

RIGHT EARLY WARNING PROCEDURE/WAIVER CERTIFICATE
For use of this form, see AR 190-30; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, United States Code, Section 3012(g)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your Social Security Number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your Social Security Number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Bagram CID Office, AF, APO AE 09354	2. DATE 21 Feb 12	3. TIME 1018	4. FILE NO.
5. NAME (Last, First, MI) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c	8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS Bagram Airfield, AF, APO AE 09354		
6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c	

PART 1 - RIGHTS WAIVER/NON-WAIVER CERTIFICATE

Section A. Rights

The investigator whose name appears below told me that he is with the United States Army **Criminal Investigation Command (CID)** as a (b)(6), (b)(7)c and wanted to question me about the following offense(s) of which I am

suspected/accused **Failure to Obey a Lawful Order, Article 92 Violation** (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Before he asked me any questions about the offense(s), however, he made it clear to me that I have the following rights:

1. I do not have to answer any questions or say anything. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c
2. Anything I say or do can be used as evidence against me in a criminal trial. (b)(6), (b)(7)c
3. (For personnel subject to the UCMJ) I have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian lawyer I arrange for at no expense to the Government or a military lawyer detailed for me at no expense to me, or not. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

- OF -

(For civilians not subject to the UCMJ) I have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. I understand that this lawyer can be one that I arrange for at my own expense, or if I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me before any questioning begins.

4. If I am now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation, with or without a lawyer present, I have a right to stop answering questions at any time, or speak privately with a lawyer before answering further, even if I sign the waiver. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

5. COMMENTS (Continue on reverse side)

Have you ever requested a lawyer after being read your rights in the last 30 days? (b)(6), **no**

Section B. Waiver

I understand my rights as stated above. I am now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation and make a statement without talking to a lawyer first and without having a lawyer present with me. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

WITNESSES (If available)		3. SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c
1a. NAME (Type or Print)		4. SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR (b)(6), (b)(7)c
b. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PH		5. TYPED NAME OF INVESTIGATOR (b)(6), (b)(7)c
2a. NAME (Type or Print)		6. ORGANIZATION OF INVESTIGATOR Bagram CID Office, Bagram Airfield, AF, APO AE 09354
b. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PHONE		

Section C. Non-Waiver

1. I do not want to give up my rights:
 I want a lawyer. I do not want to be questioned or say anything.

2. SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE

ATTACH THIS WAIVER CERTIFICATE TO ANY SWORN STATEMENT (DA form 2823) SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED BY THE SUSPECT/ACCUSED.

SUBJECT INTERVIEW OF: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Battalion, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, APO AE 09354 (BAF).

DISC ONE:

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c consented to this interview to be audio and video recorded.

About 1018, 21 Feb 12, [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c of his legal rights which he waived. (See Waiver Certificate)

Between 1019 through 1022, 21 Feb 12, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related they confiscate a lot of contraband that is located in the prison. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related once they confiscate contraband they place the contraband into a black trash bag, place it into the hallway, and the contraband is then burned. Further, he stated any items that are confiscated are then placed onto a DA Form 4137, placed into storage for 90 days, and then destroyed. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated once the items are deemed they are no longer needed they coordinate with Supply who takes the contraband to the burn pit and burn it.

Between 1022 through 1025, 21 Feb 12, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated his office was working with the Librarian, a local national in charge of passing out books to the detainees. He stated they have been watching the Librarian because he is in a perfect position to cause all kinds of problems in the DFIP. He stated he passes out books to the detainees and these books contain codes, messages, writing on the insides, etc. He stated he made coordination's with his COC and they decided to conduct a search of all books inside of the DFIP library. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and a group of individuals to include [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, Counter Intelligence (CI), DFIP, and CI translators were utilized to search the library for contraband.

Between 1025 through 1031, 21 Feb 12, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related he did not know they burned any Qur'ans. He thought they were burning any books deemed contraband such as radical books, extreme subversive materials. He stated there are notes inside of the books that contain intelligence value. The books that were taken to the burn pit were deemed radical and extreme by the team and therefore would never be given back to the detainees. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated they do not have any other options in order to get rid of contraband. He stated the unit that they replaced had the system already in place and they just followed suit. He stated he takes all the contraband and after it is deemed of no evidentiary value and use he then has supply burn it.

Between 1031 through 1035, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated the books that were confiscated were of multiple shapes and sizes. He stated the books contained Arabic, Pashtu, and other languages that he could not read. He stated the only things that contained English writing were on some pamphlets. He stated there was no question that once the books were deemed that they were contraband they were going to burn them regardless. When asked if they would of burned the

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c Bagram CID Office, Bagram Airfield
Afghanistan, APO AE 09354
Signature [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c Date: 21 Feb 12 Exhibit:

books if they were Qur'ans, he stated he doesn't know what they would have done with them. He stated that in the years previous he doesn't believe that the Qur'ans were ever destroyed prior to his unit arriving. He stated he believes all the books were kept in the library and never seized as contraband and that is one of the reasons why they focused on the Librarian. He continued to state that he told the soldiers not to allow LN's to see them burning the books because they contained sensitive information and also LN's are very peculiar about burning anything of Afghani literature. The books were never placed onto DA Form 4137's because they did not want to cause suspicion and he related it would have taken days in order to place all the books onto the DA Form 4137's.

Between 1036 through 1037, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related that the following individuals were present for the screening of the books:

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

3 Linguists/Interpreters

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Between 1037 through 1039, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated he does not know who made the final decision to burn the books. He stated he had conversations with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c discussing that there is no way to give the books back to the detainees so the only option they had was to burn the books.

Between 1039 through 1045, 21 Feb 12, (b)(6), (b)(7)c stepped out of the interview room and briefed the results of the current interview thus far to (b)(6), (b)(7)c, and (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c, this office.

Between 1046 though 1048, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related the screening of the library books took approximately 3 days. He stated the translators were what he believed to be DOD contractors. He stated every single book had writing in the book or in the margins, or was extreme in nature. He stated that any book that contained radical ideas or extreme books that situations or incidents that made the U.S look bad, make the detainees become even more as insurgents was considered radical or extreme. He stated that it was never mentioned that any of these books were Qur'ans nor did they mention they were religious in nature.

Between 1049 through 1050, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c updated his collecting of any books that contained one of the following elements: A lot of writing in it, radical writing in it, intelligence value writing in it, or extreme material.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Bagram CID Office, Bagram Airfield
Afghanistan, APO AE 09354

Signature

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date: 21 Feb 12

Exhibit:

Between 1050 through 1056, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related they took pictures of all books and all writing in order to document the Intel and be able to provide that to CI. He cannot recall seeing any books that contained English writing or English hand written notes inside of them.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related that the contractors or translators speak and read and write Pashtu and Arabic. He stated there is no real system set in place to collect or store evidence. They did not have any facility in order to place the evidence or contraband that was collected from the DFIP and detainees. He did not sign out the evidence when other agencies would utilize the evidence for whatever reasons and then bring it back. He related sometimes they would look for the evidence and it would be missing, not with the DA Form 4137, or misplaced by whoever touched it last.

Between 1057 through 1101, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related he finds it hard to believe that 90 percent of the books were Qur'ans or contained religious materials. He denied that during the screening of the books that anyone to include the translators were Qur'ans.

Between 1101 through 1106, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related this was a onetime situation that has never occurred before. He stated it wasn't utilized as a 90 day process because they did not have the proper storage capacity to store the books. He stated he never actually took control of the books. They left the books inside of the library the entire time. He stated he was apart of the screening team and all books on the floor were supposed to be burned. The instructions given to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c were to pick up the books from the library, then take them to the burn pit, and the burn them. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c continued to deny that he knew any of the books were Qur'ans. He stated he never heard anyone pick up a book and state that it was a Qur'an.

Between 1107 through 1109, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related he took photographs of all books, all writings in the margins, all notes, book marks, etc, and provided that to the CI team. When asked why he would burn possible Intel and evidence instead of making coordination's with higher in order to find a storage facility for the books.

Between 1109 through 1112, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related he did not want very many people to know about his group searching through the library for intel. He stated his Battalion Commander was aware that they were going to look at the Librarian and search all the books. He stated he didn't trust anyone to not snitch to the Librarian or tip him off that they were going to be searching the Library. He stated he did not trust anyone to include his COC with any of this information due to the fact they might snitch and tell the Librarian.

Between 1113 through 1124, 21 Feb 12, (b)(6), (b)(7)c stepped out of the interview and briefed the interview thus far to (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c	Bagram CID Office, Bagram Airfield Afghanistan, APO AE 09354	
Signature	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	Date: 21 Feb 12
		Exhibit:

Between 1125 through 1128, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related he doesn't know why so many of the books didn't have writing on or in them. He stated that there were multiple people reviewing the books therefore he doesn't know why or who reviewed those certain books. He stated that whoever could read the books would make the decisions that they were either radical or contained intelligence information. He stated that one of the translators held up a book and pointed to the author's picture and said this author only rights radical information and therefore all of his books were deemed to be contraband. When asked how they could make that type of decision off of just reading the cover or the first few pages he related that the translators could deem they were radical and they would take the translators word at face value and collect the book. When (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and his team were considered to be the judge and the jury on all books, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated yes, he was in fact the judge and the jury, the final say on all books.

Between 1129 through 1132, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c related he only had a rough estimate of how many books were taken. He stated each person makes their own decision on whether they kept the book, on whether the book was contraband, etc. He stated each person who was reviewing each book had their own judgment on whether the books were extreme in nature and how much writing each book contained. Further, he stated this search was not a conspiracy to burn all Qur'ans in the Library.

Between 1133 through 1136, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c discussed in detail who was present during the search.

Between 1136 through 1148 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was sitting in the interview room pending photographs, fingerprinting, and DNA CODIS kits.

DISC TWO:

Between 1148 through 1205, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was sitting in the interview room pending photographs, fingerprinting, and DNA CODIS kits.

About 1206, 21 Feb 12, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, this office, exposed mug shots, fingerprints, and collected a DNA CODIS Kit from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Further, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was released to a member of his unit on a DA Form 2708.

AGENT'S COMMENTS: Throughout the entire interview of (b)(3), (b)(6) he was adamant that nobody knew any of these books were Qur'ans. Further, he continuously denied that he knew any of the books were Qur'ans and denies any of the translators ever mentioning they were Qur'ans during the search of the Library.///LAST ENTRY///

(b)(6), (b)(7)c	Bagram CID Office, Bagram Airfield Afghanistan, APO AE 09354
Signature:	(b)(6), (b)(7)c Date: 21 Feb 12 Exhibit:

24 February 2012

Interview of

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[BG Watson advised (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c of his UCMJ, Article 31 rights for possible violations of UCMJ Article 92, dereliction of duty, Article 107, false official statement, and Article 134, service discrediting conduct. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c waived his right to counsel and agreed to make a statement.]

[BG Watson administered the oath to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c.]

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

U.S. Army, first being duly sworn, did testify in substance as follows:

I am the Senior NCO [noncommissioned officer] for the 535 battalion S2 [staff intelligence].

I was involved in investigating the suspicions concerning the library. I assisted the teams that examined the books. We looked at the books to see if they were even serviceable. Many of the books were old and falling apart. We also looked for writings inside of the books, in the margins and all over the books. Other people assisted in looking for extremist material. I do not read this language, so I wouldn't know what extremist material was or what was not.

This search took three complete days. There were about ten people who assisted in looking at the books. We each looked at the books and made a decision if we would keep them or not. We took pictures of some of the writings that were in the books. We found a lot of notes inside of the books, and we took pictures as well as collected that. We ended up with hundreds; I estimate over 500 books of all shapes, colors, and sizes. Our policy was that we cannot give this material back to the detainees. We also can not throw this material away because people go through the trash and take it. Some of the information was critical, and we could not allow it to get back into circulation. So these hundreds and hundreds of books were lying all over the floor. At no time did anybody hold up any of these books and say: "this is a Quran." The languages of the books were Urdo, Farsi, Pashtu, and Dari. I can't read any of these languages. I also could not tell by looking at one book in the pile of five hundred and tell if it was a Quran or not.

The examination team left for the day and following our policy that was in effect, I would arrange to have the material taken to be destroyed. There was so much material that we had no place to store all of these items. I called our supply system, and they had a regular run to take material to the destruction place every night at 2100 hours. I called, and they said they would bring a truck to pick up the material. I was not involved in transporting the books. One team examined the books, and a completely other team transported the books. I coordinated for the movement, but I was not physically present for the transportation of the books. The people that transported the actual books did not talk to anyone who examined and screened the books. I have been here three and a half months. I am part of the S2 and work with intelligence. I can't tell by looking at the books if it's a Quran or not. I do acknowledge that there were probably Holy Books in the library, but I did not know how to identify them.

When we looked at the books and there were writing, I would take it to the translators and ask what it meant. Usually, it was someone's name. Other times, we would just take pictures of the writings. But at no time did anyone say that we were looking through Qurans.

This is the first time we've ever done an operation like this. Most of the items we take to be destroyed are very small – they come in small bags from the detainees' cells. So, I don't think anyone has done what we've done in the last two year. This was a very unique experience for us.

When we were segregating the books, there were three interpreters present. This was over a three-day period, and they would come and go. There were usually two there, but at the most three were present. I cannot recall the names of the interpreters. They work with the other intelligence team.

During the search, I was present three hours on the last day. I did know one guy's name that was present that day, and he goes by (b)(6), (b)(7)c. He works for the Brigade and was present on the third day when I was there. None of the translators were aware that I called supply to come and take the books to be destroyed. I had to leave the library because there was no telephone there. I had to walk into another office.

There were many, many stacks of ten to fifteen books high covering the floor. I was not present when they were removed. The team that arrived at 2100 hours to transport the book was the other three soldiers. When the search team left, they closed the library and locked it. When the team came in at 2100 hours, the library was opened for them to remove the books that were inside. One of the soldiers who works with us from S2 had the key. Usually, the librarian had the key. However, we put a new lock on the door during the three days we were searching so he would not be able to go in and out. Three days prior to the search, I worked with the CI [counterintelligence] team and we changed the lock. During the three days the search was being completed, the CI kept the key. On the last day, when they said they were finished around 1900 hours, they gave the key to us. We locked the door and went back to the office. Many of us left because our shift was over. However, one of the Soldiers who works for us in S2 and works a later shift had the key and was going to help move the books later that night. I personally handed the key over to the soldier around 1900 hours when I returned to the office after leaving the library.

There were three Soldiers that helped move the books that night. Two of the Soldiers worked for supply and one of the soldiers works with us in the S2 shop. I didn't hear anything about the burning incident until the next morning. No one said anything to me until the next morning around 0730 hours about what happened the night before. I showed up for work at the DFIP [Detention Facility in Parwan] and was ordered immediately to the Brigade Headquarters. From there, I was directed to report immediately to the MP [Military Police] station. It wasn't until I reported to the MP station to give a statement that I was informed about what happened. I heard that the soldiers had gone to the burn pit and apparently there were Qurans within the books, which I did not know, and it was a big incident. And I knew that this was going to be a bad terrible set of events; I knew that terrible things were going to happen.

After thinking about the situation, many mistakes were made. We had no communication between the search team and the people taking the books. We could have separated the books and looked at each individual book to see if it was a Quran or not. Also, if we had any questions we could have stored them, but obviously we did not do that.

This is the truth as I know it. It is a terrible situation. Thinking back now we could have avoided all of it. It's just a terrible situation, and it will not happen again. That's all I can say. I know how important the Quran is. I work with Afghan National Soldiers every day. I work with translators. I have respect for religious material just as I have for my Bible. I don't believe that any soldier would intentionally do this kind of thing. Looking back, we could have done things differently. I was following the procedures and guidelines that we had at the time. I am confident that we will make corrections and this will never happen again. I did everything according to SOP [standard operating procedure]. We have never done this kind of thing before. Our SOP does not specifically say anything about handling large number of books at this present time. Our policy in the past is to do exactly what we did. We had no place to store these hundreds and hundreds of books. We didn't want the librarian to get suspicious about what we were doing, and we didn't want to occupy the library any longer. During the three days we were there, we found many books that had extremist material. Many books had so much writing in them that we could not cover them up and we no longer could return them. Some of the books were in such poor condition that when you opened them up, they would fall apart. I do not have any of the material we collected. It went to the CI team, and they are analyzing and working with it. It was a joint-investigation between the Intel team and the CI team. I called the truck for the burn pit. I made the decision. But I was following the written guidelines we had at the time.

The suspicions about the librarian came from both the Intel team and the CI team. [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c would go from cell to cell with pieces of paper and he would tell us that these are books that the detainees want. He has total access to go in and out of any of the detainee housing units. So what he is supposed to do is take a piece of paper to the detainee to write down one book and then he is supposed to take it away. So when he walks around from cell to cell with a big list of writing and we don't know what it says, it makes us suspicious.

I don't know what a Quran looks like. The books we had were big and small and all different colors. There were eight or nine people doing the searching. I don't know how everyone discerned which books stay and which would go. I'll tell you what I did. I would look at a book and see if there was a lot of writing on it. Then I would take a picture of it and show it to the translator. We had criteria for segregating books. The criterion was writing in the book, books falling apart, or extremist material. So if I looked at a book, and there was no writing in it and it wasn't falling apart, I would ask the translators if it was extremist material. I would ask. I don't know what the other people did.

I have been in the Army for [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. I am a [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. I have never been in [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c before.

The original intent was to go in and find material to be used against the suspicions of [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c. And to also see if anything being passed was a threat to the guard force. This was a covert

operation. We knew that the librarian would notice that 400 to 500 books were missing. It's a very small room.

Once we went through the books and we saw the writings we could no longer use the books, they were not serviceable. The books then become what we call contraband and we can no longer leave it in the library because we saw it as a threat, and we couldn't throw it in the trash; at the time, it was the only way we had to deal with it. According to the SOP for contraband, we take what is brought to us in the S2 office for thirty days. We photograph it and at the end of thirty days, it's destroyed. I am aware of logging in all contraband on a particular chain of custody form. This was not done for these books. The procedure was not followed for this contraband.

During the operation, no one approached me and said that burning this material was a bad idea. At one point when the door was open to the library, (b)(6), (b)(7) our translator, said to keep the door shut because people could see what we were doing, and he didn't want people to see what we were doing. At no point did he say it was because there were Qurans laying on the floor in a disrespectful manner. The ANA [Afghanistan National Army] soldiers don't like us being in the library at all. It was our suspicion that messages were being passed back and forth so we had to investigate the library and be in there.

When I was coordinating the movement of the books to the burn pit, I never gave instructions or arranged the operation with the intent to avoid exposure to local nationals or to the Afghan army. My instructions were for the truck to come, pick up the contraband, and take it to be destroyed. I never told any of the soldiers on the detail to avoid local nationals. I coordinated the movement. I did see that there could be an element of risk. I knew if someone saw all of these books that they may not know what they are and get concerned about them. I did not supervise this operation. I planned the disposal of the books on the last night of the operation. Our intent was to destroy the contraband we found. However, we never realized how much we were going to find.

No one from the CI team ever indicated to me that some of the books were Qurans, although they may be written in a different translation. We were looking for extremist material and the word Quran was never used. This operation was planned and coordinated with the Battalion Commander, the S2 Team, and the CI Team. There was no briefing given, only discussion. The 535 Battalion Commander did approve this operation.

As part of my pre-deployment training we had cultural awareness training. I realize that I am not supposed to touch a Holy Quran. I know that you are not supposed to touch the Quran. I know it has to be treated with respect, and when it is stored in the house, it has to be the highest book. These are the things I was taught.

There was never a briefing to transition the operation from the CI team to the S2 or Supply Team. This operation was not planned properly. There were many mistakes. I have no excuse for why standard procedures and planning operations were not followed.

Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c
24 February 2012

On a day to day basis, there is a shift change briefing, but there are many moving parts going on within the DFIP. The poor planning of this operation was a breakdown between CI and S2. In the past, the last Brigade did not encourage us to have overt communication with the CI and other intel agencies. This was our first joint operation working together and it was not planned or executed well.

I handled a lot of books. Some were newer and some were older. I cannot recall if I handled the newer books. If the interpreters said that a book was radical material, then they were pulled off of the shelves regardless of if they were newer or older. I had no idea that there were Qurans in the books that were to be taken to the burn pit. I saw this as a risky operation to transport the books to the burn pit because any time we have a large amount of something and the ANA witness it, they get riled up and question what we are doing. However, it was a mistake not to consult the ANA.

[End of interview.]

26 February 2012

Interview of

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[BG Watson advised (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c of his UCMJ, Article 31 rights for possible violations of UCMJ Article 92, failure to obey order or regulation, Article 107, false official statement, and Article 134, dereliction of duty. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c waived his right to counsel however refused to make a statement.]

[End of interview]

4 March 2012, 2017 hours

Interview of

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[At 2018 hours, BG Watson advised (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c of his UCMJ, Article 31 rights for possible violations of the UCMJ Article 92, dereliction of duty, Article 107, false official statement, and Article 134, service discrediting conduct . At 2020 hrs, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that he had conferred with legal counsel, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, and did not want to make a statement.]

[Interview terminated at 2020 hours.]