pictures.

(2) Pursuant to paragraph 7.d., Convoy Commanders will report any changes in primary route of travel and/or personnel listed on original mission movement control sheet prior to departure and upon arrival at each destination.

(a) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3), the Convoy Commander, directed his convoy to deviate from the primary route of travel (Route Green) and to drive to a pizza shop to order food. The convoy stopped. Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3), Capt (b)(6), (b)(3), and Dr. (b)(6) dismounted and traveled on foot between the two food shops. The vehicles repositioned during this time to follow the dismounted personnel as they walked between the pizza and bread shops. The food stop lasted for approximately 15-20 minutes.

(b) Dr. (b)(6) was not listed on the Movement Control Form. She was an original member on this convoy, when it departed Camp Eggers and remained with it for the entire journey returning to Camp Eggers.

(c) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3), failed to report to Movement Control both the deviations from the primary route and the addition of Dr. (b)(6) to the convoy, and he therefore violated paragraph 7.d. of the MCP.

(3) Pursuant to paragraph 7.f., Convoy Commanders are required to inform Movement Control upon arrival at the following locations by use of primary or secondary means of communications… "(6) All stops during travel will be reported."

(a) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3), the Convoy Commander, was required to inform Movement Control on arrival at the food stop, where members of his convoy dismounted for approximately 15-20 minutes to order and receive food from local vendors.

(b) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3), failed to inform Movement Control during the food stop, or to cause a convoy member to inform Movement Control, and therefore he violated paragraph 7.f. of the MCP.

(4) Pursuant to paragraph 9.a., based on the security threat in theater, NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel are not authorized any non-mission related travel (…photo-taking, dining…or any other activity not directly related to the mission for NTM-A/CSTC-A) without the approval of the applicable agency director (O-6/Director, GS-15 or above) and the NTM-A/CSTC-A Chief of Staff.

(a) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3), directed the convoy off the approved route to a pizza shop where he, Capt (b)(6), (b)(3), and Dr. (b)(6) dismounted. Capt (b)(6), (b)(3), and Dr. (b)(6) ordered pizza for members of the convoy. Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3), Capt (b)(6), (b)(3), and Dr. (b)(6) then traveled on foot to a bread shop that was down the street and around the corner from the pizza shop where they purchased bread. Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3), Capt (b)(6), (b)(3), and Dr. (b)(6) then returned to the Pizza shop where they received the ordered

pizza. The pizza was distributed to the convoy members when Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) delivered the pizza to CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) vehicle.

(b) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) authorized members of his team to dismount and take pictures.

(c) The convoy mission was to conduct movements of personnel to two sites (GMIC and Ariana) for engagements on media. A roadside stop to interact with the local populace was not the mission of this convoy nor is it officially documented as part of the Afghan Outreach mission.

(d) No appropriate authority (applicable agency director (O-6/Director, GS-15 or above) and the NTM-A/CSTC-A CoS) granted approval for this stop.

(e) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) violated the MCP when he directed the convoy and individual service members to engage in non-mission travel.

c. Adequacy of the MCP.

(1) The MCP provides adequate mechanisms to request exceptions for specific circumstances. There are two dedicated paragraphs that provide procedures for requesting exceptions, waivers, or additions as well as several embedded references for individual sections depending on what is being sought.

(2) There was no request for exception or waiver to the MCP for any actions taken by this convoy or its members in deviation from the MCP.

(3) CAPT (b)(6), (b)(3) properly signed the Movement Control Form as an O-6 per Enclosure 1 ("requires O-6 signature") of the MCP. However, he was not in Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) chain of command and while he conducted his due diligence appropriately, he was not the optimal authority to consider and approve this mission request or risk assessment.

(4) The MCP and Movement Control Form use various terms to describe approval levels, and the policy is therefore ambiguous on whether an "O-6," "Directorate O-6," "O-6 Director," or "O-6/Director" are intentionally different, and if so what meaning is attributed to each.

d. Convoy Details:

(1) The following personnel traveled on mission #331-39: Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3), Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) SGT (b)(6), (b)(3) Dr. (b)(6), CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) SGT (b)(6), (b)(3) MSgt (b)(6), (b)(3) and MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3).

(2) This convoy was briefed and conducted as a two vehicle movement.

(3) Nine personnel were on the convoy when it started at Camp Eggers; one person (CPT (b)(6), (b)(3)) was dropped off at ISAF for an official meeting. Eight persons continued on the convoy to a stop where pizza and bread were purchased before the convoy continued to its final meeting stop and returned to Camp Eggers.

(4) Camp Eggers Movement Control Cell recorded 1021 for the Starting Point (SP) and 1459 for the Rally Point Home (RPH).

(5) Convoy Route: The available evidence was insufficient to determine specific timing of the segments of each portion of the movement; however, with respect to the stops and order visited, I find as follows:

(a) Travel segment 1: The convoy departed Camp Eggers and traveled to the Government Media Information Center (GMIC) for an official meeting. Travel was conducted in the Green Zone.

(b) Travel segment 2: The convoy departed GMIC and traveled to the ISAF front gate. Travel was conducted in the Green Zone to drop off CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) for an official meeting at ISAF.

(c) Travel segment 3: The convoy departed from the ISAF front gate and moved outside of the Green Zone, traveling south on Route Green. The convoy, on order from Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) then departed Route Green turned into a neighborhood where the convoy arrived at a pizza shop. This travel took place in the KCLZ. Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3), Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) and Dr. (b)(6) dismounted and traveled on foot between a pizza shop and bread shop purchasing and receiving food. These three convoy members interacted with the local populace while traveling on foot between the two food shops. The food stop and interaction were not official missions for the convoy or Afghan Outreach.

(d) Travel segment 4: The convoy departed the pizza shop, returned to Route Green and headed south on Route Green to Ariana (media). The convoy stopped at the gate, and determined that they needed to go to Apple Media which was located in the immediate vicinity. The convoy traveled around the block to Apple Media and conducted an official meeting. I find that this was not a violation of the MCP because Ariana and Apple Media are in the immediate vicinity of one another and the movement did not require a deviation from the planned route.

(e) Travel segment 5: The convoy traveled from Apple Media to its final destination of Camp Eggers via Route Green to Green Zone.

e. Risk Assessment

(1) The Risk Assessment contained an error on the Mission line. I find that the mission was "to visit GMIC and Ariana as the CONOP and route details" and not a "RECON FOR VCR MISSION." The Risk Assessment was for a ground movement to two specific locations for the purpose of conducting meetings related to media.

(2) The risk assessment did not include consideration of the convoy departing the approved/briefed route to a local food stop where four convoy members disembarked from their UASUVs and conducted dismounted travel in the KCLZ.

(2) The preparation process included two briefings for this movement, one comprehensive brief two nights before (Thursday, 25 November 2010) and an update brief just prior to the movement (27 November 2010). Neither brief covered the food stop.

f. Threat Reports. Classified threat reports for 27 November 2010 were relevant and available for this movement.

(1) JTF Kabul (b)(1)1.4a Daily Intelligence Update (27 Nov 10): Details were relevant and classified.

(2) NTM-A CJ2 Threat Report (27 Nov 10): Details were relevant and classified.

(3) USFOR-A Shift Change Brief (27 Nov 10): Details were relevant and classified. This brief also included the route status.

g. Policy Change.

(1) There was no appropriate control of this convoy when it departed the approved route for a dismounted food stop in the KCLZ without notification to Movement Control.

(2) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) violated provisions in the MCP that were intended to maintain accountability, mitigate risk, and protect members of the Command on this movement, contributing negatively to the command climate of NTM-A/CSTC-A.

2. I disapprove the Investigating Officer's findings and substitute my findings as indicated below:

a. Violations of the NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy dated 22 August 2010.

(1) The portions of the findings that read as follows are disapproved:

(a) Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) an experienced commissioned officer, violated the MCP when she engaged in non-mission travel, as she did not have appropriate authority to do so, and knew or

should have known that Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) did not have authority to allow her to engage in non-mission travel.

(b) MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) a Navy E-4, engaged in non-mission related travel, but reasonably believed that he had appropriate authority from Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) to dismount the vehicle and take pictures.

(2) The following findings are substituted in place of these portions of the investigating officer's report: MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) and Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) engaged in non-mission related travel, but reasonably believed that they had appropriate authority from Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) to dismount the vehicle and take pictures.

b. Risk Assessment.

(1) The portions of the findings that read as follows are disapproved:

(a) The risk assessment did not include consideration of the convoy departing the approved/briefed route to a local food stop where four convoy members disembarked from their UASUVs and conducted dismounted travel in the KCLZ. The risk assessment was therefore inadequate as it did not capture the true activities, location of the activities, and related threat analysis. It was not comprehensive in a relevant manner without these details. Therefore, it was inappropriate for this convoy mission.

(b) The risk assessment was at least "HIGH" for this mission and not "MODERATE" as recorded on the Composite Risk Management Worksheet. The convoy executed an unplanned/ unscheduled route detour, without notice to Movement Control, for a food stop where the local populace took note of convoy members who broke the seal of their UASUVs and conducted a dismounted movement for approximately 15-20 minutes in the KCLZ. Prior to Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) calling the "audible", the route change, location of the food stop, and intent to dismount was unknown to members of the convoy – all requirements for establishing the preparedness of the 8 convoy members in determining the proper risk assessment. All eight convoy members at the food stop were not briefed on the plan or the contingencies for the unscheduled route detour followed by a food stop and dismounted movement. Additionally, classified threat reports were available and relevant to this convoy.

(2) The following findings are substituted in place of these portions of the investigating officer's report:

(a) The risk assessment did not include consideration of the convoy departing the approved/briefed route to a local food stop where four convoy members disembarked from their UASUVs and conducted dismounted travel in the KCLZ.

(b) The convoy executed an unplanned/ unscheduled route detour, without notice to Movement Control, for a food stop. Prior to Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) decision to change the plan, his team was not aware of the route change, location of the food stop, and intent to dismount.

b. Policy Change.

(1) The portion of the findings that read as follows is disapproved: No change to the MCP is necessary based on the circumstances of Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) movement. The MCP provided the CG-approved process that was clearly disregarded, and the current policy is sufficient to provide appropriate deliberate planning for occasional actions such as that engaged in by Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3)

(2) The following finding is substituted in place of these portions of the investigating officer's report: The portions of the MCP that refer to the specific grades or positions authorized to approve exceptions are not as precise as they could be; they require review. Otherwise, no change to the MCP is necessary based on the circumstances of Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) movement.

3. I add the following findings:

a. The mission on the day in question was adequately planned and coordinated. The convoy briefing was adequate in scope and depth.

b. Although the risk assessment prepared for the mission contained some typographical errors and superficial assessments of hazards, mitigation, and residual risk, Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) made a reasonable and prudent security assessment during the movement. When he found himself and his team early for their next meeting, it was reasonable and prudent to modify the route as he did—his choice to stop near the ANP station was sound.

c. Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) misunderstood or misinterpreted the direction in COM ISAF's Tactical Driving Directive (TDD). He indicated in his statement that he sought to implement that directive, however, the applicable portion of the TDD states:

> "Depending on the security situation, *deliberately* plan for time to get out of the vehicles and talk to people as part of mounted patrolling operations, taking every opportunity to interact face-to-face. When security allows, dismount vehicles and remove ballistic glasses and walk among the people: Buy something at the village bazaar; ask a shop-keeper how his business is going; ask pedestrians how ISAF can assist the people in the local area." (emphasis added)

There is no evidence of deliberate planning for this stop. His assertion that spontaneous stops were planned is self-serving, not corroborated by others, and therefore not credible.

(1) The failure to deliberately plan notwithstanding, since his decision to stop was reasonable and because he had a good understanding of the threat in that geographic area, Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) decision to dismount from the vehicles was not unreasonable, it had simply not been approved. He could have contacted one of the exception authorities identified in the MCP when he had his team dismount. Accomplishing this would have brought him back in line with guidance contained in the MCP.

(2) The MCP clearly directs convoy commanders to report all stops. (The questionable implication by CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) that electronic countermeasures prevent communication with command and control nodes between the time a convoy departs and when it returns is irrelevant in this situation—the team had not only stopped their movement, but dismounted. It would have been easy to either disable the countermeasures temporarily or move away from the vehicle to make such a call.) Making such a report was required by policy and common sense; it would have been reasonable and prudent. Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) choice not to make such a report was unreasonable and imprudent.

4. I approve the investigating officer's recommendations as modified below:

a. I direct the CJ3 to establish NLT 28 February 2011 a Convoy Commander's Course to ensure qualified personnel are properly trained and certified to lead movements and understand the command's MCP.

b. I direct the SJA to refer this investigation to Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) service chain of command to consider whether to admonish or reprimand him for his failure to notify the appropriate command and control node of his unplanned stop, as required by the MCP.

c. I prohibit Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) from serving as a Convoy Commander for NTM-A/CSTC-A until the first GO in his chain of command determines that he is prepared to perform these duties IAW the MCP.

d. I direct the Director, Command Communications Directorate to ensure that NLT 15 February 2011 all personnel that participated in the convoy in question are trained to understand the requirements contained in the command's MCP and the TDD.

f. I direct the CJ3 to review and modify the MCP, as necessary, NLT 28 February 2011 to ensure all approval authorities for movements, exceptions, waivers, and additions are clearly stated, internally consistent, and accurately identified.

g. I direct the CJ3 to query NLT 15 February 2011 the Deputy Commanders, Air, Army, and Police for their recommendations as to any modifications that we should consider for the MCP in order to ensure it meets COM ISAF intent.

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h. I direct the CJ3 to review the MCP semi-annually to ensure the policy keeps pace with the situation.

5. MAJ (b)(6), (b)(3) is the point of contact for this memorandum. He may be reached at DSN: (b)(2) or (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil.

(b)(6), (b)(3)

COL, US Army
Chief of Staff

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO THE
ATTENTION OF:

CSTC-A-ACG-AD

26 December 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR Chief of Staff, NTM-A/CSTC-A

SUBJECT: Report of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Movement Control Policy – Mission #331-39

1. I was appointed on 30 November 2010 to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding an alleged stop by Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) within the Kabul City Limit Zone (KCLZ) on or about 27 November 2010 to pick up a pizza. I was specifically tasked to answer the following questions.

a. Did Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) follow the applicable NTM-A policies regarding this movement?

b. Does the NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy dated 22 August 2010 (MCP) provide adequate mechanisms to request exceptions for specific circumstances? If the movement in question was not in compliance with the policy, was there a request for an exception? If there was a request for an exception, was it timely and approved by competent authority?

c. Who participated in the movement; how many vehicles and personnel were involved; when did it occur; what was the route and what were the stops; why did the move and stops take place; were all the aspects of the movement focused on a military mission?

d. Was there a risk assessment completed for this move? If so, was it adequate, comprehensive and appropriate?

e. Did anyone planning or participating in the move secure a threat assessment when planning the move? What was the threat assessment?

f. Should the command consider any policy changes based on this set of circumstances? If so, what is the rationale for considering these changes?

2. Narrative.

a. On 27 November 2010, a ground movement (convoy) was conducted with nine NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel departing in two UASUVs to several locations within the Green Zone and KCLZ. The convoy stopped at the Afghan Government Media Information Center (GMIC) for a scheduled official meeting followed by movement to the ISAF HQs front gate to drop off one member for an official meeting. It continued with eight personnel following a route consistent with the approved and signed Movement Control Form (Mission #331-39) until the convoy deviated from the route at the direction of the Convoy Commander, and stopped at a local pizza shop and bread shop. Three individuals in the convoy dismounted for a period of 15-20 minutes

to purchase food and interact with the local populace in the area. An additional convoy member dismounted for a short period to photograph the surroundings. Once the convoy dismounts received the purchased food items from the local vendors, they mounted their vehicles, returned to the approved route as per the signed Movement Control Form, attended one more official meeting at a site within the KCLZ (Apple Media), and then returned to Camp Eggers. [D,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,Q,R,1,3]

b. COMISAF Tactical Driving Directive dated 21 September 2010 (ISAF TDD) does not supersede the NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy. The COMISAF TDD provides guidance and intent for appropriate driving procedures in support of ISAF operations. In pertinent part, the TDD states in paragraph 2.f. [A,B,C]

> Depending on the security situation, deliberately plan for time to get out of the vehicles and talk to people as a part of mounted patrolling operations, taking every opportunity to interact face-to-face. When security allows, dismount vehicles and remove ballistic glasses and walk among the people: Buy something at the village bazaar; ask a shop-keeper how his business is going; ask pedestrians how ISAF can assist the people in the local area. [C]

c. The ISAF TDD does not provide Convoy Commanders authority unilaterally to deviate from approved and signed convoy plans to conduct engagements with the local populace. [A,B,C]

1) The language in the TDD is not casual or spontaneous. It requires consideration of the security situation and deliberate planning. It is also written in the context of mounted patrolling operations, which have a different purpose and operational context than the present case in which a convoy was approved to transit the KCLZ en route to official meetings at two specific locations. [C,3]

2) Even if accepted that there is some latitude to consider engaging in such activities, the TDD does not absolve Convoy Commanders from their duty to perform within the requirements of their command. Moreover, the MCP is consistent with the ISAF TDD. It is a legal order that is complementary to the TDD, providing a rational approach to ensuring that individuals, the convoy commander, supporting elements, and the Command itself are prepared for a movement, by establishing notice, providing situational awareness, ensuring proper planning and oversight, managing risk, ensuring proper approval by proper authorities, and if necessary, assisting the efforts for rescue and recovery operations. Further, the Command maintains an adaptive agile posture by providing in the MCP the approval process for exceptions, waivers, and additions to ensure requests are considered by appropriate Command authorities. Those individuals who seek to disregard or engage in non-compliance or selective compliance create peril for others, to

include their fellow US/Coalition service members, civilian co-workers, potential rescue and recovery forces, the command climate, and the Command itself. [A,B,C]

d. Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) was the Convoy Commander for this movement. He strongly asserted that he acted in accordance with the ISAF TDD. That is not so clear. What is clear is that he violated the MCP. [A,B,C,D,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P]

1) First, he departed the Starting Point (SP) without all members being accounted for on the Movement Control Form. Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6) was not listed initially on the Movement Control Form, and was never updated as a member of the convoy. [A,D,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,Q]

2) Second, he ordered deviation from the approved route to the location of food vendors without proper notification to Movement Control of either the route change or stop at the pizza shop and bread shop. Known two-way communication challenges between a traveling convoy and Movement Control are a significant consideration before deviating from the approved route. While the convoy possessed a PALLAS device, location is only one of many critical information elements necessary for proper command and control. The contention that deviating from the route to conduct a dismounted food stop lasting15-20 minutes is not significant enough to support a notification report to Movement Control appears evasive, demonstrates poor judgment, and violates the official requirement. [A,D,F,G,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,R]

3) Third, without appropriate approval or communication with Movement Control, the Convoy Commander dismounted, and allowed others to dismount, for approximately 15-20 minutes, and travel from the pizza shop to the bread shop and back again, for the purpose of ordering and receiving food, presumably to engage the local populace, but nevertheless receiving food that the convoy members consumed. [A,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,R]

4) Fourth, the target location was a food vendor where food was purchased and received. This was non-mission related travel. The fact that members of the local populace were present and interaction occurred with Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3), Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) and Dr. (b)(6) does not support a finding that this detour was mission-related. This would be an overly broad interpretation of the NTM-A/ CSTC-A mission and of the convoy's mission. The approved mission of this convoy was to conduct a series of movements to planned official meetings at specific meeting sites, and did not include the unscheduled ("audible") movement that was not properly nor officially declared, planned, briefed, or approved. Moreover, this stop was not due to exigent circumstances, as being "ahead of schedule" for a meeting is not urgent, and certainly does not support significantly deviating from the approved route in order to drive to local food vendors, without notice to proper authorities, to then "break the seal" of the UASUVs, dismount, and move on foot to order and receive food while interacting with the local populace. [A,F,H,I,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,R]

e. The proper actions of a Convoy Commander contemplating a food stop or engagement with the local populace would be to request an exception or waiver as allowed in the MCP. In this instance, the food stop and engagement were "unscheduled," no exception or waiver was sought, no approval was granted, and therefore, the stop to purchase food and engage the local populace should not have taken place. Imprudent behavior and disregard for the Movement Control Policy, if allowed unabated, will predictably contribute to the erosion of discipline and proper movement control, corrupt the command climate, and increase the risk of future incidents or tragedies that might otherwise be averted by simply complying with the MCP. The answer was always in the MCP. It provides a deliberate process in preparing for movements that also allows consideration and prudent approval of initiatives that might further the effectiveness of NTM-A's efforts in Afghanistan. [A,D,F,H,I,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,R,S,T,U,V]

3. Findings: I make the following findings.

a. The NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy dated 22 August 2010 is a properly promulgated and implemented policy that applied to all the service members who traveled on Mission #331-39. [A,B]

b. Violations of the NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy dated 22 August 2010.

1) Pursuant to paragraph 6.c(8)(g), dismounted travel in the KCLZ is prohibited unless approved by the CoS or a general officer/civilian equivalent (SES). [A,3]

a) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) and Dr. (b)(6) dismounted their vehicle in the KCLZ and traveled on foot from their vehicle to a pizza shop across a street, down the street to a bread shop to purchase bread, and back to the original pizza shop to pick up the pizzas they had ordered. They were dismounted for approximately 15-20 minutes. [F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,3]

b) MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) received approval from Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) to dismount his vehicle. MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) dismounted his vehicle and took pictures. MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) was dismounted for an estimated 5 minutes. [H,J,N,O,P]

c) No appropriate authority granted approval, waiver, or exception to policy for this dismounted travel. [R,S,T,U,V]

d) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) and Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) violated paragraph 6.c(8)(g) of the MCP. [A,B,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,3]

e) MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) violated the MCP; however, he reasonably believed that he had appropriate authority from Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) the senior member of the convoy and convoy commander, to dismount the vehicle and take pictures. [H,P]

2) Pursuant to paragraph 7.d., Convoy Commanders will report any changes in primary route of travel and/or personnel listed on original mission movement control sheet prior to departure and upon arrival at each destination. [A]

a) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) the Convoy Commander, directed his convoy to deviate from the primary route of travel (Route Green) and to drive to a pizza shop to order food. The convoy stopped. Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) and Dr. (b)(6) dismounted and traveled on foot between the two food shops. The vehicles repositioned during this time to follow the dismounted personnel as they walked between the pizza and bread shops. The food stop lasted for approximately 15-20 minutes. [D,F,G,H,I,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,R]

b) Dr. (b)(6) was not listed on the Movement Control Form. She was an original member on this convoy, when it departed Camp Eggers and remained with it for the entire journey returning to Camp Eggers. [D,H,I,J,K,L,M,N,O,Q]

c) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) failed to report to Movement Control both the deviations from the primary route and the addition of Dr. (b)(6) to the convoy, and he therefore violated paragraph 7.d. of the MCP. [A,B,D,F,G,H,M]

3) Pursuant to paragraph 7.f., Convoy Commanders are required to inform Movement Control upon arrival at the following locations by use of primary or secondary means of communications… "(6) All stops during travel will be reported." [A]

a) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) the Convoy Commander, was required to inform Movement Control on arrival at the food stop, where members of his convoy dismounted for approximately 15-20 minutes to order and receive food from local vendors. [A,B,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P]

b) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) failed to inform Movement Control during the food stop, or to cause a convoy member to inform Movement Control, and therefore he violated paragraph 7.f. of the MCP. [A,B,G,H,M]

4) Pursuant to paragraph 9.a., based on the security threat in theater, NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel are not authorized any non-mission related travel (…photo-taking, dining…or any other activity not directly related to the mission for NTM-A/CSTC-A) without the approval of the applicable agency director (O-6/Director, GS-15 or above) and the NTM-A/CSTC-A Chief of Staff. [A]

a) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) directed the convoy off the approved route to a pizza shop where he, Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) and Dr. (b)(6) dismounted. Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) and Dr. (b)(6) ordered pizza for members of the convoy. Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) and Dr. (b)(6) then traveled on foot to a bread shop that was down the street and around the corner from the pizza shop where they purchased bread. Lt Col

(b)(6), (b)(3) Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) and Dr. (b)(6) then returned to the Pizza shop where they received the ordered pizza. The pizza was distributed to the convoy members when Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) delivered the pizza to CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) vehicle. [D,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,R]

b) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) authorized MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) to dismount and take pictures. [H,P]

c) The convoy mission was to conduct movements of personnel to two sites (GMIC and Ariana) for engagements on media. A roadside stop to interact with the local populace was not the mission of this convoy nor is it officially documented as part of the Afghan Outreach mission. [D,I,R,S]

d) No appropriate authority (applicable agency director (O-6/Director, GS-15 or above) and the NTM-A/CSTC-A CoS) granted approval for this stop. [D,R,S,T,U,V]

e) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) violated the MCP when he directed the convoy and individual service members to engage in non-mission travel. [A,B,D,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P]

f) Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) an experienced commissioned officer, violated the MCP when she engaged in non-mission travel, as she did not have appropriate authority to do so, and knew or should have known that Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) did not have authority to allow her to engage in non-mission travel. [A,B,D,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P]

g) MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) a Navy E-4, engaged in non-mission related travel, but reasonably believed that he had appropriate authority from Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) to dismount the vehicle and take pictures. [H,P]

c. Adequacy of the MCP

1) The MCP provides adequate mechanisms to request exceptions for specific circumstances. There are two dedicated paragraphs that provide procedures for requesting exceptions, waivers, or additions as well as several embedded references for individual sections depending on what is being sought. [A]

2) There was no request for exception or waiver to the MCP for any actions taken by this convoy or its members in deviation from the MCP. [H,R,S,T,U,V]

3) CAPT (b)(6), (b)(3) properly signed the Movement Control Form as an O-6 per Enclosure 1 ("requires O-6 signature") of the MCP. However, he was not in Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) chain of command and while he conducted his due diligence appropriately, he was not the optimal authority to consider and approve this mission request or risk assessment. [A,R]

4) The MCP and Movement Control Form use various terms to describe approval levels, and the policy is therefore ambiguous on whether an "O-6," "Directorate O-6," "O-6 Director," or "O-6/Director" are intentionally different, and if so what meaning is attributed to each. [A]

d. Convoy Details:

1) The following personnel traveled on mission #331-39: Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3), Capt (b)(6), (b)(3), SGT (b)(6), (b)(3), Dr. (b)(6) CPT (b)(6), (b)(3), CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) SGT (b)(6), (b)(3), MSgt (b)(6), (b)(3) and MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) [D,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,Q]

2) This convoy was briefed and conducted as a two vehicle movement. [D,H,I,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,Q]

3) Nine personnel were on the convoy when it started at Camp Eggers; one person (CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) was dropped off at ISAF for an official meeting. Eight persons continued on the convoy to a stop where pizza and bread were purchased before the convoy continued to its final meeting stop and returned to Camp Eggers. [D,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,Q]

4) Camp Eggers Movement Control Cell recorded 1021 for the Starting Point (SP) and 1459 for the Rally Point Home (RPH). [G]

5) Convoy Route: The available evidence was insufficient to determine specific timing of the segments of each portion of the movement; however, with respect to the stops and order visited, I find as follows:

a) Travel segment 1: The convoy departed Camp Eggers and traveled to the Government Media Information Center (GMIC) for an official meeting. Travel was conducted in the Green Zone. [D,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,Q,1]

b) Travel segment 2: The convoy departed GMIC and traveled to the ISAF front gate. Travel was conducted in the Green Zone to drop off CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) for an official meeting at ISAF. [D,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,Q,1]

c) Travel segment 3: The convoy departed from the ISAF front gate and moved outside of the Green Zone, traveling south on Route Green. The convoy, on order from Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) then departed Route Green turned into a neighborhood where the convov arrived at a pizza shop. This travel took place in the KCLZ. Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) and Dr. (b)(6) dismounted and traveled on foot between a pizza shop and bread shop purchasing and receiving food. These three convoy members interacted with the local populace while traveling on foot between the two food shops. The food stop and interaction were not official missions for the convoy or Afghan Outreach. [D,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,R,S,3]

d) Travel segment 4: The convoy departed the pizza shop, returned to Route Green and headed south on Route Green to Ariana (media). The convoy stopped at the gate, and determined that they needed to go to Apple Media which was located in the immediate vicinity. The convoy traveled around the block to Apple Media and conducted an official meeting. I find that this was not a violation of the MCP because Ariana and Apple Media are in the immediate vicinity of one another and the movement did not require a deviation from the planned route. [D,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P]

e) Travel segment 5: The convoy traveled from Apple Media to its final destination of Camp Eggers via Route Green to Green Zone. [D,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P]

e. Risk Assessment

1) The risk assessment was not adequate, not comprehensive, and not appropriate for the mission as executed. [A,D,E,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P]

a) The Risk Assessment contained an error on the Mission line. I find that the mission was "to visit GMIC and Ariana as the CONOP and route details" and not a "RECON FOR VCR MISSION." The Risk Assessment was for a ground movement to two specific locations for the purpose of conducting meetings related to media. [D,E,M]

b) The risk assessment did not include consideration of the convoy departing the approved/briefed route to a local food stop where four convoy members disembarked from their UASUVs and conducted dismounted travel in the KCLZ. The risk assessment was therefore inadequate as it did not capture the true activities, location of the activities, and related threat analysis. It was not comprehensive in a relevant manner without these details. Therefore, it was inappropriate for this convoy mission. [A,D,E,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,3,4,5,6]

c) The risk assessment was at least "HIGH" for this mission and not "MODERATE" as recorded on the Composite Risk Management Worksheet. The convoy executed an unplanned/ unscheduled route detour, without notice to Movement Control, for a food stop where the local populace took note of convoy members who broke the seal of their UASUVs and conducted a dismounted movement for approximately 15-20 minutes in the KCLZ. Prior to Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) calling the "audible", the route change, location of the food stop, and intent to dismount was unknown to members of the convoy – all requirements for establishing the preparedness of the 8 convoy members in determining the proper risk assessment. All eight convoy members at the food stop were not briefed on the plan or the contingencies for the unscheduled route detour followed by a food stop and dismounted movement. Additionally, classified threat reports were available and relevant to this convoy. [A,D,E,F,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,3,4,5,6]

2) The preparation process included two briefings for this movement, one comprehensive brief two nights before (Thursday, 25 November 2010) and an update brief just prior to the movement (27 November 2010). Neither brief covered the food stop. [D,H,I,J,M,N,O,Q]

f. Threat Reports. Classified threat reports for 27 November 2010 were relevant and available for this movement. [4,5,6]

1) JTF Kabul (Warlord) Daily Intelligence Update (27 Nov 10): Details were relevant and classified. [4]

2) NTM-A CJ2 Threat Report (27 Nov 10): Details were relevant and classified. [5]

3) USFOR-A Shift Change Brief (27 Nov 10): Details were relevant and classified. This brief also included the route status. [6]

g. Policy Change.

1) No change to the MCP is necessary based on the circumstances of Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) movement. The MCP provided the CG-approved process that was clearly disregarded, and the current policy is sufficient to provide appropriate deliberate planning for occasional actions such as that engaged in by Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) [A,B,D,F,G,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,R]

2) There was no appropriate control of this convoy when it departed the approved route for a dismounted food stop in the KCLZ without notification to Movement Control. [A,B,D,F,G,H,J,K,L,M,N,O,P]

3) Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) violated provisions in the MCP that were intended to maintain accountability, mitigate risk, and protect members of the Command on this movement, contributing negatively to the command climate of NTM-A/CSTC-A. [A,B,D,FG,H,J,L,M,N,O,P]

4. Recommendations.

a. Establish Convoy Commander's Course to ensure qualified personnel are properly trained and certified to lead movements and will operate with clarity on movement authority and standards of responsibility and accountability.

b. Refer Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) to his ADCON chain of command for consideration of adverse action.

CSTC-A-CTAG-A
SUBJECT: Report of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Movement Control Policy – Mission #331-39

c. Prohibit Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) from serving as a Convoy Commander and refer him to the first GO/SES in his OPCON supervisory chain for counseling regarding his duties and responsibilities as a Convoy Commander, particularly with respect to the MCP.

d. Refer Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) and CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) to the first GO/SES in their supervisory chains for counseling regarding their duties and responsibilities, particularly with respect to the MCP.

e. The Chief of Staff direct the Afghan Outreach Office and all other personnel on mission #331-39 to receive extra training regarding the MCP and the TDD.

f. The Chief of Staff direct the CJ3 to review and modify the MCP, as necessary, to ensure all approval authorities for movements, exceptions, waivers, and additions are clearly stated, internally consistent, and accurately identified.

g. The Chief of Staff direct the CJ3 to take the lead in recommending to COM NTM-A/ CSTC-A if the command should move forward with a more robust program to support "spontaneous engagements" with the local populace, and if so, to incorporate clear guidance to prepare for and execute such missions into the Movement Control Policy by either a dedicated section or annex. As it will likely cover issues beyond movement control, a FRAGO and Command Engagement Policy is merited, if the command chooses to move in this direction. Those designated by the command to execute this mission should be selected based on appropriate skills, experience, and training as well as demonstrated maturity, wisdom, and responsible leadership.

h. The Chief of Staff direct the CJ3 to periodically (quarterly) review the MCP to ensure it maintains relevancy by adapting to an evolving command, recognizing positions and programs that possess unique capabilities, and optimizing persons who bring experience and specific training to their mission in Afghanistan.

5. Point of contact is the undersigned at (b)(6), (b)(3) @afghan.swa.army.mil or DSN: (b)(2)

(b)(6), (b)(3)

Colonel, USMC
Investigating Officer

NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

NTM-A/CSTC-A-CoS 30 November 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR Col (b)(6), (b)(3) NTM-A/CSTC-A, APO AE 09356

SUBJECT: Appointment as an Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigating Officer – Movement Control Issue

1. You are appointed to act as an AR 15-6 Investigation Officer to assist me in obtaining the facts and circumstances surrounding an alleged stop by Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) in downtown Kabul on or about 27 November 2010 to pick up a pizza.

2. You will produce findings and recommendations that address the following:

a. Did Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) follow the applicable NTM-A policy(ies) regarding this movement?

b. Does the NTM-A movement control policy provide adequate mechanisms to request exceptions for specific circumstances? If the movement in question was not in compliance with the policy, was there a request for exception? If there was a request for exception, was it timely and approved by competent authority?

c. Who participated in the movement; how many vehicles and personnel were involved; when did it occur; what was the route and what were the stops; why did the move and stops take place; were all aspects of the movement focused on a military mission?

d. Was there a risk assessment completed for this move? If so, was it adequate, comprehensive, and appropriate?

e. Did anyone planning or participating in the move secure a threat assessment when planning the move? What was the threat assessment?

f. Should the command consider any policy changes based on this set of circumstances? If so, what is the rationale for considering these changes?

3. You will, at a minimum, interview MSgt (b)(6), (b)(3) MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) (b)(6), (b)(3) and Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) You will review the NTM-A/CSTC-A movement control policy before making findings and recommendation. Additionally, you will review any other relevant policy or memorandum.

4. You should ensure that all personnel with relevant information are interviewed. In your report, provide your reasoning for not interviewing any persons who may have relevant information.

NTM-A/CSTC-A-CoS
SUBJECT: Appointment as an Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigating Officer – Movement Control Issue

5. In conducting your inquiry, you will employ the procedures set out in Chapters 3 and 4 of AR 15-6. During the course of your investigation, you will interview the individuals whom you identify as being relevant to the investigation. Witness' statement will be sworn using DA Form 2823. If circumstances preclude you from obtaining a sworn statement, you may summarize witness' statement. If during your investigation, you suspect that individuals may have violated regulations or orders or the UCMJ, you must advise them of their rights under Article 31 of the UCMJ using DA Form 3881.

6. Your findings and recommendations will be submitted to me on a DA Form 1574, Report of Proceedings by Investigating Officer. Your report of investigation, together with all evidence marked as exhibits, will be submitted to the OSJA for a legal review NLT 14 days from the date of this appointment. Submit any requests for extension to me through your legal advisor.

7. This investigation is your primary duty and takes precedence over all other duties assigned. Your appointment remains in effect until the investigation is complete.

8. Within 24 hours of receiving this order you will contact LTC (b)(6), (b)(3) the NTM-A/CSTC-A Deputy Staff Judge Advocate at DSN (b)(2) or email at (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil, to schedule a pre-investigation legal briefing. She will also serve as your primary legal advisor throughout your investigation.

(b)(6), (b)(3)

Colonel, US Army
Chief of Staff

Unclassified Exhibits

A. NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy (dated 22 Aug 2010)
B. FRAGO 10-340: Distribution of the NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy
C. ISAF Tactical Driving Directive (dated 21 Sep 2010)
D. Movement Control Form, Mission #331-39 (27 Nov 2010)
E. Composite Risk Management Worksheet (DTG: 271000NOV10)
F. Mission #331-39 Maps of Route Stops and Route Deviation
G. Movement Control Log
H. Lt Col : Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate
Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) : Sworn Statement (11 Dec 2010)
I. Lt Col Mission Brief Card and Route Map
J. Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) : Sworn Statement (7 Dec 2010)
K. Dr (b)(6) : Sworn Statement (9 Dec 2010)
L. SGT (b)(6), (b)(3) : Sworn Statement (7 Dec 2010)
M. CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) Sworn Statements (7, 17, 20 Dec 2010)
N. SGT Sworn Statement (7 Dec 2010)
O. MSgt worn Statement (7 Dec 2010)
P. MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3) worn Statement (8 Dec 2010)
Q. CPT : Sworn Statement (7 Dec 2010)
R. CAPT (b)(6), (b)(3) : Sworn Statement (10 Dec 2010)
S. LTC worn Statement (18 Dec 2010)
T. MAJ (b)(6), (b)(3) Sworn Statement (18 Dec 2010)
U. COL worn Statement (18 Dec 2010)
V. Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) Sworn Statement (18 Dec 2010)
W. LTC (b)(6), (b)(3) Sworn Statement (18 Dec 2010)

Classified Exhibits

1. NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy Map: Kabul Green Zone
2. NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy Map: Kabul Inner Zone
3. NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy Map: Kabul City Limit Zone
4. JTF Kabul (Warlord) Daily Intelligence Update, 27 Nov 2010
5. NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ2 Threat Report, 27 Nov 2010
6. USFOR-A Shift Change Brief, 27 Nov 2010

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
CAMP EGGERS, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTM-A/CSTC-A-CG 22 August 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR All Personnel Assigned to Camp Eggers or NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

SUBJECT: NTM-A/CSTC-A Memorandum - Movement Control Policy

1. References.

a. Field Manual 4-01.45, Tactical Convoy OPS, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Convoy Operations, 24 March 2005

b. Field Manual 5-19, Composite Risk Management, August 2005

c. ISAF SOP 231, Security and Access, February 2009

d. ISAF SOP 331, Theatre Force Protection Measures, August 2009

e. ISAF SOP 361, Theatre Driving Principles and Traffic Accident Procedures, August 2009

f. ISAF SOP 373, Escalation of Force Procedures, April 2010

g. New Kabul Compound Policy #26 – Mounted and Dismounted Movement Policy

2. General. This policy supersedes the Movement Control Policy for Camp Eggers Personnel dated 22 November 2009 and incorporates the Movement Control Policy Revision dated 15 June 2010.

3. Purpose. Establish Command Policy for movements conducted by NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel.

4. Applicability.

a. Effective immediately all personnel, including US military and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, Coalition Forces and other non-local national (LN) government personnel assigned, attached, or serving with HQ NTM-A/CSTC-A will become familiar with and adhere to this policy. This includes all Force Protection (FP), Joint Visitor Bureau (JVB), Combined Air Power Transition Force (CAPTF), and Personal Security Detachment (PSD)

personnel. All officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of this command will ensure widest dissemination and compliance with this memorandum.

b. All NTM-A/CSTC-A elements not located at Camp Eggers are required to develop movement control policies and vehicle tracking procedures consistent with this policy.

c. This policy is an order of the NTM-A/CSTC-A Commander and is punitive as applied to US Personnel; violation of this policy may result in administrative or disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for US personnel and individual nation regulations for Coalition personnel.

d. DoD civilian employees violating this policy may be subject to adverse administrative action. DoD civilian contractor employees violating this policy may be subject to criminal prosecution in Federal District Court or subject to other punishment, including discipline by their respective employers, being barred from NTM-A/CSTC-A facilities, and/or being barred from the Combined Joint Operational Area (CJOA).

5. Scope. This policy is designed to protect personnel, identified in paragraph 4 above, who serve or perform duties with HQ NTM-A/CSTC-A. Effective immediately, all personnel identified in paragraph 4 will abide by the policies contained herein.

6. Zones.

a. The term "Green Zone" refers to the US Embassy complex, US Embassy Annex, Headquarters (HQ) International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), the USAID facility, Ministry of Defense (MOD), Camp Eggers, the Alamo Annex, Knox House, the German School, the Area 10 safe house areas, Qaala House Compound, North Lot, East Lot, and the Presidential Palace compounds (See Enclosure 2 which depicts the "Green Zone"). Although this zone is a semi-secured area with multiple checkpoints, personnel should remain vigilant at all times and all vehicle movements will utilize armored vehicles.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(2) Shuttles, when available, will be used for transportation of personnel within the Green Zone. Due to force protection considerations, shuttles are the preferred method of travel within the Green Zone. Personnel using the Camp Eggers shuttle service are allowed to travel as individuals.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

b. The term "Inner Zone" refers to the Green Zone areas above as well as adds the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and New Kabul Compound (NKC) (See Enclosure 3 which depicts the "Inner Zone"). While the level of security is higher in MOI and NKC, movement to these areas requires brief movement through unsecured areas of Kabul to reach the destination. All vehicle movements through the inner zone will utilize armored vehicles.

(1) Travel outside the Green Zone but within the Inner Zone requires O-5, Civilian (GS-14 equivalent) or higher approval by filling out an "abbreviated" Movement Control Form (Enclosure 5). No risk assessment is required.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(3) A section with a recurring daily mission within the Inner Zone is authorized to operate on a properly processed Inner Zone Abbreviated Movement Control Form (no risk assessment) for seven days.

(4) Shuttles, when available, will be used for transportation of personnel within the Inner Zone. Due to force protection considerations, shuttles are the preferred method of travel within the Green Zone. Personnel using the Camp Eggers shuttle service are allowed to travel as individuals.

(5) Dismounted travel outside of the green zone but inside the Inner Zone is not authorized unless approved by the NTM-A CoS or a general officer/civilian equivalent (SES).

c. "Kabul City Limits Zone" (KCLZ) refers to all areas outside of the Inner Zone that are within Kabul City Police Districts. All areas outside Kabul City Police Districts are considered outside the KCLZ for the purposes of this policy (see enclosure 4 for "Kabul City Limits Zone" Map). Movements within the KCLZ require a full Movement Control Form (Enclosure 5) including risk assessment.

(1) The KCLZ limits are bounded by:

(a) Camp Julian in the south (Route Green).

(b) Camp Blackhorse in the east (Route Violet up to Camp Blackhorse).

(c) Afghan Defense University (ADU) (Checkpoint Orange 4).

(d) The Route Wings east and Route Brown intersection in the north.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(3) Approval for travel of two vehicles or greater movement in the KCLZ during high risk periods requires authorization from the following levels of command:

(a) 0500-2200, requires approval from an O-6/Director or higher (includes civilian equivalents GS-15 or SES).

(b) 2200-0500, requires approval from the O-6/Director or higher (includes civilian equivalents GS-15 or SES) and the NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3.

(c) Vehicle movement between 0700 and 1100 should be minimized due to the prevalence of IED attacks during this timeframe.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(c) For movements outside KCLZ, convoy commanders will coordinate movement with applicable movement and tactical control centers for areas of operations in which they plan to travel. All applicable procedures for movement in that AO will be followed. If procedures are less restrictive than that of this policy, the more restrictive of policies is to be followed.

(d) Movements outside the KCLZ require ECM. The following minimum rules apply for movements outside the KCLZ:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(2) RSC movements outside the KCLZ.

(a) Will be approved by the RSC Commander.

(b) Each RSC will establish a system to monitor and track vehicle and personnel movements, consistent with this policy.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(d) Movements will be coordinated with applicable movement and tactical control centers for areas of operations in which they plan to travel. All applicable procedures for

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(f) Convoy commanders will visually inspect equipment for damage prior to departure.

(g) Dismounted travel in the KCLZ is prohibited unless approved by the CoS or a general officer/civilian equivalent (SES).

(9) NTM-A/CSTC-A units not located at Camp Eggers, but located in the KCLZ (e.g. Camps Blackhorse and Julian, etc) will:

(a) Establish a system to monitor and track vehicles and personnel movements consistent with this policy.

(b) Comply with convoy standards and approval authorities specified in this policy.

d. Ground travel outside the KCLZ.

(1) Units located at Camp Eggers.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

e. Exceptions and Waivers. Any section requiring a waiver or exception to the above movement criteria must submit the request for approval to the NTM-A CoS or a general officer/civilian equivalent (SES).

7. Pre-Execution Check Requirements.

a. Prior to movement, convoy commanders will coordinate with the Camp Eggers Movement Control Cell for mission tracking, route status, updated threat information, or equipment directives and properly submit the Movement Control Form approved by the appropriate level of leadership. All NTM-A/CSTC-A units stationed outside Camp Eggers are required to develop their own movement control mission tracking system consistent with this policy (e.g. Camp Blackhorse is located in KCLZ, therefore movements from Camp Blackhorse must comply with the standards outlined in paragraphs 6c and 6d).

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

b. Convoy commanders will ensure each vehicle carries mission essential equipment required for all vehicle movements, as well as an emergency kit that includes a spare tire, strip map, jack, flashlight, one case of water, one case of MREs, tow straps, and a fire extinguisher. Additional equipment such as spare keys, breaker bar, axe, jumper cables and other equipment for vehicle extractions is encouraged.

c. Communication requirements.

(1) Convoy commanders will verify that cell phones have the following numbers

programmed (at a minimum):

(a) Camp Eggers BDOC: 0708375206

(b) Camp Eggers Movement Control: 0708375218

(c) Camp Phoenix BDOC: 070233292

(d) RSC Commanders and other elements not located on Camp Eggers will designate communication requirements and numbers required for movements of their personnel.

(2) All cell phone numbers and RF frequency device serial numbers will be annotated on the movement form which is filed with the Camp Eggers BDOC or filed with outstation movement control elements for those not stationed at Camp Eggers.

d. Convoy commanders will report any changes in primary route of travel and /or personnel listed on original mission movement control sheet prior to departure and upon arrival at each destination.

e. Each vehicle requires one Combat Life Saver (CLS) qualified person with CLS bag.

f. The convoy commander will report status of the mission using "MSN#" (assigned by BDOC when turning in Movement Control Form) to Movement Control and check for updates on route status. Convoy commanders are required to inform Movement Control upon arriving at the following locations by use of primary or secondary means of communications. Brevity codes are shown in parenthesis.

(1) Starting point (SP).

(2) Arrival at destination/rally point (RP).

(3) Starting point home (SPH).

(4) Rally point home (RPH).

(5) All accidents, vehicle break downs or incidents will be reported.

(6) All stops during travel will be reported.

g. Personnel are required to conduct movement briefs utilizing a verbal OPORD format prior to departure. The Inner Zone brief may be condensed. Pre-Combat Checks and verbal reviews of immediate action battle drills prior to departing are required (Enclosure 5).

h. Prior to movement, the convoy commander will ensure that all PMCS are performed on the vehicle as appropriate to vehicle type.

8. Documentation and Driving Standards.

a. All Personnel will inform Camp Eggers BDOC Movement Control Cell (MCC) of planned primary and alternate routes prior to departure by turning in the Movement Control Form (Enclosure 5) once authorized by the appropriate level of leadership (para 6). Movement Control Forms are considered unclassified, but should be treated as For Official Use Only as they are controlled due to OPSEC reasons. This is required for all movements outside the Green Zone (Inner Zone Form may be abbreviated – no risk assessment). Convoy routes must be listed on the Movement Control Form - filling out the form with "see map" is not acceptable.

(1) ECP sentries will check vehicles departing from NTM-A/CSTC-A controlled camps for proper Movement Control Forms and wear of equipment based on requirements specified in this SOP. Discrepancies will be reported to the movement control center and the convoy may be delayed or denied exit.

(2) If it is discovered a movement sheet is not turned into the movement control cell, they will call Directorate and report the convoy commander's failure to comply.

b. Driver Conduct:

(1) Personnel will not engage in reckless and aggressive driving at excessive speed.

(2) Personnel will drive in accordance with Afghan speed limits or with the flow of traffic where speed limits are not posted.

(3) Personnel will drive at "ground-guide" (walking) speed on dirt roads and through populated areas or when passing pedestrians in close proximity.

(4) Personnel will not aggressively interrupt the flow of traffic simply to prevent limited separation within vehicle convoys.

(5) Personnel will drive on the appropriate side of the road, not in the center.

c. Escalation of Force (EOF).

(1) While participating in any movement, all personnel will adhere to EOF procedures specified in the revised ISAF SOP 373 dated 10 April 2010. **Note:** ISAF SOP 373 does not limit the inherent right to self defense. Any and all national caveats to self-defense rules still apply.

(2) Refer to Enclosure 6 (Escalation of Force Guide) as a ready reference for appropriate EOF procedures.

d. Convoy Intervals: To lower convoy profile, drivers will disperse up to 30 meters (within the effectiveness of their ECM) and move with the flow of traffic.

e. Actions at Checkpoints.

(1) ANA/ANP: At ANA/ANP checkpoints you must stop the vehicle if directed. Slow down and make eye contact with the guard and show ID if required. Do not attempt to run an ANA checkpoint unless presented with the threat of immediate harm to the convoy; this is not a desired course of action - you may be fired upon. Contact the Camp Eggers BDOC if you are not allowed to pass the checkpoint.

(2) Report any suspicious activity to the movement control cell and your chain of command.

9. Non-Mission Related Travel.

a. Based on the security threat in theater, NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel are not authorized any non-mission related travel (sightseeing, photo-taking, dining, climbing any of local mountains, or any other activity not directly related to the mission of NTM-A/CSTC-A) without the approval of the applicable agency director (O-6/Director, GS-15 or above) and the NTM-A/CSTC-A CoS.

b. Social engagements inside secure compounds (e.g., foreign embassies, GIRoA Buildings in the Inner Zone, etc.) that relate to official business or are mission-related activities of a unique nature at a location other than the service member's normal place of duty may be approved by the first O-6/Director or GS-15 in the member's chain of command. Military personnel with authorization to participate in these functions will wear appropriate uniform and will carry assigned weapon(s) and ammunition.

c. Except in extraordinary circumstances, the leaders identified above will not grant exceptions for reasons that are primarily personal or social.

10. Actions Related to Late Convoys. Definition of late--30 minutes beyond time of return as listed on Movement Control Form. In the event a convoy is delayed in their return to Camp Eggers (or intended destination) by 30 minutes of the estimated time of return, BDOC will take the following actions:

a. BDOC calls convoy commander via cellular phone in an effort to ascertain the convoy's status.

b. If the convoy commander does not answer, BDOC begins calling all other members of the convoy on their cellular phones.

c. If no telephonic contact is made, BDOC will check the status of the convoy's BFT, PALLAS, and PLBs (depending on which system the convoy is equipped with).

d. If the location devices do not determine the status of the convoy, BDOC will contact the convoy commander's directorate to determine status of convoy.

e. BDOC will notify the CJ3 Joint Operations Center (JOC) regarding the late convoy.

f. If all of the above actions fail to determine the status of the convoy, BDOC will initiate a response from the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) or other appropriate response forces.

11. Actions Related to Distressed Convoys.

a. Upon notification of a distressed convoy, BDOC will initiate the QRF or other appropriate response forces.

b. BDOC will notify the CJ3 JOC and manage the situation until the threat is mitigated.

12. Motor Vehicle Accident Requirements.

a. Convoy commanders will ensure that each vehicle carries an "Accident Card" (Enclosure 7) from Transportation Motor Pool (TMP) written in English and Dari. The Accident Card should be located in the dispatch folder.

b. One Nine-Line MEDEVAC Graphic Training Aid (GTA) or similar item will be carried in each vehicle.

c. If a convoy vehicle is involved in an accident (impacts another vehicle, person, or object resulting in damage or injury), leaving the scene of an accident without justification degrades the ability of NTM-A/CSTC-A to accomplish its mission. Being involved in an accident does not automatically pose a "threat situation" and each situation must be evaluated independently. If the threat situation and mission allow, stop and perform the following:

(1) Render aid and inform ANP of accident as quickly as possible. However, NTMA/ CSTC-A personnel will never be placed under the custody of the Afghan National Police.

(2) Complete the Accident Card and hand the driver of the other vehicle the completed card. It is essential that personnel involved in an accident deliver the accident card and communicate on the card their identifying information. This should include vehicle license number, section, and identifying the unit as coming from NTM-A/CSTC-A, as this will have a deterrent effect on fraudulent injury claims.

(3) Notify the Camp Eggers BDOC and chain of command as soon as possible regarding the accident.

d. Upon return to the compound, the convoy commander will immediately file a report with the Camp Eggers Provost Marshal's Office (PMO).

13. Driver Training.

a. All military personnel assigned, attached, or serving with HQ NTM-A/CSTC-A are required to attend the Command's Driver Training Class scheduled through HHC prior to travelling in a vehicle other than as a third occupant and within first 30 days of assignment regardless of travel requirements. This training requirement also applies to all personnel

assigned to NTA-/CTSC-A locations outside Camp Eggers. If these personnel are unable to attend Driver Training at Camp Eggers, the training can be done locally. If training materials are needed, Camp Eggers HHC Driver Training personnel can be contacted for course materials.

b. All drivers and convoy commanders must be trained and approved for these duties prior to any performance in these positions by their directorates or other staff elements with training certified by Memorandum for Record.

c. For licensing, the Memorandum for Record described above must be turned into HHC to receive a NTM-A/CSTC-A driver's license once directorates or other staff elements have completed additional drivers training within the section.

14. Uniform Requirements.

a. The uniform requirement for US personnel during movement outside the Green zone is:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(3) Any change to this uniform or weapon status will be determined by the FPCON level.

c. The uniform requirements for civilians during movement outside the Green Zone is IBA worn, ballistic helmet worn if issued, and appropriate attire.

d. The uniform requirements for civilians during movement inside the Green Zone is appropriate duty attire.

e. Physical Fitness Uniform (PFU) is authorized for residents of the Alamo Annex and Knox House when traveling on foot between Camp Eggers and their respective lodging.

f. Marines, IAW their service regulation are prohibited from wearing PT uniforms for any purposes other than conducting PT and within the WFP/Clamshell areas after duty hours.

g. Equivalent uniforms and clothing corresponding to the paragraphs above (14a. through 14d.) of sourcing country will be followed for non-US personnel.

15. Wear of Civilian Attire off of the Camp Eggers Complex.

a. Civilian personnel assigned, attached or supporting NTM-A/CSTC-A will wear suitable clothing that appropriately reflects the respect and professionalism of the organization.

b. Military personnel assigned, attached, or supporting NTM-A/CSTC-A will not wear civilian attire off of the Camp Eggers complex without the expressed written permission of the CoS, DCOM or Commanding General. These officials may approve the wear of civilian attire off of the Camp Eggers complex for compelling reason related to the performance of official business.

c. Compelling Military Necessity for one person in a group of military personnel will not routinely be used as rationale for all members of the group to wear civilian clothing for a specific event or mission.

d. The only routine exceptions that may be granted are as follows:

(1) The Command's NGO liaison when conducting interaction with NGOs during which the wear of military attire would significantly harm the mission.

(2) Personnel with a regulatory authorization to wear civilian clothing during the performance of their duties (e.g. Special Agents of the US Army Criminal Investigation Division).

(3) NTM-A/CSTC-A military personnel who are moving directly to and from the Kabul Airport as passengers on civilian airlines.

e. Personnel wearing civilian attire will not carry concealed weapons. Personnel wearing civilian attire will wear proper IPE, helmet, etc, based on zone of travel as described in para 6.

f. Requests to wear civilian attire off of the complex will be made in writing through the Command's SJA and addressed to the CoS. The CoS will confer with the SJA as needed to conduct a legal review of such requests.

16. Exceptions to Policy. This is not an all inclusive movement control policy. Exceptions or

additions to this policy will be submitted through written approval from O-6 Directors/GS-15 equivalents (or appropriate authority as indicated in specific paragraphs) to the NTM-A/CSTC-A CoS. This policy remains in effect until cancelled or superseded in writing.

17. Point of Contact (POC). The POC for this policy is the CJ34 (Force Protection) at DSN (b)(2)

WILLIAM B. CALDWELL IV
Lieutenant General, US Army
Commanding

Encls
1 - Zone Requirements Chart
2 - Kabul Green Zone Map
3 - Kabul Inner Zone Map
4 - Kabul City Limits Zone (KCLZ) Map
5 - Movement Control Form with Risk Assessment
6 - Escalation of Force Guide
7 - Accident Card

ENCLOSURE 1 - ZONE REQUIREMENTS CHART

Zone	Area	Uniform	Dismounted Travel	Vehicle/ Personnel	Weapons Status	Approval	Other
Green	Embassy, HQ ISAF, USAID, MOD, Camp Eggers, Alamo Annex, Knox House, German School, Area 10 safe houses, Qaala House, North Lot, East Lot, Presidential Palace compounds	Duty Uniform (PT gear only authorized for travel to/from off-base residence)	Yes - minimum of two personnel (EXCEPTION: to/from Alamo and Knox)	Single vehicle - Two personnel (E-5 min convoy commander)	Assigned weapon with minimum of one magazine (Amber Status)	Directorate maintains internal tracker	All vehicles must be armored vehicles
Inner	All Green Zone, MOI, NKC	Duty Uniform & IBA. Helmet, eye, ear, and hand protection at the discretion of the convoy commander based on threat assessment	No - unless approved in writing by CoS or a General Officer/GO (SES)	Single vehicle - minimum of two armed personnel, unless one is LN or contractor (E-6 min convoy commander)	Assigned weapon with combat load (Amber Status)	Requires Abbreviated Movement Control Form (no risk assessment required): **O-5 (GS-14) signature.**	All vehicles must be armored vehicles
Kabul City Limits Zone (KCLZ)	Within the City Limits of Kabul as defined by the Kabul City police districts: North - no further than the Wings/Brown intersection, East - no further than Violet 8 (Camp Blackhorse), South - no further than Camp Julian on Route Green, West - no further than Orange 4 (ADU).	Duty Uniform, IBA, helmet, eye, ear, hand protection	No - unless approved in writing by CoS or a GO (SES)	All vehicles must be armored. Two vehicles with minimum of one ECM. Minimum of four personnel, each vehicle must have one person armed with a rifle (E-6 min convoy commander).	Assigned weapon with combat load (Amber Status) - at least one rifle per vehicle	Requires Movement Control Form w/risk assessment: Movement between 0500-2200 requires O-6 signature; **between 2200 -0500 requires O-6 Director or higher AND CJ3.**	Single vehicle moves authorized with **CJ3 AND Director (O-6, GS-15 or higher) approval** (E-7 min convoy commander). Vehicle must have two armed persons, one with a rifle. No single vehicle moves 1800-0800 hours. See 6.c(4) for details.
Outside KCLZ		Duty Uniform, IBA, helmet, eye, ear, hand protection	No - unless approved in writing by CoS or GO (SES)	Normally three MRAP vehicles, at least two with ECMs	Assigned weapon with combat load (Amber Status) - Crew-served weapons are recommended for MRAPS and HMMWVs	Requires Movement Control Form w/risk assessment: **CoS or GO (SES) Approval** (E-6 min convoy commander).	Use of HMMWV or armored SUV may be used with approval of GO **(SES) AND CoS. For any travel between 2200-0500 hours, GO (SES) and CoS approval required.**

Page 42 redacted for the following reason:
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(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

Headquarters
International Security Assistance Force

KABUL AFGHANISTAN

TO: See Distribution

SUBJECT: TACTICAL DRIVING DIRECTIVE

DATE: 21 September 2010

REFERENCES:
A. HQ ISAF SOP 116: Military Attitude and Discipline Applicable in ISAF AOO (21 August 2008).
B. HQ ISAF SOP 361: Theatre Driving Principles and Traffic Accident Procedures (19 August 2009).
C. HQ ISAF SOP 373 - Direction and Guidance for Escalation of Force (10 April 2010).
D. HQ ISAF SOP 302: Operational Reports and Returns (7 July 2009).
E. HQ ISAF FRAGO 221: 2008 Civilian Casualty Reporting (24 July 2008).
F. HQ ISAF SOP 309: Coordination, Deconfliction and Authorization of Deliberate Operations within the ISAF Area of Operations (3 October 2008).
G. HQ ISAF FRAGO 208-2009: Commander's Guidance on Driving among the Afghan Population (20 April 2009).
H. COMISAF Tactical Directive Revision 2 (19 August 2010).
K. COMISAF's Counterinsurgency Guidance (1 August 2010).

1. **Purpose**: To provide guidance and intent for appropriate driving procedures in support of ISAF operations. This directive also applies to all US Forces operating under the operational control or tactical control of US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A). Wherever this directive refers to ISAF SOPs or FRAGOs, USFOR-A forces will refer to comparable USFOR-A SOPs and FRAGOs, where applicable; otherwise, they will follow the ISAF guidance.

2. **Commander's Intent**:

a. Over the course of the last year a greater emphasis has been placed on the need for improved driving practices in order to decrease the frequency of road traffic accidents. Going forward, we must remain vigilant while behind the wheel and continue to emphasize the importance of safe and courteous driving. Every road traffic accident or reckless driving incident erodes the trust and confidence that we have worked so hard to earn from the Afghan people. While defensive measures must, at times, be exercised, we cannot accept an arrogant disregard for the safety of Afghan citizens.

b. Our strategic imperative is to *secure and serve the Afghan population;* we do this by being *good guests* and by doing all that we can to ensure the safety and well-being of Afghans. Every Afghan casualty—whether caused by insurgents, Afghan National Security Forces, or ISAF personnel—is an indication of an Afghan/ISAF shortcoming in our joint effort to secure the population. Unnecessarily aggressive driving not only angers and alienates the Afghan people, it also undermines our security; therefore, we must continually try to see our behavior through Afghan eyes, asking ourselves how we would want others to drive through our neighborhoods, and we must act accordingly.

c. As a general rule, members of ISAF will drive in accordance with Afghan road rules. We will obey speed limits or travel with the flow of traffic where speed limits are not posted; we will drive at "ground-guide" (walking) speed on dirt roads through populated areas or when passing pedestrians; we will not aggressively interrupt the flow of traffic simply to prevent limited separation within vehicle convoys; we will drive on the appropriate side of the road, not in the center. ISAF soldiers will not point weapons or lasers, throw objects, or fire pen flares at vehicles or pedestrians just because those pedestrians approach their vehicles too closely. Escalation of force procedures will be used in accordance with Reference C and only when an ISAF member reasonably perceives an immediate insurgent threat.

d. During convoy movements on highways in open areas, ISAF drivers will pull off the road periodically to allow civilian traffic to pass by. As a general rule, do not allow more than 30 vehicles to back up behind any convoy. In addition, oncoming traffic should be allowed to travel unimpeded by our movement. Above all, we should do all that we can not to impede civilian traffic flow.

e. In the event of an accident involving a person, vehicle, animal, or any other property - regardless of who is at fault - ISAF drivers are responsible for ensuring that the local nationals involved receive a completed copy of the Accident Form. The only exception to this rule is when the vehicle or convoy commander reasonably believes that stopping would place friendly forces at direct and immediate risk. If ISAF drivers are involved in a vehicular accident they must ensure they take the proper steps as outlined in Reference B (SOP 361). "Hitting and running" alienates ISAF from the Afghan people.

f. Members of ISAF must work to build trust and develop positive relationships with Afghans while driving; signs that direct Afghans to stay away from our vehicles undermine this effort and should not be used. I encourage ISAF members to use clear ballistic glasses and to wave, smile, and engage in friendly non-verbal interaction with local Afghans. Depending on the security situation, deliberately plan for time to get out of the vehicles and talk to people as a part of mounted patrolling operations, taking every opportunity to interact face-to-face. When security allows, dismount vehicles and remove ballistic glasses and walk among the people. Buy something at the village bazaar; ask a shop-keeper how his business is going; ask pedestrians how ISAF can assist the people in the local area. Above all, always be respectful to the people.

g. These procedures may entail a slight short-term increase in risk to ISAF personnel; however, they will generate long-term benefits. That observation notwithstanding though, in the event of an immediate and credible threat, leaders will operate in a way that protects both our forces and Afghan citizens from harm. Operating in ways that respect the Afghan people will reduce threats to ISAF members over time. The convoy commander will ultimately decide best driving practices to protect his/her convoy and troopers, while not hindering the movement of the Afghan people. As always, commanders have the responsibility to understand the situation, know the environment, and avoid placing their troopers in untenable positions.

h. This guidance will be briefed and explained to all personnel contributing to, supporting, or participating in ISAF operations within 96 hours of receipt. Commanders will report completion to HQ ISAF DCOS OPS. I expect leaders throughout the chain of command to enforce this directive and ensure that it is a part of patrol briefings.

Thanks for all your great work -- and for your great work in "operationalizing" this directive, in particular.

DAVID H. PETRAEUS
General, United States Army
Commander
International Security Assistance Force/
United States Forces–Afghanistan

DISTRIBUTION:

External –

Action:
COM RC (C)
COM RC (E)
COM RC (N)
COM RC (S)
COM SOCCE
CFACC
CJSOTF
CSTC-A

Information:
SACEUR
COM JFCB

Internal –

Action:
List A, B, J

MOVEMENT CONTROL FORM

MISSION #: 331-39 DATE OF MOVEMENT: 27 NOV 2010

SECTION: AFGHAN OR CONVOY CDR: Lt Co (b)(6), (b)(3)

DESTINATION GMIC Media (b)(1)1.4a Ariana PURPOSE: GMIC KLE, Ariana Media KLE

NUMBER AND TYPE OF VEHICLES: SUV: 2 ASUV: ____ MIL: ____ OTHER: ____

PALLAS TM#: 154

TIME OF DEPARTURE:1000hrs TIME OF RETURN:1430hrs NUMBER OF PERSONNEL:8

PERSONNEL MANIFEST

PASSENGER RANK / NAME	CELL #	WPN	Allergy	Type	VEHICLE # / TYPE / COLOR / CALLSIGN / ECM
TLC340/PLC 165					TLC340/TLC/BLACK/VIC 3/DUKE
CPT		M9/M16	NKA	A+	TC
SGT (CLS) (b)(6), (b)(3)		M16	NKA	A+	DR
~~SSgt~~		~~M4~~	~~Amoxicillin~~	~~A+~~	~~PAS~~
MSg		M9	NKA	B+	PAS
MC3 (b)(6), (b)(3)	(b)(2)	M16	NKA	A+	PAS
SUB 52/PLC154					SUB52/SUB/WHITE/VIC2/DUKE
Lt Col (CLS) (b)(6), (b)(3)		M9	DEMOROL	B+	TC
SGT		M9/M16	PCN	O+	DR
Capt (b)(6), (b)(3)		M9	NKA	B+	PAS
CPT		M9	NKA	O+	PAS

CONTACT INFO: *All convoys will have redundant means of communications in each vehicle*

Camp Eggers Contact Information

MOVEMENT CONTROL DSN: (b)(2) CELL: (b)(2)

BDOC DSN: (b)(2) CELL: (b)(2)

EMERGENCY: (b)(2)

COMMUNICATIONS

Primary: MBTR

Secondary: CELL

Alternate:

Cell phone to DSN access code to call a Kabul area DSN line from your cell phone, dial 07012 and then the last four digits of the phone number e.g. 07012-3407. The Cell phone to DSN access code for Bagram Air Field is 07013.

Task Force Phoenix Contact Information

BDOC DSN: (b)(2) CELL:

VEHICLE RECOVERY DSN: (b)(2) CELL: (b)(2)

BAF Contact Information

BDOC DSN: (b)(2) CELL: (b)(2)

PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE ROUTES

Convoy Commanders are responsible for checking the route status prior to departure

PRIMARY: EGGERS-INDIGO (b)(1)1.4a INDIGO-UNK ROAD-GREEN (b)(1)1.4a GREEN-UNK ROAD-INDIGO-EGGERS

ALTERNATE: : EGGERS-INDIGO (b)(1)1.4a INDIGO-THISTLE-SWORD-ORANGE-MAROON-RED TWO-UNK ROAD-UNK ROAD-GREEN (b)(1)1.4a -GREEN- UNK ROAD-UNK ROAD-RED TWO-MAROON-ORANGE-SWORD-THISTLE-INDIGO-EGGERS

CONVOY COMMANDER SIGNATURE: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(Must be an E-6 or above)

Inner Zone mvmt, 0-5/GS-14:
KCLZ mvmt 0500-2200, Directorate 0-6 (b)(6), (b)(3)
Approval/GS-15 equiv:
KCLZ mvmt 2200-0500, Directorate 0-6
Approval/GS-15 equiv:
and NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3:
Outside KCLZ, CoS or GO/SES equiv:
(Note: consult policy for dismounted/single vehicle travel approval levels) (b)(6), (b)(3)
Movement Control Office Review:

API, USN

APPROVED 27 NOV 2010

CAN YOU TRANSPORT ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL? YES [ ] NO [X] HOW MANY? ____

COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT WORKSHEET

1. MISSION / TASK: CONDUCT RECON FOR VCR MISSION
2. DTG: 27 1000 NOV 10
3. BEGIN: 27 1000 NOV 10
4. END: 27 1430 NOV 10

HAZARDS

HAZARDS	INITIAL RISK		RESIDUAL RISK	HOW TO IMPLEMENT
SVIEDs, Roadside IEDs, ambush or sniper fire	H	Maintain situational awareness. Rehearse immediate action drills. Use ECM.	M	Execute immediate action drills, as needed.
Human Error and inexperienced crew	L	Crew pairing / crew drills.	L	Supervise crew assignment.
Other potential hostile threats. Demonstrations and	L	Receive threat update from BDOC. Rehearse Immediate Action Drills. Use alternate routes as needed	L	Situational awareness. BDOC briefing. Convoy briefing.
Vehicle breakdown during trip	L	Conduct PMCS on vehicle, clean windows, windshield at stops, and have proper communication.	L	Check vehicle before, during and after mission.
Other Coalition Convoys	L	Avoid other coalition convoys	L	Review Escalation of Force, situational awareness, slow down, brief driving techniques.

HOW TO SUPERVISE:	EFFECTIVE CONTROLS:
(State C2 measures)	(State control measures)

OVERALL RISK LEVEL AFTER CONTROLS ARE IMPLEMENTED (CIRCLE ONE):

LOW **MODERATE** **HIGH** **EXTREMELY HIGH**

RISK DECISION AUTHORITY:	RANK	LAST NAME	DUTY POSITION	
	CPT	(b)(3), (b)(6)	OPS Officer	

RISK ASSESMENT CODE MATRIX

	HAZARD PROBABILITY				
SEVERITY	FREQUENT A	LIKELY B	OCCASIONAL C	SELDOM D	UNLIKELY E
CATASTROPHIC I	EXTREMELY HIGH	EXTREMELY HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	MODERATE
CRITICAL II	EXTREMELY HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	MODERATE	LOW
MODERATE III	HIGH	MODERATE	MODERATE	LOW	LOW
NEGLIGIBLE IV	MODERATE	LOW	LOW	LOW	LOW

Enclosure 5 – Composite Risk Assessment (CRA) Form


27 NOVEMBER 2010 OPERATION
AFGHAN OUTREACH/NGO LIAISON
ORDER OF TRAVEL
1. Camp Eggers
2. GMIC
3. ISAF
4a. Brasil Pizza
4b. Bread vendor
5. Ariana
6. Apple Media
1
2
3
4a
4b
6
5

G2
RTE GREEN
W/CHECKPOINT
G2 AND G3
HABIBIA HIGH
SCHOOL
RTE RED
G3
ROUTE DEVIATION
Brasil-Pizza
Bread Vendor

DATE	MISSION#	PALLAS#	OUTER MOVEMENTS	SECTION	POC#	ETD	SP	RP	SPH	RPH	ETA	VICs	PAXs	CONVOY COMMANDER
27-Nov	331-32	42	ILF WH	CSTCA LOG ETT	(b)(2)	0800	0902			1450	1800	2	5	(b)(3), (b)(6)
27-Nov	331-37	33/38/44	MMC	CJ43P MMC MENTOR TM		0800	0911			1528	1800	2	8	
27-Nov	331-DAX33	30	CHIMTALLAH/CMA	CJ43A CMA MENTOR TM		0730	0726			1737	1700	3	7	
27-Nov	331-DELTA4	5	KAIA	ISC PSD		1150					1600	3	12	
27-Nov	331-01	84	PHOENIX	CTAG-P		?					1700	2	7	(b)(3), (b)(6)
27-Nov	331-02	25	DI-TECH/ ILF/COPRIN/RNS B	CJ4 MMC		0830	0830			1632	1600	2	8	
27-Nov	331-03	N/A	ANCOP HQ/04 COMPOUND	CJ-43P ANCOP		0600	0845		1512	1548	2000	2	4	
27-Nov	331-04	N/A	POL-E-CHARKI	ANA-DEV		1000					1800	4	3	
27-Nov	331-05	174	EGGERS	438TH AEAG		1015	1023	1148	1439	1506	1500	2	8	
27-Nov	331-06	12	DUGAN	CJ1		1300	1331			1458	1500	2	5	
27-Nov	331-07	N/A	ANPH HOSPITAL	MTAG-P		1300	0824			1157	1600	2	10	
27-Nov	331-08	51	DEPOT0/DEPOT1	CJ6 ANSF COMMS		0900	1005/1254			1427	1400	2	7	
27-Nov	331-09	157	ANAREC	CJ1 ANA RAT		0700	0707		1606	1648	1700	2	6	
27-Nov	331-10	139	DEPOT 2	SAO-A		0900	0933	1030	1103	1149	1600	2	6	
27-Nov	331-11	194	EGGERS	NATCA J8		1000	1004	1034	1428	1454	1430	2	5	
27-Nov	331-12	43	CHIMTALLAH NASD	LTAG		0730	0710/0740	0739/0850	1236	1323	1700	2	8	
27-Nov	331-13	84	BORDER POLICY FACILITY	CTAG-P		0800	0835/1200	0916/0945/1227		1300	1600	2	10	
27-Nov	331-14	27	PHOENIX	CJ44		0730	0800	0826	1059	1127	1230	2	5	
27-Nov	331-15	28	WS/PCHKY/ DPT 0-1/PHX/LCN	NTMA/CSTCA CJ43		0730	0729	0750	1425	1455	1700	3	10	
27-Nov	331-16	26	L 8/LSOC/LOGCOM/GIBSON	CJ43A		0800	0/1139/1236		1538	1625	1600	2	7	
27-Nov	331-17	101	KMTC	PAO		0830	0746	0836	1052	1132	1500	2	4	
27-Nov	331-18	BFT	BAF	CJ1 ANP MOVEMENT		0600	0736	0921	1514	1750	2200	4	15/16	
27-Nov	331-19	N/A	KAIA	NATC-A 438 AEW		0800	0748			1056	1000	2	6	
27-Nov	331-20	142	AFGHAN POLICE ACADEMY	SJA A CORRUPTION		0745	0748			1620	1500	2	5	
27-Nov	331-21	61	MOD-F	CJ8 ANA FRO		0813		0832	1132	1154	1200	2	5	
27-Nov	331-22	13	PHOENIX/SIA SANG	CSTC-A CJ2		0715	0730/1514	0822	1732	1828	1800	4	19	
27-Nov	331-23	168	ABP HQ KABUL	ACG-PD		0900	0904	0923	1244	1310	1500	2	4	
27-Nov	331-24	25	KAIA/CMA/DEPOT1/TMSI/PEK	CJ4 MAINT		0830	0848	1620		1641	1800	2	8/6	
27-Nov	331-25	58	PHOENIX	CJ7 ED DIV		0830	0849	0928	1255	1314	1400	2	4	
27-Nov	331-26	156	ALAMO	CJ1 ANP MOVEMENT		0700				1342	2200	2	7	
27-Nov	331-27	14	NTEC/ANITC	CSTC-A CJ2		0830	0837	0846	1127	1142	1130	2	6	
27-Nov	331-28	20	MOI/JULIAN	CJ3		1000	1046/1254	1059/1326	6/1109/1	1116/141	1600	2	7	
27-Nov	331-29	20	PHOENIX	CJ3		1200	1206/			1249/	1800	2	6	
27-Nov	331-30	158	SEWING FACTORY	ANA DEV		0830	0832/1124	0857/		0913/114	1700	2	5	
27-Nov	331-31	135	SMN FACTORY	SAO-A LA & OCIE		0930	0942	1044	1319	1403	1400	2	8	
27-Nov	331-33	136	KAIA	SAO EUM		0900	0854	0912		0945	1030	2	4/5	
27-Nov	331-34	62	KAIA	CJ1/2/8		0900	0947			1208	1100	2	12	
27-Nov	331-35	11	MH/MOD/MOI/MOD/MOPH/NM	CSTC-A CJ1 ANSF RCTG		0800	1015		1505	1528	2000	2	7/5	
27-Nov	331-36	87	PHOENIX	ICCTF		1000	1014	1039	1110	1132	1300	1	2	
27-Nov	331-37	88	KAIA	CJ ENG		0945	0958	1025		1253	1500	2	5	
27-Nov	331-38	N/A	KAIA/NKC/ISAF	HQ DSST		0900					2200	2	7	
27-Nov	331-39	154	GMIC/ARIANA/MEDIA	AFGHAN OR		1000	1021/1230			1459	1430	2	8	
27-Nov	331-40	17	KAIA (MIL)	CSTC-A CJ2		1130					1400	2	6	
27-Nov	331-41	20	PHOENIX	CJ3		1600	1555	1622	1628	1654	1800	2	6/4	

RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE/WAIVER CERTIFICATE

For use of this form, see AR 190-30; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, United States Code, Section 3012(g)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your Social Security Number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your Social Security Number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE	3. TIME	4. FILE NO.
Campe Eggers, Afganistan	10 Dec 2010	1330	

5. NAME (Last, First, MI)	8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(6), (b)(3)	Afghan Outreach NTM-A/CSTC-A
6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6) / 7. GRADE/STATUS O-5	

PART I - RIGHTS WAIVER/NON-WAIVER CERTIFICATE

Section A. Rights

(b)(3), (b)(6)

The investigator whose name appears below told me that he/she is with the United States ~~Army~~ MARINE CORPS Combined Security Transition Command-Afghan and wanted to question me about the following offense(s) of which I am suspected/accused: ART 92, Violation of a Lawful Order

Before he/she asked me any questions about the offense(s), however, he/she made it clear to me that I have the following rights:

1. I do not have to answer any question or say anything.
2. Anything I say or do can be used as evidence against me in a criminal trial.
3. *(For personnel subject to the UCMJ)* I have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian lawyer I arrange for at no expense to the Government or a military lawyer detailed for me at no expense to me, or both.

   - or -

   (For civilians not subject to the UCMJ) I have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. I understand that this lawyer can be one that I arrange for at my own expense, or if I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me before any questioning begins.
4. If I am now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation, with or without a lawyer present, I have a right to stop answering questions at any time, or speak privately with a lawyer before answering further, even if I sign the waiver below.

5. COMMENTS *(Continue on reverse side)*

Section B. Waiver

I understand my rights as stated above. I am now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation and make a statement without talking to a lawyer first and without having a lawyer present with me.

WITNESSES *(If available)*	3. SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE
1a. NAME *(Type or Print)*	
b. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PHONE	4. (b)(6), (b)(3)
2a. NAME *(Type or Print)*	5.
b. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PHONE	6. ORGANIZATION OF INVESTIGATOR NTM-A/CSTC-A

Section C. Non-waiver

1. I do not want to give up my rights
   - ☐ I want a lawyer
   - ☐ I do not want to be questioned or say anything
2. SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE

ATTACH THIS WAIVER CERTIFICATE TO ANY SWORN STATEMENT *(DA FORM 2823)* SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED BY THE SUSPECT/ACCUSED

PART II - RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE

THE WARNING

1. WARNING - Inform the suspect/accused of:
   a. Your official position.
   b. Nature of offense(s).
   c. The fact that he/she is a suspect/accused.
2. RIGHTS - Advise the suspect/accused of his/her rights as follows:
   "Before I ask you any questions, you must understand your rights."
   a. "You do not have to answer my questions or say anything."
   b. "Anything you say or do can be used as evidence against you in a criminal trial."
   c. (For personnel subject to the UCMJ) "You have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with you during questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian you arrange for at no expense to the Government or a military lawyer detailed for you at no expense to you, or both."

   - or -

   (For civilians not subject to the UCMJ) You have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with you during questioning. This lawyer can be one you arrange for at your own expense, or if you cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for you before any questioning begins."
   d. "If you are now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation, with or without a lawyer present, you have a right to stop answering questions at any time, or speak privately with a lawyer before answering further, even if you sign a waiver certificate."

Make certain the suspect/accused fully understands his/her rights.

THE WAIVER

"Do you understand your rights?"
(If the suspect/accused says "no," determine what is not understood, and if necessary repeat the appropriate rights advisement. If the suspect/accused says "yes," ask the following question.)

"Have you ever requested a lawyer after being read your rights?"
(If the suspect/accused says "yes," find out when and where. If the request was recent *(i.e., fewer than 30 days ago)*, obtain legal advice whether to continue the interrogation. If the suspect/accused says "no," or if the prior request was not recent, ask him/her the following question.)

"Do you want a lawyer at this time?"
(If the suspect/accused says "yes," stop the questioning until he/she has a lawyer. If the suspect/accused says "no," ask him/her the following question.)

"At this time, are you willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation and make a statement without talking to a lawyer and without having a lawyer present with you?" *(If the suspect/accused says "no," stop the interview and have him/her read and sign the non-waiver section of the waiver certificate on the other side of this form. If the suspect/accused says "yes," have him/her read and sign the waiver section of the waiver certificate on the other side of this form.)*

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

WHEN SUSPECT/ACCUSED REFUSES TO SIGN WAIVER CERTIFICATE: If the suspect/accused orally waives his/her rights but refuses to sign the waiver certificate, you may proceed with the questioning. Make notations on the waiver certificate to the effect that he/she has stated that he/she understands his/her rights, does not want a lawyer, wants to discuss the offense(s) under investigation, and refuses to sign the waiver certificate.

IF WAIVER CERTIFICATE CANNOT BE COMPLETED IMMEDIATELY: In all cases the waiver certificate must be completed as soon as possible. Every effort should be made to complete the waiver certificate before any questioning begins. If the waiver certificate cannot be completed at once, as in the case of street interrogation, completion may be temporarily postponed. Notes should be kept on the circumstances.

PRIOR INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS:

1. If the supsect/accused has made spontaneous incriminating statements before being properly advised of his/her rights he/she should be told that such statements do not obligate him/her to answer further questions.
2. If the suspect/accused was questioned as such either without being advised of his/her rights or some question exists as to the propriety of the first statement, the accused must be so advised. The office of the serving Staff Judge Advocate should be contacted for assistance in drafting the proper rights advisal.

NOTE: If 1 or 2 applies, the fact that the suspect/accused was advised accordingly should be noted in the comment section on the waiver certificate and initialed by the suspect/accused.

WHEN SUSPECT/ACCUSED DISPLAYS INDECISION ON EXERCISING HIS OR HER RIGHTS DURING THE INTERROGATION PROCESS: If during the interrogation, the suspect displays indecision about requesting counsel (for example, "Maybe I should get a lawyer."), further questioning must cease immediately. At that point, you may question the suspect/accused only concerning whether he or she desires to waive counsel. The questioning may not be utilized to discourage a suspect/accused from exercising his/her rights. (For example, do not make such comments as "If you didn't do anything wrong, you shouldn't need an attorney.")

COMMENTS *(Continued)*

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers	2010/12/11	2130	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(6), (b)(3)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	O-5/AD

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CSTC-A, Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan

9.
I, (b)(6), (b)(3), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

A. Background.
1. Your official title for NTM-A/CSTC-A. Branch Chief of Afghan Outreach Branch
2. Your official duties for NTM-A/CSTC-A. Our mission is to use cultural and language skills to engage influential members of Afghan civil society in media, academia, think tanks and other agencies in order to inform and educate the Afghan population on progress in the ANSF.
3. Your role in the Convoy. For example, were you the Convoy Commander, Vehicle Troop Commander, passenger, or other (specify). I was the Convoy Commander.
4. Your position in the Convoy vehicle that you occupied on all of the movements associated with this Investigation. I was in the right front seat of vehicle #2.
5. How many vehicles were in the movement? There were two vehicles.
6. How many personnel were in the movement? There were nine personnel.
7. Who were the personnel that were in the movement? LTC (b)(6), (b)(3) CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) MSG (b)(6), (b)(3) MC2 (b)(6), (b)(3) SGT (b)(6), (b)(3) SGT (b)(6), (b)(3) and Dr. (b)(6)

B. Mission Preparation.
1. When did you participate in a Movement Brief? We conducted two briefings, one two nights before the mission and one more the morning of the mission.
2. Who led the Movement Brief? I led both briefings assisted closely by CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) and CPT (b)(6), (b)(3)
3. How long did the Movement Brief last? The initial brief lasted between an hour and hour-and-a-half, and the supplementary brief was around 10 minutes.
4. What was covered in the Movement Brief? During the initial briefing, I use the CONOP slide [copy provided to IO] which covers:
TASK ORGANIZATION, SITUATION, ENEMY FORCES, CURRENT INTEL, FRIENDLY FORCES, PARTNERED FORCES, ADJACENT ISAF FORCES, MISSION DETAILS, MISSION EXECUTION, ENGAGEMENT CONCEPT, WEATHER and MOVEMENT SCHEME;
The second supplementary brief provided review and updates for the above.
5. Was the Movement Brief conducted utilizing a verbal OPORD format? Yes, the brief the morning of was a verbal OPORD reviewing the details associated with the above information.
6. If the Movement Brief covered the route, what was the route that was briefed? The route [depicted on slide provided] covered movement from Eggers to GMIC, following on to the second portion of the mission to Ariana TV.
(EGGERS-INDIGO- (b)(1)1.4a -INDIGO-HWY
1-GREEN- (b)(1)1.4a -GREEN (b)(1)1.4a -GREEN-HWY 1-INDIGO-EGGERS

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIAL (b)(6), (b)(3) MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(6), (b)(3) TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS DATED 20101211

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

7. If the Movement Brief covered the stops, what specific 'stops' were briefed? To the best of my recollection, we covered the stops depicted GMIC (b)(1)1.4a) and Ariana TV ((b)(1)1.4a).
8. If the Movement Brief covered threats, what threats were briefed? We briefed from CJ-2 products covering SIGACTS, THREATS, VBIEDs, BOLO listing, FORCE PRO STATUS, and ROUTE STATUS.
9. Did you have the following equipment on your person? Cell Phone (loaded with appropriate phone numbers as per the NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy (dated 22 August 2010)); PLB; and combat load for your duty weapon. YES.
10. What equipment were you missing in the previous question? NONE.
11. Did you wear the following gear appropriately at all times during the movement? Kevlar helmet; uniform; hand, ear, and eye protection; and duty weapon. YES.
C. Movement Phase.
1. What was the route traveled? EGGERS-INDIGO- (b)(1)1.4a INDIGO-HWY 1-GREEN (b)(1)1.4a -GREEN- (b)(1)1.4a -GREEN-HWY 1-INDIGO-EGGERS
2. What were the stops along the route? GMIC ((b)(1)1.4a), ISAF HQ, roadside engagement at ANP station/International School of Kabul ((b)(1)1.4a), and Ariana TV ((b)(1)1.4a).
3. What were the timings for the stops? (Arrival, Departure). To the best of my recollection, we left Eggers at or around 1020 hrs, arrived at GMIC 10-15 minutes thereafter, we departed GMIC for ISAF around 1215-1220, departed ISAF around 1230 for Ariana, conducted roadside engagement around 1300 ((b)(1)1.4a), and proceeded to Ariana around 1320.
4. What was the purpose of the stops? GMIC and Ariana stops were to facilitate engagement with leaders in media to develop relationships for NTM-A public affairs, the unscheduled stop took place because we were running 30-45 minutes early for our appointed time at Ariana due to lighter than expected traffic. As mission commander, I had to assess the security of waiting on the roadside should we arrive early. I assessed that a known safe location was preferable should we be early. As we turned on to route GREEN, it became evident that we were in fact early due to light traffic. I determined that the safest place to hold was the roadside near the ANP station just off route GREEN at (b)(1)1.4a and near the International School of Kabul (ISK). We have visited the area several times (other of our 32 tactical missions together as a team have been near this area), I routinely worked in that neighborhood with the ANA when at Camp Darrulamman, CPT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g lived in the area for almost a year in 2003 and has many contacts there, Dr. (b)(6)'s family lives in that neighborhood, and I have a working relationship with the security detail at ISK where we have been invited to their compound if any security or medical situation ever developed. In addition, I assessed that proximity with the ANP station increased security in the immediate area. I assessed that both current intel and my team's experience in the area made it an ideal place under these circumstances. Upon further consideration, I realized this was an opportunity to conduct a roadside engagement IAW ISAF Tactical Driving Directive since CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and I speak the local language. The purpose of this unscheduled stop was therefore to wait in a known secure location for our appointment time and to engage the local population by speaking with them and making purchase from the local economy rather than just waiting in the vehicles. I had previously discussed at length with LT Col (b)(3), (b)(6) (STRATCOM director) and Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) (STRATCOM deputy and then acting director) such opportunities we might have for pursuing this type of engagement and compliance with the Tactical Driving Directive in this fashion, and they each expressed concurrence and support.
5. When and where did you dismount (depart your vehicle) during this movement? I dismounted inside the GMIC compound upon arrival, the front gate of ISK around 1300, and once we reached Ariana TV/Apple Productions.
6. If you dismounted, how long were you outside of the vehicle? I was dismounted around an hour and a half at GMIC, 15-20 minutes at (b)(1)1.4a and an hour at Ariana TV/Apple Productions.
7. If you dismounted, what were your activities outside of the vehicle? At GMIC we were given a tour of the facilities by GMIC leaders, at (b)(1)1.4a I conducted an opportune roadside engagement. At Ariana TV I dismounted to speak with Ariana TV guards to find the right parking/entrance for our appointment, and our POC came out and guided us to the spot. I then went inside to conduct the engagement.
8. If others dismounted, who were they? The whole team dismounted at GMIC, and CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) MC2 (b)(6), (b)(3) and MSgt (b)(6), (b)(3) dismounted at Ariana TV/Apple Productions. At the latter location, I directed Dr. (b)(6) to stay with the vehicle team in order to distribute our language capabilities. CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) and I expected to be able to handle the engagement entirely in Dari by ourselves, and were able to do so.
9. If others dismounted, what were there activities? At GMIC we left LAWRENCE and LANE to guard the vehicles, and the rest of the team went inside to conduct the engagement tour. At (b)(1)1.4a I, CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) Dr. (b)(6) conducted a roadside engagement IAW directives, and MC2 (b)(6), (b)(3) later dismounted to take pictures. At Ariana/Apple Productions CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) MSgt (b)(3), (b)(6) and MC2 (b)(6), (b)(3) dismounted to join me in the engagement with the TV production team.

INITIALS OF PER (b)(3), (b)(6) STATEMENT

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF _ (b)(6), (b)(3) ____ TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS DATED 20100211

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

10. If others dismounted, were they wearing their PPE? I wore every piece of PPE during this mission except that I removed all PPE inside the GMIC compound for the tour, and my helmet inside Apple Productions. I cannot recall precisely, but to the best of my memory everyone else wore their PPE appropriately and as directed.
11. When did you separate from the convoy? (Dropped off at one of the stops and did not rejoin the convoy). I was not separated.
12. When did others separate from the convoy? (Dropped off at one of the stops and did not rejoin the convoy). We dropped CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) off at ISAF to make another meeting after the GMIC tour.
D. Movement Phase: "Roadside Engagement".
1. Did the convoy stop and member or members of the convoy order food? Yes, however, the purpose of the stop was not to dine, nor was the food purchased for members of the convoy exclusively. The purpose was to engage with Afghans, do business with Afghan vendors, and in so doing purchase food for offering and sharing with Afghan civilians. The latter gesture is very well received in Afghan culture as a sign of hospitality and goodwill, thereby facilitating engagement and positive NTM-A perceptions.
2. How were you notified of this stop? I directed the stop IAW Tactical Driving Directive via MBTR radio transmission and preplanned "audible" to do so when opportunity exists.
3. When and where did you dismount? At (b)(1)1.4a while carrying an M-16 and an M9, I dismounted the vehicle in front of the ISK gate, immediately conducted 0/5/25/200 checks, then greeted an Afghan guard outside the ISK gate. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and Dr. (b)(6) dismounted and we crossed the street to greet some Afghans there and to engage with the locals.
4. If you dismounted, how long were you outside of the vehicle? I was dismounted 15-20 minutes.
5. If you dismounted, what were your activities outside of the vehicle? At (b)(1)1.4a while carrying an M-16 and an M9, I dismounted the vehicle in front of the ISK gate, immediately conducted 0/5/25/200 checks, then proceeded across the street and greeted Afghans there. I remained in front of the store for security coverage between the dismount team and the vehicles, moving carefully back and forth to ensure visibility between both elements. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and Dr. (b)(6) finished their conversation and placed a food order, I invited Afghans to have some of our food (they politely declined and cordially invited us to tea), and we walked back to the vehicles. I could see many more Afghans along the street back toward the main road, so I had the vehicles roll alongside with us as we walked the street having a variety of conversations with Afghans along the way, asking them how life was going and how we might be helpful to them. I received a very positive response from the locals, but had to decline a dozen or so invitations to join them for tea in their homes because of our schedule, so I replied politely with "tashakur, zenda bosheyn!" (a local polite way to decline an invitation) and offered my card to them instead so they could contact us if we could ever help or listen to them. We reached the main road and I greeted some 6 or so ANP troopers on the street who also invited us in for tea. I declined by saying "tashakur, zenda bosheyn!" and continued conversing with Afghans passing by. I conducted 0/5/25/200 checks upon vehicle stop and established good visibility of the surroundings. We saw a bread shop at 20 meters in front of us, and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and Dr. (b)(6) engaged the shop workers to buy bread as I continued conversing with the people. There were many smiling and welcoming faces, including two older Afghan gentlemen seated on a pile of dirt next to the bread shop. I greeted the gentlemen in Dari and Pashto, and they seemed very pleased to see a US military member speaking Afghan languages. MC (b)(3), (b)(6) opened his vehicle door and made motion like he wanted to take pictures of the two gentlemen. I asked the men if it was OK to take a picture of them. They replied very favorably, so I assessed that the combination of the visible goodwill amongst the people as well as my previous security assessment indicated it was safe for him to exit the vehicle for pictures of our engagement. I motioned for him to join us. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and Dr. (b)(6) received bread and continued conversations with the Afghan people. I offered the locals some bread and continued the polite conversation. All the while, I was scanning for any threats, saw none, so I offered to share with more Afghans walking by and spoke with a few of them for a few more minutes. I said goodbye to the police and wished them well, and we walked back around the corner as the vehicles turned and followed us. We walked back to the initial point of dismount, engaging another half dozen or so locals along the way. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and Dr. (b)(6) reengaged the shop workers inside Pizza Brazil, received food, and I covered the front of the store--greeting and offering to share food with the Afghans passing by, as I continued 0/5/25/200 checks around the vehicles and the street block. I greeted some workers in Dari around the building who were painting a wall and offered to help with their work. They laughed, declined politely and we continued to chat . They went on about how they had never seen US soldiers speaking Dari before and thanked me profusely for our service to Afghanistan and our kindness in stopping by. CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) Dr. (b)(6) and I spoke with the locals until around 1320 when I gave the order to mount up. I conducted 0/5/25/200 checks, offered the ISK guard food and thanked him, and he appeared exuberantly enthused. He insisted on thanking me for stopping by, and like nearly all of the civilians, he complimented us extensively for our ability to speak the language and for our kindness. I considered the roadside engagement a great success, having handed out many cards and spoken with many Afghans. It was such a success that soon after I returned to the office, I called the acting STRATCOM director to report these events. LT Co (b)(6), (b)(3) indicated that the engagement sounded like a success and was very affirming.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKI ↓T (b)(3), (b)(6)

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS DATED 20101211

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

6. If others dismounted, who were they? CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) Dr. (b)(6) and MC (b)(6), (b)(3)
7. If others dismounted, what were there activities? See answer to question 5.
8. If others dismounted, were they wearing their PPE? I wore all PPE except that I removed my eye protection IAW the Tactical Driving Directive and removed my gloves to shake hands. After nearly two weeks since the engagement, I cannot recall or testify to each individual's specific PPE posture, but I do not recall any irregularities with PPE wear. I know that the pictures show CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the correct PPE posture, and this is consistent with my recollection of the entire engagement. [Pictures provided to IO]
9. If others dismounted, how long were they outside of the vehicle? The dismount portion of this engagement was around 20 minutes.
E. Post-Mission Phase (Return to Camp Eggers).
1. Was there a mission Debrief? Yes.
2. If there was a mission Debrief who led the Debrief? I led the discussions.
3. When did the mission Debrief occur? The first debrief took place in the parking lot immediately after our return. I debriefed the specific results of the engagements with CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) [Engagements] and (b)(3), (b)(6) [Force Pro] following the group debrief in order to solicit their feedback for potential opportunities in the future for media engagement, how we could better integrate GMIC media analysis products into our organization, and the success of the roadside engagement. I later held a team AAR in our office.
4. What was covered in the mission Debrief? We reviewed the mission CONOP and discussed the results of the engagements as soon as we got out of the vehicles in order to get immediate post-mission observations. We discussed several elements of both media engagements and the success of the roadside engagement. At no time did anyone mention any concerns over either the security of our movement nor the scheme of the engagement. In our routine AARs we discuss sustains and improves for the day's mission in an open discussion.
5. Was the pizza stop covered in the mission Debrief? Yes, the team deemed it a highly successful engagement, so much so that I immediately called STRATCOM leadership after I reached my office to report the results.
F. Risk Assessment
1. Prep-Phase. Before the mission, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and I discussed preparation of the risk assessment, the force protection considerations to mitigate that risk and the current intelligence applicable to the mission from the BDOC Daily Shift Change Brief on SIPRNet and other CJ-2 SIPRNet reports when necessary. We then prepared our mission CONOP [provided to IO] and reviewed the intel picture prior to delivering the movement brief to the team. As our normal routine, we then posted the final movement CONOP to the STRATCOM Centrix calendar so it would be available to all mission members and STRATCOM leadership. Before the mission, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and I discussed the engagements and our desired outcomes, and our required language/cultural expertise. We rehearsed the Dari language approaches we plan to use once we engage the planned people, and we discussed specific vocabulary words we might need to carry on more technical conversations.
We also discussed--as we do prior to most missions--the potential to call an "audible" for a number of circumstances, including enemy contact enroute, vehicle breakdown, need to take an alternate route, actions on civilian disturbance or riot, and conducting roadside engagements whenever the opportunity arises. I have prepared the team with a variety of training events in the last two months that I routinely refer to in our mission planning. An example of this training is a PSD training event on or around 20 Nov 10. I directed this event for members of the team in order to prepare for reacting to contact, tactical vehicle towing, reacting to IED, reactive fire and extraction of casualties from NTVs. Another example of this preparation is several roadside engagement training sessions for our team both inside the office and in the Green Zone on the way to ISAF in order to conduct "Afghan engagement drills" that teach conversational greeting, culturally appropriate gestures and response to Afghan children crowding. I have emphasized language and cultural training and skills within our team in order to ensure we are always prepared to encounter Afghan civilians in either planned or unplanned contexts where we seek to build relationships and listen to their opinions. Again, my STRATCOM supervision was informed of all the above and supported these activities as well as roadside engagements IAW Tactical Driving Directive. During all phases of this mission, I made decisions and acted according to all policies and supervision direction to the best of my knowledge.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STAT (b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS DATED 20101211

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

2. Movement/Route/Stop Phase. We maintained two forms of radio contact between vehicles during movement [MBTRs and LMRs]. During movement I continually communicated with both my driver and the TC of the other vehicle. During this particular mission, we maintained those communications the entire time, and prior to the roadside engagement I called CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) on MBTR and told him I was looking at calling an "audible" for roadside engagement should we continue to see light traffic and arrive early. He acknowledged and I detailed for him the location that I had in mind should I decide to stop. I asked his opinion of my security assessment, and he concurred that it was both a more secure place to hold and a good opportunity for a roadside engagement IAW Tactical Driving Directive.

3. Debrief/AAR Phase. We reviewed the day's actions and engagements during debrief, and no one had any concerns dealing with mitigated or unmitigated risks, unnecessary exposure to danger, or the unscheduled roadside engagement. Our discussion touched on the apparent success of our risk mitigation with the dismounted engagement team at (b)(1)1.4a and I recall that CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and I discussed the fact that language appeared to be our most effective weapon in both understanding and mitigating risks at an engagement scene.

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11 day of December 2010 at Camp Eggers

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON M (b)(3), (b)(6) MENT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED | **MISSION #: AOM10-27** | V 2.0 (26 NOV10)

AOML : LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
Host Unit: GMIC, Ariana
TASK ORGANIZATION:

1 DR SGT TC CPT PS CPT PS Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

2 Driver SGT TC/MC LTC PS CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES:
Current Brief (information 26 NOV 2010)

B. FRIENDLY FORCES:
N/A

C. PARTNERED FORCES:
NGO Outreach

D. ADJACENT (ISAF) FORCES:
QRF (at Eggers & Phoenix)

2. MISSION Beginning H Hour on 27 NOV 10, AOM (-) conducts movement to 2 locations. Orientation to mission and meeting on future partnership with Government Media and Information Center (GMIC). Initial visit to Ariana Television and Radio station, engage with leadership and establish communications.

3. EXECUTION

3A. CONCEPT. At H hour, two AOM vehicles will depart EGR at ECP 1. AOM will convoy to GMIC for approx 2 hours than to Ariana TV for approx 1 hour and then return to Eggers.

3B. SCHEME. At H- 1:00, AOM (-) will conduct mission rehearsal and COMMEX. At H -20 AOM vehicle prep begins. At H Hour AOM departs EG and proceed to GMIC via Zulu to GMIC for a two hour engagement/meeting. Depart GMIC and travel down HWY 1 to Green to Ariana TV for 1 hour meeting. Depart Ariana TV down Green to Indigo return to Eggers.

3C. WEATHER.
Current Brief (information 26 NOV 2010)

Coordinating Instructions:

1. AOM will be in FRACU attire with full IPA
2. AOM will carry weapons (2 X M16/M4 per VIC)
3. AOM will employ ECM & PALLAS (PLC 154, 2 X DUKE)

SIGNAL

A. WITH BDOC/QRF
P: Cell to B-DOC (b)(2)
A: Iridium to DSN (b)(2)
C: World Blackberry Email to (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
E: PLB (ISAF PR)

C. INTERNAL
P: Cell: (b)(2)
A: Iridium (b)(2)
C: email (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
E: Host Cell: GMIC (b)(2)
Ariana 077-766-0609

E. FOR CASEVAC/ MEDEVAC
P: Cell to B-DOC (b)(2)
A: Iridium to DSN (b)(2)
C: World Blackberry Email to (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
E: PLB (ISAF PR)

Mission Summary

Execution Window: 271000 NOV 10 – 27 1500 NOV 10
 # PAX:7
Location: GMIC and Ariana (1030L 27NOV 10)
AOM Lead: LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
Monitoring HQ Contact: (b)(2), (b)(6) (N)
Monitoring HQ Contact: (b)(3), (b)(6) @aghan.swa.army.mil
Approval Requested: CAPT USN

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers	2010/12/07	1145	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	O-3

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

A. Background.
My official title for NTM-A/CSTC-A is Operations Officer, Afghan Outreach Branch. My duties include planning engagements for the outreach team. I was a passenger in the convoy on 27 November, 2010. My position in the convoy was in the back seat, passenger's side, of the second vehicle. There were 2 vehicles in the movement. 9 personnel were in the first phase (mission to GMIC) and 8 personnel were in the second phase (Apple Media Production) after dropping 1 passenger off at ISAF.

B. Mission Preparation.
There were 2 briefs for this mission. The more extensive one (1-2 hrs in length) was conducted a couple days prior and included information about the goals and focus of the engagements as well as movement logistics like timing, passenger lists, and the transition plan for dropping off 1 passenger (CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)) in between missions. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) led this brief, with input from myself, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6). An additional briefing with updated threat assessment information and route information was conducted verbally on the morning of 27 Nov, also led by LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6). It was 5-10 minutes in length, at around 1005 hours. The movement brief covered stops, with the exception of the stop later designated based on available time and favorable security conditions to comply with COMISAF's Tactical Driving Directive, paragraph f. There were no new or unusual threats for that day.

I had the following equipment on my person: cell phone (loaded with appropriate phone numbers as per the NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy), PLB, and combat load for my M-9 duty weapon. This mission was conducted in uniform (for service members), with duty weapon, body armor, and Kevlar helmet worn at all times during movement. Each stop had unique operational requirements that were reflected by appropriate uniform and PPE adjustements, as described below.

C. Movement Phase.
I understand a map is being provided for the exact route traveled. The first stop was the Government Media Information Center for orientation to the mission of that organization and engagement with ISAF and Afghan Government personnel. At the GMIC, which was a secure compound in the Inner Zone, Kevlar and IBA were removed and left in the vehicle with 2 force protection personnel. The rest of the team (7 PAX) dismounted and entered the building with our hosts from ISAF. The second stop was at ISAF (in the Green Zone) to drop off CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) for a separate meeting. No one else dismounted. The third stop was a roadside engagement at Brazil Pizza and local bread bakery in Karte-seh, not far from Darulaman Road/Route GREEN (Kabul City Limits Zone). The purpose of this stop was to engage the local population, speaking the language and building goodwill while acquiring food for the team before the next portion of the mission. This location was chosen very carefully among numerous options for both engaging with Afghans in a relatively safe environment and acquiring food along the route to the final stop.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1145 DATED 2010/12/07

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

The risk of this location was lowest, very near the route but off the main road, near a major police headquarters, and across the street from Kabul International School's compoud, where we have pre-existing relationships with the security detail. Nevertheless, Kevlar and IBA were maintained by military members on the dismount but no eye or hand protection was used based on operational requirements and in accordance with COMISAF's Tactical Driving Directive.

A 3-person engagement team consisting of LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6) and myself (all Dari-speakers) dismounted and Dr. (b)(6) and I entered the sandwich/pizza establishment to order food for the team while LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) stood watch outside with a long rifle, greeting passers-by. Since the pizza would take about 15 minutes to prepare, we consulted a moment and decided to continue engaging the population since it was in a relatively safe and friendly neighborhood (where I used to live as a civilian). The three of us walked to a traditional bakery about 50 meters away and around the corner (closer to the police station). We saw and greeted one old friend and numerous local people, including uniformed policemen outside the police headquarters. Regular communications were maintained with the vehicle team. The two vehicles kept pace with us slowly, and staged near the bakery while PO (b)(3), (b)(6) Public Affairs photographer, dismounted and took several photos. He also was wearing PPE. Like before, Dr. (b)(6) and I purchased bread while LtCol (b)(6) spoke to other locals and kept a watchful eye. We then returned to area between Brazil Pizza and ISK and mounted the vehicles to wait for the pizza. Altogether, we were dismounted 15-20 minutes. LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) bought one pizza to the first staged vehicle and a door was briefly opened to receive it.

Following a very short drive, the fourth stop was at Apple Media Production, a production company for Ariana, which is also next door to the Ariana compound. To find the correct entrance and parking area for that compound, I dismounted (with IBA and Kevlar) to meet our contact in front of the Ariana gate. The engagement team at Apple Media Production maintained IBA but removed helmets inside. Regular communications were maintained with the vehicle team.

E. Post-Mission Phase (Return to Camp Eggers).
Upon return to the East Lot, an informal review of the mission was conducted with the majority of the team. There was general consensus that the mission had been a success, including ample opportunity for airing any concerns, and especially enhanced by the additional engagement with the populace during the interlude between stops 3 and 4.

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7th day of December 2010 at Camp Eggers

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers	2010/12/09	1343	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	Civilian

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN

9.
I, (b)(6) _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am a linguist working for media analysis in NTM-A as a translator/interpreter. I was a passenger in this two vehicle convoy.

As usual, Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) provided a brief for this mission that lasted about one hour on the previous night.

as usual when i go on mission i have to have all the stuff for protection but believe me that day i have no memory what i had or not

The route we traveled as I remember was toward Gimak and karte se. We stopped for pizza and bread. We dismounted and were outside the vehicles for about 14-15 minutes. I don't remember who else dismounted.

Lt Col (b)(6), (b)(3) debriefed this movement after we returned to our office.

One more thing i should add that the area in which we have gone on mission is the safest and extremly expensive area because of the stronge security , i do remember when were out side the vehicle the people were so nice and kind to Col (b)(3), (b)(6) each one them were so impressed by his speaking dari, people liked him so much each singl person was asking us for tea and lunch one them told me we love American they are so nice compere to rusia . they love Afghan people, that is why they have learned dari we appreciate all american for coming to Afghanistan we think our safty is because of American soldiers.

NOTHING FURTHER

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Eggers DATED 2010/12/09

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 09 day of December 2010 at Camp Eggers

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers	2010/12/07	1130	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	E-5/SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NTM-A

9.
I, SGT (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am an Afgan Outreach Team member. On the team I operate as a driver, security and Assistant Ops planner. My role in the convoy and vehical was to drive the vehical. There were two vehicals in the movement. I don't rember (IDR) the number of people that where in the movement. The personal I do remember in the movement was myself CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and Dr. (b)(6)

IDR when I particapated in the mission brief. IDR who led the mission brief. Mission briefs usually last about 10-15 mins, but IDR the specific mission brief done that day. IDR if the mission brief was covered using verbal OPORD format. IDR the mission brief so IDR what stops where covered. The mission brief always covers threats but since IDR this mission brief IDR if it was covered. I had on my Cell phone loaded with appropriate numbers, PLB and a full combat load. I wore all required gear.

IDR the route traveled. We stopped at GMIC, and a Media place. IDR the timings of the stops. IDR the purpose of the stops. I did not dismount the vehical. Others dismounted but IDR who they were, what their activities were or if they were wearing their PPE. I did not separate from the convoy. IDR anyone else separating from the convoy.

The convoy stoped, I don't know (IDK) who ordered food but a pizza was brought to the vehical. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) notified me of the stop at Brazil Pizza. I did not dismount. I only remember LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) dismounting but others dismounted with him. IDK the dismounted personels activities. The dismounted personel were wearing there PPE. IDR how long the dismounted personal were outside the vehicle.

Usually there is a mission debrief after the mission but IDR if there was or wasn't one here. IDR who lead the debrief. IDR when debrief occured. IDR what was covered in the mission debrief and IDR if the pizza stop was covered in the debrief.

NOTHING FURTHER

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1130 DATED 2010/12/07

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, SGT (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7 day of December 2010 at Camp Eggers

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(6), (b)(3)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSO (b)(3), (b)(6) EMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP EGGERS, AFGHANISTAN	2010/12/07	1545	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	CPT/03

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

CSTC-A, STRATCOM, AFGHAN OUT REACH

9.

I, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

These statements are made to best of my recollection in regard to the events on the 27 of Nov 2010. Due to the passage of time and frequencey that we conduct missions it is possible that detials in the statement could be confused with missions occuring on other dates.

1. Your official title for NTM-A/CSTC-A.? FST XO, Current OPS
2. Your official duties for NTM-A/CSTC-A? Mission Planner for AOR, Security, COR, Training,
3. Your role in the Convoy. For example, were you the Convoy Commander, Vehicle Troop Commander, passen TC VIC 1, Comms
4. Your position in the Convoy vehicle that you occupied on all of the movements associated with this Investigation? TC VIC 1
5. How many vehicles were in the movement? 2 Vehicles
6. How many personnel were in the movement? 8-9 personnel
7. Who were the personnel that were in the movement? LTC (b)(3), (b)(6), CPT (b)(3), (b)(6), SSG (b)(3), (b)(6), SGT (b)(3), (b)(6), Dr. (b)(6) was added morning of mission, missed on movement contol), SGT (b)(3), (b)(6), TSGT (b)(3), (b)(6), Addtional PA PAX, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

B. Mission Preparation

1. When did you participate in a Movement Brief? Night prior , Prior Mission at vehicles
2. Who led the Movement Brief? I conducted the mission brief. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) may have added points that he wished to highlight or add but I cannot recollect exactly what might or might not have been said.
3. How long did the Movement Brief last? Approx 2 mins. Plus questions and answers
4. What was covered in the Movement Brief? Movement brief consisted of Mission, Intel updates, Route, Actions on contact, personnel seating. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) typically adds comments in regards to mission and other conciderations but I cannot comfirm what was cover that day.
5. Was the Movement Brief conducted utilizing a verbal OPORD format? I typically follow the format covered in statement B4.
6. If the Movement Brief covered the route, what was the route that was briefed? Route To: INDIGO to GMIK to INDIGO to HWY 1 to GREEN to ARIANA. Route From: ARIANA to GREEN to HWY 1 to INDIGO to EGGERS
7. If the Movement Brief covered the stops, what specific 'stops' were briefed? GMIK and Ariana were original destinations. CPT Informed us she could not go to Ariana and had a meeting at ISAF. ISAF was added in when talking to CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) at vehicles.
8. If the Movement Brief covered threats, what threats were briefed? Primary threats covered were VBIEDs and direct contact.
9. Did you have the following equipment on your person? Cell Phone (loaded with appropriate phone numbers as per the NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy (dated 22 August 2010)); PLB; and combat load for your duty weapon? I had a cell phone but the numbers were not loaded. I keep a laminated commo card in my pocket for all missions with the number for BDOC, Movement Contol, QRF Phonex, Vehical Recovery and all members of the AOR team.If my battery dies I still can aquire any other phone and contact help. PLB, combat load+.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS DATED 2010/12/07

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

10. What equipment were you missing in the previous question? I believe we were missing a case of MRE's. We are also missing Green Laser for EOF but it was requested from HHC and supply is backlogged.
11. Did you wear the following gear appropriately at all times during the movement? Kevlar helmet; uniform; hand, ear, and eye protection; and duty weapon? All protective gear was worn

C.
1. What was the route traveled?
INDIGO-GMIK- INDIGO-ISAF-INDIGO-HWY 1 - GREEN - UNKNOWN ROAD - FOOD STOP- UNKNOWN ROAD - GREEN ARIANA/GREEN MEDIA - GREEN - HWY 1 - INDIGO - EGGERS.
2. What were the stops along the route?
Stops were GMIK, ISAF, FOOD STOP, ARIANA/GREEN MEDIA
3. What were the timings for the stops?
GMIK approx. ARR 1010 - DEP 1200
ISAF approx. ARR 1205- DEP 1205
FOOD STOP approx. ARR 1220 - DEP 1240
ARIANA/GREEN MEDIA approx. ARR 1300-1400
EGGERS approx. 1430
4. What was the purpose of the stops?
GMIK - meet US liaisons at GMIK and get briefed on capabilities
ISAF- Dropped off CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) for meeting
FOOD STOP - Food and COIN engagement
ARIANA/GREEN MEDIA - Meet media reps and to get tour of facilities for future out reach operations.
5. When and where did you dismount (depart your vehicle) during this movement?
GMIK - Inside compound for engagement
ARIANA/GREEN MEDIA - Ground guided vehicles into position for easy ex-fill. Surveyed area than re-mounted to avoid drawling attention to our position. Spoke with ANP officer inquiring why we holding on the side street.
6. If you dismounted, how long were you outside of the vehicle?
GMIK - Length of engagement approx. 1.5 hrs.
ARIANA/GREEN MEDIA - Approx. 5 mins
7,8,9,10. If you dismounted, what were your activities outside of the vehicle? If others dismounted, who were they? If others dismounted, what were there activities? If others dismounted, were they wearing their PPE?
LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) TSGT (b)(3), (b)(6) and other PA Pax dismounted and met personal at Green Media. After dismounting and ground guiding vehicles into position. ANP approached and Dr. (b)(6) dismounted and provided translation. SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) and SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) dismounted with weapons pulling security. After concluding discussion with ANP and brief discussion with SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) and SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) I ordered them to re-mount to avoid drawing attention to our position. I re-mounted along with SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) All gear was worn.
11. When did you separate from the convoy? I did not leave the convoy till we returned to Camp Eggers.
12. When did others separate from the convoy? CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) ISAF. Everyone stayed with convoy till return to Eggers.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT OF CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Eggers DATED 2010/12/07

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

D.

1. Did the convoy stop and member or members of the convoy order food? LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) Dr (b)(6) dismounted crossed street to Pizza Shop. Others remained mounted. 3 re-crossed street after approx. 5 mins. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) informed us that pizza would be about 10 mins and that we would move vehicles down block shadowing dismounts to bread shop around corner. Moved approx. 40-50 yard down street to corner. Dismounts moved 20-30 yards down to bread shop. One PA dismounted at this point and joined other three dismounts to take pictures.
2. How were you notified of this stop? I was notified while en-route from GMIK to ARIANA of the food stop.
3. When and where did you dismount? I did not dismount at food stop.
4. If you dismounted, how long were you outside of the vehicle? N/A
5. If you dismounted, what were your activities outside of the vehicle? N/A
6. If others dismounted, who were they? See D1
7. If others dismounted, what were there activities? See D1
8. If others dismounted, were they wearing their PPE? Yes
9. If others dismounted, how long were they outside of the vehicle? LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and Dr (b)(6) approx. 10-15mins. PA approx. 2-3 mins.

E.

1. Was there a mission Debrief? Yes
2. If there was a mission Debrief who led the Debrief? Mission de-brief was covered by LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
3. When did the mission Debrief occur? De-brief occurred when we returned to office later in the day. Unknown time
4. What was covered in the mission Debrief? Engagement at GMIK, Security while at Pizza stop and at Ariana, reaction of people during engagement at Pizza Shop/Bread, Green media.
5. Was the pizza stop covered in the mission Debrief? Yes

F.

1. Your contact with the Camp Eggers Movement Control Cell (or other appropriate Camp Eggers' entity) on what notifications you made (or did not make) when departing or arriving at your listed 'stops' during the movement on 27 Nov 2010. I contacted movement control departing Eggers, departing GMIC, departing Ariana and end of mission at Eggers.
2. Also include any notifications to Camp Eggers Movement Control Cell (or other appropriate Camp Eggers' entity) for changes (additions or deletions) of personnel who went on the movement. We updated the addition of the PA paxs coming sometime the night before. The morning of we got another change to the PA paxs and penciled in the change before turn into movement control. I'm not sure exactly when Dr. (b)(6) was confirmed to go on the mission. We had begun to carry equipment to the vehicles, conduct PMCS and commo checks. I made an assumption that it had been called in when we're doing the final checks for the vehicles.

AFFIDAVIT

I, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7 day of Dec, 2010 at Camp Eggers

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP EGGERS	2010/12/17	2130	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(2)	0-3/CPT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NTM-A, STRATCOM, Afghan Outreach

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

The statements made below are to the best of my knowlegedge and could be inaccuate because of the time since the event and the possiblity of confusing this day with other missions.

I was responsible for the communication with Movement Control. I did not call in the stops at ISAF and the food location because they were short in duration and I did not deem them to be halts that required calls into Movement Control. We did not shut the vehicles down and we stayed in a convoy posture ready to contiune movement. ECM typical blocks cell phone signals so it is common practice to wait until we arrive at our main destination to power down ECMs and make calls.

I prepare the CONOPs for each mission that Afghan Outreach conducts. I prepare the CONOP with guidance from LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) after we discuss current intel and the nature of the location we will be visiting. Considerations that are taken in to account include the security of the engagement site. (Is it a compound?, Is it a compound with security, What type of security?, Are the people we are engaging reliable?) What threats are in the are we are traveling, Are there ASF in the area? How far is the QRF?, etc.
Once I complete the CONOP I typically e-mail it to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) for review and once he approves it, I post it to the STRATCOM shared calendar. Upon review of the overall AO situation with LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) I develop the risk assessment document using what was discussed. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) gets the final movement control document once is it complete for his final approval.

During the food stop we only stayed on site long enough to recieve the pizza. Once the pizza was ready LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) handed it to SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) inside the vehicle who proceeded to hand it to one of the PA personnel in the back of the vehicle. We than departed to Ariana. PA personnel ate some en-route to the location. After we arrived at our destination, positioned the vehicles, talked with an ANP officer for a short duration than got back in the vehicle did myself and SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) have some pizza.

NOTHING FURTHER

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS DATED 2010/12/17

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 17 day of December 2010 at Camp Eggers

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP EGGERS	2010/12/20	1930	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	0-3/CPT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NTM-A, STRATCOM, Afghan Out Reach

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

The mission/task statement on the movement control form was a typo from a previous mission. Possibly a save error.

The mission for that day was to visit GMIC and Ariana as the CONOP and the route details.

NOTHING FURTHER

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS DATED 2010/12/20

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of December 2010 at Camp Eggers

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers Afghanistan	2010/12/07	1355	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	E5/ARNG

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NTM-A/CSTC-A

9.
I, SGT (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

A. Background.
1. Your official title for NTM-A/CSTC-A. NGO Liaison team member
2. Your official duties for NTM-A/CSTC-A.Facilitate movement and security
3. Your role in the Convoy. For example, were you the Convoy Commander, Vehicle Troop Commander, passenger, or other (specify). I was a vehicle driver and security detail
4. Your position in the Convoy vehicle that you occupied on all of the movements associated with this Investigation. Driver
5. How many vehicles were in the movement? 2
6. How many personnel were in the movement? 9
7. Who were the personnel that were in the movement?
LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) MSG (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) MC5 (b)(3), (b)(6) Dr (b)(6)

B. Mission Preparation.
1. When did you participate in a Movement Brief? Approximately 10:15
2. Who led the Movement Brief? CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) & LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
3. How long did the Movement Brief last? Approximately 10 minutes
4. What was covered in the Movement Brief? Where we were going which were the two destinations and what route and route status. PPE and actions on contact.
5. Was the Movement Brief conducted utilizing a verbal OPORD format? yes
6. If the Movement Brief covered the route, what was the route that was briefed? Zulu to Green. Both destinations were on green except the second which was then briefed using the map since it was a block off the actual rte green
7. If the Movement Brief covered the stops, what specific 'stops' were briefed? GMIC and Ariana
8. If the Movement Brief covered threats, what threats were briefed? The most recent about the 8 teenagers
9. Did you have the following equipment on your person? Cell Phone (loaded with appropriate phone numbers as per the NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy (dated 22 August 2010)); PLB; and combat load for your duty weapon.Yes
10. What equipment were you missing in the previous question? None
11. Did you wear the following gear appropriately at all times during the movement? Kevlar helmet; uniform; hand, ear, and eye protection; and duty weapon. No glove on right hand.

10. EXHIBIT	11. (b)(3), (b)(6) SON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1355 DATED 2010/12/07

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

C. Movement Phase.
1. What was the route traveled? Zulu and green and sarak routes in the karte sai area just a block off rte green
2. What were the stops along the route? GMIC in the green zone off zulu. We used zulu to go back to indigo and then sphinx to the ISAF. We reversed route back to zulu and then headed to green and toward the second destination. Prior to second destination of Ariana, we stopped at Brasil Pizza. The Brasil pizza was approached on a road we turned onto from route green. Then we went to Ariana which was off green in the karte sai district of Kabul. Incorrect location for meeting and we went arount the block to a place called Apple something. We departed and returned on the same routes briefed prior to movement which were green to violet and into the city center around the brown mosque and in front of Serena Hotel and wizarat dakhila to zulu in the green zone.
3. What were the timings for the stops? (Arrival, Departure). GMIC was approximate arrival10:25-10:30 departure 11:30-11:40 ISAF arrival 11:45-11:50 departure was simultaneous because of drop off of one pax, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) Brasil pizza arrival approximately 12:15-12:20 departure approximately 12:25 to corner for naan(bread) stop, a bakery on side of road a block away. Arrival was approximately12:30 at corner and departure was 12:35. We rolled back to Brasil pizza and stopped approximately 12:40 and departed approximately 12:50-12:55. We arrived at second destination on movement form approximately 13:05 and departed approximately 13:10. Arrived at Apple approximately 13:15 and departed approximately 13:35-13:40. Arrived at Camp Eggers approximately 14:15.
4. What was the purpose of the stops? GMIC was a planned meeting and stop. ISAF was not a planned drop or stop. Brasil pizza was not a planned stop and it was for ordering food. The naan(bread) stop was not planned and was for buying food. The second stop at the pizza shop was to pick up food. Ariana was a planned stop but wrong destination. Apple was not a planned stop but correct destination for meeting.
5. When and where did you dismount (depart your vehicle) during this movement? GMIC I dismounted and Apple I dismounted
6. If you dismounted, how long were you outside of the vehicle? GMIC for 15 minutes. Apple for 5 minutes.
7. If you dismounted, what were your activities outside of the vehicle? GMIC was to discuss with SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) nocuous team related and personnel related information. Also I explained that we would actually drop CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) off at ECP 1, Camp Eggers.
8. If others dismounted, who were they? All personnel dismounted at some point during mission
9. If others dismounted, what were there activities? SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) dismounted the same times I dismounted for the same reasons at the same stops. With the exception of SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself every dismounted and engaged in the meeting at GMIC. SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) and I pulled security at the vehicles at GMIC and Apple along with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) MSG (b)(3), (b)(6) and Dr (b)(6) stayed with vehicles during stop at Apple . During the pizza and bread stops LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and Dr. (b)(6) dismounted and ordered pizza, bought bread, picked up pizza. From the pizza stop LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and Dr. (b)(6) walked to the corner and went to the bread stop. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and Dr. (b)(6) walked back to the pizza stop, engaged some local Afghans and then continued to pick up pizza order. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) pulled security outside the pizza stop both times. MC3 (b)(3), (b)(6) dismounted at the corner where the bread stop wsa to take pictures.
10. If others dismounted, were they wearing their PPE? Yes with the execption of the GMIC meeting when the engagement team removed their gear. Best as I can recall during the pizza stop I can only remember LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) in their PPE.
11. When did you separate from the convoy? (Dropped off at one of the stops and did not rejoin the convoy). N/A
12. When did others separate from the convoy? (Dropped off at one of the stops and did not rejoin the convoy).When CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was dropped off at ISAF

D. Movement Phase: "Pizza Stop".
1. Did the convoy stop and member or members of the convoy order food? Yes
2. How were you notified of this stop? Radio
3. When and where did you dismount?I did not dismount
4. If you dismounted, how long were you outside of the vehicle?
5. If you dismounted, what were your activities outside of the vehicle?
6. If others dismounted, who were they? LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) Dr. (b)(6) MC3 (b)(3), (b)(6)
7. If others dismounted, what were there activities? Ordering pizza, security and picking up pizza and naan(bread) and picture taking
8. If others dismounted, were they wearing their PPE?I am unsure of anyone other than the military personnel
9. If others dismounted, how long were they outside of the vehicle?20-25 minutes

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMEN (b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT OF SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1355 DATED 2010/12/07

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

E. Post-Mission Phase (Return to Camp Eggers).
1. Was there a mission Debrief? Not that I was part of.
2. If there was a mission Debrief who led the Debrief?
3. When did the mission Debrief occur?
4. What was covered in the mission Debrief?
5. Was the pizza stop covered in the mission Debrief?

1. Were you directed to make contact with Camp Eggers Movement Control Cell to inform them of the Food Stop. I was not directed to make contact
2. Did you contact Camp Eggers Movement Control Cell to inform them of the Food Stop. I did not

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7th day of DECEMBER 2010 at CAMP EGGERS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6) STATEMENT

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES


Brasil Pizza
Initial stop at Brasil Pizza
Vehicle 2 SUB 52
Vehicle 1 TLC 340
LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and Dr. (b)(6)
exit vehicles, assess threat and determine our posture.
CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) returns to vehicle as TC. I open door and
it is explained By LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) that pizza will take 20
minutes. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) stands watch in front of pizza place
while pizza is ordered. After pizza is ordered both LTC
(b)(3), (b)(6) and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) return to TLC 340 driver door and
say that they want to go to get naan. I ask where. I am
told down the street. I say where down the street? It's
just down here and around the corner. I ask, you're
gonna walk? Answer is yes. Both drivers do 3 point
turns and slow roll down the street to escort the
dismounts on foot.

Naan stop
3 Dismounts walk down the street and turn corner to the right.
Naan shop on street
Vehicle 2 SUB 52
Vehicle 1 TLC 340

Brasil Pizza
Final stop at Brasil Pizza
Vehicle 2 SUB 52
Vehicle 1 TLC 340
After 25-30 minutes, we returned and picked up pizza and continued with mission.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers, Afghanistan	2010/12/07	1200	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	E-7

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NTM-A PAO

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

My job title with NTM-A PAO is chief, media relations. I supervise the media relations division, and plan, execute and track media activity for my office. My role in the convoy in question was passenger in the rear right seat, behind the front passenger. I was seated in this position for all movements that day. There were two vehicles in the movement; I was in the second vehicle. Each vehicle carried four persons. In the first vehicle were Lt. Col (b)(3), (b)(6), Capt (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) if I recall correctly. Seated with me in the second vehicle were Sgt. (b)(3), (b)(6) (driver), Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) in the front passenger seat and MP3 (b)(3), (b)(6) opposite me in the back seat.

We all met in the East parking lot prior to departure. I'm not sure of the exact time. According to my Outlook e-mail calendar, we were due at GMIC at 0930, so I would estimate we met in the parking lot between 0830-0900. We received a movement brief shortly thereafter; I cannot recall who gave it. The brief lasted a few minutes and covered our intended destinations (GMIC and Airiana), routes and possible threats along the way, which included a green Toyota, if I remember correctly. I am not familiar with the verbal OPORD format nor was I knowledgeable about the routes mentioned, as I had only been in country for a short time. I was carrying a cell phone with the numbers of a few co-workers loaded into it, a PLB and a 9 mm with two magazines. I was not aware of the appropriate phone numbers as per the NTM-A/CSTC-A Movement Control Policy. I was wearing a Kevlar helmet, flak vest, ABSG uniform, tactical gloves, shaded BPEs, and a shoulder holster that held a 9 mm pistol and two magazines.

As I was unfamiliar with the surroundings outside Eggers, I don't recall the route we took to GMIC; I only recall us turning right onto the road that runs along North Gate. I would estimate that we left the parking at around 0900 and we travelled directly to the GMIC facility. It only took approximately 10 or 15 minutes to reach GMIC, as I recall. The GMIC parking lot appeared full, so the passengers of both vehicles dismounted in the front right section of the parking lot. Outside the vehicle, I took off my helmet and flak vests and put it into the vehicle; others did as well. The drivers relocated and parked the vehicles on side the building. Almost immediately, we were met by several GMIC staffers in the parking lot, who led us into the building, where we received a tour lasting about an hour, maybe more. We exited the building and walked over to the parked vehicles. We put on our gear, got in the vehicles, and left GMIC.

Once on the road, there was a radio conversation between Sgt. (b)(3), (b)(6) and, I believe, Lt. Col (b)(3), (b)(6) was mentioned that we were early for our 1330 Ariana visit, and the idea of stopping for pizza was mentioned. Several minutes later, both vehicles turned right onto a road and stopped in front of a building across the street on the left. I believe I saw Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) walk across the street toward the pizza place, and Lt. Col (b)(3), (b)(6) stood outside the pizza place. Both were in full gear. After several minutes, both vehicles pulled around so that we were parked, facing the opposite direction, on the other side of the street, a block up the road from the pizza place. I believe I saw someone from the first vehicle walking down the cross street, away from the vehicles. The idea of buying bread was mentioned in our vehicle. I don't recall who said it or exactly when. MCpl (b)(3), (b)(6) said he wanted to take photos and dismounted the vehicle to do so, wearing full gear. I remained in the vehicle. Several minutes later, both vehicles pulled around to our initial position. I believe Sgt. (b)(3), (b)(6) was handed bread at this point by someone from the first

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1200 DATED 2010/12/07

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

vehicle. I don't recall who. Minutes later, I saw a young man standing on the street outside the pizza place and I believe he handed pizza boxes to someone from the first vehicle. I don't recall who, and a box was given to Sgt (b)(3), (b)(6) Both vehicles then departed the location by going straight and turning right onto the next street.

We then proceeded to our next destination, Ariana Television. We were on a busy highway and the building was to our right, off the highway and along what I would refer to as a service road that was under construction. I believe there was a barrier separating the highway from the service road, so both vehicles traveled past the actual building, made a U-turn at a break in the barrier, and doubled back toward the building. We turned left on a side street and pulled up to an entrance with a large solid metal gate and armed guards. To the best of my recollection, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and Lt. Col (b)(3), (b)(6) kept out and spoke with a few guards for several minutes. Apparently there was some confusion and they were not expecting us. I believe Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) informed us we were going to another media organization in the immediate area, Apple Media Production. We drove a few more blocks and turned right onto a street. A small building (that looked like a residence) housing Apple was to our left. The vehicle passengers got out and the drivers turned the vehicles around so that they faced the direction from which we came. We were welcomed on the side of the street by two Apple staffers and four of us went in the building -- myself, MCI (b)(3), (b)(6) Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and Lt. Col (b)(3), (b)(6) We kept our gear on during the visit, except for our helmets. For most of the visit, we were seated on two sofas and talked with three Apple staffers, who showed us examples of video segments they had done for clients. It was shown on a computer monitor. The visit lasted about 45 minutes.

We departed and headed back to Eggers, using another route, from what I could discern. Traffic was very heavy.
Upon returning to the East parking lot, I don't recall a post-mission debrief taking place. I walked back to my office.

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUEN

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7 day of December 2010
at

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers, Afghanistan	2010/12/08	1500	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	MC3

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NTM-A PAO

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

My title is Photojournalist/Media Relations Specialist
My official duties are to document the NTM-A mission and to correspond with and escort international media as dictated by NTM-A PAO
I was a pssenger in the movement.
There were 2 vehicles in the movement.
I think there were 8 people in the movement.
I don't remember all of the personnel in the movement.
We participated in a movement brief in the parking lot prior to the movement.
I don't know if we used a verbal OPORD format.
I don't remember the specific route.
I don't remember the specific stops that were given.
I don't remember the specific threats.
I had a cell phone loaded with the appropriate numbers. I had a combat load for my M-16 rifle.
I wore the appropriate gear at all times.
I don't remember the route.
We stopped at the GMIC for about an hour, came back to Eggers to drop off an officer . Then we stopped for pizza for about 10 minutes. then we went to a bakery for about 10 minutes at the bakery I dismounted for about 5 minutes and took some photos at the permission of the driver of my vehicle and Lt. C(b)(3), (b)(6)d Myself, Lt. C(b)(3), (b)(6)d Cap(b)(3), (b)(6)ere dismounted with all appropriate gear. Then went back for the pizza for about 5 minutes. Then we went to the television station. The guards pevented our entrance at the gate. so we went around the corner to a different gate and went to Apple Media Company and stayed for about 30 minutes. Then we returned to Eggers.

We did not seperate from our vehicle by more than about 20 yards.

Lt. C(b)(3), (b)(6)d Cap(b)(3), (b)(6)rdered pizza and Cap(b)(3), (b)(6)ought the bread at the bakery.

We were notified of the stop during the mission.
I dismounted the vehicle at the bakery for about 5 minutes. That is all the time I was dimounted.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

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STATEMENT OF MC3 (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1500 DATED 2010/12/08

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

While I was dimounted I took photos.

I don't remember if there was a mission debrief.

I was in the follow vehicle so I assumed that the appropriate movement control information was made by the lead vehicle.

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

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(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 8 day of December 2010 at Camp Eggers

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.01ES

SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers	2010/12/06	2007	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	O3

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NTMA/CSTCA

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

A. Background
1. Official title: NGO/IO Liaison
2. Official duties: Engage Afghan civil society and its international supporters to ensure they can play a role in shaping the training and reform of the security forces.
3. Role in convoy: TC for movement from Eggers to GMIC, passenger on return journey to ISAF.
4. Position in confoy: Front right seat of lead vehicle on way to GMIC, back seat of second vehicle on return to ISAF.
5. # vehicles in movement: 2
6. # people in movement: 9
7. Personnel in movement: LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) Dr. (b)(6) SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) myself, two PAO staff.
B Mission Preparation
1. When participated in movement brief? Night prior to movement and reinforcing brief directly before travel.
2. Who led brief? Night prior: GMIC segment led by myself and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) rest of brief led by CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
3. How long was brief? Night prior was extensive briefing for at least 2 hours, GMIC brief was about 5 min.
4. What was covered? GMIC brief: route, length of travel, arrangement for communication with POC to get in gate.
5. Brief in verbal opord format? The movement brief covers the relevant parts of a verbal opord format but does not necessarily follow the exact format.
6. Route briefed? Route to GMIC: turn left out of gate, go about two blocks, turn right into GMIC.
7. If movement brief covered the stops, what specific stops were briefed? I can only speak to GMIC section of brief. Stops briefed were GMIC, drop off of myself at ISAF.
8. What threats briefed? For GMIC Section, movement is inside green zone so all threats understood by personnel; conversation to inform PAO personnel about need to remove magazines from weapons once we arrived at GMIC.
9. Equipment carried on person? Cell phone with appropriate phone numbers, PLB, combat load, personal GPS, IBA/kevalr, protective equipment, first aid kit.
10. Equipment missing? Still have received no training as CLS, so wouldn't be as effective with first aid kit as desired. No other equipment missing.
11. Did you wear all the gear appropriately at all times during the movement? Yes, this was a green zone movement so combat gear not required but we wore kevlar/IBA anyway. Did not wear hand, eye, ear protection but had it on front of IBA if needed.
C Movement Phase
1. What was route traveled? Left green zone from German embassy gate, turned left, travelled two blocks, turned right into GMIC. Same route returned to ISAF.
2. No stops along this route except GMIC (destination) and ISAF (return destination)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Eggers DATED 2010/12/06

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

3. What were the timings for stops? Departure from Camp about 10:15 or 10:20, arrival at GMIC about 10:30. Departure from GMIC about 1210, arrival at ISAF around 1225.
4. Purpose of stops? Meeting with staff of GMIC. Drop off of myself at ISAF for meetings.
5. When and where did you dismount during movement? Dismounted inside GMIC (VP) compound, and at ISAF at end of mission.
6. How long outside of vehicle? About 1.5 hours at GMIC.
7. What were activities outside of vehicle? Meeting with GMIC staff.
8. If others dismounted, who were they? All staff except two force pro (SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) dismounted at GMIC for meeting.
9. What were activities of dismounts? Meeting with GMIC staff.
10. If others dismounted, were they wearing their PPE? All dismounts left PPE in vehicles while in the meeting.
11. When did you separate from the convoy? Dropped off at ISAF and did not rejoin the convoy.
12. When did others separate from the convoy? While I was on the mission, no one else separated from the convoy.'

D. Movement phase--N/A
E. Post Mission Phase--N/A

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7 day of Dec, 2010 at Camp Eggers

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers	2010/12/10		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	CAPT/O-6 (USN)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
ANA Development / Camp Eggers

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am assigned to ANA Development, subordinate to DCOM Army, who reports to the CSTC-A CG. My office is located in Chatham House (Camp Eggers), which is across the hall from the Afghan Outreach cell. My personal familiarity with the cell was formed by our close physical proximity as well as from a 25 November movement, in which I was a participant. On at least two occassions, to include the movement of 27 November 2010, I was approached by the Afghan Outreach cell to approve movement control forms. For the 27 November 2010 movement, Capt(b)(3), (b)(6)presented to me a movement control form accompanied with a four color route brief for both departure and return as well as a risk assessment worksheet. All my questions regarding the mission purpose, routes, and timing were addressed to my satisfaction.

GMIC and Ariana Media, as listed on the movement control form, were the only destinations briefed. I was not advised of any planned visits to any food vendors.

It is my understanding that the Afghan Outreach cell lead does not have an O-6 in his immediate reporting chain and must rely on other O-6s or higher within CSTC-A to approve his movements. I approved the 27 November 2010 movement control form with confidence the mission was appropriate, there would be no deviations to the briefed routes and destinations, and that my approval authority in this matter was unambiguous.

NOTHING FURTHER

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Eggers DATED 2010/12/10

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

No Further Remarks

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL IN

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10TH day of DECEMBER, 2010 at CAMP EGGERS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers	2010/12/18	1015	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	O5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Communication Directorate, NTM-A, Kabul, Afghanistan

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

As the director for the Command Communication Directorate, formerly known as STRATCOM. I am responsible for four subordinate organizations. The organizations include: the Public Affairs Office headed by Major (b)(3), (b)(6); Afghan Outreach headed by LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) PA Ministerial Development headed by Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6), and the Joint Visitors Bureau headed by Major (b)(3), (b)(6) I am the direct supervisor for the leaders of each of the subordinate organizations.The mission of the Afghan Outreach in its original charter was to conduct analysis of Afghan media and outreach activities with key Afghan influencers including: media outlets, think tanks, university and academia leaders, and any other organization that could help further inform and educate the Afghan people of the NTM-A mission. This mission was developed out of a necessity to have a better understanding and assessment of the Afghan media and other Afghan influential organizations/publications. A key component was a very deliberate outreach effort to build relations with those key influencers addressed above in order to better understand the perceptions and opinions of the Afghan people as well as serve as a venue to inform and educate the Afghans through these key influencers. Roadside stops to interact with local Afghans are not considered part of the Afghan Outreach mission as outlined in its original charter.

NOTHING FURTHER

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Eggers DATED 2010/12/18

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY W[illegible] IT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUE[illegible]

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18TH day of DECEMBER, 2010 at CAMP EGGERS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING S[illegible]

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers	2010/12/18	1835	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	MAJ

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

NTM-A/CSTC-A

9. (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

QUESTION: Was a request for exception to policy to the NTM-A Movement Control Policy (dated 22 August 2010) submitted for the November 27, 2010 convoy for which Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) was Convoy Commander?

I cannot recall the specific movement request for 27 November 2010 but can confirm that all of Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) (Afghan Outreach) movement requests that were routed through the SJS for the Chief of Staff's signature requested Excetions to Policies for the wear of civilian clothes. Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) movement control forms would arrive to the SJS and a recommendation from the OSJA (LCDR (b)(3), (b)(6) would immediately follow. No other Exeptions to Policies were ever submitted through this office for anything other then the permission to wear civilain clothes. NOTHING FOLLOWS. ks

NOTHING FURTHER

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Eggers, AFG DATED 2010/12/18

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUE[illegible]IT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18th day of DECEMBER, 2010 at CAMP EGGERS, AFG

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP Eggers Afghanistan	2010/12/18	2105	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	COL/USA

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

CJ3, NTM-A, Camp Eggers Afghanistan

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

To the best of my recollection, LTG (b)(3), (b)(6) did not request an exception to the NTM-A Movement Control Policy for his movement on 27 November, 2010. Furthermore, I do not recall any previous request for an exception to the Movement Control Policy by his director. It is possible, though very unlikely that a request for an exception would have been submitted and approved without my knowledge. The Chief of Staff ensures these are routed through me for my recommendation prior to his review. END OF STATEMENT.....

NOTHING FURTHER

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF COL (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Eggers DATED 2010/12/18

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18 day of Dec 2010 at CAMP EGGERS, AFGHANISTAN

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan	2010/12/18	1913	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	LtCol/O-5 USMC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CJ34, NTM-A/CSTC-A, Kabul, Afghanistan

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

To the best of my knowledge and belief, Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) USAF, did not request an exception to the NTM-A Movement Control Policy for a convoy he was commander of on 27 November 2010. At the request of Col (b)(3), (b)(6) I also checked my electronic records for any exception to policy requests submitted by Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) and I did not have any for 27 November 2010 or any other dates.
END OF STATEMENT.

NOTHING FURTHER

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS DATED 2010/12/18

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18th day of DECEMBER, 2010 at CAMP EGGERS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Eggers	2010/12/18	18:35	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	LTC/USAR-mobed

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NTM-A

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On or about Nov 10th, I became deputy director of Stratcom, later renamed Command Communication. Previously, I was the Deputy Branch Chief of Afghan Outreach, but was moved for staffing reasons. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) was TDY from approximately Nov 25th through about Dec 6th. Since he was TDY, he remained in charge of Stratcom with no delegation although I did execute some staff actions in his abscence. We were in contact with him the entire time of his TDY while he was in the states. Prior to Nov 27th, a request for exception to policy was being worked with respect to signature authority of movements to be delegated to the Director, Command Communications, and in his absence, the Deputy. This policy is still being staffed on this date, 18 Dec, 2010. Specific to whether a specific exception was requested for a deviation from the movement, none was requested prior to the movement, although COMISAF guidance would allow that according to policy. With respect to the specific question of whether a request was submitted formally, to the best of my knowledge, nothing was submitted in writing as that would have triggered a formal staffing action that I would have had to approve. Prior to my move, while still in Afghan Outreach, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and I with others discussed random stops at length and whether they should be pre-planned or spontaneous, but no decision was made at that time, pending later discussion and research.

NOTHING FURTHER

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC, FA, USAR TAKEN AT Camp Eggers DATED 2010/12/18

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOTHING FURTHER

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, O

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18 day of December, 2010 at CAMP EGGERS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

EXHIBIT A

ATTACHMENT 6

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: The solicitation of personal information in conjunction with this investigation is authorized under Title 10 U.S.C § 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander, USFOR-A in determining what, if any, action to take with regard to allegations of misconduct and/or misuse of military resources and/or personnel reported in the 23 February 2011 *Rolling Stone* magazine article, "Another Runaway General: Army Deploys Psy-Ops on U.S. Senators."

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the conduct of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts and circumstances regarding the incident concerned. It will be used to determine the cause(s) leading to the incident and make recommendations for appropriate administrative and/or corrective actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for it in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION:

The private information you furnish is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter.

The other information you furnish is mandatory (unless advised of your right to remain silent as a suspect). Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

I, COL (b)(3), (b)(6), having been advised of the above provisions of the Privacy Act agree to provide information concerning the above-cited incident.

Receiver Signature/Date (b)(3), (b)(6) 9 MAR 11

IO Signature/Date 9 Mar 2011

EXHIBIT A

ATTACHMENT 7

ACEN-CG

9 March 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR COL (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Restricted Communications

1. You are to have no discussions of any nature pertaining to the issues that are the subject of this investigation, specifically the allegations of misconduct and/or misuse of military resources and/or personnel reported in the 23 February 2011 *Rolling Stone* magazine article, "Another Runaway General: Army Deploys Psy-Ops on U.S. Senators," about which you were questioned. Communications with the appointed investigating officer, his investigative team members, CID, Military Police, or your personal attorney are permissible.

2. You are prohibited from having any of your associates (third parties) conduct or attempt to conduct communications or discussions by any means (physically, telephonically, or electronically) on your behalf with regard to this matter. If anyone communicates or attempts to communicate to any other party pertaining to these issues and it is determined that you were in any way involved, you will be held accountable for your conduct.

3. If anyone communicates or attempts to communicate to you or any other party pertaining to these issues and you have knowledge or become aware of such efforts, you are required to report the incident to the appointed investigating officer, a member of his investigative team and/or his legal advisors. Failure to report such an incident will be considered as failure to follow a lawful order and you will be held accountable for your conduct.

4. You are to conduct no actions of an investigative nature into these issues. Should you be contacted by anyone other than law enforcement personnel on these issues, that person or persons should be referred immediately to the appointed investigating officer, a member of his investigative team and/or his legal advisors.

5. The term "discussions" includes any and all means of communication, to include, but not limited to, verbal, telephonic, electronic, and written communication.

6. This order is issued as an administrative measure to facilitate the neutral and detached execution of the on-going investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

GS-15, U.S. Army
Assistant Investigating Officer

Signature acknowledging receipt and understanding; (b)(3), (b)(6) _____

Date/Time 9 MAR 11 _ 1902

AR 15-6 Investigation
Information Operations in Afghanistan
LTG William Webster, Investigating Officer
COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Assistant Investigating Officer
Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6), Assistant Investigating Officer

Interview with Colonel Amrein, U.S. Army, starting at 1518 on 24 March 2011.

Q./IO:	LTG William Webster, Investigating Officer
A./WIT:	COL (b)(3), (b)(6)
LA:	COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Legal Advisor to the IO
XO:	COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Executive Officer to the IO
DE:	Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6), Assistant Investigating Officer

LA: Just to remind you, you are still under oath from the 9th of March.
WIT: Yes.
Q. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) I know you answered some questions earlier for the team and I appreciate that. I'm General Webster and I've been appointed to look into the allegations from the Rolling Stone article of 23 February and these are some follow up questions.

To whom has the SJA office, your SJA office, released the 15-6 investigation on Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) since General Patton took action on that 15-6? Have you released it to anyone?

A. My understanding is that Major (b)(3), (b)(6) said that she had given it to somebody as a part of this investigation a copy of that. I gave a copy of it to General Patton so he could review and I don't know of anyone else who -- I don't that a FOIA request had been submitted but those are the only two people that I personally know about that I can recall at this time.

Q. And I assume that Major (b)(3), (b)(6) and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) got a copy, correct? Or not?

A. Sir, they would have received, General Patton considered as the basis of the GOMOR so they would have received a packet. I wasn't involved in making sure that they had a copy of it. My predecessor did. But any documents, they would have received, sir.

Q. Was the AR 15-6 ever released to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or anyone else in the Public Affairs office? And if you're not sure, I need you to be sure.

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. We may need to ask some more people from the office. Is it possible that somebody else in the office could have released it to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or anyone else in the PAO office?

A. I'm sure they could. I'd have to go back and ask. There are times if we're preparing -- if we know there's going to be a media inquiry, it's not uncommon that we would be talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and his team in order to develop the media lines. I can't tell you whether that was done in this case.

Q. Okay. Are you aware that the findings and recommendations page from Holmes' 15-6 are posted on a website?

A. I am not aware.

Q. I've got a copy here. I'll show you what it looks like.

[The Investigating Officer showed the witness a printed document.]

Q. This is a website that's got a picture of (b)(3), (b)(6) and his wife, he claims after his return home after the deployment. And then on page three of this hardcopy of a webpage entitled "This ain't hell but you can see it from here," here's the extraction from the 15-6 findings. It's hard to read there.

A. Okay. I have not seen this before, sir.

Q. Okay. Do you have any idea where else other than the people we've talked about today, you, your shop, a couple of others to include Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) are you aware of anybody else who might have gotten a copy and might have been able to release it? Particularly someone in the Public Affairs office?

A. Sir, I know Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) would have gotten a copy. Whether he would have kept a copy, I don't know. But as the appointing authority he would have received a copy or at least had the opportunity to review it. I can go back and ask the other people in my office if someone from Public Affairs had contacted them and I can look at my email but sitting here today -- I don't believe I've released it.

Q. We've been tasked to find out how this got on the web by General Petraeus and so I think it would be helpful if you asked.

Do we need to read anyone their rights before we ask?

LA: Only if we suspect that they released it.

Q. Yeah. Okay. So it would be important to see if anybody allowed someone to have a copy and then we'd have to question them.

A. All right. I will go back and ask the people in my office and then can I just get back with Colonel Stephens?

Q. Sure.

A. And then if you need me to come back and put it on the record, I will.

Q. Okay.

A. And if you want to talk to somebody else, yes, sir.

Q. That'd be great. Thanks. I have here also a statement from Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) in the Public Affairs Office. It's a statement dated 26 February '11, 11:44 PM it says, and it's a statement signed by (b)(3), (b)(6) and sent to "Friends of NTM-A." In here, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) adds a lot of information out of investigations and other subjects and what I'd like to know is if you or anybody in the office got the chance to review this for release to anyone?

A. Sir, I didn't know anything about that statement until I saw it on my Blackberry the next morning.

Q. Was it -- I'll let you finish your notes there.

A. Okay, sir. Sorry.

Q. Do you know if it's customary or usual policy for (b)(3), (b)(6) to send out emails like this on various subjects to friends of NTM-A and with this full page list of addressees? Had you seen something like this before to add clarity to an issue maybe that PAO was dealing with?

A. Sir, I get a lot of emails but not nearly as many as you. I do remember specific emails that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had sent out when NTM-A was having a one year anniversary and it was a big story that I thought he sent out so that we could release it to other people to tell the CSTC-A/NTM-A story. There might have been others but that's the one that comes to mind.

Q. Okay. But you're not aware of reviewing this, providing a legal review of this to release. Might there be somebody else in your office who might have provided a legal review without you knowing it?

A. Sir, I don't think so. My deputy (b)(3), (b)(6) would normally be the other person who conceivably could have done it but she was on R and R at this time. So I don't think anybody else in the office would have been asked.

Q. Okay. Is Major (b)(3), (b)(6) still in your office?

A. She is not, sir.

Q. She has redeployed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was she here in February and might have reviewed this? Just last month?

A. I know she left several days after she had been interviewed by you but I don't know when that started. She left the first Saturday in March I believe.

Q. We'll have to ask her by phone. Do you recall at about the time the article was released by Rolling Stone, do you recall a timeline, an information list of what had happened chronologically coming out from Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. I do, sir.

Q. And in here we've got emails between (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) around 23 February that lists chronologically what happened. Would you look at this and see if it looks like the same thing you're familiar with?

[The witness did as directed.]

A. Sir, I'm on the email chain so I know I've seen it.

Q. Okay. Did you notice in here that (b)(3), (b)(6) says he was going to release this information as a "backgrounder"? What I'm interested in is if he asked you or someone in your office to review this or give a legal review to this information or any other release like that?

A. Sir, he did not ask for a legal review. I saw this and I know he does give background information when media inquiries are made. I had no idea that he would be giving a statement himself.

Q. Okay. This is an article that appeared in the Washington Times on or about the 27th of February and it is an editorial and appears to have much the same information as in this set of emails between (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) and did you review this or something like it, something that may have contributed to this, did you conduct a legal review of that information that might have been used by this reporter?

A. Sir, I don't think I have seen this article.

Q. Okay.

A. So I have not been involved in a request to do a legal review for something through the Washington Times.

Q. Would you go ahead and read that and just see if it rings a bell in any way?

[The witness did as directed.]

A. Sir, no one asked me about that.

Q. Okay. With regards to the Privacy Act and other legal requirements, do you think this kind of information was legally okay to release or not on or about the 27th of February of '11?

A. Sir, I am not the expert on that area. So sitting here today, I'd have to go back and do my research if I was going to be the one releasing that or asking for a legal review.

Q. Okay. (b)(3), (b)(6), any follow ups on that?

LA: No, sir.

Q. When Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) submitted their rebuttal matters to their GOMORs, do you know if someone in the office read their rebuttals?

A. Sir, I can speak for Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) because I was there when that one came in. I did review it. Several people in the office reviewed it.

Q. Do you recall seeing his claims of retaliation?

A. I do.

Q. And did you investigate that or recommend an investigation into his claim?

A. Based on conversations that I had with the former SJA, we didn't think it was necessary to do an investigation.

Q. Why not?

A. As I understood, the way the information came out, when the evidence of the misconduct came forward, we took it to the command and they decided to initiate an investigation. We recommended the investigation. There did not appear to be any reason that it was -- it wasn't a retaliation of any sort. Someone came to us with information and based on that information we said it's allegations of misconduct, we need to look into it and that was the recommendation that was made.

Q. Okay. But when the rebuttal was submitted and he talked about a retaliation, is there a requirement when a government employee, in this case a Soldier, alleges that retaliation or reprisal has occurred for pointing something out, is there a legal requirement to investigate that in accordance with the Whistle Blower Act or other legal requirements?

A. Sir, I'd have to pull that out. At the time we did not think that it was necessary to do an investigation.

Q. Okay. I think I have some of the standards here. I have an extract here from Title 10 U.S. Code on protected communications and prohibition of retaliatory personnel actions. If you'd just review that briefly and with that knowledge think back to the rebuttal and see if you think there's any application.

[The witness did as directed.]

A. Sir, I didn't think there was a need -- I don't think there was a need to do a separate investigation.

Q. Okay. And I think the SJA at the time was Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) looked at or talked to each other after reviewing Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) rebuttal, do you recall how you or Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) advised General Patton about how to deal with the rebuttal and the GOMOR?

A. I know General Patton and talked about it. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) did not brief General Patton. I looked at it and I told him I think you -- I don't think you need to do anything more. I think

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF COL(b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS DATED 2011/03/24

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

you can make your decision based on what you have in your original documents, the original basis for the GOMOR and then to consider his rebuttal.

Q. So you didn't make a recommendation about where you thought his rebuttal countered what the Investigating Officer had found issue by issue?

A. I did not, sir.

Q. Do you normally do that? Would you normally do that with a commander and an investigation?

A. It depends on the investigation, sir. We did talk in general about what was in the report. In general and some specifics, but we did talk about it.

Q. When you took it to General Patton to talk about it and advise him, was that the first time that you believe General Patton was aware of the rebuttal to this 15-6 or had he already been made aware? Could you tell? Do you recall?

A. I don't recall, sir.

Q. Okay. And you say you did not advise General Patton on Major(b)(3), (b)(6) rebuttal?

A. I did not.

Q. Do you know who did?

A. Sir, I can't tell you.

Q. Okay. I'd like to know that if you can find out from the office and tell Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6) who advised General Patton on Major(b)(3), (b)(6) rebuttal. Okay(b)(3), (b)(6) any other questions?

LA: Do you know if General Patton knew about Holmes' questioning of the order from Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6) before he gave the initial GOMOR? Before he read the rebuttal? Do you know if he found out about that beforehand?

WIT: Just through what my conversations with General Patton were, he didn't know about it until after he read the rebuttal.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT OF COL(b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS DATED 2011/03/24

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

IO: Okay. Dave anything?
DE: No, sir.
IO: That's all(b)(3), (b)(6)
LA: Yes, sir.
IO: Okay, Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)thanks very much to answer these questions.
WIT: Yes, sir.
IO: And if you will follow up on those and call Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)and tell her what you know.
WIT: Yes, sir.
IO: Okay. Thanks very much.
WIT: Thank you, sir.

[The interview terminated at 1541, 24 March 2011.]

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 6. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6) _____
(Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

_____
_____
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

_____
_____
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, at _____

_____
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

_____
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

_____
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or nonjudicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, troop assignments, retention, promotion, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP EGGERS, AFGHANISTAN	2011 03 09		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		COL, O-6

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CSTC-A NTM-A, CAMP EGGERS, AFGHANISTAN

(b)(3), (b)(6) _____ WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Interview of COL (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted on 9 March 2011.

Q. Your name.
A. (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q. Where are you from?
A. Home town or original duty station?
Q. Where are you at now?
A. I came from Fort Sam Houston.
Q. Correct contact information is?
A. 237-1257, that is my telephone number here, marian.anderson@us.army.mil (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q. Okay, and your current unit is CSTC-A.
A. Yes.
Q. And MTNA you are in both or just one?
A. It is one organization. I am on the JMD for CSTC-A.
Q. How many years have you been in the military?
A. 25.
Q. Did you have a prior MOS before you became a lawyer?
A. No.
Q. What kind of jobs have you had before you came here? (b)(3), (b)(6)
A. Before I came here I was the SJA for the AMED Center in Fort Sam. I worked at our branch back in D.C. Before that I had been the SJA at White Sands Missile Range. Keep going? (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q. Any deployment?
A. I had been in Korea but had not been in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Q. And you are now the director of the SJA office here?
A. I am the SJA.
Q. How long have you worked for LTG Caldwell in that capacity?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 17 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____, TAKEN AT _____, DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST REFLECT THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND PAGE NUMBER WILL BE INDICATED.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement of CO (b)(3), (b)(6) taken at Camp Eggers on 03/09/2011

A. I arrived at the end of June last year.

Q. And had you worked for LTG Caldwell before this?

A. I had not.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. You said that you had been on the AMEDD staff and a couple of other places have you ever worked at a three or four star level before coming here?

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

A. No AMEDD center was a two star.

Q. Can you give us some back ground on how the command group is structured, and who fills each position in CSTC-A? Start with LTG Caldwell and working your way down say just to the General officers and key O-6s.

A. LTG Caldwell. General Mallory is now his depoty. I am focusing on military side. On the civil side is Dr. Kan (b)(3), (b)(6) We are broken up into different DCOMs. So you have DCOM Army General Patton: DCOM police MG (b)(3), (b)(6) (and it is MG Patton) and we have DCOM ISC and I cannot tell you the Polish General's name without looking at it, but he is one of the GOs. We have DCOM programs which is directed by COL (b)(3), (b)(6) we have DCOM RS which is run by now BG (b)(3), (b)(6) We ha (b)(3), (b)(6) Chief of Staff office who is BG (b)(3), (b)(6) the counterpart on the CSCT-A side is COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you want me to name the other generals and their position?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. No I think that is enough. It was not really a test question I am just trying to figure out who is who in the zoo. Do you have knowledge on LTG Caldwell's philosophy on strategic communication in the command?

A. I can't say it verbatim. He is aggressive about telling the CSTC-A story, so he encourages (b)(3), (b)(6) key leaders, people in the command to tell the story, and encourages communications with the press. He does say that if you are going to talk to the press you need to stay in your lane talk about what is your lane. Things that are outside your lane you shouldn't be talking about it. What you say is attributable to you so it isn't to be off the record. If you are going to speak then you should say who it is providing the information.

Q. How about Dr. Kan (b)(3), (b)(6) is he in line with this or has he got a different approach?

A. As far as I know he is very much the same. He does multiple engagements with the press. I have never heard him not support LTG Caldwell's position on leading engagements.

Q. You say that LTG Caldwell is asks for people to tell the CSTC-A story. Has he got a specific philosophy for hosting DVs or CODELs?

A. I am not sure of a specific philosophy. He wants to tell the story, he wants to make sure that what we tell them is relevant and accurate for why they are coming to visit.

Q. Does he encourage in telling the story as a means to get things from them? Is that fair to say?

A. I do not know if that is fair to say. I guess it depends on who is coming here. If someone is coming here, I know I have been involved in CODEL s that, for example, have involved ~~ACIP~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) contacting issues that he wants to make sure the information is accurate that we are giving them. I am not sure that I can give you an answer.

Q. Is his philosophy bearing different than previous commanders that you have worked for in terms of what they want to do with their organizations and how they approach strategic communication?

A. Not to my knowledge. The last command was very engaged with the public in San Antonio. My former Commanding General did not encourage us to go out and talk to the press but he did not say you could not do it. Here LTG Caldwell just wants to make sure that the people back home know what we are going and telling the story there are a lot of good things happening here he wants us to share the good things that we are doing.

Q. Did AMHD (b)(3), (b)(6) host a lot of Congressional members?

A. They did.

Q. Did the preparation for those Congressional members at AMHD (b)(3), (b)(6) is that pretty much the same preparation they do here?

A. I would say yes, and I am trying to figure out different times I was involved but it was no different. I mean we prepared for whoever was coming in to make sure that we knew why they were coming and we wanted to give them the information that they were interested in learning.

Q. Do you know anything about how LTG Caldwell applies information operations, psychological operations, or public affairs and if those things differ in his mind?

A. We have never had a conversation regarding information ops or psychological affairs it has never been discussed with him and I have never been ---- until this came out I have never been in a discussion with him. Since this has come up he has been like "we do not do information ops. I have never asked anyone to do information ops."

Q. What was your reaction to the article?

A. It did not surprise me that LTG (b)(3), (b)(6) was taking his story to the public. I disagreed with it and I don't think there was any retaliation. No one was out to get LTG (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. I will get to that point in just a second. So your reaction was just the article it was not justified, that they seemed to have gotten that wrong.

A. Yes.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement of CO (b)(3), (b)(6) taken at Camp Eggers on 03/09/2011

Q. Do you remember (b)(3), (b)(6)

A. Yes I remember (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Can you describe him?

A. Physically or describe how I know him?

Q. Physically, professional, and what was your relationship?

A. I first met him because I gave legal advice to MG Patton. MG Patton had been delegated authority from LTG Caldwell to handle officer misconduct. When I arrived in the command one of the actions my predecessor transfer to me was this outstanding GOMOR that was given to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) So, when I came in I read his rebuttal and I talked with MG Patton and I arranged to have LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) meet with MG Patton to discuss the GOMOR response.

Q. So (b)(3), (b)(6) met with Patton as a result of his letter, his appeal.

A. MG Patton had issued the GOMOR to him and part of it was in issuing the GOMOR "it is my intent to file in your OMPF however I will not make a filing decision until I have the opportunity to review any matters you want me to review." And once he submitted matters MG Patton said "I do want to talk to him. Bring him in."

Q. Did you talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) ourself?

A. I did not. He had an attorney and I went through his defense counsel.

Q. Who was his attorney?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

A. I worked though ~~the senior~~ defense counsel. I do not know the name of his attorney. I cannot tell you off the top of my head. I have email traffic with him but the senior defense counsel that I talked to was MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) who is at Bagram.

Q. And MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) is in trial defense?

A. Yes he is the senior defense counsel

Q. Do you remember what (b)(3), (b)(6) was doing when you got here?

A. Just what was in the 15-6. I did not know him. I got here in ~~July~~ (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. You did not know him professionally in terms of what he did, just in your capacity as the SJA?

A. Yes.

Q. At that what kind of interaction is (b)(3), (b)(6) having with the command group? Can you comment on that at all? I mean you said you got him an appointment to see MG Patton at MG Patton's request. Is he in the command group often doing things at this point?

A. No idea.

Q. No idea, okay. Did (b)(3), (b)(6) ever have direct contact with LTG Caldwell during your time here? That you recall.

A. My office is not in the command group so I have no idea.

Q. Not that you are aware of then. I am just trying to see what we have got. So then based on your review of the 15-6 and based on your review of his response to it, is it your opinion that LTG Caldwell ever ordered (b)(3), (b)(6) to do psychosocial operations at all?

A. Can you repeat the question?

Q. Based on your review of the 15-6 and (b)(3), (b)(6) rebuttal to the 15-6 is it your opinion that LTG Caldwell ever ordered (b)(3), (b)(6) to do psychological operations?

A. It is my opinion that he never ordered him to do psychological operations.

Q. Or information operations?

A. Correct the same.

Q. Since this all sort of occurred prior to your arrival in June, you said June or July?

A. June.

Q. You never saw (b)(3), (b)(6) work with CODELs or DVs?

A. I did not.

Q. And you are not aware of any guidance that LTG Caldwell may have given (b)(3), (b)(6) with respect to duties prepping DV visits?

A. I do not have any personal knowledge.

Q. Do you have any knowledge other than the 15-6, that we have already kind of covered a little bit, about (b)(3), (b)(6) relation with other staff members that were in CSTC-A?

A. It is just a part of the 15-6. Obviously part of the allegations include an inappropriate relationship with MA (b)(3), (b)(6) My knowledge is only through the 15-6 or processing the 15-6.

Q. So you said that none of the commands you worked in before, or maybe I am making an assumption here. Did any of the commands that you worked in before ever do information operations or psychological operations?

A. No.

Q. So do not have an opinion in how a command can integrate those activities so that they are kept separate where they need to be kept separate.

A. No I do not have an opinion.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of any legal advice given to LTG Caldwell on the use of information ops since you arrived.

A. Again, and I think I said earlier, we had not talked information ops. He does not do information ops here

Q. But there is a directorate that is called directorate of communications and in that directorate of communications there is an IO officer; and the other side of that directorate of communication is a strategic communications officer that runs a PAO shop; and those two things are supposedly kept separate; and you have never provided any legal advice on about those two things should be kept separate or how that thing should be structured

A. I have not.

Q. Has any member of your staff advised them on the legalities?

A. They could contact members of my staff but I do not know if they have.

Q. And I am not saying there should have been but I am asking there has been not legal opinion sought about how we keep things separate if there are things that need to be kept separate.

A. Again not from me; and my deputy is on leave and I have not talked to her about this. To my knowledge we have never discussed this so I do not think there has been a legal opinion.

Q. I am going to ask you about the 15-6 investigation that was initiated against LTG (b)(3), (b)(6) prior to you getting here. You had knowledge of that because of your contact with MG Patton and advising him.

A. I did.

Q. You reviewed the investigation

A. I did.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement of CO (b)(3), (b)(6) taken at Camp Eggers on 03/09/2011

Q. In your opinion did the circumstances strike you as influenced by the fact that LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MA (b)(3), (b)(6) might have been complaining about the duties that they had based on your review of this thing?

A. Can you start the question again?

Q. Let me put it another way. The 15-6 occurs after COL (b)(3), (b)(6) gets into an argument with his boss COL (b)(3), (b)(6) And you reviewed the case.

A. Yes.

Q. So there is this argument that occurs on or about the 22nd of March and this investigation is initiated while COL (b)(3), (b)(6) is on leave, more less about the 30th of March, and so we have to ask if this investigation looks like a reprisal against LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MA (b)(3), (b)(6) for contesting that the duties that they have been told to do aren't in keeping with what they think they should be doing. They complained it results in what has been called by other interviewee a shoving match, and I think they use that term figuratively not literally, but my point is he has a disagreement with his boss and his boss then apparently initiates an investigation. So based on your review of that investigation did that seem to you to be a reprisal?

A. No

Q. Why not? What made you think it w

(b)(3), (b)(6)

A. Because during the course ---- MA (b)(3), (b)(6) had brought some information forward as my understanding, and again this is reviewing the 15-6 and talking to the folks who had been here at the time, was because COL (b)(3), (b)(6) was on leave his deputy MA (b)(3), (b)(6) came in and talked to the deputy SJA and the acting chief of administrative law. Was telling some of the issues (b)(3), (b)(6) problems they had with LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and based on that information we probably need to take that to the leadership and see if we need to do an investigation.

Q. You thought the investigation was conducted properly?

A. Yes.

Q. You thought it looked at both sides of the evidence?

A. The allegations were inappropriate relations, based on the purpose of the investigation yes.

Q. So the fact that, and let me make sure that I have my facts straight here, I don't believe that (b)(3), (b)(6) ever enters a statement in the 15-6. I have talked to at least one other officer and I do not think that (b)(3), (b)(6) does. I have talked to one other officer who said that since then she was never interviewed by LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) who is the 15-6 investigating officer; and so it would appear at least on the surface of it that (b)(3), (b)(6) contention that both sides of the case were not properly

faired out and that we did not look for evidence on both sides of the issue that maybe there is some validity to that. You do not believe so.

A. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) had the opportunity to provide a statement, they invoked and they didn't and so we stopped asking them questions. When MG Patton gave them the GOMOR he gave them the opportunity to submit whatever matters and tell their side of the story. He took all of that into consideration before he made a decision. So they had the opportunity to tell their story so I disagree with his statement saying we did not look at both sides.

Q. Do you know (b)(3), (b)(6)

A. I do.

Q. How do you know her?

A. She worked for me.

Q. What was her job?

A. She was the chief of justice and then she transferred to work in the Afghan National Police legal development office.

Q. When did that transfer take place?

A. The end of September.

Q. You read MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) opinion on the legality of the (b)(3), (b)(6) of the order that COL (b)(3), (b)(6) gave to (b)(3), (b)(6) concerning his participation in the information working group as part of this?

A. The one that was dated 30 March?

Q. That is right.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree with the advice that she gave?

A. Yes.

Q. So it was sound legal opinion in your view.

A. Yes.

Q. And proper advice for what was being asked?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) subsequently recommended the 15-6 investigation be conducted on misconduct direct at (b)(3), (b)(6) Are you aware that (b)(3), (b)(6) was the source for that investigation being initiated?

A. She is the one that had the conversation with MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) yes that is what I said. She was the acting chief of administrative law and that conversation with MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) was with MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) and then deputy LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. So you are aware that she emailed COL (b)(3), (b)(6) and asked him if this is an investigation that we should launch?

A. Yes.

Q. And she then served as the investigating officer's legal advisor during the period of the investigation. Is that true?

A. Yes

Q. You don't see a problem with that?

A. No.

Q. So, let me make sure I am understanding you. So from the point where (b)(3), (b)(6) makes her rant, which is what I have heard it termed, about her frustration with (b)(3), (b)(6) and the fact that (b)(3), (b)(6) is often off post in civilian clothes that she has rumors that (b)(3), (b)(6) is drinking, she has rumor that (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) are in an improper relationship. She says all this to (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) then initiates the investigation by emailing (b)(3), (b)(6)

A. She did not initiate it. She took the information to the command; she took it to COL (b)(3), (b)(6) who said "I think you are right we need to do an investigation." The decision to do an investigation was not MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) not COL (b)(3), (b)(6) The appointing officer, if I recall, was COL (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Right it was the investigation that was recommended by the person that was sitting in your seat at the time.

A. Yes, well I don't know if COL (b)(3), (b)(6) did, but I know that LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) did.

Q. Mitchell then serves as a legal advisor to the investigating officer.

A. Yes.

Q. And is that normal practice in places you have been before where a person involved in the case would then kind of shepherd the case through.

A. Well she received the information and she was not a party to it, she just got the information and said this looks like something we need to investigate. What do you think? MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) is the one that gave the statement, so MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) was not a witness to any of these events. And in a small shop if you don't have a whole lot of people too, you have to have one person that is the legal advisor and you have to have someone separate that is going to do the legal review.

Q. So who does the legal review on a 15-6?

A. On this one I could not tell you without looking.

Q. Maybe we should go get the 15-6 and see. If there was a legal review preformed on it then we need to make sure that we know who that was.

Q. Normally a legal review is conducted on a 15-6?

A. Where did you get a copy of the 15-6? Is that the one the LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) have?

Q. You will have to ask COL (b)(3), (b)(6) because I think we have gotten several from several people. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) brought over a copy of it and brought over also the rebuttals as part of her testimony. So normally in a 15-6 investigation there is an investigating officer and then there is someone that advises the investigating officer from the JAG shop and is it usually the same person or is it just a matter of man power and you got seven people in your shop and she just does it. One person would act as the legal advisor and somebody else in the shop is going to do the legal review.

Q. I see.

A. So it is never the same two people. I know there was a legal review done but whether or not it would not be part of what LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) received. That is an internal document we would not have given it to him.

Q. Do you think the resulting reprimand is an adverse action against LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) are properly handled?

A. More than fair.

Q. Appropriate under the circumstances.

A. Yes.

Q. You went back and altered those later on. Can you talk that process please?

A. During the course of the meeting that MG Patton had with LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) he said "I am going to mark out several portions here. I am going to take out this potion of an inappropriate relationship but I am going to leave the reprimand the (b)(3), (b)(6) not know if I had a conversation with MG Patton at the time but ultimately I said "MG Patton what I will do is I will go back do a

new GOMOR." I took that information out so what is filed is not all xed out so no one could see what was there once. And I coordinated that with the defense counsel and that included my conversations with MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Does this look like what we are talking about here? I have given COL (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) copy of the 15-6 and the rebuttal, or is this just a 15-6. Just the 15-6

A. This is a copy of the 15-6. I do not think there is a legal review in here and again it wouldn't have been given to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) So, I don't know where this copy came from but he would not have received a copy of the legal review but a legal review was done.

Q. Okay but you do not know by who?

A. I don't.

Q. Would it be possible for you to get that information?

A. I can email it back to COL (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Are you aware of a 15-6 conducted concerning COL (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. I am aware of a 15-6.

Q. In your opinion do the circumstances of COL (b)(3), (b)(6) investigation seem motivated by reprisal?

A. No.

Q. Why not, why?

A. Allegations of potential misconduct came forward. We made recommendations to the chain of command that an investigation needs to be done.

Q. Can you disclose who reported the allegations of misconduct (b)(3), (b)(6)

A. I cannot tell you off the top of my head. Two of the investigations are closed I can't tell you without going back to look. The third investigation is still open. I would rather not comment because it is still open.

Q. Well, which two are finished?

A. There was an investigation regarding a violation of a movement in November and there was an investigation regarding a Captain's R&R and the fact that she did not come back from R&R at the end of her R&R period.

Q. So I am a little concerned because CO (b)(3), (b)(6) more than insinuated, he has asserted that he got painted with the same brush and this a reprisal against him. This command has an issue with the program that he is in, the Afghan Hands program, which I assume are very similar in activities. According to what General Petraeus has said the Afghan Hands are supposed to be, it sounds a lot like what (b)(3), (b)(6) as trying to do. Where you have to manage force protection and risk against talking to the populous which General Petraeus says a strategic center of gravity of the current fight. So in your view based on what you know is this command adverse to risk unnecessarily adverse to risk?

A. No. As a (b)(3), (b)(6) commander they are going to weigh the pros and cons, the risk, and make a decision. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. You do not believe that I am really interested in finding out who initiated the investigation on Kirk.

A. The appointing authority was the Chief of Staff (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Is this command adverse to the Afghan Hands program are they down on those folks? Do you understand what that is, the Afghan Hands program? And you do not think that they are?

A. No.

Q. You mentioned an investigation involving the Captain whose R&R was some question about. Her name i (b)(3), (b)(6) think. Are you familiar with that investigation and how that has gone?

A. Yes

Q. And is it complete?

A. It is complete.

Q. And can you comment on what the findings were? We have not seen copies of those two investigations. Is it possible for us to obtain copies of those investigations?

A. I know that CO (b)(3), (b)(6) talked to you and I had never gotten word back. I know he said that he talked to you a couple of days ago, did he not?

Q. He and I had several exchanges. One of the things we asked him was if there was a problem and let me tell you why I am asking this. Are there an excessive number of 15-6s in CSTC-A do you think?

A. No.

Q. Have there been in the past?

A. It depends on what your definition of excessive is.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Sure.

A. Allegations of misconduct come up. We raise them to the command and they decided whether or not we need to investigate. There are 15-6s; whether they are excessive I do not have something to compare it against.

Q. With respect to (b)(3), (b)(6) investigation do you recall of the top of your head what the findings were?

A. Specifically no, there were detailed ones I could not repeat them back to you.

Q. Did you run those investigation did you sort of track them?

A. I mean they are out of my shop so yes, I track them. One of my officers would have been involved in giving legal advice to the investigating officer, another attorney would have done the legal review, and I would have reviewed the investigations before I sent them back to COL (b)(3), (b)(6) his action.

Q. Do you brief the commander on ongoing investigations as a matter of command and staff call or a matter of your time with him?

A. No.

Q. Do you talk to anybody about ongoing investigations?

A. I talk to the Chief of Staff.

Q. Has LTG Caldwell delegated that to the Chief?

A. Yes.

Q. Formally?

A. On various investigations I know that I have gone to LTG Caldwell and said I recommend that you direct the Chief of Staff to start an investigation. So, he knew it would come but he is the one who has been delegated the authority to do investigations. I can't tell you if that is in writing.

Q. When COL (b)(3), (b)(6) signs off an investigation does he sign for the commander or does he sign as the Chief of Staff?

A. It depends on the investigation.

Q. Average number of 15-6s going on per month here is about what?

A. I could not even tell you. We have had some that have been open for a while.

We probably have seven or eight open maybe more but they are at all levels they aren't all at the Chief of Staff level. We have them at the battalion level and at the one star level.

Q. What is the command climate like here? Do you understand what I mean when I say command climate?

A. Why don't you give me your definition?

Q. Well, are you happy working here?

A. I am happy working here.

Q. Your shop happy working here, do you have problems in your shop or is it a pretty good place.

A. It depends on the day and people involved and what we are working on. When you work with each other all day everyday people get tired of each other but most of the time, pretty good.

Q. Any issues with the command climate here.

A. Not everyone is happy here obviously but again, some people are over worked and some people like what we do. It is a mix.

Q. That is fair it is probably the same as most places. How about the IG? What is your interface with the IG like?

A. Well, we talk to each other multiple times a week. We go to a lot of the same meetings, we often sit by each other so

Q. Is the IG a trainer or is he here to handle complaints from soldiers. Or does he do both?

A. He does both.

Q. Do you think he does one more than the other.

A. I know he has a lot of work and that he tries to do both.

Q. I am just interested as to why (b)(3), (b)(6) and now Kirk and these other folks that have had these investigation, why there is never any interaction with the IG on these things?

A. No idea

Q. And you know what the Afghan Hands are and I think I might have already asked you this but is there a reason that you might know of that the Afghan Hands people that are on this base working for CSTC - A don't feel welcome?

A. I do not know.

Q. Could I ask you please to follow up with those two investigations and let COL (b)(3), (b)(6) know what the outcomes were and if you could we would like to look at copies of those?

A. I will talk to COL (b)(3), (b)(6) He is the one that directed the investigation so I will follow up.

Q. His office, not him.

A. COL (b)(3), (b)(6) is the one. I will talk to him.

Q. Right, but (b)(3), (b)(6) was not here when these went down.

A. But he is the one that came in and he is the Chief of Staff.

Q. I just want to make sure I am straight in my mind of who initiated what.

A. It is the CSTC-A side. I mean we have the Chief of Staff for NTM-A.

Q2. Do you know if LTG Caldwell had withheld, like our CG has withheld E-8s and above do you know if he has any withholdings like that?

A. He delegated it to MG Patton.

Q2. All of it for Army.

A. All of it for E-8 and above for Army to MG Patton, and now it has been subsequently delegated to MG Mallory (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q2. And that is for the disciplinary action, not the determining if an investigation is going to happen. The Chief of Staff does that and then once the investigation is done then it goes up to either MG Patton and now BG Mallory?

A. Yes, generally that is true. Obviously there are some things that LTG Caldwell in his capacity as General Court-Martial has to do unless he has delegated it and said "start it for me." But that is correct.

Q. How long did you know MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) when she was here? I do not mean to go back and cover we have already covered.

A. I met her when I came in June and she just left.

Q. And what is your opinion of her as a JAG?

A. She knows her criminal law. I mean that is what she did for me. She knew her criminal law and received good reports from her interaction with ANP working the legal development.

Q. Is she one of the better officers that worked for you?

A. No.

Q. Why not.

A. If I had to rack and stack she would not be at the top.

Q. Well, I know. But you have some criteria that you apply to get whoever is at the top at the top so why isn't she up there?

A. Professionalism. I look at multiple things. I would say professionalism, attitude, interaction with people. I think she is a good solid major.

Q. Would it be fair, and I am asking you about an opinion I am considering forming but I haven't yet because I had one conversation with her, did she seem a little bit zealous to you?

A. Zealous in the pursuit of military justice, zealous how?

Q. Zealous in a sense that she viewed her job as a prosecutor for the command as sort of a ---- where she thought of someone who was protecting it from misperception or bad news or bad activities. Is she going after people to keep them in line because she is afraid they are going to make the command look bad?

A. I do not think that was her attitude. I think as the chief of justice she saw misconduct she wanted it to be brought to the command's attention so that it could be addressed.

Q. So, in your opinion she is not going out of her way to find out inappropriate sexual relationships that are not there.

A. I do not think she is going out looking for it but if she sees it she brings it to our attention so it can be addressed.

Q. In a way that is normal for a prosecutor to do?

A. Yes

Q. So keeping in everything you have seen from prosecutors assigned before I mean these are people ---- you have had prosecutors work for you before.

A. I have

Q. She is not different then they.

A. As far as looking at crime if you see things you bring it to our attention so that it can be addressed. It is the same.

STATEMENT OF COL (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS DATED 2001 03 09

STATEMENT (Continued)

Q. She is not outside the majority.
A. No.

(NOTHING FOLLOWS)

AFFIDAVIT

(b)(3), (b)(6) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE ____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11th day of March 2011
at Camp Eggers

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) COL USA
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ Art 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.01ES

EXHIBIT B

ATTACHMENT 1

Memorandum for Record

SUBJ: Telephonic Interview with COL (b)(3), (b)(6) , 25 MAR 2011

On the above date, at app. 1745C (Kuwait time), I conducted a telephonic interview with COL (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

COL (b)(3), (b)(6) had previously provided response to some questions by email; at ENCL 1, find a copy of that correspondence.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6) affirmed that he and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) had agreed that capacity building in the MOI/MOD were a viable mission, but he reaffirmed that (b)(3), (b)(6) first priority was to support the Directorate of COmmunicaitons.

He expressed surprise and disagreement with the Rolling Stone article, stating that there were a number of inaccuracies, and emphasizing that LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) was never tasked to perform PSYOP, was never involved in IO as part of the command, which did not engage in IO activities.

He stated that neither he nor COL (b)(3), (b)(6) knew enough about the legal system to advise LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) but that he had advised him that pursuing redress through legal channels might be appropriate. Otherwise, he adjudged that the handling of (b)(3), (b)(6) case by the Chain of Command was fair.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PhD, GS-15

Assistant Investigating Officer

ENCL 1, Email exchange with COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Fri 3/25/2011 12:49 PM

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Where suitable I have commented on your questions below. I am in office on Mon 28th Mar, but then out of office on various visits for the rest of that week, therefore I suggest that we speak on Mon. Easier if you ring me and I will be by the phone from 1400 – 1500 hrs UK time.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Col

Col Inter Sy Coop

Tele Civ: (b)(6)

Mil Network: (b)(6)

Fax Civ: (b)(6)

Fax Mil Network: (b)(6)

Role E-mail: (b)(6) @mod.uk <mailto: (b)(6) @mod.uk>

Personal E-mail: (b)(6) @mod.uk <mailto: (b)(6) @mod.uk>

Civ E-mail: (b)(6) @hotmail.co.uk <mailto: (b)(6) @hotmail.co.uk>

From: (b)(6) [mailto (b)(6) @hotmail.co.uk]

Sent: 23 March 2011 20:52

To: (b)(6) Col

Subject: FW (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

> Subject: RE(b)(3), (b)(6)Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

> Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2011 21:31:13 +0300

> From: @arcent.army.mil

> To: (b)(6) @hotmail.co.uk

>

> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

>

>(b)(6) - Apologize for just getting back to you...was sent to the states

> to consolidate some analysis, but now am back in Afghanistan...need to

> speak with you very soon to clarify a couple of issues on the

>(b)(3), (b)(6)Rolling Stone investigation...misread your last - for some

> reason thought you were going to contact me once you got in from your travels.

>

> Some questions --

>

> Understand you were(b)(3), (b)(6)boss roughly from NOV 09-JAN 10?Correct.

> Also understand you loaned(b)(3), (b)(6)& IO FST from J5 to

> and, later, to (b)(3), (b)(6) in the Directorate of Communications...is

> that right?Loaned is not the correct terminology. They moved from my direct control to that of Col (b)(3), (b)(6)and then Col(b)(3), (b)(6)

> Understand you were the one, or your directorate was the organization,

> that put (b)(3), (b)(6) onto developing STRATCOMs in MOI/MOD, as well as other

> missions requiring outside the wire activities - can you describe these?

Better done by phone.

> Did (b)(3), (b)(6) ever request blanket permission to go off post in civilian

> clothes from you?No.

> Were you knowledgeable of (b)(3), (b)(6) 15-6? Can you describe your

> involvement, if at all, in this?I was aware of the investigation, but as the events did not happen when they were under my direct control and it was a US Investigation I had no formal involvement.

>

> Additionally, am very interested in finding and talking to W/CDR (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) no one seems to be able to locate him. Am interested in a

> conversation b/w he and (b)(3), (b)(6) on/about 25 MAR and his inquiry into

> the legality of (b)(3), (b)(6) activities vis a vis DVs/CODELS/US and NATO

> flag officers.Will speak with the RAF again to see if I can track him down.

>

> My DSN is (b)(6) ; I can call you if DSN isn't available from

> your end.

>

> Sincerely

>

(b)(3), (b)(6)

>

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) [mailto: (b)(6) @hotmail.co.uk]

> Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:27 PM

> To: (b)(3), (b)(6) Dr. CIG USA USA USARCENT

> Subject: RE: (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

>

> (b)(3), (b)(6)

>

> Apologies for not getting back to you sooner but I have been on TDY in

> Kenya and will be on TDY in Paris until Wed 16th Mar. Therefore my

> first full day back in office will be Thu 17th Mar. My work number is

> (b)(6) and my work e-mail is (b)(6) @mod.uk I

> suggest that you drop me an e-mail and we can work out a time when I

> am not tied up with meetings and at my desk so I can take the call.

>

> As to the whereabouts of Wg Cdr (b)(6) I have no idea, but I will

> use my RAF contacts and see if I can track him down for you.

>

> Look forward to hearing from you.

>

> Col (b)(6)

>

> > Subject: RE: (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

> > Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2011 15:51:19 +0300

> > From: (b)(3), (b)(6) @arcent.army.mil

> > To: (b)(6) @hotmail.co.uk

> > CC: (b)(6) @hotmail.co.uk

> >

> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

> > Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

> >

> >

> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

> > Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

> >

> > Colonel (b)(6) -

> >

> > I am the assisting the US Third Army Commanding General in his

> > duties as the officer appointed by the USFOR-A/ISAF Commander to

> > investigate the allegations of misconduct and/or misuse of military

> > resources and/or personnel, reported in the 23 February 2011 Rolling

> > Stone magazine article, "Another Runaway General: Army Deploys

> > Psy-Ops on

> U.S.

> > Senators."

> >

> > Sad to say, we need to interview you for this investigation. I

> > understand that you were originally LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) supervisor, and

> > therefore may be able to clear up some issues as to what his mission

> > was, the source document or order from which is was derived, and to

> > whom he reported. This has bearing on whether there were violations

> > of

>

> > the law and of policy, as Michael Hastings asserts in the article.

> >

> > Can you please provide your current duty location and telephone

> > number

>

> > so that we can arrange a time for the interview? COL (b)(3), (b)(6) may

> > have contacted you previously, and if this causes confusion I am

> > very sorry. If you can respond by e-mail or call at the Afghanistan

> > number below, I will be here for the next 36 hours.

> >

> > PS - I am also trying to get in touch with Wing Commander (b)(6) .

> > If you have W/CDR (b)(6) 's email/contact information, and feel that

> > you can forward it or forward this to him so that he contacts me,

> > I'd be in your debt. Thank you very much.

> >

> > VR,

> > (b)(3), (b)(6)

> > Special Asst to the CG

> > Third Army/USARCENT

> > DSN (Afghanistan)

(b)(6)

> > DSN (Atlanta)

EXHIBIT C

Information Operations AR 15-6 Investigation
Information Operations in Afghanistan
LTG William Webster, Investigating Officer
COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Legal Advisor
Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6) Assistant Investigating Officer

Video teleconference interview with Major (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q./IO:	LTG William Webster, Investigating Officer
A./WIT:	MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)
LA:	COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Legal Advisor
XO:	COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Executive Officer to the IO

[The interview commenced at 0909, 18 March 2011.]

IO: Okay, we'll start next with some administrative information. This is Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) my Staff Judge Advocate. And I've also got in the room Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) my XO. And so any of us may ask some questions. Go ahead, (b)(3), (b)(6)

LA: Major (b)(3), (b)(6) we talked briefly before the CG came in. This morning you signed two statements. The first was a restricted communication statement.

WIT: Yes, ma'am.

LA: The restricted communication statement indicates that you will not discuss your testimony with anyone other than those in the investigative team or law enforcement personnel. Do you agree to the terms of that statement?

WIT: Yes, ma'am. Yes, sir.

LA: And is this your signature on the statement signed today?

WIT: Yes, ma'am. Yes, sir.

LA: And you also signed a privacy act statement and that is for us to let you know that the only use we're going to make of your statement is in accordance with this investigation to help the USFOR-A commander determine what happened. Do you agree to that use of that statement?

WIT: Yes, ma'am. Yes, sir.

LA: And this is your signature on the statement you emailed back this morning?

WIT: Yes, ma'am. Yes, sir.

LA: Were you compelled or coerced in any way to sign either of these statements?

WIT: No, ma'am. No, sir.

LA: Okay, this statement is being taken at Fort McPherson, Georgia with Major (b)(3), (b)(6) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It is the 18th of March, 2011.

[The witness was sworn.]

LA: Please state your full name?

WIT: (b)(3), (b)(6)

LA: And to what unit are you assigned?

WIT: The headquarters of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

LA: And you are a Major in the United States Army, correct?

WIT: Yes, ma'am.
I.A: And are you active component or reserve component?
WIT: I am active component.
I.A: Okay, and can you please spell your middle name Lee so that we have the right spelling?
WIT: Yes, ma'am. Lima, echo, echo.
I.A: Thank you, I am going to turn it back over to General Webster.

EXAMINATION BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER

Q. (b)(3), (b)(6) how many years have you now served in the Army?
A. Almost 15, sir. It will be 15 in May.
Q. Okay. Have you had -- what is your current specialty and what additional specialties do you have? Functional Areas?
A. Sir, I was initially branched a Signal Officer in 1996. In 2006 I became a Public Affairs Officer and I was teaching at that point so it wasn't until 2008 that I actually started working in the Public Affairs field. My academic background is in English with a focus in rhetoric and composition.
Q. Okay. Can you tell me when you arrived in Afghanistan for your assignment with CSTC-A and when you left?
A. Yes, sir. I arrived November 2nd 2009 and I left December 31st 2010.
Q. And what were your duties there in CSTC-A?
A. Initially I came over to work in the STRATCOM office that General Caldwell was going to set up. For a period of time I served as a speechwriter for him and a personal PAO. Then from April 2010 to December 2010 I served as the Deputy to the Commander as personal Public Affairs officer and STRATCOM adviser, sir. (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q. Okay. And who was your rater and senior rater while you were there?
A. For both ratings I received there, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) the Executive Officer for the Deputy to the Commander was my rater and Dr. Jack Kem was my senior rater as the Deputy to the Commander.
Q. Were you associated with Dr. Kem before you arrived in CSTC-A? Did you know him before?
A. No, sir. I had just met him briefly as we got ready to deploy in October once General Caldwell started putting together a few people from the command to take over with them. That's when I first met Dr. Kem.
Q. Okay. Can you tell me about the concept of -- well, first of all, I'd like to ask you some definitions because as I have experienced personally but also as I'm uncovering in this investigation, there appears to have been some different names of functions that were used under General Formica and when General Caldwell arrived and some of those terms changed over time, maybe because of NATO, NTM-A being stood up, maybe because of coalition partners, maybe because of jointness, maybe because doctrine was changing and people didn't understand it at all, but during that period it seems that terms like communications, the director of communications, Strategic Communications, Information Ops, Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, influencing, informing, educating, all those kinds of terms were used and there were others, too. For instance, you just mentioned you were the personal Public Affairs officer for General Caldwell and then I heard that other generals had personal Public Affairs officers and I

don't understand the difference between a personal Public Affairs Officer as you were used in CSTC-A and the Public Affairs staff. So let me ask you some individual questions here.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is your definition of Strategic Communications?

A. I understand Strategic Communications in the joint definition, sir, and that started after September 11th with President Bush when he said we needed an integrated global communication strategy for the United States. That is the joint definition and goes with the Strategic Commander's handbook but I recognize other definitions as commanders have taken them and used them to meet their communications needs for their commands. (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. So General Caldwell sees Strategic Communications the same way or did during that period, is that correct?

A. Sir, there are briefings he's had and they were online at the CAC website. He understands that and acknowledges that definition of Strategic Communications but then he takes the definition where it's more of an Information Engagement strategy where it's communicating to inform and educate our audiences and the people that are interested in what we do and that we put out what our mission is and what we're doing. (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Okay. How does that differ from Public Affairs?

A. Definitionally [sic], not by much, sir. Public Affairs is set to inform and educate by doctrine and by law. It can be -- the difference would be looking at it along with the strategic planning component and looking farther out where depending on your Public Affairs stance you could be passive or more assertive in your Public Affairs stance and how you go out and get stories, but a Strategic Public Affairs office or a Strategic Communications office would be looking at opportunities farther down and arranging those opportunities together to support the mission versus just reacting or dealing with events as they come. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Well, that's interesting because as I understand it the visits were coming back to back to back in the Winter and Spring of 2009 and there were a number of key folks, I think, including General Caldwell who were calling the work being done there Strategic Communications. Is that your understanding too?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is your definition of Information Operations?

A. Information Operations is the integration of several components, some of them include Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, PSYOP. Public Affairs is related to Information Operations tasks but it is not one of the core Information Operations tasks.

Q. How about the duty to do the integration of that. Is that the -- do you understand the definition to include the integration of Public Affairs with the core aspects of IO -- is that the IO officer's responsibility?

A. Not in my eyes, sir, no. The Public Affairs office has to work independently because the definition of Information Operations is to influence and it's to influence either adversary or host nation people whereas Public Affairs is just meant for the open public, open source and it's just meant to inform and educate. So the IO integrator cannot be in charge of the PA folks because the missions are different. They need to be coordinated and they need to know what each side is doing but they have to stay separate for legality and just for purpose.

Q. Okay. What's your definition of Psychological Operations?

A. I'm not as good on this one, sir. Psychological Operations are to influence or affect an enemy population, from my very brief understanding. With all three, what is said is supposed to be true. It's just kind of how you change the rhetoric involved with it to influence or to negatively affect.

Q. Okay. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) do you recall Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) in the command?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what was his job or multiple jobs as you recall?

A. Sir, when I arrived in November, the CJ3 had just been MEDEVACed out for some health problems. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was the commander of the JOC -- the Joint Operations Center. He was then moved up to be the CJ3 until Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived in late December or early January. At that time they didn't want to move -- I was told they didn't want to move Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) back down to the JOC since he'd been the CJ3 so somewhere in the early part of 2010 they made him the Director of Communications.

Q. Okay. So he was the Director of Communications, not the Director of Strategic Communications?

A. I can't remember specifically that kind of differentiation, sir. It may have been STRATCOM, it may have been just communications. I'm not sure, sir.

Q. Do you remember another officer coming in to be Director of Strategic Communications for General Caldwell while Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) continued as the Director of Communications?

A. A British colonel, (b)(6) came in, sir.

Q. And do you remember what his job title was?

A. I think it was either the Director of Communications or the Director of Strategic Communications. I'm not sure, sir. I believe Colonel (b)(6) was brought in to become the STRATCOM Director and the idea was that a British officer would take over that role more permanently in the future and there would be an O-6 to oversee everything.

Q. As you just tried to recall that, do you think there was the potential for -- at least the potential for if not the actual occurrence of confusion among some of the staff members about what these various definitions were and how they were used and how they might have evolved over time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And do you think there was the possibility at least of confusion about what the roles of (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(6) and others might have been, including, perhaps, yourself?

A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Q. Did that present a big problem for you or was it relatively clear for you?

A. I understood my role. I had a -- there was a little bit of discontent or confusion with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) between what his role was and what my role was in a period of time and that was before Colonel (b)(6) came in and it was when I was assigned briefly as the personal PAO for General Caldwell and I know Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had difficulty with that because he felt that that was his role as well, that he should be tending to General Caldwell's media relation needs.

Q. Okay. Can you tell me how -- using that as a segway, can you tell me how your role as a personal Public Affairs Officer was different from the Director of Communications or the Director of Strategic Communications or the Chief of Public Affairs?

A. Yes, sir. As a personal PAO for the brief time I was for General Caldwell and then the rest of the time that I was for Dr. Kem, my focus was purely on that person and

arranging media interviews or media interaction with and for that particular individual and I would do all of the background prep work and coordination and I would do the sit down pre-briefings to inform them about who the person was they were going to speak to and what they were hoping to get out of the interview and what we would hope to gain out of the interview and what message we would want to put out. So that's where I focused my time. And then when I was a STRATCOM advisor for Dr. Kem, I would also sit in on briefings for other countries and for CODELs and just listen to the brief and make sure we didn't put out any erroneous information, just with wrong numbers or calling something a name it wasn't so we could just make sure we cleared that up before they left. The Director of Communication, I see it as a broader function overseeing all of the work in Communications throughout the command, and that would include the Public Affairs and it would include any work done for individual generals so they kind of manage everything but they're not an actual doer.

Q. So should I conclude from what you've just said that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) managed what you did as a personal Public Affairs Officer as well as the Public Affairs staff as well as Colonel (b)(6) and the communications staff or not so?

A. Sir, I'm not sure how the relationship between Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Colonel (b)(6) ended up evening out. To a certain extent I just stepped back and did my job because a Major getting involved with too many colonels isn't always wise so I just focused on whatever I was told my area was whether it was at that time with General Caldwell or whether it was Dr. Kem and passed down information and kept other people informed so the Public Affairs office knew when I had media coming in and tracked it and reported it but otherwise I tried to stay out of the politics of the two colonels figuring out their place.

Q. Okay. So what was the model for this information and communication structure you had there? Was there a model? Was it doctrine? Joint doctrine? Was it somebody's SOP? Was it emerging joint doctrine or papers? What did you use as a model for having these categories of communicators and information staff officers?

A. I don't know that there was a model, sir, at least I'm not aware of it. But I knew from being here prior to Afghanistan how General Caldwell liked to work and what things he valued and what he thought was important in the Public Affairs arena and in interaction with the public and so that guided how I did things in general but I'm not sure that there was a set system or doctrine. There were a lot of reorganizations when we were there, kind of figuring it out as we went, saying okay, something's missing here, we need a colonel to oversee these things or this person needs to talk to more people in the media, we're going to dedicate a personal Public Affairs Officer to them to focus on them and give them the advising and attention they need to help do their job better.

Q. So how often did General Caldwell meet with members of the media so that you had to arrange interviews?

A. During that time until about the February, early March timeframe, sir, there weren't actually that many interviews. I can remember three to five, actually. We did ~~[inaudible] reviews~~ command overviews during that period of time and there were the CODELs and the people coming in to visit but off the top of my head, I'm only remembering about four or five that actually occurred. (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. So (b)(3), (b)(6) ---

A. And they were some pretty big names, the Diane Sawyer and the Atlantic Monthly.

Q. So your job spilled over into other visitors, Distinguished Visitors, members of Congressional Delegations, et cetera, not just members of the media?

A. Throughout my time there, yes, sir.

Q. Okay.

A. Yes, sir. Throughout my time there I did.

Q. What was your interface with Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6)

A. They initially came in as a part of the CJ5, sir, I think in December or January of '09 and '10. They were on an RFF to come to the CJ5 to fill a Strategic Communication requirement the previous CJ5 had put in for. I knew they were Texas National Guard. I met them early on because the CJ5 had invited me to some Strategic Communications meetings. I never really worked with them except just with them trying to figure out how things worked and what the definitions of certain things were like how General Caldwell saw Strategic Communications versus the RFF that they filled and an IO capacity. Other than that it was intermittent contact because it's such a small camp. We never worked directly together on any projects. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Okay. Do you remember a meeting with a Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) about the end of January where Major Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) yourself and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) were discussing information that the command was wanting to put together for CODELs that were coming in?

A. I don't remember it as a CODEL focused visit, sir. I remember that meeting. It was in Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) office. It was to put together a Strategic Communication plan for the command and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) wanted that done and so he had called me together because at that point I had a suggested commander's Information Engagement strategy for General Caldwell to view and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) was there because she was the operations officer, the Media Operations Officer in the Public Affairs shop and then at that point Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) were there I think because they had been moved to or were being told they were doing a new role in Strategic Communication and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was trying to get us all online to form a single plan. I don't remember that being specifically about CODELs.

Q. Okay. That may have been a better explanation of the subject of the meeting. But can you remember what took place at that meeting? Does anything stand out?

A. What stands out from my side, sir, and what I experienced in that meeting, there wasn't necessarily disagreement. There was just a misunderstanding or confusion about whose role it was to do what and who was going to be in charge of putting together the Strategic Communication plan for the command and who was supposed to draft it up and why it needed to be done on such short suspense. The piece of the pie that I held in that was the ~~comms~~ COMs proposed Information Engagement strategy and I wasn't willing to publish that until General Caldwell had blessed off on it because I didn't want people to think they were his confirmed ideas when they were just my ideas. So I was holding that and there was some consternation from Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) for me holding that and not wanting to make that public. So after the meeting Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) -- I had asked him to stay but he had left and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) remained with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and I explained why I didn't want to release that plan yet. (b)(3), (b)(6) COM = Commander

Q. Do you recall at that meeting that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was tasking Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and his team to provide themes or messages or talking points or even something called pressure points for the plan or for a visit from various DVs?

A. I don't recall specifically that conversation. I do want to say I've never heard in my time in NTM-A the phrase "pressure points" by anyone in the command at any level. I do know that there were discussions about -- and debates within that group because Major (b)(3), (b)(6) and I would argue and discuss it about creating themes and messages and just trying to decide if they were quarterly or monthly or if it was linked to decision points within the operation and so there was a healthy academic discussion in that regard and I know that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) wanted themes and messages because he wanted to promulgate them throughout the command. I don't know if there were specific orders to do that, no, sir.

Q. Okay. Do you recall Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) telling Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) either that he would not or could not provide themes or messages or talking points because it was illegal for him to do so?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you recall Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) yelling at Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) saying it was only illegal if he said it was illegal or something to that effect?

A. No, sir. I've never witnessed Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) yelling at anyone. I've just heard second or third hand if he would yell at someone or be upset with them.

Q. Okay. So you never heard the term "pressure points" used in conjunction with themes or messages or visitors?

A. No, sir.

Q. How long did you work for General Caldwell before your deployment to Afghanistan?

A. About a year and a half. I arrived here in June of '08, sir, and we left -- I started doing the CRC process in October of '09, sir.

Q. Was the visitor preparation there in CSTC-A about the same as it had been at CAC for that year and a half before you had arrived? Before you arrived in Afghanistan?

A. It was not, sir. And what we were trying to do to a large extent, especially when we first got on the ground was start creating a program that we knew General Caldwell was comfortable with and understood to help expedite the process.

Q. Okay, so what you were trying to put together would mimic what you had done -- what the team had done for General Caldwell at CAC before he deployed, correct?

A. Yes, sir. If we could find a way to meld those two between what the staff in Afghanistan knew and what General Caldwell was comfortable with and we knew worked well with him, that was our hope when we set down on the ground.

Q. Have you ever worked for any other three or four star headquarters?

A. No, sir.

Q. Have you dealt with preparing packets for key visitors in other commands?

A. No, sir.

Q. Can you tell me if you have had any formal training or education in Strategic Communications?

A. Only what I've received at the Defense Information School as a part of my Public Affairs training, sir.

Q. So what Public Affairs training do you have?

A. I have the course that's considered the OBC for Public Affairs Officers, sir. It's about three months conducted at Fort Meade. It's a joint course.

Q. Do you have any training or education in Information Operations?

A. No, sir. Only what was received in that class, which is probably a two hour block of instruction, sir.

Q. Any formal training or education in Psychological Operations?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you recall any critical points out of that training on that two hour block or so on IO in your Strategic Communications and Public Affairs classes, do you recall anything that stands out about where they should be integrated, where they shouldn't be integrated, et cetera?

A. The discussion in that class, sir, and I was leading it because it was the academic side of me and the rhetoric side of me was talking about the word influence and wanting to really flesh out what Public Affairs meant with influence or didn't mean with influence and what the difference between influence and inform and educate meant and so that was the crux of the discussion that I led in class for those two hours.

Q. Well that brings us to your understanding of inform and educate versus influence. You know, the purpose of speaking publicly or meeting with public figures is to inform and educate in accordance with our doctrine but do you agree that when you're trying to achieve a commander's intent or you have a message to put out too that in the end someone might view that as influencing or attempting to influence the audience that you're giving the presentation to?

A. Yes, sir, I think you can't deny that but with what we do, intent is what is most important. Is the intent to inform and educate and then maybe in the end something goes your way with that? Or is the intent to influence and get what you want regardless of what means you use and the intent is very different and that is where the definition is drawn and the importance is.

Q. Okay. Using the truth or using any sort of message to include things that may not be true is a line between those two. Did you just imply that?

A. Both should have the truth in it, sir. But just from a rhetorical standpoint there's presenting information and letting your audience synthesize it into knowledge or presenting your audience with synthesized knowledge that is slanted toward what you want to achieve because the influencing side could leave out certain facts, it could just highlight the good part. But when you're informing and educating, you're supposed to share everything, the good and the bad.

Q. Can you tell me what your definition of Information Engagement is?

A. I'm thinking on that, sir. For me Information Engagement goes outside of media relations and it includes all of the Key Leader Engagements, Media Engagements or outreach that a person or organization does.

Q. When General Caldwell arrived in CSTC-A, it's been reported that sometime after he arrived he initiated an Information Engagement Working Group, an IEWG. And others have reported that was used at CAC prior to his deployment. Do you recall participate in ----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. IEWGs there at CAC?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And so was this part of the way CSTC-A worked to fit with what General Caldwell was comfortable with and what he was trying to achieve? His intent?

A. I think the IEWG was -- because for a period of time at CAC I was trying to be in charge of the IEWG and try to get it to work and function as General Caldwell saw it. What he wanted the IEWG to accomplish was to get a group of action officers together and staff officers together to look at the broad calendar and look how we could maximize visits. So if you were coming to Fort Leavenworth and if you were coming to speak to the PCC course, are there other

people on Fort Leavenworth that would like to see or like to inform you about something? Or are there other things you might be interested in and to see so we could present them to you farther out and fill them into your schedule to maximize the opportunity for you to be here for you and for us. That didn't always come to fruition because of the way we work in working groups sometime, sir, but that idea was -- they attempted to transplant that idea into CSTC-A and NTM-A to try to maximize how visitors were received and what they got to see while they were at Eggers or at Kabul or with NTM-A.

Q. Okay. Did you ever hear General Caldwell direct or order anyone to conduct Psychological Operations against any visitors?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever hear General Caldwell direct or order anyone to do anything illegal while you were in CSTC-A or at CAC?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever hear anyone else in a position of authority direct anyone to conduct any operations that were illegal?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you think it was proper to include the Information Operations task force or team, rather, that included Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) - did you think it was proper to include them in preparation for Distinguished Visitors?

A. They weren't working in an IO capacity, sir, so I didn't see any problem with it. They were working in an 01A generalist capacity just as many people are. We had an infantryman come in who was filling a YS tasker for Strategic Communications. So it wasn't an (b)(3), (b)(6) MOS specific job for him. It ended up being an 01A job and when they were asked to perform that function, I looked at them and viewed them as being retasked from their original mission to a new job and for it to be like an 01A job.

Q. So why do you think Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) were pushing back on conducting the tasks they were given to conduct?

A. I think whenever we're asked to go to a specific unit to do a specific job we kind of get our hearts set on that, sir, and so we want to do that job. And when you're told, well, you're going to do something else because that's what the commander wants, sometimes that doesn't set as well with people. They were filling an RFF and it was a very specific RFF and they had crafted from their view a team to fit that RFF and they were being told that they weren't going to do that, they were going to do something different. And I imagine they just weren't pleased with not getting to do what they wanted to, sir.

Q. Are you aware that a number of folks reported that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major Levine were frequently going off Camp Eggers in civilian clothes?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever see them go off Camp Eggers in civilian clothes?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever go off Camp Eggers in civilian clothes?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How often did you do that?

A. I was off Eggers in civilian clothes twice, sir. Once was for a TDY and my boss, two star SES, approved it. And then the second time was to attend a farewell event for a brigadier who had invited me and, again, my boss, two star SES, approved that request.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FT. McPHERSON DATED 2011/03/18

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q. So what was the policy about going off post? Who had to approve military members going off Camp Eggers in civilian clothes?

A. I don't know. I only became aware of the policy after I'd been there a while. I don't know if there was one when I got there. I believe it was that a general officer had to approve and that in some cases the Chief of Staff could approve. But I just always went to my boss since my boss was a two star, I figured he was the one to approve my actions.

IO: (b)(3), (b)(6) any questions?

LA: No, sir.

IO: Any questions (b)(3), (b)(6)

XO: No, sir.

IO: Okay, is there anything you'd like to add, Major (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: No, sir.

IO: Okay, we're going to go through some administrative points here with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and then I think we'll be complete on this discussion today. Thank you.

WIT: Yes, sir. Thank you.

LA: Major (b)(3), (b)(6) do you fully understand the contents of the statement that you made today?

WIT: Yes, ma'am.

LA: And is the statement that you gave true?

WIT: Yes, ma'am.

LA: Did you make this statement freely without the hope of benefit or reward?

WIT: Yes ma'am.

LA: Did you make it without the threat of punishment?

WIT: Yes ma'am.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Continued on following page

INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6) STATEMENT

DA FORM 28

APD PE v1.01ES

STATEMENT OF MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FT. McPHERSON DATED 2011/03/18

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

LA: And did you make it without unlawful influence, unlawful inducement or any other type of coercion?

WIT: Yes, ma'am.

LA: Okay, we've had a court reporter in here today and she's going to go ahead and get the statement transcribed. Once it's transcribed we'll email you a copy. When you get that we'd just ask that you read it, if there are changes, just make pen and ink and initial those and then initial each page, and then send it back. Are you willing to do that for us?

WIT: Yes, ma'am.

LA: All right. Great. Thank you very much. I'm going to turn it back over to General Webster.

IO: Okay, (b)(3), (b)(6) we appreciate your time today and thank you for your service to the nation.

WIT: Thank you, sir, have a good day.

[The interview concluded at 0949, 18 March 2011.]

(b)(3), (b)(6)

NOTHING ELSE FOLLOWS

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18 day of March 2011 at Fort McPherson (WTC)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERS ITATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 11 OF 11 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, N

APD PE v1.01ES

EXHIBIT D

ATTACHMENT 1

1. Email from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6), Subj (b)(3), (b)(6) & (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED).txt

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC [(b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 7:13 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA CSTC-A/NTM-A
Subject: RE: (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Got it.

If he calls me, I should refer him to you...is that my correct response to direct contact?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Colonel, US Army

Outgoing Chief of Staff
NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
CELL: (b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
[mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 10:41 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC; (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA CSTC-A/NTM-A
Subject: RE: (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Sounds good thanks for the details... will only provide Hastings with a simple statement from me that he will quote... if the story picks up any traction or demands further clarification, I will leverage this and the timeline in a backgrounder with someone other than Hastings...

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC
[mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 4:38 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA CSTC-A/NTM-A
Subject: RE: (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Thanks. Good adds.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

A few points that bear highlighting.

1. Email from COL(b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC(b)(3), (b)(6), Subj (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED).txt
(b)(3), (b)(6) apparently asserts that he was targeted after raising concerns about
what he perceived was an illegal directive to him from (b)(3), (b)(6).

First, when (b)(3), (b)(6) asserted that the (b)(3), (b)(6) directive was illegal, the command sought a written legal opinion as to the legality of the directive.
This is a sound, rational, and impartial action.

During the course of this determination, a rather junior member of the command, MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6), is the one who brought to the attention of the chain
of command the possibility of alleged misconduct unrelated to the legality
of the (b)(3), (b)(6) directive. Had (b)(3), (b)(6) been "targeted" by the command, it
would seem that a more senior individual would have suggested investigation
into these other areas.

When the SJA suggested that the command's CoS charter an investigation that
included looking into an alleged inappropriate relationship between
(b)(3), (b)(6)
and (b)(3), (b)(6), the command's CoS chose NOT to do that. Were he being targeted,
it's likely that any investigation into (b)(3), (b)(6)' behavior would have had a
wide aperture, not a narrow one.

The investigating officer was chosen purely by tasking the next directorate
responsible to provide an IO and requiring that IO to have a date of rank
earlier than (b)(3), (b)(6). If the command was targeting (b)(3), (b)(6), it's likely that
the IO would have been handpicked.

I don't have a copy of the recommendations in front of me, but know that I
didn't approve all of the recommendations. We need to have someone compare
what the IO recommended to what I approved. If any of the IO's
recommendations I did not approve would have had a pejorative impact on
(b)(3), (b)(6), then similar logic applies. If the command was targeting
it's likely that the approving authority would not reduce the severity or
scope of the IO recommendations approved.

(Then) BG Patton modified his reprimand based on Holmes' rebuttal matters.
Again, this is not the behavior associated with some type of conspiracy to
target (b)(3), (b)(6) as it reduces his culpability.

Even if some members of the command were inappropriately annoyed with
Holmes' pushback regarding (b)(3), (b)(6)'s directive, so many disparate elements
of the command were involved in the final disposition of this case that it
would be very difficult to engineer a result upon which so many individuals

1. Email from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Subj (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED).txt
agreed.

(b)(3), (b)(6) basic assertion that he was targeted for questioning the legality of (b)(3), (b)(6)'s directive is rather foolish on its face. The net result of his concern was that the issue was referred to our legal team. Our SJA, DoS, SJS, and CoS XO will likely indicate that I sent a large amount of work to the SJA requiring them to opine on its legality, even when it was considered by others in the headquarters or command as clearly lawful. A fractional marginal increase in the work assigned to the SJA is hardly cause for the command or even influential members of the headquarters to seek to target (b)(3), (b)(6). Even if (b)(3), (b)(6) actions incensed (b)(3), (b)(6) (the only senior member of the command who would conceivably take issue with (b)(3), (b)(6) actions), his involvement in the investigation's outcomes essentially came to an end when he responded to MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)'s note to him saying other alleged misconduct had come to light.

In the end, the facts of the investigation stand on their own. Even if it were true that someone or a group of people "targeted" (b)(3), (b)(6), the investigation finds a series of acts of misconduct. The command disposed of these in a rational manner, well below the level at which they could have been disposed of in criminal proceedings.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Colonel, US Army

Outgoing Chief of Staff
NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) /
Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
CELL: (b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A
[mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 3:58 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP;
(b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
Subject: FW: (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

1. Email from COL(b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) Subj (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED).txt
(b)(3), (b)(6) I made changes below to the timeline. My changes are in CAPS.
COL(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC
[mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 7:31 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil;
(b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
Subject: (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Don't mean to spam you, but wanted the team there to have all the emails I can find that relate to this issue.

Here's a quick and broad timeline:

Mid-Mar 10 LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) expressed concern that Col (b)(3), (b)(6)'s direction was illegal when (b)(3), (b)(6) told(b)(3), (b)(6) to assess the results of our engagements to inform and educate visitors. When the concern was brought to me, I directed the preparation of a legal opinion. (Still looking through electronic files on my end to find this opinion, but remember that the SJA opined that the direction was legal.)

30 Mar 10 MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6), a lawyer in our SJA, wrote to Col (b)(3), (b)(6) saying that, in the course of looking into the legality of (b)(3), (b)(6)'s directive to(b)(3), (b)(6) they received information suggesting that

--LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ(b)(3), (b)(6) may have been engaged in an inappropriate relationship

--They have gone off post in civilian clothes to restaurants and they drank alcohol.

She indicated to (b)(3), (b)(6) that, based on the seriousness of the allegations, the issue needed to be addressed quickly

30 Mar 10 Col (b)(3), (b)(6) recommended to MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) that we conduct an investigation. (b)(3), (b)(6) indicated that(b)(3), (b)(6) told (b)(3), (b)(6) that(b)(3), (b)(6) was authorized to go out into town for dinner by the previous CoS, COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to meet with an Info Opns team from the Pentagon.

31 Mar 10 COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Dep SJA, recommended to(b)(3), (b)(6) that the command initiate a 15-6 investigation.

1. Email from COL(b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) Subj (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED).txt

06 Apr 10 COL(b)(3), (b)(6) informed COL(b)(3), (b)(6) that (b)(3), (b)(6) would direct an investigation of potential violations of GO #1, but would not direct investigation of an inappropriate relationship. Buche said that he did not want to create any perception of a witch hunt. If the investigating officer came up with evidence of an inappropriate relationship, (b)(3), (b)(6) would consider expanding the IO's charter to include that.

07 Apr 10 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) was identified to conduct the investigation.

28 Apr 10 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) submitted his completed investigation to our SJA for review.

O/A 9 May 10 COL (b)(3), (b)(6), SJA, briefed COL(b)(3), (b)(6) on results of investigation and the SJA recommendations.

O/A 19 May 10 COL(b)(3), (b)(6) forwarded the investigation with the approved findings and recommendations to (then) BG Patton for action. Based on SJA advice, Buche approved the findings and most of the recommendations of the IO, and directed that a copy of the report be forwarded to the officers' respective National Guard chains of command to consider initiation of proceedings to revoke their federal recognition. (Important to note that findings generated a series of improper acts by (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6), not merely eating off post.)

O/A 22 May 10 (then) BG Patton signed reprimands for both officers and directed COL(b)(3), (b)(6) to serve the reprimands on the officers. (b)(3), (b)(6) did so O/A 22 May 10.

O/A 23 May 10 LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) went on his scheduled R&R leave. (Then) BG Patton agreed to a longer than usual time period for LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) to submit a rebuttal in order for (b)(3), (b)(6) to complete his scheduled R&R. ((b)(3), (b)(6) later completed her R&R as scheduled.)

Soon thereafter (haven't found precise dates in my electronic files) COL (b)(3), (b)(6) served Col (b)(3), (b)(6) with a reprimand for him eating off post with LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ(b)(3), (b)(6). (The IO found evidence that Col (b)(3), (b)(6) went to a restaurant off post with (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6). (Then) BG Patton relinquished authority to dispose of this report of misconduct to COL (b)(3), (b)(6) after (b)(3), (b)(6) informed Patton that he intended to reprimand (b)(3), (b)(6).)

18 JUN 10 BG PATTON DECIDED TO FILE MAJ(b)(3), (b)(6)'S GOMOR IN HER OMPF

O/A 5 Jul 10 LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) rebuttal matters submitted to BG Patton for his consideration. LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) has submitted a lengthy rebuttal and (then) BG Patton met with him to discuss it in person.

LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) indicated in his rebuttal that:

--"I was never given the opportunity to answer the specific allegations that were made against me.....I have not been offered any opportunity to provide exculpatory evidence or alibis, or to call any witnesses or provide testimony in my defense."

--"I have been tried and convicted by a "Kangaroo Court" and now only the severity of my sentence is in question."

1. Email from COL(b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) Subj (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED).txt
(During the investigation, Holmes invoked his right to counsel when questioned by the IO, so all questioning ceased at that point.)

9 July BG PATTON MET LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) TO DISCUSS (b)(3), (b)(6)'s REBUTTAL. BG PATTON MADE A CHANGE TO THE GOMOR (DELETING A PORTION) AND DETERMINED IT WOULD FILED IN HIS OMPF.

15 JUL 10 BG PATTON SIGNED A MEMO ASKING ARMY EVALUATION SUITABILITY BOARD TO SUBSITUTE A REVISED GOMOR FOR MAJ(b)(3), (b)(6) BASED ON THE CHANGE MADE TO LTC(b)(3), (b)(6)'s GOMOR.

O/A 28 Sep 10 LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ(b)(3), (b)(6) departed AFG on schedule. (b)(3), (b)(6)'s and (b)(3), (b)(6)'s OERs were completed and submitted before they departed. (In an attempt to avoid any perception of malice and ensure impartiality, Dr Kem senior rated LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) instead of COL(b)(3), (b)(6))

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

EXHIBIT D

ATTACHMENT 2

2. Email from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) from LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Subi Request for comment.txt

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC [(b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Monday, February 21, 2011 7:09 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL USA Dep COS; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US MAJ ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Subject: Fwd: FW: Request for comment

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Note below forwarded to me from my Afghan account. Indicates a Saturday sent date, but showed up in this account within last 12 hours or so. (Will check home computer when I arrive back in DC late tonight.)

All emails sent to my account there should result in an Out of Office message listing Brig Dunham and COL (b)(3), (b)(6) as POCs. Believe it also lists this AKO account as means to talk with me. Haven't gotten anything on this account other than the forwarded note.

Please provide some guidance about how I should respond or if it's best if you respond for command. Assume that MG Patton may soon get a similar request.

Thanks.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Colonel, US Army

Outgoing Chief of Staff
NATO Training Mission -Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command -Afghanistan (CSTC-A)

NIPR: @us.army.mil
Cell: (b)(3), (b)(6)

"Shohna ba Shohna --Shoulder to Shoulder"

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" (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP" < (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

From: Michael Hastings[SMTP:MHASTINGS@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2011 8:45:13 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP
Subject: Request for comment
Auto forwarded by a Rule

Dear COL (b)(3), (b)(6)

Hope this email finds you well. I'm writing to request an interview with you concerning Lt. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), formerly an Information Operations Team Chief for NTM-A/CSTCA at Camp Eggers. I have a number of questions regarding his IO cell's activities under General Caldwell's command, as well as the AR 15-6 investigation you ordered into "the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations that LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) left the Camp Eggers installation with their weapons while in civilian clothes, dined in off post restaurants, and consumed alcohol." If you have a moment to discuss, your insights and perspective would be very much

2. Email from COL(b)(3), (b)(6) from LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) Subj Request for comment.txt
appreciated.

All the best,
Michael

--

Michael Hastings
Rolling Stone
mhastings@gmail.com
Office: +1-802-893-4476
International Mobile: +1-212-945-8073

EXHIBIT D

ATTACHMENT 3

3. Email from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) from LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Subi Request for comment.txt

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC [(b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2011 9:10 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL USA Dep COS; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US MAJ ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) US LTC NTM-A CSTC-A SJA
Subject: Re: FW: Request for comment (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Roger.

Background for you....

Believe that policy expressly forbidding NTM-A/CSTC-A folks from performing IO was signed after the initial issue between (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6). MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) can check the date of the "No IO" policy.

When the issue came to me about an allegation of an illegal order by Col (b)(3), (b)(6), required that the SJA provide a written opinion regarding the legality of the directive. Our legal team opined that (b)(3), (b)(6)'s directive was not illegal.

...don't have a copy handy, but will check my electronic files here to see if I have copy. (Sitting in the National Airport baggage claim area right now at about 0100 after getting back from trip to visit Daughter #1 at her college in Oshkosh, WI. Blizzard yesterday had continuing impacts on flights that resulted in VERY later return this evening.)

Hope all is well. Thanks for sage advice.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Colonel, US Army

Outgoing Chief of Staff
NATO Training Mission -Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command -Afghanistan (CSTC-A)

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
Cell:

"Shohna ba Shohna --Shoulder to Shoulder"

Find out what's going on in NATO Training Command-Afghanistan at www.ntm-a.com

" (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP"
< (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

Sir
FYSA ISAF also got a query from a reporter in St. Petersburg asking about (b)(3), (b)(6) and his claim that he was ordered to perfomr PSYOPS by COL (b)(3), (b)(6) his supervisor. When he refused he alleges he was reprimanded and eventually targeted by the command. I told ISAF that we in NTM-A do not perform IO and in fact have a policy strictly forbidding it. Additionally, told them that if the reporter had questions he should contact COL (b)(3), (b)(6) about these wild accusations. It appears (b)(3), (b)(6) is working his own engagement plan... Since we do not comment on individual punitive and non judicial actions, (b)(3), (b)(6) comments will be the reporter's only source. Will inform the

3. Email from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) from LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Subj Request for comment.txt
CG.

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC
[mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2011 02:06 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL USA Dep COS; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US MAJ ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) US LTC NTM-A CSTC-A SJA
Subject: RE: FW: Request for comment (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WILCO. Have not responded. Will await your direction. Nothing else from Hastings (nor any other hints about this topic) thus far.

Sorry that I didn't cc our astute legal team. Have done so on this note.

Thanks.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Colonel, US Army

Outgoing Chief of Staff
NATO Training Mission -Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command -Afghanistan (CSTC-A)

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
Cell:

"Shohna ba Shohna --Shoulder to Shoulder"

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" (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP"
< (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Caveats: ~~FOUO~~ Sir, Definitely do not respond... I will send a note to the lawyers before I respond. -----Original Message----- From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC [mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil] Sent: Monday, February 21, 2011 5:09 PM To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL USA Dep COS; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US MAJ ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP Subject: Fwd: FW: Request for comment (b)(3), (b)(6) Note below forwarded to me from my Afghan account. Indicates a Saturday sent date, but showed up in this account within last 12 hours or so. (Will check home computer when I arrive back in DC late tonight.) All emails sent to my account there should result in an Out of Office message listing Brig Dunham and COL (b)(3), (b)(6) as POCs. Believe it also lists this AKO account as means to talk with me. Haven't gotten anything on this account other than the forwarded note. Please provide some guidance about how I should respond or if it's best if you respond for command. Assume that MG Patton may soon get a similar request. Thanks. (b)(3), (b)(6) Colonel, US Army Outgoing Chief of Staff NATO Training Mission -Argnanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil Cell: (b)(3), (b)(6) "Shohna ba Shohna --Shoulder to Shoulder" Find out what's going on in NATO Training Command-Afghanistan at www.ntm-a.com " (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP"

3. Email from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) from LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Subj Request for comment.txt
< (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

From: Michael Hastings[SMTP:MHASTINGS@GMAIL.COM] Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2011 8:45:13 PM To: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP Subject: Request for comment Auto forwarded by a Rule Dear COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Hope this email finds you well. I'm writing to request an interview with you concerning Lt. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) , formerly an Information Operations Team Chief for NTM-A/CSTCA at Camp Eggers. I have a number of questions regarding his IO cell's activities under General Caldwell's command, as well as the AR 15-6 investigation you ordered into "the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations that LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) left the Camp Eggers installation with their weapons while in civilian clothes, dined in off post restaurants, and consumed alcohol." If you have a moment to discuss, your insights and perspective would be very much appreciated. All the best, Michael -- Michael Hastings Rolling Stone mhastings@gmail.com Office: +1-802-893-4476 International Mobile: +1-212-945-8073 Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Caveats: FOUO

EXHIBIT D

ATTACHMENT 4

: Stroud, Subj Legal Review of Legality of Order from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) re: collection of informatior
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC [(b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2011 12:13 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) us.army.mil; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A
CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A
Subject: FW: Legal Review of Legality of Order from COL B to LTC H re: collection of
information on DVs/CODELs (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Here's the note on which I was cc'd that indicates that Col (b)(3), (b)(6) directive was legal.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Colonel, US Army

Outgoing Chief of Staff
NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
CELL: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USMC CSTC-A Director
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2010 7:39 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTM-A SJA; (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ USAF CSTC-A PAO
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA ARMY CSTC-A SJA; (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA CSTC-A/NTM-A
Subject: Re: Legal Review of Legality of Order from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) re: collection of information on DVs/CODELs (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6) LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) works for me. I will direct his duties as required. He is assigned as a STRATCOM team member as directed by the CG. He is not working IO as that function is being done by ISAF. Since we don't do IO in this command his duties have been realigned to where they are required. He is to prep all of the visitor packages for the IEWG.

I plan to make him my Deputy when I get back so I have better oversight of his daily activities. He will move into the office next to mine in the NewsRoom.
That way I can get him to do something.

27 years of service I've never seen such BS!

He needs to get off his butt and do some work. Totally UNSAT!

(b)(3), (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTM-A SJA
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USMC CSTC-A Director; (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ USAF CSTC-A PAO
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA ARMY CSTC-A SJA
Sent: Tue Mar 30 09:19:29 2010
Subject: FW: Legal Review of Legality of Order from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) re: collection of information on DVs/CODELs (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

: Stroud, Subj Legal Review of Legality of Order from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) collection of informatior
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Sir and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)

My boss, COL (b)(3), (b)(6) asked me to do a legal view of the order to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) about "collecting," "analyzing," and "sharing" information about DVs & CODELs. I talked with MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) a couple of days ago to clarify what you were asking LTC Holmes to do. I also reviewed the DODD at issue, DODD 5240.01. I reviewed another applicable regulation, DOD 5240.1-R. My conclusions and recommendations are:

1. An order to collect, analyze, and share "publicly available" information about DVs & CODELs is a lawful order. DOD 5240.1-R defines "publicly available" as "(1)information...published or broadcast for general public consumption, (2) is available on request to a member of the general public, (3) could lawfully be seen or heard by casual observer, or (4) made available at a meeting open to the general public. "General public" also means the military community, even if the military community is not open to the civilian general public." The restrictions on collecting, analyzing, or sharing information under DODD 5240.01 do not apply to this case, as this would not be considered "intelligence activity."

2. I recommend you clarify what you mean by "collecting," "analyzing," and "sharing" information. COL (b)(3), (b)(6) should issue a written order on DA Form 4856, giving LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) specific guidance as to what kind of information he is expected to collect analyze, and share with others who are part of the IEWG. An example:

"I hereby order you to gather, analyze and share with the other members of the IEWG all publicly available information about DVs, CODELs, and other important people we expect to visit Camp Eggers, or visit with members of the NTM-A/CSTC-A command. Part of the IEWG's mission is to strategize about the message we want to send to these DVs, CODELs, and other important people. In order to accomplish this mission, the IEWG needs you to research and analyze statements these people have made to a public audience. Examples of "publicly available" information includes, but are not limited to, speeches, Congressional testimony, press releases, news stories, interviews, quotes in newspapers, magazines, and books, etc. I am not telling you to conduct "intelligence activities" or "information operations" for the IEWG mission. I am simply telling you to gather information that is already out there and accessible to the public, analyze it, then share that analysis with the IEWG. This is a lawful order; if you choose to disobey it, you do so at your own peril. Disobeying a lawful order is a violation of Article 92, UCMJ. You could face adverse administrative action, or even punitive action like nonjudicial punishment or a court-martial, for disobeying a lawful order."

I'm available to discuss further.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
MAJ, JA
Chief, Military Justice
NTM-A/CSTC-A
DSN (b)(2)
(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

AR 15-6 Investigation
Information Operations in Afghanistan
LTG William Webster, Investigating Officer
COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Assistant Investigating Officer
Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6), Assistant Investigating Officer

Interview with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), USMC, starting at 0908 on 17 March 2011.

EXAMINATION BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER

Q. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), General Webster here. I've been tasked by General Petraeus to conduct an investigation using AR 15-6, Army Regulation 15-6 as a guideline, into the allegations that are made in a Rolling Stone article from 23 February, written by Michael Hastings, in which Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was quoted and in which General Caldwell was implicated as having potentially conducted Psychological Operations against key visitors and some other allegations of misconduct. I've got to report out to him in the next few weeks. And so today what we're going to do, and this may be lengthy, because we have interviewed over 20 witnesses, to include Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) --so we've got a lot of information, some of which will seem very--we'll need a break, and we'll take a 10-minute break and use the facilities, if necessary.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Good morning, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6).

A. Good morning.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Prior to the interview, you signed a restricted communications statement indicating you would not discuss your testimony today with anyone other than those investigative or law enforcement personnel connected with the investigation. Do you understand the terms of that statement?

A. I do.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): And do you agree to abide by those terms?

A. I do.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): And is this your signature on the restricted communications [showing document to COL (b)(3), (b)(6)]?

A. Yes, it is.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): And then you also signed a Privacy Act Statement acknowledging that the information that you give today will only be used for official purposes in furtherance of this investigation. Do you understand that statement?

A. I do.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): And do you agree to that use?

A. I do.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): And is this your signature [showing document to COL (b)(3), (b)(6)]?

A. Yes.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Were you coerced or compelled in any way to sign either statement?

A. No.

[COL (b)(3), (b)(6) was sworn.]

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Please state your full name.

A. (b)(3), (b)(6)

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): And can you spell your last name?

A. (b)(3), (b)(6)

EXHIBIT D

COL : Thank you. What unit are you assigned to?
A. The Joint Staff, J-6.
COL : And you are an O-6, Colonel, in the United States Marine Corps?
A. Correct.
COL : And is that active or reserve component?
A. Active.
COL : That's all the administrative for right now. I'll turn it over to General Webster.
Q. Okay. Colonel , how many years have you served in the Marine Corps?
A. '83, so 20----
Q. Continuously since '83?
A. Well, I was in the Reserves for 3 years, active Reserve to '87, and then come on active duty as an officer in '87, so…
Q. What specialties have you held, or do you hold now?
A. Well, I started out as an infantryman, TOW gunner in the Reserves, enlisted, and then I became a communications officer upon completion of the basic school, so that's been my primary MOS. That's really it, sir.
Q. Tell us a little bit about your background. What kind of jobs have you had in the Marine Corps?
A. I've been, other than being a TOW gunner with the reserve unit, I've been a communications officer for an engineer battalion and for an artillery battalion; I've done recruiting duty for 3 years as an operations officer and an XO; I've been a company commander in a communications battalion; I've been the G-6 of Marine Forces Europe, I've been the battalion commander of a communications battalion; I worked at Headquarters, Marine Corps for 2 years in the C-4 department; and on the Joint Staff; and then I've gone to schools, appropriate schools; I went to CGSC at the Army Command and General Staff College, and I went to ICAF at NDU.
Q. [Observing COL 's uniform.] And I see you served in Desert Storm?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what were you doing then?
A. I was the communications officer for 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines.
Q. So you have worked at junior or lower-level tactical assignments as well as very senior assignments, like the Joint Staff at Headquarters, Marine Corps?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So you've worked for three and four stars before?
A. Yes, sir, many. I think I've worked for six three stars, just because the communications battalion reports directing to the MEF headquarters, and so my relationship to the MEF commander was basically, he was my boss, although the deputy commander was my first rater, the MEF commander was my senior rater on those reports. Then, I was the G-6 of Marine Forces Europe; I worked for two three stars out there. On the Joint Staff, I've worked for two different three stars, and I worked for General Caldwell when I was in Afghanistan.
Q. And as I recall, rank is not easy to make in the Marine Corps?
A. No, sir.
Q. So you must have done fairly well?
A. I've been lucky, sir.
Q. When were you assigned to CSTC-A, and when did you depart?
A. I was assigned in August. I got there right at----
Q. August of '0----

(b)(3), (b)(6)

A. August of '09. I got there like on the 4th of August, I believe was when I reported in, and then I left on the 25th of June.

Q. Of '10?

A. Of 10, yes, sir, 2010.

Q. And I understand you had several titles. What assignments and titles did you have at CSTC-A?

A. Yes, sir. I started--when I arrived, I was assigned as the Current Ops Officer in the J-3, it was CJ33, ran the JOC, and did all of the Current Ops stuff.

Q. And that's CJ33 of CSTC-A?

A. CSTC-A, yes, sir.

Q. Okay.

A. This was prior to the NATO Training Mission stand up.

Q. Right.

A. Then the Director of Operations was MEDEVAC'd back to the states. His name was . At that time, I took over as the Director of CJ-3, and I held that position from sometime in October, I believe, is when he was MEDEVAC'd 'til mid January. At that point and time, we had gone through the transition of command from General Formica to General Caldwell, we'd stood up NATO Training Mission, Afghanistan, and General Caldwell told me he wanted me to lead his strategic communication effort and stand up a communication directorate in mid January. He said that, basically--his comment to us was, "I've got a lot of people that can do ops. I need somebody that can do strategic communications."

Q. Now, why do you suppose he said that you, specifically, about strategic communications?

A. Well, there's a couple of reasons: One reason is he had handpicked his J3 before he came out there, so had come out with him or right around the time he came out. He was kind of waiting in the wings to take over the J3, so he had to find a position for me on the staff. Since the headquarters is all pretty much augmentees from all different branches of services, countries, he was looking for an appropriate place to put me. He said he wanted to put me in that position because I was in the Marine Corps, and he felt like I would not be inhibited on speaking my mind. He did--was concerned about institutional, I don't know what the word is, not taking risks at the Public Affairs shop. He wasn't happy with the Public Affairs shop, and so I think that's the reason he wanted me to kind of take the reins and run with it. He had made a statement up front; when he took command he had given his commanders guidance, and I'm sure you've seen these documents [holding up documents and passing them to LTG Webster]. This is what he handed out to the staff.

Q. No. I'd like to get a copy of that today.

A. You can have this one, sir. I've got a copy. When he first took over, he handed that out to everybody and Strategic Communications came out in what he said. He said that when he worked for M (b)(3), (b)(6) , Mr. V (b)(3), (b)(6) would travel to the AOR, ask people "what can I do for you?" And he said they would just sit there and go "no, we're good". And he said V (b)(3), (b)(6) really wanted to do something for them. He wanted to go back--so he said when we have visitors, we need to tell them what our issues are, what they can do for us. So he said don't let visitors come here without letting them know what they can do for us; that was his initial guidance. Later on, and you can have this one too [passing documents to LTG Webster] -- this was an additional senior leader's guidance that he provided to us; it basically was about getting the story out. He told the whole staff he wanted everybody to Blog about their experiences. He wanted everybody to write, and he told all O6s that "you will not leave the theater until you've been published somewhere, whether it's in a newspaper, whether it's in a journal of some sort." He wanted all O6s to write about their experiences. He said we needed to be--he said don't

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

worry about writing about the negative or the positive, but to write about the accurate story from your prospective. Having given that guidance--and I was dealing with him on a daily basis as the 3, I think he saw an opportunity to push--get our story out, and he wanted me to kind of lead up that effort.

Q. Yeah. Okay, now on these two bits of senior leader guidance [referring to documents], CSTC-A Initial Operating Guidance, 21 November '09 and CSTC-A Initial Senior Leader Guidance 23 November '09, interesting that Strategic Communications or Communications, I don't them see listed once on either of these documents. He does talk about Public Engagement in one place.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. But can you tell me how he viewed Strategic Communications?

A. He basically said that Strategic Communications was--it was one of his main efforts to get the story out about where we were with the command at the time. He came in, and he saw that we were grossly undermanned, based on our command structure and what we needed to get the job done. He said that, you know, "people don't know this. We need to tell our story." He said "without telling our story, we'll sit here with 30 percent of the people to get 100 percent of the mission done, and we're going to fail." He said "we've got to tell people what the accurate picture is of where we stand as a command; where we stand in relation to making the mission that's been assigned to us," and he verbalized that very well. I mean, he was very much pushing the command to, you know, get out on the Blogs and Blog about what they were doing, and talk and educate people. His mantra was inform and educate, you know, everybody. We had the international community; we had the U.S., and he said people don't know what the situation is here.

Q. So were you the Chief of Strategic Communications?

A. Well, it was called the Director of Communications. It was the same title that ISAF used for their communications directorate.

Q. And did that title change for you any time between January of '10 and June of '10, which is what I--the period I think you said you were involved in communications?

A. It did not; no, sir. We got a British Colonel that arrived while I was on leave, and he was going to be General Caldwell's Strategic Communicator up at the Headquarters. I sat in the Public Affairs shop, basically, and because media engagement was what I did most days, I ran around to all of the media; he was going to work the Headquarters piece, and I was going to work the media engagement piece.

Q. Well, who was the Chief of Public Affairs? Was it you? Did you have that second hat?

A. No. That was Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was the assigned Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army.

Q. Okay. In trying to understand the organization and how things evolved, as the Director of Communications, is what you were called, I believe----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. As the Director of Communications, you sat in the Public Affairs shop?

A. Correct.

Q. But there were other people working for you who weren't in Public Affairs? Can you describe if there was an organization that gave you umbrella leadership authority over others?

A. Yes, sir. For a period of time, it was early March, General Caldwell had asked me to assist the one-man JVB shop that we had under Lieutenant Colonel Phil Christiansen (phonetic) in preparation for all the visits. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) (phonetic) came in probably in January, I think about the same time we were standing up this Communication Directorate. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was really just overwhelmed, because we had visitors every day, back to back to back, and all the prep work that had to be done for all those visitors was a lot. And so we took some of the Public

Affairs folks to assist him in that process. When General Caldwell came in he said "information engagement is going to be key to what we do to make sure people are properly informed." He had told us we were going to stand up a Information Engagement Working Group to look at how do we get the story out; how do we engage the media; how do we engage the folks that visit; and, what do we push to them as far as information. General Caldwell had a military assistant that was- (b)(3), (b)(6) (phonetic) was his name, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) (phonetic). Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) (phonetic) said, "hey, you know, we need to get the IEWG," as they called it, "Information Engagement Working Group, stood up, so that we can stop letting these visits kind of fall through the cracks." There was a lot of prep work that needed to be done. When I stood up the Communication Directorate, we also said we're going to start meeting with the staff at this IEWG. I wanted a representative from every staff section at the IEWG, so that if we needed an administrator from the J-1 at the briefing, because they're to talk personnel stats, then we've got the right people in the room. We were undermanned and overwhelmed so when General Caldwell came in he said that, you know, "we're not going to do Information Operations in our command." We knew that we had a five-man cell from the National Guard in our command that was supposed to do Information Operations. We made a recommendation, after having struggled through this during February, and I think it was early March when we finally sat down with General Caldwell to talk about our structure, but it might have been at the end of February, early March, somewhere in there, and we made the recommendation that we take the five-man team and reassign them to support JVB and to support the IEWG because we just didn't have enough officers really to get it done. At that point and time, General Caldwell said "yeah, you can have them". They worked for the J-5 initially, and the J-5 did come to me and say "I've got a lot of other planning stuff that needs to be done. I need these people to help me with that. Can I use them periodically to get some things done?" We cut a deal, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), UK Army, was the J-5 at the time. We kind of shared these folks for some of the tasks. Really, the primary duty was supposed to be to help us run the IEWG and to help with the visits, help (b)(3), (b)(6) (phonetic) with all the visits. So they were the only people that were not in the Public Affairs Shop proper that we tried to pull in as additional staff.

Q. Okay. Several questions here, you said that General Caldwell had a mantra of Inform and Educate?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you ever hear him say that instead of Inform and Educate we had to influence visitors?

A. Never.

Q. Never?

A. No. As a matter fact, he made it clear that we're not there to influence. We're there to provide accurate information.

Q. You talked about a personnel situation and General Caldwell said "we can take 30 percent of the people and try to do 100 percent of the mission." Do you recall what the personnel fill was in November of '09 when General Caldwell arrived?

A. I wouldn't know it accurately, but I think it was in the 30 percent range.

Q. Okay.

A. You've mentioned several terms in this first 20 minutes or so of discussion here. You mentioned: communications, Strategic Communications, Information and Engagement, Public Affairs, engagements, distinguished visitor prep, Joint Visitors Bureau and its tasks, and Information Ops. Do you think it's clear to everybody in your service, the Marine Corps, or the folks that you worked with from other services, do you think it's clear in everybody's mind what the agreed upon definitions of those subjects are?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you think that the terminology used was different when General Caldwell arrived from when General Formica had been there?

A. Completely different. They just had different--they had a different focus. General Formica was more about the numbers, and down more into the weeds of what we were doing as a command towards the mission. When General Caldwell came in, he looked across the command and did his own assessment. He just used a completely different command philosophy I guess would be the way I would put it. They were just two very different generals.

Q. And if the initial guidance didn't cover in writing more than--one additional term, the one that I hadn't listed already, Public Engagement. It didn't cover any of the other phrases or words that are used for these ideas about engaging and educating and information versus influencing and all those kinds of things. Yet, you said General Caldwell talked about Strategic Communication and verbalized his guidance on this?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you think it was clear in everybody's mind that there had been a change, and now we were getting new guidance from a new boss, and it was a new world in terms of communicating with the outside?

A. Absolutely. Yes, sir.

Q. But do you think it was clear to everyone, all the way through the chain of CSTC-A, from General Caldwell on down to the lowest ranking Soldier or Marine, that we were now in for a paradigm shift, and we were supposed to do something different?

A. I think it became clear as we moved forward. General Caldwell asked me to try to get the command talking about their experiences. We told the command that we would be bringing the press on more; we would never turn down an interview with the press, any press----

Q. Including Rolling Stone?

A. Well----

Q. It never came up?

A. It never came up while I was there, sir, but we would have actually talked to the Rolling Stone. General Caldwell--and he pushed me to push the command to talk about their experiences and encouraged people to do that. I sent out emails to the whole command saying "Blog about your experiences; tell your challenges; talk about what you're doing from your ~~prospective~~ perspective, and be honest about it, because that's the only way we can inform people on what's happening here." I would send out periodic emails to all. People started to see it. We stood up the webpage and we said "you can Blog on this webpage; you can go to the Facebook; you can go to Twitter; you can go to YouTube; if you have pictures, we'll upload your pictures for you". We really wanted it to be an opened book. One thing I saw that General Caldwell--the difference between General Caldwell and his predecessor was his predecessor was more--held things closer in to his chest. General Caldwell, on the other hand, laid all his cards out on the table, and when the press came in or any DVs, I mean he wanted to have all of the information available there so if a question came up, boom, we could give him the latest status. It was very different.

Q. So the workload--it is true then that the workload went up in preparation for media engagements or other visitors?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Because if you're going to have all of the cards on the table, you've got to be sure that it's accurate and current information?

A. Yes, sir. That's correct. The workload did go up tremendously across the staff in preparation for their own areas of expertise so that they could have the information available. When we ran the IEWG, like I said, sir, we had--I wanted somebody from every staff section at those meetings. It was a big meeting; it wasn't just a small group, because each visitor--we would get from USFOR-A the visitor list; the purpose of their visit; what they wanted to see; and who they might want to talk to. We would take that and say, "okay, we need somebody from your staff section because they want to talk about attrition, and you have all the attrition stats," or they'd want to talk about the police development, so we'd have the police development people in the room that could talk to that because they had the expertise. It was about understanding who was visiting, purpose of their visit, you know, what did they want to see when they were there, and then did they have anything specific they wanted to see, so that we had all of the right people available to them.

Q. Did you have someone try to do assessments of when they last visited, what they saw then, and what they went away with in terms of information?

A. We did look at the previous history, yes, sir, and what they asked the last time they were there, you know, what were their interests, and what are their interests now? A lot of times we didn't know what their full agenda was. We would try to see, okay, they're coming to, you know, ISAF first, or USFOR-A, or IJC; what might come up in those that might affect us that they may ask us?

Q. In the other three and four star headquarters where you've worked before, was it a similar process there in trying to assess when the visitor came last, what they saw, and what they heard----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what they were interested in, so you could shape the visit for the next time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Had you worked for General Caldwell before?

A. No, sir. I'd never heard of General Caldwell before.

Q. You mentioned the IEWG. Can you talk a little bit more about that; that was not in place before General Caldwell arrived?

A. That's correct. It wasn't in place because General Formica really wasn't focused on the media and focused on pushing the story up and out. It was more internal focus. General Caldwell came in; he said we would stand up an IEWG----

Q. Did you know what that was?

A. No, sir.

Q. So that was a new term also coming in?

A. It was new to me; I'd never worked in this type of a--I'd never done Public Affairs, never done Strategic Communications----

Q. IO? Had you ever worked with or around IO before?

A. I had studied. I took some classes at CGSC, and I wrote a thesis on defensive IO in the Marine Corps, the need for it, when I was at CGSC in 2001-2002. And then----

Q. Could I get a copy of that paper you wrote?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Thank you.

A. And then I took IO classes at ICAF. They have an IO track, so I did that; it's four classes on IO taught by (phonetic); he's the IO instructor at ICAF. I'm very familiar with the IO realm of, you know, targeting the enemy and, you know, from all different aspects: electronic, kinetic, and informational. This was more focused on Public Affairs, as I would see Public Affairs, and public outreach. When General Caldwell put me in the position, he said "I do want your focus to be pushing information out." He wasn't so concerned with the IO mission because IJC had that, and that's why he

(b)(3), (b)(6)

said we're not going to do it. What he was concerned with was ensuring people understood the current picture because he said he didn't understand the current picture until he got out there. He said that's--you know, people just have no idea what's going on. He asked us to stand up this IEWG. ; (phonetic), who was his Military Assistant and had been for some time said "here's what he expects." I did find this [referring to a document.]----

Q. Is that because he had run an IEWG in his previous assignment and brought that idea with him?

A. It may have been, sir. He just knew--he had been working with the General so long, he knew what the General expected. Then he had , who was a Public Affairs Officer, Major , she came with him from Leavenworth. She had run the IEWG at Fort Leavenworth. She kind of-- said "get with ; figure out how she likes to run this, and lay out the tasks so that we don't miss anything." What happened was, and I found this at this house before I came down here--trying to go through and find any papers I have. I had one page. This was the output from the IEWG [passing document to LTG Webster]. This is the product we would produce to make sure that we knew who was tasked with what for each visit. That's just one or two days, or one week. I'm not sure.

Dr. : That looks like a Targeting Matrix [referring to document].

A. No. It's just a----

Q. Information Engagement Matrix.

A. It's a matrix of who's visiting, who's got the task, what's the purpose of their visit, what do we want to tell them, you know, if somebody from the Appropriations Committee is coming, we want the budget folks in the room, so we know who's got the task. Before we had that, it was chaos. It was--we didn't have a process that was clean like that for the visitors. General Caldwell's a stickler on having things prepared for the visits. He didn't want anything to go not right. He wanted a handoff from the time that person got out of the car to the time that they came into the room. Everyone knew "okay, I'm handing the person to you. You've got them until they take off, and when they're done, they're going to go to the chow hall. They're going to meet with these people. Somebody's got to make sure they're prepared." It was a tasking matrix, basically.

Q. Do you think this level of preparation is approximately equal to the preparation in other three and four star headquarters for important visitors who were coming?

A. Yes, sir. And what--USFOR-A put out a similar product. Well, they had the same kind of product; it was in a different format. Same kind of product, we just kind of modeled ours after theirs, and then we streamlined it down into a smaller, you know, spreadsheet. They had a--USFOR-A would put out a sheet on each visitor, purpose of their visit, what was the USFOR-A message for them. They had the whole nine yards from USFOR-A's ~~prospective~~ perspective. We would take that and we would say "okay, they're coming. USFOR-A's going to talk about this with them. We want to make sure they walk away understanding here's our situation in this regard." We would have to put our information that we wanted to put together in that.

Q. Okay.

A. And you can see the CAG on there. I called it the CAG. Some people called it the SAG. It was the CAG before General Caldwell got there. I never changed it on the thing. Somewhere along the line I think it changed to the SAG.

Q. Do you think that changed because General Caldwell, or his personal staff, was accustomed to working with a different-named organization?

A. It may have been. who was a close personal friend of General Caldwell's; they'd worked together in the past. He came in with General Caldwell as one of his trusted people, and he led that group. I don't know where the name changed.

Q. And so what was your relationship with ?

A. It was peripheral. I didn't deal much with He was kind of in his own world, so it was just different, sir. I didn't deal much--I was too busy. I was out running around with the Public Affairs guys, going to visit media all day. I didn't have much time.

Q. Did it--when you say he was in his own world, or in another world, do you mean something negative or do you mean that he was working some overarching strategic thoughts and you were trying to get the job done from day to day?

A. Right. That's more--I was on the execution end. He was on the think piece. We--and I didn't have much dealing with him other than we would meet up at meetings periodically. I did more with his people like , Lieutenant Colonel who was kind of the lead guy to put the command briefs together under General Caldwell had his inner circle of folks. I was not part of that inner circle, and so I was out doing the mission, and the inner circle, as I defined it, was Dr. Kem, , his Aide, , and prior to that, (phonetic), and that was about it, and they would meet often, but I was not privy to those meetings.

Q. Can you give me some of what you perceived, personally, or what some of your people may have perceived personally about the characteristics of that inner circle? Think about the people who worked there. How were they characterized? What made them different, or what made them inner, as opposed to what you did?

A. I think it was just a level of trust for General Caldwell. I think--because any time you have a transition of commanders, you have to adjust the command. You've got to figure out what the new commander wants and sometimes it's hard to make that adjustment. There are adjustments across the staff. Some of the staff members, General Caldwell wasn't very keen on, and so he moved them to different jobs. I was one of those. Not that he wasn't keen on me, but I got moved to a new job. Others got moved to new jobs. Some of them might have felt slighted because of that, and felt like they were kind of on the outside looking in. Understanding personalities matter; trust matters. General Caldwell had worked with some of these people for many years. That's what--commanders need to be comfortable with their staff; they need to be able to know their staff and trust them. It even says on one of these guidance things that "seek out the advice of my SAG and Military Assistant," and all that, "they know me well." Okay? He tells the staff to go see these people if you've got issues where you're wondering what I'm thinking because you can't get access to me. You know, I just thought it was the natural thing to happen. People at that level, they've got so many folks that want to get in and see him, you've got to have gate guards to kind of filter things to him sometimes.

Q. So General Formica had a Commander's Action Group or CAG from before?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when General Caldwell arrived, as you pointed out on here, he says on his 23 November Senior Leader Guidance [reading from document], he says "use SAG, SA, and MA to assist; they know me well. I handpicked them and they are great sounding boards."

A. That's correct. Yes, sir.

Q. So it looks like he was intent on using the term "SAG," but he didn't say CAG. Do you know what the difference was, what the SAG stood for? Did he ever talk about that?

A. I probably had to ask somebody and they said "oh, that's the guys in the CAG."

Q. That's the CAG. How about the SA?

A. I don't know what the SA is, sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. How about the MA?
A. MA is Military Assistant.
Q. And as we've heard before, that is a NATO term. We don't tend to use that in the U.S. military except when it comes to Secretary level civilian leaders.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And I notice here [referring to document] that you talk about the German Parliament Defense Committee. Do you recall if the Minister of Defense from Germany visited in that same visit?
A. [Indicating negative response.]
Q. You don't recall?
A. I don't. We had so many visitors from so many countries, sir.
Q. But across your matrix, your Info Engagement Matrix, that's good as of 11 March 2010, this gives responsibility for the itinerary and biographies, I assume that's biographies, bios, to the CAG?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. For an information paper, to the CAG? The message to Inform and Educate is on Afghan National Security Forces Development?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. The talking points were to be prepared by the CAG? The briefing slides and the Post-ExSum, I assume that is a Post Visit Execute Summary, by the CAG?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And a ghost note by the CAG. What was a ghost note?
A. That's a note from General Caldwell to the visitors thanking them for their visit. He always attached a copy of the brief to his--he typically would attach a copy of the brief to his email, that'd say "thank you; if you want any more information we're here to give it to you." Push them information. General Caldwell did give us a talk about follow through. He said "every visit is important. It doesn't matter who's visiting." He said "what really is important is the follow thru from the visit." He said "they come in; they get a lot of information quickly. They don't have time to think about it," and he said "they will leave," and so the ghost note, the note from him to the visitor he saw was the most important piece. He wanted those notes within 48 hours, at the longest, sent. He gave us the golf analogy; it's all about the follow thru ~~and~~ the swing. It's not about the swing itself. He said the follow thru is the most important piece of this whole thing because that will invite them to ask for more information, and then they will just be better informed from it.
Q. Did he ever put limits on the information that anyone in the command could provide?
A. No, sir.
Q. He, meaning General Caldwell.
A. No, sir. And he said we could not classify documents in the command. He said "we are a training command; we're recruit, train, and equip." He said "there's nothing classified about that." He said "so, if--we will not classify documents internally." He said "if it comes to us classified, we've got to treat it as classified, but we will not classify"--and he made himself as the classification authority on all documents and said "we want it all to be unclass; we want to push it on the unclass side."
Q. Looking again at the German Parliament Defense Committee visit [referring to document] it says here that on this Information Engagement Matrix again from 11 March '10, it indicates that the Web update was to be done by (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6). I'm assuming that's Major (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6), the Public Affairs Officer?
A. Yes, sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. And then that Flicker, Tweeter, and Facebook were to be done by as well as Blog and photojournalist, was responsible for those. Can you tell me what was intended by Web update and the social media engagements?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

A. Yes, sir. When we had DVs visit: we would have photographers there; we would typically have a videographer there; if we could get an interview with them, ask them what do you think about your visit, any of that kind of information; we would post it to the web. We would put it on our webpage that this person visited. Then, if we got a video interview of them, we'd post it to our You-Tube. If we were going to put out a Flicker, so and so visited NTM-A, that's what we would do. See Def would visit; we would go out with him. We'd have photographers there; they would take pictures of the visit. Immediately, they would get back and upload those to Flicker. Because Flicker was tied to our webpage, it would automatically post on our webpage.

Q. Okay. Alright, what I'd like to do here, an hour into the interview, is take a short break. There are restroom facilities here and back here, behind those two doors [indicating restroom locations]. We can recharge coffee and freshen up.

A. Yes, sir.

[The interview recessed at 0955, 17 March 2011.]

[The interview resumed at 1007, 17 March 2011.]

Q. I'd like to follow up on some things that you said earlier about communications, Strategic Communications, Information Engagement, etc., to include Information Ops. What do you consider to be your definition of Information Operations?

A. Information Operations to me is using information to influence the enemy's actions, is basically the why I look at it. It's focused on an opposing force; it can be taking a kinetic strike against something to influence their actions. It's trying to shape the way they view their situation to get them to act a certain way.

Q. The Joint Pub 3-13 talks about the definition of Information Operations, and it says that it's integrated employment of the core capabilities of EW, CNO, PSYOP, Military Deception, and OPSEC in concert with specific supporting and related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Does this coincide with what you believe is correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what you've written about?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And so when you talked about Defensive IO, what were you including in Defensive IO?

A. We were looking at how to protect the networks. I was really focused on that piece, but really, it's been awhile. Looking at Defensive Operations, how do we influence the enemy, or how do we protect our own information.

Q. So it sounds like you're talking about Computer Network Defense?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And Operation Security, OPSEC, protecting our own information?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But in your eyes IO is focused on adversaries, potential adversaries?

A. Absolutely. Yes, sir.

Q. Should IO be used on, or when dealing with U.S. citizens?

A. Never, sir.

Q. Is it illegal to use some of those core capabilities against, or on U.S. citizens?

A. Yes, sir, it is.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Computer Network Attack? For the military to use Computer Network Attack is illegal?
A. It is, yes, sir.
Q. Psychological Operations, illegal?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Military Deception, illegal to use on U.S. citizens, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you ever direct Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or any of his people to do any illegal activity in preparation for DVs?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever direct Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or his team to do any illegal operations or Psychological Operations against any visitor?
A. No, sir.
Q. Frequently in the IO community there's a discussion about a bright line between what's legal and what's illegal, and that bright line, however, runs through what some call a gray area, but to you, what you said to me today, it sounds like that bright line is very clear to you that there are legal activities and there are illegal activities?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have just stated what you believe to be illegal activities and that you did not ever direct anyone--is it true that you did not ever direct anyone to conduct Psychological Operations or Military Deception against any U.S. citizen?
A. That's true, sir.
Q. Did you ever hear anyone else in authority, to include Lieutenant General Caldwell, direct Psychological Operations or other illegal activity against U.S. citizens?
A. No, sir.
Q. Can you tell me briefly about how Public Affairs differs from Information Operations?
A. Public Affairs is about pushing information about the command that's accurate; it's got to be accurate information, truthful information. Whereas Information Operations, being focused on the enemy, can be deceptive; it doesn't have to necessarily be truthful. Public Affairs has to be accurate and correct information, and it's focused on the external public; it's not focused on informing the enemy.
Q. So it's focused on informing and educating the public?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Based on the truth?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How about Strategic Communications, how does that differ from IO?
A. Well, I think----
Q. Or does it overlap?
A. No. I think in our context----
Q. Meaning in CSTC-A?
A. In CSTC-A, NTM-A, we had--I viewed Strategic Communications as the same as the Public Affairs mission, but it's what information is more important to us to make sure it gets out. It's ensuring that people are informed with information that we feel as a command impacts us the most. For instance, things like attrition of the force and how we're meeting that mission; what challenges we have with that. We wanted people to understand that, and so that to me is Strategic Communications. It's not just telling facts about the command, but it's what are the facts that we want to put out there in kind of a--more of a priority effort. You know, we wanted people to know we're undermanned. Well, let's make

sure everybody walks out of here knowing we're undermanned. That to me is Strategic Communications ~~and~~ then just sitting back and answering questions.

Q. So telling people that you were undermanned would meet the commander's intent of informing and educating them that you were undermanned?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you see where it might be confusing in somebody's mind that you weren't just telling them so they would know it, but you were telling them because you were hoping that they would assist with getting you additional personnel?

A. I could understand how somebody could see that. That was not really the goal, but it was to ensure they understood the current situation as we stood at the time.

Q. In your opinion, what's the difference between IO and Information Engagement, or do they overlap?

A. Well, the way we viewed it, they didn't overlap. The way we viewed Information Engagement was all focused on friendlies; it's who's coming; who are the distinguished visitors that we're going to have visit; and, you know, what do we want them to walk away from that visit knowing? And the commander would set those priorities saying, "hey, we want them to understand the attrition issue; we want them to understand the manning issue; we want them to understand the resourcing issues," those type of things that would be the Information Engagement. IO is enemy centric; it's focused on the enemy. Information Engagement here is the same as Strategic Communications as far as I'm concerned; it's understanding who's coming and understanding what information they want from us; and understanding what we want to make sure they walk away with from us.

Q. Do you know if you had anyone trained specifically in Psychological Operations on the staff that you supervised?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know if there was anyone on the CSTC-A staff anywhere who was Psychological Operations trained?

A. I do not know.

Q. Was it your job to know that?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know if Lieutenant General [sic] (b)(3), (b)(6) knew if he had anyone who was PSYOP trained the staff?

A. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), sir?

Q. I'm sorry Lieutenant General Caldwell?

A. Oh. I don't know, sir.

Q. Okay. Let me restate the question.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know if Lieutenant General Caldwell was aware of any PSYOP trained personnel on his staff?

A. I do not know, sir.

Q. Never discussed that?

A. Never discussed it.

Q. And General Caldwell never talked about conducting PSYOP on visitors?

A. Never. Not once in my presence did I ever hear anything like that. All that I heard from General Caldwell in relation to PSYOP, which is a subset of IO, is that we will not do IO in this command. That's all I heard him say.

Q. When the IEWG was stood up, you said (b)(3), (b)(6) (phonetic) was aware of what the General wanted, what General Caldwell wanted, and he helped explain it to you and to others?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you pulled this group together, and you were looking for members from every staff element, so that they would all be informed and they could all bring information to the table in preparation for DVs if those interests were there, or those questions were asked. Correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. This was a new concept though, IEWG, to everyone who was participating?

A. That's correct, sir.

Q. Expect (b)(3), (b)(6) (phonetic)?

A. Yes, sir, and (b)(3), (b)(6), and I think the front--Dr. Kem, because Dr. Kem came with General Caldwell from Leavenworth. I think that (b)(3), (b)(6) probably already knew about it, but other than a few folks that came with General Caldwell, the folks that were already in the command had no idea about IEWG.

Q. Was there already a heavy workload among the staff in general when the idea of standing up an IEWG was started?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any resentment by people who already had a heavy workload that they now had to sit in on what could be a long meeting to prepare for visitors?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you talk about that a little more?

A. The staff--and I'll hand you this as well, sir [passing document to General Webster]. This is--I just was going through in my mind who I remember attending the IEWG. It's just some of the staff principles that I can recall. Yeah, we were an undermanned headquarters when General Caldwell got there. People were working--some of us, we were working 20-hour days, and you'd get a few hours sleep, and be right back at it. Another meeting on top of everything else, you had to prioritize your workload, and General Caldwell said this was a priority effort. We had to make it work. People felt like, well, you know, they would have to sit in two more meetings because now we're going to task staff members from different staff sections to sit in the meetings as subject matter experts. Whereas General Formica didn't have larger staff meetings when visitors came; he would have smaller meetings. General Caldwell wanted a cast of characters in the room, so if a question came up he could say "hey, we've got our personnel officer here, or our budget guy here. Do you have anything to add?" General Caldwell told the staff also--he encouraged us to chime in during briefings as discussions were happening. He invited the staff to add anything they felt was pertinent to the discussion. A lot of the staff saw it as another task that they would have to fill. Most of those principles didn't come to every meeting; they sent representatives normally, but I can't recall most of the folks.

Q. Well, did you chair every----

A. No, sir.

Q. Who chaired the IEWG for you?

A. I typically had (b)(3), (b)(6) run some of them.

Q. Is she on here [referring to document]?

A. She may not be. I can add her.

Q. Yes, I see Major (b)(3), (b)(6), U.S. Air Force, Public Affairs Officer under Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) (phonetic), a DOD civilian, and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And so why would she chair, a Public Affairs officer, chair the IEWG if you weren't there?

A. Because she was my Ops-O, basically.

Q. But it lists her as a Public Affairs Officer. Was she also doing Public Affairs work?

A. She was. Yes, sir.

Q. And this IEWG, in your role in it, did you consider it to be a primary task for you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Because General Caldwell said that Information Engagement was a priority task for him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you consider the IEWG a standing organization that met all the time, or every day, or...

A. We met once a week. I can't remember which day we'd meet; it might have been Thursday, but it was a once-a-week meeting. We tried to keep it to an hour. I found the utility of the IEWG, after we ran a few of them, not as valuable as I thought they would be. What we ended up getting down into was logistics. It became more of a logistics meeting than anything. The intent was to have a quick meeting and talk about the visitors and here's what we think they want to receive, here's the information, and who's going to put that information together. Really, since the CAG did the command brief and the CAG sat down directly with General Caldwell to shape that command brief, the IEWG didn't get heavy into content. We ended up really talking about all the logistics, because that's what ended biting us in the butt more than anything: nametapes being in the wrong place, ~~sitting~~ SEATING charts, the things that the commander cared about. We spent the majority of our meeting talking about logistical efforts than really Information Engagement stuff.

Q. Was the evolution of the IEWG from what you expected it to be to what it became, did you consider that to be a necessity?

A. Oh, it definitely was a necessity. It was a synchronization effort for the staff, so people understood who was tasked to participate in each visit.

Q. Did you consider this evolution to be something less than what you had originally expected it to be because that's what General Caldwell wanted?

A. It appeared that when we--well, I don't know what General Caldwell wanted necessarily, but I knew what was frustrating him, so that's what we focused on in the IEWG was "hey, we can't have another visitor come here and somebody's not on cue, or waiting there, or the protocol isn't ready, or we don't have the food out;" those type of logistics things tended to be--bit us more than anything. General Caldwell was always happy with what the CAG gave him for the command brief, it seemed to me.

Q. Was the IEWG feeding the CAG, who was providing the information to him, or was the IEWG in support, because it was coordinating those things that the CAG was not coordinating?

A. It was more--this is the way I saw it, sir. It was more in support.

Q. In support, yeah. Was it affected by the fact that people, that staff directors, being very busy, frequently sent second or third tier people, my assessment, who weren't necessarily subject matter experts but were sent to take notes?

A. Yes, sir. Correct. Most of the room was there to take notes to go back to their sections.

Q. If this was--let's walk through something here.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If this was a priority effort for General Caldwell, and he wanted, according to (b)(3), (b)(6) (phonetic), he wanted to stand up an IEWG, and second and third tier folks were attending, and you were in charge of it I would say nominally, if you couldn't make the primaries attend, what authorities were you given to make this happen?

A. I wasn't. The only thing I could do was go back and complain to the commander, which I wouldn't do. I'd go to the staff sections. I wasn't that concerned with the principles attending. Note takers for most of them was okay, because most of them wouldn't get a task. But occasionally we'd get, you know, the chief of the medical, you know, from Canada for instance, or whatever, and we would want a medical person there. I wanted somebody there to know "hey, you've got it." We did want these meetings to run fairly quick, so I wanted to keep them an hour or less, normally, because of all the logistic stuff we had to go through. The JVB would brief the visitor. They would walk through all of the logistics, and then we would make sure that protocol knew the folks that were printing the--it turned into a logistics meeting. I gauged my focus on it based on General Caldwell's satisfaction with the visits. If we were satisfying the commander, and he was happy with the visit, and everything went smooth; he felt like we were doing our job. I quickly--I thought when we first stood it up that we would be doing the command briefs, we would be saying, you know, determining what would go in the command brief. IEWG never really did that.

Q. Was there an SOP provided by (phonetic) of how the boss wanted--how General Caldwell wanted these meetings run?

A. No, sir. He gave us some ideas, but you know----

Q. Did anybody ever put that in an SOP for the IEWG?

A. I don't think so. We may have put something together that kind of outlined here's what we expect IEWG to do, and every time we would start the IEWG we'd say we want this to be a quick meeting. Really let's kind of focus in on what--what do we want to present to these visitors, and then we'd get marred down on the logistics of the visits.

Q. In other commands this might be called a JVB synchronization meeting?

A. That's exactly the way I saw it.

Q. And in other commands the content of the briefing might be discussed in a sequence when you were also discussing the logistics of the visit. But sometimes that would be a separate session with a smaller group to decide the content of the briefings and the intent. So it sort of settled into the CAG producing the content and IEWG producing the logistics plan?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did Lieutenant Colonel attend these IEWGs, generally, or did he have someone else attend?

A. He attended some of them.

Q. Master Sergeant attended some of them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What were the tasks for the IO Field Support Team that Lieutenant Colonel led, these five people?

A. I had asked them to assist (phonetic), the JVB, in making sure that all of the, really the logistics of these visits went well, and that we prepped the package--there was a visitor package that we would prep. There would be biographics of the visitors, somebody had to print that; it was really administrative, logistics type of tasks: who were the visitors, what have they written about this mission or talked about this mission lately, and what likely will they want to know about from our command when they visit. They were also--I asked them to sit in on the weekly VTC with USFOR-A, where USFOR-A would have IJC and our command on the VTC to discuss all the visits. They would go through their big visitor's matrix, which was a lot bigger than ours. The visits changed often; they would change the day of. The best we could be prepared, we had to attend all of those meetings. I asked them to assist (phonetic) with those meetings, to ensure that we understood who was coming, who was the entourage too. This DV's coming, but who's traveling with that DV and what

(b)(3), (b)(6)

might they want to know when they visit, staffers and the list. The more information we could get about the visit, the better prepared we could be. That's what I really asked them to assist with.

Q. Okay. Let's take a 5-minute break.

A. Yes, sir.

[The interview recessed at 1031, 17 March 2011.]

[The interview resumed at 1035, 17 March 2011.]

Q. There wasn't an SOP for the IEWG; it was a new concept brought in by General Caldwell. The members of the staff, other than his inner circle were not familiar with the concept, or how it ran before. You were trying to shape that and, ultimately, you were taking the staff that you had coming to the IEWG, and you said you were evolving the meeting's purpose to meet the requirements of the commander and trying to meet his intent knowing that somebody else might be providing the substance of the briefings. You were going to do whatever was necessary, the logistics or whatever was left undone?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Were there people--do you think everybody who participated in the IEWG, and you said they changed, the members changed from time to time, do you think that they understood that their role was evolving and changing because you were having to shape it to do something else?

A. I think they got the gist of it. We would talk about it at the IEWG. I would tell all those that showed up our goal was to make sure that every visit went smooth, bottom line. We had members of the CAG in every IEWG that I chaired. The people that showed up to take notes, which was the majority of them, knew that if they got a task they would go back and convey that task. Everybody kind of understood. I would lead into every meeting about what the purpose of that meeting was.

Q. In late February and into March, maybe the 1st of April, do you recall a surge of visitors?

A. We had--the whole time we had visitors just constantly. You know, from the time I started doing that to the time that I left the visitor rolls were full.

Q. Knowing that General Caldwell intended to engage all of those visitors and to educate and inform them about what CSTC-A was trying to do, did you consider all those visits and the prep that it took to get ready for them, to do them nearly 100 percent right, was all that a distraction to your normal workload, or just another addition, an important addition, but another addition to your workload, or something else?

A. I wouldn't call it a distraction; I would call it a priority effort, because the commander made it a priority. It trumped other things that we might want to do on the staff, only because it was to meet the commander's intent. We had to make sure that they went well.

Q. When you say "it trumped other things that we might want to do on the staff," do you mean other priority efforts for the commander also?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So what were your work hours like on a daily basis and on a weekly basis, for you personally?

A. My work hours, typically, I would get up at 0600, go over to the Public Affairs shop where I had my office. We'd work all day, either out in town or wherever, and then I would probably hit the rack around 0200 in the morning. That was my typical day.

Q. Did you have breakfast everyday; did you take time to eat breakfast?

A. I did eat breakfast most every day.

Q. In the office or in the DFAC?

A. In the office typically.

Q. Did you take a break for lunch? How long was the lunch break, and did you eat that in the office?

A. I would typically break for lunch and go eat it at the DFAC with folks in our shop if I was on the camp. If we were out with the media, sometimes we ate at the TV station with the folks we were visiting with. Other times, you know, we would just miss lunch because we were running around.

Q. And how about dinner? Did you get a break for dinner?

A. I would take a break for dinner, typically, go to the DFAC and eat it at the DFAC.

Q. And your work typically carried you until after midnight; you said you wouldn't hit the rack until 0200?

A. Every night. Yes, sir.

Q. So when did you normally leave the office, or leave the work that you were trying to accomplish?

A. I'd leave there about 0100 in the morning, sir, probably, 0100, 0130.

Q. Did you do that because you liked it, or because that's what it took to get the job done?

A. That's what I thought it took to get the job done. We were undermanned; we didn't have a lot of folks and I needed to continue to work until we could get as much done as we could.

Q. Based on the Math there, you were getting roughly 4 hours sleep a night.

A. Very little, yes, sir.

Q. Is that typical on a deployment from your past?

A. It depends on what's going on in the deployment.

Q. Was it typical for this deployment that you needed to get this done?

A. I don't think many others in our command were working that many hours.

Q. So what do you think--well, let's continue then. What was your workload for the week? Did you get any time off, and when did you do that?

A. Fridays were the days that we had some time to reset.

Q. How much time were you able to take?

A. I would typically sleep in on Friday mornings until 0900, 1000, even, and then get up and go eat lunch, and then start the day from there.

Q. Start the day at 1300 or so, 1200?

A. Yes, sir, somewhere in there.

Q. And work again until when?

A. Until late.

Q. Until late, midnight or so. Were the other people in Public Affairs working those kinds of hours?

A. Most of them were not. They were on shifts, because they--we had photographers, we had journalists, and so they had a schedule--and I just handed a sheet of paper, that one that's a quad--that sheet there [document passed to General Webster], that was our typical planning thing for the Public Affairs shop. Chief (b)(3), (b)(6) would put that together, and it would let each section of the Public Affairs shop know what kind of week they were going to have.

Q. Okay.

A. But some of the--like the web guys, they would work long hours because we had a lot of content to put up on the web, and we only had two Navy petty officers that did the web stuff, so they worked a lot more hours than the rest of the shop.

Q. Back to authorities. Who was under your authority? Who were you rating, senior rating, or who were you supervising?

A. The only person that I ended up--well, (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Public Affairs shop.

Q. So you were the Director of Communications?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Only the Public Affairs shop worked directly for you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But you were also tasked with leading the IEWG and working Information Engagements with DVs?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But you didn't have any written authority over them, except by virtue of your rank?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And there were no written documents that described what the IEWG did or who was in charge of it, but you were trying to pull all of those people together. Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you find some people--well, you said first of all that you found some people who sort of resented this additional workload of the IEWG and the work that you were doing. Did you find some people who resented you giving them tasks out of the IEWG and outside of the IEWG?
A. I'm sure there were people that resented it; nobody came and verbalized that.
Q. Nobody?
A. Not that I----
Q. Did Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) come talk to you about the tasks he was getting?
A. Oh, as far as him working (b)(3), (b)(6)? Well, he was part of my team, sir, I thought you were talking externally.
Q. So, let's get that straight. That hasn't been clear to me before. So Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was assigned to you as part of his team, because you were taking the team and using part of them under Public Affairs and the other part somewhere else, or how was that deal cut with the J-5?
A. Yes, sir. Okay. So we had a meeting with General Caldwell; we had a little org chart that said here's who we have in the Public Affairs shop. I made a recommendation that because I was being tasked with it that I'd take the JVB and (b)(3), (b)(6) (phonetic); that I'd take the five-man team from the CJ-5, Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) and crew; and (b)(3), (b)(6) the Public Affairs shop. When we met the Chief of Staff said "no, I want to keep the JVB under me." Even though I had all the tasks to get everything ready, he kept them; that's fine. Then they said you can have this five-man cell. The issue came down to we didn't have office space for them where we worked because the camp was basically full. They had a bunch of new construction projects that were going to happen, so we could move them and co-locate them with the rest of the team. They were just going to be another part of the communications directorate. During that time, because everybody--well, many of the staff sections were short people, (b)(3), (b)(6) came and said "I need Holmes and Levine to help me with planning on the CJ-5 side." I said "fine, if we can make this work. As long as I get the assistance with (b)(3), (b)(6) (phonetic) and the JVB, and he helps me run this IEWG that we're going to start up." While he was supposed--he was technically assigned to me; it was about for a month. What happened is I went on leave, and when I came back from leave we had (b)(3), (b)(6) on the staff, (b)(3), (b)(6) was a UK Colonel, who came in and he was going to be the new STRATCOM lead for General Caldwell, and he was going to work in the head shed. They said "you're going to do the media relations piece, and continue to push the web and do all of the Public Affairs stuff, and Stu will do the planning piece up at the Headquarters. He'll run the IEWG from now on." At that point, (b)(3), (b)(6) and crew reported to (b)(3), (b)(6), so technically I had them for maybe--not even a month, assigned to me. There were no reports done, you know, OERs, or anything like that. Their--and those weeks that we had them assigned were painful, only because oftentimes Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) wouldn't show up when he was supposed to be at a meeting.

our OPS-O, would have to jump through hoops to get there and represent the shop. She was very frustrated with the whole situation. Colonel would also fill in for him. That was the situation with me and Lieutenant Colonel

Q. So you went on mid-tour leave, R&R leave, sometime around the third week of March until sometime in April?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you have those dates?

A. I do. I went TDY and leave. General Caldwell wanted me to do briefings at the Pentagon, had a whole schedule for me, wanted me to do press interviews while I was there, so I left on 22 March for 8 days of TDY in the Washington D.C. area, and then I did my 2 weeks leave, and I came back on 13 April.

Q. And when you came back is when (b)(3), (b)(6) was now a Director of Strategic Communications for General Caldwell?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So your job had changed?

A. It did.

Q. And Lieutenant Colonel and Major , who had been working for you were now reporting to ?

A. Correct. Yes, sir.

Q. And how did you find that out?

A. Well, I found that out when I got back.

Q. But I mean did someone come brief you on those changes?

A. I think Dr. Kem called me in and said--yeah, Dr. Kem did. Dr. Kem called me in and said "hey, we got in while you were gone." He came in to do Strategic Communications. He had done it down at RC-South, and General Caldwell wanted him to be in the head shed to do that, and that I would still do the execution piece of the media relations and all of the interviews and all that. I'd still be the command spokesman; that was one of my titles, and so Stu would do the planning piece and run the IEWG.

Dr. , I've just got a question. So this is your fourth job change while you're in CSTC-A? And---

Q. I'm not sure you said that. Did you consider it an assignment change, or a job change, or a mission and task change?

A. It was a change. Yes, sir. It was the fourth change I had gone through.

Dr. : You came in as the Deputy J-3 for Current Ops?

A. Correct.

Dr. : You took over as Current Ops guy?

A. Right.

Dr. : Then they move you to head of the comms directorate, as the Director of Communications?

A. That's correct.

Dr. : And now you are what?

A. Command Spokesman; I think that was the title they were using at that point, Command Spokesman.

Dr. : And you were trying to run this--can I characterize the IEWG as a cross-functional working group?

A. That's correct.

Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6): Okay. And you're trying to run this cross-functional working group to support General Caldwell?

A. That's correct.

Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6): Which you have no sort of----

A. Background in?

Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6): Background for and no SOP. You're using hearsay from his trusted agents?

A. Uh-huh.

Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6): How frustrating is this for you?

A. Oh, personally I was frustrated, but, you know, in a command that is made up of all individual augmentees, of people from various backgrounds, people from various skill sets, from various countries, I mean, we were a NATO command at this point, it was a chaotic environment. Yeah, I was frustrated, but, you know, that didn't matter. I had a mission to accomplish, and I just continued to press with the mission. I understood that the commander sets priorities, changes things as he sees fit. He was a new commander in a new command that had just stood up, and he was feeling his way through it as he was going. As months went by, the command morphed into what he wanted it to be, and it took some time. I just happened to be there during that transitional period that everybody was probably frustrated with.

Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6): How hard was it to lead the people that you were tasked with leading through these evolutions?

A. Well, it was not easy, I mean, it was difficult. The Public Affairs shop, I would say those folks were great; they knew their business, The enlisted folks we had were phenomenal. The only real frustration I had--I mean, the biggest frustration I had was when I got the team under Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and we tried to use them for, you know, getting some of these tasks done, and they were resistant. Up front, when I first met them and they came in, they seemed okay with the tasks, but they weren't happy with the task. They were frustrated too, because they felt like they were there to do a specific mission, and they weren't being able to do it. I saw their frustration, and I talked to them about it. I said "look we've just got to get the mission done. The mission is not what you think it is; it's this." There was resistance there from his part. I was frustrated with him, because we would have to send people out to go find him, you know, when he's supposed to be at a meeting.

Q. Let's talk about that in just a minute. Let me ask you about your individual augmentation tasking. Say again where you were working when you got this tasking to go to Afghanistan.

A. I was working on the Joint Staff, J6.

Q. And was this an individual augmentee tasking for you to deploy?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what was the tasking for? What did you expect it to be?

A. I was a volunteer, and the Joint Staff said "if we find a billet, we will get you to Afghanistan." They found a billet; it was supposed to be ANSF assessments, okay. That was what I thought I was going to go do when I got there in August. When I got there in August, General Formica was in charge. I was told "hey, we don't need you in ANSF assessments, we need a Current Ops officer; we need somebody to run the JOC." I said "roger that. I'm here for the duration. I will do whatever you need me to do," and I did Current Ops.

Q. And so as your expectations weren't met, in other words, you were tasked to fill a billet to do assessments of Afghan National Security Forces yet you arrived and were told that we don't need that billet filled; we need you to be an Operations Officer, Deputy Chief of Current Ops?

A. Yes, sir. And that happens in a command like that. It happens in a command that is not a formed unit.

Q. So what did you think was the right thing to do?

A. Whatever I needed to take to accomplish the mission, sir.

Q. Did you find any conflict between your background and training and the need for another officer to do a different task?

A. No, sir. I was there for the tasking, whatever the commander--in my mind the commander can task organize internal to meet the mission requirements, and that was what they were doing as people came in. If they needed someone somewhere else within the organization, they would re-task them to that mission need.

Q. So individual augmentees were assigned to CSTC-A?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Some may have been attached from other places, but most of the individual augmentees were assigned?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And a small unit, perhaps like a field support team from an IO unit, were probably assigned or OPCON. Do you recall what the relationship was between Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) team and the organization?

A. I do not. I know they came in on an RFF, which is different than individual augmentees. As we were going through the manning documents, we had various sources, personnel that were part of our command. We had IAs, or JMD IAs, we had RFF, we had CJSOR, and we had--there was one other category, a NATO category. I can't think of what it is right off the top of my head. They were--their team was an RFF team to CSTC-A that predated General Caldwell coming in and setting up the command structure.

Q. So from your experience, a commander and his operations staff have the authority to task organize as necessary?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In other words to organize the unit and organization to fit the tasks that have to be accomplished?

A. Yes, sir, that's correct. Regardless of their skill sets or background.

Q. Do you remember--well, you said that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) then worked for you for about a month?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you recall how many times you met with him during that month?

A. Well, I told him I wanted to meet with him everyday; that didn't happen, only because he didn't get with me everyday. I would be out most of the days going to various media bureaus around Kabul, so I was not accessible during the day, but he knew I was in the office at night, and I asked him to come by. I saw him maybe a couple--two or three times a week during that time.

Q. Did you--was it frustrating that he wasn't coming to see you in accordance with your guidance to him?

A. Yes, sir, very frustrating.

Q. Did you ever give him a direct verbal order to meet you each day and have him disobey it?

A. I did. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you consider reporting him for disobeying an order?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And why did you not do that?

A. Well, frankly, I didn't have the time to deal with chasing down Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) sir. I was busy, and while I was frustrated with (b)(3), (b)(6), I just never really took the time to follow through on that; had we stayed together longer that may have led to that. I only had a short duration with him really working in the shop.

Q. Did you task anyone else to account for Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and his team?

A. I did. I asked (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) to go find Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) if they could find him, because he wouldn't answer his phone or we couldn't get a hold of him. I would ask them to go find him and bring him to the shop or tell him we needed to talk.

Q. And in your 20-plus years of service, have you ever had to send field grade officers on a consistent basis to go find other field grade officers who failed to show up when you direct them to?

A. Never, sir. It was professionally embarrassing, only because the troops in Public Affairs knew what was going on, because they knew they were part of us, and that we were looking for him. We would ask people if you see Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), please tell him to come by here. It was a frustrating time.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): You said that he wasn't co-located with you at the beginning.

A. That's correct.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Was he ever co-located with you?

A. No. He stayed in the CJ-5 spaces only because we never had office space for him. We were already packed in to the shop we were in at the time. There was a lot of construction planned, but they weren't there yet, and the camp was growing. As the command grew, we had different international detachments and stuff showing up and really the camp was bursting at the seams with people.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): So when he wasn't where you needed him to be, is it possible he was in the CJ-5 section at that time?

A. Right. And so we would send people to the CJ-5 to look for him, and we couldn't find him; that was the problem.

Q. Looking back on it now, how would you handle the situation differently, or would you?

A. Well, sir, I think that typically I trust field grade officers to do their job. They don't require supervision you would expect an E3, E4 to require. I think when I had the problems with Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), I would have written out his tasks up front and given them to him. I typically don't do that. I never write down people's tasks as a field grade officer; I sit down and talk to them about what is expected, and then they go do their job. In this case, I felt like--I could feel the resistance from the beginning that he didn't like being re-tasked. I don't know what I would do different other than if it persisted--which I didn't get an opportunity to follow through because the command changed again, we reorganized and they got moved again. Had they stayed longer, I probably would have gone through some legal action, at least through the Chief of Staff and said, you know, this isn't working. We're going to need to either send these guys home, because they're not doing their job or we need to charge them with malingering, because I can't find them half of the time and I don't know where they are. They're not in their office; they don't report in to us. They don't come when we tell them to come to meetings, so I think had I had a little more time, it may have gone that route, sir.

Q. Were they providing products that the IEWG and you and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) were tasking them to provide?

A. Typically, no. They did some, sir. At that beginning, they did. At first I thought it was going to work okay. They came in, they understood "hey, we need--here's what a package looks like. We need bios; we need itineraries, and that kind of thing." They had format from the front office. They knew what they needed to build, and at first they were doing it, but as the days went by it became more of a chore to get them to do that. (b)(3), (b)(6), as OPS-O, she saw the need; she just stepped in and started

doing it for them. Now, she was very frustrated. She would come and say "I can't get them to get this done. I'm doing it, but"--and I would call them in, both Colonel and Major , and I would tell them "look we've got out here doing your job, and that's inexcusable. I'm not going to put up with this. I need you to do the basics of building a package, because she's got a day job." Her job, with all the media we had, she was swamped. and were working around the clock. Now, was the heavy hitter in the Public Affairs shop. did okay, but was not as engaging as was. would pick up these tasks and run with them when she saw that somebody else wasn't getting it done.

COL : You said that had a day job. Did feel like he had a different day job that you know of?

A. He did. He did not--resented the fact that he was going to do administrative work in preparation of these visits. He wanted to stay in the 5 and do whatever the 5 was doing.

Q. Do you know what he thought the 5 wanted him to do, or what he thought he was supposed to be doing in the 5?

A. He said he came to do--he told me one time his state sent him here to do an IO mission, and he was going to report that he wasn't doing IO. He was going to recommend they not fill this mission ever again. I said "that's fine; you can do whatever you want. I have a mission to get done now. I don't need the--I can't help that. The commander has already ended your mission. This is what he's tasked you to do, and it's not that."

Q. Do you recall giving you a PowerPoint briefing on his 71st IO Field Support Team and what their capabilities were?

A. I think he did, yes, sir, yeah, when he first came down.

Q. And you said you had some background in IO, and you understood what the Joint definition was. Did his briefing--do you recall if his briefing coincided with the Joint definition of IO?

A. I think so, yes, sir.

Q. Did he talk to you about the--what he thought was the mission that he ought to be doing?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he talk to you about what tasks he was being given that he didn't think he ought be doing?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So he pushed back on specific tasks?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you remember what those were?

A. Anything dealing with the JVB and the IEWG.

Q. Did he give you a reason for feeling that those tasks were not appropriate?

A. Yes, sir. He said that he was an IO guy, and he couldn't do IO on friendly forces.

Q. Did you feel that what he was being asked to do was IO on friendly forces?

A. No, sir. I told him--I distinctively remember, I said "I would not ask you to do anything unethical, immoral, or illegal. We're not doing IO in this command. The tasks that you're doing have nothing to do with IO, but I need you to get them done. You need to let go of the IO mission, because that has ended, based on the commander's guidance, and move on to the new task."

Q. Do you remember about when that occurred?

A. Probably early March when they were officially supposed to be designated to our staff sections, sir.

Q. They meaning the team?

A. The team, yes, sir.

Q. Do you remember (b)(3), (b)(6) coming back to you frequently, or at what interval, to tell you what he perceived to be the legal and illegal boundaries of what he was doing?

A. Not really, sir. No. I remember him saying that he didn't think it was right that he was doing these tasks. He was an IO guy; he didn't think it was appropriate. I reiterated to him, over and over, we're not dealing with the IO mission. We're dealing with, you know, visitors and pushing information out; it had nothing to do with IO.

Q. Did other members of the team, (b)(3), (b)(6) or Master Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), come express to you that they thought they were doing something illegal?

A. All three of them basically reiterated the same thing.

Q. Did they ever tell you that directly, that some task you gave them was illegal, and therefore, they could not or would not do it?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. Do you recall in any discussion that (b)(3), (b)(6) brought out a definition of IO and what he could and couldn't do?

A. I think so. Yes, sir.

Q. And what did you tell him; along the same lines of what you just told me that you explained to him this wasn't IO, or what did you tell him?

A. Correct. Yes, sir. That's what I did tell him. I kept reiterating to him that we didn't have an IO mission; we weren't going to do IO. What we were doing had more to do with Public Affairs than IO, and that they needed to let the IO mission go, and they needed to focus on the tasks at hand.

Q. Do you remember how many previous meetings you had had with (b)(3), (b)(6) where he was trying to explain to you what he thought he should be doing and you were trying to explain to him--the time when he brought in these PowerPoint slides?

A. I do remember him coming to me saying "here's what we were tasked to do; here's our team; here's what our capabilities are." He was trying sell me on the fact that he wanted to continue to do IO tasks, focus on the Afghans, and I agreed in some aspect that our command did need to focus on the Afghans, but that wasn't our task at hand from the commander. The commander was more focused on informing and educating those that visited us and the public at large, via the web, of what our current situation was on hand.

Q. Do you--would you say that--would you characterize yourself at that time as working, getting about 4 hours sleep a night, undermanned and heavily tasked, that you were looking for the people who could help get the job done in a teamwork fashion?

A. I would have taken anybody that was available from the staff, regardless of what their background was.

Q. And would you ever order anybody to--or ask them to do anything that was illegal, immoral, or unethical?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you find that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and his team were willing do what the team needed to have done for the commander, or unwilling?

A. They were unwilling.

Q. To the point of being insubordinate?

A. Yes, sir. At first I would say they were willing. When--I remember when we first got the task, they came down to the shop, and this is before they really worked for us. We were getting support from the 5; we were getting support where we could. They weren't officially assigned to us yet. I had asked for help, and they were going to help build packages, and they were doing that. It was over, you know, a couple weeks of time that it became--the resistance built up, and then they couldn't be found.

and then it was no one knew where they were, and it was--it became increasingly frustrating and more insubordinate all the time.

Q. So undermanned, heavily tasked, 4 hours sleep a night, a field grade officer and his team becoming more and more resistant to the tasks that you were giving them, which you thought both legal proper, were you ever concerned about the--were you getting frustrated?

A. Very, yes, sir.

Q. And so did you ever have a shouting match, or did you ever stand Lieutenant Colonel at attention? Did you ever shout at him?

A. I did raise my voice with him. I called him in the office, and I called both him and Major in, and I said this inexcusable. I was frustrated; I was tired. We were all tired. I told him "I don't need to be chasing down field grade officers to do their job."

Q. Do you recall him showing you definitions on PowerPoint slides that angered you even further?

A. I don't know, sir.

Q. Do you recall some document that he was trying to show you and throwing it at him?

A. No, sir. I don't recall that.

Q. Is it possible that you did it?

A. It's possible. We had already gone down that road, and it's possible that I said "I don't want to see this anymore."

Q. And that road meaning it was for 4 or 5 weeks probably that he was working for you, so it was some period of 5 weeks or less?

A. Yes, sir, somewhere in there. Yes, sir.

Dr. : Your disagreement about the nature of the mission was to do and was based on your knowledge of what Information Operations was already? I mean, you've already said that you've written on this.

A. Uh-huh.

Dr. : And you understood the doctrine.

A. Uh-huh.

Dr. : So in your disagreement with him, was that because of the mission that you've been given or was that because you knew what Information Operations was, or is it both?

A. It's both. The commander had said we weren't going to do Information Operations; we knew that. So, therefore, they didn't have a mission, and I looked at these duties that they were being asked to do as administrative duties that any staff member would do anywhere, at any level, to prepare for distinguished visitors. That had nothing to do with Information Operations, and I kept reiterating that to him. He kept trying to use this "well, I'm an Information Operations guy, I can't do certain duties." I disagree. There's nothing that he can't do, other than do Information Operations against friendly forces, against the American public. We weren't asking him to do that. We were tasking him to do administrative duties within the staff, like we would task any other individual augment as a part of our Headquarters, and I just needed him to get his duties done.

Dr. : And you knew that wasn't IO based on your own training?

A. Correct.

COL : Was there a specific portion of what you were asking him to do that he thought was illegal or just all of it?

A. There was a complete resistance to being involved with this whole process.

COL : I'm going to back up a little bit and come back, but you said that when you were assigned there, your duty was to do ANSF assessments?

A. That was my line number----

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): That was your line number.

A. --that I deployed on; I never did that.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): What was meant by assessments?

A. That was to assess the Afghan forces: the police, and the Army, where are they going, what do we need to do to build the force, because that was our mission.

Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6): Who's doing that? Because obviously you have to have facts and figures to support these briefings, so who's doing those assessments?

A. We have a whole team of ORSA folks that work in the CJ-7? No, I can't remember the staff organization. It's a different staff organization than I'm used to, but they had a team of ORSA people that did the modeling of the force and say okay, based on attrition--whatever models they used. I could never relate to them because I just speak a different language than they do. They did that type of assessment, really. Then we had a--are you an ORSA guy?

Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6): No. No, no. I've heard that before though.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Yeah.

A. No, it was like--you're an ORSA, sir?

Dr. Eubanks: No. Not very enamored of them either.

A. No. It was like speaking to dolphins. I mean, "eeeee", and I didn't understand them. They did the modeling, and they did those real assessments. We had an assessments group in the 3 that we had a Navy commander leading. He wasn't an assessments guy either, but that was his job to kind of work with the ORSA folks, and put it together as the, you know, overall assessment.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Did the IEWG do assessments?

A. No. Assessments in how well did the visit go? Now, that we might have done. We might have said okay, we punted this one out of the ballpark, because, you know, we didn't--they showed up 10 minutes early, and we didn't get the call, and so we didn't have somebody pre-positioned; that's the kind of assessment we did and how we could do it better next time.

Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6): And you--or (b)(3), (b)(6) tasked him with doing that assessment?

A. I don't know that--you know, she might have asked him to do that type of an assessment, say how did we do on the visit.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Might there have been a bit of confusion between the assessment that the IEWG was doing and the other type of assessments that might he have thought you were asking him or she was asking to do some other--that kind of assessment that the G-3 was doing?

A. Frankly, I don't think so. Now, based on the dynamics of the way we were working, our assessments were on our own performance in the visits: how did the visit go; what do we need to do better next time; you know, take lessons learned and try to fix it so we have a check and balance in there. There were a lot of moving parts in these visits, between the Protocol, the JVB, down to the Security Teams, down to getting people through the gate. You know, the whole nine yards: the chow hall being set up; the conference room having nametapes and enough visitor packages printed. That's the kind of thing that we were concerned about--I was concerned about because as I learned quickly, my role in this whole thing was to make sure that these visits went smooth, and so I had to kind of synchronize all those people. Once we got it going, and people understood their role--because coming into an individual augment unit, you've got an Air Force captain that was the Protocol Officer--it's not a cohesive unit; they don't know each other. They all come together and they're trying to work together and figure out whose role is what. It is chaotic, and it takes some doing before people understand their role. But after awhile, it became on autopilot almost. I mean, these visits got better and better as we got going on.

Q. Okay. Let's take a 5-minute break, and then we'll come back and try to finish this up. Okay?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Thanks.

[The interview recessed at 1121, 17 March 2011.]

[The interview resumed at 1126, 17 March 2011.]

Q. So as you were approaching your R&R leave on or about the 22nd of March '10, were there tasks that you had to get accomplished before you left so that you could leave someone in charge to get things done, or were there tasks that you were trying to get accomplished in the last hours and days before you departed?

A. Yes, sir, I'm sure there were. I don't recall what those tasks were, but, yes, sir.

Q. So suffice it to say that the frustration level, fatigue level, my word, stress level was going up as you prepared to depart?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. To make sure that the right things were done?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you recall Holmes coming in about that time and telling you that he either would not or could not do something for you because it was illegal?

A. I don't recall that, no, sir.

Q. Do you recall ever yelling at him that something is not illegal if you say it's not illegal?

A. No, sir. My phrase I typically say--and I know I said it to him is that I would not ask him to do anything unethical, immoral, or illegal. That was the only thing I recall saying to him about legalities. I do know my frustration was more about him not being at places when he was expected to be at places than it was about, you know, him showing me another IO chart and how he wanted to do IO.

Q. Do you recall telling Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), shouting at Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), that something--when he said that something you were asking him to do was IO and he couldn't do IO against friendly--against U.S. citizens, do you recall yelling at him that it's not IO if you say it's not IO?

A. I recall saying we're not doing IO. Nothing in what I'm asking him to do has anything to do with IO.

Q. Okay. Do you recall the email trail, which we need to show him--the email trail that went from Major (b)(3), (b)(6), to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), on the day that you left for R&R, 22 March '10? Do you recall seeing that email trail and then providing an email back to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), either from your office or from some other place as you started leave?

A. I'll have to take a look at it.

Q. We'll show it to you here in just a minute.

A. Yes, sir.

[The interview recessed at 1129, 17 March 2011.]

[The interview resumed at 1131, 17 March 2011.]

Q. Before we get back to the email that (b)(3), (b)(6), sent on the 22nd of March, let me ask about your feelings about the time you departed on R&R. Did you feel that this was--that the relationship between you and (b)(3), (b)(6), was now reaching a level that you would have to take drastic measures, such as giving a direct order, reporting him, etc?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you recall saying that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), is a difficult person to work with because he lacks initiative and does not understand the commander's intent?

A. I would say that absolutely is true.

Q. And you said that because you felt it was true?

A. Yes, sir. I still believe that to be true.

Q. Did I cut you off just a minute ago?

A. No. I was going to say when I was leaving, and Lieutenant Colonel came to me and they were concerned that they would not be able to get anything--to get Lieutenant to do anything while I was gone. She was very concerned about it, so I did have a discussion, I believe, with Holmes before I left, you know, reiterating the fact that he needed to support the team there while I was gone. Because knew things rolled down to her; she was the mover and shaker to get things done in the shop. She kept her thumb on things pretty well.

Q. And at that time Lieutenant Colonel was under your supervision in the shop?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And so knowing that Major was an O4 and Lieutenant Colonel was difficult as you described him and was an O5, what caused you to make that decision to leave her in charge?

A. Well, really, was more in charge. I just knew that the person that would take more initiative was going to be Major , because she was--she didn't wait for things to get done; she would move out. She would see the requirement and move out to get it done. She was the initiative person amongst her and Colonel . Colonel was actually the Public Affairs Officer, Lieutenant Colonel but he had less push. She saw, by default, things were going to come to her to get done, and so that was her concern.

Q. Were you concerned that you were leaving her in a difficult position, because she was now going to be responsible for getting Holmes to do what he needed to do?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did you consider alternatives, such as leaving or in charge and decided not to?

A. was actually in charge, but Major would be the one getting everything done.

Q. Okay.

A. She worked for Dave directly.

Q. Back to the email trail from about that period, specifically, 22 March '10. Let me show you here three emails, one of them is from to , and then a second from to , and a third one from back to , and a fourth one where you clarified the situation [passing documents to Colonel

A. Okay.

Q. I'll give these to you; let you review those; and ask you to comment on them.

A. [Reviewing documents.]

Q. They run back from the first one.

A. Yes, sir. Yeah, I remember sending this. Yeah, he didn't get it.

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. He didn't understand that after every visit we needed to do lessons learned from the visit, and so: what did we do right, what did we do wrong, and what corrective action do we need to take for the next one, so that we don't get it wrong the next time. That's what we're talking about in assessing the visit. He continually tries to push this "I'm an IO officer, I can't do these activities," but that's the type of assessment that I needed done. I needed to know----

Q. Do you agree that assessments are part of IO--the IO responsibility, assessments of the enemy and----

A. Yes, sir.
Q. So that you can integrate the five core elements of IO?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you agree that you were using the term assessments, you and Major , but you were talking about assessing the performance when DVs were coming to visit?
A. That's correct, yes, sir.
Q. Do you think that Major or you adequately explained what you were asking him to do and that it was not IO work?
A. Sir, we had talked about this over and over and over again. He knew exactly what we asking him to do, and he kept trying to shape it as a different argument, and we kept telling him "you've got to let this mission go."
Q. Did he ever tell you that it would not only be illegal but it could be perceived wrong if word were to go out, leaked or officially, that you had an IO cell, or somebody who had IO training, who was now doing assessments and helping to prepare information to give to distinguished visitors?
A. He probably said that up front when he came down to our shop.
Q. If he said that, would you agree with him or disagree with him?
A. Well, it depends on how it's phrased to people. If you go out to someone in the public and say "I'm trained in Psychological Operations, and, oh, I'm working on visits from distinguished visitors, and I'm there to shape their perceptions," then, yeah, I think people would say there's something wrong with that. If you go and say "hey, I'm an IO guy, but they've got me doing administrative duties in preparation for visits," that's a completely different situation. So I think the context of how it's presented means something.
Q. Okay. When Major says that he needs to provide the assessment piece every week, you mean the assessment of your performance in the visits?
A. Yes, sir. It's our feedback loop on how well we did.
Q. Did Colonel ever talk to you about the missions or tasks that he had under CJ-5 leadership?
A. He did. He was doing--setting up concerts for the Afghan forces so that they could have some recreation, because we were having attrition problems. When he came over to the shop, wanted him to finish some of those tasks, and that had to do with, you know, having a movie night on the base, some of the things he was doing for MOI and MOD. That's all I really know about it.
Q. Did he ever talk to you about what he believed to be his tasks under the 5, to teach MOI and MOD, how to conduct IO, or Strategic Communications?
A. He did. Yes, sir, that's right.
Q. Did he ever talk to you about prioritizing those tasks given to him by the 5 with those given to him by you?
A. He felt that those--that was what he came to do, and that should be his primary tasks. The reason I say in here [referring to document] that his primary task is to support us is because he had been re-tasked by the commander. I was letting him assist the J-5, CJ-5, in some of their planning tasks because they were short people, and had asked for him.
Dr. , would you characterize those missions as Information Operations?
A. They could be. You know, if you're looking at Afghan--well, no, not really, I guess.
Dr. : Isn't this more like a Civil Affairs operation?
A. It is. It is really. It was really--we were looking--no, it's not Information Ops. It's really trying to--we were looking at the attrition rates and what can we do to get people from walking away from recruit training. There were people in the command and all different staff sections throwing out

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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ideas. He had the idea of let's do movie nights at the camp, which was a good idea, and provide an outlet to these guys. If you went to the barracks, the Afghan barracks, they were terrible. A lot of the plumbing didn't work properly, and so no kidding, I would see our guys walking too if we put our Soldiers in those kind of barracks. It really wasn't Information Operations, because it wasn't focused on the enemy; it was really focused on helping the Afghan forces, more of a Civil Affairs type of thing.

Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6): When you gave him the task--we already talked about the assessment piece, did you use a term like "collect information"?

A. (b)(3), (b)(6) like getting the bios on the people and seeing what--yes, sir.

Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6): Is there a possibility that (b)(3), (b)(6) misconstrued that?

A. We looked at the packages; it was, you know "we need to go get the bios, we need to figure what they've written about lately on the mission, have they done any testimony on the Hill or anything regarding our mission, so we could understand the context of what they were going to come in with and ask us about. We're trying to anticipate the questions, so we have the information prepared prior to the visit.

Q. So someone might characterize that as Collection and Analysis, and someone might characterize that as gathering information and looking at it, assessing it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where do you think you were when you wrote that email on the 22nd of March? Were you still in the office or on Camp Eggers?

A. I was still there. Yes, sir. That was the day I left.

Q. Did you--and from that time you left Camp Eggers to go on R&R, did you have exchanges by email or phone or with Major (b)(3), (b)(6) or Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) again until you returned to Afghanistan?

A. I had emails--I know I had emails with Major (b)(3), (b)(6) and probably (b)(3), (b)(6), because they were--we were emailing back and forth. I was sent reports back of here's the media visits I've done, here's the briefings I've given, so that we could update General Caldwell.

Q. Did (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) tell you in those emails--did they give you an assessment of Colonel Holmes' performance while you were gone?

A. They may have. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you have those emails any place?

A. I don't.

Q. Did Major (b)(3), (b)(6) or anyone else tell you that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) submitted your emails and Major (b)(3), (b)(6)'s emails to the JAG office for a legal opinion on its legality?

A. I don't think anybody told me up front, but when I got back, the JAG officer--while I was gone--oh, the JAG officer actually emailed me, one of the JAG officers, (b)(3), (b)(6) I believe emailed and said that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had dropped off a tasking I had given to them to determine the legality of it.

Q. Did you ever read a copy of emails between Holmes and a Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) out of the JAG office?

A. No, sir.

Q. Are you aware that Wing Commander (b)(6) was involved in asking about the legality of what you had told them to do? Wing Commander (b)(6) do you recall him working for the Chief of Staff?

A. I do recall Wing Commander (b)(6) working at the head shed, but I don't recall him asking about the legalities.

Q. So you never saw (b)(3), (b)(6) rendering what might be called a legal opinion, or at least legal advice about the email?

A. Not that I recall, no sir.

Q. Did you ever know that (b)(3), (b)(6) had advised, Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) had advised (b)(3), (b)(6) to go see Trial Defense Service?

A. No, sir.

Q. Because he thought an order might be illegal?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you recall seeing any email from Major (b)(3), (b)(6) on the legality of your order to (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. Yes, sir, I do.

Q. Were you on R&R when you received that?

A. I did. I believe I was on R&R.

Q. Did you feel comfortable that what she was saying was in line with your own personal feelings about the orders?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That the orders that you were giving Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had nothing to do with IO, but, in fact, were administrative tasks and therefore legal and proper orders?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you ever worry about the perception of an IO officer doing these duties?

A. No, sir. We had--like I said, we had people from all different MOSs doing all different jobs, and so it was only the perception of (b)(3), (b)(6) trying to make it an issue.

Q. Did Major (b)(3), (b)(6) ever talk to you or ask you either in email or in person or on the phone about allegations of inappropriate conduct or the misconduct of Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. Yes, sir. I got an email from her saying that in the legal review they had uncovered some other inappropriate activity and that she wanted to know what I wanted to do with that.

Q. And how did you respond to her?

A. And I said, well, if there is inappropriate activity then I would recommend the command look at an investigation; that'd be my recommendation.

Q. Did you ask where her information source was?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you wonder where the information might have come from?

A. No, sir. She just said they had uncovered some and--I think she had mentioned that they had gone off base and drank alcohol; that was my concern that--that was the one that caught my eye. She was trying to paint an inappropriate relationship, I think, between Major (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) and I didn't see that, personally. They worked together in an office, side by side everyday; they're going to be together. I didn't get the feel, personally, that there was necessarily an inappropriate relationship there, at least as I recall. She did mention that they'd gone off base and drank alcohol; that was my concern.

Q. Were you aware of those allegations before (b)(3), (b)(6) brought those to your attention?

A. No, sir. I knew he had gone off base; he had told me that he had gone off base on the authority of our Chief of Staff, who was (b)(3), (b)(6) at the time, and had gone to a restaurant with IO folks, and this was before he started working with me. That was all I knew about his off-base thing.

Q. Was he supposed to report to you every time he went off base, went off Camp Eggers?

A. Yes, sir. He was supposed to report to me everyday, as I had directed him to do, which he did not do. Oftentimes, he was out doing whatever he was doing during the day. I would go and try to track him down to get a status on what are they up to.

Q. He stated that he had received what amounted to blanket permission from Colonel to go off post in civilian clothes, off of Camp Eggers, and that Colonel had said as a follow up that he was to keep you informed, his boss, in other words, informed about his activities. Was your directive to him to report to you each day part of that knowledge or was it separate because you just wanted to keep track of him?

A. I wanted to know--well, I had tasks for him everyday, so I wanted to know where he was, what he was doing, so that we could get the job done, sir. The problem I had was most days I couldn't find him, didn't know where he was, and we would literally send people out to find him, and some days we couldn't find him.

Q. When he sent you emails, telling you of what he was doing, did he tell you he was doing activities in civilian clothes?

A. He said that had asked them to come over-- was from the State Department--asked them to be in civilian attire and that had given them permission to go out in civilian attire.

Q. When he talked about his other activities, did he tell you what uniform or what clothing he was wearing?

A. No, sir. Not that I recall anything.

Q. Did he tell you about these activities ahead of time, his activities off post at Camp Eggers ahead of time, so that you could approve them, or after the fact?

A. If I found out anything, it was always after the fact, sir.

Q. Now, at any point did Colonel or anyone from the JAG office ask you for recommendations on the disposition of the findings and recommendations of the 15-6?

A. I do not think so. I don't recall--once the investigation began, I met with the investigating officer one time, I believe, Lieutenant Colonel , and I gave him a statement or written statement, and that was basically my involvement with the investigation. That was after I returned from leave at this point. Now, and crew were working for , and so I didn't have really much involvement with them from that point on.

Q. Did you play any part in raising the allegations against Lieutenant Colonel and Major ?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have any reason to retaliate or reprise against Lieutenant Colonel or Major ?

A. No, sir. I was, as we've discussed, if they would have worked for me longer, I probably would have taken some legal action either to say we need to send these folks home, because they're not productive, or we need to take legal action against them to--you know, for not doing any of their duties.

Q. Did you report any of their activities as allegations to the JAG officer or to Lieutenant Colonel ?

A. I don't think so. I think all I told them was that I knew they'd gone off base; I knew that he had told me that; that he told me he had the Chief of Staff approval to do that; and, that I believe that the allegation that--they had a few allegations on there. Inappropriate relationship, I didn't see. I think I said that in my statement, but I could see how it could be perceived; sometimes people work closely together.

Q. We're going to look for the statement. When you agreed, or when you stated that an investigation was a good course of action, or when you responded to by email and told Major that you thought the command ought to look into the allegations with an investigation, did you consider that a retaliation or reprisal against because he had questioned your orders?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever think about how it might be perceived by or used by him against the command?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know of anybody else who had reason to allege that there was illegal activity on the part of and in order to get back at them for questioning the illegal order?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know where the allegations initiated from? Do you know where those allegations of drinking, and off post in civilian clothes, and concealing a weapon, and relationships, do you know where those started?

A. I do not. They came from the JAG office; they said they had uncovered that in their looking into this, and I don't know how they uncovered it. All I could say is if they found something inappropriate, they should look into it.

Q. I'll let you review your statement there, which I think you gave to the investigating officer of the 15-6 [passing document to Colonel

A. [Reviewing document.] Okay. [Passing document to General Webster.]

Q. Okay. This is your statement in answer to the questions from the IO about the activities of and . In here you said you didn't know if they drank alcohol; you did not think that they had an inappropriate relationship, but they worked closely together. You were not aware if there were other people going out to dinner with them, or if they were choosing these opportunities to go have dinner in civilian clothes because they wanted to have dinner and drinks or because they were doing work.

A. Well, they did go out. I knew the one time they went out with the group that had visited from the Pentagon, and there were a couple of folks. I knew their names, because they had given me their business cards when they passed through. They were traveling with a Mr. William Reeve of BBC who came to our Public Affairs shop and talked to us about outreach to the Afghans via radio, so he was encouraging us to do radio interviews. I met that group of people, and I knew he had gone out with them to dinner, but I didn't know anything about alcohol or anything like that.

Q. All right. And in here you say that and do give classes to the Afghans on IO, and that you had a difficult time getting them to complete any other duties. "Lieutenant Colonel is a difficult person to work with because he lacks initiative and does not understand commander's intent. Major works for , and I have had little observation of her duties."

A. Yes, sir. She was quiet. She basically followed Lieutenant Colonel ; he was--you know, they came as a small team from, I think, Texas. I believe it was Texas. They've known each other for a long time. She was the follower in the crowd. He was outspoken, but that's correct. That would be my characterization of them as I left.

Q. So you gave no allegations about their misconduct? The strongest thing you said here is that he was difficult to work with and that he lacks initiative and doesn't understand the commander's intent?

A. That's correct. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you give any other statements to the investigating officer about illegal activities or activities of misconduct?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you take any action to cause the investigation to occur other than agreeing with Major s email?

A. That's the only action I took is based on her email, which I didn't know what the facts were. I recommended if they think it's inappropriate from the legal shop, that we should do a command investigation. That was my recommendation to the command.

Q. A command investigation, in and of itself, is it considered a form of punishment, in other words, is it punitive, or is it simply interrogative to determine facts and circumstances?

A. It's to determine facts, yes, sir.

Q. In your years of service in the Marine Corps, has every investigation resulted in punishment?

A. No, sir.

Q. Have some of them cleared the people being investigated?

A. Absolutely, yes, sir.

Q. Therefore, in your experience in the Marine Corps, do you consider it a method of determining what actually happened with sworn statements, as opposed to listening to hearsay?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you think that the people being investigated will then be punished or austersize or otherwise, some sort of negative personnel action will take place on them?

A. No, sir. Not if it's not warranted. I mean, that's what the investigation's to determine.

Q. Did the JAG office or the investigating officer or anyone else ask you to make recommendations for who should rule on what to do with the investigation?

A. No, sir. All I did was make a recommendation, and when I made that recommendation, I believe I was still on leave. I sent the email back, and I'm sure I emailed a more senior JAG officer, one of the colonels. They had a few colonels in the JAG shop, and I know I put one of them on there, because I wanted them to weigh in. I also put the Chief of Staff on the email, because I wanted the Chief of Staff to be aware of what was coming back to me. I tried to make sure the Chief of Staff was aware of everything that was going on so that there was--it was all above board.

Q. Did the Chief of Staff--I'll ask you again. I think I asked this earlier. Did the Chief of Staff ask you for recommendations on the disposition of this investigation?

A. I do not recall anybody coming back to me on the investigation once I gave my statement.

Q. Are you aware that and received General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand?

A. I'm aware after the fact only because on the 23rd of February, the day before the article came out, I was in my office, filling in for the EA up in our front office, and the Public Affairs Officer, one of the Public Affairs officers from the Joint Staff came down and said, "hey, Rolling Stone want to talk to you. They said this isn't going to be good, whatever it is." They recommended I not talk to them. That was on the 23rd. They said it will probably come out soon, whatever this story is. At that point, I emailed , who was our Chief of Staff, this was on the 23rd, 22nd or 23rd. No, it was the 23rd. The article I think came out on the 24th, right?

Q. 23rd of February is when it was written.

A. Okay. Then this would have been the 22nd that----

Q. In other words, the day before the article appeared in public?

A. The day before the article came out, sir. Yes, sir, that's when the Public Affairs officer came down to me. I emailed and asked him "hey, do you know if the Rolling Stone

contacted you about NTM-A," and then he had sent me back some emails. He said this is about Lieutenant Colonel and he sent me some history on what happened to . After I got back from leave, I didn't have any dealings with at that point.

Q. Did anyone else ask you about how to dispose of the GOMORs, the reprimands?

A. I was not involved in that process, sir.

Q. You were not asked for any recommendation on how to deal with those?

A. Not that I recall, and knowing anything about it to be honest.

Dr. Is that because is now their boss?

A. Probably. He may have been asked, but I wasn't involved in the process.

Dr. And when you say that doesn't understand commander's intent; I just want to make sure I understand what you meant by that.

A. His intent was we would not do IO; that we would--we had been re-tasked and his intent was to give priority effort to making sure these visits went smooth, and that was a priority effort over other tasks. He didn't understand that; he wanted to continue to do what he wanted to do, and resented the fact that he was being re-tasked.

Q. Have you read the Hastings article in Rolling Stone of about 23 February?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What do you think about its accuracy?

A. It's not accurate at all.

Q. Can you talk about that a little more?

A. Well, it paints a picture of us doing Information Operations, or PSYOPS, on U.S. dignitaries, which didn't happen. I was there; I know it didn't happen. It paints Lieutenant Colonel as some PSYOPS guy, which he is not, and he never claimed to be. The quotes that are in the article I think are inaccurate. I've never heard "we need to get into these people's heads". I never heard General Caldwell say whatever the quote was in there about influencing or anything like that. General Caldwell didn't use the word "influence" in our settings. And then me having a screaming match with him; I did raise my voice with him a couple of times. It was not about the legality issue, it was about him not showing up for work. I never recall saying "it's legal if I say it's legal;"that sounds kind of ridiculous to me. So I think the article is very inaccurate in the way it portrays the whole situation. He did not do IO anyway. All he did was administratively help us put a spreadsheet together so we could track visits and who was tasked with what. He did put together biographies, you know, administrative duties in support of (phonetic) and the JVB.

Q. In the article talks about "the General wanted the IO to provide a deeper analysis of pressure points we could use to leverage the delegation for more funds."

A. That's absolutely not true. General Caldwell would have never said anything like that, ever.

Q. It also says "the Chief of Staff also asked how Caldwell could secretly manipulate the lawmakers", a quote from the article, "secretly manipulate the lawmakers without their knowledge". Quoting that the Chief of Staff said "how do we get these guys to give us more people? What do I have to plant inside their heads?"

A. That to me is a made-up quote by Lieutenant Colonel . I don't believe would ever say anything like that, to be honest with you.

Q. Did you, or anybody else ever ask and his team, or anyone else on the staff to use propaganda against visitors?

A. No, sir. was not involved in that. The CAG put together whatever briefings and it's not propaganda, it was facts of where we were in our mission. There were no propaganda tasks. He

was not tasked with putting together briefings. The whole thing paints him as putting together this grand scheme to influence, you know, Senators and others; it's just not true. He was not in that position to even do that, and he only attended a couple of briefings where we prepped General Caldwell, that I recall. He wasn't even the guy prepping him; the CAG prepped General Caldwell. I would sit in the room, add my comments. normally gave the media, if media was there. She would give the media analysis of who's coming from the media; there's what they want to see. He was not involved in any of that process.

Q. Do you recall Master Sergeant providing assessments or reports of information that had been gathered on open source from either the IEWG to the CAG or providing it to Major who provided it to the CAG?

A. He may have, yes, sir. I know he did get these bios and articles that people had written and background data, as I would call it, on the individual so we knew what their interests were. Him, Major and Colonel , all three provided that type of information.

Q. Why do you think Lieutenant Colonel was pushing back so hard on accomplishing these tasks, these administrative tasks, as you called them, in preparation for visits, and assisting with the JVB and Public Affairs? Why do you think he was pushing back so hard on that?

A. I think he didn't want to do it. I mean, my perception was he thought he was coming to do one thing, and he was tasked to do something else. Well, weren't all of us, pretty much. I mean, the staff was kind of fluid in a way. It wasn't like being in a normal unit. We were going through growing pains, and all of us were feeling it. I was frustrated. I got moved a few times, sure, but I sucked it up and did the mission, and that was what we had asked him to do is "your mission has been stopped. And so General Caldwell doesn't want you doing that anymore. He wants you to do something else," and we were using the people we had on the staff to do whatever the mission at hand was, sir.

Q. To your knowledge, were there other units or individuals that pushed back consistently hard on tasks that they were given?

A. Not that I know of, sir.

Q. Okay. Any questions? Is there anything you'd like to add?

A. No, sir. I just want to say I thought the--I think the article is completely fabricated; it's not--there's not any factual information in there. It's overblown, and he's painting a picture that is absolutely not true, not accurate. I personally have a lot of heartburn with it, because he throws my name out there in saying things that I know that I wouldn't have said. I know that General Caldwell did nothing wrong. I've been around long enough to figure out if it's wrong or right, and I know that we weren't--our intent wasn't to influence anybody. Our goals were to make sure that people were better informed. I'll leave you with briefings on the way we saw our information pushed [passing documents to General Webster]. I'll leave you with an example of a brief that we gave back in--well, this was in December, but General Caldwell had been there for the Fed Forum; this was typical of briefs that we gave to people. Our focus was on, really, the Public Affairs side of the house, and those are the media engagements we use to do. The folks that were in the Public Affairs shop, if you haven't had an opportunity to talk to many of them, they can give you ~~a prospective~~ their perspective. Many of them were assisting in this whole process. I leave you with those and just want to say, you know, General Caldwell, you know, he's a great commander; he was doing the right things. He was focused on the mission. He saw that he had deficiencies in the unit that he took over, and he retooled his command to meet those deficiencies. He made it clear to everybody that came there of what those deficiencies were if we were going to meet mission success, and made it clear to everybody that he was not concerned about the good story getting out or the bad story getting out, but he wanted the accurate story getting out, and that was his big focus. He was the most open commander I've worked with, ever, as far as putting information out on the table

STATEMENT OF COL (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FT McPHERSON ~~CAMP HOGERS~~ DATED 2011/03/17

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

and sharing information. I think the characterization in there is a complete slander on him and on everybody involved, and I take it very personally, and I just think it's wrong, so I just wanted to say that, sir.

Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6): For the record, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) passed us an email from (b)(3), (b)(6) to him, the news directorate lay down, the monthly engagements, and this will all be part of his statement. I just want to make sure we include it, a briefing called the Strategic Main Effort from NTM-A, and several other slides that lay out the NTM-A, the Fed Forum Brief, and some talking points for Afghan media interviews. We have those.

Q. Okay, some administrative comments.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Do you fully understand the contents of the statement that you made today?

A. Yes.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): And is that statement true?

A. Yes.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Have you made the statement freely, without the hope of benefit or reward?

A. Yes.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Did you make the statement without the threat of punishment?

A. Yes.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): And did you make it without unlawful influence, unlawful inducement, or coercion?

A. Yes.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6): Okay. When the statement is transcribed, we're going to send it to you. We'd like you to read it, pen and ink any changes that you need to, and then initial the bottom of each page, and sign it, and send it back to us.

A. Okay.

COL Stephens: Thank you very much.

A. Thank you.

Q. Okay. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), thank you very much.

[The interview concluded at 1217, 17 March 2011.]

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 38. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY (b)(3), (b)(6) WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 17 day of March, 2011 at Ft McPherson

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 38 OF 38 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 1

Subject: **FW: list of things for next team (UNCLASSIFIED)**
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil, LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>

Date 06/25/10 19:51
From (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CST

IO FST.doc (31kB)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

And this as well.

You should have enough to chew on for a while . . .

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

-- Original Message-- --
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) SFC US ARMY CSTC-A CJ5
Sent: Friday, January 08, 2010 4:36 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5; (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTMA/CSTC-A CJ5; (b)(3), (b)(6) MSG MIL USA NTMA/CSTC-A CJ5; (b)(3), (b)(6) SGT MIL USA NTMA/CSTC-A CJ5
Subject: list of things for next team (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

All,
Review and add anything you can think of relating to our getting here (to include pre-mob, mob, and travel here). This is sort of a lessons learned list. I'll wait until we think of everything and then send it to (b)(3), (b)(6) for our follow on team. I here they have been identified and are prepping now (Mob 1 Aug). Thanks!

SFC (b)(3), (b)(6)
CSTC-A, CJ-5, SCAT
cell (b)(2)
office (b)(2)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Subject: **FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)**
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>
Cc: COL TXARNG" <leesa.papler@us.army.mil>

Date: 07/03/10 11:09
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" <(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 10

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Peter Check out the traffic below. Apparently the Army Training Group here no longer want IO services . . .

Might want to pass this up your chain soonest.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm a.com

--- Original Message ---
From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 11:06 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC A CJ5
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35; (b)(3), (b)(6) GBR MAJ CSTC-A CTAG A; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA MAJ USAF NTMA/ANATC; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA CPT CSTC A CMD GRP
Subject: RE: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Slightly bizarre, unless we have the wrong RFF, as they have simply nothing to do with CTAG-A, they tend to work at Ministerial level. The next rotation in Oct is provisionally booked.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Please can you speak to CJ3 to clarify this.

Thanks

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)
Col
CH Strat Comms
HQ NTM A
DSN:
VOIP: (b)(2)
Mob:

See www.ntm-a.com

"Shohna ba Shohna - Ooga pa Ooga - Shoulder to Shoulder"

--- Original Message ---
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC A CJ3
Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 10:14 AM
To: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
Cc: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35; (b)(6) GBR MAJ CSTC A CTAG A; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA MAJ USAF NTMA/ANATC
Subject: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Sir,

COL (b)(3), (b)(6) CTAG A requested the info Ops MRTT be stopped. Apparently CTAG-A says that is no longer a requirement. You may want to inquire with them. My guess is the Afgs do not have that requirement any more. You may want to talk with CTAG-A first as they have the Afg Army reqs. Thanks

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC (OF-4), US Army
NTM-A / CSTC-A Force Manager, (CJ3)

DSN:
SVOIP (b)(2)
NIPR Email: @us.army.mil
NIPR Email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
SIPR Email: @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 9:20 AM
To: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3; (b)(3), (b)(6)
USA CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
Subject: Re: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Thanks

I really need to get into the weeds on PA mentors and juggling stratcom and pa slots. I also need to check that RFF for follow on Info Ops team has been bid for.

(b)(3), (b)(6) an you do Mon afternoon

Thanks

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
To: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3; (b)(3), (b)(6)
USA CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
Sent: Sat Jul 03 08:52:31 2010
Subject: RE: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

You need to see the CJ38 Force management shop to staff any requirements issues. As you know, we intend to replace (b)(6) with an officer from 2-44.

I've cc'd (b)(3)

(b)(6)

Lt Col (UK-A)
Chief Future Ops CJ3/5
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Camp EGGERS
KABUL
ISAF SVIOP: 786 4133

IVSN:
DSN: (b)(2)
Mobil
NIPR: GBR@afghan.swa.army.mil
SIPR: (b)(6) GBR@afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
Website: [redacted] > "Shohna ba Shohna" --
"Shoulder to Shoulder"

Original Message--
From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC A NTM-A
Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 11:10 PM
To: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
Subject: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

(b)(6)

Please can I sit down with your team and thrash out where we stand with establishment for all I have responsibility for. 17.00 on Mon 5 Jul would be good if you could do it..

Thanks

(b)(6)

Col

CH Strat Comms

HQ NTM-A

DSN:

VOIP: (b)(2)

Mob:

See www.ntm-a.com

"Shohna ba Shohna - Ooga pa Ooga - Shoulder to Shoulder"

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Subject: **RE: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)**
To (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>
Date: 07/03/10 11:17
From (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

CJ5 SCAT Command Brief.pptx (69kB)

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 11

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Seriously (b)(3), (b)(6) I would not wish this particular tour on ANY of my enemies (except for one). If you can get out from under it, DO.

Attached is my base command brief with Team Composition, Mission (Hah!) and other stuff.

Let me know your questions based on that.

...and go to sleep, Man!

(b)(6)

LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

--Original Message--
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 11:15 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
Subject: Re: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

thanks.. I am strangely glad that I was up at 2:30 in the morning checking emails.. I really need to get a life.... this is important info and I will immediately send up my chain.... I think we have another tasker floating our there somewhere, so this is good to know.

On a side note, can you share what the current composition is of your current team, just in case we get told to go anyway... hopefully as I-O / I E guys, and not as extra staff to be used as fillers... this has happened elsewhere.

Thanks

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

- Original Message
From: " (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5"
< (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
Date: Saturday, July 3, 2010 2:39
Subject: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)
To: " LTC RES USAR USARC" < (b)(3), (b)(6) us.army.mil>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL TXARNG" < (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>

> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
(b)(3), (b)(6) Check out the traffic below. Apparently the Army Training
> Grouphere no longer want IO services . . .
>
> Might want to pass this up your chain soonest.
>
>
> (b)(3), (b)(6)
>
> LTC (OF-4), USA

> IO FST Chief
> Strategic Communications
> NTM-A/CSTC-A
> Roshan: (b)(2)
> VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)
>
> Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
> Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 11:06 AM
> To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3; (b)(3), (b)(6)

> USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
> Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35; (b)(6) GBR MAJ CSTC-A
> CTAG-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA MAJ USAF NTMA/ANATC; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA
> CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
> Subject: RE: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> (UNCLASSIFIED)
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>

(b)(3), (b)(6)

>
> Slightly bizarre, unless we have the wrong RFF, as they have simply
> nothing to do with CTAG-A, they tend to work at Ministerial level.
> The
> next rotation in Oct is provisionally booked.
>

(b)(3), (b)(6) Please can you speak to CJ3 to clarify this.

>
> Thanks
>
>
> (b)(6)
>
> Col
> CH Strat Comms
> HQ NTM-A
> DSN:
> VOIP: (b)(2)
> Mob:
>
> See www.ntm-a.com
>
> "Shohna ba Shohna - Ooga-pa-Ooga - Shoulder to Shoulder"
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3
> Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 10:14 AM
> To: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
> Cc: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35; (b)(6) GBR MAJ CSTC-A
> CTAG-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA MAJ USAF NTMA/ANATC
> Subject: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> (UNCLASSIFIED)
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: FOUO
>
> Sir,
> COL (b)(3), (b)(6) CTAG A requested the info Ops METT be stopped.
> Apparently CTAG A says that is no longer a requirement. You may want
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> requirement any more. You may want to talk with CTAG-A first as they
> have the Afg Army reqs. Thanks
>
>
>
> v/r
>
> (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)
>

> LTC (OF-4), US Army
> NTM-A / CSTC-A Force Manager, (CJ3)
>
> DSN:
> SVOIP: (b)(2)
> NIPR Email: @us.army.mil
> NIPR Email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
> SIPR Email: @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
> Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 9:20 AM
> To: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
> Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3 (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
> USA CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
> Subject: Re: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> (UNCLASSIFIED)
> (b)(6)
>
> Thanks
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> I really need to get into the weeds on PA mentors and juggling
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> has been bid for.
>
(b)(3), (b)(6) an you do Mon afternoon
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> Thanks
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> (b)(6)
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
> To: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
> Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3 (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
> USA CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
> Sent: Sat Jul 03 08:52:31 2010
> Subject: RE: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> (UNCLASSIFIED)
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
> You need to see the CJ38 Force management shop to staff any
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>
> I've cc'd (b)(3), (b)(6)
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> (b)(6)
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>
>
> Lt Col (UK-A)
> Chief Future Ops CJ3/5
> NTM-A/CSTC-A
> Camp EGGERS
> KABUL
> ISAF SVIOP: (b)(2)
> IVSN:
> DSN: (b)(2)
> Mobile
> NIPR: GBR@afghan.swa.army.mil
> SIPR: (b)(6) GBR@afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
> Website: [illegible] > "Shohna ba Shohna"

> "Shoulder to Shoulder"
>
>

>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message---
> From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
> Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 11:10 PM
> To: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
> Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA CPT CSTC A CMD GRP
> Subject: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)
>
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
>
>
> (b)(6)
>
>
>
> Please can I sit down with your team and thrash out where we stand
with
> establishment for all I have responsibility for. 17.00 on Mon 5 Jul
> would be good if you could do it..
>
>
>
> Thanks
>
>
>
(b)(6), (b)(2)
>
>
> Col
>
> CH Strat Comms
>
> HQ NTM-A
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> DSN:
>
> VOIP: (b)(2)
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> Mob:
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> See www.ntm a.com
>
>
>
> "Shohna ba Shohna - Ooga-pa-Ooga Shoulder to Shoulder"
>
>
>
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
>
>
>
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
>
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
>

> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
>
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

CJ5 STRATCOM Advisory Team

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
71st Theater Information Operations Group
Texas Army National Guard

STRATCOM Advisory Team Chief to ANSF
CJ5, NTM-A/CSTC-A
Cell: (b)(2)

(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
ISAF NTM-A CSTC-A CJ-5 ISC

CJ5 SCAT (STRATCOM Advisory Team)

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) 71st Theater Information Operations Group
Texas Army National Guard

Composition:

5 x IO Qualified Soldiers

- LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) (MA Diplomacy & Int'l Terrorism/Military Instructor/Intelligence)
- MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) (Lean Six Sigma Blackbelt/Instructor)
- MSG (b)(3), (b)(6) (Computer Network Operations/Information Assurance/OPSEC)
- SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) (Mission Planner/Military Instructor)
- SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) (OPSEC/Force Protection)

Team Strengths:

- Coalition Experience
- Intelligence/Counterintelligence
- International Relations
- Counterterrorism/Counterinsurgency
- Computer Network Operations
- OPSEC
- Instruction

CJ5 SCAT

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6), 71st Theater Information Operations Group
Texas Army National Guard

Mission Statement:

Develop and Implement a STRATCOM Training and Advisory plan by 25 MAR 2010 (SY Start) in order to provide STRATCOM capacity to ANSF. On order, conduct Information Operations Assessment and Effects in support of NTM-A/CSTC-A Mission.

CJ5 SCAT

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6), 71st Theater Information Operations Group
Texas Army National Guard

Be Prepared To:

- Provide NTM-A/CSTC-A Command STRATCOM as directed by CAG/CoS
- Conduct KLE with key ANSF ministry officials as required to accomplish training mission
- Supplement CJ5 staff as directed to support CJ5 mission

Key Tasks:

- Develop STRATCOM POI
- Embed within ANSF ministry structures to become a part of *their* team
- Provide STRATCOM tools the ANSF *need*, vice what we think they do
- Focus on COIN – *getting inside the insurgent OODA*
- *Be Invisible, be Nothing, be No One* from outside the ANSF

CJ5 SCAT

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

71st Theater Information Operations Group
Texas Army National Guard

Current Projects:

- Tashkil fill for Students in new SY
- Radio Free Afghanistan
- History for ANA (meeting with potential writer on 9 DEC)
- Command STRATCOM OPT
- Thompson CODEL (20 DEC)

Other bits for SA:

- 71st TIOG Commander *is* IJC Red Team Chief (COL (b)(3), (b)(6))
- Year-long tour: depart o/a 13 NOV 2010
- Anticipate this mission as an enduring requirement for TXARNG
  - Next SCAT already forming and training-up in Texas

Subject: RE: RE: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>
Date: 07/03/10 11:38
From: " (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 12

Living Brief - mostly up to date now (Except for IO view TM)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM A/CSTC-A
Kosham: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http://ntm-a.com

--Original Message--
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
Sent: (b)(3), (b)(6) Saturday, July 03, 2010 11:37 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
Subject: Re: RE: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

What was the date on this brief?

Okay - thanks. night night.

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

--Original Message--
From: " (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5"
" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
Date: Saturday, July 3, 2010 3:47
Subject: RE: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)
To: " (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>

> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: FOUO
>
> Serious (b)(3), (b)(6) I would not wish this particular tour on ANY of my
> enemies (except for one . .) if you can get out from under it, DO.
>
> Attached is my base command brief with Team Composition, Mission
> (Huh?) and other stuff
>
> Let me know your questions based on that.
>
> And go-to sleep, Man!
>
> (b)(3), (b)(6)
>
> LTC (OF-4), USA
> IO FST Chief
> Strategic Communications
> NTM-A/CSTC-A
> Kosham: (b)(2)
> VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)
>
> Check out our website at: http://ntm-a.com
>
>
> --Original Message--
> From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
> Sent: (b)(3), (b)(6)

> Sent: Saturday, July 04, 2010 11:15 AM
> To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
> Subject: RE: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> (UNCLASSIFIED)
>
> thanks. I am strangely glad that I was up at 2:30 in the morning
> checking emails.. I really need to get a life... this is important
> info and I will immediately send up my chain... I think we have
> another tasker floating our there somewhere, so this is good to know.
>
> On a side-note, can you share what the current composition is of your
> current team, just in case we get told to go anyway... hopefully as
> I O / I-K guys, and not ex extra staff to be used as fillers. This
> has happened elsewhere.
>
> Thanks
>
> LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
>
> --- Original Message --
> From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5"
> <
> Date: Saturday, July 3, 2010 2:19
> Subject: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> (UNCLASSIFIED)
> To: LTC RES USAR USARC" <
> Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) IOL TXARNG" <
>
>
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
> >
> (b)(3), (b)(6) Check out the traffic below. Apparently the Army Training
> > Groupthere no longer want TO services
> >
> > Might want to pass this up your chain soonest.
> >
> >
> > (b)(3), (b)(6)
> >
> > LTC (OF-4), USA
> > TO PMT Chief
> > Strategic Communications
> > NTM-A/CSTC-A
> > Mobile: (b)(2)
> > VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)
> >
> > Check out our website at: http://ntm-a.com
> >
> >
> > -Original Message -
> > From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM A
> > Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 11:06 AM
> > To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC A CJ1; (b)(6)
>
> > D
>
> > USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
> > Cc: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35; (b)(6) GBR MAJ CSTC-A
>
> > CTAG A; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA MAJ USAF NTMA/ANATC; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA
>
> > CMT CSTC A CMD GRP
> > Subject: RE: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> > (UNCLASSIFIED)
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
> >
(b)(3), (b)(6)
> >
> > Slightly bizarre, unless we have the wrong RFF, as they have simply
> > nothing to do with CTAG A, they tend to work at Ministerial level
> > The

> > next rotation in Oct is provisionally booked.
> >
(b)(3), (b)(6) please can you speak to CJ; to clarify this.
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> >
> > (b)(6)
> >
> > Col
> > CH Strat Comms
> > HQ NTM-A
> > DSN:
> > VOIP: (b)(2)
> > Mob:
> >
> > See www.ntm-a.com
> >
> > "Shohna ha Shohna - Ooga pa Ooga - Shoulder to Shoulder"
> >
> >
> > --Original Message--
> > From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ1
> > Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 10:14 AM
> > To: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
> > Cc: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35; (b)(6) GBR MAJ CSTC-A

> > CTAG-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA MAJ USAF NTMA/ANATC
> > Subject: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> > (UNCLASSIFIED)
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
> >
> > Sir,
> > COL (b)(3), (b)(6) CTAG-A requested the Info Ops METT be stopped.
> > Apparently CTAG-A says that is no longer a requirement. You may want

> > to inquire with them. My guess is the Afgs do not have that
> > requirement any more. You may want to talk with CTAG-A first as they

> > have the Afg Army reqs. Thanks
> >
> >
> >
> > v/r
> >
> > (b)(3), (b)(6)
> >
> > LTC (OK-4), US Army
> > NTM-A / CSTC-A Force Manager, (CJ1)
> >
> > DSN: (b)(2)
> > SVOIP: (b)(2)
> > NIPR Email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil NIPR Email:
> > (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
> > SIPR Email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
> >
> > --Original Message--
> > From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
> > Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 9:20 AM
> > To: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
> > Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3; (b)(3), (b)(6)

> > T USA CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
> > Subject: Re: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> > (UNCLASSIFIED)
> > (b)(6)
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> > I really need to get into the woods on PA mentors and juggling
> > stratcomand pa slots. I also need to check that RFF for follow on
> > Info Ops team has been bid for.

(b)(3), (b)(6) you do Mon afternoon

Thanks

(b)(6)

---- Original Message -
From: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
To: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM A
CC: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM A/CSTC-A (CJ3) (b)(3), (b)(6)

T USA CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
Sent: Sat Jul 03 08:52:31 2010
Subject: RE: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
(UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~NONE~~

You need to see the CJ38 Force management shop to staff any
requirements/issues. As you know, we intend to replace (b)(3), (b)(6) with an
officer from 2-44.

I've cc'd (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Lt Col (UK-A)
Chief Future Ops CJ3/5
NTM A/CSTC A
Camp EUGERS
KABUL
ISAF SVTOP: (b)(2)
IVSN:
DSN: (b)(2)
Mobile
NIPR: (b)(6) IBR@afghan.swa.army.mil
SIPR: IBR@afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
Website: "Shoulder to Shoulder"

"Shoulder to Shoulder"

Original Message-
From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM A
Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 11:10 PM
To: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA CPT CSTC A CMD GRP
Subject: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~NONE~~

(b)(6)

Please can I sit down with your team and thrash out where we stand
with
establishment for all I have responsibility for. 17 00 on Mon 5 Jul
would be good if you could do it..

> >
> > Thanks
> >
> >
> >
> > (b)(6)
> >
> >
> > Col
> >
> > CH Strat Comms
> >
> > HQ NTM-A
> >
> > DSN:
> >
> > VOIP: (b)(2)
> >
> > Mob:
> >
> >
> >
> > See www.ntm-a.com
> >
> >
> >
> > "Shohna ba Shohna Ooga pa Ooga Shoulder to Shoulder"
> >
> >
> >
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
> >
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
> >
> >
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
> >
> >
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
> >
> >
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
>
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Subject: **RE: RE: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)**
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>

Date: 07/03/10 11:39
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" < (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 13

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Holiday, Hell! I am running a 10k just to see if I can still do it. My old bones are going to be hurting tomorrow!

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

--Original Message--
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
[mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) army.mil]
Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 11:35 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
Subject: Re: RE: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

Thanks brother.. just sent up the info.. I hope they figure this out in time before we hop on a plane... the current mobe-date for us is the end of September, but they were looking into moving that up to get some other training requirements solved. For some reason, they were going to send us to Dix which thinks small teams are actually units, and they train them as units instead of teams.. wasted time (weeks).. we were hoping for Benning (less weeks).

Night night.. be safe and enjoy what you can of the 'holiday'.. I think during my 'holiday' in Iraq, it meant that I made it to the PX and took a little longer for lunch.

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

-- Original Message --
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5"
< (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
Date: Saturday, July 3, 2010 2:47
Subject: RE: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" < (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>

> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: FOUO
>
> Seriously (b)(3), (b)(6) I would not wish this particular tour on ANY of my
> enemies (except for one . . .) If you can get out from under it, DO.
>
> Attached is my base command brief with Team Composition, Mission
> (Hah!)and other stuff.
>
> Let me know your questions based on that.
>
> ...and go to sleep, Man!
>
>
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)
>
> LTC (OF-4), USA
> IO FST Chief
> Strategic Communications
> NTM-A/CSTC-A
> Roshan: (b)(2)
> VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

>
> Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
> [mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @army.mil]
> Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 11:15 AM
> To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
> Subject: Re: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> (UNCLASSIFIED)
>
> thanks.. I am strangely glad that I was up at 2:30 in the morning
> checking emails.. I really need to get a life.... this is important
> info and I will immediately send up my chain.... I think we have
> another tasker floating our there somewhere, so this is good to know.
>
> On a side-note, can you share what the current composition is of your
> current team, just in case we get told to go anyway... hopefully as
> I-O / I-E guys, and not as extra staff to be used as fillers... this
> has happened elsewhere.
>
> Thanks
>
> LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5"
> <
> Date: Saturday, July 3, 2010 2:39
> Subject: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> (UNCLASSIFIED)
> To: ' LTC RES USAR USARC" <
> Cc: ' (b)(3), (b)(6) COL TXARNG" <
>
>
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: FOUO
> >
> > Check out the traffic below. Apparently the Army Training
> > Grouphere no longer want IO services . . .
> >
> > Might want to pass this up your chain soonest.
> >
> >
> > (b)(3), (b)(6)
> >
> > LTC (OF-4), USA
> > IO FST Chief
> > Strategic Communications
> > NTM-A/CSTC-A
> > Roshan (b)(2)
> > VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)
> >
> > Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
> > Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 11:06 AM
> > To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3; (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

> > USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
> > Cc: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35; (b)(6) GBR MAJ CSTC A

> > CTAG-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA MAJ USAF NTMA/ANATC; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA

> > CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
> > Subject: RE: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> > (UNCLASSIFIED)
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

> > Caveats: FOUO
> >
(b)(3), (b)(6)
> >
> > Slightly bizarre, unless we have the wrong RFF, as they have simply
> > nothing to do with CTAG A, they tend to work at Ministerial level.
> > The
> > next rotation in Oct is provisionally booked.
> >
(b)(3), (b)(6) Please can you speak to CJ3 to clarify this.
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> >
> > (b)(6)
> >
> > Col
> > CH Strat Comms
> > HQ NTM-A
> > DSN:
> > VOIP: (b)(2)
> > Mob:
> >
> > See www.ntm-a.com
> >
> > "Shohna ba Shohna - Ooga pa-Ooga - Shoulder to Shoulder"
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3
> > Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 10:14 AM
> > To: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC A NTM-A
> > Cc: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35; (b)(6) GBR MAJ CSTC-A

> > CTAG A; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA MAJ USAF NTMA/ANATC
> > Subject: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> > (UNCLASSIFIED)
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: FOUO
> >
> > Sir,
> > COL Charrington, CTAG-A requested the info Ops METT be stopped.
> > Apparently CTAG A says that is no longer a requirement. You may want

> > to inquire with them. My guess is the Afgs do not have that
> > requirement any more. You may want to talk with CTAG A first as they

> > have the Afg Army reqs. Thanks
> >
> >
> >
> > v/r
> >
> > (b)(3), (b)(6)
> >
> > LTC (OF 4), US Army
> > NTM-A / CSTC-A Force Manager, (CJ3)
> >
> > DSN: (b)(2)
> > SVOIP: (b)(2)
> > NIPR Email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil NIPR Email:
> > (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
> > SIPR Email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
> > Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 9:20 AM
> > To: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
> > Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3; (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
> > Subject: Re: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> > (UNCLASSIFIED)

> > (b)(6)
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> > I really need to get into the weeds on PA mentors and juggling
> > stratcomand pa slots. I also need to check that RFF for follow on
> > Info Ops team has been bid for.
> >
(b)(3), (b)(6) an you do Mon afternoon
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> > (b)(6)
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
> > To: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
> > Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3; (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) CPT CSTC A CMD GRP
> > Sent: Sat Jul 03 08:52:31 2010
> > Subject: RE: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops
> > (UNCLASSIFIED)
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: FOUO
> >
> > You need to see the CJ38 Force management shop to staff any
> > requirementsissues. As you know, we intend to replace Dan with an
> > officer from 2-44.
> >
> > I've cc'd (b)(3), (b)(6)
> >
> >
> >
> > (b)(6)
> >
> >
> > Lt Col (UK-A)
> > Chief Future Ops CJ3/5
> > NTM-A/CSTC-A
> > Camp EGGERS
> > KABUL
> > ISAF SVTOP: (b)(2)
> > IVSN:
> > DSN: (b)(2)
> > Mobile
> > NIPR: BR@afghan.swa.army.mil
> > SIPR: (b)(6) BR@afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
> > Website: [illegible] <[illegible]> "Shohna ba Sholna"
> --
> > "Shoulder to Shoulder"
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ---Original Message---
> > From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
> > Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 11:10 PM
> > To: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
> > Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
> > Subject: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)
> >
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: FOUO
> >
> >
> >
> > (b)(6)
> >
> >

> >
> > Please can I sit down with your team and thrash out where we stand
> with
> > establishment for all I have responsibility for. 17.00 on Mon 5 Jul
> > would be good if you could do it...
> >
> >
> >
> > Thanks
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> >
> >
> > (b)(6)
> >
> >
> > Col
> >
> > CH Strat Comms
> >
> > HQ NTM-A
> >
> > DSN:
> >
> > VOIP: (b)(2)
> >
> > Mob:
> >
> >
> >
> > See www.ntm a.com
> >
> >
> >
> > "Shohna ba Shohna - Ooga-pa-Ooga - Shoulder to Shoulder"
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> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: FOUO
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> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: FOUO
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> > Caveats: FOUO
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> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: FOUO
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>
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Subject: RE: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)
To (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3" < (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
Cc (b)(6) BR COL CSTC- A NTM-A" < (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>,
(b)(3), (b)(6) TC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) s.army.mil>

Date: 07/03/10 11:48
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan sw

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 14

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

My team is currently filling RFF #1006. Is this the one which is being canx'ed? Or are we talking about another one.

As Col (b)(6) notes, I am here working primarily with CJ5 and STRATCOM on Ministerial Development not with CTAG-A.

We need to get this resolved quickly - my erstwhile replacement team, headed by (b)(3), (b)(6) (r'd) needs to know this before they mob in two months . . .

Thanks!

(b)(6)
LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

---Original Message---
From: (b)(6) BR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 11:06 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
Cc: (b)(6) BR LT COL NTMA CJ35; (b)(6) BR MAJ CSTC-A CTAG-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA MAJ USAF NTMA/ANATC; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
Subject: RE: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Slightly bizarre, unless we have the wrong RFF, as they have simply nothing to do with CTAG-A, they tend to work at Ministerial level. The next rotation in Oct is provisionally booked.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Please can you speak to CJ3 to clarify this.

Thanks!

Stuart

(b)(6)
Col
CH Strat Comms
HQ NTM-A
DSN:
VOIP: (b)(2)
Mob:

See www.ntm-a.com

"Shohna ba Shohna - Ooga-pa-Ooga - Shoulder to Shoulder"

---Original Message---
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3
Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 10:14 AM
To: (b)(6) BR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
Cc: (b)(6) BR LT COL NTMA CJ35; (b)(6) BR MAJ CSTC-A CTAG-A; Tozer, Mark A USA MAJ USAF NTMA/ANATC
Subject: FW: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: FOUO

Sir,

COL (b)(3), (b)(6) CTAG-A requested the info Ops METT be stopped. Apparently CTAG-A says that is no longer a requirement. You may want to inquire with them. My guess is the Afgs do not have that requirement any more. You may want to talk with CTAG-A first as they have the Afg Army reqs. Thanks

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC (OF-4), US Army
NTM A / CSTC-A Force Manager, (CJ3)

DSN: (b)(2)
SVOIP: (b)(2)
NIPR Email: (b)(3), (b)(6) us.army.mil NIPR Email:
(b)(3), (b)(6) ifghan.swa.army.mil
SIPR Email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil

---Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 9:20 AM
To: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3; (b)(3), (b)(6)
USA CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
Subject: Re: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6)

Thanks

I really need to get into the weeds on PA mentors and juggling stratcom and pa slots. I also need to check that RFF for follow on Info Ops team has been bid for.

(b)(3), (b)(6) n you do Mon afternoon

Thanks

(b)(6)

---Original Message---
From: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
To: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(3) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ3; (b)(3), (b)(6)
USA CPT CSTC-A CMD GRP
Sent: Sat Jul 03 08:52:31 2010
Subject: RE: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

You need to see the CJ38 Force management shop to staff any requirements issues. As you know, we intend to replace Dan with an officer from 2-44.

I've cc'd (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Lt Col (UK-A)
Chief Future Ops CJ3/5
NTM A/CSTC-A
Camp EGGERS
KABUL
ISAF SVIOP: (b)(2)
IVSN:
DSN: (b)(2)
Mobil
NIPR: BR@afghan.swa.army.mil
SIPR: (b)(6) BR@afghan.swa.army.smil.mil

Website: [illegible] > "Shohna ba Shohna"
"Shoulder to Shoulder"

Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 11:10 PM
To: (b)(6) GBR LT COL NTMA CJ35
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA CPT CSTC A CMD GRP
Subject: JMD CE and RFF for PAO Mentors and Info Ops (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

(b)(6)

Please can I sit down with your team and thrash out where we stand with establishment for all I have responsibility for. 17.00 on Mon 5 Jul would be good if you could do it..

Thanks

(b)(6)

Col

CH Strat Comms

HQ NTM-A

DSN:

VOIP: (b)(2)

Mob:

See www.ntm-a.com

"Shohna ba Shohna Ooga-pa-Ooga Shoulder to Shoulder"

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Subject: **FW: July NTM-A COMISAF Assessment Slides (UNCLASSIFIED)**
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>
Date: 07/03/10 11:49
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

20100609 STRATCOM Master Slides.pptx (370kB)

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 15

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

I am starting to pass all pertinent stuff your way . . .

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

--Original Message --
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A PAO
Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2010 11:44 AM
To: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5; (b)(3), (b)(6) CIV CSTC-A PAO
Subject: FW: July NTM-A COMISAF Assessment Slides (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Sir,

The STRATCOM slides for the monthly assessment are attached. They have to be submitted on 7 JULY.

v/r
(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
NATO Training Mission Afghanistan PAO
email: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
DSN:
cell: (b)(2)
commercial: (b)(2) (U.S. number)
http://www.NTM-A.com

"Shohna ba Shohna -- Ooga pa Ooga -- Shoulder by Shoulder"

-----Original Message---
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) US LCDR USN CSTC-A CJ5
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2010 4:21 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A PAO
Cc: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC-A CJ5; (b)(6), (b)(3) CDR USN CSTC-A CJ5; (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ USA CSTC-A CJ5; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA CAPT USMC CJ 5; (b)(3), (b)(6) US LCDR USN CSTC-A CJ5
Subject: July NTM-A COMISAF Assessment Slides (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Sir,

Attached are the STRATCOM "roller deck" slides for this month's updating. Please make changes from last month in red. PERSTAT slides should contain SY June data and be labeled Nov 09, Jun 10, Nov 10. Arrow slides (lam slides) should be labeled Nov 09, Jul 10, Nov 10 as they describe events/initiatives currently happening. Please feel free to add other metrics/slides that may be important to your DCOM, however don't delete any slides without contacting the assessments team as they may be used in various other products. Suspense is 1200 on July 7th.

V/r
LCDR (b)(3), (b)(6)
CSTC-A / NMT A
CJ5 Assessment Action Officer
DSN:
Cell (b)(2)
http://www.ntm-a.com
"Shohna ba Shohna -- Shoulder to Shoulder"

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan
Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan

NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN

STRATCOM

ANSF Communications Capacity

NOV 09	JUN 10	NOV 10

• 55 ANSF PAOs trained in Basic PAO Course
• 0 trained technicians.
• 4 ANSF PAO kits issued
• Regional Staff:
  • MoD = 74
  • MoI= 30
• Virtual Comms Capacity
	• 97 ANSF PAOs trained in Basic PAO Course
	• 38 trained technicians
	• 20 ANSF PAO kits issued
	• Regional Staff:
	  • MoD = 212
	  • MoI = 175
	• Delivered Victory Parade Comms
	• Embed with 205 Corps
	• Re-organized MoI Comms organization
	• Limited Comms capability outside Kabul
		• 121 ANSF PAOs trained in Basic PAO Course
		• 62 trained technicians
		• 50 ANSF PAO kits issued
		• Regional Staff:
		  • MoD = 221
		  • MoI = 184
		• Ministerial Comms Strategies
		• MoI devloping Comms Plan for Parliamentary elections
		• Media partnering to ANSF Bde/TF level

Must develop STRATCOM capacity above Corps and encourage "Media Partnering" at operational and tactical level. Afghans must hear an Afghan voice for more credible communications.

STRATCOM Themes and Messages

Aggressive Building of the Foundations for future ANSF

- Headlines
  - NTM-A is a vital component for transition strategy - building Afghan capability to ensure their own security in strategic partnership with ISAF
  - At 180 day point, NTM-A has measured where we were in Nov 09, how far we have come and where we are going to deliver objectives in Nov 10
  - Success not assured, we face key challenges in leader development and attrition, and can only be successful if fully resourced
- Radically changed process is having a dynamic RPPPLL effect:
  - Recruit/Train/Assign
  - Predictability in duties - Pay initiatives - Partnering
  - Leader Development – Literacy
- Tangible Transition
  - The quality and quantity of training has measurably increased
  - Leader development is getting focused attention
  - Where fully resourced, the effect on training is pronounced
- Afghan Communication – Afghans must also communicate the change

NTM-A Outreach

- Coalition
  - Bloggers Round Table – 2 per week (1 x DCOM, 1 x O6)
  - Kabul 1st Secretaries Lunch – monthly
  - Professional Bodies
  - Think Tanks
- Afghan
  - Media (TOLO TV, TV1, ARIANA, NOORIN)
  - Parliamentary Engagement Plan
  - Battlefield Circulation to ANSF – ANCOP
  - Transition Staff in NTM-A
- Inform and Educate
  - ANSF wounded NMH Closed-Circuit Televisions and Programs
  - ANCOP Concert for Heroes Welcome
  - MoI "Women's Shura"
  - ANSF Recruit Radio and TV
  - Anti Corruption - Blue Dye

NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan
Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan

NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN

STRATCOM
Backup Slides

STRATCOM Considerations

- We forecast increase in size and quality of ANSF to 2010 targets by Oct 2010, however significant challenges with attrition remain.
- ANSF growing in operational competence & confidence and building capacity to plan and lead operations.
- We are establishing framework for strategic relationship with ANSF through training and building institutions that will provide intellectual and conceptual capital for long-term future of ANSF.
- We've built training command rapidly—it still needs more support from ISAF and wider bi-lateral arrangements.
  - Short-term bridging solutions in place, but still need commitment of trainers with right skill sets to enable an enduring ANSF capability.

STRATCOM Themes and Messages

Aggressive Building of the Foundations for future ANSF

- Headlines
  - NTM-A is a vital component for transition strategy - building Afghan capability to ensure their own security in strategic partnership with ISAF
  - At 180 day point, NTM-A has measured where we were in Nov 09, how far we have come and where we are going to deliver objectives in Nov 10
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  - The quality and quantity of training has measurably increased
  - Leader development is getting focused attention
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	• Limited Comms capability outside Kabul
		• *121* ANSF PAOs trained in Basic PAO Course
		• 62 trained technicians
		• *50* ANSF PAO kits issued
		• Regional Staff:
		  • MoD = *221*
		  •MoI = *184*
		• Ministerial Comms Strategies
		• MoI developing Comms Plan for Parliamentary elections
		• Media partnering to ANSF Bde/TF level

- **Must develop STRATCOM capacity above Corps and encourage "Media Partnering" at operational and tactical level**
- **Afghans must hear an Afghan voice for more credible comms**

Subject: **RE: checking SIPR on Friday morning (UNCLASSIFIED)**
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC (b)(3), (b)(6) us.army.mil>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTMA/CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>,
(b)(3), (b)(6) MSG MIL USA NTMA/CSTC-A CJ5", (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>,
(b)(3), (b)(6) SFC US ARMY CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>,
(b)(3), (b)(6) SGT MIL USA NTMA/CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

Date: 07/28/10 21:21
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 16

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

(b)(3), (b)(6)

My team are all on the cc' line, and are happy to talk with your side anytime. Their duty breakdown is as follows ... but please know that the duties are all pretty flexible:

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) - Team Deputy, TO Planner

MSG (b)(3), (b)(6) Admin NCO, and special projects (i.e. Blue Fuel)

SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) - Mission Planner, and special projects (i.e. ANSF Media Campaign)

SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) - Force Protection and OPSEC

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC (OF-4), USA
TO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

----Original Message ----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2010 9:14 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
Subject: checking SIPR on Friday morning (Eastern Daylight Time)

FYI,

I finally have access to my AKO-S, noted below.

I can only check it 1 to 2 times a week and need to coordinate that ahead of time, but if you need to send anything there, I am finally UP.

I remembered you stating most everything you do is on NIPR. Still, if you need it, it's there.

On a side note, I'm plannig to send your POCs the contact info for my team. Just need to make sure I have good info. If we can't get them together as a group through DSN, which is hard-due to distance and schools, then we can still get some one-to-one conversations going, and perhaps indivudally can get some of them on DSN.

If you need to talk secure, that may be harder, but if so, let me know so I can start working on it.

E-talk to you later.

Thanks.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
FA, FA30
email: AKO: (b)(3), (b)(6) us.army.mil
SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) us.army.smil.mil
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Subject: RE: Info Engagement Memorandum (UNCLASSIFIED)
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>, (b)(3), (b)(6) COL TXARNG" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>

Date: 06/24/10 14:59
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" <(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 17

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Brother - that ain't the half of it:

You might note that the architect of IE was LTG William Caldwell - our commander. When he came here, he brought a number of By-Name-Requested people from both his past and CAC along with him. It is a hothouse environment of group-think. As you can see, Information Engagement is still alive and kicking here - and Information Operations is anathema.

Let me know how this turns out for you all. And again, if I can help in any way, let me know.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

---Original Message ---
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
[mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Thursday, June 24, 2010 2:49 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ RES USAR USARC; (b)(3), (b)(6) COL TXARNG
Subject: Re: Info Engagement Memorandum (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Thanks for the heads up.

There are some changes occuring with our staff internally, specifically, MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) will likely not be on this mission due to a medical condition. I am his alternate and am likely going although I am waiting official work from my boss, probably today or shortly.

Please keep MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) on your distro, but be sure to include myself, pending other changes.

I know there are some doctrinal changes occuring between I-O and I-E that will get ironed out on the next revision to FM 3-0 (hopefully), but there does appear to be some doctrinal and legal issues surrounding I-O and I-E as you have it outlined.

The tasker you outlined sounds different from what was portrayed to our command, so we will certainly take back that message to them.

Thanks and good luck

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

---- Original Message ----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5"
<(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
Date: Thursday, June 24, 2010 4:08
Subject: Info Engagement Memorandum (UNCLASSIFIED)
To: " (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ RES USAR USARC"
<(b)(3), (b)(6) army.mil>, (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL TXARNG" <(b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>

> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: FOUO
>
> Gentlemen,

I presume my earlier communications might have taken you both aback some. Not surprising.

Attached is an official representation backing up my earlier claims. This command does not do Information Operations - at least they don't know they do.

I cannot be more plain, you will be landing in a "hot LZ" so if you are indeed coming, be prepared. Frankly, if I were you, I would take the attached memo back up your chain and beg off of this mission fast.

Here is my experience in a nutshell: From January to March, I was pressured to provide analysis, assessments, themes and messages targeted at the DV's, Leaders and population of the United States and our coalition partners. On 22 March, I received a written order by email to do just that. I took the order to JAG for review, and they determined it to be illegal - although later the order was "clarified" to take out the strictly illegal parts. Within 3 weeks, the command launched a 15-6 against me, and after a flawed and one sided process that did not even look at exculpatory evidence or ask for our testimony, issued both me and my team deputy with GOMOR's. I currently have an IG "whistle blower" complaint lodged with the IG but the process has been horrifically draining, and has permanently damaged the projects and relationships I had going.

So forewarned is forearmed. Given the attached, you might have the ammunition to show that the need for an IO FST is now made redundant. They don't do IO, so therefore, they don't need an IO FST. There are plenty of other commands and activities here that need your help so please do not feel like it is this deployment or nothing!

I will do everything I can to help you in any way to include being completely truthful with you.

But if I were you, I would run away from this one. Fast.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC (OF-4), US Army
Chief, IO FST Support to ANSF (Or whatever the hell they want us to call ourselves now!) Strategic Communications NTM A/CSTC-A

"Shohna-ba-Shohna" Shoulder to Shoulder

Check out our website at: http://www.ntm-a.com

VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)
Cell: (b)(2)

SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
ISAF: ISAF NTM A CSTC-A CJ 5 ISC

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Subject: **RE: changes to team lead (UNCLASSIFIED)**
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil

Date: 06/25/10 19:40
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

IO Projects.doc (50kB) GMIC Graduation.pdf (414kB) CJ5 SCAT Command Brief.ppt (126kB)

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 18

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Don't sweat the SIPR account - we hardly use SIPR here at all. Just not that kind of place.

We plan to leave here o/a 15 OCT. If you get here earlier, great. If not - I would not worry. We will be happy to call you via DSN morale call lines and chat with you and whomever you would like.

Our primary purpose for being here was to train two teams of Afghan STRATCOM folks: one team of 8 from the MoD, and one team of 8 from the MoI. The MoD guys are up and running. The MoI never filled their slots and really don't have a team. Kind of a bust.

Of course, the request for us to do these things went out before LTG Caldwell and the Klown Kollege arrived. Hence, some of the problems.

I have attached our very abbreviated command brief, along with an article on the STRATCOM training we recently did back in April, and a list (somewhat dated now) of the IO projects we have either done, or attempted to do.

Battle Rhythm . . . - Not terribly bad. Since no one knows what to do with us, we don't have a lot of internal meetings. This is a training command, not an operational command, so the pace of life here is slow. The nominal work day runs from 0800-2000 - which some people take to mean that you need to be sitting at your desk for the entire time. That is ridiculous. As long as someone is answering the phones/email during that time - or you are actually working somewhere, you are good. They issued us with cell-phones, so we are easy to reach. We pretty much do have someone here during those hours, but we also PT, eat, meet people, train, etc... during that time as well. No one in the CJ5 Directorate (where we are attached) is a clock watcher - as long as things get done, we are good to go.

The week runs from Saturday through Thursday - the Afghan work-week. Friday is a half-day - we can sleep in until 1300. And Sunday is off until 1000 so that people can go to church. All in all, not too bad really. The team usually does movie night in our office (we have a big screen) on Thursday evenings. It is a pretty easy pace.

Read what I have sent, and then when you have digested it, we can talk more.

I am also going to forward a couple of emails we sent a while ago to Texas, when we thought they were going to back-fill us.

Stand by for those under separate cover...

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
[mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) us.army.mil]
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2010 1:41 AM

To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
Subject: changes to team lead

(b)(3), (b)(6)

I just received official word this morning that I wil be deploying in MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) place.

Please continue to include MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) on any correspondance while we work through our battle handoff.

He was trying as hard as he could to go, but the stars were not aligned, literally and figureatively.

Please send me anything you can to allow me to get spun up.

I have to get my SIPR account re-activated too.. might take a little while; my unit is 400 miles from my home, so I need to find a friend.. I have a few leads.

I understand from a mission standpoint that it sounds like your team's mission has changed.

Please let me know what they were doing, and what they are doing now so we can get our arms aruond the changes.

I don't have any hard times/dates yet.. just generalities. If are able to speculate in an unclassified way, that would be great.

Battle-rhtym would also be good to know... I would guess based on my own experiences, but since it's you're HQs isn't shooters, all bets are off.

I have forwarded your info through my chain of command. I don't know if we can do anything about it anyway, but at least they now have S.A.

Thanks.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 19

SUBJECT: NTM-A/CSTC-A Information Operations projects
As of: 14 APR 2010

Prepared by: LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) , Team Chief
71st Theater Information Operations Group, TX ARNG
Information Operations Field Support Team (IO FST) to NTMA-CSTCA

NTM-A/CSTC-A IO FST Mission: Develop and Implement a STRATCOM Training and Advisory plan by 25 MAR 2010 (SY Start) in order to provide STRATCOM capacity to ANSF. On order, conduct Information Operations Assessment and Effects in support of NTM-A/CSTC-A Mission.

IO FST's primary task is to develop an ANSF "STRATCOM" capability.

ISAF's STRATCOM Definition:
"In concert with other political and military actors and with higher headquarters, Strategic Communication advances ISAF's aims and objectives through the coordinated and appropriate use of Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, Information Operations, and Key Leader Engagements."

ALL IO FST projects will primarily support ISAF LOO #3 - ANSF Development.

The projects are designed either as tasks for the ANSF STRATCOM Teams to complete as part of their training, or in at least two cases (Comic Book & ANA History Book), to directly support Recruiting and Retention for specific ANSF elements or goals.

Projects already underway:

1. ANSF STRATCOM Training.
   a. Requirement: CSTC-A identified a STRATCOM gap in early 2009 and submitted a Request For Forces (RFF) through USFOR-A for an IO FST to instruct MoI and MoD on Strategic Communications in order to build a STRATCOM capacity at the ministerial level.
   b. Method: In response to RFF #1006, 71st Theater IO Group, Texas Army National Guard deployed a five-man Field Support Team to CSTC-A on 15 NOV 2009. The team arrived well before either MoI or MoD had fielded the STRATCOM Teams – which did not happen until the SY 1389 Tashkil (March 2010). Between November and March, the IO FST prepared for the training, evaluated the environment, participated in several Joint Planning Groups, and fulfilled a variety of both IO and non-IO related activities.
   c. Current Status of Training.
      IO FST began training a class of Strategic Communications Planning and Effects Specialists for the MoI and MoD on 3 April, 2010. The classroom portion of this training lasted one week, and consisted of a variety of Media, Ethics and Legal courses taught by GMIC staff and NTM-A/CSTC-A trainers.

      This initial instruction will be followed by a hands-on portion (currently underway), during which NTM-A/CSTC-A staff will partner with their Afghan Counterparts and work with them in support of

current ANSF operations. In this way, the ANSF STRATCOM Teams will not only receive the intellectual components of their task, but also receive the benefit of an "over-the-shoulder" advisor once they return to their ministries.

Additional 2-3 day sub-courses will be taught periodically over the next several months on Problem Solving & Identification, Effects Assessments, Measures of Performance & Measures of Effectiveness and Messaging.

Scheduled projects for the ANSF STRATCOM Teams include:
- ANCOP Mission and Recruiting/Retention Support
- Comic Books, Literacy Support, Heroes Welcomes, etc...
- Portable Theater Systems and Message Programming for ongoing combat operations
- Community Outreach and Support Programs

The culminating exercise of this program will be the planning and execution for the Parliamentary Election Campaign in September, 2010.

2. ANA History Book
   a. Requirement: Produce and disseminate a short history book to demonstrate an historical tie between the Afghan Army of the past, and the Afghan National Army of today.
   b. Method: Book is written and produced by an Afghan Scholar, and published under the auspices of the MoD's Directorate of Religious and Cultural Affairs (RCA). Funded through US Embassy, this book will be distributed to both the DoS Lincoln Centers (several locations throughout AFG) and through the RCS directly to each recruit reporting to Basic Training at either ANAREC or at KMTC.
   c. Primary Audience: ANA Recruits & Potential Recruits
      i. Desired Effect: Positively influence Recruiting & Retention by instilling a sense of esprit de corps through linkages to Afghan historical past
   d. Secondary Audience: Afghan Populace
      i. Desired Effect: Influence Afghan Populace to support its Army, by showing linkages to Afghan historical past
   e. Tertiary Audience: INS and INS Supporters
      i. Desired Effect: Degrade popular support for INS by countering their propaganda that current ANA units are wholly creations of ISAF and Coalition with no linkages to the people or the historical past
   f. Attribution: GREY. This book is for all intents an Afghan MoD product, produced with US DoS Funds and will have a frontispiece and foreword written by Brig Naseeb, RCA Director.
   g. Status: The book is written and proofed, and is in production now through TF-41 contracts.

3. USO-Type Concert for ANCOP (o/a 15 JUN 10)
   a. Requirement: Demonstrate and generate public support and appreciation for ANCOP

b. Method: Produce an Afghan "concert" to be staged tentatively at ANCOP HQ in Kabul (negotiations currently underway)
c. Primary Audience: ANCOP Soldiers and Potential Recruits
    i. Desired Effect: Positively influence Recruiting & Retention through a visible display of national pride and affection for the Force and for its orphaned children
d. Secondary Audience: Afghan Populace
    i. Desired Effect: Influence Afghan Populace to support ANCOP, by publicizing ANCOP sacrifices
e. Tertiary Audience: INS and INS Supporters
    i. Desired Effect: Degrade popular support for INS by showing effect of violence on innocent victims, and by showing an outpouring of positive support from notable Afghan cultural figures and leaders
f. Attribution: GREY. This will be an AFGHAN event with minimal visible participation by Coalition or US Forces
g. Status: NTM-A/CSTC-A has approved this project, pending ANCOP confirmation and site selection. Negotiations with ANCOP currently underway. TF-41 will support.

4. Portable Theaters (Vector)
    a. Requirement: Small, portable, self-contained theater systems to deliver Messaging and Entertainment to Influence, Educate and Entertain selected Target Audiences.
    b. Method: Purchase 3 x systems with US DoS funding
    c. Primary Audience: This is a vector to deliver messaging to ANY audience.
    d. Desired Effect: Provide an information vector to each ANA soldier, through which we can inform, educate and influence. As a delivery system, the Effect will be determined by the Target Audience and the Messaging. These systems are purely the delivery vectors to enable the desired effects.
    e. Attribution: N/A
    f. Status: Funded, ordered, awaiting delivery

Planned Projects (Under development or Looking for Funding)

1. ANCOP "Men of Honor" Comic Book
    a. Requirement: Change both public and internal perceptions of ANCOP in order to positively affect recruiting and retention.
    b. Method: Monthly story serial focusing on dramatized "real-life" stories derived from interviews with ANCOP personnel. Books will be produced locally by Afghan artists under Afghan direction
    c. Primary Audience: ANCOP Soldiers
        i. Desired Effect: Positively influence Recruiting & Retention by elevating ANCOP popular status amongst the ANCOP troops
    d. Secondary Audience: Afghan Populace & Recruiting Pool
        i. Desired Effect #1: Influence Afghan populace to support ANCOP, by publicizing ANCOP sacrifices & heroism
        ii. Desired Effect #2: Educate Afghan populace on roles, mission and training of ANCOP through storyline and through capturing real-experiences via interviews with ANCOP

e. Tertiary Audience: INS and INS Supporters
   i. Desired Effect: Degrade popular support for INS by subverting public opinion away from them through popular entertainment and emotional appeal
f. Attribution: BLACK. This will be an AFGHAN product with no directly visible ties to USFOR-A or ISAF
g. Status: NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ1 (Recruiting) is looking at this project now for funding/desirability. If they do not choose to fund it, I may pursue funding through TF-41, or through JARB process. A capable vendor has already been located and has provided an estimate of $3M for a year's production, produced monthly @ 100k per issue.

2. MoI Story Book Handout (PSYACT)
   a. Requirement: Change public perception of AUP and MoI from one of corrupt oppressors, to one of public servants.
   b. Method: Purchase children's story books in both Dari and Pashto for police to distribute to the public directly, through their Literacy centers or through other means yet-to-be staffed. Books would be free-of-charge to the public, and would bear a frontispiece with MoI logo and a message from MoI Minister Atmar.
   c. Primary Audience: Afghan Populace
      i. Desired Effect: Influence AFG pop to view MoI/ANP as public servants and helpers, rather than oppressors to be feared by placing the Police in a charitable support role
   d. Secondary Audience: MoI/ANP Personnel
      i. Desired Effect: Influence ANP to feel differently about themselves by having them distribute free books to children at schools and through other vectors (TCP's???)
   e. Attribution: GREY. This will be an AFGHAN product with no directly visible ties to NTM-A/CSTC-A, USFOR-A or ISAF
   f. Status: A vendor (Hoopoe Books) has already been found with suitable stories written by non-controversial Afghan author (Idries Shah). This project is not eligible for ASFF/Title 22 funding, and TF-41 will not support (as of 12 APR 10). Referred to JARB.

      NOTE: The books are NOT the important thing here – the Act of Giving is! This is primarily a PSYACT meant to demonstrate service, the books are simply the method, but they reinforce a number of other positive themes.

3. Army Recruit Radio Give-away (Vector)
   a. Requirement: Develop ways to Entertain and Influence ANA recruits in the evenings after training and on holidays.
   b. Method: Issue one hand-crank/solar powered radio w/ ANSF logo and *"Sada-e-Azadi 88.5"* messaging and earplugs (expected cost = $1 each for total package) to each ANA recruit upon in-processing through ANAREC.
   c. Primary Audience: ANA Recruits
      i. Desired Effect #1: Provide an information vector to each ANA soldier, through which we can inform, educate and influence
      ii. Desired Effect #2: Influence potential listeners (ANA Recruits) to get their news and entertainment from CJPOTF's

"Sada-e-Azadi" Radio – thereby increasing the range and depth of ISAF messaging

iii. Desired Effect #3: Entertain and Inform ANA recruits through CJPOTF approved and generated programming

iv. Desired Effect #4: Influence potential recruits to join the Army by using this radio as a "sign up bonus" – "Join the Army, get a free radio…"

d. Secondary Audience: Soldiers' Families

i. Desired Effect #1: Influence AFG populace to support their Army by providing them a news source for Army information and programming (Sada-e-Azadi)

ii. Desired Effect #2: Influence potential listeners (ANA Recruits) to get their news and entertainment from CJPOTF's "Sada-e-Azadi" Radio – thereby increasing the range and depth of ISAF messaging

e. Attribution: WHITE

f. Status: CJ1 Recruiting Team (CDR Gaghan) is currently looking at contracts to support this project.

NOTE #1: This same project should be considered for the MoI, but with MoI logos on the radios!

NOTE #2: This project is meant to be used in conjunction with – and capitalize on - the Army Recruit Publicity program, to be generated by 2-22 IN BN at KMTC.

4. Army Recruit Publicity spots and advertisements on "Sada-e-Azadi" Radio

a. Method: 2-22 IN BN PAO (and their follow-on relief) will generate human interest news stories – specific to KMTC – and publicize these stories and interviews of the Afghan soldiers on "Sada-e-Azadi".

b. Primary Audience: ANA Recruits

i. Desired Effect #1: Influence ANA recruits to listen to "Sada-e-Azadi" by providing news and information pertinent to them – they get to hear their name on the radio!

ii. Desired Effect #2: Inform ANA recruits of recent training successes and upcoming events through short ads and notices on "Sada-e-Azadi"

iii. Desired Effect #3: Educate ANA recruits of recent operational successes against the INS through truthful news and information on "Sada-e-Azadi"

c. Secondary Audience: Soldiers' Families

i. Desired Effect: Influence the AFG populace to support their Army with recruits and referrals through access to information on their sons, and truthful news and information

d. Attribution: WHITE

e. Status: 2-22 IN BN PAO is planning this now.

5. "Sada-e-Azadi" newsstands at MoI Central Training Center (CTC)

a. Requirement: (1)Provide news and information to ANP recruits; (2)Provide positive reading material to reinforce literacy training

b. Method: Set up free "Sada-e-Azadi" newspaper distribution to CTC

c. Primary Audience: ANP recruits

i. Desired Effect #1: Provide an information vector to ANP recruits, through which we can inform, educate and influence
ii. Desired Effect #2: Influence potential readers (ANP Recruits) to get their news and entertainment from CJPOTF's "Sada-e-Azadi" newspaper - thereby increasing the range and depth of ISAF messaging
iii. Desired Effect #3: Entertain and Inform ANA recruits through CJPOTF approved and generated news and information

d. Attribution: WHITE
e. Status: In research now - working with CJPOTF Distro

6. Recruit & Convalescent Entertainment/Messaging
   a. Requirement: Develop and implement a system to entertain, educate and influence soldiers in barracks and in hospital, in the hours after training or treatment.
   b. Method: Install closed-circuit TV monitors with central programming to show pre-approved and programmed shows, serials, movies and PSA's
   c. Primary Audience: ANSF Recruits and Sick/Wounded
      i. Desired Effect #1: Entertain soldiers/police to keep them from being bored
      ii. Desired Effect #2: Influence soldiers/police to develop good ethics and values in order to support GIRoA and their parent services
   d. Attribution: GREY (the programming should look and feel Afghan, and should be produced by Afghans wherever possible)
   e. Status: Pilot program under development at KMTC w/2-22 conducting study for numbers of TV's and logistical requirements etc…

NOTE: This project is meant to be used in conjunction with - and capitalize on - the Closed Circuit Video Messaging Loop

7. Closed-Circuit Video Messaging Loop
   a. Requirement: Develop and implement a system to entertain, educate and influence soldiers in barracks and in hospital, in the hours after training or treatment.
   b. Method: Develop programming to show pre-approved and programmed shows, serials, movies and PSA's
   c. Primary Audience: ANSF Recruits and Sick/Wounded
      i. Desired Effect #1: Entertain soldiers/police to keep them from being bored
      ii. Desired Effect #2: Influence soldiers/police to develop good ethics and values in order to support GIRoA and their parent services
   d. Attribution: GREY (the programming should look and feel Afghan, and should be produced by Afghans wherever possible)
   e. Status: Contractor has submitted proposal outlining costs and options. Looking for funding/sponsor now.

8. Live Entertainment Plays for Recruits
   a. Requirement: Develop and implement a system to entertain, educate and influence soldiers in barracks after training.

b. Method: Invite local acting troupes, specializing in social education and support to civil society, to present live "morality plays" to soldiers at KMTC and CTC on a regular basis.
c. Primary Audience: ANSF Recruits
   i. Desired Effect #1: Entertain soldiers/police to keep them from being bored
   ii. Desired Effect #2: Influence soldiers/police to develop good ethics and values in order to support GIRoA and their parent services
d. Attribution: GREY (the programming would be wholly produced and acted by Afghans - paid for by NTM-A/CSTC-A budget)
e. Status: Located a local NGO (Fanayee Group) capable of doing this. Looking for funding/sponsor now.

This list is current as of the date of publication. Decisions of funding, operational timings and a variety of other factors change the priorities and possibilities almost daily.

As new requirements arise, we will add to this list.

POC for this memo is LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Cell: (b)(2)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC, MI, USA
Chief, IO FST

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 2

IO FST pre-mob and travel to Eggars

8 Jan 2010

1. Front load as much as possible prior to Mob. Legal (power of attorney and will), medical (PHA and hearing test), dental (with X-rays), online courses/certs: SERE, OPSEC, Suicide prevention, all here: **https://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/misc/whats_hot/index.htm**
2. Attend relevant schools prior to Mob, Mirror Image, NATO IO, etc.
3. Spin up on Strategic Communications. Instructor certification is currently relevant. PAO skills needed. KLE and Affects Assessments. KNOW planning processes.
4. Ensure someone on the team is a Microsoft guru – Power Point (sigh), Excel, Word, etc.
5. Ensure all are current with IA training; if it is going to expire soon - recert.
6. Ensure NCOER's/OER's, 4100's, DD214's, DD93's are updated prior to Mob.
7. **Study Dari** – Rosetta Stone.
8. **Study Kabul maps**. I'll try to send a couple back.
9. Immerse in current events relative to Afghanistan, both events in Afghanistan and Coalition Nations news related to Afghanistan – BBC international news is a good source. Pay particular attention to support oriented news such as troop commitments and opinions on US Policy.
10. It's a great convenience to mail gear ahead from the Mob station to alleviate hassle and the chance of losing gear enroute. Upon arrival in Kuwait there is a massive duffel bag scramble and you could lose gear you have to turn in later (and you *will* lose your temper during the scramble). Mark bags to be clearly ID'd prior to leaving (paint bottoms bright yellow and stencil names, tape locks with fluorescent tape). Bring civilian attire. Do not bring the contractor uniform (5-11's and cargo pants are a no-go) and don't wear stuff with logos and name brands. And please don't wear all black, ninjas are frowned upon here. Bring cold weather attire and have warm weather mailed later – you *will* lose weight and what fits now will not fit later when it's warmer. Civilian holster and mag holders are a good idea (look at Cross Breed Holsters – inside the pants kydex). Bring a personal GPS – you can download maps for Afghanistan from Geo-Spatial upon arrival for free. Bring a decent camera. Bring meds – Benadryl is hard to get – you *will* get sick. Have luxury/comfort items mailed ahead from home (we'll receive it for you if it beats you here – 2-3 weeks average). Mattress covers (foam) are *great*; the mattresses here will kill you. Sheets and blankets, coffee and makers, all can be mailed from home. You can get a local phone and sim here and you will be issued a phone for work. Bring good PT shoes.
11. Do a lot of cardio as the altitude here is a bitch. Not elliptical machines and bikes – run.
12. Ensure you check out your weapons for functionality prior to departing Mabry (ours were slightly chewed up, especially the front sight posts). Rails and Aimpoints/ACOG's are a great idea (make sure you have batts for them). You can

Zero upon arrival. We have a good range deal going. Bring extra mags as they are hard to get and you won't be issued any later (both M4 and M9). Look for a good sling, Blackhawk Mamba is a decent choice.

13. Concealed body armor with esapi plates will be a great help; I'm still trying to get them on this end.
14. Motorola XTS 5000's will help (or iridium sat phones) if you can get them.
15. There will be a good battle hand-off for processes, routes, POC's, maybe even billets (ours rocks) upon arrival. Focus on getting here and be flexible on mission related events as they morph constantly.
16. When flying to Kuwait, travel light if possible; you will need IBA, helmet, NBC gear, weapons, and bring snivel in an assault pack. Keep the team together.
17. Upon arrival in Kuwait, send your highest ranking with ID cards to check in and grab billets for the team *immediately*. The rest of the team can grab gear off the trucks. After all have swiped in, start lobbying for a flight to BAF. This should be your priority.
18. Upon arrival at BAF, same plan. Use the rankers to seek transport to Eggars and the team can recover gear and sit on it while waiting (no hurry, it will be a while). Try not to leave the area, just hang tight and wait for a flight to KAIA or a MRAP convoy to Eggars. Keep in contact with us and we'll help to expedite.
19. Ensure you have orders and DD93 *in hand* upon arrival at Eggars.

GMIC Graduation . PD. EXHIBIT E
ATTACHMENT 20

ANSF Strategic Communications Teams Start Building Relationships and Bridging Gaps

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) *and MAJ* (b)(3), (b)(6) *at the Afghan Government Media Information Center, with the new Strategic Communications Teams from the Afghan Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of the Interior*

8 April 2010, Kabul, Afghanistan

Today marked the beginning of a new capability for the Afghan National Security Forces as eight students graduated from the first phase of *Strategic Communications* training, ready to begin working on a variety of projects for the Ministries of the Interior and Defense.

NTM-A/CSTC-A's Information Operations Field Support Team (IO FST) began training a class of Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) Planning and Effects Specialists for the MoI and MoD on Saturday 3 April, 2010. The classroom portion lasted one week, and consisted of a variety of Media, Planning, Problem Solving, Ethics and Legal courses jointly taught by GMIC staff and NTM-A/CSTC-A trainers.

Much of the course was also attended by Afghan journalists, primarily Pashto speakers from the southern parts of the country. This addition was a great benefit to both the participating journalists and the government STRATCOM people. The collective training allowed both parties to share views, mix socially, and gain a level of trust and respect that would not have been otherwise possible in separate training sessions.



LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) *teaching a class on STRATCOM Problem Solving methodology to a mixed class of Strategic Communicators from the MoD and MoI.*

This initial week-long training period will be followed by a hands-on portion, during which LTC Holmes' team will partner with their Afghan Counterparts and work with them in support of current ANSF operations. In this way, the ANSF STRATCOM Teams will not only receive the intellectual components of their task in the classroom, but also receive the benefit of an "over-the-shoulder" advisor once they return to their ministries.

Additional 2-3 day sub-courses will be taught periodically over the next several months on Problem Solving & Identification, Effects Assessments, Measures of Performance & Measures of Effectiveness and Messaging. This will allow the ANSF STRATCOM Teams to continue actively working on their projects and other ministry business without spending too much time away from the workplace.



Cross-cultural instruction and small-group facilitating techniques were crucial to the success of this program as it allowed for the time required to translate each class and conversation from English to Dari without losing the pace of the class. Students engaged in Socratic Method question and answer sessions designed to draw out their experiences and thoughts, while still working within a structured learning environment.

Scheduled projects for the ANSF STRATCOM Teams include:
- ANCOP Mission and Recruiting/Retention Support - Comic Books, Literacy Support, Heroes Welcomes, etc...
- Portable Theater Systems and Message Programming for ongoing combat operations
- ANA History Book for Recruits
- Community Outreach and Support Programs

The culminating exercise of this program will be the planning and execution for the Parliamentary Election Campaign in September, 2010.

CJ5 SCAT Command

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ANSF STRATCOM Advisory Team

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6), (c) Chief Information Operations FST
71st Theater Information Operations Group
Texas Army National Guard

Mission Statement:

Develop and Implement a STRATCOM Training and Advisory plan by 25 MAR 2010 (SY Start) in order to provide STRATCOM capacity to ANSF. On order, conduct Information Operations Assessment and Effects in support of NTM-A/CSCT-A Mission

EXHIBIT E
ATTACHMENT 21

ANSF STRATCOM Advisory Team

Composition:

5 x IO Qualified Soldiers

- LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) (MA Diplomacy&Int'l Terrorism/Military Instructor/Intelligence/Planner)
- MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) (Lean Six Sigma Blackbelt/Instructor/Planner)
- MSG (b)(3), (b)(6) (Computer Network Operations/Information Assurance/OPSEC)
- SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) (Mission Planner/Military Instructor)
- SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) (OPSEC/Force Protection)

Team Strengths:

- Instruction
- International Relations
- Coalition Experience
- Counterterrorism/Counterinsurgency
- Information Effects Planning
- OPSEC Planning
- Computer Network Operations

ANSF STRATCOM Advisory Team

Be Prepared To:

- Provide NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Information Engagements as directed by CoS
- Conduct KLE with key ANSF ministry officials as required to accomplish training mission

Key Tasks:

- Embed within ANSF ministry structures to become a part of *their* team
- Provide STRATCOM tools the ANSF *need*, vice what we think they do
- Focus on COIN – *getting inside the insurgent OODA*
- *Be invisible, be nothing, be no one* from outside the ANSF

ANSF STRATCOM Advisory Team

Current Projects (other than DV and CODEL Support):

(b)(3), (b)(6)

- Restive ANSF recruits w/COL
- ONSC STRATCOM Team Stand-Up
- Tashkil fill for Students in new SY
- History for ANA (under contract now – also a Literacy Support program for MoD)
- Literacy Support for MoI (Hoopoe Books)
- Portable Movie Screens for Messaging in Remote Areas
- ANSF Radio Network
- Ammonium Nitrate Ban Support
- Recruiting Ad Campaign wargaming
- Joint Planning Group
- MoI/MoD/GMIC embedding and socializing
- POI/Apprenticeship Program Development

Other bits for SA:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

- 71st TIOG Commander *is* IJC IO Chief (COL)
- Year-long tour – depart o/a 13 NOV 2010

Subject: **FW: train-up input (UNCLASSIFIED)**
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) TC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>
Cc (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil

Date: 06/25/10 19:47
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 22

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

As you can see - this was written back in January, but most of it still applies.

I highly recommend your team going - as a team - to the Mirror Image course. THE BEST training we had. Seriously.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
Sent: Sunday, January 10, 2010 11:01 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: RE: train up input (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

(b)(3), (b)(6) We are putting together a consolidated recommendation, but there are a few things up front that you should probably consider:

1. Go NCO heavy. For the work we are doing here at NTM-A/CSTC-A, two officers can cover most of the major things, but the NCO's have been MOST helpful. I recommend a 2:3 ratio. ALSO Captains here are a dime a dozen. Unless you have an outstanding personality, an E-7 will get far more respect, and far more done.

2. NATO IO Course at Oberammergau. This is a NATO show, if you don't speak NATO, you are already behind. Send at least two people, if not ALL.

3. Mirror Image. Still THE best training we have had. Period.

4. Dari. Everyone should know the basics, just to be able to get around, and to make that entry with the COL's and GEN's they will be dealing with at MoD and MoI. Tell (b)(3), (b)(6) get off his ass and order the Dari Rosetta Stone programs I asked him to get before I left . . . and don't even think that you will have time to do it once you get here. Seriously wished I had been more serious about it a year ago.

5. DoD Instructors Course. It just so happens that I lucked out and have three instructors on my team. This is a teaching mission, you will need the skills and the creds. Start shopping for somewhere that can give you the course (I think it is two weeks now). Most TRADOC installations run one.

6. Civilian Clothes. We are getting FEC's to work at the Media Center . . . but don't get crazy and don't have everyone showing up in 5-11's and sunglasses looking like Xe shooters. We are meant to look like the press, not mercs: Kakhi's, brown shoes, blue blazers, oxford shirts . . . Look like something from the Int'l Press Pool, not a wannabe SOF weenie.

7. Woman. Put one on the team. Seriously. I cannot tell you how useful their natural skillsets are for THIS type of mission. Get someone senior, and someone who can mix with people at the Embassy and Ministerial level - and someone who will keep their head about them when

the stress rises. Best conscious decision I made.

8. Reading. Everyone talks about it, no one does it. Start reading now. Even the tiniest knowledge of Afghan history amazes them and makes for great conversation - and even LESS knowledge makes your smarter than almost any other American around. If you don't know the names, Zahir Shah, Daoud Khan, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal, Mohammed Najibullah, Amanullah or anything about the Saur Revolution, then you are reading the wrong books. We will guide you to the right ones . . . and we will guide you to the ones that are actually interesting to read and won't bore you to death. Reading list to follow in the upcoming week (along with citations, etc... so that you can find them.

9. Cultural Training. See what is out there that is specific to Afghanistan. Don't stress over the tribal stuff (your targets here are not so much tribal, and you will never get it all anyway) but DO know the differences between ethnicities and how they acted over the past 200 years or so. If you don't know the political and cultural differences between Tajik, Pashtun, Hazara and Uzbek . . . and if you think that Kuchi is a slightly naughty word . . . then you need some work in this area.

10. Start now! The bureaucracy is so damned slow that to get anything done, you will need to work it now!

There is apparently some rumor or impression that we are leaving here after only 9 months. Bollocks! No one here is saying that, and nowhere on my orders does it say this. We are expected to be here for the full 365, and our orders say Not To Exceed 400, which gives us the time to downspin afterwards. Let me know if there is something more than rumor and innuendo that counters this please.

All for now, more coming!

Oh and one more thing. WE NEED OSIS ACCOUNTS! And so will your team.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC (OF-4), USA
ANSF SCAT Chief
CJ5, NTM-A/CSTC-A
(b)(2)

"DOCTRINE: It's easier than thinking . . ."

Original planned Replacements from Texas ARNG TIOG

Became USAR (b)(3), (b)(6); then

Swapped w/ (b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) [mailto:] (b)(3), (b)(6) [jiowc.osis.gov]
Sent: Saturday, January 09, 2010 11:28 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) @mail.us.army.mil
Subject: train-up input

Need to get some specifics on recommended changes to the train-up - looking like a July/Aug mob date to get through the Ft. Dix stuff and get you out in time.

SIPR is good - just don't have it here at drill. Any changes/recommendations from your stuff will be good. I got your note on the debrief course.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC, AV

JIOWC JOSC

S3, 71st TIOG

(b)(3), (b)(6) jiowc.smil.mil
<blocked mailto:> (b)(3), (b)(6) [jiowc.dci.smil.mil]>

(b)(3), (b)(6) jiowc.ic.gov <blocked mailto:> (b)(3), (b)(6) [jiowc.ic.gov]>

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Subject: **FW: lessons learned (UNCLASSIFIED)**
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>
@us.army.mil

Date: 06/25/10 19:51
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" < (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

IO FST.doc (36kB)

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 3

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Here is something else we came up with at about the same time. Still mostly valid.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) SFC US ARMY CSTC-A CJ5
Sent: Saturday, January 09, 2010 10:53 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5; (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTMA/CSTC-A CJ5; (b)(3), (b)(6) MSG MIL USA NTMA/CSTC-A CJ5; (b)(3), (b)(6) SGT MIL USA NTMA/CSTC-A CJ5
Subject: lessons learned (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

K, this is what I came up with. They can email me if they have questions.....

SFC (b)(3), (b)(6)
CSTC-A, CJ-5, SCAT
cell (b)(2)
office (b)(2)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

IO FST pre-mob and travel to Eggars 8 Jan 2010

1. Front load as much as possible prior to Mob. Legal (power of attorney and will), medical (PHA and hearing test), SGLI, 2 sets ID Tags (can be gotten at Mabry ID section), dental (with X-rays), online courses/certs: SERE, OPSEC, Suicide prevention, all here (signed off by O6): **https://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/**
2. **Bring copies of everything, both hard and digital.**
3. Army Warrior training tasks (signed off by O6)
4. Range qualifications within last 90 days (M4 & M9)
5. Bring 15 copies of orders – and you *will* actually need them all. You hand off a copy at *every* station!
6. Attend relevant schools prior to Mob, Mirror Image, NATO IO, JIOPC, etc.
7. Spin up on Strategic Communications. Instructor certification is currently relevant. PAO skills needed. KLE and Affects Assessments. KNOW planning processes.
8. Ensure someone on the team is a Microsoft guru – Power Point (sigh), Excel, Word, etc.
9. Ensure all are current with IA training; if it is going to expire soon - recert.
10. Ensure NCOER's/OER's, 4100's, DD214's, DD93's are updated prior to Mob.
11. **Study Dari** – Rosetta Stone.
12. **Study Kabul maps**. I'll try to send a couple back.
13. Immerse in current events relative to Afghanistan, both events that occur in Afghanistan and Coalition Nations news related to Afghanistan – BBC international news is a good source. Pay particular attention to support oriented news such as troop commitments and opinions on US Policy.
14. It's a great convenience to mail gear ahead from the Mob station to alleviate hassle and the chance of losing gear enroute. Upon arrival in Kuwait there is a massive duffel bag scramble and you could lose gear you have to turn in later (and you *will* lose your temper during the scramble). Mark bags to be clearly identified prior to leaving (paint duffel bottoms bright yellow and stencil names, tape locks with fluorescent tape). Bring civilian attire. Do not bring the contractor uniform (5-11's or *any* cargo pants are a no-go.) and don't wear stuff with logos and name brands if you can help it. And please don't wear all black, ninjas are frowned upon here. Bring cold weather attire and have warm weather attire mailed later – you *will* lose weight and what fits now will not fit later when it's warmer. A civilian holster and magazine holders are a good idea (look at Cross Breed Holsters – inside the pants kydex). Bring a personal GPS – you can download maps for Afghanistan from Geo-Spatial upon arrival for free. I'm working on Vehicular GPS's on this end. Bring a decent camera. Bring any meds you normally would take during cold/sinus/flu season– Benadryl is hard to get here – you *will* get sick. Have luxury/comfort items mailed ahead from home (we'll receive it for you if it beats you here; 2-3 weeks average). Mattress covers (memory foam- $40.00 at Target) are *great*; the mattresses here will *kill* you. Sheets and blankets, coffee and makers, all can be mailed from home. You can get a local phone and a sim card here (total will be around $100.00) and you will be issued a phone for work. Bring good PT shoes. Bring Civilian hiking boots/shoes. Bring your combat boots; they are only issuing extreme cold-weather and mountain boots. You'll need a *ton* of name tapes/US Army tapes.
15. Do a lot of cardio as the altitude here is a bitch. Not elliptical machines and bikes – ***run***.
16. Ensure you check out your weapons for functionality prior to departing Camp Mabry (ours were slightly chewed up, especially the front sight posts). Rails and Aim-points/ACOG's are

a great idea (make sure you have batteries for them). You can Zero upon arrival. We have a good range deal going. Bring extra magazines as they are hard to get and you won't be issued any later (both M4 and M9). Look for a good sling, Blackhawk Mamba is a decent choice ($40.00).

17. Concealed body armor with esapi plates will be a great help; I'm still trying to get them on this end. A good drop-rig is a must; they don't issue one. Belt holsters are another option. Blackhawk serpa holsters work well and offer changeable platforms for drop-rig, belt and IBA (helpful in vehicles). Shoulder holsters can be bought locally for $20.00.
18. Motorola XTS 5000's (or 3000's – better range) will help (or iridium sat phones) if you can get them. Bring batteries and chargers if you get them (lithium, not ni-cad)
19. There will be a good detailed battle hand-off for processes, SOP's, routes, locations, supply points, POC's, maybe even billets (ours rocks) upon arrival. Focus on *getting* here and be flexible on the mission related events as they morph constantly.
20. When flying into Kuwait, travel as light as possible; you will need to wear IBA, helmet, weapons, and bring snivel in an assault pack. Bring a change of uniform and your NBC gear in the duffel as well as your sleeping bag for the transient tents.
21. ***Keep the team together***.
22. Upon arrival in Kuwait, send your highest ranking with ID cards to check in and grab billets for the team ***immediately***. The rest of the team can grab the gear off the trucks (it will be a while). After all have swiped in, start lobbying for a flight to BAF. This should be your priority. Average is a two to three day layover (ours was 20 hours) so enjoy Pizza Hut and Burger King.
23. ***Keep the team together***. (This is not a typo – its reiteration!)
24. Upon arrival at BAF use the same plan. Use the rankers to seek transport to Eggars and the team can recover gear and sit on it while waiting (no hurry, it will be a while). Try not to leave the area, just hang tight and wait for a flight to KAIA or a MRAP convoy to Eggars. Keep in contact with us and we'll help to expedite.
25. Ensure you have orders *and* DD93 ***in hand*** upon arrival at Eggars. Good luck!

SFC (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
(b)(3), (b)(6) @yahoo.com

Subject: Info Engagement Memorandum (UNCLASSIFIED)
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6)@us.army.mil>
(b)(3), (b)(6) us.army.mil
Cc (b)(3), (b)(6) COL TXARNG (b)(3), (b)(6)@us.army.mil>

Date: 06/24/10 12:38
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" <(b)(3), (b)(6)@afghan.swa.army.mil>

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 4

Info Engagement Memorandum.doc (152kB)

<<Info Engagement Memorandum.doc>> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Gentlemen;

I presume my earlier communications might have taken you both aback some. Not surprising.

Attached is an official representation backing up my earlier claims. This command does not do Information Operations - at least they don't know they do.

I cannot be more plain, you will be landing in a "hot LZ" - so if you are indeed coming, be prepared. Frankly, if I were you, I would take the attached memo back up your chain and beg off of this mission fast.

Here is my experience in a nutshell: From January to March, I was pressured to provide analysis, assessments, themes and messages targeted at the DV's, Leaders and population of the United States and our coalition partners. On 22 March, I received a written order by email to do just that. I took the order to JAG for review, and they determined it to be illegal - although later the order was "clarified" to take out the strictly illegal parts. Within 3 weeks, the command launched a 15-6 against me, and after a flawed and one-sided process that did not even look at exculpatory evidence or ask for our testimony, issued both me and my team deputy with GOMOR's. I currently have an IG "whistle-blower" complaint lodged with the IG - but the process has been horrifically draining, and has permanently damaged the projects and relationships I had going.

So - forewarned is forearmed. Given the attached, you might have the ammunition to show that the need for an IO FST is now made redundant. They don't do IO, so therefore, they don't need an IO FST. There are plenty of other commands and activities here that need your help - so please do not feel like it is this deployment or nothing!

I will do everything I can to help you in any way - to include being completely truthful with you.

But if I were you, I would run away from this one. Fast.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC (OF-4), US Army
Chief, IO FST Support to ANSF (Or whatever the hell they want us to call ourselves now!)
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A

"Shohna-ba-Shohna" Shoulder to Shoulder

Check out our website at: http://www.ntm-a.com

VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)
Cell: (b)(2)

SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
ISAF: ISAF NTM A CSTC-A CJ 5 ISC

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTM-A/CSTC-A-CoS

15 June 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR Staff Directors, NTM-A/CSTC-A, APO AE 09356

SUBJECT: Information Engagement Activities

1. Effective immediately, the engagement in information operations by personnel assigned or attached to NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan is strictly prohibited. Any currently operating information operations cells, working groups, or sections are to be immediately discontinued and all information operations activities immediately ceased. Beginning immediately, engagement in information operations activities will require my express written consent.

2. For the purposes of this memorandum, information operations activities are defined in accordance with the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02) as follows: "The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own."

3. Any existing Information Operations cell, working group, or section will be immediately restructured as an Information Engagement cell. This cell will engage in activities for the sole purpose of informing and educating U.S., Afghan, and international audiences regarding the building, sustaining, and equipping of the Afghan National Security Forces, current conditions in Afghanistan, and other topics related to the missions of NTM-A and CSTC-A as directed by the undersigned.

4. Any request to conduct information operations activities will be in writing and forwarded through the chain of command to me for written approval. Requests will include data on the activities to be conducted, the NTM-A and CSTC-A personnel to be involved, and the expected impact on the missions of NTM-A and CSTC-A.

5. Personnel with any questions regarding this matter are to address them through their supervisory chain of command to the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
COL, USA
Chief of Staff

CF:
Commander
Deputy Commanders

Subject: RE: clothing/uniforms? (UNCLASSIFIED)
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) TC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>
Date: 06/27/10 12:20
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
Blackwater Fever.doc (28kB) — not Include

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 5

(b)(3), (b)(6)

We THOUGHT that we would be in civvies about half the time as well. NOT the case. You will need a set, but don't overdo it.

You should bring along a set or two - A sport coat, a couple of nice shirts, some dockers and/or nice jeans. Don't bring nice shoes - Kabul streets are shit (literally). The best I have found are Blundstone boots - because they look dressy enough, are rugged, and you can slip them on and off easily to get inside places where they don't want you to wear shoes.

As for holsters (and yes EVERYONE should bring pistols!) we have found that Crossbreed makes about the best inside-the-wasteband holsters out there. Just google them and you can see for yourself. Worth the money! Also, Blackhawk makes a set of mag holders that are pretty easy to conceal under a coat or shirt as well - I will send you a link if you like.

I have attached a humorous send-up of what NOT to wear - but there is a lot of truth in it.

Whenever you want, we can call you on the morale lines or DSN.

I also have a reading list when you are ready. If you all are not starting to read up now, you will truly be in the dark.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC (OF 4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

-- Original Message --
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
[mailto:peter.a.brown@us.army.mil]
Sent: Saturday, June 26, 2010 6:20 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
Subject: clothing/uniforms?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

We were hearing that we'll spend about half of our duty time in civis (dockers) due to the assignment.

Does that make sense on yuor end? It wasn't making sense to me.

By the way, my boss (LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) forwarded the letter and other info to our Group CDR, COL (b)(3), (b)(6) aka Mr (b)(3), (b)(6) teaches FA 30 resident).

We'll see if there is a change for us.... I'm not expecting that to occur, but we'll see.

FYI.. I'm on the road a few days, so if I don't hget back to you, that is why.

I will be trying to check emails each day though.

THanks for all the info thus far.. I'm still reading it.. some similar to my trip through Kuwait in 2006/2007, some also similiar to my travles

through MNSTC-I (ref MoD, MoI, etc.: same types of structure).

THANKS :

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Subject: **RE: RE: clothing/uniforms? (UNCLASSIFIED)**
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) TC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>
Date: 06/27/10 16:02
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 6

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Do everything you can to get pistols for every member of your team. You will only need 2-3 rifles - and Autoweapons (SAW's, etc...) are useless for this mission. No point in wearing civvies if you are strapping an M4 on - it ruins the effect. Pointless, really.

Below is the reading list I recommend - it is listed in order of priority. If you read nothing else, then at least read "The Great Game", and then the "Great Gamble". Both are fun reading, and they move quickly.

The Great Game (Peter Hopkirk)
The Great Gamble (Greg Feiffer)
Taliban (Ahmed Rashid)
My Life with the Taliban (Abdul Salaam Zaeef)
Through Our Enemies Eyes (Mike Scheuer)
Imperial Hubris (Mike Scheuer)
Descent Into Chaos (Ahmed Rashid)
Eastern Approaches (Fitzroy MacLean. Just for fun, but damned good reading!)
Seven Pillars of Wisdom (T.E. Lawrence. NOT about Afghanistan, but ALL about advising and working cross culturally!)
In the Graveyard of Empires (Seth Jones - CAREFUL! This one is a bit boring!)

If anywhere along the way, you want a literary dessert or palate cleanser, then try "The Enchantress of Florence" by Salman Rushdie. It is one of my favorites - an historical novel, set in this part of the world.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

---Original Message---
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
[mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Sunday, June 27, 2010 3:50 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
Subject: Re: RE: clothing/uniforms? (UNCLASSIFIED)

I'll take the reading list too... I've done some reading, but am behind... been swamped with FA 30 until last April.

We have some new folks on the team as well.

Interesting attachment... we had something like that in Traq... some things never change... we had a convoy support cell in our unit at MNSTC-I... they ran secuirity for vehicles transitting the country... they ran into Blackwater all the time and would definitely agree.

Not sure yet what firearms we are getting... not quite sure pistols are on the list, but will check. I preferred having both when I was in Traq... you never know...

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

- Original Message -
From: " (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5"
< (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
Date: Sunday, June 27, 2010 3:50
Subject: RE: clothing/uniforms? (UNCLASSIFIED)

To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>

> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
(b)(3), (b)(6)
>
> We THOUGHT that we would be in civvies about half the time as well
> - NOT
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> shirts, some dockers and/or nice jeans. Don't bring nice shoes Kabul

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> boots- because they look dressy enough, are rugged, and you can slip
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> Also, Blackhawk makes a set of mag holders that are pretty easy to
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> starting to read up now, you will truly be in the dark.
>
(b)(3), (b)(6)
> LTC (OF 4), USA
> IO FST Chief
> Strategic Communications
> NTM A/CSTC A
> Roshan: (b)(2)
> VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)
>
> Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com
>
>
> -----Original Message----
> From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
> [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted]
> Sent: Saturday, June 26, 2010 6:20 PM
> To: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
> Subject: clothing/uniforms?
>
(b)(3), (b)(6)
>
> We were hearing that we'll spend about half of our duty time in civis
> (dockers) due to the assignment.
>
> Does that make sense on yuor end? It wasn't making sense to me.
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> other info to our Group CDR, COL DeWitt (aka M(b)(3), (b)(6) teaches FA
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>
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> occur, but we'll see.
>
> FYI.. I'm on the road a few days, so if I don't hget back to you, that

> is why.
>

> I will be trying to check emails each day though.
>
> THanks for all the info thus far.. I'm still reading it.. some similar

> to my trip through Kuwait in 2006/2007, some also similiar to my
> travlesthrough MNSTC-I (ref MoD, MoI, etc., same types of structure).
>
> THANKS !
>
> LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
>
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Subject: **Other Points (UNCLASSIFIED)**
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) us.army.mil>
Date: 06/27/10 16:28
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) JSA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 7

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Some other thoughts came to mind as I hit send on the last message.

As for team composition - 2-3 NCO's would be VERY helpful - you will need them for driving around and just getting stuff done. IF you only bring one, you will wish you had more.

Health. Kabul sits at 6,000 ft of elevation. If you have never been at altitude for a length of time, this is no joke. Unless you live in Denver or Colorado Springs, it is going to take you several weeks to adjust to the lack of oxygen. Aerobic fitness will help you immensely, but you will still have an adjustment period.

Additionally, and compounding this is another fact - Kabul is the most polluted capitol city in the world. You have no idea how bad the air here is until you get here.

So - no oxygen, and what air you do get is full of shit (seriously - I mean actual poop particles).

For this reason, I would NOT bring a smoker or someone who is just not fit. I brought a smoker, and he has not been well the entire time we have been here. His lungs and overall conditioning just are not up to living here.

I am not a fitness freak or anything, but in the next 100 days or so your people are not running around getting their aerobic fitness levels up, you are not going to have a good time for the first several months take it from us.

Language. Dari, Dari, Dari, Dari. Do the Rosetta Stone now, because you won't have the bandwidth to do it here. If they still don't have Dari on Rosetta Stone, then do the Farsi - it is close enough (like British English and American English). Don't waste your time with Pashto - all the Pashto speakers you will find on this mission already speak Dari - and Dari is MUCH easier to learn. If you can get your unit to do it, have them buy you Rosetta Stone Dari Disks. The DLI disks are not worth much, unless you want phrases like "Open your doors!" and "I wont shoot"

Baggage. If you mob through Benning, they will not let you bring anything with wheels on it - Duffel Bags and Kit bags are pretty much all Benning allows on the planes. Stupid, but there it is. I would pre ship everything you think you want, and travel light through the Mob station. Once you get closer, I will give you a good POC to receive anything you want to ship.

Field Gear. You really don't need much. You will not be sleeping in the field. You will not be running around the hills with troops. You MAY do a couple of overnighters away at distant FOB's. A day pack is all you will need for that. Benning will issue you everything else you might need. If you show up at MOB looking like you are ready to invade Iran, you will be toting all that crap around behind you for a while, and you will wish you had not.

Quarters. EXTREMELY Tight! Do NOT expect to have your own room - in fact, unless you are a field grade, you can expect to have a couple of roommates in a can. Very tight, indeed. I have a roommate - that is just life here at Eggers - so again, travel light, because there is not a lot of space to store things. The same goes for office space too. Don't bring a lot of comfort stuff for the office, because you won't have any place to put it.

Voltage and Adapters. Afghanistan is on 220 like Europe, and they use the two-prong British style plugs. I would not bother buying a bunch of electronic kit to bring with you - AAFES is pretty well stocked.

Internet. Other than what you have in the office, Internet costs $100 a month. Not free on Eggers. And it sucks. Don't promise to do a lot of Skyping back to home, unless you want to pay those fees. Most of us

have decided it isn't worth it.

Phones: You can buy local phones and cards here on post for about $100.

PT: Like everything else, the gyms here (there are two) are crowded, but you can find times when it is better. Eggers is only about 4 square blocks big - you CAN run outside around camp, but you have to really want to. Most running is really done on treadmills . . . and there is a lot of time for PT if you want to. Four of us have become PT demons - the smoker has not. Go figure.

This is a quirky place. If you are expecting Iraq, you will be disappointed. The food is pretty bad - not up to Iraq standards at all and the supply lines are on again/off again. You can get almost anything you want through the mail - which comes reasonably quickly - but it may take weeks for the right razor blades to appear at the PX. SO if you have specific things you don't want to run out of, then you might want to pre-ship them to yourselves, or bring them with.

Okay - probably all you can stand for now.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted]
Sent: Sunday, June 27, 2010 3:50 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
Subject: Re: RE: clothing/uniforms? (UNCLASSIFIED)

I'll take the reading list too... I've done some reading, but am behind... been swamped with FA 30 until last April.

We have some new folks on the team as well.

Interesting attachment.. we had something like that in Iraq... some things never change.... we had a convoy support cell in our unit at MNSTC-I... they ran secuirity for vehicles transitting the country.. they ran into Blackwater all the time and would definitely agree.

Not sure yet what firearms we are getting... not quite sure pistols are on the list, but will check. I preferred having both when I was in Iraq... you never know...

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----
From: " (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5"
< (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
Date: Sunday, June 27, 2010 3:50
Subject: RE: clothing/uniforms? (UNCLASSIFIED)
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" <peter.t.brown@us.army.mil>

> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: FOUO
>
(b)(3), (b)(6)
>
> We THOUGHT that we would be in civvies about half the time as well
> - NOT
> the case. You will need a set, but don't overdo it.

>
> You should bring along a set or two - A sport coat, a couple of nice
> shirts, some dockers and/or nice jeans. Don't bring nice shoes Kabul

> streets are shit (literally). The best I have found are Blundstone
> boots because they look dressy enough, are rugged, and you can slip
> them on and off easily to get inside places where they don't want you
> to wear shoes.
>
> As for holsters (and yes EVERYONE should bring pistols:) we have found

> that Crossbreed makes about the best inside the-waistband holsters out

> there. Just google them and you can see for yourself. Worth the money!
> Also, Blackhawk makes a set of mag holders that are pretty easy to
> conceal under a coat or shirt as well - I will send you a link if you
> like.
>
> I have attached a humorous send-up of what NOT to wear - but there is
> a lot of truth in it.
>
> Whenever you want, we can call you on the morale lines or DSN.
>
> I also have a reading list when you are ready. If you all are not
> starting to read up now, you will truly be in the dark.
>
> (b)(3), (b)(6)
> LTC (OF 4), USA
> IO FST Chief
> Strategic Communications
> NTM-A/CSTC-A
> Roshan: (b)(2)
> VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)
>
> Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com
>
>
> ---- Original Message----
> From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
> [redacted]
> Sent: Saturday, June 26, 2010 6:20 PM
> To: (b)(3), (b)(6) afghan.swa.army.mil>
> Subject: clothing/uniforms?
>
(b)(3), (b)(6)
>
> We were hearing that we'll spend about half of our duty time in civis
> (dockers) due to the assignment.
>
> Does that make sense on yuor end? It wasn't making sense to me.
>
> By the way, my boss (LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) forwarded the letter and
> other info to our Group CDR, COL (b)(3), (b)(6) aka MG (b)(3), (b)(6) teaches FA
> 30 resident).
>
> We'll see if there is a change for us.... I'm not expecting that to
> occur, but we'll see.
>
> FYI.. I'm on the road a few days, so if I don't hget back to you, that

> is why.
>
> I will be trying to check emails each day though.
>
> Thanks for all the info thus far.. I'm still reading it.. some similar

> to my trip through Kuwait in 2006/2007, some also similiar to my
> travlesthrough MNSTC-I (ref MoD, MoI, etc.. same types of structure).
>
> THANKS .
>
> LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

> Caveats: ~~FOUO~~
>
>
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Subject: **RE: Other Points (UNCLASSIFIED)**
To (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>
Date: 06/28/10 09:17
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 8

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

OSIS - Open Source Information System. A secure govt logon to a really cool portal. You really DON'T need it for here now, but it would be nice.

Mirror Image is a contract course - about a week long - that puts you in the mindset of terrorists and insurgents. My whole team went through it for trainup, and it was the most valuable thing we did. Seriously. The only mistake I made was in not doing it all together as a team (we went in two separate groups). It would have been a wonderful bonding experience for us prior to deployment.

Google it - there is even a YouTube video of it. It really is very good.

As for clarity on the mission - we ALL need that. It is developing, so stand by. BOTTOM LINE is that it IS a training mission for the Afghans - you will be teaching the MoI and MoD senior level communicators how to do STRATCOM for their ministries.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm a.com

----- Original Message -----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted]
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2010 8:28 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC A CJ5
Subject: Re: Other Points (UNCLASSIFIED)

very helpful.. I guess I have about -2- months to learn some Dari.... about a year ago they were talking about sending me to Africa or somewhere else, so I was brushing up on my french...

:)

What is an OSIS account?

What is Mirror Image?

I'm back out of town the next few days, but appreciate all the info.

I should have time to delve into all this more after this wednesday... and can re-package it for my team.

Keep it couming though.

We probably DO need more clarity on the current mission, and how the recent changes affect it. There are a couple of ways to read that policy memo since we're not there. I don't see us getting pulled unless something drastic has changed, and even at that, it's unlikely.

On a side note, before this mission, MAJ Sheridan and his team where going to be doing another MSN that fell through, so this one cropped up only around March, and his team was largely expanded since then, from 2 to the current 5 or so.

- I saw your note somewhere about having women on the team.. I don't think we have any now.. can try through, but probably too late.

LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

Original Message -----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5"
(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
Date: Sunday, June 27, 2010 7:58
Subject: Other Points (UNCLASSIFIED)
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>

> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: FOUO
>
> Some other thoughts came to mind as I hit send on the last message.
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> As for team composition - 2-3 NCO's would be VERY helpful - you will
> need them for driving around and just getting stuff done. IF you only
> bring one, you will wish you had more.
>
> Health. Kabul sits at 6,000 ft of elevation. If you have never
> been at
> altitude for a length of time, this is no joke. Unless you live in
> Denver or Colorado Springs, it is going to take you several weeks to
> adjust to the lack of oxygen. Aerobic fitness will help you immensely,
> but you will still have an adjustment period.
>
> Additionally, and compounding this is another fact - Kabul is the most
> polluted capitol city in the world. You have no idea how bad the air
> here is until you get here.
>
> So no oxygen, and what air you do get is full of shit (seriously
> - I
> mean actual poop particles).
>
> For this reason, I would NOT bring a smoker or someone who is just not
> fit. I brought a smoker, and he has not been well the entire time we
> have been here. His lungs and overall conditioning just are not up to
> living here.
>
> I am not a fitness freak or anything, but in the next 100 days or so
> your people are not running around getting their aerobic fitness
> levelsup, you are not going to have a good time for the first
> several months -
> take it from us.
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> Language. Dari, Dari, Dari, Dari. Do the Rosetta Stone now,
> because you
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> the Pashto speakers you will find on this mission already speak
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> and Dari is MUCH easier to learn. If you can get your unit to do it,
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(b)(3), (b)(6)

> LTC (OF-4), USA
> IO FST Chief
> Strategic Communications
> NTM-A/CSTC-A
> Roshan: (b)(2)
> VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)
>
> Check out our website at: http//ntm-a.com
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
> [mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6)
> Sent: Sunday, June 27, 2010 3:50 PM
> To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
> Subject: Re: RE: clothing/uniforms? (UNCLASSIFIED)
>
> I'll take the reading list too... I've done some reading, but am
> behind... been swamped with FA 30 until last April.

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> Interesting attachment.. we had something like that in Iraq... some
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> MNSTC I... they ran secuirity for vehicles transitting the country..
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>
> Not sure yet what firearms we are getting... not quite sure
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> Iraq... you never know...
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> LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
>
> -- Original Message ---
> From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5"
> <
> Date: Sunday, June 27, 2010 3:50
> Subject: RE: clothing/uniforms? (UNCLASSIFIED)
> To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" <
>
>
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: FOUO
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(b)(3), (b)(6)
> >
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> >
> > I also have a reading list when you are ready. If you all are not
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> >
> > (b)(3), (b)(6)
> > LTC (OF-4), USA
> > IO FST Chief
> > Strategic Communications
> > NTM-A/CSTC-A
> > Roshan: (b)(2)
> > VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

> >
> > Check out our website at: http//ntm a.com
> >
> >
> > ---Original Message ---
> > From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC
> > [(b)(3), (b)(6)
> > Sent: Saturday, June 26, 2010 6:20 PM
> > To: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
> > Subject: clothing/uniforms?
> >
> (b)(3), (b)(6)
> >
> > We were hearing that we'll spend about half of our duty time in
civis
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> >
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> > travlesthrough MNSTC-I (ref MoD, MoI, etc.. same types of
structure).
> >
> > THANKS !!
> >
> > LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)
> > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> > Caveats: FOUO
> >
> >
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: FOUO
>
>
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Subject: FW: ANCOP IVR Results (UNCLASSIFIED)
To: (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC- A NTM-A" (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>, (b)(3), (b)(6) CIV CSTC-A PAO" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>, (b)(6) GBR COL CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTMA/CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>, (b)(3), (b)(6) MSG MIL USA NTMA/CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>, (b)(3), (b)(6) SFC US ARMY CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>, (b)(3), (b)(6) SGT MIL USA NTMA/CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil>, (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC RES USAR USARC" (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil>

Date: 06/28/10 12:29
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5" (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan

EXHIBIT E

ATTACHMENT 9

IVR Data ANCOP.xlsx (19kB)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Gentlemen,

These are the same results I shared with Col (b)(6) yesterday. But the commentary from Col (b)(3), (b)(6) the IO TF Commander is new, and worth noting.

THIS is what I get from my collaboration with the IO Task Force.

THIS is why we need to continue working with the IO Task Force to change the perceptions - and dare I say, Influence - the Afghan people to think positively about their ANSF.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
LTC (OF-4), USA
IO FST Chief
Strategic Communications
NTM-A/CSTC-A
Roshan: (b)(2)
VOIP/SVOIP: (b)(2)

Check out our website at: http//ntm a.com

--- Original Message ---
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL USA TF-41
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2010 12:12 PM
To: Brittain, Jonathan R GBR BRIG I&O HQISAF CMD GRP; Smith, Gregory J. USN RADM ISAF; (b)(3), (b)(6) hq.isaf.nato.int;
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) US MAJ US ARMY TF-41; (b)(3), (b)(6) CIV USA DCOS COM Stratcom Planner; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA Mr CTR TF-41 STRAT COM PLANNER; (b)(3), (b)(6) hq.isaf.nato.int; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA LTC USA CSTC-A CJ5
Subject: FW: ANCOP IVR Results (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Admiral and Generals,

As you know, we coordinated with NTM-A to sponsor a concert for the ANCOP who participated in Moshtarak as they returned from block leave. In addition, we filmed it in order to rebroadcast it on commercial television. We did so on 19 June and tied an IVR mechanism to it.

Attached are those IVR results. While not scientific, this is solid feedback on a couple of aspects. First, this is very solid and positive feedback on ANCOP as an institution. Second, we are seeing also an overwhelming positive response to the continued use of music and concerts, the desired effect for Op ESPINA.

IVR use also continues to shine by providing immediate feedback from the target audience. It's easy to do as long as we keep our questions asked in a format that lends itself to a yes/no or short answer.

vr
(b)(3), (b)(6)

--Original Message--
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) US MAJ US ARMY TF 41
Sent: Sunday, June 27, 2010 6:06 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL USA TF-41
Subject: FW: ANCOP IVR Results (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Sir,

Attached is the IVR data for the ANCOP concert.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6)
MAJ, U.S. Army
Operations Officer, TF-41

DSN (b)(2)
SVOIP (b)(2)
(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
@afghan.swa.army.smil.mil

Original Message
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG USA TF 41 JOC
Sent: Sunday, June 27, 2010 5:15 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA SSG USA TF-41 PDD; (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG USA JOC; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA MSG ARMY TF41 S3; (b)(3), (b)(6) UE MAJ US ARMY TF-41
Subject: FW: ANCOP IVR Results (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

FYSA

V/R

SSG (b)(3), (b)(6)
Task Force 41
Current Ops NCOIC
Email: (b)(3), (b)(6)
VOIP:
SVOIP (b)(2)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

ANCOP Concert Episode 1 IVR data: 19JUNE10 - 26JUNE10		Language preference			Would you attend concerts in your area?		
Date	Number of Calls	Dari	Pashtu	N/A	YES	NO	N/A
19-Jun-10	839	458	92	289	315	109	415
20-Jun-10	251	139	38	74	100	42	109
21-Jun-10	53	33	6	14	22	12	19
22-Jun-10	19	12	2	5	8	2	9
23-Jun-10	12	6	6	0	8	2	2
24-Jun-10	8	6	1	1	3	3	2
25-Jun-10	3	2	0	1	1	0	2
Total	1187	656	145	384	457	170	558







Do you listen to music or poetry regularly?			Do you approve of the job the ANCOP are doing?		
YES	NO	N/A	YES	NO	N/A
321	64	454	276	78	485
107	29	115	94	27	130
22	10	21	21	8	24
7	2	10	6	1	12
7	3	2	5	5	2
3	4	1	4	3	1
1	0	2	1	0	2
468	112	586	407	122	656







Recommend a EXHIBIT F
to Initiate. ATTACHMENT 1

COL (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6) COL MIL USA ARMY CSTC-A SJA
Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 2010 6:55 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USARMY CSTC-A SJA; (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTM-A SJA
Subject: FW: Legal Review of Legality of Order from COL (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) re: collection of information on DVs/CODELs (UNCLASSIFIED)

Categories: Investigation

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Based on COL (b)(3), (b)(6) note below we recommend a 15-6 investigation. We have a draft appointment memo ready to go if you concur and provide us the name of an IO. You can appoint an O-6 or an O-5 with a date of rank earlier than 1 August 2008.

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USMC CSTC-A Director
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2010 9:23 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTM-A SJA
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA ARMY CSTC-A SJA; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USARMY CSTC-A SJA; (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP
Subject: Re: Legal Review of Legality of Order from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) re: collection of information on DVs/CODELs (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6) you are just full of good news today.

I think if there are allegations of wrong doing then the best thing to do is an investigation. I do know the LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) are two members of a five person team and do work closely together in their duties. I do know of one case where he did go out in town for a dinner to meet an Info Ops team that was visiting from the Pentagon. This was when he was still working in the CJ5 and was about to chop to my shop. I asked him about the dinner and he told me that the COS, COL (b)(3), (b)(6) had authorized him to go. I haven't heard anything about him drinking alcohol. I think since we have an allegation then we are obligated to look into it.

I hope that's all the good news you have for me.

Let me know if you need anything else!

Semper Fi,
(b)(3), (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTM-A SJA
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USMC CSTC-A Director
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA ARMY CSTC-A SJA; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USARMY CSTC-A SJA
Sent: Tue Mar 30 18:54:29 2010

Subject: RE: Legal Review of Legality of Order from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) re: collection of information on DVs/CODELs (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Sir,

In the course of looking into the issue regarding your order, we got some information suggesting that both LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) may be engaging in an inappropriate relationship, as well as some information that they have gone off post in civilian clothes to restaurants, and they drank alcohol. The nature of the relationship between LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) is that they spend an unusually large amount of time together, just the two of them, which seems to be interfering with their work, and it seems to be having a negative impact on the people they work with. My understanding is that MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) works for LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) So in addition to the issue regarding the order you gave him, we are also dealing with possible violations of AR 600-20 (which prohibits inappropriate relationships, both "actually inappropriate" and "appears to be inappropriate") and GO 1, which prohibits drinking alcohol and wearing civilian clothes w/o GO approval. We have reason to believe LTC Holmes is married, so there may be some other issues too.

Since you are LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) boss, I thought you should know. How would you like to handle this? Would you like to look into this further yourself when you return? Would you like for us to brief COL (b)(3), (b)(6) and ask him to order a commander's inquiry or AR 15-6 investigation?

Please reply ASAP. I've been told you are on leave, and I am very sorry that you have had to deal with these issues during your leave. However, given the information uncovered, and the seriousness of the allegations, this needs to be addressed quickly, and we would like your input.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
MAJ, JA
Chief, Military Justice
NTM-A/CSTC-A
DSN (b)(2)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USMC CSTC-A Director
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2010 12:53 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTM-A SJA
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA ARMY CSTC-A SJA; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USARMY CSTC-A SJA; (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP
Subject: Re: Legal Review of Legality of Order from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) re: collection of information on DVs/CODELs (UNCLASSIFIED)

Categories: Investigation

(b)(3), (b)(6) you are just full of good news today.

I think if there are allegations of wrong doing then the best thing to do is an investigation. I do know the LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) are two members of a five person team and do work closely together in their duties. I do know of one case where he did go out in town for a dinner to meet an Info Ops team that was visiting from the Pentagon. This was when he was still working in the CJ5 and was about to chop to my shop. I asked him about the dinner and he told me that the COS, COL (b)(3), (b)(6) had authorized him to go. I haven't heard anything about him drinking alcohol. I think since we have an allegation then we are obligated to look into it.

I hope that's all the good news you have for me.

Let me know if you need anything else!

Semper Fi,
(b)(3), (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTM-A SJA
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USMC CSTC-A Director
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA ARMY CSTC-A SJA; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USARMY CSTC-A SJA
Sent: Tue Mar 30 18:54:29 2010
Subject: RE: Legal Review of Legality of Order from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) re: collection of information on DVs/CODELs (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Sir,

In the course of looking into the issue regarding your order, we got some information suggesting that both LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) may be engaging in an inappropriate relationship, as well as some information that they have gone off post in civilian clothes to restaurants, and they drank alcohol. The nature of the relationship between LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) is that they spend an unusually large amount of time together, just the two of them, which seems to be interfering with their work, and it seems to be having a negative impact on the people they work with. My understanding is that MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) works for LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) So in addition to the issue regarding the order you gave him, we are also dealing with possible violations of AR 600-20 (which prohibits inappropriate relationships, both "actually inappropriate" and "appears to be inappropriate") and GO 1, which prohibits drinking alcohol and wearing civilian clothes w/o GO approval. We have reason to believe LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) is married, so there may be some other issues too.

Since you are LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) boss, I thought you should know. How would you like to handle this? Would you like to look into this further yourself when you return? Would you like for us to brief COL (b)(3), (b)(6) and ask him to order a commander's inquiry or AR 15-6 investigation?

Please reply ASAP. I've been told you are on leave, and I am very sorry that you have had to deal with these issues during your leave. However, given the information uncovered, and the seriousness of the allegations, this needs to be addressed quickly, and we would like your input.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
MAJ, JA
Chief, Military Justice
NTM-A/CSTC-A
DSN (b)(2)
(b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USMC CSTC-A Director
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2010 4:09 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTM-A SJA; (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ USAF CSTC-A PAO
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA ARMY CSTC-A SJA; (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA CSTC-A/NTM-A
Subject: Re: Legal Review of Legality of Order from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) re: collection of information on DVs/CODELs (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6) LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) works for me. I will direct his duties as required. He is assigned as a STRATCOM team member as directed by the CG. He is not working IO as that function is being done by ISAF. Since we don't do IO in this command his duties have been realigned to where they are required. He is to prep all of the visitor packages for the IEWG.

I plan to make him my Deputy when I get back so I have better oversight of his daily activities. He will move into the office next to mine in the NewsRoom.
That way I can get him to do something.

27 years of service I've never seen such BS!

He needs to get off his butt and do some work. Totally UNSAT!

(b)(3), (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ MIL USA NTM-A SJA
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA COL USMC CSTC-A Director; (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ USAF CSTC-A PAO
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA ARMY CSTC-A SJA
Sent: Tue Mar 30 09:19:29 2010
Subject: FW: Legal Review of Legality of Order from COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) re: collection of information on DVs/CODELs (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Sir and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 5 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Page 5 of 1. 15-6 Initiation is redacted under FOIA exemptions (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

EXHIBIT F

ATTACHMENT 2

(b)(3), (b)(6) **SGT MIL USA USA USARCENT**

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2011 12:36 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL USA Dep COS; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US MAJ ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) US LTC NTM-A CSTC-A SJA
Subject: RE: FW: Request for comment (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WILCO. Have not responded. Will await your direction. Nothing else from Hastings (nor any other hints about this topic) thus far.

Sorry that I didn't cc our astute legal team. Have done so on this note.

Thanks.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Colonel, US Army

Outgoing Chief of Staff
NATO Training Mission -Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
Cell: (b)(2)

"Shohna ba Shohna --Shoulder to Shoulder"

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" (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP" < (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Caveats: ~~FOUO~~ Sir, Definitely do not respond... I will send a note to the lawyers before I respond. -----Original Message----- From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC [mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil] Sent: Monday, February 21, 2011 5:09 PM To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL USA Dep COS; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US MAJ ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP Subject: Fwd: FW: Request for comment (b)(3), (b)(6) Note below forwarded to me from my Afghan account. Indicates a Saturday sent date, but showed up in this account within last 12 hours or so. (Will check home computer when I arrive back in DC late tonight.) All emails sent to my account there should result in an Out of Office message listing (b)(3), (b)(6) and COL (b)(3), (b)(6) as POCs. Believe it also lists this AKO account as means to talk with me. Haven't gotten anything on this account other than the forwarded note. Please provide some guidance about how I should respond or if it's best if you respond for command. Assume that MG Patton may soon get a similar request. Thanks. (b)(3), (b)(6) Colonel, US Army Outgoing Chief of Staff NATO Training Mission -Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil Cell: (b)(2) "Shohna ba Shohna --Shoulder to Shoulder" Find out what's going on in NATO Training Command-Afghanistan at www.ntm-a.com " (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP" < (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

From: Michael Hastings[SMTP:MHASTINGS@GMAIL.COM] Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2011 3:45:13 PM To: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP Subject: Request for comment Auto forwarded by a Rule Dear COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Hope this email finds you well. I'm writing to request an interview with you concerning Lt. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) , formerly an Information Operations Team Chief for NTM-A/CSTCA at Camp Eggers. I have a number of questions regarding his IO cell's activities under General Caldwell's command, as well as the AR 15-6 investigation you ordered into "the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations that LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) left the Camp Eggers installation with their weapons while in civilian clothes, dined in off post restaurants, and consumed alcohol." If you have a moment to discuss, your insights and perspective would be very much appreciated. All the best, Michael -- Michael Hastings Rolling Stone mhastings@gmail.com Office: +1-802-893-4476 International Mobile: +1-212-945-8073 Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

EXHIBIT F

ATTACHMENT 3

(b)(3), (b)(6) **SGT MIL USA USA USARCENT**

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2011 9:10 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL USA Dep COS; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US MAJ ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) US LTC NTM-A CSTC-A SJA
Subject: Re: FW: Request for comment (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Roger.

Background for you....

Believe that policy expressly forbidding NTM-A/CSTC-A folks from performing IO was signed after the initial issue between(b)(3), (b)(6)and (b)(3), (b)(6). MAJ(b)(3), (b)(6)can check the date of the "No IO" policy.

When the issue came to me about an allegation of an illegal order by Col(b)(3), (b)(6), required that the SJA provide a written opinion regarding the legality of the directive. Our legal team opined that (b)(3), (b)(6) directive was not illegal.

...don't have a copy handy, but will check my electronic files here to see if I have copy.

(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

Hope all is well. Thanks for sage advice.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Colonel, US Army

Outgoing Chief of Staff
NATO Training Mission -Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
Cell: (b)(2)

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" (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP" < (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

Sir
FYSA ISAF also got a query from a reporter in St. Petersburg asking about(b)(3), (b)(6)and his claim that he was ordered to perfomr PSYOPS by COL (b)(3), (b)(6) his supervisor. When he refused he alleges he was reprimanded and eventually targeted by the command. I told ISAF that we in NTM-A do not perform IO and in fact have a policy strictly forbidding it.

Additionally, told them that if the reporter had questions he should contact COL (b)(3), (b)(6) about these wild accusations. It appears (b)(3), (b)(6) is working his own engagement plan... Since we do not comment on individual punitive and non judicial actions, (b)(3), (b)(6) comments will be the reporter's only source. Will inform the CG.

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC [mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2011 02:06 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL USA Dep COS; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US MAJ ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) JS COL NTM-A CSTC-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) US LTC NTM-A CSTC-A SJA
Subject: RE: FW: Request for comment (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WILCO. Have not responded. Will await your direction. Nothing else from Hastings (nor any other hints about this topic) thus far.

Sorry that I didn't cc our astute legal team. Have done so on this note.

Thanks.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Colonel, US Army

Outgoing Chief of Staff
NATO Training Mission –Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A)

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
Cell: (b)(2)

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" (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP" < (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Caveats: ~~FOUO~~ Sir, Definitely do not respond... I will send a note to the lawyers before I respond. -----Original Message----- From: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC [mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil] Sent: Monday, February 21, 2011 5:09 PM To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL USA Dep COS; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US MAJ ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP Subject: Fwd: FW: Request for comment (b)(3), (b)(6) Note below forwarded to me from my Afghan account. Indicates a Saturday sent date, but showed up in this account within last 12 hours or so. (Will check home computer when I arrive back in DC late tonight.) All emails sent to my account there should result in an Out of Office message listing (b)(3), (b)(6) and COL (b)(3), (b)(6) as POCs. Believe it also lists this AKO account as means to talk with me. Haven't gotten anything on this account other than the forwarded note. Please provide some guidance about how I should respond or if it's best if you respond for command. Assume that MG Patton may soon get a similar request. Thanks. (b)(3), (b)(6) Colonel, US Army Outgoing Chief of

Staff NATO Training Mission –Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil Cell: (b)(2) "Shohna ba Shohna -- Shoulder to Shoulder" Find out what's going on in NATO Training Command-Afghanistan at ww.ntm-a.com ' (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP" < (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

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EXHIBIT F

ATTACHMENT 4

(b)(3), (b)(6) **SGT MIL USA USA USARCENT**

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 7:13 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA CSTC-A/NTM-A
Subject: RE: (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Got it.

If he calls me, I should refer him to you...is that my correct response to direct contact?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Colonel, US Army

Outgoing Chief of Staff
NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
CELL: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
[mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 10:41 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC; (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA CSTC-A/NTM-A
Subject: RE: (b)(3), (b)(6)/ Levine Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Ir,
Sounds good thanks for the details... will only provide Hastings with a simple statement from me that he will quote... if the story picks up any traction or demands further clarification, I will leverage this and the timeline in a backgrounder with someone other than Hastings...

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC
[mailto (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 4:38 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA CSTC-A/NTM-A
Subject: RE: (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Thanks. Good adds.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

A few points that bear highlighting.

(b)(3), (b)(6) apparently asserts that he was targeted after raising concerns about
what he perceived was an illegal directive to him from (b)(3), (b)(6).

First, when (b)(3), (b)(6) asserted that the (b)(3), (b)(6) directive was illegal, the command sought a written legal opinion as to the legality of the directive.
This is a sound, rational, and impartial action.

During the course of this determination, a rather junior member of the command, MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) is the one who brought to the attention of the chain
of command the possibility of alleged misconduct unrelated to the legality
of the (b)(3), (b)(6) directive. Had (b)(3), (b)(6) been "targeted" by the command, it
would seem that a more senior individual would have suggested investigation
into these other areas.

'hen the SJA suggested that the command's CoS charter an investigation .hat
included looking into an alleged inappropriate relationship between
(b)(3), (b)(6)
and (b)(3), (b)(6) the command's CoS chose NOT to do that. Were he being targeted,
it's likely that any investigation into (b)(3), (b)(6) behavior would have had a
wide aperture, not a narrow one.

The investigating officer was chosen purely by tasking the next directorate
responsible to provide an IO and requiring that IO to have a date of rank
earlier than (b)(3), (b)(6). If the command was targeting (b)(3), (b)(6) it's likely that
the IO would have been handpicked.

I don't have a copy of the recommendations in front of me, but know that I
didn't approve all of the recommendations. We need to have someone compare
what the IO recommended to what I approved. If any of the IO's
recommendations I did not approve would have had a pejorative impact on
(b)(3), (b)(6) then similar logic applies. If the command was targeting

.t's likely that the approving authority would not reduce the severity or
scope of the IO recommendations approved.

(Then) BG Patton modified his reprimand based on (b)(3), (b)(6) rebuttal matters.
gain, this is not the behavior associated with some type of conspiracy co target (b)(3), (b)(6) as it reduces his culpability.

Even if some members of the command were inappropriately annoyed with (b)(3), (b)(6) pushback regarding (b)(3), (b)(6) directive, so many disparate elements of the command were involved in the final disposition of this case that it would be very difficult to engineer a result upon which so many individuals agreed.

(b)(3), (b)(6) basic assertion that he was targeted for questioning the legality of (b)(3), (b)(6) directive is rather foolish on its face. The net result of his concern was that the issue was referred to our legal team. Our SJA, DoS, SJS, and CoS XO will likely indicate that I sent a large amount of work to the SJA requiring them to opine on its legality, even when it was considered by others in the headquarters or command as clearly lawful. A fractional arginal increase in the work assigned to the SJA is hardly cause for the command or even influential members of the headquarters to seek to target (b)(3), (b)(6) Even if (b)(3), (b)(6) actions incensed (b)(3), (b)(6) (the only senior member of the command who would conceivably take issue with (b)(3), (b)(6) actions), his involvement in the investigation's outcomes essentially came to an end when he responded to MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) note to him saying other alleged misconduct had come to light.

In the end, the facts of the investigation stand on their own. Even if it were true that someone or a group of people "targeted" (b)(3), (b)(6) the investigation finds a series of acts of misconduct. The command disposed of these in a rational manner, well below the level at which they could have been disposed of in criminal proceedings.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Colonel, US Army

Outgoing Chief of Staff
NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) /
Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
CELL: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A
[mailto (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 3:58 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP;
(b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
Subject: FW: (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

(b)(3), (b)(6) I made changes below to the timeline. My changes are in CAPS.
COL (b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC
[mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 7:31 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) US COL NTM-A CSTC-A; (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil;
brian.prosser@us.army.mil
Subject: (b)(3), (b)(6) Investigation

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Don't mean to spam you, but wanted the team there to have all the emails I can find that relate to this issue.

Here's a quick and broad timeline:

Mid-Mar 10 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) expressed concern that Col (b)(3), (b)(6) direction was illegal when (b)(3), (b)(6) told (b)(3), (b)(6) to assess the results of our engagements to inform and educate visitors. When the concern was brought to me, I directed the preparation of a legal opinion. (Still looking through electronic files on my end to find this opinion, but remember that the SJA opined that the direction was legal.)

9 Mar 10 MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) a lawyer in our SJA, wrote to Col (b)(3), (b)(6) saying that, in the course of looking into the legality of (b)(3), (b)(6) directive to (b)(3), (b)(6) they received information suggesting that

-LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) may have been engaged in an inappropriate relationship

--They have gone off post in civilian clothes to restaurants and they drank alcohol.

She indicated to (b)(3), (b)(6) that, based on the seriousness of the allegations, the issue needed to be addressed quickly

30 Mar 10 Col (b)(3), (b)(6) recommended to MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) that we conduct an investigation. (b)(3), (b)(6) indicated that (b)(3), (b)(6) told (b)(3), (b)(6) that (b)(3), (b)(6) was authorized to go out into town for dinner by the previous CoS, COL (b)(3), (b)(6) to meet with an Info Opns team from the Pentagon.

31 Mar 10 COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Dep SJA, recommended to (b)(3), (b)(6) that the command initiate a 15-6 investigation.

06 Apr 10 COL (b)(3), (b)(6) informed COL (b)(3), (b)(6) that (b)(3), (b)(6) would direct an investigation of potential violations of GO #1, but would not direct investigation of an inappropriate relationship. (b)(3), (b)(6) said that he did not want to create any perception of a witch hunt. If the investigating officer came up with evidence of an inappropriate relationship, (b)(3), (b)(6) would consider expanding the IO's charter to include that.

07 Apr 10 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) was identified to conduct the investigation.

28 Apr 10 LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) submitted his completed investigation to our SJA for review.

O/A 9 May 10 COL (b)(3), (b)(6) SJA, briefed COL (b)(3), (b)(6) on results of investigation and the SJA recommendations.

O/A 19 May 10 COL (b)(3), (b)(6) forwarded the investigation with the approved findings and recommendations to (then) BG Patton for action. Based on SJA advice, (b)(3), (b)(6) approved the findings and most of the recommendations of the IO, and directed that a copy of the report be forwarded to the officers' respective National Guard chains of command to consider initiation of proceedings to revoke their federal recognition. (Important to note that findings generated a series of improper acts by (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) not merely eating off post.)

O/A 22 May 10 (then) BG Patton signed reprimands for both officers and directed COL(b)(3), (b)(6) to serve the reprimands on the officers. (b)(3), (b)(6) did so O/A 22 May 10.

O/A 23 May 10 LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) went on his scheduled R&R leave. (Then) BG Patton agreed to a longer than usual time period for LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) to submit a rebuttal in order for(b)(3), (b)(6) to complete his scheduled R&R. (b)(3), (b)(6) later completed her R&R as scheduled.)

Soon thereafter (haven't found precise dates in my electronic files) COL (b)(3), (b)(6) served Col(b)(3), (b)(6) with a reprimand for him eating off post with LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ(b)(3), (b)(6) (The IO found evidence that Col(b)(3), (b)(6) went to a restaurant off post with(b)(3), (b)(6) and(b)(3), (b)(6) (Then) BG Patton relinquished authority to dispose of this report of misconduct to COL (b)(3), (b)(6) after(b)(3), (b)(6) informed Patton that he intended to reprimand(b)(3), (b)(6))

18 JUN 10 BG PATTON DECIDED TO FILE MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) GOMOR IN HER OMPF

O/A 5 Jul 10 LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) rebuttal matters submitted to BG Patton for his consideration. LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) has submitted a lengthy rebuttal and (then) BG Patton met with him to discuss it in person.

LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) indicated in his rebuttal that:

--"I was never given the opportunity to answer the specific allegations that were made against me.....I have not been offered any opportunity to provide exculpatory evidence or alibis, or to call any witnesses or provide testimony in my defense."

--"I have been tried and convicted by a "Kangaroo Court" and now only the severity of my sentence is in question."

(During the investigation,(b)(3), (b)(6) invoked his right to counsel when questioned by the IO, so all questioning ceased at that point.)

9 July BG PATTON MET LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) TO DISCUSS (b)(3), (b)(6) REBUTTAL. BG PATTON MADE A CHANGE TO THE GOMOR (DELETING A PORTION) AND DETERMINED IT WOULD FILED IN HIS OMPF.

15 JUL 10 BG PATTON SIGNED A MEMO ASKING ARMY EVALUATION SUITABILITY BOARD TO SUBSITUTE A REVISED GOMOR FOR MAJ(b)(3), (b)(6) BASED ON THE CHANGE MADE TO LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) GOMOR.

O/A 28 Sep 10 LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ(b)(3), (b)(6) departed AFG on schedule. (b)(3), (b)(6) and(b)(3), (b)(6) OERs were completed and submitted before they departed. (In an attempt to avoid any perception of malice and ensure impartiality, Dr Kem senior rated LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) instead of COL(b)(3), (b)(6))

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

EXHIBIT F

(b)(3), (b)(6) **SGT MIL USA USA USARCENT** ATTACHMENT 5

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TRADOC (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil]
Sent: Monday, February 21, 2011 7:09 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC USA ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL USA Dep COS; (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA NTM-A/CSTC-A CMD GRP; (b)(3), (b)(6) JS MAJ ARMY CSTC-A CMD GRP
Subject: Fwd: FW: Request for comment

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Note below forwarded to me from my Afghan account. Indicates a Saturday sent date, but showed up in this account within last 12 hours or so. (Will check home computer when I arrive back in DC late tonight.)

All emails sent to my account there should result in an Out of Office message listing (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and COL (b)(3), (b)(6) as POCs. Believe it also lists this AKO account as means to talk with me. Haven't gotten anything on this account other than the forwarded note.

Please provide some guidance about how I should respond or if it's best if you respond for command. Assume that MG Patton may soon get a similar request.

Thanks.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Colonel, US Army

Outgoing Chief of Staff
NATO Training Mission -Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil
Cell: (b)(2)

"Shohna ba Shohna --Shoulder to Shoulder"

Find out what's going on in NATO Training Command-Afghanistan at www.ntm-a.com

(b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP" < (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil> wrote:

From: Michael Hastings[SMTP:MHASTINGS@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2011 8:45:13 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL US CSTC-A CMD GRP
Subject: Request for comment
Auto forwarded by a Rule

Dear COL (b)(3), (b)(6)

Hope this email finds you well. I'm writing to request an interview with you concerning Lt. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), formerly an Information Operations Team Chief for NTM-A/CSTCA

at Camp Eggers. I have a number of questions regarding his IO cell's activities under General Caldwell's command, as well as the AR 15-6 investigation you ordered into "the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations that LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) left the Camp Eggers installation with their weapons while in civilian clothes, dined in off post restaurants, and consumed alcohol." If you have a moment to discuss, your insights and perspective would be very much appreciated.

All the best,
Michael

--

Michael Hastings
Rolling Stone
mhastings@gmail.com
Office: +1-802-893-4476
International Mobile: +1-212-945-8073

The (b)(3), (b)(6) Family

703912502 EXHIBIT F

AR 15-6 Investigation
Information Operations in Afghanistan
LTG William Webster, Investigating Officer
COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Assistant Investigating Officer
Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6) Assistant Investigating Officer (Interviewer)

Personal ~~Telephonic~~ Interview with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) U.S. Army, starting at 0905 on 15 March 2011.

IO:		LTG William Webster, Investigating Officer
WIT:	COL	(b)(3), (b)(6)
LA:		COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Legal Advisor
~~**XO:**~~		~~COL~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) ~~Executive Officer to the IO~~
DE:		Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6) Assistant Investigating Officer

IO: ...but this may take awhile and we are going to have Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) do some administrative stuff here upfront and then we will ask some questions to get into this detail and background and all of that kind of stuff. I have got a long list of questions. And we appreciate your participation in this inquiry. It is important that we get all of the truth out and give it back to General Petraeus to decide what to do.

Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

LA: Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) before we start today, you signed a restricted communication statement indicating that you would not discuss your testimony today with anyone other than those connected with the investigation.

Do you understand the contents of that statement?

WIT: I do understand the contents of that statement.

LA: And do you agree to abide by its terms?

WIT: I agree to abide by its terms.

LA: And is this your signature on the statement?

WIT: It is my signature on the statement.

LA: And then you also signed a Privacy Act Statement acknowledging that the information you give us today will only be used for official purposes in this investigation.

Do you understand that statement?

WIT: I do understand the statement, and I also affirm that is my signature at the bottom of the page.

LA: And were you coerced in any way to sign either of those two statements?

WIT: I was not coerced in any way to sign the statements.

LA: The statement is being taken at the courtroom at Fort McPherson, Georgia, at 0805 [sic], on 15 March 2011. Please state your full name.

WIT: My name is (b)(3), (b)(6)

LA: And to what unit are you assigned?

WIT: Currently I am assigned to the U.S. Army War College.

LA: And you are a Colonel in the United States Army?

WIT: That is correct.

LA: And you are active component.

WIT: I am active duty. That is correct.

LA: That is all of the preliminaries, sir.

IO: Joe tell us a little bit about your background. Where you have -- how long have you been in the Army; where you have served; what are your specialties, et cetera?

WIT: Yes, sir. I was commissioned almost 27 years ago from the University of Wisconsin ROTC Program. I majored in economics. I was commissioned an Infantryman with a regular Army commission. From there served in Germany and went to a standard assignments for an Infantry lieutenant. I went back to the Advanced Course and was assigned to Fort Campbell 101st. I ended up commanding there almost three years. I went and commanded in Desert Storm. Came back and interviewed the HHC Company Commander. Finished in second place. The reward for that was to be the Division Protocol Officer. I spent a year doing that.

IO: Sounds logical to me.

WIT: It sure was a great experience. My boss was a guy named (b)(3), (b)(6) which was gratuitous, just for the professional development.

Then I went and served in the Old Guard. Commanded again a couple of times and last year was the Regimental S-3. From there went to Leavenworth; did two years at Leavenworth. I graduated from SAMS at the end of the second year, went to Hawaii, was a Battalion XO, Brigade S-3, Brigade XO, and then a Planner. Served for a short period of time at Central Command right after 9-11 as a Planner, and then had a stint on the Army Staff in the G-8. From there went into Command of the 3-187th Infantry in the 101st. Commanded in OIF-1. Returned -- transition that unit into a RSTA Squadron. From there spent a very short period of time as a Deputy Commander and then went to the Joint Staff in DC. I was detailed to a National Counter-Terrorism Center and worked in the interagency in a plans billet working for, at the time, Brigadier General Jeff Schloesser. I worked planning for the War on Terrorism at the national level. From there I took command of 3rd Infantry Regiment, the Old Guard. Following that was in a fellowship, in a think tank, in DC, the Center for American Security for about six months, and deployed to Afghanistan and served as the Chief of Staff for the last year. My background is essentially in Operations and Plans.

IO: Can you tell me when you were assigned to CSTC-A/NTM-A?

WIT: Sure. I believe it was the 3rd or 4th of February. I can't remember the exact day, but it would have been 2010.

IO: And when did you leave CSTC-A/NTM-A?

WIT: Sir, I departed Afghanistan on the 31st of January of 2011. Now, technically I departed there TDY. The intent was for me to come back here, do some engagements, and serve on the Chief of Staff of the Army's Transition Team. They had asked for me to be extended. That extension ended up being disapproved and I was interviewed for, and pending the outcome of the investigation, will become a Special Assistant for the Director of DARPA.

IO: Have you -- had you worked with General Caldwell before you were assigned to CSTC-A?

WIT: Sir, I had. In Hawaii when he was the Assistant Division for Operations I was a Brigade 3 and a Brigade XO. We maintained a personal relationship after that when he worked on the PACOM staff and then when he worked in the Undersecretary of Defense's office. Those were the two primary times I had contact with him.

IO: So you know General Caldwell fairly well.

WIT: Sir, I think I knew him prior to going there and certainly now I know him. I would say, very well.

IO: A pretty close relationship normally between a Chief of Staff and a Commander.

WIT: Sir, I think that is true, and I believe we enjoyed a close relationship too.

IO: What, if any, training have you had in Strategic Communications?

WIT: Sir, I don't believe I have had any formal training to be best of my recollection. I haven't had any courses or taken any undergraduate or postgraduate work. While I was serving in the 3rd Infantry Regiment one of the things that we discussed inside the command was that we were -- part of our job was to be a strategic communications element for the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army. One of the things that -- one of the endeavors which we undertook was to try and make sure that we were prudently applying the resources given us by the taxpayers and our superiors by ensuring that organizations like the Fife and Drum Corps, the Drill Team were doing things that nested well with what the Secretary and the Chief, the Chief of Staff of the Army, wanted us to do.

During that period of time I went and talked to General Cucolo, who was then the Chief of Public of Affairs, about what kind of process we had to follow in terms of, you know, identifying on the horizon what kind of capabilities we had and things we had already been scheduled for, and then how we took those assets that hadn't already been scheduled and applied them in a way so that we were then nested with our higher Headquarters. So it is practical experience I would say.

IO: What formal training have you had in Information Operations?

WIT: Sir, I don't believe I have any formal training in Information Operations. Certainly while I was at Fort Leavenworth there was some exposure to Joint Doctrine. I don't recall specifically if that Information Operations popped up at that time. I am certain that there were discussions when we were in SAMS seminar about it, but I have no formal training that I am aware of.

IO: How about any formal training you've had in Public Affairs?

WIT: Sir, I have no formal training in Public Affairs.

IO: How about formal training in PSYOP or MISO?

WIT: Sir, I have no formal training in PSYOP or MISO.

IO: How would you define Strategic Communications, STRATCOM?

WIT: Sir, I would say my definition of STRATCOM is the provision of facts to relevant audiences and then -- providing a set of facts to relevant audiences and having identified, you know, what you believe the facts show. It is an attempt to achieve an end. And then going back and assessing how well you did that based upon the effects that you achieve whether or not you've got the facts right and whether or not you need to provide the facts again through different means.

IO: Do you know what General Caldwell's philosophy was on using Strategic Communications?

WIT: Sir, I am going to try and answer this in a broader sense, and let me know if I've addressed the question that you are after.

General Caldwell arrived there in November. He hired me in a phone conversation on New Year's Eve, and I arrived just over a month later. During that period of time he did share some e-mails with me before I got there and then when I arrived he made it very clear to me, and anytime the conversation came up, that his view was that what we needed to focus on was informing and educating. And he drew a bright line between that Information Operations because there were activities under the

I did audit a course on Information Operations while at CGSC, but have not had formal training.

Information Operations umbrella that: number one, that we couldn't do: and, number two, that we shouldn't do.

He talked about when he was at Leavenworth and when he modified -- he was in charge of modifying the doctrine that focused on informing and educating. And his perspective of it: in my opinion was that he wanted to focus on providing people with the facts in context and letting them make their own decisions. He said several times that what -- he didn't want to get in the influence business. That the provision of facts and contexts was what we needed to do and then others could make up their minds.

He was also interested in keeping track of to whom he had spoken: who had received our messages. Now, part of the reason for that is, for instance, over time the attrition rate in the Afghan National Civil Order Police would change over time. If the last time we had spoken to person A we had said that the attrition rate was X, and we were speaking to them again six months later: it made all the sense in the world for us to go back and identify what it is we told them, so that again we could provide them with a set of facts in context. Last time we told you it was X: right now it is Y. And he was also interested in assessing, you know, that we had done the right thing and how well we did or what impact it was having.

Did I answer your question, sir?

IO: Yes. (b)(3), (b)(6) did you have a follow-up question?

DE: No, sir.

IO: Was General Caldwell's philosophy different from other commanders you have worked for in terms of Strategic Communications?

WIT: Sir, he is much more focused on communicating than some of the other commanders with whom I have -- or for whom I have worked. And so in that regard the amount of time he focused on doing it was different than other commanders for whom I have worked. However, his broad philosophy didn't vary from other commanders in terms of the concept. For example, my discussions with General Cucolo when I commanded 3rd Infantry Regiment were essentially about the same paradigm that I just addressed to you. My characterization of my conversation with General Cucolo is that he supported that. He thought that was prudent, and that he thought it was -- I guess I am putting words in his mouth here -- but he did not say that was out of the ordinary. I also, early in my tenure there, had a chart that I had drawn and sent to the CAG Chief at ISAF, General Smith, the director of public affairs, and to General Flynn: the two. And said, "Hey, you know, this is the direction I think we need to consider when we are talking about Strategic Communications. What is your feedback back to me?" I didn't get a chance to talk to General Flynn. I did talk to Colonel Owens, who is the CAG Chief for General Petraeus, and General Smith, those two. I either talked to them or they sent notes back. I think both I talked to them and they sent me notes back indicating that was a valid protocol. I took from that it wasn't a paradigm that was out of the ordinary. If you are interested I have got copies of their notes the chart that I sent to them too, sir.

IO: Yes. I would like to have them.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: You'll provide that the break. We will take a break here in a little while.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: You mentioned earlier some emails that General Caldwell had showed you where he was explaining to you what Strategic Communications was. Do you have those?

WIT: Sir, I didn't mean to give you the impression that he had sent me e-mails talking about that, ---

IO: What it sounded to me like was he had something where he had written or someone else had written and he wanted to share that with you to have this conversation.

WIT: No, sir, that is not true. I did have communications with him from New Year's Eve until I arrived. It did not specifically address STRATCOMs. I believe all our relevant communication was in person. And, sir, I did bring along with me -- I have got it in the car -- computer and my PST file for e-mails. If it is okay with you I can go back through that and check to make sure I'm not overlooking something.

IO: Well, what would be helpful is trying to find -- and we haven't talked to General Caldwell yet -- but try to find where his philosophy was written and/or explained on Strategic Communications. Were you were incongruence with that or not, et cetera? So those kinds of written documents would be helpful.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: For instance, your chart on where we ought to go.

WIT: Yes, sir. And like I said, I can provide that to you, sir, because I have printed that out.

If you don't mind, sir, one of the things that General Caldwell made clear just in terms of how he titled the shop that affected what we are calling Strategic Communications here, is he made clear that guy was going to be called a Communications Director as opposed to Strategic Communications Director. This I think was another effort on his part to ensure that we didn't drift off of inform and educate. If I heard General Caldwell repeat a phrase or a concept with respect to this process more than anything else it would be that: inform and educate. So that may well indicate a distinction between how he viewed it and other commanders.

IO: Did you find that there were many interpretations of what Strategic Communications was? What a Communications Director was? What IO was? What PSYOP or Public Affairs? Did you find that there were multiple interpretations of those things over -- because our doctrine has evolved a lot in some manuals and very little in others? Did you find that?

WIT: Sir, I did. I believe one of the reasons that General Caldwell continued to repeat this is because he had the same perception that a lot of people came to the table with different concepts of what Information Operations, Strategic Communications, Communications, and he spent a lot of time talking about what our command was going to do and, again, repeated "inform and educate" as the centerpiece of that kind of concept. So the short answer to your question is, yes, sir, I did see that a lot of people came to the table with different perspectives, and I believe that is one of the reasons why he continued to repeat this over time.

IO: I may have alluded to this earlier, but did he write this down in some fashion to help clarify it for people in the command? Did he write down and talk about in some philosophy or guidance statement about informing and educating and not trying to influence?

WIT: Sir, I am not aware of one. Before June 15th where he directed me to write a policy that indicated a prohibition -- a specific prohibition on Information Operations. And we had for a couple of things -- a few things we had very precisely limited exception authority and this was one of them. For example, I was the only person -- or my position was the only position that could approve TDY's for anybody in the command. And so in this policy that I signed on the 15th of June, you know, we drastically limited those who could create an exception. Now, I have looked through my notes and I

have looked through my e-mails. I don't find the specific date that he and I discussed it, but my recollection is that he said, "Look, it appears that, ~~you know~~ we -- are constantly talking about, you know, this prohibition on conducting Information Operations, and it is not sufficient, so let's write it down. Let's make it ironclad and clear exactly what we are not going to do." And then in that policy it, of course, focuses on inform and educate.

But I am not aware of a document prior to that where we elucidated that prohibition or specifically what he meant.

IO: We will talk about that memo in a few more minutes.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: I don't want to get into that.

How do you define Information Operations?

WIT: Sir, my preference would be to refer to doctrine to give you a precise definition, but I will tell you that I view Information Operations as an umbrella under which a series of activities occur: things like computer network attack. There'd even be some things where you might employ deception. It certainly includes PSYOP or MISO, but it is an umbrella under which a series of functions occur. As you mentioned before, you know, our doctrine has changed over time. When General Myer was the chairman I know that he published a memo over his signature that identified, you know, again I am characterizing it here, but a clear line between Public Affairs and this other set of activities, so my take on Information Operations is that it includes more than inform and educate, and it would include those things that an Operational Commander in theater -- excuse me, of which he might take advantage and ~~effect~~ affect.

IO: Okay. And where do you think -- do you recall the five pillars -- or the five segments of Information Operations?

WIT: Sir, I do not. I should have referred to doctrine before I came in for this interview, but I did not.

IO: Doctrine as of 2008 talks about Information Operations being the integration of the five elements of IO which include Computer Network Operations which is both network attack as well as network defense, so it is not all about the aggressive operations.

Electronic Warfare, Psychological Operations, OPSEC, and Military Deception, MILDEC. Along with integrating the related activities and supporting activities such as Public Affairs and other such subjects to achieve your goals in conjunction with physical movement or operations on the ground.

Do you agree with that definition?

WIT: [No response.]

IO: Do you take exception with it in any way?

WIT: Sir, I do not. And I pause because -- I am not trying to be trite. I am trying to figure out my rationale for taking exception to it. But I think that is a -- I believe that is a legitimate definition of what Information Operations should entail.

Is that responsive, sir?

IO: Yes. So an element of Information Operations is Psychological Operations or Military Information Support Groups, MISO?

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: So how would you define PSYOP or Miso?

WIT: Sir, my primary thought on PSYOP is that it is -- I am drawing a distinction here I guess between, you know, what we did with respect to inform and educate -- is PSYOP is the creative use of truths and untruths to achieve an effect. It is, you know, it is something that wouldn't be part of informing and educating an audience, and it is also something, you know, for a variety of reasons ~~both~~ pragmatic, regulatory, and illegal it shouldn't be focused on U.S. personnel but also from a broader perspective not on Allied personnel.

IO: So it is focused on adversaries and potential adversaries.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: Not on friendly audiences.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: Especially on United States citizens.

WIT: Yes, sir, that is correct. You know when I went to the senior officer legal orientation I know we talked a great deal about intelligence oversight and the collection of intelligence and the restrictions on that -- the prohibitions on that on U.S. citizens. And while that is not necessarily a portion of that element of training, it is logical that, what you are talking about, that prohibition follows from that too, so even if there were no legal regulatory reason for not -- for avoiding that kind of behavior with respect to U.S. citizens, it is clearly logical and professional that one wouldn't do that.

IO: So what you're talking about is that it would be unprofessional and illegal -- and/or illegal is what you just said I think, to conduct Psychological Operations against U.S. citizens.

WIT: Yes, sir. I feel strongly -- again, whether or not -- yes is the answer to your question. But whether or not there was a regulatory or illegal prohibition I believe, you know, an officer's oath would prevent him or her from doing that.

IO: Do you have knowledge of what General Caldwell's philosophy was on the use of Information Operations in CSTC-A and NTM-A?

WIT: Sir, on several occasions he made it very clear to me and to others inside the Command -- and this is personal discourse with no rationale attached. No framing or putting in context his reasoning -- that we did not conduct Information Operations.

IO: "We" meaning?

WIT: CSTC-A and NTM-A. We were focused on informing and educating. This was the provision of facts placed in context to relevant audiences. And so, again, I think that is the best summary of his perspective on how CSTC-A/NTM-A conducted Information Operations: we didn't.

IO: You said "on several occasions". Do you remember him saying this frequently? 10 times? 20 times? Two times?

WIT: Sir, I remember him saying it frequently. I kept my notes ~~and~~ in an almost OC fashion in a series of these books, and I have gone through them several times, and I haven't come up with a specific date/time group where he did so I could count those things up. It is quite a few books, so I haven't -- I can't say that I have been through them all, you know, exhaustively, but I know that he repeated it several times. And, you know, he repeated it to groups with which he had routine contact and then when the topic came up when he was talking to others he certainly did. He had the Communications Directorate as part of his inner circle. And the Communications Director worked for him and so that was certainly one of the audiences where he talked about that. Again, I cannot offer you a specific date/time group.

IO: He arrived in November and you arrived in February.

WIT: I arrived in early February. Yes, sir.

IO: So did you hear it from him or others when you first arrived? In other words, had he already -- do you believe, for some reason, that he had already been talking about NTM-A not doing IO?

WIT: Sir, he talked about ---

IO: Or was it new when you arrived?

WIT: Sir, I don't recall him indicating that to me in any of the email traffic that I saw from him between the time that I was hired and the time that I arrived. However, when I arrived he both made it clear to me, and I had others talk to me about it; in particular, I recall Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) talking to me about it. And then as I worked specifically with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) his conversations and some of his e-mail notes where I was CCed, you know, it was clear to me this had been made clear to (b)(3), (b)(6) and others. We did not execute IO. What we were going to do is inform and educate.

IO: And Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had been his aide, as I understand, or XO.

WIT: Sir, you and I would call it XO. The duty title that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had was MA, but he served as I think traditionally we would call it an XO. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived about two weeks before I did.

IO: And you said (b)(3), (b)(6) told you about General Caldwell's philosophy of not doing IO.

WIT: I know that we had that discussion, and I believe -- and I'm thinking about it in terms of the location. Shortly after I got there the Chief of Staff's office moved, and I believe I recall it in both offices, so that would have indicated that soon after I arrived he and I had that conversation.

IO: Do you know why General Caldwell said that NTM-A/CSTC-A would not conduct Information Operations?

WIT: Sir, we were a training command. Our focus was on growth and development of the Afghan National Security Forces. So it didn't fit into our mission set to be focused on the enemy. We were actually focused on friendly forces. The other aspect of it is there was a pragmatic concern in that if we lost our credibility with those that we were trying to advise, then that would clearly tend to have a chilling effect on that advisory role. I also know again from personal discourse with General Caldwell that he believed strongly in this inform and educate piece. He had a great deal of experience in Iraq working as a Director of Strategic Effects. I believe that crystallized in his mind when he went to Leavenworth and had a hand on developing our doctrine the need to reshape our doctrine and, therefore, what we did.

IO: In CSTC-A and NTM-A what was the CAG or Commander Action Group, if that is what it is?

WIT: Sir, the CAG was a group -- and the size varied a little bit -- of about 10 officers that worked in the Headquarters building downstairs. They were led by an O-6. When I arrived there it was a Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) In the last five months I believe that I was assigned to the command it was Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) [phonetic]. The CAG actually had two pieces. There was an initiative portion and an action portion. The initiative portion was really a deeper thinking, a longer-range organization.

The action's group focused on those events, reports, or briefings that the commander would personally execute. So they took information ~~on~~ and data from the rest of the command and then also applied some of their understanding of the commander's thoughts and produced, for example, we had a weekly -- a set of weekly, monthly, biweekly reports that we would send up. Typically they would ~~air~~ open them, staff them with the deputy commanders, and then with the boss, and make final corrections. If there was a briefing that was going to be conducted by the Commander or one of the D-Coms in the

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Commander's name, they would produce the briefing, you know, and take the thing from cradle-to-grave I guess I would call it, develop it, be there for execution, and then conduct an after action review.

IO: What was the IEWG? Information Engagement Warfare.

WIT: The IEWG was a group that was chaired by the Communications Director. Now, over time -- as I think is prudent with any routinized meeting -- the agenda and the participants change slightly. That was an opportunity for the Communication's Director to look at what was on the horizon; identify how to focus the assets that he had at his disposal considering what it is that both General Caldwell and the ISAF commander, and then a little further out, you know, what NATO and the United States military wanted to accomplish and allocate assets against those. There was also a component of it where there was an assessment. It had to do with, okay, here is what we wanted to do. These are the facts in context that we gave to these folks. Do we think that resonated with them? Did they find that helpful? Did it answer the questions that we believed they wanted answered? Do we think that how we offered them these facts in context made sense to them? Do we need to go back and question our facts? Do we need to present them in a different context so that the individual that's getting them sees them the same way that we do?

The attendees -- and I attended informally from time to time. It was not common for me to attend, but when I did it involved the leaders out of the Communications Directorate; when the Deputy Commanders had a Public Affairs officer assigned to them they would attend. And we tried to get the XOs ~~as~~ the deputy commanders to attend those meetings ~~as~~ because some of it was a simple calendar de-confliction. too

And, sir, related to that for a period of time. On Sunday evenings I chaired a meeting with the XOs for the various deputy commanders, the SJS, the Protocol Officer, and our Joint Visitor Bureau Directorate. That was largely a scheduling meeting where here is an individual who is visiting, let's look at the boss's calendar, should we -- you know, is the boss going to meet with these folks and give them a brief, or should we select one of the other flag officers, or is this kind of a thing where I should assign a Colonel to do it? So it was a supplementary meeting.

IO: What was the COSB or COSB? Do you recall an organization by that name?

WIT: Sir, I do not.

IO: How about the JVB? Did you have a Joint Visitor's Bureau?

WIT: Sir, we certainly did. When I arrived the JVB was led by a Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) It was a very small organization. We had not been doing well at that. I believe a few days before I took over as chief of staff from Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) the CJ-3, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had told Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) to move into the JOC; that Edmonds was personally going to supervise him so that we can make sure that we have the mechanics of visitors down pat. Within several weeks we assigned Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) to our Regional Support Command North as the deputy commander, and I assigned a Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) who had come in to be our congressional liaison, but I had assigned her to run the Joint Visitor's Bureau. She is a very sharp individual, and we needed to make sure that we had that working well again. Their job is mostly mechanical. The protocol officers are subordinate to them. They certainly fit into the entire arrangement of an engagement if somebody is coming to visit us, but the scope of their responsibilities, as I say, are largely mechanical.

UNK: How many visitors a week are we talking in CSTC-A, just out of curiosity?

WIT: It depended on the time. This last January there were a couple of weeks there that were -- the amount of visits were -- there were a significant enough number of visitors so that was the primary

focus of the command group for about two weeks. And I am guessing here, but I would say are high and these would be visits that the Commander would personally attend. Our high would've been on the order of about 15 in a week, but, again, I would tell you that it's probably high. I am not sure a mean. I would absolutely be guessing if I gave you a mean. Shortly after I arrived General McChrystal had asked that we limit CODELs, and I believe the number was three a month. We certainly got three a month. There were also, you know, senior military leaders or senior defense officials that came outside of that. Since we, you know, we were CSTC-A so we were a U.S. Command and we are also NTM-A and a NATO command. We had Joint Force Command Brunssum, the intermediate Headquarters between ISAF and Shape, would send visitors from time to time. I just don't know that I could give you a very accurate guess. My perception, again, having been in command of the Old Guard and having been a protocol officer for year is that the number of visitors were significant, and it was a larger number than I was accustomed to.

DE: So the CAG and the IEWG and -- is it the SOC-B? Can you tell me what the SOC-B is? I think that's what you meant, sir.

WIT: I don't know of an organization that was labeled like that to me.

IO: As the Chief of Staff, did you appoint all of the 15-6 investigations in NTM-A, CSTC-A or how was your appointment authority?

WIT: Almost all of them, sir. I recall there being at least two where the lawyers came and said that I could not by regulation appoint the 15-6 ~~authority~~. It needed to be the commander. But general Caldwell had early in the tenure -- you know, very early after I got there talked about how he wanted to the Chief of Staff to behave and one of them was that he wanted me to be the appointing authority for investigations and inquiries. Yes, sir.

investigating officer

IO: How would you characterize the number, the amount of investigations that were done when you were the Chief of Staff?

WIT: Sir, I would say we did more investigations than I am accustomed to.

IO: Can you quantify that somehow?

WIT: I don't know the number of investigations that we did throughout the year. Unfortunately, I didn't bring back electronic copies of all the investigations that were done. But there was a sufficient number so that there was a -- you know, the CJ-1 had a protocol where they had the next directorate responsible to provide investigating officers, and it was a routine occurrence for one of my subordinates to call them and ask which was the next director to provide an investigating officer. On those occasions when we needed a full colonel or a Navy captain, or a Coast Guard captain to perform the investigations, generally I would ask for some advice and then appoint them personally. I mean, there were a series of these. I think that the number of investigations in the theater at large was greater than that to which I am accustomed. And one of the indications of that is I was personally assigned an investigation that lasted -- it took me out of the mix for about 10 days to two weeks by General Petraeus. ~~There~~ That was a hostile fire death in Kandahar. And I would say it's -- again, in my experience it is unordinary -- it is out of the ordinary that somebody would grab a three-star Chief of Staff and tell him to go conduct an investigation perhaps as it is with telling an Army commander to go conduct an investigation. I would say the number of investigations was higher than I am accustomed to, and I felt the tempo was fairly high.

IO: If we haven't already we need to ask how many investigations were conducted; inquiries and investigations.

Did you -- was there some limiting factor on the investigations or inquiries into allegations based on rank or type or any of those kinds of things where you designated them, or did you do all of them for CSTC-A and NTM-A?

WIT: Sir, with the exception of those that were -- where the Chief of Staff was prohibited, the Chief of Staff -- the reason I am using the position there instead of my name in particular is because while I was on R&R my -- the guy that was filling in for me as Chief of Staff, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) appointed Brigadier General Smith to conduct an investigation that we had regarding a possibility that a Colonel-level director might have been culpable in the deaths of a couple of Sailors. And when that investigation came back, (b)(3), (b)(6) was the one who, as the appointing authority, approved the findings and recommendations.

The way the system was set up is, for instance, as Chief of Staff I had the administrative authority over E-7s and below on the staff. When the General Court-Martial Convening authority was approved for General Caldwell under CSTC-A hat we stood up an administrative detachment that I commanded that consisted of the staff. And I had authority for E-7s and below. I tell you this because that would have then given me the authority to act on reports of misconduct by E-7s and below, but, you know, I was required -- I couldn't take any punitive or administrative action without referring it to either the commander or the acting commander. Early on General Caldwell had delegated Article 15 authority to General Patton, and so he was the one to whom we referred Article 15 matters.

Was that responsive to your question, sir?

IO: Yes, but it brings up a number of questions. So you did not act on -- you were not the deciding authority on allegations of misconduct in their investigations for E-8s and above?

WIT: Sir, I had the authority to direct and scope an investigation. When the investigation came back, after receiving advice from the JAG, I approve, disapprove, or modify the findings and recommendations, but then I had to refer it to another authority who could then either take action or release jurisdiction to me or some other official in the chain of command.

IO: E-8 and above or E-7 and below.

WIT: E-8 and above was reserved by General Patton. I can't remember the date -- because again during the year was when General Court-Martial Convening authority was granted to General Caldwell and that modified the specific authorities under UCMJ that we have for US personnel. However, earlier on General Caldwell had delegated Article 15 authority to General Patton. He indicated that he reserved jurisdiction for E-8 and above. So that is why I say I had authority without reference to higher authority for E-7 and below.

IO: What was General Patton's position in the administrative chain? Was he the commander of the U.S. Army element, or was he performing some other role that allowed him to do these -- to act on these findings and recommendations?

WIT: Sir, specifically with respect to this issue, my recollection is that General Patton was the Acting Commander and that is why he took -- he was the one with the authority to take action.

IO: When you say "this issue", do you mean with Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or with something else?

WIT: No, sir. With respect to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6)

In the US chain, you know, he was a deputy commander, and General Caldwell delegated Article 15 authority to him as a flag officer deputy commander. Unfortunately, -- we kept our calendars on the classified system. So I have gone back and tried to reconstruct exact dates and

everything, but to the best of my recollection with respect to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) the reason why General Patton was the one taking the action is because he had been the acting commander at the time.

IO: What was Wing Commander (b)(6) role?

WIT: Sir, Wing Commander (b)(6) was our Director of Staff, and that is a NATO term in our parlance ~~parallel~~ we would've called him a Deputy Chief Of Staff. He had been in the CJ-1. When I first arrived the Chief of Staff's office consisted of an XO, Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Chief of Staff, myself. Shortly after being there I identified the fact that, you know, I just simply wasn't able to function with that. We were authorized a director of Staff, an XO, and a SJS. I didn't want to leap into hiring both an SJS and a Director of Staff, but I did at least want to hire ~~at least~~ one. So Wing Commander (b)(6) was working in the CJ-1, I conducted a set of interviews and then I hired him. His role was, you know, his continuing function was he was the guy responsible to track tasks that came out of command group directorate or a higher headquarters and ensure that they were effectively assigned to a staff organization and that a suspense was met, you know, with an appropriate product.

Now, the other things that I assigned him is, number one, he was senior by date of rank to the Director of the JVP, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) so I assigned him to be her rater. And from time to time, you know, as with any Deputy I assigned him certain things that I wanted him to do or look into or try and work for me (b)(3), (b)(6) was very effective when there appeared to be some kind of black-and-white issue, some kind of, you know, loggerhead between members of the staff. I would send (b)(3), (b)(6) say, "Okay, go find out what the issues are. I would like you to try to deal with it before I get involved." It wasn't necessarily ~~a~~formal, but from time to time I assigned him those roles.

IO: Was there any working relationship or supervisory relationship between Wing Commander (b)(6) as the Director of Staff and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, there was no formal relationship between the two in terms of rating or supervision. When he was acting on my behalf clearly, you know, there is that old saying, hey, everybody works for the Chief of Staff, but -- and there was no formal relationship. If you don't mind, I would tell you that my recollections in this case -- and when I say "in this case" I am talking about specifically around the end of March when -- I can't remember who told me, but somebody made me aware that there was some concern about a directive by Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had issued to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) And I was told Holmes thinks it's not legal. Number one, I said that is what we have lawyers for. Let's get the lawyers to tell us whether the directive is legal or not. And then I also told Wing Commander (b)(6) "What I need you to do is go talk to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and find out what the real issue is here."

At that specific point in time, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was not in country. My recollection is that he had left a few days before that. He had gone back to the States. He had a series of engagements going on before he took R&R. So again, with respect to this specific issue and the issue in late March of 2010 where Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had difficulty with the directive that (b)(3), (b)(6) had issued him, I asked Wing Commander (b)(6) to talk to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and find out specifically what the issues were and getting more familiar.

IO: Did you talk to (b)(6) to resolve the issue, or did you expect him to resolve it, or was he just gathering facts and information for you?

WIT: If he was able to resolve the thing I certainly would have expected him to do that, sir. I don't recall specifically what I told him to do, but I do recall saying words to the effect of "Please find out what's going on here and figure out if we can get this fixed." I do recall someone, and I don't

remember who it was, suggesting to me that I needed to start issuing orders to (b)(3), (b)(6) And to the best of my recollection that was around the time that I had told the lawyers, "Hey, someone says this is illegal, that is what we have lawyers for, check this out. Let's get somebody who has a JD [JA] to tell us specifically whether this is legal or not." I realize that I'm going past your question here, but someone, you know, a responsible member of the team, not necessarily somebody who is trying to be recalcitrant on several occasions during my tenure there various officers would say, hey, this does it match the statute. I don't say that someone said, hey, this is illegal, but somebody would say we are not following the law here. We were spending hundreds of millions of dollars a month, and so trying to ensure that every time we spent money we were on the right side of the law, there were numerous -- I would say there were numerous occasions where people expressed concern to me about the legality of some action or order. On occasion it was really more a policy concern than a legal concern. But by referring it to the lawyers that is one of the things we were able to do is determine: Hey, is this really a legal concern or is it in fact a policy concern? We gave our lawyers a lot of work. You know, I still remember when I attended SOLO, General Tate telling us "CYA" stands for "call your attorney", and so every TDY in the command, everyone, went through our attorneys. I think if you polled the people that worked closely with me they would probably tell you that, you know, as a Chief of Staff I sent a lot of stuff to the lawyers, and that -- a lot of it was and let's figure out exactly what the law says here. You are the one that is paid to tell us ~~to review it so bring it back~~. if it is legal or not.

IO: So would you say people were encouraged to question legality and correctness of policy and those kinds of things to ensure that the command didn't overstep its boundaries, or was it -- how did you consider it? Was it a pain? Was it something you didn't want to have happen? Tell me how you can consider these requests for clarification or people questioning orders.

WIT: Sir, I will tell you I consider that a responsible officer's duty to do that.

IO: To do what?

WIT: To question things, to critique things, to identify where they think there are problems, or where we are stepping over a policy, regulatory, or legal line. I think it was General Herzog when he took over as TRADOC had a great statement where he said, "If you're violating regulations, let me know. If you violate the law, you are on your own." I offer this as I guess background and context, and I can provide you written copies of these if you would like.

As a Regimental Commander everybody that I rated, senior rated, an intermediate rated got an initial counseling that required them to disagree with me at least three times a quarter. And then when we did performance counseling they had to identify what they were, and we had to talk about productive disagreement. Now, periodically people would come in and say, well, sir, I said we should be shirts and you said skins. And, of course, we'd say okay that doesn't quite cut it. It has got to be something, you know, legitimate. It's got to be something that matters because, you know, if you're passionate about your craft and what you are doing: Number one, you are going to be aggressive and sometimes you will make mistakes, and so we have the people on the left or right to help us regain ~~our~~ our focus on what the appropriate thing to do is; but, number two, people are going to disagree about the way ahead.

I know that I had intended on issuing that in writing to each of the staff directors, and I told them that when I arrived. I did not issue them initial counseling that contained that in this position. This is one of those where I think -- you know, I have a body of work of almost 10 years, you know, since I took field grade command -- I shouldn't say that, not quite 10 years, where that has been a

directive to my subordinates. So at least I think I can prove to you that that is my professional outlook that not only is it authorized but it is encouraged or even required to offer disagreement.

And I believe the general Caldwell is the same way. He frequently said, "Do not wait on bad news. Come give me bad news. And, you know, I don't look forward to bad news, but, by God, I need to know it." Some of the times where he got upset with me was not that I had brought him bad news but that I didn't bring him bad news in a timely fashion. You know, a constant balancing act ~~between~~ before any subordinate, okay, is this my level or his? Should I take action and inform him or do I need to pass it to him. this is

Sir, does that answer your question?

IO: Yes. This is helpful. If I talked to your subordinates, people who served under your supervision and your peers about this time that you were in the Chief of Staff position, how do you think they would characterize how you took disagreement or questioning of policy and law? How do you think they would characterize that about you?

WIT: Sir, I think they would tell you that I enjoy arguing. That, you know, I like -- in fact, I said this several times and I think they would quote it back to you: "I think meetings ought to be provocative." It is a waste of time otherwise -- and sure there is -- some spread ~~the~~ of information, make sure everybody has a common outlook, and all of that. But meetings are in place to address provocative issues. I think particularly if you ask people if I ever said that, they will tell you that I did. I think our -- I encouraged professional confrontation and provocative topics to be placed on agendas.

I had a Saturday morning staff meeting and several times I told people that, "Our goal here is not just to whip through stuff, but we need to bring up provocative things." And the staff directors and I had several meetings where we argued about policies. One in particular was release from the command. The commanding general said I was the only one who could release people from the command, and if you like I could go into the reason why, but -- we had one staff meeting in particular where I had told the acting CJ-2, Mr (b)(3), (b)(6) [phonetic], I want you to bring up this point because I realize that there is a -- you know, staff directors and I don't see it the same way, and I want us to talk about it, and I want it to be provocative, and I want us to come up with a answer. (b)(3), (b)(6)

IO: So in these arguments that you said you encouraged and enjoyed, were you always the winner or did you allow somebody else to sway your belief unless it was a matter of law or policy?

WIT: Sir, that's a good question because I understand it is one thing to encourage people to disagree with the boss and tell them no. I think in this specific example that I highlighted I believe if you go back and talk to the staff directors that were there, what I did was I backed off of my position -- and I am talking about the release letters in particular where at the end of it I said, "Okay. You are right. What I'm doing is not the correct way to proceed. I need to follow what you guys are doing and here is how we are going to set this up. And I realize raising one's voice is not necessarily always an indication of their tyrannical nature, but I believe I raised my voice -- I yelled three times during that year as the Chief of Staff. And I think if you talk to people that worked with me, you know, say -- ~~in regards~~ when I was a Battalion Commander I think it was twice that I raised my voice. If anything I believe particularly if you talk to people who worked with me over time, they will tell you that I am a consensus builder by nature.

IO: Did you ever raise your voice at Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, not to my recollection. I don't think he was in the group. There was a staff meeting where I raised my voice. I don't recall -- I mean, because there were 30 to 35 people there. I don't think

Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was there, but, sir, I don't recall any time where I raised my voice at Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

IO: Were you in Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) rating chain?

WIT: Sir, initially I was his senior rater. Again, very early in my tenure there General Caldwell made it clear to me that he wanted us to publish a rating scheme once a month, and he wanted me to sign it. He wanted it signed every month.

IO: Why once a month?

WIT: Sir, we had a great deal of turbulence inside the command. When I arrived there we had a number of people who were on six-month rotations. Some non-U.S. personnel were on anywhere from 4 to 15 months rotations. Some of the U.S. personnel were on 12 months. If we didn't attack that every -- if we didn't address it every month, we would get behind. So early on Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was his rater and I was his senior rater. Later on during the year, there was a decision made by -- I know Dr. Kern, our civilian deputy, is the one who made the decision, and I am not sure about with whom he had discussed it -- the decision made that he would senior rate Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) And one of the reasons for that was so that I would be removed from the rating scheme and that this would be yet another individual who would assess how Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had performed. It would remove any stigma a specific individual or even a small group of individuals were the only ones evaluating how he performed, what his potential was, if there had been any acts of indiscipline or misconduct.

IO: There are indications that we found that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and his 71st Field Support Team were assigned to the CJ-5. So what was the role of Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) in all of this?

WIT: Sir, my understanding is when he originally arrived he was in the CJ-5. I know that they were moved from the supervision of the CJ-5 underneath the Communications Directorate, and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) with the Director of the Communications Directorate. My understanding is that when they arrived, and they arrived, and they arrived prior to General Caldwell taking command, that General Formica had used them in an Information Operations role. I only have hearsay to support that.

My understanding is that when General Caldwell took over, in making an assessment of changes he wanted to make in the command, he decided to move them from underneath the CJ-5 supervision to the Communications Directorate. And my understanding was part of that was based on the fact that he did not want us executing Information Operations. He believed that, you know, they were better served in that capacity.

Now, if I could, sir.

IO: Go ahead.

WIT: Again, my understanding -- and I certainly saw this later in my 10 years as Chief of Staff. My understanding is that this team was mobilized and deployed and because they were from the National Guard, for all kinds of great reasons we go out of our way as a military not to demobilize somebody before the end of their deployment if they are from the Reserve component. My understanding is there were some U.S. forces Afghanistan that for whatever reason the original focus of their deployment was either no longer valid or some decision was made to send them to at that time. CSTC-A. I don't know the rationale for that at all. I do know that when General Caldwell said that we were not going to do Information Operations that, you know, them serving in that function was no longer viable because the commander had precluded us from doing that. It would have been foolish for us, particularly at that point in time, where we were literally thousands of people short in an organization

that at that time was authorized less than 5000 people to have not made best use of the people that were assigned to the command.

I remember talking with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) very late one night, on the board, ~~and what~~ that was in our conference room, ~~and~~ Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) wrote down, "We need to find some pockets of competence, and then we need to make sure that we have loaded those people up to the limits of their capability." ~~In~~ My perception of Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) when I arrived and went through the standard Chief Of Staff Orientation and meeting people, is that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was capable and smart, ~~and~~ I had some dealings with him when I first took over in February and in March that led me to believe the same thing.

You know, I'm talking about before I got there, but for me I thought it was prudent to take a look at who is assigned to the command; we are woefully short; we've got to make sure that the people that are capable are assigned to things we need to get done. And there were a number of task organization changes that took place during that period of time. We affected a major task organization change, for example, in April -- middle of April -- middle to end of April where we made some -- we called them "pocket staffs" for the deputy commanders, where we took an entire organization deployed by the Air Force, the Logistics ~~and~~ Training Advisory Group, and broke it apart and assigned most of it to the CJ-4 and took the very senior people and assigned them to assistant commanding generals for police development and Army development. So there is a -- we were doing a great deal of looking at the organization, modifying it so that we had good people assigned against what we needed to get done.

IO: But the issues that you talked about why the 71st FST was there, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) unit, what they had been doing before you arrived, et cetera, all of that. You don't have direct knowledge of that.

WIT: Sir, that is entirely hearsay. Yes, sir. That is correct.

IO: Okay. What role did you play in the various Congressional delegation or distinguished visitor visits?

WIT: Sir, it was the rare exception where I didn't participate in the prep session for the flag officers who were going to attend, and the flag officers, flag officers, or others who were actually going to conduct a brief. And then it was the rare exception where I didn't attend the briefing themselves. Again, indicative of General Caldwell's view of a Chief of Staff involved in almost everything and, you know, a key member of the command group. I tended to focus my attention beforehand more on the mechanics of the visit. Part of that was based on up until late summer the Joint Visitors Bureau worked for me. As I told you, I had Wing Commander (b)(6) is the supervisor for the JVB Director, but I was also involved in the prep session, which was largely substantive.

IO: Okay. Do you recall meeting with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) regularly or infrequently or only in the context of large meetings, or did you have some occasion to talk to him one-on-one?

WIT: Sir, early in my tenure, as I mentioned to you before, I was interested in what our process was going to be for, you know, communications. And as I indicated, I believe -- well, number one, it was based on what I had tried to put in place for the command in the 3rd Infantry Regiment and nested not only with the thoughts of various ISAF senior staffers and also General Cucolo, ~~Regional~~ Army Chief of Public Affairs. So I spent some time talking about that, drawing on the board.

I know I talked to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) on a couple of -- a few occasions about things related to that. I didn't have a routinized meeting with him that was scheduled as part of my battle rhythm. Specifically, in February General Caldwell had asked Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) to develop a list of think tanks in the U.S. with whom we ought to develop a dialogue and maintain a dialogue. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had --

add CSIS, too.

excuse me, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had asked Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) to develop the list. He sent the list to me, and I offered to him to please add -- I know I told him to add the Center for New American Security and I think also CSIS. I also asked him to talk to Professor (b)(3), (b)(6) phonetic] at the Army war College to ask him to take a look at the list and see if it was comprehensive or not (b)(3), (b)(6) and that and we talked a little bit about that. He and I also had an e-mail conversation about a note I had forwarded to a few people that talked about, you know, communication's processes. He specifically wrote me back a note and I believe we talked about it in person about measures of effectiveness versus measures of performance. You know, early in my tenure I tried to get out and meet as many people as I could. As I got more into the battle rhythm I ended up restricting more and more with whom I had routinized meetings to direct reports.

IO: What kind of assessments were done after CODEL or DV visits?

WIT: Sir, unfortunately I didn't participate in many of the IEWGs where, you know, it was -- it was certainly my desire that that organization be responsible to see, you know, how well we had communicated, if our facts were right, if we had placed them in context, how those who had attended either questioned what we said so we might take a look at our fax or how they absorbed and how they helped us put it in context. We certainly did some informal assessments where we would talk about the types of charts that we used and the manner in which we communicated.

Senator Lindsey Graham visited numerous times; sometimes as Senator; sometimes as Colonel. And one of the things he told us when he had visited once is to say, "You have too much data on your charts here. You show me these PowerPoint slides here and I'm not really sure what to look at. Simplify your charts." So we certainly made that kind of assessment and that one in particular was largely me and the CAG and some other folks in the command group.

IO: You said that you had a discussion with Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) about MOP and MOE, performance and effectiveness measures, so was that about assessments of previous visits or what was that about?

WIT: Sir, it was more generic than that. It wasn't specifically focused on what we were doing in NTM-A but it was concept. I had gotten, I think through one of those SAMS hot loops, a note that talked about Strategic Communications (I think is precisely what was in the subject) and I have got a copy of that e-mail discourse here. And I had sent it out to a few people involved in that process. And (b)(3), (b)(6) had written me back and said "I entirely agree or you are right on" or something like that. And then went on to discuss a little bit about MOP and MOE.

IO: Do you know if some of the staff in the IEWG were tasked with producing packets for DVs and CODELs in preparation for their visits?

WIT: Yes, sir. We made a deliberate effort to try and prepare for any DVs that were showing up. And there were some people, you know, you can decide where the threshold is for distinguished visitor, but if somebody was coming for an engagement with us we tried to prepare for it. We tried to identify "What is it that they are coming to learn? What questions do they have of us? What do we think is appropriate for them to understand about our organization?"

IO: When you say, "appropriate for them"; what do you mean by "appropriate"?

WIT: Sir, for example, and this is conceptual, it's hypothetical, if we have somebody coming who is -- his focus is on foreign affairs, then they're probably most likely interested in things involving foreign affairs and diplomatic relationships. They may be less concerned and it may mean less to them about what our process is for auditing our money trail. So when I say "appropriate" I'm not talking

about legal and regulatory distinctions per se, but also about what is relevant, I guess that would be a better word to use there.

IO: And how would you determine what was relevant or appropriate? Two words that you have used.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: How would you determine that? What process was used to determine it?

WIT: Sir, typically before an engagement took place there would be preparation at action officer level that would include the Congressional Liaison Officer, that would include some folks from the Communications Directorate, would include the action officer from the CAG. And as I mentioned previously, they would try and look had this individual been there before; if so when? What had been told to them before? What was ground truth at that time? Were there any distinctions in ground truth now? Had something changed for better or for worse?

IO: Let me just ask about that. You said "what was ground truth at that time" and "what was ground truth now". Does that mean you are modifying the truth?

WIT: Sir, I would tell you in no way was that the case. One of the things that I think, again, one could rigorously show is that we were very open about what our challenges were, what things were not going well. I don't know that I could tell you that was a piece of every brief, but I believed that it was. We tried to be very upfront about what's not working. And we labeled the challenges, and I think you will see that on most of our formal briefing products, most of our -- if not all, of our reports that went in.

IO: Are you saying that the facts and the truth was different because situation and conditions changed over time or because you personally or you purposely changed what you told them because you wanted to influence them in a different way? Which was it?

WIT: Sir, we did not manipulate the truth. We tried to be very factual in what we were portraying. ~~betraying~~. And when I say "factual" I am talking about being objective to the greatest amount possible. I believe it was in April General Caldwell directed that we develop a set of ~~matrix~~ metrics. "This was important enough that the final version I did personally on my computer with a bunch O-6 staff directors sitting around my office late into the evening where we decided ~~on~~ why this is a valid measure. This is something that is relevant to what we are doing. We need to track this over time." I think this is an indication that we were ~~were~~ trying to manufacture truth, by God, we were trying to report the appropriate data. I don't want to get melodramatic but that again is part of the oath.

IO: So do you recall telling people we are to gather information from on the visitors who are coming in? Was that all public information, publicly available information that had to be gathered and sorted and prepared for the senior briefer, or was it information that was not available to the public that you were trying to get inside of the heads of these congressmen or something like that?

WIT: Sir, I don't know of -- number one, I don't know of how we would have gathered other than publicly available information, nor am I aware of any attempt to gather other than publicly available information. I guess that is, you know -- I don't know how we would've garnered something else.

IO: Okay, let's take a short break.

[The hearing recessed at 1024, 15 March 2011.]

[The hearing resumed at 1031, 15 March 2011.]

LA: Sir, can I make an admin correction before we start. At the beginning I said it was 0805, but we have just gone to daylight savings time, so it is 0905 when we started.

WIT: I don't think that is a ~~reversal~~ error. reversable

WIT: Sir, if it is acceptable could I add something to my last response.

IO: Yes, of course.

WIT: Sir, you mentioned -- your words were "get inside people's heads". If you don't mind, what I would like to do is offer you -- I know that was one of the quotes attributed to the Chief of Staff in the Rolling Stone article, two sentences; one of them being "How do I get inside people's heads?" I don't have as good a recollection of my precise quotes a year ago as apparently some do that attributed them to me in that article. Now, in the defense of Mr. Hastings and Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)f he was the source, specifically in the article it just says the Chief of Staff, so it could've been Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)they were talking to. But I would tell you I have no recollection of making that statement, and I would also tell you that I tend to speak in plural pronouns. I will say we, us, our, unless I'm talking about my responsibility. And that is another thing that I think you could check with the people with whom I have worked, and they would say the same thing, and I have also written about it in a Brigade Command AAR that is widely distributed throughout the Army. So I would tell you I believe that is an indication that that is an inaccurate quote, if, in fact, it was intended to be attributed to me.

IO: Okay. Describe your working relationship with Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)and what position he was in and how you conducted business with him.

WIT: Sir, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) is a Marine Communicator. He was assigned, as I understand it, initially into the CJ-3 into a deputy position. General Caldwell brought with him in November an officer who he intended have worked as his 3 and that was Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6) before I arrived was assigned as the Director of Communications. General Caldwell had faith in his ability to organize that. He liked Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)you know, what he was able to accomplish in terms of outreach to Afghan media, to U.S. media, to European media, you know. He was aggressive in terms of building a website that offered, you know, pictures of what the command was doing that provided people who worked inside NTM-A/CSTC-A with the opportunity to put some blogs down there.

I did not -- Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)was not a direct report to me, however, I am not trying to shirk responsibility there. Just like I said before, you know, informally everybody works for the Chief of Staff. Well, the reverse is also true; everybody is kind of a direct report to the Chief of Staff. So I monitored what was going on in the Communications Directorate just as I did for the -- depending on the point in time between the other 13 to 20 people who were formally in my direct reports.

IO: Okay. What was Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)like to work with? Professional, calm, and quiet, or very aggressive, explosive, loud, argumentative?

WIT: Sir, I never witnessed him being explosive, loud or argumentative. His dealings with me and his dealings with others while I was present, he was entirely professional. I did hear reports from time to time about him raising his voice and him being very directive with people. The reports I got were insufficient for me to take significant concern over it, but I did talk to him one time about, you know, making sure that his message -- what he was trying to get his people to do didn't get lost in transmission because of the way he transmitted it.

IO: Do you think there were cultural and service and international differences of policy, law, culture, et cetera, that caused relationships to be a little more strained than they otherwise might have been if they were all one service?

WIT: Sir, I certainly think that is the case. We had all five U.S. services represented in the command and as you indicate, there are certainly different service protocols, ethics, cultures that are at play. And when you add in the international flavor that -- I would say isn't just additive, but perhaps multiplicative in terms of the dynamics. That plus the fact that we were at that point in time -- and I am talking about early in the calendar year of 2010 -- under strength compared to what we were authorized and needed certainly added to a level of stress and may have contributed to people being short-tempered or being interpreted as curt or overly directive or even, you know, loud and abusive, whereas others might not have viewed it in that way.

IO: Do you think that there were different interpretations and understandings of what Public Affairs, IO, Strategic Communications, and Communications Director what those terms meant to people in different services with different specialties and backgrounds with different international origins, et cetera?

WIT: Yes, sir. I do believe there are different interpretations and understandings of Information Operations, and it wasn't necessarily just across the services, but also across specialties inside services and certainly outside of the U.S. -- the NATO part of our command.

IO: How about your working relationships with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Was he the Public Affairs officer or do you remember if Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) sir, was a -- one of the direct reports to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) I served as his senior rater (b)(3), (b)(6) as a Public Affairs officer and during the period of time ~~where~~ he was there, he worked for Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and he focused on -- first, on media. He also focused on other engagements but when (b)(3), (b)(6) was there he was the -- I am talking geographically here too -- he was the guy in charge locally of the Public Affairs shop which was down Gator Alley on Camp Eggers.

IO: You said just now that (b)(3), (b)(6) worked for (b)(3), (b)(6) Is that what you mean?

WIT: No, sir, that is incorrect (b)(3), (b)(6) worked for (b)(3), (b)(6) I apologize.

IO: Okay. And so he worked for (b)(3), (b)(6) directly and not for General Caldwell, as far as you recall?

WIT: Sir, that is right. And, again, I was his senior rater. I senior rated him on his report, and I couldn't have done that if Caldwell was his rater.

IO: Do you know how big the Public Affairs shop was and what kind of things -- what kind of work was done in there?

WIT: Sir, over time the size changed.

IO: Did you think it was large, small, about right?

WIT: I thought it was a little small particularly early in calendar year 2010 for what we asked them to do and what we needed them to do. And there was also some specialty mismatches there. One of the things that we wanted to do is make sure that we improved access to our website by Afghans, people in the U.S., and people in the coalition. You know, that kind of specialty wasn't necessarily resident in what we had, so we moved people around to take advantage of their capabilities, but that is an example of a place where we could have used more people and people with that specialty or that expertise.

IO: We have testimony that the Public Affairs shop was 24 strong or such -- some contractors, some interpreters, some people who were looking at specific things -- but some people have testified that with a shop that large there were still people sitting around looking at Facebook much of the day.

Does any of that ring a bell to you as being true or something you have heard of before or not?

WIT: Some of the people in that directorate also performed the roles as advisers to various people inside the two security ministries: The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense. I certainly can't speak for, you know, what all the individuals did day-to-day. I can tell you, sir, that when I found people who were unemployed; they became employed. It wasn't a punitive measure. It was a pragmatic one. We didn't have a sufficient number of people to do what we were required to do according to our mission. At certain times during the year various directors, for instance, came to me and said, "Hey, I have run out of work for this guy. I want to send him back seven days early. 'No. I will reassign him to work seven days somewhere else.'" You know, if there is a once-in-a-lifetime event we are going to send him back early; if there is a birth of a child; kid graduating from high school; but if that is not the case everybody is going to be employed. And that was true even later in the year when our strength was higher.

IO: How familiar are you with the 71st Information OP's Forward Support Team that Lieutenant Colonel Holmes was the leader of?

WIT: Sir, I am familiar with Lieutenant Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)nd Major(b)(3), (b)(6) I have an individual who was the platoon leader in the company I commanded in Desert Storm; he is a member of 1st IO Command, so he and I have talked over the years very broadly about it. You know, in CGSC we talked a little bit about IO Forward Support Teams.

IO: Do you know how many people were on the Forward Support Team, the 71st?

WIT: Sir, my understanding is that there were five on that team.

IO: And did you have any working relationship with the rest of the five?

WIT: Sir, certainly no routinized interaction with them. Now, the replacement for that team, the team that was deployed after Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)eam -- for instance, Lieutenant Colo(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)rves as the Deputy inside the Communications Directorate at it now. The Master Sergeant on that team is the NCOIC of the Communications Directorate. Specifically, with the spatial arrangement that exists now, I had more interaction with those people than I did with Colon(b)(3), (b)(6)nd his team.

IO: You said earlier that the 71st was assigned to Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)nd he was the Director of Communications, and do you recall what the 71st -- what the IO FST's primary duties were?

WIT: Sir ---

IO: You were the senior rater.

WIT: Sir, I was.

I am aware that Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)directed that Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)ssist in the assessment process, and I could quote his written directive, but using publicly available information to determine this. They were also involved in some other efforts. They were assigned by Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)o put on a concert for various members of the ANSF. They were also working on a comic book, quite frankly, you know, in an illiterate society, that is, a very effective means to communicate, so he was working on that piece too.

IO: Do you recall that they were also out teaching Strategic Communications or IO to the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Interior?

WIT: Sir, there was a course that they had in place where they were part of the instructors for that.

IO: Did this set of instructor duties, these tasks, were they -- with the FST relieved of those tasks at some point while you were there that you know of, or did they continue with our responsibility as well as helping to prepare for DVs?

WIT: Sir, I am not aware that they were relieved of those responsibilities. I know that there was a graduation while Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and his team were there. I don't recall about the next iteration of it, so I am not familiar. I don't know if they were relieved of that responsibility.

DE: Sir, I got a follow-up. You mentioned a concert for the ANSF and you mentioned a comic book. Do you know who -- was CSTC-A responsible for producing these things?

WIT: We did -- we played -- when you say "responsible" we certainly were the ones that were ----

DE: Did you fund it?

WIT: --- working -- I don't know the answer to that question.

DE: Do you don't how it was done?

WIT: I do not. The comic book I believe was released in late calendar year 2010. I am not familiar with how it was funded.

DE: I have other testimony that says that the concert and the comic book were both productions of the 41st Information Operations Task Force. So my question is if you don't do IO, what are the comic books for? What is the concert for?

WIT: Yeah. Well, I would tell you that the concert was there as a reward for Soldiers, and I think it was Soldiers specifically in this one, who had deployed, you know, did a good job. It was a way to reward them for it.

DE: Afghan Soldiers?

WIT: That's correct. Yes.

I take exception to anyone indicating that merely because either someone with an IO specialty was involved or even an IO Command was involved, that Information Operations were perpetrated. For example, we had an Air Defense Artillery Battalion that was assigned to the Command and if someone were to say because of that it is clear that we were doing Air Defense Operations I think it's foolish. We have an Artillery Battalion assigned, and we ~~were~~ weren't doing artillery operations. We had several Special Forces officers assigned.

DE: I was given to understand that the concert specifically -- the comic book not so much -- but the concert specifically was to put on display for the Afghan national population and was later actually broadcast nationally on TV, that those were to give the impression that the Army was making some strides towards not only competence but -- you know, the Army was as much on display because I've seen it -- the Army is as much on display in this concert as the people who are singing.

WIT: And I can't talk to you necessarily about how or who used various videos about the concert. I do know that at least our focus with respect to the concert was something, you know, an incentive for people in the ANSF. For example, with the ANCOP, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, our Deputy Commander for police was instrumental in when one of the ANCOP Battalions returned from deployment, that they had a welcome home ceremony; that there were key leaders there

that thanked them for their service. You know, we took all kinds of steps to try and help members of the ANSF mimic effective leadership behavior that we thought was appropriate. That is part of our advisory role.

You know, General Petraeus and General McChrystal both worked on getting senior Afghan leaders out into the countryside. General Petraeus tracked how many of the ministers had traveled outside Kabul. So, you know, I can tell you that my perspective and I think our command's perspective specifically with respect to this concert was the reason that we were putting it on was focused on, you know, the Soldiers and giving them a reward, you know, some incentive for doing it.

IO: At some point did CSTC-A start doing assessments of the effectiveness of the congressional delegations, you had talked about that briefly earlier, and if so when did the command start doing this? Do you know?

WIT: Sir ----

IO: Was it about this surge in February/March timeframe?

WIT: I am not trying to get out of answering your question specifically. When I arrived in early February, took over about the middle of February, my perception is that from the time I got there we were trying to assess, you know, how well we were engaging -- it is not just with visitors. For example, we took a look at how many people visited our website. There were some times we would attempt to correlate, "Okay, there was a surge there in the number of people who visited the website. What was it that drew them to the website?" So I certainly viewed it as an ongoing effort.

IO: And General Caldwell's purpose for these assessments and for shaping each briefing was to inform and educate?

WIT: Sir, it is and I think it would be irresponsible if we didn't prepare for senior folks to come to the command. You know, let's take senators who come and visit. They have a limited amount of time. They are clearly there to find out, you know, the relevant facts placed in context of the situation there. We needed to pay attention. What questions ~~[illegible]~~ ask ~~this~~? We need to make sure that we have the answers to those questions. What information is relevant for their decisions? We need to provide that information to them. And then, for example, I told you Senator Graham had told us, "Hey, simplify your charts some." Again, it is entirely proper. It would be unprofessional not to assess how well we had communicated to them. If we believe this is a relevant fact for a national decision-makers; how well did we give it to them? That's, again, we took an oath to do that.

will they

IO: Did you sit in on most of these senior DV and CODEL visits?

WIT: Sir, I did. The vast majority. Yes, sir.

IO: Did you find that it was common practice for them to ask at the end what can we do to help you: what can I -- how can I help you?

WIT: Sir, that was certainly the case. It was during the brief, after the brief. Specifically Senator Levin, Senator McCain, Senator Lieberman. I would say it was almost universal that we were asked: What can we do to assist you in this endeavor?

IO: And did you look at their backgrounds and assess their interests and the committees they sat on and how they voted in the past and those kinds of things? Did you gather that information so that you could focus what you asked them to do for you or was there some other reason?

WIT: Sir, all the information ~~they~~ we gathered was entirely focused on informing and educating them; provided them the facts; placing them in context. For example, Senator Reid served in the 82nd Airborne Division. He has an intuitive sense of how large a battalion is or what a brigade consists of.

There are other senators or representatives or visitors who don't have any military connection, haven't served on military committees, so it is important as you're preparing for visitors to figure out what kind of words you can use. If you say "battalion" do you have to identify that a battalion has about 7 to 800 people or can you just say it is a battalion, and they understand it is commanded by an officer who has got about 15 to 20 years experience. Those are literally the kind of things that we would discuss.

You know, the OSD, the joint staff, the Central command, and ISAF, legislative liaison teams all have, you know, pages that they would provide that say, hey, here is the Senator that is coming and here are the committees they serve on. Here's the last time they visited Afghanistan. You know, those organizations and those people certainly track data about our nation's leaders, again so that we can answer the appropriate questions and provide them facts and put them in context.

IO: Do you recall visitors from NATO nations coming?

WIT: Yes, I do.

IO: And is it true that you were short NATO military trainers and police trainers throughout much of the time you were there?

WIT: Sir, that is true. Always on the order of hundreds and sometimes over 1000. Sir, it is also true we -- during the entire time I was there, we were not up to the assigned strength of U.S. personnel. I think it is classified exactly what our priority of our joint manning documents are inside DoD, but we were fairly high. Even with this, we remained short of assigned personnel from the U.S. side.

IO: Did you try to inform and educate U.S. or NATO visitors about the shortages of personnel in order to achieve the intent of getting a higher level of resourcing so that you could accomplish more?

WIT: Sir, we absolutely did. And it's -- I can't envision a situation where that kind of behavior in that situation would be nefarious. Someone else, a senior leader, had determined what the priority was of our manning and our assignment level. If they have already done that and we haven't been assigned sufficient personnel, it would be inappropriate for us not to highlight to various people who could influence that what our documented requirements were in order to accomplish the mission with respect to personnel.

IO: At any point do you recall Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) challenging whether or not his team should work on the CODEL and DV visits?

WIT: Sir, I do. I don't recall Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) expressing it to me in person. He may have. I do recall the issue being brought to my attention. I believe it was by Wing Commander (b)(6) but I can't remember. This was around the -- it was in late March, and it was as a consequence of Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) [sic], from the states, issuing him a written directive.

IO: (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: I apologize. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) sir, issuing him written direction of the assessment. Again, we had all kinds of conversations throughout the command about what the best use of various personnel were. And we needed our subordinates to identify where they thought they could best contribute and what they thought was the most important input, so differences about what people ought to be focusing on was not out of the ordinary.

I mentioned to you before that the change in task organization for LTAG, Logistics, Training and Advisory Group. That was very controversial. People arguing about what we ought to be doing and what we ought not do, so subordinates identifying something else that they ought to be doing or not doing was not out of the ordinary.

IO: So when this was brought to your attention, do you recall how you felt about Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Did you get mad? Did you decide to get back at him? Did you decide that you were going to teach him a lesson?

WIT: Sir, no to any of the things you just said, if I recall them correctly. I absolutely and unequivocally state that there was, number one, no desire to commit any reprisal or retribution for him having offered this. You know, this was, of course, one more action that we needed to take, but it was one more action that we needed to take. But from my perspective this is not out of the ordinary. Someone had asserted that something was beyond the bounds of what they ought to be doing according to the law, and so I referred it to our SJA, and then I moved onto one of the myriad of other tasks that confronted us.

IO: You don't recall talking to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) about this person? His objection to the directive of that (b)(3), (b)(6) had given him?

WIT: Sir, I recall talking to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) about what the focus of his team was. I cannot remember, quite frankly, if this was before or after (b)(3), (b)(6) had issued the direction. Again, I had assessed Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) when I first met him as a smart and motivated individual. You know, I didn't assign to (b)(3), (b)(6) any -- I didn't question his motivation for doing this. He had raised an issue of the legality of the directive, so the way to dispose of them properly is have the expert in legality provide an opinion back.

IO: Do you recall that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) I went on R&R at about the same time?

WIT: Yes, sir, that was in late March. Now, there was a combination of -- they were all gone at about the same time. During some points during their absence they were TDY and not all R&R (b)(3), (b)(6) had one of his offspring -- I can't remember son or daughter -- it was the available time for them to get together. I can't remember the specific circumstances that (b)(3), (b)(6) needed to go during that period of time. I don't specifically recall when (b)(3), (b)(6) was gone.

IO: With your personal involvement and General Caldwell's personal involvement in Strategic Communications and the importance that it took for the command; did it seem okay to you that all three of these personnel with a key role to play in Strategic Communications -- in Communications; did it occur to you that they were all leaving at the same time and was set okay? Or how did this all come about?

WIT: Sir, I certainly -- I looked into specifically why those people had to go at those times. I remember (b)(3), (b)(6) rationale, but I do not remember (b)(3), (b)(6) rationale for it. I would -- in part of the reason I investigated was try to see if we could offset them. I did not view Major (b)(3), (b)(6) absence as important to synchronize as (b)(3), (b)(6) Again, this was one of those times where I thought, you know, the personal interests of the officers involved likely outweighed the impacts on the command.

IO: Do you recall a Major (b)(3), (b)(6) who worked in Communications?

WIT: Sir, I do.

IO: Was there a discussion as to whether a more senior officer should be left in charge of Communications such as Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or someone else, or that it should be Major Hillman who was in charge while (b)(3), (b)(6) were all gone?

WIT: I recall asking about the chain of command while all of these folks were gone. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) felt most comfortable with Major (b)(3), (b)(6) being in charge. He also indicated that, you know,

"I will be up on e-mail so I can -- you know, it is the 21st-century, so I can be involved in some extent." It was difficult because, of course, we have Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) - I think I am saying her name right - (b)(3), (b)(6) who are having to work through the focus for the entire directorate in the absence of Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

IO: Did you have to get involved in arguments between them in any way, or did you only find out about this after the fact?

WIT: Sir, there were certainly, you know, Major (b)(3), (b)(6) came to me from time to time and said, "Hey, I need help with this or I need help with that." That was one of the reasons that I asked Wing Commander (b)(6) to talk to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) I guess, again, by nature I'm a consensus builder and so my goal was to get in a less confrontational manner than me going and directing everybody what to do was to get Wing Commander (b)(6) to look into it. The other aspect of it is I knew that I just didn't have the time to be the Communications Director and addition to being the Chief of Staff, so I was trying to make sure that I didn't take over that role when I knew that I wouldn't be able to do it well.

IO: You mentioned earlier that you recall someone, you couldn't recall who, but someone telling you that the time had arrived for you to give direction -- to give orders to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Was that potentially Major (b)(3), (b)(6) who during this period may have talk to you about that?

WIT: Sir, it may well have been. I honestly don't recall, and I am certain she would have felt more comfortable if someone senior to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had issued him direction.

IO: Can you tell me why Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) appears to have left the Director of Communications position soon after returning from R&R?

WIT: We had a British officer, Colonel (b)(6) who I think fairly senior levels of the British government had agreed to assist us in our personnel shortages, and so Colonel (b)(6) was one of the ones who was coming to us. And he was coming to us to perform in the role of the Communication Director. I think literally the British called STRATCOMS. With that kind of deal in place, there was a necessity to assign him to that role, and it wasn't just a political and diplomatic requirement, either. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had some bona fides associated with having performed that function.

General Caldwell still wanted Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) involved. I think the title we assigned to him was "spokesman", and so he continued in that role still contributed to Strategic Communications.

IO: Okay. Did he remain a rater for Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, I don't recall. I do believe that is the case, but I don't recall. We may have transitioned it to Colonel (b)(6)

IO: To your knowledge was SJA requested to do a legal opinion on whether or not Major (b)(3), (b)(6) could task Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) to do some DV prep work?

WIT: I don't recall if they were tasked to do it. I do recall one of the lawyers saying that (b)(3), (b)(6) could do that because she had been left in charge. I don't have, sir. I haven't found an e-mail that indicates that.

IO: You didn't ask for this opinion. It wasn't something that you decided on. It wasn't something key to your work.

WIT: No, sir. I don't recall having asked for that.

IO: Do you know a Major (b)(3), (b)(6) who worked in the SJA office?

WIT: Sir, I do. Major (b)(3), (b)(6) was a member of the SJA.

IO: Once (b)(3), (b)(6) brought up the point that he didn't think that he could execute the order that (b)(3), (b)(6) had given him, did Major (b)(3), (b)(6) ask you if she should enforce the order with the legal opinion?

WIT: I don't recall Major (b)(3), (b)(6) having doing that, sir. I do recall saying, "Get the lawyers to decide, you know -- to tell us the legality of that directive."

IO: And do you recall what that legal opinion was?

WIT: Sir, I think it was on the 30th and I have a copy of the e-mail in here. Major (b)(3), (b)(6) sent a note, and I believe it was addressed to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) that indicated her examination of the directive and the nature of the responsibilities was, in fact, legal. And she highlighted -- I can't recall the specific quote. I could refer to it but sharing, assessing. There were three verbs and then specifically publicly available information was, in fact, was a legal directive. And she referenced the various things she sought for guidance, and then she recommended that the order be clarified in writing from (b)(3), (b)(6) to (b)(3), (b)(6) so that, you know, there was no confusion whatsoever about it. Now, I had not asked for Major (b)(3), (b)(6) to be the one to render the opinion. She was, although an experienced attorney, she was fairly junior inside the command. We were pretty rank heavy organization, and I do know that I'd talked frequently to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) the SJA, and his deputy, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and typically one of them was looking at the work that their subordinates had done whether it was determining the legality of an investigation or whether it was an opinion back on spending practices or some kind of TDY expense.

IO: So you depended more on (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) that (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, my practice was refer things to the SJA. They would then identify which of their subordinate attorneys worked on it, we would run it through them, and then it would come back to me. When there was some important topic or resolution of something typically (b)(3) (b)(3), (b)(6) was the one -- and their successors (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) were the ones that came to me and talked about it and talked to the CG. I certainly got direct feedback from their subordinates, but, you know, I certainly depended on them, and I expected them to vet the work of their subordinates.

IO: And do you recall what the e-mail said about (b)(3), (b)(6) relief on whether this order he had been given was legal or not? Do you recall an e-mail on that?

WIT: Sir, if you don't mind I am going to reference ----

IO: Please and then we would like to get copies of all of those that you have.

WIT: ---- the emails I have. Yes, sir.

On the 22nd of March and the timestamp on this is 11:41 a.m. I presume that was local time. I haven't gone back and tried to check to see whether it was UTC or something else. Major (b)(3), (b)(6) sent a note to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) Acting Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Wing Commander (b)(6) that says, "Wing Commander (b)(6) met with me at the IEWG meeting yesterday. He gave me some guidance on how Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) wants the IEWG to progress. Went right in line right with what I said before the meeting. This shouldn't be another calendar scrub. This needs to be a high-level discussion two prep leaders for information engagements. The way we need to start has to be with an assessment of the information engagements from the prior week. How did we do with our communication efforts and messaging? What results did we get?" And then she asks, "To name the point of contacts from his office to provide the assessment piece each week." (b)(3), (b)(6) then writes back and says, "No, we can't. We are not set up to do assessments." And then he does say, "Nor should we assess the effects of information engagements on US or coalition allies. We are focused on the adversary and on the Afghan population by both joint doctrine and US law." He goes

on to identify MCM1 Mobley in the PAO shop who he believes ought to be tasked to do it. And then he talks about some of the Public Affairs -- he calls them STRATCOM officers assigned to the various Deputy Commanders. And then he indicates some other things, you know, the instruction on STRATCOM and some other things that he thinks are his primary missions.

Ther(b)(3), (b)(6)writes back. "I need your help in the process especially in the next month. Can you please identify a person that will do this?" Ther(b)(3), (b)(6)writes back on 22 March. It says, (b)(3), (b)(6)ou will do the assessment piece for the IEWG. You are directly tasked to support the IEWG and all of the DV visits."

IO: Who is writing that to whom?

WIT: This is Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)o Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)sir.

"I am taking that off the PAO plate until both(b)(3), (b)(6)and I, Lieutenant Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6) return, so I need you to do this daily. I want to be clear that this is your task so figure out how you will get it done with your team of five. Make sure you sync with Major(b)(3), (b)(6)each day. This takes priority over all other duties even your duties and MoI and MoD. I expect you to attend each visit and ensure that all details are taken care of prior to the visit. You'll also need to attend the SOCB so that you can prepare the context and develop the prep package for each visit. None of this is hard but I have made this your top priority. Thanks for making it happen."

And I am continuing down the thread here, sir. On 30 March at 9:19, Major(b)(3), (b)(6) writes back to Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)Major(b)(3), (b)(6)and Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)Lieutenant Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)as the Deputy SJA. She says, "Sir, Major(b)(3), (b)(6)my boss Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)asked me to do a legal review of the order to Lieutenant Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)bout collecting, analyzing, and sharing information about DVs and CODELs. I talked with Major(b)(3), (b)(6)couple of days ago to clarify what you are asking Lieutenant Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)o do. I also reviewed the DoD at issue, DoD 5240.01. I have reviewed another applicable regulation DoD 5240.1-R. My conclusions and recommendations: in order to collect, analyze, and share publicly available information about DVs and CODELs is a lawful order." It goes on to identify what DoD 5240.1-R defines as "publicly available". She then defines what "general public" means. "The restrictions on collecting, analyzing, or sharing information under DoD 5240.01 do not apply to this case as this would not be considered intelligence activity. I recommend you clarify what you mean by "collecting, analyzing, and sharing information". Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)hould issue a written order on a DA Form 4856 giving Lieutenant Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)pecific guidance as to what kind of information he is expected to collect, analyze, and share with others for part of the IEWG." And then she lists an example that is largely a restatement of the above.

(b)(3), (b)(6)writes back to(b)(3), (b)(6)and(b)(3), (b)(6)CCin(b)(3), (b)(6)now me, and Lieutenant Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)t says,(b)(3), (b)(6)talking to Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6) Lieutenant Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)orks for me I will direct his duties as required. He is assigned as a STRATCOM team member as directed by the CG. He is not working IO as that function is being done by ISAF. Since we do not do IO in this command his duties have been realigned to where they are required. He is to prep all visitor packets for the IEWG. I plan to make him my deputy when I get back, so I will have better oversight of the daily activities. He will move into the office next to mine in the newsroom." The newsroom as what he called the building in which they worked. "That way I can get him to do something. 27 years of service I have never seen such BS. He needs to get off his butt and do some work. Totally unacceptable."

And I think that is the trail I have on that, sir.

IO: Did you see an assessment -- a legal opinion by a Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) that Information Operations officers are not suppose to engage in influencing US citizens?

WIT: Sir, I did not. If it was brought to my attention I certainly don't recall it. I don't know what -- I don't know how it was characterized to Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) don't know precisely how he viewed it, and, you know, I would have referred it to our SJA and, in fact, in this case, you know, Major Mitchell did more than just look at the controlling instruction, but she actually examined -- she went down and talked to people about the nature of what was going on. So she did more than just provide antiseptic feedback.

IO: So Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) has questioned the orders of (b)(3), (b)(6) A legal opinion has been rendered, first of all, by (b)(3), (b)(6) that said this is not right, it's probably not legal, and then clarified by (b)(3), (b)(6) as you just stated, and so she told (b)(3), (b)(6) to clarify the orders.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) said the orders were clarified in writing and he was comfortable with this. So did you decide at this point in time that I am going to get back at (b)(3), (b)(6) I am going to punish them. I am going to investigate him. I'm going to get back at this guy who is a pain in my side?

WIT: Sir, again, the answer is absolutely not. From my perspective the issue had been raised and been referred to the appropriate expert. The expert had rendered the appropriate opinion.

IO: Were you aware at the time of this e-mail that you just read where (b)(3), (b)(6) was telling (b)(3), (b)(6) someone else about the performance of (b)(3), (b)(6) Where he said "27 years of service I have never seen such BS"?

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: Were you info'd on that e-mail?

WIT: Sir, I certainly was. That was the first time in that trail I had been.

IO: Did that cause you to form an opinion were to decide that you were going to get back at Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) for asking these questions are any of those assessments by (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, no. Absolutely not. I really lacked any rationale for doing that. This was, again, not at all -- not an uncommon occurrence. It had been appropriately referred to an expert. An expert had come back and told us what to do. That had been done. We needed to move on to the ----

IO: So you had other officers, NCOs in the command, other personnel questioning orders of the legality and the appropriateness of other orders?

WIT: Sir, that happened -- frequently may be the wrong term. But it was not at all uncommon particularly with respect to how we were spending money both Title 10 and ASFF.

IO: And you dealt with them the same way? You requested a legal opinion and then you ensured that the command was following the legal ----

WIT: Sir, if it was a legal issue I talked to the -- I had the lawyers tell us what the bounds of legal -- the legal prohibitions were. It was a policy issue, we talked to the people who were communicating with the ~~typically~~ the Undersecretary of Defense for policy in ISAF about -- well, technically USFOR-A, about that piece. But this was -- you know, this was something -- again, my impression of (b)(3), (b)(6) was that he was capable and smart. We needed people like the in the command, you know, and we need to load them up to the limits of their capacity. I was happy to have capable and smart guys on the team.

IO: Do you have any knowledge of Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) senior rater being switched from you to Dr. Kern, I believe?

WIT: Sir, I do. I was on TDY and R&R beginning -- I can't remember if it was the 20th or 21st of August through ----

IO: August?

WIT: Of August, yes, sir. I believe it was the 18th ~~and~~ or 19th of September. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and his team had been scheduled to leave, as I recall, in October. There was a decision made while I was on R&R in an effort to help with the number of personnel in theater to accelerate by a few weeks some folk's departures. The decision was made that his team would leave a little early. The report was prepared and finalized while I was gone, and Dr. Kern was the one who senior rated.

IO: So this was done because he was leaving theater while you were not in theater.

WIT: Sir, I believe that is one of the rationales.

IO: Did you direct this change?

WIT: Sir, I did not.

IO: Did you tell somebody or influence anybody to make this change of senior raters in anyway?

WIT: No, sir. I felt entirely comfortable with ----

IO: So it wasn't your intent to push aside Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) to be senior rated by somebody else because of your negative opinion of him or something you didn't want to do?

WIT: No, sir, not at all. I was very comfortable senior rating the people that I was assigned to senior rate and rating the people I was assigned to rate.

IO: Do you recall how items came to your knowledge about allegations of inappropriate behavior, misconduct, inappropriate relationships, that kind of thing involving (b)(3) and (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Yes, sir. If you will give me a moment, what I would like to do is reference specifically the e-mail trail here. [Pause.]

Sir, what I am going to do is I am going to start with the earliest. Sir, on the 30th of March, and this is time stamped 1854, Major (b)(3), (b)(6) writes to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) CCing Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) the SJA and the deputy SJA. She says, "Sir, in the course of looking into the issue regarding the order, I have got some information suggesting that both Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) may be engaging in an inappropriate relationship, as well as some information that they may have gone off post in civilian clothes to restaurants and they drank alcohol. The nature of the relationship between Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) that they spend an unusually large amount of time together, just the two of them, which seems to be in preparing with their work. It seems to be having a negative impact on the people they work with. My understanding is the Major (b)(3), (b)(6) works for Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) so in addition to the issue regarding the order you gave him, we are also dealing with possible violations of AR 600-20 and GO-1 which prohibits drinking alcohol and wearing civilian clothes without GO approval. We have reason to believe Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) married so there may be other issues too. Since you are Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) boss I thought you should know. How would you like to handle this? Would you like to look into this for yourself when you return? Would is like for us to brief Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and ask him to order a commander's inquiry in the AR 15-6 investigation? Please reply ASAP. I have been told you are on leave, and I am very sorry that we had to deal with this issue during your leave. However, given the

information uncovered and the seriousness of the allegations this needs to be addressed quickly, and we would like your input."

(b)(3), (b)(6)writes back on the 30th, timestamp is 12:53 p.m... He writes to Major(b)(3), (b)(6) He CCs (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)u are just full of good news today. I think if there are allegations of wrongdoing then the best thing to do is investigate. I do know that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)nd Major(b)(3), (b)(6)re two members of a five person team and do work closely together in their duties. I do know of one case where he did go out on town to meet and info op team that was visiting from the Pentagon. This was when he was still working in CJ-5 and was about to chop to my shop. I asked him about the dinner and he told me that the Chief of Staff, Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)had authorized him to go. I haven't heard anything about him drinking alcohol. I think since we have an allegation then we are obligated to look into it. If that is all the good news you have for me today let me know if you need anything else."

On 31 March, 6:55 a.m. is the timestamp. Colon(b)(3), (b)(6)rites to(b)(3), (b)(6) CC(b)(3), (b)(6) and(b)(3), (b)(6)(b)(3), (b)(6)alking to me -- based on Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)note below we recommend a 15-6 investigation. We have a draft appointment memo ready to go if you concur and provide us with the name of an IO. You can appoint an O-6 or an O5 with a date of rank earlier than 1 August 2008."

I responded later, this -- I responded on Tuesday, 6 April(b)(3), (b)(6)alking to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)nd CCing Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6) after sleeping on this a few nights I'd like to charter an IO to look into allegations tha(b)(3), (b)(6)nd his major colleague violated GC-1 but would rather not investigate alleged inappropriate relationship. Concerned that adding that second element to the investigation might be perceived as a witch-hunt. If the investigating officer generates evidence during an investigation of an inappropriate relationship and asks me to broaden the scope of the relationship, I would be willing to do that."

(b)(3), (b)(6)rites back to me and CCs (b)(3), (b)(6) . I think that makes sense. We will rework the appointment memo. Do you have a certain IO in mind?"

In here I also have e-mail traffic where I direct my XO, Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) to find out from CJ-1 who the next directorate is responsible for providing an IO and then simply to make sure that IO has a date of rank earlier than 1 August 2008. So I didn't handpick the IO.

I felt uncomfortable chartering an investigation into inappropriate relationship because while technically, you know, the standard requirement to charter investigations is pretty low, again, I don't want to run around investigating a whole series of things that may or may not lead to some kind of concern. And also if people, particularly folks who work closely together are seen talking together quite a bit, I am not convinced that that is an inappropriate relationship. I was concerned that perhaps in this investigation because one was male and one was female that folks might be drawing more of a conclusion that they needed to.

I believe his name is Lieutenant Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)[sic] was IO that was appointed out of the CJ-7. He conducted the investigation. As I recall he turned it in later that month to the JAG. Lieutenant

IO: Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)was tasked.

WIT: (b)(3), (b)(6) I'm sorry. Yes, sir.

IO: And did you talk to(b)(3), (b)(6)before he started his investigation?

WIT: Sir, I don't recall having to (b)(3), (b)(6) in person. Upon occasion I did talk to some of the IOs beforehand. I don't recall having talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) I tried to spend some time with the appointment memos making sure that they were worded appropriately.

IO: So you didn't brief (b)(3), (b)(6) on what you wanted him to do or how you wanted him to look at (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, I don't recall having done that. I don't recall at all any kind of interaction with this investigating officer that was any different than any of the other investigations that we did. As I look through my e-mails from before. I mean, we had a few other investigations ongoing at that time. For my money this was, you know, another investigation. I mean it was one of those things, you know, we needed to do. We needed to look into the allegations. You know, investigations are interrogative they are not punitive. So it was questioning. It was trying to develop what the facts are.

IO: So it was important to you was gathering the facts and circumstances surrounding these allegations because -- did you have the authority to overlook allegations of misconduct?

WIT: Sir, I certainly didn't. It would have —

IO: You did not?

WIT: I did not have the authority to do that. It would have been improper to not have looked into allegations where there was a reasonable level of evidence or suspicion that acts of misconduct might have taken place.

IO: When you arrived as the Chief of Staff, do you recall what the rules were for traveling off Camp Eggers: rules about civilian clothes: permission to move convoys: number of vehicles: arming status: et cetera?

WIT: Sir, there was a -- I do know that there was a policy in place that had to do with movement control. It, you know, it was really specific about, you know, how one -- permission to move: to whom one reported: and the authorization to move. It described the parameters for those moves.

IO: Did you routinely approve people traveling off Camp Eggers in civilian clothes?

WIT: Sir, I was one of the approval authorities. I tended not to approve people moving off of Camp Eggers in civilian clothing. Some requests that I did routinely approve were those of our NGO, (nongovernmental organization) liaison, Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) . Most of the NGOs with whom she met asked people to visit them in civilian attire. And they did that so as to eliminate a perception that they were meeting regularly with the military.

Now, every one of those that I approved, I mean, I had to get a rationale for why they had to go do this, why this was associated with the mission. I also on a few occasions approved members of the MTAG, Medical Training and Advisory Group, to go meet with the Ministry of Public Health in civilian attire because they had been asked by the Minister of Public Health to go meet them in civilian attire. I approved that because that building is right next to the US Embassy and literally only requires departure from the controlled area around the central part of Kabul for several meters really to kind of get out the gate by [phonetic] Circle and then enter.

Our lawyers were always concerned about having people in civilian attire who were Soldiers carrying concealed weapons. And so I always balance the benefits of going in civilian attire with the risks associated with traveling like that, and the need for us to wear civilian clothes. Most -- well, almost all of our interaction, in our mission, was as a uniformed military presence. We certainly

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have civilians that worked with us, but our military officers we enjoyed an expert authority associated with that. And it was appropriate for us to stay attired in combat gear.

DE ~~IO~~: Sir, I got a quick follow-up. I was interested to hear you read your e-mail about not wanting the investigation to include the inappropriate relationship because, in fact, it does. So, can you account for the fact that you told the lawyers that you didn't want to do that and that they, in fact, went ahead and did it? Or was that added later?

WIT: And, again, I don't have a copy of the investigation in front of me. My recollection is I said that I am not going to charter the investigation into an inappropriate relationship. And, again, (b)(3), (b)(6)writing back and saying, "I think it makes sense. We will rework the appointment memo." I have to believe that is what the original appointment memo said is that the inappropriate relationship was not on the table. If, in fact, it didn't then I have to think that both Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)and I made an error and neither one of us looked closely enough at the appointment memo.

I do know that the investigating officer, at the end, talked about his belief that there was an inappropriate relationship. My recollection is part of the propriety of that relationship was also based on his findings of ~~that~~ the Facebook entries by Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)ndicated an intent to open a civilian company with Maj(b)(3), (b)(6)ollowing their deployments and that he cited on his Facebook page the Afghan government and US military as clients, if you will. That element of the propriety of their relationship, certainly at the end of the investigation, I thought was a legitimate thing to inquire into.

Does that answer your question or no?

DE: It does, but it is still troubling because I think General Patton ends up striking it from the GOMOR when he administers it. So you said that you're never going to investigate that aspect of the thing, yet they do. They find inadequate evidence exists that relationship is inappropriate at the end and yet we are modifying GOMARS to take that language out.

WIT: If I recall correctly what happened was General Patton struck that element of the GOMAR based on Lieutenant Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)ebuttal. Then appealed to ----

IO: Hang on a second. I can clarify this with the appointment memo. And the appointment memo does not mention inappropriate relationship. The appointment memo directs the investigating officer to investigate the travel in civilian clothes violations, the weapons violation allegations, consuming alcohol allegations, and then it also says "Also determine whether(b)(3), (b)(6)(b)(3), (b)(6) committed any violations of the UCMJ." And in the report that is where the investigation officer says, "In addition" -- or in answer to that question he found that they violated -- they disobeyed orders referenced movement and weapons but a separate finding that they had an inappropriate relationship that violated AR 600-20 and that they were too close. So good points but addressed.

I just didn't want us to spend time going down that path when I thought we had those right here in front me.

The report of the 15-6 when Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)was done, did he bring that to you to review?

WIT: Sir, he took it to the SJA and that was our operating procedure. He took it to the SJA. They reviewed it, and then I got a recommendation from the SJA as to whether or not to approve the findings in full or in part or disapprove them; whether to send it back for more investigation. And then similarly with the recommendations whether to approve them or hold them in part, modify them, or send them back for further investigation.

IO: Do you recall what you did after that recommendation?

WIT: Sir, my recollection is that I approved the findings but I did not approve all of the recommendations. Again, I haven't consulted with that. As soon as I found out that you had been appointed I ceased all my communications with the command, and so I did not ask for a copy of that.

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IO: Talk to me about the procedure that got the report from you and (b)(3), (b)(6) to General Patton and (b)(3), (b)(6) How did that occur?

WIT: Sir, I reviewed the report of the investigation, looked and talked to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) about his recommendations. I believe sufficiency and whether or not the findings ought to be approved, whether or not the recommendations ought to be approved. I took action. Again, my recollection is that I approved the findings, but I didn't approve all the recommendations. I took final action there. I forwarded a copy of it based on the recommendation of the SJA to the authorities in the Texas National Guard for them to consider whether or not they should revoke federal recognition for Holmes and Levine. I then forwarded it to General Patton with a transmittal memo that indicated to him, you know, what I had done. And I also indicated to him that I thought that reprimand was appropriate, and I thought he ought to consider whether or not to file it in their performance fiche.

we talked

Is that responsive to your question, sir?

IO: Do you recall talking to your predecessor, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) during your transition period? Do you recall talking to him about anyone that he may have given blanket permission to travel off post?

WIT: Sir, I do not -- I don't recall that topic coming up when he and I did our transmission.

IO: So he didn't inform you of anyone that he had granted permission to?

WIT: Sir, I don't recall that nor do I find that in my notes.

IO: So tell me again, did Major (b)(3), (b)(6) brief you on the findings and recommendations, or did she send it to you and you made your decisions without talking to her?

WIT: Sir, my recollection, and I think I have indications and my e-mail traffic, that it was Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) - it may have been Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) that brought the report to me and talked to me about it. Again, I would be hard-pressed to find an investigation on which I took action or an inquiry on which I took action without getting a legal opinion. And even with the case of FLIPOs while technically, you know, the lawyers only have to look at it if I approved financial liability, I generally have one of the lawyers look at it before I did.

IO: Were you and either (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) satisfied with the investigation that (b)(3), (b)(6) had done due diligence in his investigation?

WIT: Sir, I was I recall -- I believe this is Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) telling me that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was upset with Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) behavior. And I thought that (b)(3), (b)(6) was a bit strident in some of his recommendations. Again, my recollection is that I didn't approve all his recommendations based on that perception.

IO: So whose decision was it to issue a GOMOR, a General Officer Memorandum of Record? Reprimand

WIT: Sir, that was General Patton's decision to issue the GOMOR. He did it pursuant to my recommendation and the JAG's recommendation that he do that. He was also the decision authority on the filing location whether it was local ---

IO: So what were your other choices besides issuing a GOMOR?

WIT: Sir, as I recall the lawyers told me and also from my perspective we could have taken no action. We could have issued a reprimand or we could have issued non-judicial proceedings or

convened

judicial proceedings. The scope of the findings indicated a pattern of misconduct that could have resulted in some kind of punitive action instead of merely administrative action.

IO: But in particular why did you recommend a GOMOR to General Patton as opposed to an Article 15-6 or a court-martial?

WIT: Sir, I didn't think that the findings indicated a pattern of misconduct that rose to a level of criminal misconduct. In cases like that I wanted to make sure, as in all of them, that I was giving the benefit to people who were deployed who, you know, had essentially raised their hand and were sacrificing in order to accomplish the mission. I thought it was important to, number one, look into the allegations; and, number two, once there was a finding of misconduct to appropriately address -- I thought a reprimand was an appropriate disposition.

IO: Did you read or were you briefed on the rebuttal statement from Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Major (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, I didn't get a copy of it. It was provided to General Patton, but he did allow me to take a look at it.

IO: Did you make a recommendation to General Patton about what to do with the rebuttal or did you see it after the fact?

WIT: Sir, I don't recall. I believe that I recommended to General Patton -- I believe I recommended to him in person in his office that he file it in their performance fiche. He and I -- I recall talking about his decision to strike the one portion of the reprimand that addressed the inappropriate relationship. I felt uncomfortable about the inappropriate relationship from the start with respect to their distinct gender relationship. I found inappropriate their relationship as it involved an attempt to start a future business advertising that intention on Facebook and listing the government of Afghanistan and the US military as clients. From that perspective, Joint Ethics Regulation perspective, I felt there was a breach of appropriateness in their relationship, not from male/female spending a lot of time together.

IO: Did you hear General Caldwell encourage people to use Facebook and to have Facebook pages?

WIT: Sir, he encouraged everyone to use social media, and we had a set of fairly simple rules associated with it. It had to be, you know, first person. You had to be something about which you were aware; it had to address the mission; and it shouldn't be something that should be addressed through the chain of command. In other words, it was not a forum in which to post complaints or identify problems either with subordinates, peers, or superiors. But he certainly did, in fact, the senior members of the command were told that they would engage. The minimum was that you wrote a blog and the NTM-A/CSTC-A website included the ability to post blogs.

IO: Did General Caldwell emphasize, as you said, this first-person knowledge. Did he also emphasize telling the truth?

WIT: Sir, he absolutely did. That's part of the business. You have to know what; you have to be an expert in it. It is -- you need to talk about what you know.

IO: Did you look at evidence in the 15-6 report that General -- or that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) Major (b)(3), (b)(6) and engaged in a Facebook page referenced this business of theirs, SYZYGY logos; did you either go online or look at the report and see this evidence in their -- of their business?

WIT: I don't recall having gone online and looking at it. It was developed in the investigation, sir. Specifically, as I recall in the investigation there with screenshots of the various aspects of the

website. There were some screenshots in there of photos that had been posted, but Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) included that in the report.

IO: And one of those photos appears to implicate another person, at least one, and the investigating officer discovered that other military personnel were involved particularly Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) a surgeon I believe or a member of the Surgeon Command Office.

Do you recall that?

WIT: Sir, I do.

IO: So how did you decide how to deal with that implication (b)(3), (b)(6) being in civilian clothes off post?

WIT: Sir, I talked to General Patton about it. I indicated to him that I thought the (b)(3), (b)(6) should be reprimanded, too, for a variety reasons. Number one, he was the senior individual implicated in having gone there. He was responsible for the same rules as Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) were. And talking to General Patton about it, that act of misconduct we thought was appropriate for a reprimand. He decided, based on my recommendation, that I reprimand (b)(3), (b)(6) have an e-mail in here that ~~really tells -- all the e-mail says that tells~~ directs Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) come talk to me, but I can tell you that was at about the same time that (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) received their reprimands. I brought in Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and gave him a written reprimand. The Air Force -- you know, again this gets back to different service cultures and nuances. They have a slightly different term for it, but I issued a written reprimand to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

IO: And (b)(3), (b)(6) as an Air Force officer is the reason why you did it slightly differently?

WIT: I mean, I didn't think we needed to do another investigation. I talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) and when he came in I said, "Okay, did you go off post in civilian attire and eat with these people?" And he said, "Yeah, I did." I said, "Well, why did you do it?" I said, "I intend to issue you a reprimand for this in writing." And he essentially said, "Yeah, I think that is appropriate."

IO: Did he tell you that he had permission to go off post in civilian clothes and dine at a civilian restaurant?

WIT: Sir my recollection is that what (b)(3), (b)(6) told me is that he went with (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) because they said this was suitable behavior. One of the reasons I considered recommending a higher level of accountability ~~step~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) was because he didn't ask questions that I think a colonel should. I think Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) an accomplished officer. He is also a medical doctor, and I recognize that there is some, you know, we talk about different cultures ----

IO: Culture.

WIT: Yes, sir. So that played into my decision, my recommendation to General Patton, and I believe his authorization to me, his ~~select~~ release of jurisdiction to me ----

IO: Did you request him to give you permission to handle it at your level or did he direct it?

WIT: Sir, I don't recall. I will tell you my recollection is that I recommended that he allow me to issue a reprimand, and that he agreed to do that. So I don't think that those are mutually exclusive outcomes. I believe I recommended it. I believe he directed it.

IO: Did you and/or General Patton decide to take this action on Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) because of reprisal because he was associated with (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: No, sir, absolutely not. I mean he -- based on the investigation and my conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6) he had perpetrated ~~the~~ that same act of misconduct -- that discrete act of misconduct as had Colonel

1 (b)(3), (b)(6) and Maj (b)(3), (b)(6) And so, again, there is the necessity to take appropriate action when that
2 occurs.
3 IO: Tell me again why you believe that you should handle it at the O-6 level as opposed to
4 general officer.
5 WIT: And I am going to compare here for you, sir, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major
6 (b)(3), (b)(6) versus Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) The investigation develops a series of acts of misconduct on the part of
7 (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) Not merely having gone off post, you know, in civilian clothes and eating in a
8 civilian restaurant. The totality of what the investigation developed ~~but then~~ was more substantial than for them
9 had been developed for Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) So I thought it appropriate that the administrative action taken
10 in each of those cases be different with that in mind.
11 IO: Okay. Was -- and so you signed a letter of reprimand to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)
12 WIT: Sir, that is correct.
13 IO: Did you file it locally or did it go into his official file or how did this work?
14 WIT: Sir, it was filed locally. I didn't have the authority to file it in his performance record and
15 Colonel -- excuse me -- General Patton and I discussed that.
16 IO: Did you issue a copy of it to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) WIT: Yes, I did. IO: Did he submit a rebuttal
17 WIT: Sir, he did not. In fact, my recollection is during our conversation he said that was an
18 appropriate disposition.
19 IO: Were there other personnel implicated by this 15-6 investigation of (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)
20 WIT: Sir, I don't recall by name or by identity other people being implicated.
21 IO: Did you direct any action to be taken against others than (b)(3), (b)(6) anyone other than
22 (b)(3), (b)(6) as result of the 15-6?
23 WIT: Sir, I don't recall directing any action other than against (b)(3), (b)(6) And, you know,
24 recommending (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)
25 IO: Okay. Back to these DV visits. To your knowledge did Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) ever issue an
26 order to conduct an IO campaign with respect to the DV visits?
27 WIT: No, sir. In fact, my understanding of the directives issued by (b)(3), (b)(6) [sic] is that he, you
28 know, in his e-mails and his discussions emphasized that we weren't conducting Information
29 Operations. In fact, we were focused on informing and educating; providing the facts in context.
30 IO: You said several times today "facts in context"; what do you mean by "in context" in this
31 case?
32 WIT: Sir, when I say that I am paraphrasing General (b)(3), (b)(6) who talks about, you know, what
33 the responsibilities are, you know, of me and what we owe to those who come and visit us. You know, a
34 fact is an accurate assessment whether it is ~~subjective~~ subjective or objective. And in context I can offer you an
35 example. If someone is walking along ~~the~~ a path and trips, that is a fact. If it is in the middle of night with
36 no moon versus in broad daylight, that places it in context. You can make legitimate logical deductions
37 about the relevance of that fact by having highlighted the circumstances in which it took place.
38 IO: Were there any limitations ever expressively placed on the source or a type of
39 information to be included in these DV packets? In other words, did you tell people to go to specific
40 places to get information or did you tell people not to go to other places to get it?
41 WIT: Sir, I don't think I specifically did either one of those. You know, I think it was clear that
42 what we were doing was we're looking at publicly available information. For instance, with members of
43 U.S. Congress, Senators, and Representatives, and staffers we would regularly consult with the

legislative liaison products available from our higher Headquarters, from Central Command, from the Joint Staff and OSD that gave us biographical information; indicated the last time that they had traveled there: their committee assignments: and things that they had indicated interest in.

I can't remember his name but I believe he is a Senator from Montana who had been a farmer. He was interested in farming, and that was one of the things that was noted on one of our higher Headquarters' summaries.

IO: To your knowledge, was anyone on Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) ever asked to conduct Psychological Operations on U.S. citizens?

WIT: Sir, I am not aware of anyone asking him. I'm not aware of anyone directing him. I am suspect of any assertion that that was done. I have seen no evidence that that was done, and I don't think they had the capability to do that.

IO: Same question for foreign DV's. Was (b)(3), (b)(6) or his team ever asked or tasked or directed to conduct PSYOP on PSYOP on foreign DVs?

WIT: Sir, same answer. I am not aware and I would be suspect of any assertion that that would occur -- excuse me -- ~~bet~~ that had occurred

IO: Did you ever find an example of when a CODEL left and made positive press statements about the CSTC-A story that you were telling, the facts in context. Do you recall any particular examples standing out as to a CODEL or another visitor going back and reflecting what had been provided in their command directives?

WIT: I don't recall specific cases. I do recall, in general, the challenges and progress that had been made with respect to the Afghan National Police were not well understood. We thought that was the case within our command, within ISAF and IJC, and then outside the theater also. I recall generally hearing individuals talk about both the progress and the challenges with respect to Afghan National Police and assumed our discussions with them contributed to that.

IO: Let's switch gears now to talk about Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) who was holding what position in CSTC-A? Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) came in -- my recollection is that it was -- he met up with General Caldwell following his mid-tour leave in July and came back and became the Communications Director.

IO: The Communications Director. In other words, he replaced (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, he replaced (b)(3), (b)(6)

IO: (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: Who had replaced (b)(3), (b)(6).

WIT: Yes, sir, that is correct.

IO: Did Michael Hastings, the author of the *Rolling Stone* article, did he ever contact you directly?

WIT: Sir, I received an e-mail from Mr. Mike Hastings. It went to my Afghan address. The timestamp on that was Saturday. It was over the President's Day weekend. I believe it was Saturday over the Presidents' Day weekend. I was ---

IO: Of which year? This year?

WIT: This year. Yes, sir. I was traveling with my family to visit my daughter who is a freshman in college in Wisconsin. I had set up a couple of days before I had left all of my e-mail

accounts, all three e-mail accounts, with an out of office message that indicated that I had departed the command. It left the names of my successors, and I use plural because we had an American colonel and a British Brigadier, their e-mail contacts, my AKO address, and my cell phone number. I believe I received that e-mail -- it was forwarded to me because I also had an auto forward set -- up on the Sunday or Monday of that weekend. I forwarded it to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) said, you know, "I have been approached by this member of the media. Do you want me to respond or do you want to respond?" What I got back from him was, you know, "Please don't respond. The command will respond -- we will get a consolidated response." What he told me I believe in a later message was -- although it could've been the same one -- but he said, "We'll provide a quote from me and that will be our feedback with respect to the article." And as I recall the article came out that following Wednesday or Thursday. I can't remember exactly when it came out. I think Thursday.

IO: And say again when you left Afghanistan.

WIT: Sir, I departed on the 31st of March in the late afternoon -- the 31st of January of 2011 in the afternoon.

IO: Okay, the 31st of January. And this e-mail conversation with Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was in February of 2011. So this was after you had changed out of and departed -- changed out of position and departed Afghanistan.

WIT: Sir, that is correct. Yes, sir.

IO: Let me show you this e-mail trail that you just talked about between you and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: And ask you if that is the e-mail that we are talking about -- that you were talking about.

WIT: Sir, this is a later version. This is a later version. I forwarded the note from Hastings to (b)(3), (b)(6) This is a follow-on conversation because what I did is I tried to gather all of the facts I recalled about the situation: e-mails that identified when things happened and what the timeline was: and forwarded it back to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) I wasn't sure if ISAF would address this Public Affairs channels. So before you were appointed -- before I was notified that you were appointed, I provided the command everything that I could during that period of time that showed, "Hey, here are relevant e-mails about this: here is the timeline as I understand it; and that is how I would characterize this. That was what I was doing here."

IO: So this e-mail trail is providing all the information that you could recall in terms of the timeline and what happened as a result of the information you had been given, the investigations. (b)(3), (b)(6) report out, General Patton taking your recommendations, and then deciding what to do.

WIT: Yes, sir. If the command, at whatever level, was going to make a statement to the media about this, I thought it was important, again, that they have the facts. And I also in there provided some rationale. I think in there it talks about, you know -- I think that note says it is not a reasonable deduction from this set of facts for the following reasons. And I thought it was important for me to do that so if there was a decision made to respond to it in the media that we would do so accurately. We would understand the rationale from my perspective of why those actions took place.

IO: But you were no longer assigned to the command; to CSTC-A and NTM-A.

WIT: Sir, this is where it gets a little tricky.

IO: But you had departed Afghanistan.

WIT: Sir, I had.

IO: Had completed your tour.

WIT: Sir, I had and was soon to interview to be the -- for a position at DARPA. Before I left we had submitted an extension on me to try and keep me until at least 1 April. That was a means to allow me to work on the Chief of Staff of the Army's transition team. That extension, I later found having talked to the folks at Senior Leader Division, had not been acted on, and, in fact, they intended to recommend disapproval because they had me in mind for this DARPA job. I want to the absolutely accurate and honest with you at that point in time I think I was technically TDY back here. My perspective at that time is I was assigned to CSTC-A. I hadn't been reassigned. I have recently talked to SLD and said, "Tell me exactly to my ---

IO: Were you still the Chief of Staff at CSTC-A?

WIT: Sir, I was not still the Chief of Staff.

IO: Did you have any other position in CSTC-A at that time?

WIT: No, sir. I did not.

IO: Had you been given any guidance by General Caldwell or anybody else as to what your job was as you left Afghanistan?

WIT: What he wanted me to do, sir, was twofold and that was talk to people in DC. For instance, I had been set up to go to the AFPAK forum at the Pentagon and answer questions about what had been going on in NTM-A. General Keane was going over to visit, and I went and talked to General Keane. It had been awhile since he had been there, and I talked to him a little bit about some of the progress, some of the challenges. But, you know, that piece and then I was talking to -- I can't remember his name but the Colonel who was orchestrating Chief of Staff of the Army transition team and had made arrangements after about seven days back to start working for them. It was at that point in time he told me "No, the Vice has got you lined up for something else."

IO: So did you -- this information which includes a timeline of activities as you recall them dealing with the investigation of (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) Did you provide this information directly back to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, I did.

IO: Did you provide this information to anyone outside of CSTC-A? Did you send this to, for instance, Mike Hastings?

WIT: Sir, I did not.

IO: How did you respond to Mr. Hastings?

WIT: Sir, I did not respond to Mr. Hastings.

IO: Did you send this information to any other member of the media or anyone outside of CSTC-A/NTM-A?

WIT: Sir, what I would like to do is describe for you exactly the interaction I had with members of the media. Number one, I did not respond to Mike Hastings. I didn't contribute to his research nor did I respond to his query addressed to my Afghan address.

The morning that they story came out, I wrote a note to Mr. (b)(3), (b)(6) who is a -- was an acquaintance of mine at CNAS. And I said simply, (b)(3), (b)(6) have you looked at the story? Tell me what you think." He wrote me back and said, "Here is what I think about it." I called him and I said, "Okay. Thanks. Appreciate it." Essentially what he said was -- it was paraphrased later in his blog that day -- "It is the aggressive generals who get in trouble. Caldwell probably ought to apologize if it happened and move on." The most damning thing he saw in the story was the statement by the lawyers.

Later that day, (b)(3), (b)(6) who is also an associate of mine from CNAS called and talked to me. Part of our discussion was about me, you know, "Glad you're back. How did Afghanistan go?" Things like that. I told Tom it is inappropriate for me to comment on this now. To be honest with you, sir, some of that was because I wasn't sure how the US military and the DOD ~~was~~ were going to respond to it and some of it was that I suspected that I would be involved in any investigation if one was to come up.

Later that day, I got an e-mail from Jennifer from Fox News: Jennifer Griffin who asked to talk to me. I wrote back to her and said that I thought it was imprudent for me to do so. She said that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had suggested I talk to her. I called her and I said, "I appreciate that (b)(3), (b)(6) has offered my name. I think it would be imprudent for me to talk." And she did what any reporter will do she said, "Hey, you know, we really want to understand." I said, "I am not comfortable talking on record. I am unwilling to talk on background." And, you know, I didn't [redacted] things off the record. feel comfortable discussing

After the AFPAK fed forum -- I don't know Julian Barnes from the Wall Street Journal. I did run into him in the food court. He was talking to other people. He did ask me I think two questions. Each time he did I said -- I think this is pretty close to a quote -- "Julian, I am sorry if it seems that I am unresponsive, but it is imprudent for me for me to offer any comments here." And, sir, I am happy to, you know, communicate with those members of the media and have them, you know, release whatever confidentiality is imposed if that is necessary."

One more thing, sir.

IO: Please.

WIT: I did provide that e-mail to -- I think I provided that e-mail or I provided a similar e-mail to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) who had been General Caldwell's XO and had left. I don't think that (b)(3), (b)(6) was technically assigned to CSTC-A. He was in between jobs. But that would have been somebody outside of NTM-A/CSTC-A technically to whom I ~~would~~ had provided that information.

IO: Do you know what Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) did with this information you shared with them?

WIT: Sir, I mean we certainly talked about it. I am not aware of what they did. I know Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) you know like I told you -- well, I don't know this, but it is a logical deduction that Ms. Griffin said that (b)(3), (b)(6) had provided my name. They were in the process of flying back from Europe. I think at that point in time he wanted -- he was thinking that what we needed to do was to make sure that a series of reporters understood our background what -- you know, the facts from another perspective. But I think that is why he told her to talk to me while they were airborne.

IO: And you know and understand that the information that the part of the investigation is covered by the Privacy Act?

WIT: Sir, I do. My point in sending that particularly to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was so that if there was a decision to respond to the media that the Public Affairs folks could respond again factually and in context. I also included, as you see on there, the SJA that followed Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) because, again, I thought it prudent to make sure that the lawyers would take a look at it. And then if there was a decision to make a comment it could be informed legally too.

IO: Did anybody ask you to give this timeline, this set of information to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, no.

IO: And you did so because you thought he needed to have the background in case the command wanted to respond.

IO: In case the command wanted to respond?

WIT: Yes, sir. That is precisely why it went back.

IO: Did you receive any guidance from Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or anyone else in ISAF or NTM-A about the media posture in reference to the *Rolling Stones* article?

WIT: Sir, I spoke specifically to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) on the phone. I talked to Brigadier Dunham [phonetic] on the phone. I talked to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) on the phone. I can't remember the exact date that occurred, but I was told "We are not going to comment on the story. That is the ISAF position." It was within a day or so of that. I believe it was Friday of that week, where I was notified that General Petraeus had directed an investigation. At that point in time whether or not I knew of the ISAF position I would have thought it was imprudent to talk to members of the press.

Now, sir, I will tell you that on Thursday I was considering talking to members of the press on background. I sought some advice from various mentors and was told -- I guess it was the same thing that I thought in my heart of hearts, that it was imprudent to do so and it wouldn't be proper.

IO: Do you know what Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) did with this information? Did he give a statement or release a statement or answer any questions based on the information in your e-mail?

WIT: Sir, I know that he wrote -- I believe it was addressed to, you know, people inside NTM-A. He wrote a statement saying -- essentially refuting what was in the article. I helped inform him of that, but I know he did that. Presume the note

IO: Why would he write as the Director of Communications why would he write an e-mail to the staff to the members of NTM-A to inform them about a timeline potentially referenced in an article in *Rolling Stones*?

WIT: Sir, I think what he -- I believe what he wanted to do was make sure that the members of the command understood what the command had and hadn't done and his personal assertion that the command had behaved improperly.

IO: I have here an editorial from the *Washington Times* that came out I believe on the -- Sunday of the 27th of February. It might have been on Saturday, but I believe it was Sunday the 27th. And it is called editorial *Rolling Stones War on Troops -- on Our Troops*. And I will ask you to review that and see if the information in there appears to be the -- is similar to the information you provided to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

[The witness did as directed.]

WIT: Sir, I think it does generally track with it. There are some other things and there some other pieces.

IO: Did you release that information yourself to any member of the media?

WIT: Sir, unequivocally I did not. I have outlined every interaction I have had with members of the media. I took the time to think back through with whom I had spoken and exactly the times. But I can tell you I absolutely was not a source for ----

IO: This e-mail from Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) back to you responded to your timeline that you had sent to him, it is from (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) subject reference (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) investigation. It says, "Sir, it sounds good. Thanks for the details. We will only provide Hastings with a simple statement from me that he will quote. If this story picks up any traction our

demands further clarifications. I will leverage this and the timeline and a backgrounder with someone other than Hastings."

Do you believe that -- or do you have any knowledge that this was provided Lieutenant Colon(b)(3), (b)(6) the Washington Times or this editorial that you just read?

WIT: Sir, I don't. And, in fact, my understanding talking to Colon(b)(3), (b)(6) is that (b)(3), (b)(6) was feeling very stressed; that he could not engage based on General Petraeus' prohibition.

IO: So do you think he was looking for other ways to get this information out? Do you think he wrote this memo to others in NTM-A in order to get this information leak

WIT: Sir, I don't know that is why he did it. I know -- for instance, (b)(3), (b)(6) [phonetic] told me that he had seen a copy of what (b)(3), (b)(6) had written. So, you know, in the e-mail age clearly things will, you know, work their way out. I will tell you there are also e-mails up until -- again, I believe it was that following Friday where -- I can't remember if (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) [phonetic] but, yes, there had been direction of an investigation (b)(3), (b)(6) had sent me encouragement to go do backgrounders with members of the media. I think he did that with the understanding that I was it any longer a member of ISAF, and so that I could legitimately do that.

IO: So (b)(3), (b)(6) did not tell you directly that he had release this information to anyone in the media?

WIT: Sir, he absolutely -- he did not tell me directly that he had done that. I do not believe that he is the source of that.

IO: Do you have any idea who might be the source of that; that *Washington Times* editorial?

WIT: Sir, I don't. I know that Colon(b)(3), (b)(6) had talked to -- he had a discussion with I think it is called the "*danger room*" in *Wired* magazine. I think he is quoted in a couple of places in the back and forth with him.

IO: Are you implying then that that's the only person you know of who has had contact with the media about the situation? Are you implying that you think it is Lieutenant Colon(b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, I am not implying that I think it is Lieutenant Colon(b)(3), (b)(6) What I am trying to do is be as comprehensive as possible about who I know has engaged with bloggers, members of media, things like that. And I am trying to think here if there would be anybody else who I could reasonably assume had contact with the media. You know, I talked to Colon(b)(3), (b)(6) twice on e-mail and once in person when I ran into him. But I don't have reason to believe that he is the one who did it, sir.

IO: Okay. Do you recall reading the Hastings article about his interview with (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Sir, I did. I do recall reading it. I did read it.

IO: And if so -- or since you have read it what is your view of its accuracy?

WIT: Sir, my view is that there are assertions in there that are incorrect, that there are relevant facts that are excluded, and that several points are taken out of context.

IO: Would you tell me, without the article in front of you, can you tell me what stands out to you as being inaccurate, absolutely inaccurate?

WIT: Sir, the greatest inaccuracy is the general assertion of the article that indicates that there was any type of effort to inappropriately influence members of Congress or any other visitors who arrived. The term PSYOP is used quite frequently. Our command, number one, lacked of the capability; number two, internal directives had specifically focused us away from Information Operations in general. And, therefore, we weren't executing any PSYOP on anybody.

IO: When you say "incapable" -- or "lacked the capability", does that mean that you have no one assigned to the command who was PSYOP trained that you knew about?

WIT: Sir, at the time I didn't know of anybody who was PSYOP trained. Since that time I have found out that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had been a PSYOP officer before in the National Guard. You know, he had since changed to a strategist. We also did have, as I mentioned it before, several Special Forces officers. And as I recall from the SOCOM release that was one of three recourses that they talked about having some kind of PSYOP training that they counted as one of the three courses that addressed that. We have a PSYOP cell, sir. We didn't have somebody who -- we didn't have the capability to do -- we didn't have the tools.

IO: So you are saying during the time that you were the Chief of Staff of CSTC-A/NTM-A, you had no knowledge of any PSYOP trained officer or even a MILDEC trained officer anywhere on your staff? You have no knowledge of that?

WIT: Sir, I had no knowledge of a PSYOP trained officer on our staff while I was Chief of Staff.

IO: Or MILDEC?

WIT: MILDEC is military deception.

IO: Military deception.

WIT: Sir, that is correct.

IO: Is there anything else you want to talk about in terms of the article that you think is inaccurate, wrong, faults, et cetera?

WIT: Sir, I spoke before about early on it quotes the commander's Chief of Staff -- and, again, it doesn't indicate whether that's me or Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) attributes to the Chief of Staff two statements or questions ~~earlier~~, "How do I plant an idea inside their head or how do I get inside their heads and then how do we get them to give us more people?" And, as I mentioned previously -- well, I don't have precise recall of statements I made over a year ago or about a year ago. I've had a few people who know me pretty well. One of them my wife of 26 years saying "That is not the way you talk". I would also say, you know, I tend to talk in plural pronouns. You can ask folks with whom I have worked and I have written about. I do think, like I said, I certainly said the second thing about how do we get more people -- how do we get them to assign us more people and I am absolutely certain that I said that.

The assertion in the article and I believe the language was "retaliatory investigation". Number one, I will tell you I absolutely deny that; number two, investigations, as I mentioned before, are interrogative. They are not punitive. We did not initiate that investigation based on a member of the command questioning if we were doing the right thing. I don't want to go over old ground, but the fact that that article doesn't highlight the legal opinion that we got internally is something that is a relevant fact not brought into play. And to be honest with you, I don't know if Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was aware of Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) -- excuse me -- Major (b)(3), (b)(6) statement about the legality of the thing. Having said that, that is an exception I take to the article.

Another fact that I believe is absent from the article but is relevant is the fact that General Patton was the one who made the decisions about final dispositions. And I say that not to put blame on General Patton but it evidences the number of people who took independent looks at the situation.

First of all, there is Major (b)(3), (b)(6) again, a fairly junior member of the command, although an experienced lawyer. You know, when you ~~will~~ be a field grade, you are part of the team, but

in that rank heavy organization, fairly junior. She is the one that initially brings allegations of potential misconduct to light. The JAG officers, the two senior ones, the Deputy and the Chief of the SJA, also take a look at it. They recommended we initiate an investigation. I take a look at it.

I scoped the investigation smaller than that recommended by the lawyers. While not at random, we didn't handpick the investigating officer, but followed the same protocol we followed before to pick the investigating officer. He recommends a set of actions based on his findings of fact. I again scope this smaller in terms of the recommendations than the IO had recommended and that the SJA had recommended.

It then now goes to General Patton. Patton takes an independent look at it. Patton asks for rebuttal statements from (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) Patton modifies the reprimands based on the rebuttal statements by (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)

This is one that's hard to prove I guess, but, you know, we had better things to do than to try and single out capable, intelligent members of the command for some kind of retribution. The people in the Headquarters, you know, I am not lying to you when I say we normally got about five hours of sleep. We have plenty of stuff to do. This was not a time where we looked around for other outlets for our energy. And certainly if we were going to attempt to conspire, to reprise against either Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) I believe that set of facts I just laid out indicates how broad it would have had to have been. So I think it is illogical to believe that that took place.

IO: Last subject that I would like to ask you about is the 15 June memorandum that you issued for staff directors at NTM-A/CSTC-A: subject information engagement activities. And I'm going to show this to you now and do you recall writing and releasing this memo?

WIT: Yes, sir. I do.

IO: Tell me again who gave the directive for this memorandum to be issued.

WIT: Sir, my recollection is this was a conversation between General Caldwell and myself. My recollection is that he said, "As much as we are talking about this it is not getting to everybody involved in the command, so this is something that we need to put in writing. It needs to be crystal clear, and we want to limit the exception and approval authorities a great deal so that we are certain it is not taking place unless somebody is specifically failing to follow this policy."

The last paragraph says here, "If anybody has any questions it needs to come through their chain to the undersigned." The first paragraph indicates that "Engagement in any information operations activity will require my express written consent." I've got an e-mail trail in here that shows this too.

I have not been able to find a note that I took from General Caldwell to execute this, but I did send a note to my XO that says, "Quick, draft something; send it to the lawyers. Send it to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and send it to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) And what I want to do is, you know, prohibit information operation activities." She penned a very quick, terse memo; send it to them; got responses back from (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) The lawyers took another shot at it and if this isn't exactly what the lawyers sent back it is pretty close. And then my recollection is and I think it is the 14th of June when I sent that direction to her, by the 15th, you know, I signed this and sent it out.

IO: Did General Caldwell feel it was necessary to issue this memorandum because CSTC-A was still conducting information operations, IO?

WIT: No, sir. This was not an indication that we were going to cease an activity but rather it was more precise and absolutely clarifying in written policy that repeated what he had been saying since

he got there: "We do not do information operations." We thought that was, you know, that those statements repeated time and again by the commander, and, as I have indicated to you certainly communicated to me by Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) so there was a second order of communications there through the chain of command, was sufficient. But this is about the time we are finalizing the (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) action. My take is, like any prudent commander, he was taking a look at the totality of the situation and saying, okay, this is a prudent step. We need to make absolutely certain that everybody knows about it.

From time to time we looked at the movement control SOP. After we had two sailors who were killed during a movement and in the subsequent investigations we relooked at that policy. Those are -- again, those are things that we expect of competent leaders.

IO: Paragraph 3 in there I believe states that "any existing IO cell will be immediately restructured."

Does this mean that you had any IO cells or more than one IO cell, et cetera?

WIT: Sir, it does not. Had we had one this would have used a definite article, you know, "the" or "our" [redacted] you know, "instead". It is worded that way on purpose so that it is clear to everyone this is a blanket prohibition. There is nobody that is outside the bounds of this. Because what we didn't want to have happen, you know, because our experience has shown us that merely repeating it and directing it verbally and spreading it out through the chain of command had not been sufficient. Apparently, some people still believed that perhaps they were excused from this prohibition, so that is worded that way for that specific reason.

of "any"

IO: Do you recall an official legal review? You said you sent it to the lawyers but you are not sure if they took a cut at it.

WIT: Sir, this is the product I got back from the lawyers. I have an e-mail note in here that indicates that the SJA says, "Hey, we are taking a cut at this, and we will send it back to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Okay, I would like to receive a ----

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: ---- copy of that.

WIT: I have those.

IO: What is the difference between information OPs and information engagement?

WIT: Sir, we talked some about what comes under Information Operations, information engagement, and the way it focused on inform and educate. I apologize for repeating this but I think it is worthwhile.

IO: That is why I asked it again.

WIT: It's facts placed in context. Now, that is my characterization, but it is a concise and pointed summary of what information engagement means. We, and General Caldwell personally encouraged, in fact, like I told you, senior officers were required to engage. At a minimum they had to blog before they left. O-6s. I mean when I signed their release letter I was asking them, "Have you blogged? 'Yeah.' Show me." He encouraged engagement, but he encouraged it on the basis of, you know, facts placed in context. We did want to be aggressive in terms of identifying challenges and progress. We wanted to do it I think for all the right reasons. The national command authority [redacted], you know, spending [redacted] time, resources, national treasure. was

IO: Did you do assessments of the effectiveness of General Caldwell's guidance to use social media? In other words, did you have someone on the staff check to see if leaders were, in fact, using social media?

WIT: Sir, we did -- I believe it was largely informal. Now, for the flag officers we did track their media engagements. Not just media, but their information engagements. It wasn't just with media. And, you know, particularly later on in the year we were more focused on us, our team coaching the Afghans to engage with the media. But we did track specifically senior leaders and informally, like I said, I would talk to the O-6s, colonels and captains, before they left. And I would tell them that this is a requirement before you go.

IO: Do you remember somebody tracking the staff, individual's use of Facebook?

WIT: Yes, sir. Early on -- now, that was less -- in fact, that may have been entirely outside of the realm of the information engagement piece and more on the side of the techie; the use of our bandwidth. That had been one of the issues that are CJ-6 had had to -- to which he had to deal. We had to push to get our website posted somewhere off of the military domain because it made it easier for people to get to, you know, in terms of taking a look at the metadata that Google uses. So if you searched for NTM-A or CSTC-A our website is what would pop up. And so as we were able to remove the policy restrictions present in theater about access to social media, we did take a look at statistics that showed, you know, how much was being used in total and who was using it in total.

IO: Were you ever concerned about how much Facebook time or other social media time Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Major (b)(3), (b)(6) were spending?

WIT: I was only concerned as a result of the investigation with respect to what was posted on Facebook, and I had talked to you a little bit about that before. My greatest concern was an indication of an intent to start a business between (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) based on their experience in this military mission in listing the government of Afghanistan and the US military as clients. I know that (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the top 15 or 20 of those Facebook users. After -- it was Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) who was the CJ-6 at the time. After he provided me with that, my recollection is that either at the next staff meeting or one of the one[redacted] following that, I reiterated to people that we are not allowing you to get on Facebook to do personal business but rather we are opening up social media so that people can talk about the command, talk about mission, talk about progress, talked about challenges.

IO: Do you have any questions (b)(3), (b)(6)

DE: Sir, I had just got maybe one or two. We talked a little bit about culture and differences in cultures in your organization, and I have been there, and it is an interesting place because there are a lot of different people.

But as you went through this, did you ever give consideration to how those cultures might perceive your philosophy of investigations in general? And specifically if -- you have said and I think I understand your philosophy as an investigation is questioning the facts. It is not punitive in the sense that it is out to punish. But not everybody sees it that way. So were you concerned at any point that multiple 15-6s on an officer or 15-6s that were managed at a lower level could get out of hand and be perceived as an attack on somebody?

WIT: I would tell you I believe I was -- in retrospect that I was insufficiently concerned about that. I think -- you know, I have looked back and each one of those books, and I think I have all of them sitting out in the car here. I have some AAR pages and particularly in the last few weeks I have thought about this set of circumstances and what could I have done better. I think you're right. I probably

should have -- well, yeah. There is no probably involved. I should have spent more time talking about that fact. The other side of the coin is that we -- while I am willing to take responsibility for it-That was a command made up of almost 130 colonels. When I left we had 13 flag officers. I believe it is legitimate to assume that those kinds of capable people would also be doing those things. And I will -- for better or worse,I have been either the subject of ~~or~~ witness to,or an investigating officer in several circumstances and, you know, as a company commander I commanded a long time about 4 1/2 years as a captain. I was investigated or part of an investigation many times and perhaps I learned earlier in my career, and like you say, in a different culture. So that is one of my AAR comments for myself.

DE: Exasperating this may have been a couple of incidences where General Caldwell had direct interaction. I want to call your attention to one of them. Were you aware -- you have already stated that you knew who Lieutenant Colon(b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: Right. I sure do.

DE: And are you aware of an e-mail that ~~you~~ he sent to his former chain of command? Can you describe exactly how that e-mail was received after it ran the gauntlet back through General Petraeus and General Caldwell?

WIT: Yeah. I am not sure how it got Caldwell. I am not sure if Petraeus is the one who provided it to him are not. I do know ----

IO: What e-mail are we talking about?

DE: As I understand the e-mail, it was an e-mail sent(b)(3), (b)(6)his former chain of command at the chairman of Joint Chiefs Office, and in it was an assertion or a discussion -- it may have been a phone call that added to this the perception that there was an issue with AFPAK hands whi(b)(3), (b)(6)s a member of.

IO: Okay. We haven't seen the e-mail, have we?

DE: Yes, sir. I don't think we have.

IO: Go ahead(b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: I'll look to see if I have a copy of it, but I don't know if I have an electronic copy of it.

And, again, I am characterizing General Caldwell's response to it, but, again, I think, number one, I ought to be in a position to do that based on our relationship.

DE: And I am asking you to.

WIT: Yeah. I think there were two significant disappointments that he had with that. One was fellow lieutenant generals, fellow O9s. ~~have~~ had forwarded that up the chain of command without talking to him about it -- some officers in theater -- you know, flag officers in theater without talking to him about it. And the other was he was disappointed that Colo(b)(3), (b)(6)uld address something outside of the chain of command like that without talking to him. You know, frankly, I think his disappointment was genuine. I guess I am trying not to be defensive about it, but I am trying to characterize it here. He wanted people to bring him bad news.

IO: "He" meaning?

WIT: General Caldwell, sir. If people's perceptions were that they were getting action through their chain of command, then they could go talk to the Sergeant Major; they could go talk to me. Now, if somebody he wanted to talk to the boss under the open door policy, and I believe I recall one time that happened. It was a warrant officer from CJ-6. I asked him if I could talk to him first. He said he could -- I could. He had three issues. I tried to address each one of them. And after I went back to him he said, "Well, this doesn't address the issue I want to talk to General Caldwell." That was as I was

leaving. I believe he got his audience with General Caldwell. In this case, you know, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) worked, you know, in terms of the diagram, fairly close to General Caldwell. Again, Caldwell, I think like most of us, was into facts placed in context. And he was disappointed that (b)(3), (b)(6) hadn't brought that to him.

IO: I want to follow up here. At any time during the year that you were the Chief of Staff, was General Caldwell ever absent for an extended period of time, and if so, when did that occur?

WIT: Yes, sir. He was absent two sets of R&R and then some TDY in conjunction with that R&R. One of them occurred in July. One of them occurred in November. He also had some medical issues, and I believe it was March and April that, of course, were unforeseen and took him out of the theater.

IO: In March of 2010?

WIT: Sir, that is correct. I apologize. March 2010.

I have tried to re-create the exact timeline out of my notes and e-mails. And my recollection is that that is precisely why General Patton was involved as the acting commander at the time. It was not under his delegated -- my recollection it was not under his delegated UCMJ authority but rather as his acting commander CSTC-A authority that he became involved. One of the things I thought through and looked at my notes to try and reconstruct is at one point in time I told General Caldwell that I had directed an investigation and under what circumstances. You know, I ended up with my TTP of writing, you know, "Tell C3" notes in the back.

IO: "C3" meaning General Caldwell?

WIT: I apologize. Yes, sir. Tell Lieutenant General Caldwell. When I have, you know, opportunities or if he had a hole in his calendar, you know, information not necessarily any action. And, sir, I don't know the answer to that question and part of the reason I don't I think is because he was gone during this period of time.

IO: So, as you recall, he was gone for all of March and April or parts of March and April of 2010?

WIT: Parts thereof, sir. I don't remember the dates. I remember it was on a Friday evening that he went to talk to the doc. They took a look at, you know, some of his vitals.

IO: That's all okay. You don't need to go into those details -- personal details about his health.

But did his absence for any period of time greater than one week, did that absence cause any difficulty in the ability of the command to function because he wasn't present?

WIT: Sir, I think any command when they have a senior leader missing, you know, somebody has got to move up, and so you're not operating as you would if they were there. But, you know, he is very tech savvy; tried to maintain contact. He and General Patton worked out a set of commanders critical information requirements. You know, the wake me up; give me a call if. And, you know, General Patton has subsequently been selected for promotion to Major General pretty cagey, mature, sage leader; has worked as the Director of the J1 Joint Staff so has been associated with senior leaders before and has a good understanding.

IO: Are you saying that General Patton was selected for promotion because General Caldwell made it so?

WIT: No, sir. In fact, I don't think he would've had the ability to have done so.

IO: And you are not implying that General Caldwell ensured that General Patton was selected for promotion because he had taken action against Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Major (b)(3), (b)(6)

WIT: In fact, sir, I would deny that was the case. I am certainly not asserting that whatsoever. And like I said, based on timelines I think that would have been impossible based on inputs and things like that.

IO: Do you have any questions?

LA: Sir, I just want to clarify. When you are talking about interaction with the media you mentioned Julian Barnes, Wall Street Journal. You mentioned Jennifer Griffin, Fox news.

WIT: That's correct.

LA: You mentioned Tom Shank. Is that a member of the media?

WIT: Tom Shanker. He works for the New York Times. He and I have worked together at CNAS. The two people that contacted me the day that the article came out were Jennifer Griffin and Tom Shanker. Barnes I ran into in the food court at the Pentagon following the AFPAK Fed Forum. And Ricks, you know. I initiated the conversation with Ricks the morning the article came out. Tom said he hadn't read it but he would. Then he came back to me and I gave you his feedback. Really what I was interested -- and I didn't set it up at all with him. I was interested in whether he found it credible or not.

LA: And the media outlet for Tom Ricks is?

WIT: Tom ricks is -- you know, he has got a blog ----

IO: *Washington Post*.

WIT: *Washington Post* and Foreign Policy. He's got a blog, Best Defense, there. I did not -- I don't think I know anybody at the *Washington Times*, and I certainly wasn't contacted by them and did not provide any information.

LA: That was all, sir.

IO: One other question came to mind.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: Were there differences of opinion about the AFPAK Hands Program between CSTC-A/NTM-A and ISAF?

WIT: Sir, I don't necessarily know that there was a difference of opinion between CSTC-A and ISAF. I am not trying to split hairs but it is probably important here. I would say that we had a different perspective of it than the AFPAK Hands Manager, Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) at USFOR-A. While General Petraeus commands USFOR-A and ISAF, they established a separate Headquarters run by General Tim McHale who was formerly the Deputy Commander for Support, but operated a separate Headquarters. For a lack of a better term, I define it as a Joint Service Component Command, and I realize that is a contradiction in terms, but it actually worked okay.

IO: Great help from Third Army.

WIT: Yes, sir. And, in fact, I should have noted ----

DE: It is what General McChrystal wanted, a Joint Service Component, and he got it.

WIT: And, in fact, Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) and I disagreed several times about the utility program and how it ought to be managed. I would say some of the basis of that were the expectations that had been established in the minds of people that were joining the AFPAK Hands Program and the fact that our mission set in CSTC-A/NTM-A didn't allow them to realize that. And I am trying to think of an example here. I mean, for instance, I talk to you about the artillery battalion that was assigned. Those

guys were trained artillerymen and yet when they came they needed to modify what they were doing for the command's purposes, that the command modifying what it was doing for their aspirations. Most of our AFPAK Hands were in uniform. We didn't let them wander through ---

WIT: Did you think there was an expectation among the AFPAK Hands that they would spend most of their time in civilian clothes and/or modified grooming standards and out among the people working for the greater good of the world?

WIT: Sir, I believe there certainly was an expectation that they would get to do that great deal more than we allowed them to do. And if you were the advisor to the Deputy Governor in Badakhshan [phonetic], you were probably wearing native attire. You had relaxed grooming standards. You interacted on a daily basis. You were euphemistically alone and unafraid. If you were an AFPAK or an Afghan Hands in CSTC-A/NTM-A, we might have you as the senior advisor to the First Deputy Administer, and you went in a military uniform; that is the nature of the mission.

IO: Was there any ill feelings that you know of between General Caldwell and the members of that AFPAK Hands Program as a result of this difference of expectations?

WIT: No, sir. In fact, I had told General Caldwell and I had told Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) I think we need to remove the Afghan or the AFPAK Hands coding from our JMD. I think it would be appropriate to bring a pool into theater and then a competent authority can make assignment from there. What had happened is we add various coding on the JMD billets, so if there is a decision made that this person, this AFPAK Hand, wasn't doing what they were sent here to do, there was an effort to reassign them somewhere else. Well, now that JMD billet went unfilled. And (b)(3), (b)(6) and I had some very strident disagreements about that. One of the times I raised my voice to Dr Kem's office. But, you know, this is another one where I wrote to my counterpart at USFOR-A, the Chief of Staff there (b)(3), (b)(6) said "I think (b)(3), (b)(6) is doing what he thinks needs to be done. This is not a questioning of his patriotism or anything. I just disagree with it." I think that was General Caldwell's position too. It was a policy, if you will, kind of thing. In fact, he's the guy that said, "No, we don't want to remove all of the coding. We need some AFPAK Hands to be advisors."

IO: Do you know if there was any disagreement between what Dr. Kem thought, as the Deputy – General Caldwell's Deputy – between what Dr. Kem thought and about program and what General Petraeus or others thought about program? In other words, did Dr. Kem have a negative attitude towards AFPAK Hands?

WIT: Sir, I don't think he had a negative perspective of AFPAK Hands. In fact -- God, I can picture his face – an Air Force colonel. He was the senior AFPAK Hand in the command. I know we all had a very high opinion of him.

IO: So it would surprise you if somebody said that they believed that Doctor Kem said at one point in time that AFPAK Hands were the real enemy?

WIT: Sir, it would surprise me if he said it, and I think if he said it, it would have – it would surprise me if he said it. Again, we have some AFPAK Hands who were – who we leaned on. And I would like to offer this, one of the times I personally selected an investigating officer when these two sailors were captured and killed. It this officer in particular (b)(3), (b)(6)

DE:

WIT: (b)(3), (b)(6) You know, I personally selected him along with General Patton to be the guy to investigate this because he was one of the most dependable, mature, and logical senior officers that we had. And admiration for him was -- I don't know of anybody that said anything bad about the guy.

IO: Is there anything else in general that you would like to add for your testimony?

WIT: Sir, I apologize. I just want to make sure. I prepared for this engagement, and I want to take a look at my notes.

IO: But you're only providing the facts in context?

WIT: Sir, and I will -- yes, sir.

DE: To educate and inform.

WIT: And I think I took an oath to do that. I swore to do it. I will provide you some e-mails here, sir, that just show Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and my interaction in February and March that, again, I kind of characterize as routine and normal. Me reaching out to him as somebody I thought was intelligent and capable, and I didn't detect any strident response back. When somebody told me that they thought, and this was in the fall, that we had been accused of some sort of whistleblower reprisal, I sat back and thought "Who is blowing the whistle against -- you know, who could logically perceive that they have blown the whistle and we reprised against them?" I couldn't come up with anybody. And one of the reasons for that is shown by the tenor of those notes.

One of the other things I would like to point out about the *Rolling Stone* article, and I -- of course, I don't know what information was provided to Mr. Hastings, and so I am certainly not questioning Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or anybody else about it. But I do know that the article indicated that this alleged campaign was focused on -- it indicated Senator Franken being one of them against which it was focused. As I understand it Franken visited in January. And then if the directive to which Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) took exception took place near the end of March that would indicate another inconsistency in the article. Now there may be something of which I am not aware before that, but again this leads one to question the veracity, the presence of all relevant facts, and the fact that they had been put in context. Sir, I don't have anything else. I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you. What I would like to do is I guess I can sit down with somebody else and go through these.

IO: Yes. We would like to get copies of that information, and I need that memo of yours back too when you are done.

WIT: Yes, sir. Now, the other thing I am happy to offer is if anybody wants to take a look at my unclassified PSI file to make sure that I am not excluding something that would be somehow exculpatory for somebody else. I am happy to do that. My preference, of course, is that it doesn't become a matter of record unless it is relevant because I have got all kinds of e-mails from my wife and stuff like that there. I brought all of my notebooks for the same reason.

IO: Thanks.

WIT: Yes, sir.

IO: Okay, would you close with some administrative information?

LA: Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) do you fully understand the contents of the statement that you made today?

WIT: Yes. What I would like to do is review it and make sure that I am -- again I want to be exactly precise.

LA: And we are going to give you the opportunity to do that. We are going to send you a copy once it is transcribed and ask you to make any pen-and-ink changes that you require and initial at the bottom of each page and then send that back to us. We will send that to you on e-mail.

Is the statement you gave today true?

WIT: It is true. Yes, ma'am.

STATEMENT OF CO(b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT DATED 2011/03/15

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

LA: Have you made your statement freely, without the hope of benefit or reward and without the threat of punishment?
WIT: I have.
LA: And have you made the statement without coercion, unlawful influence, or other unlawful inducement?
WIT: I have.

[The interview concluded at 1311, 15 March 2011.]

AFFIDAVIT

I, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 53. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.01ES

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
FORT McPHERSON, GEORGIA 30330

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

AUSN-JA

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Restricted Communications

1. With the exception of the appointed investigative officer, LTG William G. Webster, your personal attorney, and/or the assigned legal advisors, you will have no discussions of any nature pertaining to the issues that are the subject of this investigation for which you were questioned.

2. The term "discussions" includes any and all means of communication, to include, but not limited to, verbal, telephonic, electronic, and written communication. This term further includes having any of your associates (third parties) conduct or attempt to conduct communications by any means (physically, telephonically, or electronically) on your behalf. If anyone communicates or attempts to communicate to any other party pertaining to these issues and it is determined that you were in any way involved, you will be held accountable for your conduct.

3. If anyone communicates or attempts to communicate to you or any other party pertaining to these issues and you have knowledge or become aware of such efforts you are required to report the incident to the investigating officer and/or legal personnel. Failure to report such an incident will be considered as failure to follow a lawful order and you will be held accountable for your conduct.

4. You are to conduct no actions of an investigative nature into these issues. Should you be contacted by anyone other referenced in paragraph one (1) on these issues, that person or persons should be referred to the investigating officer and/or legal personnel immediately: call (b)(2) (b)(2) or DSN (b)(2)

5. This order is not imposed as punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but issued as an administrative measure to facilitate the neutral and detached execution of on-going investigations.

WILLIAM G. WEBSTER
Lieutenant General, USA
Investigating Officer

Signature acknowledging receipt: (b)(3), (b)(6) **Date/Time:**

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: The solicitation of personal information in conjunction with this investigation is authorized under Title 10 U.S.C § 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander, USFOR-A in determining what, if any, action to take with regard to allegations of misconduct and/or misuse of military resources and/or personnel reported in the 23 February 2011 *Rolling Stone* magazine article, "Another Runaway General: Army Deploys Psy-Ops on U.S. Senators."

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the conduct of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts and circumstances regarding the incident concerned. It will be used to determine the cause(s) leading to the incident and make recommendations for appropriate administrative and/or corrective actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for it in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION:

The private information you furnish is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter.

The other information you furnish is mandatory (unless advised of your right to remain silent as a suspect). Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

I, COL (b)(3), (b)(6) having been advised of the above provisions of the Privacy Act agree to provide information concerning the above-cited incident.

Receiver Signature/Date:_

(b)(3), (b)(6)

IO Signature/Date:_

RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE/WAIVER CERTIFICATE

For use of this form, see AR 190-30; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, United States Code, Section 3012(g)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your Social Security Number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your Social Security Number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE	3. TIME	4. FILE NO.
Camp Eggers, Afghanistan	25 March 2011	1415	

5. NAME (Last, First, MI)	8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	
6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS: LTG/0-9

PART I - RIGHTS WAIVER/NON-WAIVER CERTIFICATE

Section A. Rights

The investigator whose name appears below told me that he/she is with the United States Army AR 15-6 Investigating Officer and wanted to question me about the following offense(s) of which I am suspected/accused: 18 USC §1913; 50 USC 413b(f); DODAA FY10 §8001; 31 USC §1341; 10 USC §1034, Article 92; 5 USC §552a & §552

Before he/she asked me any questions about the offense(s), however, he/she made it clear to me that I have the following rights:

1. I do not have to answer any question or say anything.
2. Anything I say or do can be used as evidence against me in a criminal trial.
3. *(For personnel subject to the UCMJ)* I have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian lawyer I arrange for at no expense to the Government or a military lawyer detailed for me at no expense to me, or both.

   - or -

   (For civilians not subject to the UCMJ) I have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. I understand that this lawyer can be one that I arrange for at my own expense, or if I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me before any questioning begins.
4. If I am now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation, with or without a lawyer present, I have a right to stop answering questions at any time, or speak privately with a lawyer before answering further, even if I sign the waiver below.

5. COMMENTS *(Continue on reverse side)*

Section B. Waiver

I understand my rights as stated above. I am now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation and make a statement without talking to a lawyer first and without having a lawyer present with me.

WITNESSES *(If available)*	3. SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE
1a. NAME *(Type or Print)* (b)(3), (b)(6) COL, JA	W B Caldwell IV
b. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PHONE HHC, USARCENT (b)(2)	4. SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
2a. NAME *(Type or Print)*	5. TYPED NAME OF INVESTIGATOR: LTG William G. Webster, Investigating Officer
b. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PHONE	6. ORGANIZATION OF INVESTIGATOR: ARCENT/Third Army

Section C. Non-waiver

1. I do not want to give up my rights
   - ☐ I want a lawyer
   - ☐ I do not want to be questioned or say anything
2. SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE

ATTACH THIS WAIVER CERTIFICATE TO ANY SWORN STATEMENT *(DA FORM 2823)* SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED BY THE SUSPECT/ACCUSED

EXHIBIT G

AR 15-6 Investigation
Information Operations in Afghanistan
LTG William Webster, Investigating Officer
COL (b)(3), (b)(6) **Assistant Investigating Officer**
Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6) **Assistant Investigating Officer**

Interview with Lieutenant General William Caldwell, U.S. Army, starting at 1409 on 25 March 2011.

Q./IO:	LTG William Webster, Investigating Officer
A./WIT:	LTG William Caldwell
LA:	COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Legal Advisor to the IO
AF:	LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Legal Advisor to the Witness
XO:	COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Executive Officer to the IO
DE:	Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6) Assistant Investigating Officer

IO: Okay, General Caldwell, as I think you know. I've been appointed by General Petraeus to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations in a Rolling Stone article that Michael Hastings wrote in February, in which Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had been a source and had provided him some information in which you and some others were accused of some wrongdoing. So I have been interviewing as many people as I could who might know something about these allegations and the facts and circumstances surrounding them and today you are the last or one of the last that we'll talk to based on what we've found so far.

To get started I'll ask Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) to cover these two documents and to go over some administrative things and then to administer a rights reading and then we'll go into the questions.

WIT: Okay.

IO: All right.

LA: Sir, there are two documents in front of you. One is a restricted communications statement and that statement talks about you not discussing your testimony today with anyone except for those connected with the investigation and the second is a privacy act statement which tells you what uses we'll make of this statement and the use will be only in accordance with the investigation. So if you'll take the time and read those and then if you would please sign them.

[The witness reviewed the document.]

WIT: And again, this is for as long as the investigation is still going on until it concluded and final disposition's made?

IO: Yes.

WIT: Okay.

[The witness signed the document.]

IO: Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) have you seen that before?

AF: No, sir, but I was just reading it.

WBC

WIT: Okay.

LA: Sir, the second one is a privacy act statement. That tells you the use that we make of your statement is to give General Petraeus to make decisions on the investigation.

WIT: Okay. And again, that also means anyone within DoD?

LA: Yes, sir.

WIT: And then I guess it's restricted from there, though, to outside people beyond that?

LA: Sir, if he determines to release it, it will be done in the Freedom of Information Act.

WIT: Okay.

LA: I will make the assumption that it will probably be posted on a Freedom of Information Act reading room somewhere, a redacted copy, because I have a feeling there will be a lot of requests into this investigation.

WIT: Okay.

[The witness signed the document.]

IO: If you'll pass that down, thank you.

LA: Sir, this is the Rights Waiver certificate. I will go ahead and go through all of the procedures just to make sure we do everything correctly. The Investigating Officer is General Webster. He has been appointed by General Petraeus to conduct the investigation into allegations made in the 23rd February Rolling Stone article. Sir, the offenses that are alleged in the article are first, in conjunction with the allegation that Lieutenant Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)and Major(b)(3), (b)(6)investigation, the command's actions following that investigation were in retaliation for(b)(3), (b)(6)questioning an order. The statutes that are implicated there are Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice which would be failure to follow an order, 10 USC § 1034, which is the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 USC § 552, which is the Freedom of Information Act and 5 USC § 552a, which is the Privacy Act. In connection with the allegations that were made in the article that you may have ordered members of CSTC-A/NTM-A to use Information Operations to inappropriately influence Congress or other Distinguished Visitors the statutes implicated would be 18 USC § 1913, which is the Anti-Lobbying Statute, 50 USC § 413b sub-paragraph F, which is Congressional Prohibition Against Covert Activities, the FY10 DoD Appropriations Act § 8001 and 31 USC § 1341, which would be the Anti-Deficiency Act.

Sir, before you are asked any questions you must understand your rights. Those are: you do not have to answer questions or say anything; anything you say or do can be used as evidence against you in a criminal trial; you have the right to talk privately to an attorney before, during or after questioning and to have a lawyer present with you during questioning. This lawyer could be a civilian arranged for at no expense to the government or a military lawyer detailed to you at no expense to you, or both. I know that you have Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)here today, a military lawyer, but you are also authorized a civilian attorney if you wanted to get one at your own expense.

Sir, if you are willing to discuss the offenses under investigation either with or without Colone(b)(3), (b)(6)or any other attorney present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time, to speak privately with a lawyer before, during or after questioning even if you sign the waiver certificate.

Sir, do you understand your rights?

WIT: I do.

SWORN STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CALDWELL TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS ON 25MARCH 2011

LA: Sir, have you requested a lawyer within the last 30 days after having been read your rights other than Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)?
WIT: No. I have not.
LA: Sir, other than Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6) do you want a lawyer at this time?
WIT: No. No, thank you.
LA: Sir, if at this time you are willing to discuss the offenses under investigation and make a statement with Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6) present, we'll have you sign the rights certificate, initialing that you want a lawyer and that would be Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)?
WIT: Right here?
AF: Initial right where ----
WIT: So check that?
AF: Sign here.
WIT: Okay.
LA: And sign underneath and if you want to make a note that Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6) is present, you can handwrite that in but it is on the record.
WIT: Okay. All right.

[The Investigating Officer also signed the document.]

AF: I'm sorry, can we go off the record please?

[The interview recessed at 1413, 25 March 2011.]

[The interview reconvened at 1415, 25 March 2011.]

IO: Colonel(b)(3), (b)(6)?
LA: Sir, this statement is being taken at Camp Eggers on the 25th of March. It is 1415.

[The witness was sworn.]

LA: Thank you, sir. Sir, please state your full name?
WIT: William Burns Caldwell, IV.
LA: And you are assigned to CSTC-A/NTM-A?
WIT: That is correct.
LA: And you are a Lieutenant General, Active Component, Regular Army?
WIT: That is correct.
LA: Sir, that's all the administrative information.

EXAMINATION BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER

Q. Bill, how many years do you have in the military now?
A. Almost 35 years.
Q. And just tell me briefly about your background in the Army?

SWORN STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CALDWELL TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS ON 25MARCH 2011

A. Commissioned in 1976, served in various operational jobs throughout my career, most recently at Fort Leavenworth Kansas as the Commander of the Combined Arms Center. I've had jobs outside of operational units, serving in the White House in the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and as the Exec to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Q. And the commander of the All American Division?

A. That is correct.

Q. What training have you had or education have you had specifically in Strategic Communication? Formal training or education.

A. Yeah, whatever normal training that a military officer would be exposed to throughout their military career. My only real formal communications training was a four hour general officer course on how to talk to the press. That's the only formalized training, per se, that I've received. Other than what we receive through normal military education, you know, about dealing with the press, but I did spend a year kind of OJTing, or 13 months, when I was assigned as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects as part of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, which included as a duty of mine to serve as the spokesman for the Multi-National Force. So for 13 months I operated in that role.

Q. Have you had any formal training or education in IO or Information Operations?

A. No, I have not.

Q. How about in Public Affairs, per se?

A. No, I've had no formal training.

Q. Or Psychological Operations?

A. No, I've not had any formal training.

Q. For the record, can you tell me when you were assigned to CSTC-A command?

A. I was assigned here in November of 2009.

Q. As you are well aware from your time at CAC and as a spokesman in Baghdad, there are many versions of doctrine and policy that talk about Strategic Communication and Information Ops and Information Engagement and information superiority and dominance and Public Affairs and so it seems to me that doctrine has evolved in some areas but not in others to the same level. So how do you define STRATCOM as you use it and deploy it?

A. When I use the term Strategic Communications, I'm talking about communicating a message to inform and educate others as to what you're doing so they're more knowledgeable and can make therefore an informed decision, whatever that decision is they determine to make. But that is kind of Strategic Communications. It's that approach of figuring out how to communicate and share and transmit information to others.

Q. Is Strategic Communications directed at a particular audience or can it be at multiple audiences, friendly as well as adversary?

A. Again, in my view, Strategic Communications are really directed -- and I wouldn't even call it directed -- they're being done in order to inform and educate the general population of the world. It's not intended to do anything other than just make people more knowledgeable and educated about whatever you're trying to share with them.

Q. Are there components of Strategic Communications such as what we just talked about? Is Public Affairs a component of Strategic Communications or is it something different?

A. No, I would think of Public Affairs as most people know it, that that would be a component of Strategic Communications.

Q. How about Information Operations?

A. No, it would not be a part of Strategic Communications.
Q. Psychological Operations?
A. No, again, it would be separate and distinct from Strategic Communications.
Q. Do you think that General Petraeus and ISAF have the same view of Strategic Communications that you do?
A. I would say yeah, they probably do, yeah. There's no reason that's led me to believe otherwise.
Q. And the other commands such as most recently Combined Arms Command, is that basically the same philosophy that you used there?
A. It was.
Q. Several witnesses have remarked that you've stated that Information Ops has no place in CSTC-A/NTM-A because of your training mission. Is that correct?
A. That is correct. Things like Information Operations and Psychological Operations belong in the operational force and we're not an operational element. We're a training element. That's the reason our title is called NATO Training Mission. Our mission is to train others in skill sets -- so it has no place and should not be utilized by us at all.
Q. And separate and distinct from that as you talked about Strategic Communications, Strategic Communications, how do you feel about that in NTM-A and CSTC-A?
A. My feeling is that given that the U.S. government has given us a large sum of money every month in the training of the Afghan Security Force here -- Police, Army, Air Force, Logistics, Medical -- that therefore we have a responsibility to share with others exactly how that money is being spent and to what effect it is achieving in terms of professionalizing, developing, equipping and manning the security force of Afghanistan.
Q. So it plays a key role here in informing and educating the people of Afghanistan as well as the rest of the people of the world?
A. I think it absolutely does. I think it's very important that we -- in fact, I encourage everybody in the entire organization to think of themselves as somebody who should share with others what they're doing here and the area that they're operating in and working in.
Q. Several witnesses have told us that one of the first things you said when you arrived was "We inform and educated but we don't conduct IO. It has no place here in this training command." Do you recall making that comment shortly after you arrived or was it sometime later that you came to that conclusion?
A. No, that has always been my philosophy that there is a distinct and set place where things like Information Operations would be conducted, but it would not be done in a training environment.
Q. You mentioned just briefly telling people at all levels in CSTC-A to do their part in telling the story. How would you describe your philosophy on telling Soldiers to speak to the media, all forms of the media?
A. I'm very open to it. You know, we have three or four general rules that we tell people to use and none of them require anybody to per se have it cleared with anybody but rather just talk your lane, talk about that only which you have firsthand knowledge about, and feel free to share the story about what you're doing. It's not intended to be a place to air your grievances. There's a chain of command for that. But other than that, everybody is very much -- all the way down to the lowest level private -- through print, radio, and TV to engage with and dialogue with the international community.

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Q. Okay. You told everybody or you've mentioned several times, as I understand it, that you wanted people to be themselves and speak the truth. Did you issue any guidance to folks about whether or not they should represent other organizations or not or whether they should take on pseudonyms or blog names or should they ensure that they identify themselves and represent your organization and the United States?

A. The guidance that we've given out since I took command is that if you're going to talk to any form of media, print, radio, TV, or engage in those areas, then it has to be 100% attributable to you as a person so that people know where it comes from and that the only thing that you can engage in dialogue about is that which you have firsthand, personal knowledge. If it's the larger organization's goals and missions, again, if you don't have firsthand, personal knowledge and experience in that area, then you should not be talking about it because then it becomes second and third hand information, which, you know, there's no way -- you just shouldn't do that. So the guidance has always been firsthand personal experience and knowledge.

Q. Now to doctrine. As we mentioned earlier it has evolved over time. Policies have changed. You served as the CAC commander at Fort Leavenworth right after General Petraeus and our doctrine on Information Operations and Strategic Communications has changed over time, as has a lot of our doctrine, COIN doctrine and how we operate and what is the spectrum of operations and those kind of things. Do you recall how IO doctrine evolved from the time you arrived and what you found? Did you have a hand in personally shaping IO doctrine or was it another one of your doctrinal writing requirements? How would you describe it?

A. There was a requirement for us to -- as part of the Combined Arms Center you have a doctrinal department that does all the various Army doctrines. One of them was they were required to be updated on their different frequencies and one they were working on was the Information Operations doctrine. But it became very challenging during my time there. We never did -- as best I recall -- ever finally produce a document because there were so many diverse opinions within the Army that we never did come to a consensus. Again, it's not a matter of what we wanted at Fort Leavenworth, it's what does the Army need with us helping facilitate that doctrine being written. When we wrote 3-0 Operations, you know, from what we produced initially to what finally was proved and signed out was in many respects very different. Again, we just facilitate helping produce the doctrine for the United States Army. And so I don't believe the doctrinal manual was ever completed because General Casey very much was trying to come to grips in his own mind as our Chief as to what he thought was Psychological Operations, which he did not like the term and wanted to eliminate that from our vocabulary, to what does all this really mean.

Q. Would you say that when you arrived at Fort Leavenworth you were or you were not specifically trying to change IO doctrine?

A. Oh, no. I don't know if I would say -- I didn't come in with an agenda when I assumed command of Fort Leavenworth to do any particular piece of doctrinal manual, to shape it or move it in any particular direction. Rather, there was a list of things we were given to do, there's a frequency that's been established by the Department of the Army and we execute those according to that approved thing that the TRADOC Commander gives to us.

Q. Would describe a little further, Bill, if you can the procedure or the process, rather, for that doctrine being developed? And I guess start with -- the first question would be from me are there special people selected to go in and write doctrine?

A. There are. There are people assigned to the doctrine department at Fort Leavenworth, both military and civilian. They have oversight and responsibility for pulling that doctrine together. There's pretty set procedures and processes that have been used for a long, long time, from revisions that have to be done to groups that have to be brought in from across the Army to talk and dialogue about it to getting the TRADOC Commander to eventually concur and approve with whatever we're pushing forward to the Chief of Staff of the Army for final approval. Yeah, they get selected and assigned. I'm not per se involved with that process any more than I would be anybody else being assigned to the command, you know, so I didn't -- the team there was pretty much the team that was there as best as I can recall. There may have been some changes but it was just routine, normal assignments.

Q. So there's a routine procedure in the Army for examining our doctrine, determining whether it fits our needs for the next several years and then getting officers and NCOs from throughout the Army to be assigned there to help draft something and then it goes through multiple processes of having the leaders out in the field and the four stars collectively and the chief individually review that? Is that correct?

A. That is correct. And the one thing we even tried to add while I was there was making it somewhat like Wikipedia based so we could a lot of input from the field, from those who are out there. So if it's a rifle squad manual, then a lot of squad leaders, hopefully, would get on this Wikipedia kind of system we were trying to set up and provide a lot of input to it.

Q. Okay. So you don't personally write doctrine as the CAC Commander?

A. I did not personally write any doctrine while I was the CAC Commander.

Q. Okay. Several witnesses have talked about the IEWG, the Information Engagement Working Group. And some of told us because they were here working for (b)(3), (b)(6) they've said that there wasn't an IEWG before you came and this came with you. Do you recall what that means to you? Did you specifically bring that with you to set up and, if so, what was its purpose?

A. It was a forum that we used at Fort Leavenworth in order to prepare for when visitors were coming in, to know who they were, what was their intended purpose, are they seeing the right kind of people so that they can accomplish the objectives they want to accomplish, everything from the administrative support, the logistics of taking care of them, who are their escorts and all of that kind of stuff to then synchronizing it so if it's a key, senior kind of person that we would then want to ask while they're there, "Would you mind also talking to CGSC students or SAMS students?" That everybody had the opportunity to take advantage of that person being present, to solicit them to become a guest speaker at some of our different educational forums at Fort Leavenworth and so we did use that at Fort Leavenworth. Then when I came here, I can't remember quite how the first visitor happened but what they told me they did was each time a visitor came in they had a standard command brief that they gave and they just gave their brief. And I said, "Yeah, but I've been giving speeches for a long time in my military career and normally what I try to do when I give a speech is understand the audience to whom I'm talking, the why they invited me in particular to speak, what do they want me to best talk about to inform them so that I, in fact, am able to do what that audience asked for me to do." And so I said "When visitors come in, if it's a person that's a military officer or a retired military officer, the terminology and the lexicon we use in the briefing can have a lot of military jargon and expressions and we can talk military terminology very comfortably. But if it's a civilian coming in who's a CEO of some business who's never served a day in his or her life in the military, simple terms like squad, platoon, company, they won't understand and be able to assimilate what that means. So you have to

modify how you communicate that information to them so they can understand what you're trying to talk about."

Q. So understanding your audience is important so that you can educate and inform them in a way that they can understand it and take it away as a communication. Would you say that is shaping the briefing or shaping your speech to fit the audience, is that shaping the brief to fit the audience who's visiting?

A. I would say that trying to, you know, especially here in Afghanistan if somebody comes all the way to travel to Afghanistan, they obviously have an objective they're trying to achieve. They're coming here to gain some knowledge and understanding so let's make sure that whatever we're trying to communicate with them, they can understand then so it's not a waste of their time while they were here.

Q. Did you use a particular term, I guess is what I'm getting at. In many commands that I've been in, three and four star level, we call it shaping the briefing to fit the audience. Is the audience going to understand what we gave last week or yesterday? Or are they interested in something else? You know, if they're interested in agriculture we don't want to talk to them about tanks.

A. Correct, yes.

Q. Is that what you're talking about?

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you use a particular phrase for that?

A. I'm trying to think if there's a particular one I use. I normally talk in terms of we want to inform and educate and ----

Q. No particular term?

A. Not that I can think of offhand.

Q. Okay. And the Information Engagement Working Group has its name ostensibly from the term Information Engagement FM 3-0 or other lexicon, so tell me what you -- is there something specific about that term or what were you thinking when you and your staff applied that term, information engagement?

A. To me it is a very separate and distinct thing between Information Engagement and Information Operations. Information Operations is normally directed at an adversary of a foreign nature. Information Engagement is just engaging with someone in a dialogue to share information with them so they can understand it and process it and have the knowledge and data so they can come to an informed decision, whatever that informed decision is. It doesn't mean that it's going to go in any particular direction. It's just you want to ensure that they're the most knowledgeable -- it's like when my staff brings something to me, a lot of times it's "Sir, we need you to sign this particular action." I may send it back and say "Can you get me a little more information about this because I don't understand the context of what you're saying. You're asking me to sign it and I'm not quite sure what the phraseology in here says when this and this happened. Can you clarify that for me?" So for me to sign that or to move it forward I'd want to be more informed. And so, again, when people come to Afghanistan in this case or to visit us at Fort Leavenworth when I was there, they normally had a particular purpose in mind, why they were taking that time in their life to come and visit and so, again, understanding what they would like to be informed about so that it's most beneficial for their time and their energy and their effort that they put forward is kind of the intent of the IEWG to also understand -- amongst everything from the administrative support and everything else, and the opportunities that they present to other organizations too.

Q. Is it correct that some visitors, like Congressional Delegations, have escorts or some people call them handlers, escorts from one service or another or from their own staff who will sometimes provide information ahead of time as to what they're interested in, what are they looking for, what are their questions they want answered? Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And if whether or not that was the case, if some visitors who were coming -- did you feel it was important to find out what their interests were and to try and experience what their experience levels were so that you could develop a briefing that would answer what you thought they would like to hear?

A. Absolutely. And that was normally a key part of our prep session for visitors coming in is going through that kind of discussion with the group. Again, it was never a small group. It was normally a large group because you're soliciting a lot of input from different folks.

Q. Yeah. So you're saying that you were inclusive in this process and not exclusive. You weren't trying to leave people out and only get select information?

A. Oh, no. In fact, most of the time I wasn't quite really sure who was in the room but at least I did know who was at the primary table. And then I figured everybody else was brought because somebody thought they might add something to the conversation. And I'd always turn around as I normally do and ask if anybody had anything else, they could add anything we've missed, anything we should be thinking about that we're not thinking about.

Q. Who did you task as the primary responsible organization or person to pull that information together for you in preparation for a visit?

A. My director of communications had that overall arching responsibility for me and then within there, if there was like a Congressional Delegation coming in, then I'd ask my OCLL representative to kind of have the senior leaf of that, within that. If it was a think tank kind of person coming in, I'd normally as my CAG to sort of have the lead with, again, within the Directorate of Communication's overall effort. So kind of who might have been the most knowledgeable perhaps in that particular area. If it was a retired military officer, well, you know, that's kind of different because you can almost inherently understand and know what they know and don't know, generally, but my CAG normally has the lead on that too.

Q. Can you talk about the process -- what you knew of the process for the Director of Communications to bring these people and this information together for you?

A. It's not like I -- I didn't give any particular guidance or direction on how it had to be done. The only kind of guidance I gave out was the outcome that I wanted to be achieved so that when they sat down with me they could provide the information that I was looking for then for our discussion amongst the group. So I didn't tell them "You must have this number of meetings at this amount of time." When I first got there, there was no process at all so I was probably a little more directive initially in my first month or two there saying "Look, what I'm looking for is a group that gets together, that brings all the different disciplines of support, security, transportation, lodging, the communications, you know, bring everybody into one room so that we're making sure we're managing this visit the right way." And normally I'd try to have my CAG there too to look for opportunities as I called it with whoever the visitor or visitors were so that we might engage them too, since they're there.

Q. This process, is it one that you're accustomed to from other assignments? In other words, have you seen other headquarters do something similar to this in preparation for visits?

A. Yeah. I've probably been watching this since the time I was a Lieutenant Colonel or probably a senior Major working in the White House all the way up to the present. Everybody has some method very, very similar to this. Everybody calls it, perhaps, something different. But there's not a senior person I've ever seen, you know, and it starts all the way back in the White House when I worked in the Office of Public Liaison as a White House fellow and preparing the President of the United States for things all the way up to when I was working for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Every time he had a visitor coming in, you know, we went through the same kind of process to best prepare him and have him most informed and knowledgeable and give any guidance he had that he wanted to give. All the way to working for the Deputy Secretary of Defense when I was his military assistant doing the same thing.

Q. When you were briefed by the Director of Communications and the staff in this prep session, what did you particularly like to see in a packet of information on a visitor? Did you have a list of things that you wanted or did you have an idea that you just verbally informed people about of what you thought was important?

A. There is pretty much a couple of things that I always wanted to see. I wanted to understand the itinerary of the visitors or visitor. I wanted to kind of know where they've come from, what they're doing while they're with our bigger organization here and then kind of what they're going to do next. Because having that context tells you a little about what they're looking for based on what you see, the different things they're going to go see and do. So you understand how you fit in to this puzzle. That person is trying to gather knowledge and information. How do you contribute to that effort of that person trying to do that? So what's their schedule and then where do we fit in? Then I wanted to know the exact details of our own schedule from reception to movement to briefers, the whole deal so I understood who was involved in our process. I liked to know who the people or person was or is that's coming with whatever information we have on them so I know, kind of, you know, again I'm trying to understand their background and experiences. Is this a retired military officer who was logistics all of his or her life? They may not know that much about combat arms and therefore as you're talking about how you're training the Afghan squads and platoons, they may not have that understanding. Or is it somebody who has a real background and experience and you can quickly assimilate and move through that and perhaps even use them to ask "Can you give us any feedback?" And "Would you mind doing that perhaps after you've been through and seen some of our training?" So it was the schedule to understand who the people were, kind of what's our desired outcome? When the person leaves, what do you want them to have been informed about? Again, that should directly tie into what they're looking for. So you have to understand kind of what they're looking for, why they're taking the time in their schedules to come see or whatever they're doing.

Q. How about biographies or biographical sketches? Were they useful?

A. They're very useful. Like if it was General Keane coming in, I'd like to see his regular military bio. Now, I know who he is.

Q. Sure.

A. But if it wasn't a general I was familiar with or a flag officer or a senior officer, you know, a retired person I'm talking about, I'd like to at least know what their background experience was because, again, it tells me how to convey messages.

Q. And we in the military typically have a bio that we update every assignment or so. Did you find or do you think the staff found in your background in this that everybody has a bio or some you have to go collect information to put together a biographical sketch?

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A. I'd say 99% of the people -- there was a bio out there that was out wherever it is and they were able to print it off from someplace and provide it for me to look at. Perhaps a person at a think tank doesn't have a long bio, but then they have produced for me whatever they may have found that was on one of their books they wrote or something like that that they thought was important for people to know.

Q. Yeah. I know sometimes that I find that congressional staffers, for instance, they don't want to give you a bio. They don't want you to have it. So you've got to mine for that data. You've got to look around for it. Did you experience the same thing?

A. We do. Yeah, and I never expected real detailed stuff, you know. If they had no existing bio then they could do something like a Wikipedia search or something like that just to see if there was something out there. But it would usually note if they had a Master's degree or a doctorate degree. If their doctorate degree was in ethics and morality, well then that's very useful. Then I'll know that they have a real unique interest and ask about what are you doing about the instruction of ethics for the Afghan Army and then I'll grab my resident expert who knows most about ethics and say, "Hey, this staffer is coming and he or she has a doctorate in ethics and, you know, you are running our program, how about you at least share in an exchange with them what we're doing here." And, again, leverage them back and ask if there is anything they would see that we are missing, that, you know, since they're very knowledgeable themselves in this area that we might learn too.

Q. So when you got here you said there wasn't a real process and the command briefing was pretty much the same for everybody. As you shaped that in the early months that you were here, you said you were fairly dictatorial because maybe you didn't have a written SOP as to what you wanted to see but if you sat down and there wasn't much there about the visitors, did you direct people to go back and pull specific kinds of information? Were you trying to be instructive to the staff?

A. I was initially. My first few months here there were not really many processes that perhaps I had been accustomed to seeing in a headquarters so I did give instructions initially about you know, "When you guys and gals come in I really would like to see who the person is, what their biographical background is that's out there, when was the last time they visited this theater, did they ever visit this theater before or is this their first time ever in the theater?" You know, just general information so I kind of knew a little bit about the person. It's nothing different than even my wife and I would talk about with a dinner guest coming to our house. I mean, if a dinner guest was coming to my house, I would assume that I'd know a little about the person but I'd ask my wife, well, you know "Suzie X is coming with her husband, can you tell me a little about Suzie so in the dinner conversation tonight I can at least have an engaging dialogue." You know, if I find out that Suzie is a psychiatrist, then you know maybe I might crack a joke and say, "I hope you're not going to analyze me all night, tonight." It's breaking the ice, it's having the ability to have a little dialogue and understanding. And what I find, especially when I'm doing a dinner party or having dinner guests, they actually are very appreciative of the fact that you know who they are and you know a little bit about what they've done. Because they're probably proud of their accomplishments.

Q. Yeah.

A. And it does really enable a much more conversant discussion and exchange when you're together.

Q. Did you ever tell anybody to go gather private information that was not publically available?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Would you ever do that?
A. No, I would not.
Q. Did you ever tell anybody to put information into these packets that was untruthful?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. After a DV or a visitor would leave, did you conduct something like an After Action Review or some sort of assessment or trying to determine well how did we do? Did we inform and educate this person? Or did you just move onto the next one.
A. Regardless of what area I'm operating in, I normally always expect us to do an AAR for any kind of engagement. If I'm out with some Afghan counterparts and they're watching training, normally afterwards I'll ask "How did the training go? Did it go well? Is there something that they made a comment on that they would want us to refocus our efforts and energy on? Were they knowledgeable about why you were doing this particular training?" So that next time we have a visitor or a meeting like that we're more informed.
Q. Would it be important to understand how many times somebody visited, like some senior Senator, to understand what they were interested in the last several times they visited and what you told them so you could update them on that information?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever provided guidance to your staff to specifically influence Congressional Delegations so as to get more funding for your Soldiers or for your mission?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Do you recall a Texas National Guard Info Ops Team, IO Team, the 71st Field Support Team, that started working on teaching Strategic Communications to the MoD and MoI? Do you recall them coming in about the same time you did?
A. I do. Yes. They got here a month or two, I think, before I got here.
Q. Were you aware of them at the time you arrived? I mean, is it an organization you would interface with regularly or not?
A. No, I can't quite recall when I became aware of their presence but it wasn't something that was briefed to me ahead of time nor that I engaged with in my first encounters.
Q. Are you aware that they were redirected or remissioned to not do IO because of your directive and that instead they were told to either teach Strategic Communications to the Afghan MoD and MoI or to gather information like the Director of Communications was providing you for visitors?
A. I don't remember the time when that occurred but I do remember us remissioning them at some point.
Q. Did you have any concerns about that or did you feel that was the right thing to do?
A. Oh, no. I felt it was absolutely the right thing to do. You know, we had and still do have, not as intense but a critical shortage of personnel in our organization to do all the things we need to do. So it's kind of like when Brigadier General Jeff Smith arrived in my organization and I told him "You're going to do development of the Ministry of Interior and you're going to partner with and be an advisor to the Minister of Interior. I know you have never been trained in police operations in your entire life. I know that you don't know anything about police operations to speak of, but you understand leadership, you understand staff processes, you understand organizational skills and therefore Jeff Smith you're now going to be the new Assistant Commanding General for police development in the Ministry of Interior." And it's all the way down, remissioning folks to where we had a requirement to do a particular task that our organization was expected to accomplish.

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Q. Do you know Lieutenant Colone (b)(3), (b)(6)
A. I do.
Q. And how do you know him?
A. He was assigned to our command.
Q. Did you -- when did you become aware of Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) ?
A. Probably sometime after my first 30 days on the ground here in Afghanistan.
Q. And how did you come to know him?
A. As best I can recall working out of the CJ5 shop and we were looking for people to help us with communications and that looked like another group of folks who were doing something that was not a requirement in a training command and so we remissioned them to do that, which they did. I may have had a few exchanges with them.
Q. Did you know any others in that 71st FST? Do you recall any of the other personnel specifically who worked there?
A. I remember Major (b)(3), (b)(6) being a part of the team and then there was three others.
Q. Did you notice any of them in these -- at any point in time -- in these Distinguished Visitor and CODEL prep sessions? Do you recall them outstanding in some way good or bad?
A. I don't doubt for a minute that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was probably in on a couple of them but not as my primary interface person but rather as a board person working for the Director of Communications.
Q. To shift gears for a minute, how do you handle allegations of senior personnel misconduct? Senior personnel meaning some level of senior Noncommissioned Officer and above or your description of it. Do you have a policy, written or verbal, that tells your staff how to handle allegations of misconduct of some form or another?
A. The general policy is that if an allegation of misconduct is brought forth and somebody has some reason they had brought it forth, then the standard kind of policy is the best thing you can do is go ahead and conduct an investigation into that to ascertain whether or not it's accurate, inaccurate, misrepresentative so that one, rumors don't persist and continue and two, if there was some validation behind the allegation then we can modify, change, correct the behavior or whatever the circumstances associated with this is or we may find that there's absolutely no substance to it at all and it was a complete misunderstanding or miscommunication so we are able to resolve that too. Generally, the thought is that if you at least document it or put it in writing that if it came up three months, six months, nine months later, it was clearly documented, you looked at it at the time and all the information available came to whatever the conclusion was.
Q. And do you normally, as many other commanders do, use Army Regulation 15-6 as a guide for that -- for your subordinates in your organization to conduct those investigations?
A. Yeah. We do. And I very much encourage that to be the form that we use versus trying to do something informally that doesn't get documented and then can be misinterpreted much later.
Q. And by documented, do you mean with written sworn statements that are sworn to and therefore allegedly the truth that you can then refer back to later?
A. Absolutely. And then it's an official document so if something were to come up later, there's already a place you can go and find it and pull it up. You know, people have a difficult time recollecting facts much, much later and what a 15-6 does is it ensures that we capture it at that time as it was best known.

Q. And do you allow subordinates like the Chief of Staff and deputy commanders or commanders of subordinate organizations even to conduct -- do you expect them to conduct those investigations of allegations themselves? Not personally themselves but to handle that inside those organizations?

A. To direct it and have it conducted.

Q. So you didn't require any of these allegations to come to you for you to direct the investigations?

A. No, in fact, the vast majority of the time I would not even know something was going on until it was well into the process and only when my lawyer said for some reason I had to give at least verbal okay or sign an authorization for a 15-6 based on different reasons that I would even know what was going on.

Q. Okay. Did you give the Chief of Staff or deputies any particular guidance on how to conduct those investigations or what kinds of allegations to investigate?

A. I mean, not really. I didn't tell them how to conduct them. Again, I would have left that up to the legal, the SJA folks ----

Q. To give legal advice?

A. Yeah, to follow the process so that it's a valid document at the end. But again, normally, if there's any question about irregularities, you know, my general philosophy is over here especially that it's prudent to just go ahead and do a 15-6 so that an outside person looks at it, ascertains the facts as their best known and can come to some conclusion.

Q. Do you recall being notified any time last spring that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) were alleged to have conducted some misconduct?

A. I don't recall exactly when it came to my attention but I don't recall it being until probably closer to the summer time, is the best I can recall. Most of the March, April timeframe I was out of theater, not in theater, because of my medical conditions. I was MEDEVACed at the end of March to Landstuhl, and I brought the exact dates if people needed them and then I was MEDEVACed in April to Brooks Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas and had another medical procedure done.

Q. To Brook Army Medical Center?

A. Back in San Antonio, Texas. My medical condition, although it had been existing probably for about six weeks before it became identified, I mean I've got the exact date. They MEDEVACed me out, from the best we can see on our records, on the 29th of March. I had been gone from 21 to 26 March attending a police conference at Joint Forces Command Brunssum and then had gone from the police conference in Brunssum, having left on the 21st of March, to France where I was meeting with the Gendarmes, again, soliciting contributions of trainers to the police training mission in my command because the French have a lot of Gendarmes. I returned on the 26th as best as I can recall and it was that night I went right to the doctors, at which point they said "We've got to MEDEVAC you out immediately."

[The witness discussed detailed medical issues of a private nature.]

A. I took another 48 hours to close out a number of key, critical things because I had been gone for another eight days before that and I was MEDEVACed out on the 29th.

Q. The 29th of March of '10?

A. The 29th of March of '10.

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[The witness further discussed detailed medical issues of a private nature.]

Q. Just a reminder, you don't have to cover this medical information unless you want to.

A. Okay, I probably won't. But I was medically out of theater.

Q. We will take that part out if General Caldwell wants to, the part about his particular medical condition.

A. On the 29th of March I did go out for a medical procedure and returned on the 3rd of April as best as my calendar shows and then the medical procedure was not successful as it turned out and I was MEDEVACed out again on the 12th of April and did not return again this time to theater until the 26th of April and then in a very limited status of operations for about a month.

Q. Do you recall anyone informing you during that period of time that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Major (b)(3), (b)(6) had allegedly had some form of misconduct?

A. Not during that time. In fact, unlike most times when you go TDY and you're able to communicate and stay in touch every day, my medical condition was such in both situations ----

Q. So you designated someone else to be in command?

A. Yeah, you know, we don't have on the organization chart, we do now but we did not at that time have a true deputy commander, so I took my senior U.S. military officer, General Patton, and every time I travelled I made him the acting commander of the organization.

Q. So when you returned to theater, do you recall hearing that a 15-6 investigation had been conducted on (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) after you returned?

A. At some point much later I did. I just don't recall when that was.

Q. So you had no part in the investigation or directing it or directing actions to take as a result of the report of the investigation?

A. No, as best as I recall nobody ever talked to me about any of that during that time period.

Q. Do you recall being notified by anybody that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) had received a GOMOR for the findings of an investigation?

A. I was informed sometime after the fact. I just don't remember when it was.

Q. So you don't remember being informed or you don't recall ever being informed before the GOMOR was issues and/or telling anybody how to administer the GOMOR?

A. No, when I leave General Patton in command, it's totally how he wants to conduct it. There's no guidance from me other than to make sure you do it with lawyers' advice.

Q. Do you recall when you might have heard about their misconduct or 15-6 or GOMOR issue?

A. The best I can recall was probably sometime early summer.

Q. Do you recall how you found out?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Do you recall anyone ever informing you that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had alleged that someone had given him an illegal order that he was questioning while it was going on?

A. No, I was never aware that any of that was taking place.

Q. Do you know Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. I do.

Q. And what positions did you have him working in?

A. I had (b)(3), (b)(6) at a point in time working as my Chief of Communications.

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Q. Did you at some point have a British officer come in and replace him in that position? Do you recall?

A. I did.

Q. And did you move Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) out for some particular reason? Is it something he did or didn't do?

A. No, we were going to make Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) our liaison officer working back in the PAC in the Pentagon and so the intent there was to give him a greater breadth and depth of our organization. I sent him on a round robin around the country, seeing everything and touching everything so that when he was back and asked questions he could talk from an informed basis about having been there, done that.

DE: I'm sorry, sir. Could I ----

WIT: Please.

DE: So Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) is going to be your LNO after he finishes as Director of Communications here? Or was he going to leave here and go there while he was still ----

WIT: He was finishing up his tour here, his one year tour.

DE: Yes, sir.

WIT: And the intent was he would go back -- he did not become my PAC LNO but that was the intent because he got reassigned to CJ6 instead.

DE: Okay.

WIT: Not our CJ6 but J6 in the Pentagon instead.

DE: So that was his follow on was to go back and be the LNO and that was your intent?

WIT: That was my intent was to make him my follow on.

DE: I understand.

WIT: But it didn't materialize.

DE: Okay, sir. Thank you.

Q. So did Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or anyone else you recall tell you that they were out to get Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Major (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. No, I don't recall him ever saying something like that.

Q. So in passing somewhere you heard about a 15-6 having been conducted but you didn't know what the allegations were and you never heard about (b)(3), (b)(6) alleging that (b)(3), (b)(6) had given him an illegal order?

A. The comments on the illegal order I had never heard about until the Rolling Stone article came out. But at some point after the 15-6 and General Officer letter were done, as best as I can now piece together the timeline, I was informed of it [15-6] but not in the sense of "Here's a special briefing on just this situation" but more rather "Here's officer matters, here's routine" -- it was probably the Chief. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) who talked to me about it, just doing the normal information update that he would do on "Here's ongoing things in the camp. Here's action I'm working on in personnel. Here's any kind of disciplinary actions that have recently taken that you should be knowledgeable of." It was that kind of information update that I probably had it in.

Q. Okay. When CODELs came to visit, as you were reviewing the information that was available about their backgrounds and their biographies and their experience and education and all of those things that you would look at so you would know your audience, did you develop something that you were trying to achieve with their visit? I mean, did you say that you had an intent for their visit or an objective for their visit or did you use some other term of an outcome you wanted from their visit?

A. On the form that we normally use it normally says "desired outcome." So I normally ask when their visit is complete, what information would you like them to have been informed about and educated on or had the experience to see so we'll know whether or not the visit achieved what we thought would best suit what they're looking to get out of the visit here.

Q. Is this something you would include in their slides that you would use to help describe information? Did you have a desired outcome slide that you presented to them or that was presented to you as a recommendation?

A. It was normally presented to me as a recommendation and it wasn't normally a slide, just part of this information on one big kind of chart we use that has sort of a timeline of stuff with us, desired outcome, who the visiting party is to include the escorts, so we kind of know how many people, who they are. But it was pretty much a standard sheet we use, a one-pager to kind of capture that information.

Q. I'm going to name off some key visitors that were mentioned in the article and that General Petraeus has asked me to inquire about and I'd like for you tell me if you recall what was your desired outcome or intent with each of these visitors if you recall. Senator John McCain?

A. I don't really recall.

Q. Senator Joe Lieberman?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Senator Jack Reed?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Senator Al Franken?

A. Don't recall.

Q. Senator Carl Levin?

A. Probably one of the things with Senator Carl Levin would have been to let him know that we're following through with the guidance he had given us to make sure that we were working hard to retrograde equipment from Iraq to Afghanistan to generate savings and overall expenditure of our budget.

Q. You should have sent him to see me. I could never get him to stop in Kuwait. I could have told him that answer. You wouldn't have had to do it.

A. But that was one thing that we knew he had specifically told us to do so one of the desired outcomes was to make sure he left understanding what we were doing. Probably Senator Levin it was mostly about are we being fiscally prudent in the way we're spending the money that they've allocated to us so trying to give him a little information about how we're spending the budget was probably another outcome.

Q. Is it possible that you would tell Senator Levin that you had sufficient funding or that you accomplishing these things with the funding you had and you needed more or were you trying to just show him the use of what he had given you?

A. We were just trying to make sure he understood that we were using -- that we were being fiscally responsible in how we were using the money that we had been given.

Q. How about your desired outcome for Congressman Steve Israel?

A. No desired outcome there.

Q. You don't recall if there was?

A. If there was it was probably to inform him about what we were doing with professional military education. That's an area that he has a real interest in as far as the U.S. military goes so we

probably talked to him some -- probably an outcome was to let him know that we were working hard at developing an Afghan military education system so it wasn't just the training you got in the initial training phase but we understood the need to do mid-level career training and then a little more senior level career training.

Q. Is there anything you would say from that group of congressmen and senators, was there anything in particular that you might have said to all of them as a desired outcome?

A. I would have said generally to that group of people it would have been to make sure they knew where we were in the growth and development and the equipping of the Afghan Army, Police and Air Force. You know, one of our charters when we stood this command up was to start growing and professionalizing those three forces. You know, just two months before we got here there had been a negative growth in the Army that month, the Afghan National Army so probably each time they came we were trying to show them that growth is taking place and we're adding quantity while we also ad quality and these are the things we're doing to add more quality into the force as we develop it.

Q. Do you recall ever telling these Members of Congress that you needed more funds?

A. No. I never did.

Q. Do you recall telling these Members of Congress that you needed more people from them?

A. I didn't need people from the U.S. Congress but I did through my military chain of command routinely ask for more people.

Q. So when military visitors would come, if they were in a position to provide more people, whether they were NATO or U.S. forces, was that something you would tell them because that's something they could help you with?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Did you do that by showing the outcomes -- by trying to show the outcomes of the people you had, how you were using them and therefore trying to extrapolate what some additional personnel could help you accomplish?

A. We were probably even more up front. We'd normally just say "How you can help us" as the title of the slide that we normally used. "How you can help us." And normally we tried to look at, especially in terms of the U.S. military, what the service was and where our shortages were and our authorized personnel we were supposed to have and then if we thought, like if it was the Chief of Naval Operations, you know, perhaps he could help us with some engineers, because you know they might have more engineers. So we'd be upfront that "Here's our authorized positions that are empty and if you could possibly go back and look and see if there's perhaps any way you could help us fill those, that would be a real asset."

Q. So you were showing an organizational structure which required engineers to do what?

A. In this case mostly overseeing the construction and development here of many projects inside of Afghanistan.

Q. Were they also coaching and advising Afghans?

A. Oh, yeah, absolutely.

Q. And so it was an organizational structure that had shortages and you knew that the Navy had Seabees who could do this work and so you provided that information to him not to fill some new organization but to do what needed to be done to make the Afghans better?

A. That's right. To fill an already existing authorized -- or to continue filling something that they had already provided to us.

Q. Yeah, when it came time for rotation.
A. And nobody was going to backfill it and we would ask them if they would reconsider.
Q. Was that common?
A. Routine.
Q. Do you remember what your desired outcome was for Chairman Mike Mullen?
A. Normally when I was talking with the Chairman it would have been making sure that he clearly understood our personnel challenges and then therefore with those challenges therefore the impact that it had on us attempting to do the mission we were trying to accomplish by not having those people on.
Q. And those personnel challenges, were they shortages against your organizational structure?
A. Yeah, shortages against our requirements.
Q. How about the Czech Republic Ambassador to Afghanistan?
A. We normally would look for, again, putting my hat on as a NATO Officer which is the way I normally operate, how, you know, because there's a CJSOR, which is an authorized, identified requirement of people for a NATO organization.
Q. For the record, can you tell us what that acronym stands for? CJSOR? If not could you provide that to us for the record so we make sure we get it right?
A. Absolutely. [Combined Joint Sourcing of Requirements]
Q. But it's a NATO requirements document?
A. It is. And it's your personnel document and we meet at least twice a year and we review this. We make requests for any changes to it and then after that there's a sourcing conference, again, twice a year at least, and then you go in and nations bid on it. The key thing on this is that, though, my boss in Belgium, SACEUR, who's my big boss above General Petraeus, his deputy is the guy who does all this, DSACEUR. So one of the things we always had to make sure we were very, very careful about is any request to a foreign dignitary, foreign ambassador or anybody else had to be 100% coordinated through him before I could make the request. I could not ask for something that he had not approved. So that way we stayed totally in sync. So when he had meetings or put out letters of request, which only he could do, that my request inside of theater was absolutely in sync.
Q. So these requirements had to be approved by the DSACEUR and they were to fulfill the requirements that NATO was not filling?
A. That's correct.
Q. Do you remember what the desired outcome was for the German Minister of Interior?
A. One of them was we wanted to ask him if he would consider putting police officers on our staff to work with us so that we would have a little more police expertise. They work on a bilateral basis here in Afghanistan with their police efforts so we were asking them if they could consider not assigning them to us but as serving as resident experts in some number that they're comfortable with on our staff to help guide and direct us in our police development efforts.
Q. Do you recall any other visitors who came to CSTC-A/NTM-A who could have been expected to influence the policies and actions of the United States? Was that the kind of visitor you might receive?
A. Well, I kind of looked at it the other way. Normally the visitors came to get information from us as to how best they could help us accomplish our mission or to have a concern if they did with

something we were doing. So we were normally trying to answer those questions for them. It's not what we wanted, per se, but what we needed to best accomplish the mission we were given?

Q. Did you ever use propaganda to try and influence policies and actions of the United States?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Do you recall other visitors who came from other foreign national governments?

A. Yeah, there were a lot.

Q. Did you ever use propaganda or influence operations even to try and influence the policies and actions of foreign governments?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Are you aware if you had any PSYOP trained officers on your staff throughout CSTC-A?

A. None that I am aware of or were aware of.

Q. Would you be surprised if I told you there was one on the CAG who had PSYOP training?

A. I would be surprised.

Q. Is it something you looked for?

A. No, no, not at all. I'd be surprised in the sense that -- I'll be very clear. I'd be surprised because we're not looking for those types of personnel on our staff.

Q. So you had no one authorized in a PSYOP position?

A. No. We're a training command and there's no place for PSYOP or Information Operations in a training command.

Q. And so PSYOP is not a branch or specialty that you're looking for?

A. No, it's not.

Q. Wouldn't need one?

A. No, I'm not looking for anyone.

DE: I'm sorry, sir.

IO: Go ahead.

DE: It's not in CSTC-A's mission to build PSYOP capacity in Afghanistan in the Afghanistan National Army, sir?

WIT: No, we're not doing that right now.

DE: Okay, sir. Thank you.

WIT: Not that I know of, I mean.

Q. So would it be improper to have somebody who has training in a particular area like PSYOP, would it be improper to have that person perform some totally different function like you said with General Jeff Smith?

A. No, I don't think it would be improper at all. The military has a very, very hard time matching our exact skill requirements.

Q. Because you're not doing something that's ----

A. It's a normal thing. There's no -- we don't have any unit, per se, as our higher organizational headquarters here, that you can reach into the United States Army or some other nation and pull the headquarters out and put it here. We're 100% individual replacements.

Q. Given that the role of an IO team and an IO trained officer is to integrate the five core functions of IO with Public Affairs and other operations, would you think it would be improper to have a member of an IO team do some other routine staff task like gathering information for DV prep?

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A. No, I do not.

Q. Does that cross a line from something legal to something illegal?

A. Remissioning them to do a completely different task and requirement would not be illegal as long as they are doing that remissioned task in the organization. If they were using any specialized training they've had, then that would be improper.

Q. Did you ever order Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) to conduct what amounted to IO against Congressional Delegations or other DVs?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. What about Psychological Operations?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Did you ever order Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) to gather nonpublic information? In other words information that was available to the general public on the web or otherwise. Did you ever order Holmes to gather that nonpublic information about Congressional Delegations or other DVs?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Did you ever issue guidance or have any of your subordinates issue guidance to Holmes on how to influence CODELs or other DVs?

A. No I did not, nor am I aware of, nor should they have ever done that.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of any disagreements that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) may have had regarding his mission regarding CODELs and DVs?

A. Not until just very recently was I aware of that.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of disagreements between (b)(3), (b)(6) and other members of the staff? And if so how did you come about it?

A. I knew generally that he was not considered by some to be performing at a level that a professional officer of his grade and experience might be expected but none where I would have sat down and got involved in any of the details or specifics, per se.

Q. Did you conduct reprisal against Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) by having General Patton issue him a GOMOR in his official file for unrelated misconduct after he questioned an illegal order?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Did you reprise against Major (b)(3), (b)(6) by having General Patton issue her a GOMOR in her official file for unrelated misconduct after she questioned an order?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Did you order U.S. military personnel to conduct or observe anyone actually conducting what amounted to Psychological Operations or IO intended to influence individual U.S. citizens?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Did you ever order or observe anybody actually conducting PSYOPs or IO against groups of citizens or foreign officials such as CODELs or foreign dignitaries.

A. No.

Q. You indicated you had read the Rolling Stone article from February 23rd written by Michael Hastings. You're mentioned in there a number of times. What is your view of the accuracy of that article?

A. My personal view is that I felt the article was very misleading. It's completely inaccurate and it was very, very disappointing to see that kind of journalism where there was no attempt to even verify any of the allegations that somebody else is making in there.

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Q. Did you give anybody in your command orders with regards to the media posture after the publication of the Rolling Stone article?

A. Two or three days later I did put out to the command that there will be no official engagement on anybody responding to or putting out information from the command to anybody at all.

Q. What guidance, if any, did you give to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding speaking to Rolling Stone or other media about the Rolling Stone article?

A. It was two phased. There was the initial response that we put out when we were -- we were in Belgium at the time at NATO headquarters and got the email late that night. (b)(3), (b)(6) did from Michael Hastings asking, saying "Here's some allegations, do you want to comment on these? I'm publishing an article in like six or eight hours." And we quickly just worked up a very bland statement that we wanted to put back out, ran it by OSD, got their okay and sent it back rather than trying to address the specifics of what he was asking about, especially given that he was planning to publish it within six or eight hours.

IO: Go ahead, Dave.

DE: Did you get a chance to look at that statement and approve it?

WIT: I did. I was aware of the statement.

DE: Okay, thank you, sir.

Q. And was this the statement where Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) said speaking on behalf of the command that he "categorically denied" the kind of stuff that Rolling Stone was talking about?

A. That is correct.

Q. Was it routine for you to look at a statement like that that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) would release? Not that the article was routine, but was it routine for Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) to contact OSD PA and ISAF PA about this kind of thing?

A. Because it was Rolling Stone and they were getting ready to publish it in six or eight hours and none of us ever even heard of something like this -- normally you get some of indication that some article is being written because people are being asked questions and the Public Affairs folks all start saying, hey, there's something brewing. This was from an absolute cold start. It was about eight o'clock at night. As best I can recall, eight or nine o'clock in Belgium. It was 11 or 12 o'clock at night in Afghanistan. But given that this would clearly have national media attention being that it was Rolling Stone and it was allegations against a flag officer, from a couple of statements the best I can recall as it read, that we went right to OSD at that time of night because we knew we only had about six hours to respond. It was not something we could staff. So we went right to OSD Public Affairs saying, one, heads up most importantly because you're back in the United States and your time zone is different and somebody may be asked the question back there and you just need to know that we, one, categorically deny these allegations in case there's a question but secondly, here's the statement we plan to put out in response to this very quickly. Normally we don't have something of that magnitude of sensitivity that plops on our doorstep at eight o'clock at night while we're travelling outside of theater and said "Hey, do you have a response?"

Q. Did Hastings give Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) some flavor of what the article would say? Did he give some the allegations?

A. He did (b)(3), (b)(6) shared with me the email. I don't recall it right off hand but he shared with me the email Hastings had sent him. We were all in the hotel room having just completed, sort of AARing that day, and he walked in and showed me and I said "This is not good." I said "We've got to get a statement out right now, but clearly we cannot address these issues. We've got to get everybody

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notified. We have to get everybody in the chain of command all the way up to the Secretary of Defense informed." Just because of the things that were there were like four different bullets there and you know there was a very vague question, it said "Do you have any comment on any of this?" I mean, it wasn't an attempt to be investigative and try to ascertain facts and ensure that we had accuracy in reporting. Instead it was "I'm getting ready to launch this. Do you want to throw anything in the article?"

Q. Do you remember when you told (b)(3), (b)(6) he could send that comment back to Hastings at Rolling Stone? Was it the same evening?

A. Yeah, we did it right after we got a response back from OSD saying (b)(3), (b)(6) got it, here's one or two small tweaks to it we recommend." And so once OSD had acknowledged they were aware and informed and knew about this I told (b)(3), (b)(6) to go ahead and launch.

Q. So OSD PA and you authorized that statement that evening?

A. We did.

Q. Okay. Have you become aware that Rear Admiral Smith believed that he had told your command to not respond to requests like that?

A. Those aren't normal requests that you get.

Q. Right.

A. So, no ----

Q. But that particular request or requests from other media outlets?

A. We routinely respond to requests from media outlets all the time on information, routinely. And most of the time I don't even see the responses.

Q. yeah.

A. It's not like they even have to run them by me. If it's a media outlet looking for information and they want to know what's the current size, how are you equipping them or anything routine to engage back and share the information -- one of the most important things that I set when I came in was the three Ts in our organization and I told everybody we've got to work as a team both within our organization and with our Afghan counterparts and the second thing is we've got to be transparent and I said we've got to be 100% totally transparent in everything we're doing. With the amount of money that's being given us to expend and the view that a lot of people have about how this effort is going, it's absolutely imperative that we're absolutely transparent with everyone about what we're doing with the NATO training mission. So if a request came in, we'd work up a response and respond back to it. The one from the Rolling Stone was very unusual because it was allegations against a senior officer, myself, you know, out of the clear blue. Nobody had any foreshadowing that this was being put together. So that was a little different in this case.

Q. Okay.

A. But we routinely answer press inquiries. Now we did get guidance after the fact to do everything through ISAF headquarters.

Q. After the publication of the article?

A. That's correct.

Q. And we did tell the whole command nobody is to respond to or engage in anything officially and if you get a query, just send it up to ISAF and needless to say I got plenty of queries my own self. Again, I just pushed them to Shawn to push up to ISAF when we got them.

DE: Sir, did you have a chance to look at Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) statement to "Friends of CSTC-A"?

WIT: I did after the fact.
DE: Okay, so you didn't see it before he sent it?
WIT: No, I did not.
DE: Sir.
Q. Some specific questions now.
AF: Is this a good time for a short break?
IO: Sure. Let's take a break. Five minute break.

[The interview recessed at 1413, 25 March 2011.]

[The interview reconvened at 1422, 25 March 2011.]

Q. Are we going? Okay. At any time, to your knowledge, did anyone at CSTC-A ever start a campaign to try to get regular U.S. citizens to lobby Members of Congress on CSTC-A's behalf?
A. Not that I'm aware of, no.
Q. At any time, to your knowledge, did CSTC-A try to persuade U.S. citizens that funding or personnel was required without letting the CODEL or DV know who authored the message, that is the U.S. military?
A. No.
Q. At any time, to your knowledge, did CSTC-A insert editorials in the U.S. press without disclosing that the editorial was authored by the U.S. military or someone in the U.S. military?
A. No.
Q. At any time, to your knowledge, has CSTC-A engaged in purely partisan political activities in order to get more funding or personnel for CSTC-A?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. At any time, to your knowledge, has CSTC-A tried to influence the domestic population at home to get more funding and resources from Congress?
A. No.
Q. Have any of the CSTC-A information packets -- information that you gave to CODELs or other visitors fail to clearly annotate that they were produced by CSTC-A and the U.S. military?
A. No.
Q. In other words have you ever provided them anything that was anonymous?
A. No.
IO: Any questions?
DE: No, sir.
IO: Any follow on questions?
LA: Sir, I have just one to clear up. When General Webster, sir, asked about Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) speaking to Rolling Stone or any other media, I thought I heard you talk about two phases. You talked about phase one of running the statement by OSD but then you didn't say a second phase. Did I hear that correctly?
WIT: When that initial email was received that night in Brussels we did respond, but then the next day I was given guidance that we officially were not to engage, respond to or talk about anything associated with the article and that all queries would be sent to ISAF, at which point I told my entire staff in a very open meeting, because, again, anybody is allowed to engage with the press and so I need

to make sure my whole command understood that nobody was to engage in this respect so if asked a question, do not respond, rather send that query to ISAF headquarters.

LA: Thank you, sir.

DE: Sir, could you then -- and I asked you about the email statement, I'm sorry, the email to "Friends of CSTC-A" earlier.

IO: It was actually "Friends of NTM-A".

DE: Friends of NTM-A. So to your knowledge this wasn't sent to get around that guidance, in other words, put information in the hands who could comment?

WIT: No, I took it the next day from what he told me when we talked about it was he did it because he felt -- he looked at it as a very personal email to people he personally knew that were on his personal email trail, communicating to them his feelings about this. Which, you know, you may have heard, I verbally reprimanded him for that. I said, (b)(3), (b)(6) know I said officially no one can respond, but I don't even want people personally doing anything either" at which time I told him "So therefore what you did was not in line with what I intended." So I clarified for everybody also, don't even personally engage with any dialogue or discussion. Just stay off the net.

IO: Okay. Is there anything else you'd like to add.

WIT: The only thing I might add is when we discussed earlier about was there any procedure we used with respect to investigations within the command, there is a statement that my legal people prepare for me which I have signed and I think I've updated once or twice since based on people changing and all that does give clear guidance about who can initiate what level of investigation.

IO: So it's a delegation of authority for investigations.

WIT: It is. That's correct. And I have delegated that down very clearly through my legal folks on an official form.

IO: Okay. Anything else you'd like to add?

WIT: The only other thing I'd add is that the article came out by Rolling Stone, I just want to make sure everybody understands, anybody -- one of the great things about our nation is our freedom of the press and anybody has the right to publish in our nation. That's one of our greatest strengths. So I did not mean in my personal comment a minute ago when asked to imply anything other than how it affected me personally, not as a command or any official position.

IO: Okay. Thanks very much. Anything?

LA: Sir, should I do the admin?

IO: Admin portion now, thanks.

LA: Sir, do you full understand your statement today?

WIT: I do.

LA: And was your statement true?

WIT: It was.

LA: Did you make this statement freely without the hope of a benefit or a reward?

WIT: I did.

LA: Did you make this statement without the threat of punishment?

WIT: That is correct.

LA: And did you make it, sir, without coercion, unlawful influence or any unlawful inducement.

WIT: Correct.

STATEMENT OF LTG CALDWELL TAKEN AT CAMP EGGERS DATED 2011/03/25

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

1 I.A: Sir, as you know we have a court reporter here who will transcribe your statement. When
2 it's finished we'll send it to you. We'll probably send it through Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) through you. We just
3 ask that you read it, pen and ink any changes that you have and then sign it and send it back.
4 WIT: Okay.
5 I.A: Thank you, sir.
6 IO: Okay.
7
8 [The interview terminated at 1429 hours, 25 March 2011.]

AFFIDAVIT

I, William B. Caldwell, IV, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 26 I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT

W. B. Caldwell IV
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25 day of March 2011
at Camp Eggers, AF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

EXHIBIT H

AR 15-6 Investigation
Information Operations in Afghanistan
LTG William Webster, Investigating Officer
COL S (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) Assistant Investigating Officer
Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6) Eubanks, Assistant Investigating Officer

Video Teleconference Interview with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) U.S. Army, starting at 1526 on 16 March 2011.

Q./IO:	LTG William Webster, Investigating Officer
A./WIT:	COL (b)(3), (b)(6)
LA:	COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Legal Advisor
XO:	COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Executive Officer to the IO
DE:	Dr. (b)(3), (b)(6) Assistant Investigating Officer

EXAMINATION BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER

Q./IO: (b)(3), (b)(6)

~~WIT~~: We may have to rejoin this tomorrow or Friday, and I'll let you work that with Joe and see when it's the best time to do it. Again, because of my time limits on the investigation, I've got to go back to Afghanistan on Sunday, head back in that direction. This may be a split discussion we have. I'll ask Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) to start this off, and then I'll tell you the purpose.

LA: Good afternoon. Can you hear us?

WIT: I can, yes.

LA: This morning Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) sent you a Restricted Communications Statement. Did you get that?

WIT: I did get the email, yes.

LA: Okay. I'm just going to talk you through it right now, and then if you'll email those back afterwards, that'd be great, okay?

WIT: [Indicated affirmative response.]

LA: The Restricted Communications Statement talks about who you can discuss your testimony with, and it basically says that we don't want you to discuss your testimony today with anybody other than those attached to the investigation or law enforcement personnel. Do you agree with that?

WIT: I do.

LA: Okay. Then there's also a Privacy Act Statement that was sent to you which tells you what the routine uses of this statement today will be, and the routine use will be only for the purposes of this investigation or anything that comes out of this investigation. Do you agree with that use?

WIT: Yes, I do.

LA: Okay, great. So if you'll sign those afterwards and email them back, that would be terrific. The statement is being taken at Fort McPherson. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) is on VTC from the War College. It is 1530 on the 16th of March.

[The witness was sworn.]

LA: Please state your full name?

WIT: Yes, my full name is (b)(3), (b)(6)

LA: Okay, great. You can put your hand down; thanks (b)(3), (b)(6) To what unit are you assigned right now?

WIT: Currently I'm a student at the Army War College, class of 2011.

LA: And you are an active component colonel in the Army, correct?

WIT: That is correct.

LA: Okay. I'm turning it over to General Webster.

EXAMINATION BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER

Q. Okay (b)(3), (b)(6) unless you're getting feedback from us, there doesn't appear to be any problem with us having open mics on both sides. So, unless you're getting feedback from us, I would encourage you to leave that one open, since there is a delay from when you press the button until we can hear you, so that will work better.

(b)(3), (b)(6) A. Yes, sir.

PETRAEUS Q. Okay (b)(3), (b)(6) the reason we're talking today is because I've been appointed by General ~~Patreaus~~ to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations that were raised in the Rolling Stone article of 23 February in which there were allegations that General Caldwell and others improperly used government resources and personnel to conduct Psychological Operations and other activities that were not authorized. General ~~Patreaus~~ PETRAEUS has tasked me to investigate this from all (b)(3), (b)(6) in angles and to answer about 20 questions in detail, so it's not just about those issues, and that's why I've got a number of questions to ask. How many years now (b)(3), (b)(6) do you have in the Army?

A. Sir, I'm -- I entered the Army in 1990, so I'm in my 21st year.

Q. All right. Have you held any other MOS other than as an attorney in the JAG Corps?

A. No, sir, I have not.

Q. Can you tell us about the kind of jobs you've had since you've been in the Army?

A. Yes, sir. I -- starting from most recent positions and going back, when I was in Afghanistan, I was the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate for the Combined Security Transition Combined, Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission, Afghanistan. Prior to that deployment, from 2007-2009, I served as the Executive Officer at the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School in Charlottesville, Virginia. Prior to my time at the JAG School, from 2005-2007, I was the Regional Defense Counsel at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and I had the Midwest Region of 5 to 6 TDS Legal Offices. Prior to that I was a student at CGSC, and then from 2002-2004, I was the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Prior to that, from 1998-2002, I was at 10th Mountain Division, serving in a variety of positions as Chief of Ad Law, Chief of Military Justice. Earlier in my career, I did Trial Defense in Germany and Administrative Law and Contract Law at Fort Sheridan, Illinois as my first duty assignment.

Q. Okay (b)(3), (b)(6) when you were assigned to CSTC-A? When did you arrive and depart Afghanistan in that assignment?

A. Yes, sir. I arrived to CSTC-A 14 June of 2009, and I departed the theater on 13 June 2010.

Q. And what was your duty title at CSTC-A?

A. Sir, at CSTC-A, I was the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate. When I arrived, the first 30 days I served as the Acting SJA between the outgoing SJA leaving and the new one coming in.

Q. So there was a single SJA for you entire period I assume?

A. Yes, sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. And who was that?

A. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was the incoming SJA. I did work a little bit with the outgoing SJA for a little overlap, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) ~~Iphonetic~~, and the Commanding General, of course, was Major General Formica at the time. (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. So how much of that time was under the command of Lieutenant General Caldwell, from November '09 on or was it different?

A. Yes, sir. It was from early November to my time when I redeployed back in June, General Caldwell was the Commander.

Q. Was that the first time that you worked for General Caldwell, or had you worked for him before?

A. I had never worked for him before, and the first time I ever met him was in Afghanistan when he took command.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. When you worked at Fort Leavenworth or in some of the other assignment, had you been working for a three or four star any of those times?

A. No, sir. Prior to that, most of my assignments were -- at the JAG School, we had a one star that was in charge of the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, but I hadn't worked directly for a three or four star before that time period.

Q. Okay. You can probably understand that we've gotten testimony that as commanders changed in CTST-A, NTM-A that things changed also: task, conditions, standards, missions. Some of those kinds of things may have changed when General Caldwell came in as a three star with a three star set of expectations and experiences and staff and those kinds of things. Can you describe for us what you noticed that changed the most when General Caldwell came in? PERSPECTIVE (b)(3), (b)(6)

A. Yes, sir. What really changed the most from my prospective is that when General Formica was there, it seemed that the staff was not as robust. And at that time of the surge, General McKrystal had put in the request for troops and General Caldwell then took over. I noticed an emphasis on building up the command and filling slots, because the command had been operating for a long period of time at only -- in the lower percentages of authorized positions, maybe, I think around 70 percent or below. So one of the biggest priorities that I saw General Caldwell do was to get involved with trying to get the command built up so that we could do the job. There was also an emphasis, greater emphasis, on some of the VIP visits. General Formica had a very limited staff, and so I didn't think all the DVs necessarily were as well coordinated or planned out. Whereas General Caldwell, knowing that we were under a lot of scrutiny, I think he put a lot of assets toward trying to make visits worthwhile to the command and then worthwhile to the visitors coming in so that they got the information that they were looking for.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. (b)(3), (b)(6) How often did you interact, one on one, with General Caldwell?

A. I interacted -- initially, I had an opportunity to brief him with the 4 at the time on an issue, so I did see him, not a whole lot of issues, but I had a meeting with him. I saw him quite a bit at the gym. It just always seemed like our schedules happened to cross paths there, and then of course, I sat in on a lot of the meetings that ~~the~~ he gave out, you know, command guidance and things of that nature. So, I felt like I got to know him pretty well. During that time, I was a lieutenant colonel and I actually came out on the list over there and was promoted in theater to colonel, and General Caldwell actually presided over my promotion ceremony.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Do you recall what his philosophy or his guidance was on officer misconduct allegations?

A. I do. I actually had a pretty lengthy discussion with him on his philosophy of Military Justice. One of the issues came up. I recall I was briefing him on a negligent discharge, and unfortunately, I hadn't looked at the report close enough to actually see that he was actually standing at the firing barrel

(b)(3), (b)(6)

when the weapon went off. So when I briefed him on the situation, he said "oh, heck, I know about that one. I was right there." He discussed, in great detail, kind of his Military Justice philosophy and it came across to me that he was not somebody that was out to hammer people, that he really felt that negligent discharges is a matter of lack of training or lack of adequate supervision, so he advocated that the person give classes and, you know, do things and rehabilitate that way. So after that meeting, I kind of left very comfortable that he was reasonable in his approach to military ----

[The VTC transmission stopped at 1541, 16 March 2011.]

[The interview resumed at 1543, 16 March 2011.]

Q. He was going to be reasonable in military justice?

Q. Yes, sir, that is correct. And, of course, that was one thing any Staff Judge Advocate or legal office is very concerned about with any new commander coming in is to understand their Military Justice philosophy. And after that meeting I felt very comfortable that he would be fair and impartial in any case.

Q. When you were having this discussion, do you recall what the rank was of the offender?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What I'm trying to get at is his philosophy on officer misconduct, or senior personnel misconduct versus junior, what misconduct was brought to the commander versus what was allowed by him to be handled at a lower level?

A. Yes, sir. The individual that had the negligent discharge when General Caldwell was at the firing barrel I believe was an enlisted soldier. There was also another issue that I dealt with him on. There was a lieutenant colonel who had just simply visited a different camp and left her weapon in the gym, and when she returned some soldiers had taken it. That weapon was later recovered. But if I recall, talking to General Caldwell, he really had a philosophy, whether it was officer or enlisted, that if there's a chance for them to learn from that mistake that he was a strong advocate of rehabilitation. In terms of the handling matters, we were looking to try to delegate things down to lower levels to allow him to focus on, you know, big issues. So we did during that timeframe. I believe we had basically had a delegation memo signed which subordinate general officers would handle some of the lower-level misconduct. And then it was just a matter of whether General Caldwell wanted to, you know, let them handle it or not. So General Patton I believe was in the position where he was involved with handling reprimands and things of that nature.

Q. Okay. I'll probably have some more questions about that the next time we meet about -- what was the Chief of Staff's role in issuing and listening to investigation reports and then how to deal with the punishments, what was being recommended or decided at the Chief of Staff level, etc. based on your recollection? How about General Patton, Major General Patton, how often did you interact with him one on one?

A. Actually quite a bit. There was -- he was, of course, in charge of the Afghanistan Security Forces funds, so we dealt a lot with him on fiscal issues and things of that nature. I was involved in actually having -- I think I took a letter of reprimand in for Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) for him to actually sign, so I actually had a meeting with him at that time to get him to sign the GOMORs. But fairly frequently I would see him in meetings at some of the Afghan Security Forces Fund Boards determining what could be spent on the Afghan forces.

Q. How often did you interact with -- one on one with Doctor Kem?

A. Quite a bit with Doctor Kem. Dr. Kem was helpful to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and I, who was the SJA, because Dr. Kem was a way that we could get information from the command and information through the command. He liked us, the legal office, and so we did work with him on several issues.

Q. How about your interaction with the Chief of Staff, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and then Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

A. Lots of contact with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) almost I would say every other day at a minimum, often daily contact via email or telephone call.

Q. How about your interaction with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

A. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) I would see at, you know, different meetings and things and I had several discussions with him and would see him at the Camp, but a lot of -- wasn't really giving a lot of advice to him. If he had questions or issues, certainly he could come and find us or talk to us, but I didn't have as much contact with him.

Q. Was it common practice in the SJA office to task subordinate attorneys, JAG officers to work directly with O6s or above, O5s or above I should say, who were asking questions about legal opinions?

A. Yes. That was fairly common that -- to have, you know, subordinate officers deal with senior-level staff members. That was really apparent with General Patton on the fiscal issues and contracts issues where we had an Air Force lieutenant colonel that dealt with him almost exclusively on some of those issues. So, that wasn't uncommon to have that happen.

Q. Do you recall who that Air Force lieutenant colonel was?

A. Yes, sir. It was Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Okay. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) went on R&R towards the end of March of 2010, and do you recall anything about a discussion there or rendering a legal opinion there about whether Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) should be left in charge of Strategic Communications or Major (b)(3), (b)(6) a more junior officer, should be left in charge of Strategic Communications?

A. I do recall meeting with Major (b)(3), (b)(6) and we didn't really discuss the issue of who was in charge. When she came into the office, she led me to believe that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had left her in charge, which I thought was a little strange because of, you know, the rank. But that was kind of how the issue was. When I spoke with her, Major (b)(3), (b)(6) was also present. She had come over to seek advice on how she could best get Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) to, essentially, do their jobs. So I treated her like she was the deputy of the section, and I gave her advice on how she could hold personnel underneath her accountable to do their -- to do what they were supposed to do.

Q. Even if that person was senior in rank?

A. Yes, sir. I -- you know, I told her I said that you have a challenge if -- by being, you know, placed in charge, if that's truly what Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) intended. I said but there's a mission to do, and if Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had directed that certain things be done, then she would have to try to get those things accomplished. And, you know, through persuasion or whatever she could do to try to get that done.

Q. John, I'm assuming you spent most of your time on Camp Eggers, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And Eggers is a fairly small place. Do you recall hearing anything about what appeared to be potentially an improper relationship between Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6)

A. Yes, sir, I do. When Major (b)(3), (b)(6) had come to seek advice on the issues of what Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) you know, was supposed to be doing and things of that nature, she went on to disclose that he had invited her out with Major (b)(3), (b)(6) to go off base to a restaurant and also to have dinner and drinks, essentially.

[The VTC transmission terminated at 1554, 16 March 2011.]

[The interview resumed at 1556, 16 March 2011.]

Q. Allegedly inviting Major (b)(3), (b)(6) for dinner and drinks, that's the last thing I heard.

A. Yes, sir. That really kind of shocked me and so I dug a little deeper on that, and I said, you know, can you explain. And she basically said that he routinely would go off the Camp with Major (b)(3), (b)(6) and other people and they would go out for dinner and have drinks. I told her that, you know, she really needs to report that and asked her if Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was aware of that. And that point, she was very reluctant to say anything. She was -- she kind of said, well, I don't want to get involved with that. And I said well, look, we've got an obligation. If something happened to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Major (b)(3), (b)(6) when they're out there, you know, the Taliban may get them. I said this command and they are going to be in a lot of trouble. So I encouraged her to make a statement. What I didn't tell her is that if she wouldn't have made a statement, I would have based on our conversation.

Q. Okay. Did Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) ever have a conversation with you about looking into the relationship between (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)

A. I did discuss the situation with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) One of the things that came up is that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) always seemed to be together, and, of course, the Camp was fairly small. So there was some question of, you know, was that appropriate or not. If I recall, and I can't recall necessarily what we put into the appointment letter, but I don't think Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) really wanted to focus on that. I -- we just didn't have any information whether there was some kind of adulterous relationship. But the main concern for the investigation was this going off the base without permission was really the real crux of what our concern was. Also, Major (b)(3), (b)(6) indicated to me and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) when she spoke that their relationship was not the typical professional relationship you would expect of a lieutenant colonel and a major, that it was -- and I don't exactly what her words were, but it that an undue familiarity seemed to exist that she indicated kind of was affecting the workplace a bit.

Q. (b)(3), (b)(6) say again who told you that?

A. Major (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Do you know where Major (b)(3), (b)(6) was getting this information? Was it firsthand knowledge, or was she getting it from another source?

A. I think it was firsthand knowledge because she worked directly with them, and the sense that I got from her was that maybe there was some resentment by Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) toward her and I don't know exactly, but she certainly seemed to know them enough to know that -- to observe their daily interactions. On the other hand when she was reluctant to make a statement, I think she indicated to me that she didn't want them to come back at her or something, for some type of retribution if she made a statement. And I told her, I said "well, if the command decides to investigate this, which would be my recommendation, that, you know, that shouldn't be a problem, that we wouldn't let them coerce her or intimidate her or anything like that.

Q. Did you tell her to whom to make the report?

A. I'm trying to recall. I think we had her draft up a statement, and I can't remember who we had swear her in, if it was Major (b)(3), (b)(6) but we had her go ahead and do a sworn statement.

Q. (b)(3), (b)(6) I don't think we've seen that sworn statement, have we?

LA: [Indicating a negative response.]

Q. And I'm assuming (b)(3), (b)(6) you don't have a copy of it, right?

[The VTC transmission terminated at 1601, 16 March 2011.]

[The interview resumed at 1604, 16 March 2011.]

Q. And I lost my train of thought there on your last sentence.

LA: The statement.

Q. Yeah. You said you had sworn her to a statement you believe, somewhere in your office, and I was -- my follow-on question was we'd like to have a copy of that because the source of this information is important, because Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) thinks that he was reprised against, and I'm trying to determine how this came about.

A. Yes, sir. I think -- my recollection is that Major (b)(3), (b)(6) did make a statement, a sworn statement. Where I think that would be, would be with the CSTC-A legal office, and that would have been the 15-6 investigation that was conducted and would have served as a basis for any disciplinary action against Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Major (b)(3), (b)(6) I recall that she did make a statement, but I don't have a copy of that. I think Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) would probably be the best the source of information for that in CSTC-A at the legal office. (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Okay. We'll request it. We've got the 15-6, but it's not included in there. We'll go back and request that officially from (b)(3), (b)(6) What was Major (b)(3), (b)(6) job in the Office of the SJA?

A. Sir, she had come over I believe in the March timeframe, I think, of 2010, and her job was to come over as the Chief of Military Justice. We were in the process of trying to get joint GCMCAs (b)(3), (b)(6) going back from when I first arrived there, so she was going to be the Chief of Justice. In the meantime, until we got that we had her serving in a variety of functions, Ad Law and different things like that. (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. All right. I think you recalled a few minutes ago that you were present for a conversation in which (b)(3), (b)(6) was telling you and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) about some of these alleged improprieties with (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) correction, with (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you recall asking Major (b)(3), (b)(6) if she had any knowledge of a GO-1 violation between (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. I did ask her if -- because what she had said to me was that they were going to restaurants and drinking alcohol and that, of course, you know, kind of alerted me and so I do remember, you know, kind of saying "what's your basis for that". I don't recall exactly she said but it seemed to me that she had a pretty good understanding from maybe talking to other people or even maybe it was Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) that they had drank alcohol on some of these events.

Q. Okay. In March of 2010, I believe Major (b)(3), (b)(6) was covering down on Admin Law. Do you recall if she was -- why she was covering down on Admin Law at that time?

A. Yes, sir. My normal Ad Law Chief, Major (b)(3), (b)(6) she was taking her mid-tour leave at that time, so that's when Major (b)(3), (b)(6) kind of stepped in to cover the gap when (b)(3), (b)(6) was out.

Q. So (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Chief of Military Justice at that time and was also covering down for Sallis on Ad Law, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Were there any -- did you have any concerns at that time about having the Chief of Justice cover down on Ad Law's position?

A. Not at the time. You know, certainly, we were not a real robust staff in terms of we had in folks that worked on either the police or Army side. We had limited personnel, so we had to cover down. Ideally, would I would rather have not had to do that, yes. But, you know, at the time we needed her to fill that role.

Q. Do you recall the scope of Major (b)(3), (b)(6) involvement with the investigation on (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)

A. I do. She certainly was working, I believe, with the investigating officer ----

[The VTC transmission terminated at 1609, 16 March 2011.]

[The interview resumed at 1610, 16 March 2011.]

A. Yes, I saw her reviewing the statements and looking over the investigation, and working with the IO to try to figure out if there was any misconduct.

Q. Okay. So Major (b)(3), (b)(6) had heard about the misconduct in the course of a conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6) about how to get (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) to do the work they were supposed to do, and at the same time (b)(3), (b)(6) was Chief of Ad Law, Chief of Justice, and was now advising or about to become the advisor to the IO for the investigation, correct?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. Is there anything inherently wrong with that combination of work there?

A. Well, normally you would want your investigating officer -- legal officer, providing the advice to the investigator, you would normally want to have that person giving independent advice, and then when you turn it over to the Chief of Justice for action, then you would want to get the advice of a separate officer to make the decision of what is right for the command. I believe the way we worked it with Major (b)(3), (b)(6) is we had her work the investigation with the IO, but ultimately, the final advice given to the authority, the commander who was going to take action, would have come from the SJA in terms of what we actually would recommend, if anything, for disciplinary action.

Q. Okay. And so is there anything legally wrong with the course of action that you took in terms of assigning legal advice to various people in the chain?

A. I don't believe that there was any problem with that. You know, she helped facilitate the investigation and answered those questions and then ultimately Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and I worked to try to figure out what was the best recommendation for -- to the command as to how to handle any misconduct, if it came up. I can honestly say that with regard to the misconduct, I would not have -- if Major (b)(3), (b)(6) had not told me about them going off the installation, I don't believe that there would have ever have been an investigation. But I just did not feel comfortable knowing that that was out there and leaving the command exposed with that, if something bad were to happen.

Q. Okay (b)(3), (b)(6) do you have a draft copy of the questions that I'm going to be -- that I'm going through today?

A. I do not, sir. I was provided some emails in advance from when I actually served over there, so I reviewed those, but I don't have any draft questions, no, sir.

Q. Okay. Can you explain further how you received some emails from over there?

A. Yes. I believe Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had sent me three email attachments that were detailing some of the interactions of the legal office with regard to some of the issues that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had raised and then also advice provided to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and I believe her email said since I'm not going to be physically present there that it would make sense for me to be able to review these emails, and I didn't see that as a problem.

Q. Yeah. But you don't have any emails from your former SJA office preparing you for this today, do you?

A. No, sir. I do not.

Q. Okay. Thanks. How did it come about that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) appointed an investigation into (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) conduct? Did you recommend that or did (b)(3), (b)(6) recommend that to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. I actually recommended that there be an investigation, and before I did that, I spoke with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) the SJA. We felt that it needed to be investigated; that was going to be our recommendation. Certainly, it was going to be up to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) you know, whether he wanted to, you know, to do an investigation or handle it a different way. So ultimately, he decided that an investigation was the proper and right thing to do.

Q. Did you, around the same time, notify General Caldwell that there'd been alleged officer misconduct?

A. I did not. In fact, during this, you know, entire period I never had any discussions with General Caldwell about Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Major (b)(3), (b)(6) on any of the misconduct. I just expected that the Chief of Staff would have informed him if there was anything we needed him to do, and I don't know if Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) actually had any discussions with him about that, but I did not.

Q. Do you know (b)(3), (b)(6) if that's standard procedure, if that was standard procedure at the time that you or the SJA himself would notify the Chief of Staff and not notify the Commanding General?

A. I think normally we certainly would let the General know, but the -- I don't know if during that timeframe General Caldwell was actually -- there was a period of time when he was out of theater, and so I don't know if he was actually physically around during the timeframe I believe of March of 2010. But it would not be uncommon for us to work with the Chief of Staff, and then if the Chief of Staff said I'll let the boss know, that could be possible, yes sir.

Q. Okay. But I think ----

A. The reason I raise that is we -- in the legal office it was a challenge for us, both under General Formica and General Caldwell, to get times to meet because of the heavy op-tempo that was going on and all the travel that they did. So under General Formica, we had regular meetings but they did not always occur and then with General Caldwell just taking command, it was difficult, you know, to get time in to brief him on things, so if we would have notified him of the investigation, it would have been probably via email, if anything.

Q. Okay. And how did the command normally pick investigating officers for AR 15-6 Investigations?

A. Well, sir, the -- as far as I recall, I don't think they had a regular DA 6-type roster. I think it was more kind of ad hock. They tried different things, but ultimately it was I think the Chief of Staff's office trying to identify who might be available, and I believe we would get the name from the Chief of Staff's office.

Q. All right. Do you know, or did you know Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) the Investigating Officer for (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. I did not know him and I really can't recall him. I think I may have saw him once in passing but didn't have any interaction with him.

Q. Do you know how he was selected?

A. I do not, sir. I believe that we probably got the name from the Chief of Staff's office, but I'm not 100 percent sure of that.

Q. Back to the initiation of the 15-6 Investigation, did you advise Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or did Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) advise Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or was it Major (b)(3), (b)(6) to start the Investigation?

A. Yes, sir. I'm trying to recall and unfortunately I cannot recall who actually spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6) Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) about that. I do know that in an email string Major (b)(3), (b)(6) had recommended our

position to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) that it be investigated, and on that email I believe Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) said yes, you know, we probably need to get this investigated then. And I believe Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was cc'd on that email. But I cannot necessarily recall whether I spoke exactly to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) about it. I think that I did, and I know that ultimately then we appointed the Investigation.

Q. Okay. Can you characterize what you think about or what you thought about the quality of the investigation that was being conducted by Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. I did not review it real in depth; I did look through it. Actually, I read it a couple of times. I thought it was a pretty good investigation; there was some evidence that was, I think, pretty alarming. Things I recall was there was photographs of Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) in a restaurant and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) outside of a restaurant. I do recall that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had indicated that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had given him permission to go to restaurants; I don't think that was the case. Also I recall that the surgeon was in one of the photographs as well, the command surgeon, at one of the outings. Also, the Investigation had lengthy emails on Facebook where Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was communicating certain things that were inappropriate in terms of he was trying to start some kind of business, or something like that. He was portraying that he was using -- he led people, I think, to believe that he was working for a corporation while he was deployed and was using that as kind of a tool to promote a business that he wanted to form. So that was other aspects of it. I think all in all, I think the Investigation was pretty sound and proved that he did go and violate the Force Protection procedures of going off post and drinking alcohol.

Q. Okay. During the Investigation, the IO told us -- correction, the IO told us that during his Investigation, he discussed it with Major (b)(3), (b)(6) probably every other day. Do you think that's a normal experience for how investigations were conducted there?

A. That would not be uncommon for -- you know, to meet with an investigator quite a bit and have communications. There's no question, Major (b)(3), (b)(6) was very into the Investigation. That was primarily what she was working on, so make no bones about it, she was really wrapped into this Investigation. But part of that was -- that was the big thing she had going on at the time, and that's where she was spending, you know, most of her energies.

Q. Do you think Major (b)(3), (b)(6) was out to get Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. I think -- you know, Major (b)(3), (b)(6) background -- I've served with her, not in the same command, but in different locations. She has been trial defense and she has been a prosecutor. I would say that she certainly was -- had a prosecutor look to things, looking for the misconduct. That's kind of how she operated, and I don't think she -- I don't think it would have mattered if she wouldn't have found anything, but she certainly was looking for misconduct based on the facts presented.

Q. During the Investigation, Major (b)(3), (b)(6) recommended that the IO, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) look at Facebook, and she provided the Investigating Officer with an email about the top Facebook users in the command. Is that level of involvement over the top or is that normal?

A. I think -- I wouldn't say that it was over the top. I think she certainly, you know, in a deployed setting had more time to do her job, and so I think that it did cause her to dig into things, so she actually did, I believe, go onto Facebook and find some of the information. I wouldn't say that's that unusual. Normally though, of course, the way it's set up is that, you know, we have the Investigator and then we provide the legal advice and don't investigate, but I think due to the duties that she had and the time that she had, I think it caused her to probably dig a little deeper than she might normally do.

Q. Do you -- is that digging inappropriate or is it certainly within legal bounds and appropriate given that she had the time to do so?

A. I don't think that there was any problem with it. You know, she was trying to figure out if there was misconduct or not, and so I don't think there was anything illegal or inappropriate about it.

Q. Okay. During the Investigation (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) invoked their right to an attorney when they were briefed that they were being investigated. This was, as is normal, near the end of the Investigation, after the Investigating Officer had spoken to most of the other witnesses he wanted. They invoked their right to an attorney but not their right to be silent. The IO did not make an attempt to talk to the -- to Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Major (b)(3), (b)(6) again. Do you think that's normal, or should there be some concern that the IO was not advised to specifically talk to the persons being investigated and their attorney?

A. Well, in my experience, sir, typically with a situation where you have potential misconduct, normally we want to interview the individuals that may have committed the misconduct last; that way it gives the Investigating Officer the most information going into the interview. If I recall in Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) case, my understanding was that they actually invoked -- they both got lawyers I believe and invoked their right to remain silent, so from my PER perspective they had closed down any possibility of making a statement, which is typical protocol if you have that situation. (b)(3), (b)(6) Now, with the defense counsel, sometimes they can submit information on behalf of the client, so that was always a possibility. But from my recollection of it, we didn't have anything -- they didn't provide us anything to go with based on not talking. So, to be honest, I was actually a bit disappointed that they didn't come out and say things, but I also understood that that was their right, and that was -- you know, certainly they made that fully informed.

Q. For the record, they both indicated that they wanted an attorney but they did not wish to remain silent. In other words they invoked their right to remain silent at the time that they were advised, but they did say they wanted a lawyer and didn't say they wanted to never talk.

A. Okay. Yeah, actually -- I wasn't aware of that I guess at the time, but I think, based on the recommendation that we were ultimately going to make, depending on what the evidence showed is that I expected that they probably would have an opportunity to submit some matters if the command decided to go with a reprimand, which ultimately became our recommendation.

Q. And they did. They each, in fact, provided matters for -- in rebuttal, for the potential letters of reprimand, so it's correct on that. Do you think that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was in any way out to get Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) because he had questioned the legality of what he thought was orders to gather and assess information on Congressional Delegations?

A. I don't think that he did, sir. My discussions with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and my interactions with him were he didn't strike me as a vindictive kind of person. I never got any feeling from him that he was out to try to get Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Major (b)(3), (b)(6) in any way, shape, or form. I think, you know, being that they were always together, there was certainly kind of was there something going on there, but again, the real focus of the Investigation was the off post misconduct.

Q. Roger. All right, there was a Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) an Air Force Captain, who at some point gave Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) an opinion on whether or not the work he was being asked to do in IO was legal or not. Are you familiar with that set of emails, where a Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) gave an opinion on that?

A. Yes, sir, I am.

Q. And Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) worked for you, is that correct?

A. He did. I had assigned Major (b)(3), (b)(6) essentially be his intermediate supervisor for day-to-day advice and activity.

Q. Did you agree with -- or did you have a discussion with Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) or Major (b)(3), (b)(6) about (b)(3), (b)(6) opinion on (b)(3), (b)(6) questions?

A. I -- if I recall when I realized that that issue came up and I certainly was willing to look in -- have us look into the matter, because I was not real sure of what was conveyed to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) I do -- I was familiar with the Information Engagement Working Group. I actually was part of that standing working group, so I knew what some of the tasks were coming out of that personally, and actually had worked on some of those, but I didn't know specifically what Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or the command had asked him to do. So I did ask Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) -- actually, I think I asked Lieutenant Commander (b)(3), (b)(6) [phonetic] to look into it and Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) and to try to figure out if there were any issues there. I know, ultimately, Major (b)(3), (b)(6) also looked into it and researched it. Ultimately, I don't think that the command had asked him to do anything that was illegal in any way, shape, or form.

Q. Are you aware that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) had a lengthy conversation with Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and that the email from Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was presented along with the guidance from Major (b)(3), (b)(6) and that Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) talked to Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) about his interpretation and others' interpretations of what he was being asked to do? Are you aware that that conversation took place in addition to the email look?

A. I'm not aware of a conversation between Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) or Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) Major (b)(3), (b)(6) All I was familiar with was the email string in which Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was raising this issue.

Q. And you read those emails yourself also? The ones you thought were in question?

A. I did, yes.

Q. Yeah. And you just said you and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) -- you agreed with Major (b)(3), (b)(6) opinion that those emails did not constitute something illegal that he was being directed to do?

A. No. I didn't think that it was and after -- my impression was that, and I probably had the inside information as a member of that Working Group where I actually prepared some information for distinguished visitors, so I thought I understood what the command was asking him to do. And so that was consistent with what Major (b)(3), (b)(6) said. So at that point, I think Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) then -- I had asked Major (b)(3), (b)(6) to look into this, and she then sent him an email and then he kind of came back with, well, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) works for me and here's what we're doing. You know, so I felt comfortable that anything that they had asked him to do was not illegal in any way, shape, or form.

Q. Are you aware that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) sent Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) an email indicating that he thought what he had discussed with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was in fact illegal or not correct, not proper at least?

A. I think that, you know, Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) maybe had some concerns. I don't necessarily know all that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) conveyed to Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) but I was a little worried. In one of the emails, I asked Lieutenant Commander (b)(3), (b)(6) [phonetic] to be aware of the situation, partly because I knew Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) that was not his expertise, and so I was very concerned that he may not necessarily know all of the legal nuances in that particular area of Info Ops, Intelligence Law, or PSYOPs. So, ultimately, Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) referred Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) to TDS, which at the time I wasn't sure was such a good idea, but then Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) explained to me that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was actually contemplating disobeying an order. So at that time, to protect Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) it made sense that he get trial defense counsel to have that ability before he makes any mistakes.

Q. Okay. So to summarize, you were aware, after the fact, that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) had told Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) in an email that he had some concerns about what Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was telling him to do, and that Major (b)(3), (b)(6) gave an opinion saying that she saw nothing in the (b)(3), (b)(6) orders that were illegal, correct?

A. That's correct, yes, and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) position ultimately was what I believe was the right, legal answer. In fact, she showed me that email before she sent it to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and I reviewed that and I said yeah, this fine. I think this is good advice.

Q. Okay. Do you see any issue, looking back on it now, with Major (b)(3), (b)(6) having issued the legal opinion on the legality of the order and her acting as the legal advisor on the 15-6? Do you see any issue with that, legally or otherwise?

A. I don't see any issue with it. I think in hindsight now, you know, to go back, it would have been probably better to have different people involved with that, but again, I looked at the issue with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and his fear that he was going to have to do something illegal, I looked at that really as a separate issue, and I certainly wanted to make sure that the command had a good solid position and that they weren't asking him to do anything improper. And then for his own protection that he was not placed in a position that he would feel that he had to violate a lawful order. Again, I think the only thing that really triggered the investigation from my PER perspective was when I learned about the off-post misconduct. That was a red flag that said, well, we certainly (b)(3), (b)(6) have to look into that. But for Major (b)(3), (b)(6) ever saying that, I don't think we would even be investigating this at all.

Q. Okay. Once the AR 15-6 report was completed, did -- who did the legal review? Was it Major (b)(3), (b)(6) or someone else?

A. You know, I -- sorry, sir, I cannot recall who actually did the legal review on that.

Q. Did you read the report of investigation after it was complete?

A. I did, yes, sir. And the reason I know that is I ultimately took some of that information in to General Patton for signing the reprimands that he signed.

Q. And I think you said earlier, or you implied, that you felt the Investigation met the preponderance of the evidence standard for a 15-6 in its findings.

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. And did you notice that the Investigation noted that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and potentially others were involved in going off post in civilian clothes to restaurants?

A. I do recall Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) being involved, yes, sir. I cannot necessarily recall the other folks that were involved.

Q. I think they were not identified, but if Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was implicated, what actions did your office recommend to the command?

A. Well, sir, with regard to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) I remember I spoke with Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) the SJA, and my position was that the command would need take, you know, some type of action against him. What we didn't necessarily, I didn't necessarily know was what pretense this Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) was led to believe for going off the base. I didn't know if he thought he had permission or not. I think that the command was looking at handling Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) differently and was viewing him more as somebody that maybe didn't have all of the necessary information that he would have needed to make that mistake. He had just, I think, taken over as the Command Surgeon, so he was pretty new to the command, I believe when -- during the misconduct.

Q. And as you recall -- or do you recall if he was a Medical Doctor?

A. I believe he was a Navy Captain and a Medical Doctor, yes, sir.

Q. Navy Captain, or Air Force Colonel, or Army?

A. You know, I thought he was Navy. I may be wrong on that. I don't think he was Army though. He was either Air Force or Navy.

Q. Okay. And the command decided to treat him slightly differently, but you're not certain of the reasons, except that he was probably new in the position and probably from another service?

A. I think that's true, yes, sir. And ultimately, I don't know what ultimate action was taken against him, if any.

Q. Okay. Who took the (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) investigation to Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) for his review, was that you or Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A. I'm trying to recall, sir. I just can't recall who actually took it to him. However, I do recall going in to brief General Patton on it and Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) actually I believe was present for that meeting as well as Major (b)(3), (b)(6) I believe. And that meeting was for me. I was trying to get General Patton to sign the General Officer Memorandums of Reprimand for Major (b)(3), (b)(6) and Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) told us that in this case, which he thought was normal for him, that he approved the findings and the recommendations, but then he passed it to a general officer for actually applying the recommendations. Was that standard procedure?

A. I believe it was, yes, sir. We had tried to push down delegation of investigations to as low as we could, so that wouldn't be surprising and then, of course, for any action we'd have to have a general officer, for a reprimand, take that action. And that's when I went in and briefed General Patton about the case.

Q. Okay, so procedures were followed there; nothing extraordinary?

A. That's correct.

Q. So is it possible that Major (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) the Chief of Staff, about the 15-6?

A. It's possible that she may have taken it over to him. Typically, it was not uncommon for us to drop off an investigation for the Chief of Staff to review and take a look at, because, of course they were so busy all day that it would not be uncommon for us to leave an investigation with them.

Q. Okay. Did you feel that it was appropriate for Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and Major (b)(3), (b)(6) to receive an Article 15?

A. At the time I actually really thought that that probably was proper as well, but ultimately the recommendation, I believe that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and I thought was a reprimand. Part of it was the Article 15, of course, would require them to accept it or not and we didn't think that we wanted to, you know, potentially run into an issue of a court-martial and all those things that come with it based on what we were trying to do within the command. So we basically recommended a reprimand, and I think Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) believed that that was appropriate, as I did, and the discussion of an Article 15 did come up, but we both came to the agreement that based on the situation it wouldn't be worth the time and effort in our current situation.

Q. So the decision was made that a general officer memorandum of reprimand could be issued to the two officers for whatever the general officer found them guilty of and that was lesser punishment than the total punishment that could have been issued by the -- by General Patton to the officers if they had -- if you had recommended an Article 15, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir, certainly, you know, an administrative reprimand is not necessarily deemed punishment under the regulations, but we always expected that, you know, General Patton might see it differently and he may say, look I want to give them Article 15s. I don't recall in this case that he wanted to do that, so the reprimand seemed appropriate disciplinary action for the two based on the situation.

Q. Okay. So the punishment that was recommended -- correction, the administrative action that was taken in the end was ultimately lesser than the Article 15 punishment could have been administered, which included up to half a month's pay for 2 months and restriction as well as a reprimand?