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CCC-CAG

7 MAR 05

MEMORANDUM FOR General Abizaid

**SUBJECT:** Ken Pollack's Recommendations for the U.S. Policy Initiatives Following Iraqi Elections.

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of the paper is to advise you of continuing interactions with Ken Pollack, Brookings Institution, Saban Center, in two areas. First, we provide you with some thoughts Ken has passed to you through the CAG on "helping Egypt help itself," on helping Israel with a big part of its security dilemma, and on a regional security forum. Second, we relay notification Ken passed of a forthcoming article he wanted you to be aware of that is critical of U.S. military actions in Iraq.

2. **Background & Pollack Policy Thoughts.** In the course of continuing interaction between CAG and Ken Pollack since his visit, Ken called in on 1 MAR 05 (after an extended period of travel) with the following thoughts on where CENTCOM might advance three promising processes with senior leaders in Washington, D.C. if/when the timing is right for your engagement:

a. **Help Egypt Move Towards Legitimate Elections.** In the wake of Mubarak's 26 FEB 05 announcement on multi-party elections for the presidency, we might discreetly ask at a very senior level (Mubarak, CHOD, or other senior contacts CENTCOM has) what the United States can do to help Mubarak facilitate the steps needed to execute the elections?

- Ken believes that Mubarak does grasp clearly the problems Egypt faces and realizes that a transition to an elected government is necessary. Yet at 76 years old, Mubarak is also likely fearful of significant change late on his watch.
- While not a "fan" of further arms sales, Ken believes that if some form of military sales or aid will gain solid military support for the election process, then we should support such a deal.
- Ken recommends asking the same question, "What can the United States do to help make the changes you think are necessary in your country?", in our other AOR nations of concern (particularly KSA).

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highlighted the Middle East Peace Process and its criticality in the mind of Arabs. He added that the Brookings Institute had recently had two Israeli's as visiting fellows. One, Mr. Schlomo Yanai, was the IDF "J-5" before he retired. What these visiting Israeli's have revealed is that, with the demise of the Hussein regime, Israel is more secure than at any other time in its history—but the Israeli's can't yet internalize thier improved situation—they're too close to the issues, and too locked into the security dilemma they perceive as alone against all neighbors. One of the key tasks is to make Israel feel as secure as it really is, thus, Ken recommends exploring a long-term effort that leads to Israeli membership in NATO.

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- Ken says that coordinated move to explore Israeli affiliation with NATO proposal has the tacit support of NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (according to former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ron Asmus). De Hoop Scheffer recently visited Israel and publicly announced an effort to deepen Israel's ties with NATO but also denied this was a move towards Israeli membership in NATO.
- Pollack's Saban Center is working this initiative with the German Marshall Fund, where Dr. Asmus is a fellow, with the perspective that this is a five to ten year project.
- Closer NATO-Israeli ties and eventual NATO membership for Israel is based on the assumptions that NATO and its members have better ties to the Arab world, providing a wider venue for improving Arab-Israeli relations, and that NATO political-military backing of Israel will facilitate Israeli concessions with regards to Palestine and potential arms control agreements for the region.

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c. **Pursue a Regional Security Forum Framework for the Arabian Gulf.** Ken suggests that the time is ripe for opening discussions on a regional security forum similar to the OSCE—an idea he first introduced in his 2003 *Foreign Affairs* article, "Securing the Gulf." He believes that a collective security framework for the region might address three significant issues:

- **Iraqi Rearmament and Security.** Ken believes that the Iraqis, due to the "tough neighborhood" they live in, will be tempted to rearm in a manner that makes their neighbors feel less secure. A collective security framework and arms control could render Iraqi rearmament less controversial with its neighbors.
- **Iran.** Ken believes that a regional forum regarding Iran before it has nuclear capability could make the Iranians feel secure enough to persuade them not to "go nuclear." The forum remains important even if Iran becomes a nuclear state since the Iranians have proven themselves "totally incapable" of reading U.S. intentions towards them. There is a reasonable expectation that Iran would participate in a regional security forum given its participation in the "six plus two" talks. If Iran declined an invitation, it would constitute a public blow to the Teheran regime's legitimacy both at home and abroad.
- **Legitimacy of U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf.** U.S. participation in a regional security forum and/or the agreement by the parties regarding U.S. regional military presence could help legitimize a residual U.S. presence in the region, moderating the sentiment that the U.S. is there to dominate the AOR. In essence, the proposed forum could facilitate "keep[ing] the Americans in, the Iranians out, and the Iraqi's down."

3. Ken referenced a forthcoming book that he is working with others at the Brookings Institution on the topic of Iraq, and indicated it would not be kind to the U.S. military in general, and CENTCOM in specific. Ken offered to float a copy of it when in near-final form, for our review and (if appropriate) comment back to him. We told Ken we would greatly appreciate the courtesy, and are awaiting his transmission of the article. We will mark-up and pass to you ASAP upon receipt.

4. Please advise us if you require or desire more from the CAG on any of these topics.

VR/  
CAG

cc: DCG  
CoS  
J5