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## Survey of Counterinsurgency Practices

(1-16 AUG 2005)



*An Independent Assessment of Coalition Military Counterinsurgency Practices in Iraq  
As Compared to Successful Practices of 20th Century Counterinsurgencies*

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## **Background and Summary**

### **Terms of Reference**

In late July, the Commanding General, Multinational Force-Iraq, directed formation of a counterinsurgency (COIN) survey team. Its mission and deliverables are summarized below. The terms of reference are at Annex A.

Mission: Survey the application and effectiveness of counterinsurgency practices in planning and operations by Coalition forces, at division, brigade and battalion levels, to discern successful techniques and lessons learned for theater-wide dissemination.

Deliverables: The team was tasked to provide the Commanding Generals of MNF-I and MNC-I a written survey report and briefing and a paper and briefing COIN operations inform senior civilian government officials and the general public.

Timeframe: Survey conducted 1-16 August 2005.

### **Analytical Framework**

There are many definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The team found it necessary to consult a variety of current and previous doctrine to establish a definition of insurgency and counterinsurgency relevant to Iraq. The team used a combination of current and previous Service and Joint Definitions as they related to the challenges faced in Iraq.

The definition of insurgency is drawn from FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict:

- “An organized, armed political struggle whose goal may be the seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government . . . [or to] break away from government control and establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or religious bounds . . . [or] to extract limited political concessions unattainable through less violent means.”
- It seemed clear from discussions with leaders across Iraq that insurgent and terrorist groups are variously pursuing all the objectives enumerated above.

The team leader and historian felt this definition was more comprehensive and relevant to the Iraq than the current joint definition: “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict”

By way of reference, another useful definition is drawn from FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations (2003):

- An insurgency is an organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict to achieve its aims. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy—the central issues in an insurgency. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on its strategic objectives, its operational environment, and available resources. Insurgencies normally seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country. They may also seek to—
  - Overthrow an established government without a follow-on social revolution.
  - Establish an autonomous national territory within the borders of a state.

- Cause the withdrawal of an occupying power.
- Extract political concessions that are unattainable through less violent means.

The definition of counterinsurgency found in Joint Publication 1-02 was deemed to be sufficient:

- Counterinsurgency (COIN): Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.
- The MNF-I Campaign strategy embraces all elements of counterinsurgency, but is not fully enabled in execution.

The survey team based its assessment on observations and interviews of commanders and staffs from division to company/troop level. The insights gained were compared to a series of best practices derived from analysis of successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgencies in the 20th century (see Enclosure 2). These practices are summarized in the table below.

<b>COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) PRACTICES</b>	
<b>SUCCESSFUL (average 9 years)</b>	<b>UNSUCCESSFUL (average 13 years)</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Emphasis on intelligence</li><li>• Focus on population, their needs &amp; security</li><li>• Secure areas established, expanded</li><li>• Insurgents isolated from population (population control)</li><li>• Unity of Effort on multiple lines of operations, local to national</li><li>• Resources (money, manpower, time)</li><li>• Effective, pervasive PSYOP campaigns</li><li>• Amnesty &amp; rehabilitation for insurgents</li><li>• Police in lead, military supports</li><li>• Police force expanded, diversified</li><li>• Conventional military forces reoriented for counter-insurgency</li><li>• Special Forces, advisers present with indigenous forces</li><li>• Insurgent sanctuaries denied</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Inferior intelligence operations</li><li>• Primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency</li><li>• Priority to “kill-capture” of enemy, not on engaging population</li><li>• Ineffective, minimal PSYOP campaigns</li><li>• Battalion-size operations as the norm</li><li>• Military units concentrated on large bases for protection</li><li>• Special Forces focused on raiding</li><li>• Advisor effort a low priority</li><li>• Building, training indigenous army in image of own (foreign) force</li><li>• Peacetime government processes</li><li>• Open borders, airspace, coastlines</li></ul>

### **Conduct of the Survey**

During the period of 1-16 August, the team was able to visit 5 divisions and 9 of 15 US brigades that hold ground in Iraq. Coalition units visited included MND-CS and the El Salvadorian battalion in CS and MND-SE and TF Maysan were the units visited in Southern Iraq. The Korean Division was excluded due to time. In each location, the team met with commanders or deputy commanders and staff principals. In each area visited, several battalions and companies were visited.

While the Commanding Generals of MNF-I and MNC-I spend a lot of time visiting the force, this is the first time we’ve conducted such a comprehensive effort focused on counterinsurgency best practices. Due to the scope of the survey and the time available, visits to individual headquarters and subordinate units were between 3 and 5 hours. The conclusions and

recommendations that follow reflect a bottom-up perspective of the effect or effectiveness Coalition military and civilian operations and activities.

## Summary

### *Findings*

Coalition military strategy, plans and operations generally align with the best practices of history's successful counterinsurgents and are generally not guilty of those practices common to history's unsuccessful counterinsurgencies. It was apparent that some arrived at this point through learning in Iraq, while others were well prepared to hit the ground running.

The focus on COIN does not suggest, however, that this conflict will be successfully concluded in the near term. History suggests that this is predominantly a political effort with a heavy security component—not the other way around. Therefore, much remains to be done, particularly in non-security areas such as government and economic development, and success will take time. A cautionary note is that successful counterinsurgencies take an average 9 years to win and unsuccessful counterinsurgencies take 13 years to lose.

While Coalition actions align with successful COIN practices, this is a decentralized fight that demands that responsibility, authority and resources are pushed down. Greater freedom of action and empowerment is needed at the lowest levels (battalion, company and even platoon and squad levels) due to unique nature of the fight in each area. Resource, policy and legal constraints that hinder freedom of action at the lowest levels appear to be partially self-inflicted—there is a wide disparity between how different units approach approval of IO messages, the use of CERP funds, and use of intelligence funds. There are, however, constraints that hinder operational effectiveness including availability of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), access and flexibility of CERP funds, IO decisions, tools and support, availability and flexibility of rewards, authority to conduct engagement, government development and economic expertise, tools and resources.

- ISF: numbers matter, but numbers of competent ISF matter more; competent ISF are a force multiplier and we need more; incompetent ISF, especially poor leaders can become a resource sump that impedes progress.
- People to build government—commanders, staffs and units are split between conducting operations and building legitimate government, but they have neither the expertise nor the appropriate resources to build legitimate government capacity.
- Flexible CERP and other Funds—there appears to be a wide degree of variation on guidance on what can be done—need maximum flexibility so that the rules are appropriate to the situation on the ground. Contracting rules and funding have proven inflexible.
- IO rules—some units produce post-incident IO on scene and others wait weeks for approval of themes and messages. Commanders want maximum flexibility so they can exploit opportunity.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

- Rewards—micro rewards program ineffective (micro rewards, micro effect, micro management).
- Economic tools—CERP remains the principal means of impacting the day-to-day economic lives of Iraqis, building commerce is key to meeting the expectations of Iraqis.

Some units demonstrated many areas of brilliance in their approach to COIN and in execution given the challenges they faced. This is due mostly to leadership and preparation. In fact, outside of resources, leadership and command intent, guidance and policies are the key enabler of the units making the most progress in security and non-security areas. However, none can fully operationalize history's best COIN practices due in great part to shortfalls in capacity for government and economic development which exceed the knowledge, skills and capabilities currently organic to the brigades and even divisions in theater.

All units appeared to have sufficient training. However, not all training received prior to deployment was relevant or adequate to the needs of all units visited. Tactical training was generally assessed by commanders as not long enough for most National Guard units and RC Marine units. Some training and most scenarios were not current enough to be relevant to the situation in Iraq—use of “live” scenarios and current intelligence in predeployment training was a consistent request. Cultural training appeared to be based more on Saudi Arabia than Iraq and did not account for the unique groups and factions that predominate some areas. IED and convoy training was identified as insufficient, not realistic and dated; some felt that convoy training promoted behavior that hampers mission in Iraq. Some areas that are becoming more important, such as detainee/crime scene processing, need training packages, TTP, and inclusion in predeployment training at mobilization sites and CTCs.

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a

increasing availability of ISF is easing the tension slightly, but effective ISF are not yet available in numbers to end this challenge. Re-task organization or redistribution of forces should be considered for specific areas as re-posturing becomes an option.

To win, the Coalition and Iraq's government and security forces must protect and control the population to gain their support and deny enemy action, deny the enemy sanctuary to disrupt their operations and meet popular expectations to draw the population away from the insurgents and sustain their support. Presence of CF and ISF has proven to be essential to protecting the population and ISF have been key to improving population control absent other measures. Insurgent sanctuary is moveable. Disruption is temporary. Sustained presence has been required to permanently deny sanctuary. Forces are not yet sufficient to stop intimidation of the population and local Iraqi forces. Meeting popular expectations remains the largest gap in

capability and effect—there is no evidence of meaningful, legitimate government action outside of Baghdad. To achieve these effects, the Coalition requires more trained and reliable ISF, improving economic and governance capacity, increasing boots on the ground using ISF to gain the trust and confidence of the people, and an increasing ability to wrest control of areas from insurgents and never leave or allow them back in. In pursuing these operations, there is no cookie cutter solution—each area, certainly from company on up is different and requires freedom of action at the lowest possible levels across all lines of operation, operating system, etc. Constraints—some of these appear to be self inflicted and constrain freedom of action; some examples:

The bottom line is that military forces and resources remain the principal means of impacting government and economics—this is insufficient. **The Coalition requires more capacity to make a difference in governance and economics if we are to fully operationalize the best practices.**

### ***Key Recommendations***

COIN/ CI School: Establish in-country Iraq COIN leader program and intelligence school to propagate best practices among **brigade, battalion and company leaders.**

Intelligence Assessment: Assess intelligence functions and resources at brigade, battalion and company levels and identify ways to decentralize additional systems and people.

Population Protection Measures: Implement population protection measures to isolate insurgents from the Iraqi people (national ID card system, vehicle and personnel checkpoint systems, biometric solutions, berming).

Authorities Review: Assess MNF-I authorities practices from a holistic perspective and recommend opportunities to decentralize applicable authorities and tailor policies, rules, restrictions and resources based on the local situation.

IO Training Review: (A subset of authorities review) Review IO practices and expectations specifically and recommend opportunities to decentralize applicable authorities and tailor policies, rules, restrictions and resources based on the local situation.

Improved Provincial Support (Govt/Econ): Develop a combined organization to synchronize resources for governance and economic development requirements from the local to national level.

Advisor Presence: Sustain Transition Team and SF presence as CF presence reduces in order to sustain the quality of the force and effect cultural change in the ISF.

Development of the Iraqi Government and Economy: Develop a robust, stand-alone organization for national, provincial and local political and economic development, partner with the military at all levels. Complement with new economic funding to demonstrate confidence and lead donor nations into process.

Deny Sanctuary and Counter Intimidation: Establish Iraqi strike forces to confront insurgents and support local operations where intimidation of local forces challenges OPSEC and operational effectiveness.

**Assessment—COIN Practices in Iraq**

**Assessment Framework:** Based on unit feedback, data analysis, the background knowledge of the team members and professional judgment, MNF-I’s ability to successfully implement the 13 best COIN practices were divided into three bins:

- **Effective implementation:** Units taking appropriate action that is having the intended effect.
- **Adequate implementation:** Units taking appropriate action where the intended effect ranges from limited to improving to sufficient
- **Ineffective implementation:** Units taking no, improper or ineffective action where there is no, inadequate or unintended negative effects

Within each bin, the best practices are then rank ordered from best to worst implementation

This is a subjective evaluation based on the judgment of the survey team given feedback from commanders on the ground, trend analysis of data and knowledge of the overall situation in Iraq. While the “bell curve” is slightly skewed to the left (ineffective) this is due as much as to resources such as the production and maturing of ISF capacity or an absence of supporting resources or efforts from other agencies as it is to any errors in unit action.

<b>Assessment Category</b>	<b>COIN Practice</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Effective Implementation:</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Units taking action</b></li><li>• <b>Having the intended effect</b></li></ul></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Conventional military forces reoriented for counterinsurgency</b></li><li>• <b>Special Forces, advisers present with indigenous forces</b></li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Adequate implementation:</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Units taking action</b></li><li>• <b>Intended effect ranges from limited to improving to sufficient</b></li></ul></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Emphasis on intelligence</b></li><li>• <b>Focus on population, their needs &amp; security</b></li><li>• <b>Secure areas established, expanded</b></li><li>• <b>Insurgents isolated from population (population control)</b></li><li>• <b>Insurgent sanctuaries denied</b></li><li>• <b>Police force expanded, diversified</b></li><li>• <b>Effective, pervasive PSYOP campaigns</b></li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Ineffective implementation:</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>No, improper or ineffective action</b></li><li>• <b>No, inadequate or unintended negative effects</b></li></ul></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Police in lead, military supports</b></li><li>• <b>Unity of Effort on multiple lines of operations, local to national</b></li><li>• <b>Resources (money, manpower, time)</b></li><li>• <b>Amnesty &amp; rehabilitation for insurgents</b></li></ul>

The report that follows will address each successful practices in the order shown above, providing a mix of strategic, operational and tactical insights. For each practice, there will be a summary of conclusions reached by the team based on commander and unit feedback and some top level recommendations mostly derived from commander feedback. Four unsuccessful practices will also be addressed.

## Effective Implementation of COIN Practices

### Conventional Forces Reoriented for COIN

*Decentralize to the point of discomfort (Ninawa)*

Conclusion: Coalition and Iraqi forces are oriented on COIN. All have adapted their unit organization, operations, and training to countering the insurgency in assigned areas. Some units appear to be doing better due mostly to leadership. Some units are better enabled by organization, equipment and training.

Observations: All unit leaders understand and operations exhibit COIN principles & best practices; the more successful units are more adaptive to their environment.

- Most successful units adapt and decentralize authority and resources
- SBCT organization and C2I capabilities powerful enablers
- Organizational and Operational adaptation is evident
- Integration of Iraqi forces in nearly all operations
- Underutilized MOS augment intelligence, IO, act as infantry, etc.
- Establishment of special capabilities: NCO academies, police training and advisors, etc. using out-of-hide and SOF capabilities
- Integration and exploitation of Coalition SOF in operations
- Unit and leader initiative is strong across the board
- Service pre-deployment training assisted, but insufficient to prepare units for Iraq

Recommendations: Establish an in-country Iraqi counterinsurgency leader course and empower tactical units by decentralizing policies and resources tailored to the situation.

- Augment and equip other BCTs with SBCT enablers (C2I, ISR, etc.)
- Decentralize authorities to battalion and company leaders
- Decentralize and assign analysis and collection capabilities to brigade and below
- Implement intelligence innovations within all units (BN S2 Plans, use of FA and other MOS to augment intelligence and IO at battalion and company levels)
- Constantly update and link Service training to the current situation in Iraq; use of current intelligence and scenarios should be used exclusively.

## SF, Advisers Present with Indigenous Forces

*The relationship between the ODA's and the Iraqi Army is very powerful (Ninawa)*

Conclusion: The presence of Special Forces and transition teams is making a difference. The presence of Special Forces and advisers (Transition Teams) is essential to development of competent Iraqi forces and is an important factor in success of combined operations.

Observations: They are making a tangible difference to the level of Iraqi development and quality of joint operations. Team quality directly tied to Iraqi effectiveness. Ineffective or incompetent Iraqi forces become a resource sump for partnership units.

- Competent ISF is the key ingredient to meaningful presence; SF, Transition Teams and Partnership units are all part of developing this capability
- Special Forces training of reconnaissance units and development of Iraqi intelligence capability acknowledged as important to operations where ISF presence is substantial
- Transition Teams (and unit provided LNO teams) allow for better integration of Iraqi forces that are of increasing quality and quantity
- Unit partnership essential to development of ISF (Army AND Police)
- Almost every unit intimately involved in Police development (de facto PTT)
- US leaders concerned ISF will be unable to sustain training base any time soon
- Partnership relationship and programs are important to ISF development across Iraq; BATTs are an important enabler in 3 ACR area due to CF troop levels and operations
- Transition Team focus on staff development too limiting; as Coalition forces reduce, Transition Teams must make up for absence of partnership unit contributions
- Transition Team and SF team influence is key to development of next generation of Iraqi leaders; inculcation of an ethos of service and loyalty to nation, not religion, tribe, etc. will take at least half a generation
- To assist promising leaders, the Transition Teams will need to understand the process and policies that lead to promotion and advancement in the ISF and IPS

Recommendations: Sustain Transition Team and SF presence as CF presence reduces in order to sustain the quality of the force and effect cultural change in the ISF.

- Sustain generation and development of ISF; quality over quantity for both leaders and units
- Sustain Special Forces presence at current levels (potentially less BTT mission) and Transition Team presence at all echelons certainly through 2006. Develop plans to sustain advisory capacity in Iraqi formations well past the presence of Coalition forces in Iraq
- QUIETLY continue unit initiatives with Iraqi Police
- Rapidly assist MOI and MOD to develop the process and policies for promotion and advancement in the ISF and IPS

## Adequate Implementation of COIN Practices

### **Emphasis on Intelligence**

*Nobody from higher ever gave me any useful intel ... my battalions say the same about me  
(Al Anbar)*

Conclusion: Clearly understood and aggressively pursued. All units recognize the importance of intelligence; in practice, intelligence collection and exploitation is uneven—some units are better than others, some are better enabled than others.

Observations: Major emphasis in every unit. However, resources and authorities not decentralized to support small unit, intelligence driven fight. Those units that had the best understanding of the threat in their area had pushed intelligence collection and analysis resources down to the lowest tactical levels (battalion and company) augmenting at each level.

- Best intelligence comes from the people; ISF and interpreters are key

(b)(1)1.4c

- Bottom-up process; collection and analysis that occurs together at the same level as action (battalion and company) enables quicker action and better refinement at higher levels
- Drives successful operations; success builds on itself
- Enablers are not equally accessible; ISF access to ISR/enablers also limited
- Pre-deployment training and handoff of clear baselines can mitigate lag between rotations

(b)(1)1.4c

- Most effective intelligence analysis results from assets being decentralized and pushed to lower echelons; most successful units appear to be the ones that make this a habit at the expense of higher echelon capability
- Exploitation of information from captured materials and detainees must occur at the lowest level possible to enhance timely inclusion in the decision making process

Recommendations: Augment and empower the intelligence function at brigade, battalion and company levels. Push collection and analysis assets to the lowest levels—the point of collection/exploitation—so that exploitation can be done on the spot, initiative reinforced, and analytical products, not raw reports and data can be pushed to higher. This may allow higher echelon intelligence organizations to do more analysis and prediction and less processing and initial analysis—speeding the process and potentially creating actionable intelligence from higher on a more routine basis.

- Augment BDE, BN and CO intelligence function (ISR, analysts, THT, interrogators, interpreters (in all key languages in an area))
- Increase interpreters; break contracts or allow on site hiring based on commander judgment
- Other units should be reorganized to mimic intelligence structure and approach in the SBCT

- Relax detention time limits to allow tactical units more time for exploitation

(b)(1)1.4c

- Put measures in place to allow greater intelligence sharing with ISF

### **Focus on Population, Their Needs & Security**

*Hopelessness will perpetuate violence without government engagement (Salah ad Din)*

Conclusion: Understood, variously implemented. While all units acknowledge the population's importance, actions, resources (including ISF) and priorities are uneven. Absence of a civil capability able to undertake meaningful action limits progress and splits the CF commander's focus.

Observations: Population's importance clearly understood. However, weakness of Iraqi political and economic institutions and absence of meaningful civil support limits progress. Building government and economy left to the military; CERP remains the principle economic tool.

- Units variously define the population as the center of gravity, key terrain and most important source for intelligence; these definitions shape action and priorities
- Presence in contested areas is the key to gaining the trust and confidence; fleeting presence undermines credibility, while the addition of ISF is a key enabler
- Unit strength, even with ISF, insufficient to protect the population in many areas
- Military leaders at all levels engaged with local political, tribal and religious leaders; they are not assisted by any meaningful non-military civil expertise, advisors or capabilities
- Building government and economy left to the military; CERP remains principal source of economic activity
- Gaps between Iraqi national and provincial and provincial to local governments continue to make Coalition commanders the principal power brokers
  - There is no meaningful penetration of legitimate government action beyond Baghdad and this is particularly damaging to credibility in the Sunni areas—fueling the notion of the “good insurgency”
- Cultural advisor at brigade level appears to make a difference

Recommendations: Develop a robust, stand-alone organization for national, provincial and local political and economic development, partner with the military at all levels. Complement with new economic funding to demonstrate confidence and lead donor nations into process.

- Presence in contested areas matters; re-look task organization to shift combat power to undermanned areas without creating unsupportable risk elsewhere

- Continue to emphasize generation and development of competent ISF; this is the key to sustained presence and support by the population
- Review RC records of all services, ID service members with necessary civic and cultural skills (national, state, local leaders, managers, etc.) and mobilize them to create teams to advise military commanders and develop national, provincial and local governance and economy. (The CORDS program from Vietnam is a possible model).
- Establish cultural advisor at the brigade level appears to make a difference; Bi-lingual, Bi-cultural Advisors

### **Secure Areas Established, Expanded**

*If you enter a town and expel the enemy . . . you must stay (Ninawa)*

Conclusion: Not yet achieved. There are no “white areas” in Iraq where the population is not subjected to intimidation. However, there are areas where insurgents are on the defensive; this is achieved with deliberate operations and persistent presence by CF and ISF and sustained with competent police, governance and economic action.

Observations: Presence matters; raiding temporarily disrupts; some progress but culture of intimidation remains. While insurgents exploit seams and continue operations and intimidation, they do not have the initiative.

- Stability achieved by persistent presence; for example, Mosul turned by increased presence and associated operations and supporting action to the West
- Toughest areas not adequately covered by Coalition or ISF forces (Samarra, Ramadi, Tall Afar, etc.); conforming to Iraqi boundaries aids in teamwork
- Raiding disrupts, but effect is temporary and may be counterproductive. Units in Ninawa clear towns and leave Coalition and ISF presence behind; units in Al Anbar beginning to do the same; both are seeing evidence of progress
- Presence in cities essential; not establishing presence in contested cities is counterproductive
- Iraqis less likely to provide information and intelligence if they feel their family is threatened
- Pushing forward an “arc of stability” requires presence, police and governance
- Time to achieve stability appears to be effected by numbers of troops; more troops, less time

Recommendations: Conform Coalition boundaries to Iraqi political and security boundaries, closely monitor where we hand over responsibility and sustain or increase presence in hard areas into 2006

- Closely monitor the re-posturing of forces in Najaf and Karbala
- Retain presence in Mosul, Tall Afar, Samarra, Ramadi, Fallujah, Hit, etc. well into 2006
- Conform CF boundaries to Iraqi political, tribal and security boundaries
- Consider redistribution of forces as part of 2005 and 2006 re-posturing decisions

## **Insurgents Isolated from the Population**

*They thought we wouldn't stay . . . Just like a hurricane blowing through . . . (Al Anbar)*

Conclusion: Not yet achieved. Deliberate combat operations, sustained CF and ISF presence and effective governance and economic activity are necessary to isolate the insurgents from the population in contested areas and sustain it elsewhere.

Observations: Presence and population control are key; the former is improving, the latter needs greater emphasis

- Presence, ECPs, TCPs, and creative measures constrain insurgent freedom
- Insurgents initially opposed CF directly, quickly revert to stand off attacks and intimidation of the population; ISF proving to be a key enabler of sustained presence
- Documentation of population and vehicles need more resources and emphasis
- Much of insurgency is local, driven by the idea of a “good resistance”
- Elevated observation (UAV, OH-58D, Towers) and berming of cities appears to be effective
- Immediate, post event (positive and negative) IO important to capitalize on success and counter insurgent propaganda
- Detainee operations perceived to be ineffective by some (*revolving door, training camp, health clinic*); return undermines CF/ISF credibility and source security
- Training on this aspect of the mission was deemed inadequate by most units

Recommendations: Focus ISF in contested areas. Implement control measures. Improve government legitimacy to counter “good resistance”

- Counter the idea of “good resistance” through increased Iraqi government effectiveness in Sunni areas and greater ISF presence
- Weight ISF to key and contested cities
- Berm in contested cities; implement other control measures
- Provide units Aerostat or other overhead surveillance capability; approve unorthodox observation platforms
- Provide “IO in a box” for patrols for post-event IO and “detainee/SSE-in a box” to improve detainee conviction; train same during pre-deployment

## Insurgent Sanctuaries Denied

*The Euphrates River Valley . . . the insurgent super-highway (Ninawa)*

Conclusion: Not yet achieved. Border operations and movement into previously unvisited areas having an effect; however, many areas remain “safe” for insurgents due to the size of Iraq and resource limitations.

Observations: Sanctuary is moveable; disruption is temporary—presence required to permanently deny sanctuary but intimidation can limit effectiveness of local Iraqi forces.

- Sanctuary is an area where insurgents can rest, plan, prepare and train with confidence and in relative safety
- Sanctuaries in and out of Iraq are disrupted, but not denied
- Insurgent “sanctuary” is moveable; planning is evident
- De facto sanctuary continues to exist in Tall Afar, N. Babil, Al Anbar

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a

- Need for closer cooperation and coordination regularly cited by commanders
- Exploitation of returning unit expertise suggested by multiple commanders

(b)(1)1.4a

- Time, more ISF and stability in other areas will enable reduction of sanctuary in Iraq

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

- Continue operations and maintain patience and expand presence
- Conform boundaries to Iraqi political and tribal boundaries and establish “quick fire channel” to enable “hot pursuit” of insurgents to deny insurgent exploitation of seams
- Consider movement of “offramp” candidate units into areas where insurgent sanctuary is most evident

## Police Force Expanded, Diversified

*Police are the first guarantors of security in every civilized society (Ninawa)*

Conclusion: Still insufficient. Police are the key element to stability, existing capabilities are exploited where possible, but Police cannot be effectively formed under the pressure of insurgent violence and intimidation and MOI interference hinders development.

Observations: Units uniformly recognize the essential nature of Police to stability, but quality, leadership and MOI interference are constraints to operations and progress.

- Almost every unit intimately involved in Police development (de facto PTT)
- Police essential to intelligence collection
- Samarra feels they've trained every special police unit in MOI; unity of effort and control of both IA and IP in contested areas is needed
- MOI interference in local police leadership and personnel policies, personnel leave policies and failure to pay the police severely hinder development of effective local police
- Good leadership makes a huge difference
- Special Police are a stop gap replacement for loss of local police capability; Special Police cited for abuse by several CF commanders, undermining credibility of the Police and the Iraqi Government especially in Sunni areas
- Some units see Iraqi Army presence as key to creating the conditions that allow for Police development
- Police not accountable to CF or more importantly local and provincial governments
- MOI often unresponsive to MOI-CF agreements and compacts on the conduct of operations

Recommendations: Pursue unity of effort in operations, including CF control in contested areas and seek support from other nations with police experience in COIN operations.

- Form CF-MOI-MOD compacts that allow for units to direct action at local level until specified conditions of stability are established
- Develop a list of consequences for failure of MOI to honor commitments on operations—funding, etc.
- Change Iraqi government and MOI policies to empower provincial government control of police
- Review RC records of all services, ID service members with necessary police experience and mobilize them to create teams to develop local police capability
  - Seek multinational partners for special and paramilitary police capabilities (India, Pakistan, Malaysia, etc.)
- QUIETLY continue unit initiatives with Iraqi Police
- Rapidly assist MOI and MOD to develop the process and policies for promotion and advancement in the ISF and IPS

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## **Ineffective Implementation of COIN Practices**

### **Police in Lead, Military Supports**

*You can't hold a town without police (North Babil)*

Conclusion: Rare. The primary importance of police is uniformly recognized; however, in areas visited, the Coalition currently leads, the Iraqi Army follows and the Iraqi Police trails.

#### Observations:

- Almost every unit intimately involved in Police development (de facto PTT)
- Effective Iraqi police are a key to stability
- Police are tied to governance, police forces are representative of the local area
- Timely development of effective IP under pressure of insurgency is unrealistic
- In areas where police are under pressure, Coalition efforts are often hampered by lack of authority and poor cooperation and interference from Baghdad MOI
- Leadership is essential ingredient and hard to develop due to MOI interference
- Development of local to provincial police and special units results in competition for leaders
- Intelligence capability generally absent at the provincial levels

#### Recommendations:

- QUIETLY continue unit initiatives with Iraqi Police
- Form CF-MOI-MOD compacts that allow for units to direct action at local level until specified conditions of stability are established
- Change MOI policies to empower provincial government control of police
- Review RC records of all services, ID service members with necessary police experience and mobilize them to create teams to develop local police capability
- Seek multinational partners for special and paramilitary police capabilities

### **Unity of Effort on Multiple Lines of Operations, Local to National**

*Nothing is happening in this province if a guy in a uniform isn't doing it (Ninawa)*

Conclusion: Not happening. All commanders recognize the importance of the other lines of operation, but they are neither equipped nor supported to make meaningful headway; especially in contested areas, the Iraqi government and non-military Coalition agencies are insufficiently integrated and are not responsive to the commander and provincial and local governments.

Observations: Commanders taking action, but are neither equipped nor supported to make meaningful headway. No other capability is making any difference in the day-to-day lives of Iraqis beyond those owned by Coalition military units. Resource constraints, centralization and inflexible policies on the use of funds further constrain initiative and hinder exploitation of opportunity and timely completion of tasks.

- Responsible commanders meet with applicable political and cultural leaders regularly
- Provincial and local Iraqi authorities look to the Coalition as source of solutions, even with Baghdad; the central government is not seen as concerned or responsive—in the Sunni areas
- Perception that there is no political and economic strategy; Commanders are looking for the Force, Embassy and ITG to fix short term problems (electricity, water, fuel, food) that have impact on the population . . . “don’t turn key needs issues to a market solution too soon”
- Presence of non-military Coalition personnel acknowledged by the military, but are not seen as bringing much tangible benefit to the mission in their areas . . . “haven’t seen USAID here”
- Government, economic and justice development are almost completely out-of-hide: CA BN working government, JAGs working justice, MPs and NG developing police, etc.
- After establishing security, there is little capacity for immediate follow through; after 7 days of clearing operations, the mayor returned . . . “USAID is mal positioned and under resourced”
- CERP remains the principal economic tool that makes a difference on a daily basis and provides the local population and government with tangible benefit
- The Iraqi government is not visible in the lives of citizens, particularly in Sunni areas
- Corruption often prevents effective use of Iraqi and Coalition funds
- Contracting rules prevent timely completion of projects because of local intimidation . . . “I know who can lay brick, give me the money and I’ll get the job done—on time and on budget”
- To be effective and allow for substantial changes in US posture in the Sunni provinces, the impending constitutional government will need more help early, not less
- ISF not enabled with CA or other organizational capabilities useful for COIN

Recommendations: Develop a stand alone organization for national, provincial and local political and economic development, civil-military partnership at all levels.

- As long as the military is in charge of an area of operations, non-military agencies and activities should be responsible and responsive to the military commander
- Provide more latitude to military commanders on the implementation of projects and contracts in his area of operation
- Secure more funds for next year and lobby to remove constraints that hinder IRRF I utility
- Either secure an immediate commitment from DOS and other US agencies or review RC records of all Services, ID service members with necessary civic and cultural skills (national, state, local leaders, managers, engineers, etc.) and mobilize them to create teams to advise military commanders and develop national, provincial and local governance and economy
- Enable with funding and resources that are not hampered by bureaucratic restrictions
- Develop some CA and other COIN specific capabilities in the Iraqi Army and Police

## Resources (Money, Manpower, Time)

*Contracting sucks. US rules don't work in Iraq . . . Give me the resources and I'll get it done  
(Al Anbar)*

Conclusion: Under resourced. There are key shortfalls, limitations and resources mired in peacetime bureaucracy. Responsibility for COIN has been decentralized without a commensurate decentralization of resources that would empower tactical commanders.

Observations: There are more missions than resources; COIN responsibility is decentralized without a commensurate decentralization of resources; and there is no meaningful non-military presence in any province or town.

- Brigade and Battalion commanders have more missions than resources (fight insurgents, train and partner with ISF, force protection, MSR security, IO, CA, Iraqi government development, etc.) in areas the size of New Jersey or larger with local populations that range from several hundred thousand to several million
- As ISF increase in number and effectiveness, troop to task challenges will decrease, but some areas like government development will remain a challenge due to lack of specific skills, inflexible funding and relevant resources
- CERP remains the primary source of economic action and their use appears to be increasingly restricted and bureaucratic; units in challenged areas hindered by an apparent cookie cutter approach to limiting their use of CERP
- IRRF projects do not provide needed near term effect; ITG efforts are mostly nonexistent or at best unrecognized in contested areas
- IRRF rules are inflexible, limiting development of key economic sectors important to several provinces: agriculture and housing
- IRRF 1 will run out in spring 2006 with no planned back up and no indication of donor funding to make up the difference
- Iraq's budget is in deficit and the Iraqi government has not yet demonstrated an ability to spend money effectively
- There is no meaningful, complementary non-military presence in any province or town in the areas visited
- Regional Engagement Officers and State Embedded Teams are important parts of the team, but their focus is not on developing Iraqi capacity, their focus is on developing and reporting political intelligence
- REO and SET personnel are no more qualified than a Brigade or Division commander to advise a provincial governor or large city mayor and have far fewer resources
- Pervasive corruption threatens the impact of available resources, especially contract awards and funding, and ISF pay; criminal influence an issue here as well
- Ministerial shortcomings impact lowest levels—police not paid, military pay skimmed, etc.
- NGO's are not present in any meaningful numbers

- Presence matters, contested areas are undermanned, whether CF or ISF, to have a positive effect that would conform to desired Coalition and emerging Iraqi timelines
- Constraints on operations, Division and below:
  - ISF: numbers matter, but numbers of competent ISF matter more; competent ISF are force multiplier and we need more; incompetent ISF, especially poor leaders can become a resource sump that impedes progress
  - People to build government—commanders, staffs and units are split between conducting operations and building legitimate government, but they have neither the expertise or the appropriate resources to build legitimate government capacity
  - Flexible CERP and other Funds—there appears to be a wide degree of variation on guidance of what can be done—need maximum flexibility so that the rules are appropriate to the situation on the ground. Contracting rules and funding have proven inflexible.
  - IO rules—some units produce post-incident IO on scene and others wait weeks for approval of themes and messages. Commanders want max flexibility so they can exploit opportunity.

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management)

- Economic tools—CERP remains the principal means of impacting the day-to-day economic lives of Iraqis, building commerce is key to meeting the expectations of Iraqis

Recommendations: Tailor policy, rules, restrictions and resources based on the situation . . . Province by province, area by area, town by town, secure new economic funding, and establish a meaningful, complementary non-military presence to develop government and economics at the national, provincial and major city levels.

- Develop a robust, stand-alone organization for national, provincial and local political and economic development, with civil-military partnership at all levels.
- Clarify rules to ensure tactical commanders have maximum freedom to act
- Allow on the ground commanders to decide whether a centrally run contract is working and provide them the option to terminate and work it at the local level
- Presence in contested areas matters; re-look task organization to shift combat power to undermanned areas without creating unsupportable risk elsewhere
- Secure new economic development funding—demonstrate confidence, lead Donor funding into Iraq

### **Amnesty & rehabilitation for insurgents**

Conclusion: Unobserved. Amnesty program currently in the planning process; must be authorized by the ITG or the constitutional government

Observations: Historically part of successful COIN and proven useful in generating intelligence.

- No Amnesty programs currently authorized; has proven useful in other insurgencies

Recommendations: Implement only from a position of strength, after political or security success and only as part of a larger, coherent and comprehensive reconciliation program.

- Implement only from a position of strength, following political or security success
- Make amnesty part of a larger, coherent and comprehensive reconciliation program
- Make as unconditional as politically possible to attract the right level and type of participation
- Insurgents must: forswear arms, fully cooperate, pledge allegiance to the government
- Ensure the design reinforces the rule of law
- Re-look de-Ba'athification
- Exclude war crimes and crimes against humanity

### Assessment—Unsuccessful COIN Practices

Of the eleven practices identified from unsuccessful counterinsurgencies, four will be briefly addressed. The strategy, plans and operations reviewed by the COIN survey team were found to eschew these unsuccessful practices. The following 4 unsuccessful practices are addressed to highlight the Coalition's avoidance of these traps. One, **Peacetime Government Processes** is a shortcoming in how the Coalition as a whole is approaching the counterinsurgency.

#### **Primacy of Military Direction of Counterinsurgency (not an issue)**

While this practice is evident by observation, appearances are deceiving. The focus and conduct of Coalition military operations takes into account the essentially political nature of COIN and this is "a good news story" given resources and facts on the ground. Presence and resources grant the military primacy; however, within resources, a civil-military strategy is being pursued. As discussed previously, there is a need to develop a robust, stand-alone organization for national, provincial and local political and economic development, with civil-military partnership at all levels to resolve the disparity in resources and the ineffectiveness of Iraqi government.

#### **Military Units Concentrated on Large Bases for Protection (not an issue)**

Coalition and Iraqi forces establish presence at the right levels and as the situation dictates. Large bases exist, but do not house the majority of the force that interacts with the people and Coalition and Iraqi forces are integrated in appropriate ways. The re-posturing of forces in Karabala and Najaf appears to be an opportunity to create a new model and should be monitored.

#### **Advisor Effort a Low Priority (not an issue)**

As previously highlighted, substantial effort and manpower is dedicated to this task. Special forces uniformly praised by commanders while Transition Team quality and mission focus was an issue with some commanders. Expect that Transition Team quality will continue to improve as the program matures. Sustaining Transition Team presence at all levels, even as the Coalition presence reduces will be important to impacting the culture of the ISF and potentially the government and country.

#### **Peacetime Government Processes (at issue)**

This is a primary concern of every commander; everything is too hard. It is particularly troublesome when rules and policies constrain action and exploitation of opportunity. Issues here, cited in several of the best practices discussions, include inflexible funding, contracting, IO, personnel policies to secure the right civil skills and numbers, etc. One example is unit characterization of the Micro Rewards Program: Micro rewards . . . Micro amount, micro management, micro effect. . ."

## Terms of Reference

### Survey of Counter-Insurgency Practices in Coalition Forces in Iraq

**Mission:** Survey the application and effectiveness of counter-insurgency practices in planning and operations by Coalition forces, at division, brigade and battalion levels, to discern successful techniques and lessons learned for theater-wide dissemination.

**Membership:** COL (b)(3), (b)(6) , (b)(6) , C2 Representative (LTC or MAJ), and MNC-I Representati

**Deliverables:** (1) To the CG, MNF-I/MNC-I, a survey report and briefing for use by the chain of command in theater. (2) To the CG, MNF-I/MNC-I, a paper and briefing on the conduct of COIN operations in IZ to inform senior civilian government officials and the general public.

**Timeframe:** The survey will be conducted 1-16 August 2005. The reports and briefings will be submitted as directed.

#### **Analytical Focus:**

- Counterinsurgency Best Practices
- Major survey areas (at each level of command):
  - Intelligence gathering, processing, and exploitation
  - Threat understanding and description
  - Threat activity measurement and reporting
  - Integration of COIN principles into plans and operations
  - Planning and conduct of operations
  - Assessment of results of operations
  - Measurement of effectiveness of COIN-specific tactics and practices
  - Adaptations to plans and operations based on experiences
  - Allocation of available time to COIN-specific activities
  - Allocation of personnel to COIN-specific activities
  - Allocation of material resources to COIN-specific activities
- ISF-related survey areas (at each level of command):
  - Conduct and support of ISF training
  - Conduct and support of ISF operations
  - Assessment of ISF during training and operations

## Unit Feedback (Fixes, Observations, Insights and Good Ideas)

### Some Fixes

- Increase boots on the ground in contested cities if you want meaningful, useful stability before the elections
- Uniformly equip units before they come to Iraq
  - Stryker Brigade should be the model for C2, Intel, Infantry density, etc.

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- Train FIST teams as company intelligence sections; the FIST team leader is the company S2

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- Improve Army Aviation use
  - Increase availability of Airlift for operations in rural areas
  - Overhaul “AMR” approach to operational support to increase effectiveness of air-ground integration
- Government and economic development
  - OPCON IRMO
  - Engage NGB and OCAR, screen all records, mobilize state and major city and utility managers, engineers, etc. and staff IRMO and PSTs

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- Streamline small-unit communications
  - Consolidate the three or more radios some leaders deal with

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## Unit Feedback (Fixes, Observations, Insights and Good Ideas)

- Contracting mechanisms too restrictive
- Must account for areas where a single platoon needs access to 2 or 3 languages
- Contested Cities
  - Engineer support to berm in the city
  - Reinforce CF presence, augment ISF

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### Observations, Insights and Good Ideas

- Give us two more companies and 120 days and we can get this job done (Salah ad Din)
- De-Ba'athification is hampering critical efforts and reaffirming Sunni fears of an Iranian-dominated Shia government (Salah ad Din)
- Training conducted in Kuwait was outdated, much more suited to OIF I than OIF III . . . Not enough focus on restraint and target discrimination (Salah ad Din)
- Projects were the 'coin of the realm' when we got here, but our inability to follow through became a sore point (Salah ad Din)
- Sunnis only make the news when bad things happen, not when good things happen (Salah ad Din)
- Hopelessness will perpetuate violence without government engagement (Salah ad Din)
- This AOR isn't the 'battle of Baghdad' [but] if we can't get a handle on fuel, electricity, jobs and other basic services, we ain't gonna win (At Tamin)
- There is no strategy for economic development (Ninawa)
- Not much funding is 'trickling down' from Baghdad (Ninawa)
- Commanders have almost unlimited authority to use violence and limited authority to use non-violent means [money] (Various)
- Only 10% of the Task Force's inquires of IRMO have been satisfactorily answered (Ninawa)
- There is nothing happening across any of the lines of operation if a guy in uniform isn't making it happen (Ninawa)

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Reorganize you battalion S2 to include an S2 plans section (Ninawa)

- You can get inside the enemy's decision cycle and you can disrupt his freedom of action (Ninawa)
- Everything you do has a purpose . . . even giving children candy (Ninawa)
- The automobile is the center of gravity for the insurgency . . . Lack of control on licensing hinders policing and security efforts (Ninawa)

B-2

## Unit Feedback (Fixes, Observations, Insights and Good Ideas)

- 90% of insurgent safehouses are on rented property (Ninawa)
- Berming of the city works (Ninawa)
- ISF and IPS are coming along well . . . the government needs to catch up! They are being outpaced by their security forces . . if they don't catch up soon . . . we'll be here a long time (Ninawa)
- The strategy is good. The tactical fight is going well . . . there is no link between policy in building ISF, governance and economic development (Ninawa)
- CTC training underemphasized operations at the TF level (Ninawa)
- OCFI integration is a force multiplier (Various)
- Sometimes the decision not to shoot is just as important as deciding when to shoot (Ninawa)
- A platoon out in the AOR without an interpreter is just wasting gas and wearing out tires (Ninawa)
- We build parks in 'rocket boxes' (Ninawa)
- I wasn't prepared for the level of decentralization required . . . You must decentralize to the point of discomfort (Ninawa)
- Reorganize your battalion S2 to include an S2 plans section (Ninawa)
- All patrols must have a purpose (IRs, Lines of Operation), even presence patrols, and should must be debriefed upon completion (Various)
- Right now the enemy is attempting to gain a 'standing 8-count' to prevent us from attacking their support base. They are more centralized that we initially thought (Ninawa)
- If you want to defeat the insurgency . . . you have to defeat the conditions that allowed it to exist in the first place (Ninawa)
- Every operation we do is a combined operation. We go where they [ISF] go and they go where we go (Ninawa)
- In COIN trust is huge. You cannot move units too much. You must establish and maintain relationships with the populace. It also requires time to develop situational awareness. You hurt the mission and you hurt the unit moving them around too much (Ninawa)
- If you enter a town and expel the enemy . . . you must stay (Ninawa)
- Need better intelligence baselines or exploiting of previous tours in Iraq; we conducted PDSSs for locations that were never executed and were not assigned where our prior knowledge would benefit the mission (Ninawa)

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Aviation integration needs work; the 'AMR' approach to air-ground operations hinders our effectiveness (Various)

- Align your battlespace along Iraqi political, tribal and ISF boundaries, not lines on a map (Ninawa)

**Unit Feedback (Fixes, Observations, Insights and Good Ideas)**

- When you talk to an Iraqi . . . you talk to a hundred of them (Ninawa)

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- Iraqis are starving for information from their government (Ninawa)
- IO needs to be more decentralized . . . Give us left and right limits and let us do it (Ninawa)

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- ISF needs to decentralize authority to recognize and promote junior leaders (Ninawa)
- The citizens fear CF withdrawal, so they are hesitant to cooperate with us (Ninawa)
- Lack of unity of effort on both sides of the Euphrates minimizes the effects of CF efforts in this area (Ninawa)

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- Give me all of the province tomorrow. We won't fix the problems here until we have unity of effort (AO Biloxi)
- We're in the support area of the insurgency, with Baghdad as the main effort (AO Biloxi)
- We need more police and unity of effort (AO Biloxi)
- NTC training did not adequately prepare us for this type of fight (Babil)
- ISF are always the main effort in our operations (Babil)
- Our TF is enemy focused rather than terrain focused as we do not have enough troops to hold ground or maintain constant presence in areas (Babil)
- Substitute power with privilege—Sheik ID cards co-opt tribal leaders (Babil)
- The advantages in this battlespace belong to the enemy. There's more troop to task than can be done (Al Anbar)
- In areas where we're not maintaining constant presence, the AIF is the 'legitimate government' (Al Anbar)
- Persistent presence is the only way to affect the population . . . the insurgents are the population (Al Anbar)
- Tribal-insurgent clashes can and are being exploited (Al Anbar)
- We're making progress, but governance is tied to the economic piece (Al Anbar)
- Its going to take Sunni leadership (Al Anbar)
- We're losing the battle of strategic communications . . . the people back home are only getting bad news (Al Anbar)
- We've done a terrible job of defining boundaries (Al Anbar)

### Unit Feedback (Fixes, Observations, Insights and Good Ideas)

- I don't need more police . . . I need them paid and I need more police stations built (Al Anbar)
- ISF needs more mobile, protected firepower platforms (Al Anbar)
- We were unable to establish a presence in areas we have cleared--not enough troops (Al Anbar)
- Use women to search and interview local women (Al Anbar)
- In the Middle East, water is life and life follows the river (Al Anbar)
- Give me more Iraqis . . . if you give me more capabilities it will take the me longer to get out of here . . . (Al Anbar)
- The enemy doesn't need to smuggle weapons and ammunition into this AOR . . . They're already here (Al Anbar)
- The ISF doesn't have to be as good as us, they just have to be better than the AIF (Al Anbar)
- Lack of a command relationship with MOI forces makes Unity of Effort nearly impossible (Baghdad)
- Interpreter density is . . . not as bad in Baghdad as many of the citizens speak passable English . . . bigger problem in the rural areas (Baghdad)
- Build the interpreter requirement from the bottom up (Baghdad)
- AIF are like "the Sopranos on testosterone" (Baghdad)
- OPSEC is a big challenge in combined operations; we had guys in the MOI feeding the plan to the AIF . . . this limited what we could tell MOI leaders (Baghdad)
- Once you get the security fixed, you have to fix governance, otherwise everything we'll be doing will be humanitarian aid . . . the GOI must focus on providing essential services (Baghdad)
- With a population of 4 million in our AOR, we don't control anything! . . .we just try to contain it (Baghdad)
- You have to co-opt the sheikhs; but you can only co-opt them so far (Baghdad)
- All the Iraqi soldiers and IPS have to understand how to win the people over...with dignity and respect (Baghdad)

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- Lack of ministerial capacity is hurting ISF organizations (Baghdad)

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### Unit Feedback (Fixes, Observations, Insights and Good Ideas)

- CERP funds have to keep flowing . . . main source of improving things (Baghdad)
- TF boundary is not aligned with city districts, police boundaries or tribal/cultural boundaries; best alignment would be along police district boundaries (Baghdad)
- Surveillance cameras are a tremendous asset . . . mast mounted J-LENS makes a tremendous difference (Baghdad)
- Sheikhs don't have the same level of confidence in the GOI [as CF] which promises far more than they can deliver (Babil)
- Multinational forces need some focus on MWR such as telephone banks (Various)
- Long range communications and up armored vehicle constraints limit OPTEMPO— Operations and CMO and MiTT all compete for the same vehicles (Babil)
- Corruption is a major impediment to progress in this region (Various)
- ISF soldiers and NCOs are good; officer leadership remains an issue (Various)
- Reconstruction and economic development not rewarding good behavior (MND-CS)
- Buying consent here is a big deal, but the longer we're here the less we're buying because their expectations are going up (Basrah)
- Military operational patterns may have allowed seams and sanctuaries to develop (Basrah)
- Experience in Oman tells us that this [MiTT] effort is a 10 year commitment if we want to get it right (Basrah)
- Use ISF units from other areas for tough missions to limit intimidation (Wasit)
- ISF prefer conducting operations to training; have shown progress in joint OPS recently, so we use those operations as training (Wasit)
- Concern for OPSEC has lowered our sights in setting joint operations objectives at too high a bar (Wasit)
- Responsive IO is critical as most of the population is poorly educated and tend to believe "the first man they hear" after an incident (Wasit and elsewhere)
- TF has difficulty in assessing capability of ISF: "In the majority of operations we're still leading them by the nose" (Various)

## Unit Best Practices

The following reflects some of the best practices shared by leaders in the field.

- **Embed key leaders and staff with in-country units early to inform training and gain situational awareness.** Several units sent key leaders over to shadow units for extended periods—in addition to the PDSS. This was cited as important to the effectiveness of the incoming unit. The SBCT achieved a similar effect by linking its digital C2 systems into the deployed SBCT. Further, SF makes an effort to deploy into the same area each time they return—with conventional units on their second and third rotations, this may also be warranted.
- **Lose your ego; give the Iraqis credit for everything.** Ultimately the Iraqis must win this counterinsurgency. Making them successful gains you their trust and support and provides them with increased credibility with the local population.
- **Decentralize until you are uncomfortable.** This is a platoon, company and battalion fight on a daily basis. Pushing down resources and authorities to that level enables operational effectiveness and reinforces initiative. The degree of decentralization required is greater than many commanders have experienced previously and are initially comfortable with. Training may help.
- **Push intelligence collection and analysis capability to the lowest tactical levels.** Those units that had the best understanding of the threat in their area had pushed intelligence collection and analysis resources down to the lowest tactical levels (battalion and company) augmenting at each level.
- **Develop an S2 plans section at Battalion level using an experienced platoon leader.** The platoon leader knows exactly what kind of information another platoon leader needs to know.
- **Use company fire support elements as company S2 and CP “staff”.** The degree of analysis and battle tracking during continuous operations places great demands on a company commander. Use of the fire support element as a “staff” enables the commander and their training in targeting is a natural transition into development of tactical intelligence and exploitation.
- **Persistent presence; clear out hard core, sustain presence with CF and ISF.** As one commander noted, “If you enter a town and expel the enemy . . . you must stay.” Most cited their ability to impose a presence, put boots on the ground, etc. as key to denying the insurgents the ability to come back in with force and was essential to gaining the trust, confidence and eventual cooperation of the local population.
- **Establish combat outposts in contested areas that demand insurgent action.** Just as insurgent presence is a challenge to the legitimacy and authority of the CF, ISF and Iraqi government, our presence in insurgent areas is a challenge to them. It is often difficult to chase down insurgents, particularly in areas where the population is unwilling or unable to cooperate. However, when platoon and squad combat outposts are established in contested areas, the insurgents are drawn to them and are killed or captured with great regularity when they attempt to attack the outposts. Coalition casualties are low in these operations.
- **Use of M1s and M2s as rolling TCPs to hem in traffic and “scoop” up suspected insurgents, couriers, etc.** Many Iraqi drivers will ignore or run check points where

**Unit Best Practices**

HMMWVs are used. Conversely, the use of M1s and M2s as a surprise TCP—pushed into traffic from a side street—creates a TCP that cannot be ignored and provides great protection to the soldiers.

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- **Maximize joint operations; LNOs w/ Iraqi Army.** With ISF improving in effectiveness and professionalism, their use is a force multiplier. They have a far better sense for the area, who is not Iraqi, etc. and when acting professionally they gain the support of the people much more quickly.

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(b)(1)1.4c

- **Exploit sheiks for control and information; replace loss of power with privilege.** Sheiks still have influence with their tribal members and when properly exploited can be used to control local citizens. While local government is beginning to supplant their power, you can sustain their cooperation by providing them with simple privileges such as Sheik passes that allow them access to areas, quick pass of a TCP, etc. Their use requires constant cost-benefit analysis, but has proven useful in some unit areas.

**Unit Best Practices**

- **Zip Code Offense.** Documentation of neighborhoods, photographing occupants of houses and GPSing those houses allows for rapid direction to an objective and quick verification of whether there are new people in an area.

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- **Clear and area and sustain with Iraqi Army first, then back fill with competent police.** Police are the key to stability, but they cannot be built effectively under pressure. Using IA as a partner can decrease the pressure and intimidation on IPS.

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- **Treat population with dignity and respect.** It is important that both CF and ISF act professionally—proper treatment of the population garners cooperation and intelligence. One unit captures the requirement:
  - Polite, professional, prepared to kill
- **Review all rental housing.** It appears that most of the “safe houses” that insurgents use, particularly in urban areas are rented.

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- **Use operations as training for ISF.** Iraqis do not have a training culture. While this mindset is developed over time, many units have found that the conduct of operations—even those that are not operationally necessary can achieve the same or at least a similar aim as training exercises.
- **Use ISF from out of area for ‘hard’ missions where intimidation can influence operations.** In some areas, intimidation of local ISF challenges OPSEC and the effectiveness of operations. Using ISF from outside of a locality or province can resolve this

**Unit Best Practices**

issue, particularly when the operation may be controversial in the local community or high risk.

- **Berming-in contested cities.** Surrounding contested cities with tank berms changes the geometry of the area, denies insurgents freedom of movement, particularly when trying to move weapons and other materiel that requires vehicle transportation, and canalizes them into traffic control points where their persons and vehicles are subject to search, identify verification, etc.. This population control measure has constrained insurgent operations in Mosul, Tall Afar and Samarra.

## Recommended Counterinsurgency Leader Program

**Purpose:** indoctrinate tactical leaders and key staff (platoon through brigade) on

- Commander's direction and intent
- Nature of the insurgency in Iraq
- Nature of the Iraqi government and population
- Coalition military (conventional, SOF) and civil organizations
- Best COIN practices and lessons learned from previous rotations
- Exploitation of unique tools and organizations in Iraq
- Required processes and procedures unique to the theater

**Implementation:**

- Participants: leaders (BDE-BN Commanders, Operations Officers, Intelligence Officers (BDE & BN S2s, CO "INTEL"), Platoon LDRs and PSGs)
- Timing: Conducted during PDSS or during off load period of JRSO

**Key Topics**

- Insurgent, terrorist, militia and criminal organizations, TTP, etc.—focused by area
- Government orientation—processes, organization, shortcomings and CF interface—focused for the level of leader
- Interfacing with the Iraqi population—realities by MND, province and city
- Organization of the theater, roles and mission of various military organizations
- Organization and roles of civil organizations—CF responsibilities and support and exploitation
- Best COIN practices (OPS, INTEL, CMO, etc.)
  - By region and level of command
  - Taught by outgoing leaders
- Exploitation of tools
  - Intelligence tools
  - Funds (CERP, IFC, etc.)
  - Information Operations
- Processes
  - Detainee requirements
  - Construction
- Practical exercises using in-country equipment