

2 March 2012, 2110 hours

Interview of

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[At 2110 hrs, BG Watson advised (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c of his UCMJ, Article 31 rights for possible violations of UCMJ Article 92, dereliction of duty. At 2113 hrs, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c waived his right to counsel and agreed to make a statement. ]

[At 2114 hrs, BG Watson administered the oath to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c.]

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, **U.S. Army, first being duly sworn, did testify in substance as follows:**

I am (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. I am assigned as the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. I have been in the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c since I came to the unit on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, and I took over as (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c after (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. During our two training sessions, it was already laid out that I was going to be the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. I came to Afghanistan with the ADVON [advanced echelon] party on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, stayed for a week, and then went to the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c for a couple of weeks. I was here for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c before the main body got here.

I had little to no knowledge of the issues in the library before my arrival. After being here for a month, I did get word from interactions that there were issues with the library. I felt that the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. During RIP/TOA [relief in place/transfer of authority], we never really did sit down and have a conversation about it, but whenever there was mention of the (b)(6), (b)(7)c, there would be a comment like: "Oh, we've gotta do something about the (b)(6), (b)(7)c." And there were sidebar conversations. Because I was there as part of the ADVON team, I wasn't actually working as the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c discussed wanting to search the library. My comment to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c at the time was, "don't you think you should be talking to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c about this?" And (b)(6), (b)(7)c said that (b)(6), (b)(7)c didn't know if they really had time for that. To my knowledge, they didn't clear this idea through the brigade, the TIG [Theater Intelligence Group], or CI [counter intelligence] and that seemed to be normal op[erations]. I thought that was odd, but at that time, it was my job to learn (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. During the RIP, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I sat (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c down and briefed (b)(6), (b)(7)c on a new collection plan to include the TIG, CI and brigade before going to the battalion, and he said that was a good idea and would make things easier. It didn't really take off because the day after TOA is the day the incident happened.

Just prior to the TOA, me and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c were sent a PowerPoint slide that was kind of a target package that the TIG had done up. I received a really excellent RIP with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c as far as the COIN, the collection teams, and direct questioning techniques. But I met the CI and TIG just once one day to introduce myself, but I didn't really sit down in too many TIG and brigade syncs. I did not receive any specific information about the planned search of the library. Sometime in the last week of January or the first week of February, I received a couple of e-

Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

2 March 2012 at 2110 hours

mails from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c that mentioned the op and when they wanted to search the library. I replied to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c via e-mail that they should run that through their brigade S2.

There are three to four collectors that walk around the DFIP [Detention Facility in Parwan] and write up their observations that get funneled up to the analysts for each housing unit, and then it comes up to us at brigade. I believe that those collectors should've been a part of the library search. There was no COIN asset involved in the search at all. If the TIG wanted to search something in the facility, or if the battalion wanted to do something in the facility, that idea should've been funneled up to the brigade, up to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c for (b)(6), (b)(7)c knowledge. I don't know if that occurred as they were planning the library search; there could've been a conversation between battalion and the 43rd about searching the library that I just wasn't in. I never saw that link that they actually were communicating.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c actually got put on the brigade advisory team to go help with any of the investigations that might occur. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c is a (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and is used as a CI liaison between the TIG, so when CI issues and operations come up, they can be pushed to the brigade. I'm not sure why those two individuals were there during the search of the library, if it's because they needed experts who had done searches before or because of the nature of it. The COIN office is in the same building as the library, but those personnel have no affiliation with the library or any activities therein. I am not aware of any COIN assets that were involved in the events happening in the library. I'm not sure, but I believe it was the night before the incident happened, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c sent out an e-mail to myself and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and some other folks. I guess just to say this is the rollout of what they found, detailing the bad stuff they had found in the library search. Even before that e-mail, I heard chatter that one of the linguists found some Taliban stuff written in the books. The nature of things they were finding in the books included writing things like phone numbers, notes, but I do think they said that some of the books were also radicalized, Taliban-type religious materials, not necessarily Qurans, but other writings that the linguists said shouldn't be in the library.

Prior to deploying, our shop had to do a field exercise and some training in (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and get briefs on Afghan culture. I remember a class on etiquette and respecting religious customs, but I don't think it was much different than our normal pre-deployment brief, to include cultural awareness and religious sensitivity training; it was about a 30-60 minute class. From having that type of training in the past, I know that it teaches you the basics of the Muslim culture, including not looking women in the eye, how to shake hands properly, but I don't recall it ever stating that we could not touch the Quran or move anything that it was resting on. I don't believe I have ever received training about disposing of Qurans, but most people probably know that they shouldn't be burned.

Disposal of contraband depends on what type of material it is. If it's a document, we run it past a translator. If it's a dangerous item, it's disposed of. We know not to touch a Quran during a search unless it's an ANA [Afghanistan National Army] member or linguist in there. Qurans would not be brought out of the facility to our office, but any kind of notes or pamphlets or things of that nature, I don't know how they would've been disposed of. We were handed off an SOP; however, there were only one or two lines that mentioned cell searches. To the best of my

Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c  
2 March 2012 at 2110 hours

knowledge, there was no SOP from the prior unit or otherwise that dictated how to perform cell searches.

[Interview terminated at 2146 hours.]