2 March 2012, 2015 hours

Interview of

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[At 1816 hours, BG Watson advised (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c of his UCMJ, Article 31 rights for possible violations of UCMJ, Article 92, dereliction of duty. At 2018 hours, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c waived his right to counsel and agreed to make a statement.]

[At 2019 hours, BG Watson administered the oath to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c.]

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c **U.S. Army, first being duly sworn, did testify in substance as follows:**

I am (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c I am assigned to the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. I am the (b)(6), and have been with the unit and in that position for approximately (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. I was in this position as we prepared for deployment. We departed CONUS (Continental United States) on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and arrived in Afghanistan on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c.

The best way to describe our train-up for this deployment starts when I arrived to the unit in late (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. When I arrived, I immediately went TDY (temporary duty) to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c to overview the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. That was my first taste of getting to see the SOP (standard operating procedures) for the DFIP (Detention Facility in Parwan); it was a robust document. I was able to see how the (b)(6), (b)(7)c was performing. At that time, the document was about 450 pages. About June of 2011, our own brigade CTE used the 450-page SOP to operate. The entire brigade HHC (Headquarters and Headquarters Company) went through two separate training sessions, to include Afghan history and a cultural specialist provided insight into Afghan culture and their value systems. That was the largest part of our training and we used that in conjunction with our past deployment experience to Iraq.

As far as the search of the library within the DFIP, at a point during our RIP (Relief in Place) process, I was briefed on the basic concept of that operation by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. On either (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c said they had been doing some background investigations into the librarian, (b)(6), (b)(7)c, and whether he was using his position to move messages back and forth between detainees. At some point prior, they believed he may also have been passing contraband. I do not know who made the operation plan for that operation. It was probably our 4th day of RIP when I was told of that planned operation, and the next day they began searching the library. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c did tell me they found items of contraband and were continuing their search. Gen Petraca, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, and a member of our BDOC (Base Defense Operations Center) staff were present during that particular briefing. The brief was an overview of what kind of support they could provide; it was not focused on just the operation to search the library. They discussed that operation for only a minute or two during the briefing. I don't recall a specific DTG (date time group) being provided for the operation. There were no specifics provided about operations going on within the TIG (Theater Intelligence Group) or DFIP.

Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c
2 March 2012 at 2015 hours

On the first day of the search, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c swung by my office to give me a two-minute rundown to tell me they found numerous books that were extremist in nature. I understood that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was referring to the actual text of the books when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c spoke of the extremist nature of the books. On the second day of the search, I didn't get any updates. On the third day, around 0030-0100 hrs, I checked my e-mail and saw an e-mail from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c that indicated they had completed the search, found numerous items, to include writings in the books and pieces of paper, and had turned control of the library over to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c at approximately 1930 hours. The e-mail did not indicate the type or value of the intel or the amount of books or intel they were dealing with. It was strictly an update, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c did not ask for any guidance and there was no information as to what they would do with the books after the search. I also spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c after the third day of the search, and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c only mentioned that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was tired and that the library was very dusty. It was a casual conversation, and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c also did not mention what would be done with the books after the search. I was not told how many books there were or what plans they had for the books.

During RIP/TOA with my counterpart, I received only a minute or two briefing about (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c indicating they thought (b)(6), (b)(7)c was shady and probably wouldn't renew (b)(6), (b)(7)c contract when it expired. I would say that all-in-all we received a fairly decent handoff about the critical tasks they received on a daily basis, but we did not receive a good background on the target sets. Any specifics on operations were relatively glossed over. It took 3 days of me asking to get a short Excel list of about 5 outstanding ops; the library operation was not on the list. Any RIP/TOA time I spent with them was because I made an effort to get with them. They were very compartmentalized in how they dealt with things. I sat down with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and explained where I saw the operations going, but (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c did not provide any further information or guidance from the brigade level. That was about 3 or 4 days into our RIP/TOA. We did not discuss (b)(6), (b)(7)c or the pending search of the library. I met (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c briefly during RIP/TOA, but only for an introduction and handshake.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Early on during the RIP, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c found out we had a CI NCO, and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was interested in collaborating with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and using (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c to assist in some of their operations. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was used as an LNO (liaison officer) between the brigade and the CI team. I think that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c came to me possibly the day or evening before the search started and asked if it was alright to go and assist with the library search; it may have been the day that the search started.

Around midnight on the night of 20 February 12, I was woken up and told that someone had burned Qurans on Bagram. About 10 minutes later I was called into work. When I was initially told this information, I did not immediately affiliate it with the search of the library. I was unaware at that time that the search of the library was complete.

(b)(1)4c

feed their individual assessments of each housing unit up in order to make a bigger picture of what is going on in the DFIP. I don't believe our predecessors were doing any actionable targeting; they were collecting data and using it to disrupt networking within the DFIP. It was a more reactive approach to mitigate actions by cells and other issues that were developing.

Periodically, my guys will use the catwalks to observe the library, but I don't believe our predecessors had people in the library at all. There is no one that stays in the library to observe activities therein.

The normal procedures for disposition of material containing intel value the SOP are framed around DFIP operations and management. There is very little mention of cell searches and how identification of contraband is done or the handling and removal of contraband. The only mention of handling contraband is during the initial inprocessing of a detainee and how contraband would be disposed of, and there is mention of fire. I have not seen any mention of how to destroy any contraband found during cell searches. I find it surprising that material of intel value would be taken to the burn pit. Until we finalize exploitation of those items, they should be secured and kept until we decide what final disposition will be. I was surprised that those items found during the search were disposed of so rapidly.

[Interview terminated at 2105 hours.]

[The comments in parentheticals are explanations of acronyms that were used by the witness in testimony; the witness actually used the acronyms.]

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c