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Operation FARDH al QANOON: Operational Overview

11 Mar 07

Problem Statement: How do we secure the population of Baghdad while helping the GOI transition to security self-reliance?

The overall classification of this briefing is:

SECRET

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Purpose and Agenda



- ✧ **Purpose:** *To provide an overview on Operation FARDH al QANOON*
 - *past, present, future*

- ✧ **Agenda**

- Background
- Threat Overview
- Mission and Commander's Intent (MNF-I, MNC-I)
- Operational Concept
- Baghdad Security Plan



Background



- ▶ **Late Nov 06 – MNC-I (V Corps) explores idea of end state “disconnect” between the Coalition and GOI**
- ▶ **Early Dec 06 – MNC-I (V Corps) develops Transition Bridging Strategy**
- ▶ **5 Dec 06 – PM Maliki proposes plan to protect and secure Baghdad, prompting discussion regarding additional U.S. BCTs**
- ▶ **7 Dec 06 – Receipt of JCS and CENTCOM draft PLANORD for deployment of additional 5 BCTs and a division HQ**
- ▶ **MNC-I (III Corps) planning effort begins prior to TOA and intensifies**
 - Parallel planning with MND-B and MNF-I
 - Combined planning with GOI
- ▶ **27 Dec 06 – Orders brief to MNC-I CG**
- ▶ **2 Jan 07 – FRAGO 179 to OPORD 06-03 published**
- ▶ **10 Jan 07 – POTUS speech – New Way Forward**
- ▶ **13 Jan 07 – JCS EXORD authorizes incremental deployment of 5 BCTs to Kuwait**
- ▶ **MNC-I planning efforts continue with refinement through Jan and Feb 07**
 - Development of employment options for additional BCTs
 - Courses of action for employing an additional division HQ
 - Campaign Operational Concept

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V Corps Dilemma

Is There a Disconnect in End States?



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Critical Conditions



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Defining the Problem



- ✧ **Competing groups are seeking to exert control over the Iraqi population as a means of fulfilling their own objectives**
- ✧ **This has led to a self-sustaining cycle of violence that has further undermined the legitimacy of a GOI hampered by an inability to provide adequate security, essential services, and the rule of law**
- ✧ **Though external players have a role, instability in Iraq stems largely from internal sources whose actions – though undertaken for a variety of reasons – have had the cumulative effect of undermining GOI legitimacy**
- ✧ **The principal characteristic of this instability is a lack of security, which has been felt most prominently in Baghdad**
- ✧ **The Coalition must work on several fronts to improve the legitimacy of the GOI, enabling it to gain broad support among the Iraqi people**



MNF-I Mission

MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan, Apr 06

- ✧ **The U.S. Mission and Coalition Forces will, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, contribute to an environment where the Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people, creating the conditions for the Rule of Law, defeating the terrorists and irreconcilable insurgents, bringing other insurgents into the political process, reducing sectarian tensions, and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror.**

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End States and Objectives

Strategic – MNF-I 2007 JCAP (draft)

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MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan End State

- Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists

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MNF-I Commander – Major Challenges and Priorities



Extract from Answers to Advance Policy Questions (Prior to Testimony)

- **Providing the security necessary to reduce the cycle of violence**

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- **Continuing the development of capable ISF**

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- **Integration of the interagency effort**

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- **Addressing the lack of capacity of the GOI**

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MNC-I Mission



MNC-I conducts combat, stability, and support operations in coordination with the Iraqi Security Forces to secure the population, defeat terrorists and irreconcilable extremists, neutralize insurgent and militia groups, and transition responsibilities to the ISF in order to reduce violence, gain the support of the people, stabilize Iraq, and enable Gol security self-relian

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MNC-1 Commander's Intent



Purpose: The purpose of our operations is to stabilize the security situation with priority to the population of Baghdad, then to the nine strategic cities and the rest of Iraq, and transition security responsibility to the Gol. Simultaneously, strengthen Gol legitimacy through the development of Iraq's emerging security institutions and rule of law, enabling them to be self-reliant, effective, and representative of the Iraqi people; and create the conditions that allow Iraq to be peaceful, stable, representative, and secure, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves justly and provide security for their people by defeating terrorists and extremists while denying its territory as a safe haven

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Endstate: In the near term, the population is secure and conditions are set for the full restoration of civil authority through stability in Iraq, with **priority to Baghdad**; sectarian violence is reduced and militia's influence is diminished. The Gol is viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the Iraqi people, able to provide security, essential services, justice based on the rule of law, and economic opportunity for all Iraqis. Iraqi Security Forces are in the lead with CF in operational overwatch, and operating from a reduced footprint. AQ, AQI and irreconcilable extremists are defeated.

In the longer term, Iraq is self-reliant and politically stable with the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves justly, secure from internal and external threats, inaccessible as a safe haven for terrorists, and integrated into the international community with an engine for regional economic growth.

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
Forces Over Time



Today

● Ready to enter Iraq

★ Earliest Decision Point to turn off the unit



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IA Deployment Tracking Matrix

Baghdad Security Deployment Update - As of 09 MAR 07

Unit Summary Table:



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Baghdad Security District Command and Control



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Baghdad Security District Command and Control BOC Assumes TACON



as of BOC FOC @ 01 March 2007

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Clear, Control and Retain



Clear: remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area. Security Forces (ISF and CF) and infrastructure required to protect the population identified and resourced.

Control: maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations. Security Forces (ISF and CF) in place to protect the population and security infrastructure improvement / construction ongoing.

Retain: ensure a terrain feature controlled by a friendly force remains free of enemy occupation or use. All required Security Forces (ISF and CF) are in place, fully functional, and sustainable.

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Risks and Opportunities



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Comments and Questions



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