



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (FORWARD)  
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE HEADQUARTERS GROUP (FORWARD)  
UNIT 42511  
FPO, AP 96427-2511

5830

CG

AUG 22 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)  
To: Commanding General, United States Forces - Afghanistan

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT ON 6  
APRIL 2011 IN REGIONAL COMMAND (SOUTHWEST) (RC(SW))

Ref: (a) COM USFOR-A memo USFOR-A-SJA (1-009) of 28 May 11 (U)  
(b) Command Investigation 5830 S-1 of 25 Apr 11 (S)  
(c) JAGINST 5800.7E w/ch 2 (JAGMAN) (U)

Encl: (1) CO, 1/23 Comments to Command Investigation of 25 Apr 11  
(2) Col (b)(3), (b)(6) MFR 5830 IO/RPN of 27 Jul 11  
(3) GC, II MEF Preliminary Inquiry 5830 SJA of 23 Jun 11

1. Per reference (a), the subject investigation was closed on 28 May 11. I concur with the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations as approved by the Commander, United States Forces - Afghanistan and as identified in reference (b).

2. The following actions have taken place since the investigation was closed:

a. Input was Provided by the Commanding Officer, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 23<sup>rd</sup> Marines (1<sup>st</sup>Bn/23<sup>rd</sup>Mar). Per paragraph 0209 g(5) of reference (c), a commanding officer that receives a copy of an investigative report may provide comments and recommendations to such report. The 1<sup>st</sup>Bn/23<sup>rd</sup>Mar Commanding Officer's comments are provided as enclosure (1). While these comments do not become part of the investigative report, I have considered them as part of my review of this investigation. After careful review of Lieutenant Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) comments and my meeting with him to discuss his comments, my opinion remains the same as noted in paragraph 1 above.

b. New Evidence from Regional Command Team-8 (RCT-8), Task Force Leatherneck. On or about 30 Jun 11, RCT-8 informed the operational chain that Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) 1<sup>st</sup>Bn/23<sup>rd</sup>Mar, was in possession of a personal (b)(1)1.4a revealing footage of the friendly fire incident of 6 Apr 11. While the Investigating Officer, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) had already redeployed, this (b)(1)1.4a footage was turned over to him for his review. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) made comments to the new evidence,

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED, BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONS CENTER

prepared a statement (as provided in enclosure (2)), and it was forwarded to the USFOR-A Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) states that he reviewed the entire video "and find that it does not change the findings of fact, opinions, or recommendations of the command investigation." I reviewed the video footage, and while it added clarity to what transpired that day, I determined that my opinion remains the same as noted in paragraph 1 above.

(c) Complaint from Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) Father via Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC). On or about 16 Jun 11, HQMC received a complaint by Mr. (b)(6) former Marine and father of Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) (member of Company A, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion (2dReconBn) during the time of the friendly fire incident). The complaint was forwarded to Lieutenant General Paxton, Commander, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Members of Company A, 2dReconBn, were part of the incident on 6 Apr 11, but had already redeployed when this complaint was raised.

Mr. (b)(6) complains that there was a command climate problem involving 2dReconBn; in particular, with Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) the Company Commander, A Company, 2dReconBn. On 23 Jun 11, Lieutenant General Paxton appointed a Preliminary Inquiry Officer to look into Mr. (b)(6) complaint and the command climate of Company A, 2dReconBn. The PI was completed on 30 Jun 11 and a copy forwarded to II MEF (FWD) on 7 Jul 11 to determine if the information impacts the subject investigation. This reported is provided as enclosure (3).

After review of enclosure (3), I have determined that the information derived from this complaint bears no weight to what transpired on 6 Apr 11. However, the Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force, directed a command climate survey of 2dReconBn be conducted.

(d) Appropriate Administrative Action Completed. As indicated in reference (a), Commander General, United States Forces - Afghanistan directed the findings and recommendations be forwarded to the Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), "for whatever disciplinary or administrative action, if any, he deems appropriate." I further delegated this authority to the Commanding General, 2d Marine Division (Forward), as it was his area of operation and who, on 7 Aug 11, took appropriate administrative action on First Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) USMC and Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) USMC.

(e) Release of Investigation to the Families. The Director of MRPC is coordinating with the families of Staff Sergeant Smith and Hospitalman Rast to ensure they are briefed on the results of the investigation. The Command Investigating Officer, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) is expected to be part of this team.


Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED, BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONS CENTER

3. After careful review of all the above, no further action or investigation is required.

4. II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) mourns the loss of Staff Sergeant Jeremy Smith and Hospitalman Benjamin Rast. They served with honor and were well respected by the Marines and Sailors they worked with as well as their chain of command.

5. Point of contact regarding this matter is Colonel  
at (b)(3), (b)(6) @afg.usmc.mil or DSN (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



JOHN A. TOOLAN



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
1ST BATTALION, 23D MARINES  
II MEF HEADQUARTERS GROUP FORWARD  
II MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FORWARD  
UNIT 42090 FPO AP 96427-2090

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
5800  
CO  
24 Jun 11

From: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines  
To: Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force Forward

Subj: COMMENTARY AND RECOMMENDATION ON COMMAND INVESTIGATION (CI) INTO THE  
FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT ON 6 APRIL 2011 IN REGIONAL COMMAND-SOUTHWEST  
(RC(SW)) INVOLVING THE FRATRICIDE OF STAFF SERGEANT JEREMY D. SMITH  
(b)(6) 0313 USMCR AND HOSPITALMAN BENJAMIN D. RAST (b)(6) /  
8404 USN

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7E, the JAGMAN, Chapter 2, Sec 0203 & 0219 (d)  
(b) Afghanistan SPINS reference 5.3.7.1 (Self Defense strike approval  
authority) in version 03.07 13 March 11  
(c) Joint Publication 3-09.1-3, Close Air Support, dated 8 July 2009  
(d) ISAF FRAGO 118-2009 SOP 311 (Close Air Support)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2), (b)(5)

This commentary is per JAGINST 5800.7E, the JAGMAN, Chapter 2, Section 0219 (d)  
"Commands receiving copies of investigative reports may provide all or some of the  
commands concerned with their comments and recommendations; these comments do not  
become part of the investigative report unless a reviewing authority expressly  
incorporates them."

The four major areas of concern regarding the investigation are: conflict of  
interest; scope of investigation; improper fires control and coordination  
procedures; and confusing and convoluted command relationships.

**Conflict of Interest.** The Preliminary Inquiry (PI) conducted by 2d Reconnaissance  
Battalion on this fratricide incident was conducted improperly because of the  
following: any investigating officer appointed or on his own volition from within  
2d Reconnaissance Battalion would have a serious conflict of interest since they  
had a vested interest in the outcome of the investigation. 2d Marine Division  
(Forward) should not have allowed the PI by 2d Reconnaissance Battalion who had  
tactical control over 2d Platoon, Alpha Co, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines (RCT 8 QRF)  
at the time of the fratricide incident. Furthermore, it was done with RCT 8's  
knowledge. There is no official record of any interviews being conducted of the 2d  
Reconnaissance's Battalion Commander, Operations Officer, and/or the Assistant

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Operations Officer, who all ultimately have responsibility for fires coordination and control procedures within their battle space when two personnel under their tactical control were killed by their friendly fire. The description of the PI as enclosure 2 in the CI does not clearly state that the PI was done exclusively by 2d Reconnaissance Battalion. The interviews conducted by Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) are not found in the PI. Per JAGINST 5800.7E, Chap 2, Sec 0203, in the event of a major incident, the first general officer in the chain of command, will immediately take cognizance over the case as the "commander." In this case, this would have been the Commanding General of 2d Marine Division (Forward). This was not done.

**Scope of Investigation.** In his appointment letter, USFORA/COMISAF directs "the scope of your investigation can be as broad as necessary." He also directs, "you will also fully address the sufficiency of actions relating to operations, logistics, and command and control." The PI conducted by 2d Reconnaissance Battalion contains serious material weaknesses due to its selective nature, as well as the conflicts indicated above. This PI was likely Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) first impression of the incident. Additionally, upon careful review of the event timeline and witness statements in the CI, it appears that Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) used the interviews conducted by 2d Reconnaissance Battalion's Assistant Operations Officer (the investigating officer for the PI) and incorporated them verbatim into the CI, but never attributed the source of the interviews as being from the PI by 2d Reconnaissance Battalion anywhere in the CI. The PI by 2d Reconnaissance Battalion is enclosure (2) in the CI. Moreover, there are no directed questions to the Marines from 2d Reconnaissance Battalion, unlike the directed questions asked by the Air Force of the Predator crew in CONUS. The narrow scope of the investigation allowed little to no scrutiny of 2d Reconnaissance Battalion's actions by not investigating their fire support coordination and control procedures in detail before and during the incident; or the poor command and control climate by Alpha Co, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion towards 2d Platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines (RCT 8 QRF) that existed at Patrol Base Alcatraz. Additionally, issues such as lack of clarity of orders from higher(s); scarce logistical support; poor communications to the platoon by higher(s); etc. were not addressed in either the PI or the CI.

**Improper Fires Control and Coordination Procedures.** There are five points to bring out under this area of concern in the investigation.

First, the Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC) is not authorized on his own volition to initiate a remote air strike in self defense without the on-scene ground commander initiating the request, per Afghanistan SPINS reference 5.3.7.1 (Self Defense strike approval authority) in version 03.07 13 March 11. The Predator was pushed by the 2d Reconnaissance Air Officer to the JTAC with ROE of Self-Defense. A request for a close air support by Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) himself or by him personally directing his JFO under his command on the scene is the first hurdle to initiate a 9-line Close Air Support request. This never occurred, so therefore, all the actions after by the JTAC were not authorized, and thus not justified. This fact refutes Opinion #6 that Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) was even "conducting a kinetic strike in the vicinity of compound 58." It was the JTAC conducting the kinetic strike.

Second, the Command Investigation's (CI) conclusion that if Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) and his Sergeants had better situational awareness of their Marines moving on the enemy in a firefight, then the JTAC would have not cleared hot his own unauthorized Hellfire missile strike, is erroneous. Even though the Ground Force Commander was Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) of 2d Reconnaissance Battalion, the CI refers to the on-scene commander, Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) as the "ground force." The CI's assertion in the Summary of the

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FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT ON 6 APRIL 2011 IN REGIONAL COMMAND-SOUTHWEST

Incident that "the key shortfall was a lack of accurate friendly locations by the ground force" does not identify all the facts. This assertion does not take in consideration the following (8) points in the investigation:

(1) Enemy fire from an unknown position from the northwest direction (with undetermined grid location) was the first communication shortly after the Marines dismounted. This report came 24 minutes before (0827 to 0851) the strike of the missile. At no time does the on-scene ground commander, Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) claim to have PID on Building 58. This refutes CI Opinion # 5,6,7,9, 11.

(2) The positions he provided to the Watch Officer were 31 and 16 minutes before the strike. He communicated this to the Watch Officer not knowing the JTAC was planning his own air strike. Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) was never given a 9-line by the JTAC or asked by him what his most westerly position was because it was his intent to fire a missile at a target with a Time on Target (TOT). So therefore, when Sgt (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked for his position, he only gave the grid position he was standing at and not a 360 degree lay down of all of his Marines or his second element.

(3) The platoon had a qualified Joint Fires Observer (JFO), Corporal (b)(3), (b)(6) at the time. The JTAC was aware of this capability, yet choose not to use him. Moreover, the JFO was collocated with the same team as SSgt Smith and HN Rast, in position to positively identify the enemy, de-conflict friendly positions, and initiate a close air support if the on-scene commander, Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) thought it was warranted. Unfortunately, the JTAC did not allow the situation on the ground to mature before taking it upon him to initiate his own strike.

(4) Additionally the fire was not as intense by the time the JTAC sent his 9-line because the Marines had the situation in hand using fire and movement; and their direct fire weapon systems. The JTAC never asked for an update on the enemy fires.

(5) The JTAC never had positive identification (PID) on the enemy. He relied on inconclusive muzzle flashes and unknown "individuals," possibly friendly, in covered or tree lined areas communicated to him by the Predator Intelligence/Surveillance/ Reconnaissance (ISR) with indistinguishable infrared (IR) images; and relayed reports from the Watch Officer in the ROC. This refutes the CI Opinion #7 that the JTAC "believed without a doubt to have positive identification of an enemy position firing on friendly forces along RTE 611." There is nothing that would lead a JTAC or Watch Officer to believe it was enemy "without a doubt" either from the on-scene commander communications or the description of images by the Predator crew.

(6) Since the JTAC relied on the ISR video, looking at the video by itself one can distinguish that HN Rast's large body is oriented to the east towards the Westside wall of Building 58. This places Building 58 between HN Rast and SSgt Smith and Route 611 where the vehicles of 2d Platoon (RCT 8 QRF) were located. The JTAC had positive identification (PID) on unidentified "individuals", but the "individuals" could not have demonstrated hostile act or intent towards Route 611 where the JTAC thought 2d Platoon (RCT 8 QRF) was located from their positions behind Building 58. SSgt Smith's image was seen to have a muzzle flash. He could only fire west towards the enemy and not east into the Westside wall of Building 58 a short distance away. The JTAC relied on this muzzle flash from SSgt Smith's image to "clear hot" the missile strike that was directed on SSgt Smith's position.

(7) The imagery of the ISR that the JTAC was relying on to clear his own initiated fire even shows Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) position along the tree line near SSgt Smith and HN Rast's position. The grid location that Sgt (b)(3), (b)(6) reports in his statement is

(b)(1)1.4a and the grid that the Predator reports of four "individuals" (no indication of enemy activity) to the JTAC IVO (b)(1)1.4a meters from Sgt

(b)(3), (b)(6) position. Furthermore, Sgt (b)(3), (b)(6) even popped up a (b)(1)1.4a that is not brought out in the CI as an additional effort to mark their position. This refutes Opinion #9 that states the platoon should have marked their positions.

(8) The JTAC must have had some knowledge that friendly troops were closing with his intended target. During his 9-line to the Predator pilot he states that friendly positions are 200m from his intended target. When the JTAC first informs

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Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) of his intention to fire a missile towards 2d Platoon's (RCT 8 QRF) position he instructs him to get down and that the missile will be danger close, or within 110m of the friendly position. Therefore, this indicates the JTAC refined his earlier 9-line showing friendly positions moving closer to his intended target. Yet, he still continued to clear his own danger close strike without the consent of the on scene ground commander, or advising the Predator pilot.

Third, the JTAC or Watch Officer could have likely made an error in communicating and analyzing grid locations of friendly positions to the Predator due to his use of scratch pads with confusing chicken scratch (PI pages 31 and 36) on them instead of using standardized report formats on laminated fire support mission cards, yellow canaries and/or computer fill-in forms. Moreover, the photo of the map board in the ROC to determine if the JTAC and Watch Officer were tracking the movement of friendly positions is not to be found in the PI enclosures as indicated. Failure to use fire mission cards is a major departure from established fire support coordination procedures. Even the radio operator admits to writing down a wrong grid number in the log book, which was also not investigated. It calls into question the accuracy of the log book and whether or not it was contemporaneous.

Fourth, since the Alpha Company Commander for 2d Reconnaissance Battalion did not wish to sit in on the 2d Platoon's patrol briefs, and he only wanted their mission card, he limited his situational awareness of 2d Platoon (RCT 8 QRF) in his battle space by his own doing. Nevertheless even taking the mission card independently, it still tells the Reconnaissance Operations Center (ROC) that the platoon will "secure route 611 . . . in order to prevent the enemy from interfering with civilian and friendly freedom of movement along route 611. Will be mounted with a 4 vehicle section. Dismounting 21 PAX and sweeping through compounds on West side of the 611 directly off the road." There are no other buildings between Building 58 and Route 611 allowing it to directly interfere with the road by small arms fire or command detonated IEDs. It is common that patrol break into two components for bounding over watch and satellite patrols so this refutes Finding of Opinion #6 in the CI. Therefore, Building 58 is not outside the scope of what the platoon would do even without having been ambushed by the enemy who they were attempting to close with. In fact, Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) lead his platoon following his scheme of maneuver that he had written down on his mission card and provided to the 2d Reconnaissance's Watch Officer and JTAC prior to 2d Platoon's (RCT 8 QRF) departure. Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) executed his plan. This calls into question whether or not the ROC (Reconnaissance Operations Center) read the mission card in their possession.

Fifth, the JTAC did not advise the on-scene commander/platoon commander of his intentions to fire a missile until he said "enemy has located southwest of Building 58. Get your guys down - Danger close!" shortly before the missile struck per the CI. The advisement sounds contemporaneous, in extremis, and immediate in nature that corroborates Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) statement as to the timing of events. Furthermore, the JTAC never told the Predator crew it was going to be danger close in the 9-line. To be danger close, the JTAC acknowledges he was clearing hot a Hellfire missile within 110 meters of friendly positions. The JTAC never received authorization to release a danger close strike from the on-scene ground commander which is required per SOP 311. (b)(1)1.4a Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) call sign was passed instead of the Watch Officer's call sign (b)(1)1.4a to the Predator as the Ground Force Commander authorizing the immediate strike, yet Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) states he was not in the ROC at the time, and Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) was the on-scene ground force commander. Moreover, the JTAC passes ROE 421-422 instead of ROE Self Defense which is used for enemy showing intent to attack (like staging for an attack on a patrol

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FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT ON 6 APRIL 2011 IN REGIONAL COMMAND-SOUTHWEST

base) and not already firing on friendly forces. The JTAC's last transmission to the ground commander was "17 seconds."

Alpha Company, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion's fire support coordination procedures during this incident and before with their other platoons were not fully investigated for unorthodox fire control and coordination methods. Instead the investigation asserts the claim that the platoon commander, Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) while one of his sections was (b)(1)1.4a moving towards enemy fire through canals and tree lines, on line with the vehicles failed to de-conflict and coordinate a danger close Hellfire missile strike that he never requested and was only made aware with enough time to tell his sections to seek cover moments before it hit. The time was so short from notification to the strike that SSgt Smith and HN Rast did not have enough time to find cover from the danger close strike. Alpha Company's Watch Officer and JTAC did not allow the On-Scene Ground Commander, Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) time to assess his platoon's situation and determine if he wished to call in supporting fires, or let his direct fire weapon systems repel the enemy. Instead they took the initiative of the air strike away from Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) and/or his JFO by injecting themselves, yet the Command Investigation places on him the lion's share of the responsibility for its outcome. There may be reason to believe that nonstandard Close Air Support (CAS) procedures were being utilized during and before the incident by 2d Recon Battalion and in particular Alpha Company, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion not in compliance with ISAF SOP 311 (CAS) or SPINS.

Confusing and convoluted command relationships. The poor command and control climate due to the confusing command relationships was not investigated or explained in either the PI or CI. 2d Platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines was attached to Regimental Combat Team 8 (RCT 8) at the time and commonly referred to as the "RCT 8/ (b)(1)1.4a QRF." This important point was never mentioned in the CI. RCT 8 in turn placed their platoon in direct support of 2d Reconnaissance Battalion (under the tactical control of 2d Marine Division) in the Upper Sangin Valley in RCT-8's battle space, north of the forward edge of battle area (FEBA). The platoon was there by itself with little to no tactical or logistical support from higher or adjacent forces. Their mission was to secure a stretch of road in heavily controlled enemy territory. It was and still is a well known danger area making it easy for the enemy to plan attacks. Neither, the company or the battalion briefed 2d Platoon (RCT 8 QRF) on their fire support procedures before sending them forward in their battle space. There were no clear orders given. During the incident itself, the battalion Fire Support Coordination Center provided no oversight to the clearance of fires despite having multiple units under their control in their battle space. The incident occurred in a gap in between their Alpha and Bravo Companies which normally requires battalion oversight.

Recommendation. Sir, it is my humble and urgent recommendation that a new Command Investigation be initiated and that a new investigating officer from outside the chain of command, not known to the parties involved, and with substantial fires support/live fire experience be appointed. The Command Investigation of 25 April 2011 was tainted and guided by the PI completed by 2d Reconnaissance Battalion who had a strong interest in the outcome of this investigation. The final thought regarding this matter comes from SSgt Jeremy Smith's father, (b)(6), who said, "Make corrections because I don't want another family to have to go through this..."

(b)(3), (b)(6)



~~SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~

**HEADQUARTER**  
REGIONAL COMMAND (SOUTH WEST)  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE  
CAMP LEATHERNECK, AFGHANISTAN  
FPO AE 96427-2513

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
5830  
IO/RPN  
27 Jul 11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: Investigating Officer, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) 0302 USMC  
To: Commander, United States Forces - Afghanistan  
Subj: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT ON 6 APRIL 2011 IN REGIONAL COMMAND-SOUTHWEST (RC-SW)  
Ref: (a) (U) JAGINST 5800.7E, Change Transmittal 2, Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN), 16 September 08  
(b) (U) Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan Appointment Memorandum dated 9 April 2011  
(c) (U/~~FOUO~~) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT ON 6 APRIL 2011 IN REGIONAL COMMAND-SOUTHWEST (RC-SW), 25 April, 2011  
Encl: (56) (~~S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~) Sgt (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) from 6 April, 2011

1. (U/~~FOUO~~) In accordance with the references (a) and (b), the enclosed video is submitted as supplemental information to the command investigation into the friendly fire incident that occurred on April 6, 2011 in Regional Command-Southwest, reference (C). It should be added to the command investigation as enclosure (56).

2. (U/~~FOUO~~) The video is from (b)(1)1.4a worn by Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) during the combat patrol conducted on April 6, 2011. The video depicts the patrol from commencement until mid way through the evacuation of the casualties.

3. (U/~~FOUO~~) I reviewed the entire video and find that it does not change the findings of fact, opinions, or recommendations of the command investigation. It does confirm all the findings of fact related to the conduct of the patrol, hellfire strike, and casualty evacuation process. Since it confirms the findings of the investigation it should be formally included in order to ensure a full and accurate recording of the events surrounding this friendly fire incident but does not necessitate reopening of the investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

~~SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
II MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE  
PSC BOX 20080  
CAMP LEJEUNE, NC 28542-0080


IN REPLY REFER TO:  
5830  
SJA

AUG 4 2011

From: Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force  
To: Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE COMMAND CLIMATE IN ALPHA COMPANY, 2D  
RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 11.1

1. Readdressed and forwarded as a matter under your cognizance.
2. I concur with the summary of findings and recommendation. The preliminary inquiry demonstrates that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) had no direct impact on the events leading to the apparent fratricide on 6 April 2011. While I agree that no disciplinary action is necessary, the widely varying opinions about Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) leadership and mentorship of junior officers, and integration of attached units, may warrant further inquiry. Accordingly, this report is provided to you for the actions you deem appropriate.
3. I have simultaneously directed that Brigadier General W. L. Miller initiate a command climate survey on the entire 2d Reconnaissance Battalion, focusing in particular on officer and staff non-commissioned officer mentorship and teamwork. He should not initiate the survey until talking to you and receiving any additional or more specific guidance you may have.

  
J. M. PAXTON, JR.

Copy to:  
CMC (JAM)  
CG, 2dMarDiv  
File



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

II MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE  
PSC BOX 20080  
CAMP LEJEUNE, NC 28542-0080

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
5830

SJA

JUN 30 2011

From: First Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) 4402 USMC  
To: Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE COMMAND CLIMATE IN ALPHA COMPANY, 2D  
RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 11.1

Ref: (a) JAGMAN Section 0203

Encl: (1) Appointment letter dated 23 Jun 11  
(2) Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(3) Memorandum for the Record: Interview with 1stLt (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(4) Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. This reports completion of the preliminary inquiry conducted in accordance with reference (a) into the command climate of Alpha Company, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion. Specifically, the inquiry focused on the climate and working relationships between the platoon commanders and company commander of the company and their interactions with other units located and operating nearby. It was started after a complaint was made to Headquarters Marine Corps alleging that Alpha Company's command climate contributed to a friendly fire Hellfire incident that took the lives of a Marine and Sailor in Afghanistan on 6 April 11.

2. Personnel contacted:

a. Captain (b)(3), (b)(6), a platoon commander in Alpha Company during the time period that was the subject of this inquiry. He is currently the S-2 officer for 2/9. His cell phone number is (b)(2), (b)(6)

b. First Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) First Platoon Commander, Bravo Company, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion. Bravo Company was located approximately 4 kilometers from Alpha Company during the majority of their deployment, and was co-located for the final 35 days. His cell phone number is (b)(2), (b)(6)

c. Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) a platoon commander in Alpha Company during the time period that was the subject of this inquiry. He is currently a platoon commander in Force Company, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion. His cell phone number is (b)(2), (b)(6)

3. Materials reviewed: none external to the investigation. I created memorandums for the record based on the interviews conducted, that are attached as enclosures.

4. Summary of findings: Based on the limited scope of my investigation, there are conflicting viewpoints and opinions as to the efficacy of Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) leadership (Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) was Alpha Company commander during the deployment). Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) and First Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) have low opinions

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE COMMAND CLIMATE IN ALPHA COMPANY, 2D  
RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 11.1

of Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) leadership, and stated that he may have created an environment in which Second Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) the inexperienced platoon commander of the reserve unit that took casualties, was without guidance and mentorship from Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) and the rest of Alpha Company. However, Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) told a different story, claiming that Second Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) was included in all planning and was repeatedly provided guidance and instruction from Captain (b)(3), (b)(6). None of the officers that were interviewed laid the blame for the friendly fire incident on Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) and all cited to Second Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) continuous problems with accurately reporting his unit's position. Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) and First Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) admittedly did not like Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) and would not want to work for him in the future. They stated that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) is an authoritative leader, routinely shoots down suggestions from subordinates, and acts unprofessionally by berating the junior officers behind their backs. Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) also said that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) does not use the planning process, and constantly required his Marines to merely "wing-it." Again, Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) speaks differently, saying that Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) always provided commander's intent and then gave his platoon commanders the room and leeway to develop a plan as they saw fit.

5. Recommendation: Based on the conflicting versions of events, I recommend that a formal command climate survey be conducted. Pooling a larger number of the Marines will inevitably result in a more accurate portrayal of Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) leadership style and the environment in Alpha Company during the deployment. At this time I see no basis or reason for disciplinary action on any parties mentioned or referenced in my inquiry.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Copy to:  
CMC (JAM)  
CG, 2d MarDiv  
CG, II MEF (Fwd)  
File



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
II MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE  
PSC BOX 20080  
CAMP LEJEUNE, NC 28542-0080

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
5830  
SJA  
23 Jun 11

From: Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force  
To: First Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) 4402 USMC  
Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE COMMAND CLIMATE IN ALPHA COMPANY,  
2D RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM  
11.1  
Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7E w/ch 1 & 2  
(b) Email between SJA, II MEF and SJA, II MEF (Fwd)

1. This appoints you, per Chapter II of reference (a) and in accordance with the coordination conducted in reference (b), to inquire into the command climate of Company A, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion.
2. You are to inquire into the unit's command climate and determine if a more extensive climate assessment and investigation is required. Ensure that prior to taking a statement from someone you suspect may have committed an offense under the UCMJ, you have the person complete and sign the Suspect's Rights Acknowledgment Form, Appendix A-1-m of reference (a).
3. Your inquiry will begin on the date of this correspondence. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations by 1 July 2011. If you require more time to complete your report, you must request an extension in writing to me. The Staff Judge Advocate, II Marine Expeditionary Force, will provide advice and guidance as necessary.

*J. A. Lore*

J. A. LORE  
By direction

Copy to:  
CMC (JAM)  
CG, 2d MarDiv  
CG, II MEF (Fwd)  
File

Enclosure (1)  
Pg 1 of 1

27 June 11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: INTERVIEW WITH CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 27 June 11, I met with Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) to discuss the command climate of 2d Recon Bn and its relation to a friendly fire incident that occurred on 6 April 11 in Afghanistan. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) joined the Marine Corps in 2007, and his MOS is 0203 (Ground Intelligence Officer). He has been to OCS, TBS, IOC, GIOC, and Ranger School. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) joined 2dRecon in July 2008 as the Force Co XO. In January 2010 Co A was stood up. At that time he became a platoon commander and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) who had been a Plt Cmdr in Co C of 2dRecon, became the new A Co CO. His first deployment was the one that was the subject of this investigation.
2. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) described Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) leadership style as authoritative, not very diplomatic, and not open to suggestions or input. They did not see eye to eye on many things. He also stated that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) did not have any published command philosophy. He said the Bn had CCIRs, but that was really all the published information provided by the chain of command.
3. During the lead-up to deployment, 80% of the training was done in Company sized elements. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) only interacted in a platoon cmdr to company cmdr way. No social interaction, no friendship.
4. While deployed, 2dRecon was living and operating out of PB Alcatraz. They were primarily conducting VCPs and Platoon sized patrols. When they arrived at their PB, there were very few hard structures. As a result, the COC went into one, and the HQ Marines who man the COC slept in there. There was one tent (which was flown in) and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) the Company Cmdr, lived in that. The remainder of the Marines slept under vehicles and in vehicles, until more permanent structures could be established. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) thought this was one example of poor leadership, and rubbed a lot of enlisted Marines the wrong way.
5. During the deployment Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) would hold a staff meeting each evening. He was very company cmdr to plt cmdr oriented in his communication, and didn't spend much time discussing with the junior Marines. The team leaders (enlisted personnel from the platoons) had grown frustrated with their lack of face-time/underutilization by the Company Cmdr. As a result, they approached the Ops Chief, a MSgt, and arranged to meet with the CO for a few hours on more than one occasion. Furthermore, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) or any officer who wanted, could approach Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) with suggestions or to discuss problems, but was unlikely to have their suggestion or opinion treated with respect. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he did this about 4 times, but most of the time was completely shut down. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was formally counseled by Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) at one point during the deployment for his attitude. He believes Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) one of the other platoon commanders, was also counseled, but for employment/mission related issues.
6. One of Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) main problems with Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was the fact that he thought Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) wasn't a good leader. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) repeatedly stated that he didn't care for the planning process, and in Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) opinion, he was a poor planner. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) operated on more of a "wing-it" mentality, which Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said Recon Sergeants are fully capable of doing, but shouldn't be required to.

Enclosure (2)

Page 1 of 3

7. When asked about interactions with supporting units, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) had an "interesting" way of dealing with them. He stated that they (A Co) did not do much to welcome new units to the AO, or provide mentorship/guidance to other units with less experience. To paraphrase Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) "it was like it was a competition to see who we could treat worse."

8. This was apparent with 1stBn/23<sup>rd</sup> Marines (b)(1)1.4a platoon that had joined A Co at PB Alcatraz approximately 2 weeks before the FF incident occurred. In Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) opinion, this reserve platoon had no business being there in the first place. They were a reserve unit of approximately 40 Marines, led by 2ndLt (b)(3), (b)(6) who had volunteered to deploy in this position, and had been sent to IOC, but was actually a pilot, or student naval aviator. He was inexperienced and in over his head. Administratively, (b)(1)1.4a belonged to the Bn, but operationally they were located with, and lived with, A Co. Despite knowing how inexperienced they were, A Co, mostly by the example of Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) did nothing to include them. When they arrived, 2dRecon had been there for 3 or 4 months already, and didn't welcome them in any way. They weren't included in any mission planning, they didn't receive any guidance or mentorship from the leadership that had been there, and were sort of ignored. Some of the platoon commanders would make an attempt to talk to Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) and give him some good information and guidance, but for the most part it was minimal info giving and receiving to ensure they wouldn't be conducting operations in the same areas.

9. At the time of the incident, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) platoon was conducting a VCP out in the Green Zone on 611. They had begun at 0300 for a two day patrol, but he was unsure as to whether they were on their first or second day of the op when this incident occurred. While at the VCP he had been personally listening to the radio when in his vehicle, and when dismounted his RTO provided him with updates. He was in the vehicle when Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) platoon took contact, and could tell they were having some Comm issues. The area Lt (b)(3) was located was along a road with power lines, and the units routinely have comm issues there. This is something that would have been shared with Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) had the Company been including the reservists in their planning, intelligence, and meetings. Despite the issues, he heard the JTACs in the Co COC receive the position from Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) multiple times before the hellfire was launched. From what he could tell on the radio, both JTACs were in the COC when this occurred. One, the Co XO, he identified by voice, and he thought he could hear the other as well, who was their Bn Fires Chief. Both JTACs are fully trained and qualified. At the time he heard friendly WIAs called over the radio, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) had not been on, but as soon as the incident occurred, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was then on the radio for approximately the next 2 hours, trying to coordinate their medevac. Apparently getting the platoon back took longer than they expected because the COC thought the Marines were WIA. Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) the commander on the ground, knew they were dead and was more concerned with getting the rest of the Marines back safely and loading the MRAPs. As an aside, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said that the logistics of this particular patrol were way off, and had Lt (b)(3) been able to get some input from another officer or someone from the Company, he would've decided to take more vehicles or less Marines/packs.

10. As a result of the incident, some Marines gear, to include weapons, was blown away from them. The unit lost a few M-4s and some M203s that are now likely in the hands of the Taliban. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said that he saw a LCpl from the reserve unit wandering around PB Alcatraz after the incident repeatedly saying, "I tried to find my rifle..." He said the entire platoon

was taken back to FOB Jackson for interviews, and he assumes/hopes they got treatment and counseling there.

11. Post-deployment, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) put in a good number of his Marines for awards, and as far as he knows they haven't had any trouble with approval. All of the other platoon commanders in the Bn received an award, except for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6). His platoon sergeant also did not receive an award. His fitrep from Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) although not adverse, was not glowing. He was set to go to First Recon after returning from this deployment, but Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) canned that, and he has just checked in as the S-2 for 2/9.

12. In closing, Capt (b)(6), (b)(3) stated that he believes an in-depth AAR should be conducted on this incident, and disseminated to every Marine Officer, but specifically JTACs, and any officer who could potentially lead a platoon on patrol or in combat.

13. During the interview, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) provided the names of other Platoon Commanders, both within A Co and B Co, who operated out of PB Alcatraz for a few months with A Co.

Capt	(b)(3), (b)(6)	- A Co plt cmdr, cell #	(b)(2), (b)(6)
Capt		- A Co plt cmdr	
Capt	(b)(3), (b)(6)	B Co plt cmdr	
1stLt		B Co plt cmdr, work #	(b)(2), (b)(6)
1stLt	(b)(3), (b)(6)	- B Co plt cmdr	

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Investigating Officer

28 June 11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: INTERVIEW WITH 1STLT (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 27 June 11 at 1330, I, as the Investigating Officer, spoke with 1stLt (b)(3), (b)(6) MOS 0302. He has deployed once before to Iraq with 3/9. Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) was a platoon commander in Co B, 2d Recon Bn, during the deployment to Afghanistan from Nov 10 to June 11. He joined 2d Recon in Dec 09/Jan 10 as 1st platoon commander, and remains in that billet now.
2. Prior to the deployment, the Bn conducted pre-deployment training in company and platoon sized operations. However, Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) interacted with Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) the Co A commander, on various occasions to coordinate training and operations for his Marines. He mentioned a specific instance where he was told by the platoon commanders in Co A that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) spoke badly about Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) behind his back and was unprofessional.
3. When 2d Recon Bn first deployed in Nov 10, they did not have a clear mission. The first few weeks to one month were spent staging at Leatherneck and going to various patrol bases to attempt to establish an AO. Finally on 19 Jan 11 both Co A and B moved into Patrol Bases along 611, near Sangin. The two companies were separated by about 4 kilometers and a mountain range.
4. Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) said that when the reservists arrived in theater, they were tasked with securing route 611, which in his opinion was impossible. On top of that, even if possible, that platoon was inexperienced reservists led by a well-meaning and hard-working, yet inexperienced platoon commander. They were given Grid Reference Guides (GRGs) that were in packets of 8.5"x11" paper, instead of a large map, so it was constantly difficult for them to locate positions accurately.
5. Due to their inexperience and tough situation, whenever Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) and the reserve platoon was up near Co B's patrol base, Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) would allow Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) to sleep in his quarters, shared maps, and included him in any new gouge or intel that had been gathered. The B Co commander was co-located with Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) platoon, and Maj (b)(3), (b)(6) was also willing to give intel and aid to Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) when he was located at their PB.
6. He began a lot of his discussion and stories with the disclaimer that he does not like Capt (b)(3), (b)(6). He thinks that he is an unprofessional Marine officer. He would not want to serve under him in the future. He also stated that he feels that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) attempts to bully other officers and Marines, and blows them off. A specific instance he explained was when he traveled to PB Alcatraz from his PB at night to pick up some of his Marines. The next day, still at Alcatraz, he was waiting until nightfall to travel back, and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) confronted him asking why he hadn't left yet. He explained that he was mitigating the risk (to which Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said, isn't risk part of the job), since he had seen 8 command wire IEDs on the way down to Alcatraz, and didn't want to take that chance in the daylight. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) stormed off, and later asked similar questions of some of Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) Marines. Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) thought this was unprofessional.
7. During the deployment one of Co B's platoon commanders was fired by the Co commander, Maj (b)(3), (b)(6). Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) said the removal was completely necessary, and the Lt that was replaced was a danger to his Marines. Other than that,

Enclosure (3)  
Pg 1 of 2

there were no disciplinary problems, and Maj (b)(3), (b)(6) was incredibly fair in his leadership. After the deployment Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) had no trouble putting in his Marines for awards, and was put in for an award himself. From what he could tell, the situation was much different in Co A, where Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) chastised and "crushed" his platoon commanders regularly. He never accepted any questioning of plans or situations, and platoon commanders who asked "why" were shot down. After the deployment Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) heard that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) put a stop to award write-ups for a lot of the Marines, saying that what they had done didn't meet the criteria for the proposed award.

8. Another example of Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) leadership was relayed to Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) by a platoon commander from Co A. Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) said that when Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) platoon was patrolling they came to a compound that a local guide said was laden with IEDs. They reported it up, and told the CO they were steering clear of the building. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) told them they had to systematically clear the compound, without EOD.

9. On the date of the friendly fire incident Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) and his platoon were conducting a patrol. He was not on the radio at the time, but was told of the incident involving the reserve platoon by his JTAC, GySgt (b)(3), (b)(6). From what he was told, the reserve platoon was in heavy combat, attempting to maneuver, and relayed a grid coordinate for fire support that was 100 meters off of their actual position (something he potentially attributed to their poor GRGs). As a result, those Marines who were maneuvering were not in position with the rest of the platoon, and from what Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) speculates, could have looked just like Taliban laying in the prone with weapons.

10. Lt Wallin knows both JTACs for Co A that were present at the time of the incident. They are both trained and very systematic in their approach to controlling fires in support of ground units.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Investigating Officer

29 June 11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: INTERVIEW WITH CAPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 29 June 11 at 0755, I, as the Investigating Officer, spoke with Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) MOS 0302, via telephone. He is currently on leave. Our phone conversation lasted 37 minutes. As background, he has deployed once before to Iraq in 2008 with 1/2. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) has attended OCS, TBS, IOC, Recon School, and Jump School. He joined 2d Recon Bn on 14 Dec 09, and is checking in to 2d Force Co at 2d Recon after he returns from block leave. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was a platoon commander with Co A, 2d Recon Bn, during their recent deployment to Afghanistan.
2. Prior to the deployment, the Bn conducted pre-deployment training in company and platoon sized operations. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) routinely interacted with Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and the other platoon commanders to organize training. Due to the small size of the recon community, the commanders at all levels are familiar with one another, and during the training in preparation for their deployment he saw Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) interact with other companies and company commanders. Specifically, he stated that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) had a good mutual respect and professional working relationship with Maj (b)(3), (b)(6) the Co B commander.
3. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) command philosophy was informally understood. He had 18 years of experience in the recon community, and as a result was a great company commander. To organize training, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) took suggestions and ideas from his platoon commanders, encouraging collaboration, and then made the final decision as to what was done. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was a delegator, and would provide commander's intent to his platoon commanders, expecting them to come up with the details for completion. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said this was to allow the platoon commanders to do their jobs and foster their leader/subordinate relationship with their platoons.
4. During the deployment Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) thought the commanders had good relationships. He said that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) maintained his style of delegating to platoon commanders after providing commander's intent. This didn't mean that he ignored the Marines, and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said he saw Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) interacting with junior Marines often, even if it was just to "shoot the shit" in passing.
5. When they arrived in Afghanistan, Co A began at Leatherneck, then heli-inserted into a PB down in Sangin. They were there for 5 days before extract back to Leatherneck. About a week later they returned to Sangin, staging at PB Alcatraz this time, where they operated from the remainder of the deployment. PB Alcatraz was a deserted compound when they arrived. The reservists arrived either in late February or March.
6. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said that there weren't many issues with disciplining or counseling Marines, mainly because there wasn't time for that. They were operating in the most kinetic AO in theater. The op tempo was high, and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) was constantly providing support to the Marines on the ground from the command center. Their operations included both well-planned missions and some other short-fuse operations. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said this was a function of the environment. Sometimes they would have time for deliberate planning of missions, with full 5 paragraph orders, while other times they had to be more

Enclosure (4)  
Pg 1 of 3

reactionary and plan as they went. Regardless of the time, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) always provided commander's intent and relied on his platoon commanders to plan accordingly.

7. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said there was never a time, with his platoon, that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) dictated precisely what had to be done. He mentioned an instance with another platoon where they were being lazy and merely staging in a compound and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) told them they had to go out and patrol. Other than at times when Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) could tell the Marines were being lazy or unresponsive to his commander's intent, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) felt that the company commander had a lot of trust and confidence in the boots on the ground.

8. When the reserve platoon arrived, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said it was a good thing. It took a lot of the pressure off of Co A, allowing them to focus on their missions in the green zone and not requiring them to worry about screening 611. He said Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) the reserve platoon commander, was included in the evening meetings that were held at 1900, and got along great with the rest of the officers there at Alcatraz. He didn't know Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) well, and said he was quiet and stuck to his platoon. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) did say that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) gave Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) guidance, gouge, and info, and on more than one occasion had to get on for incomplete position reports or failing to update the Company on his position at all. The Marines in Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) platoon seemed to get along fine with the other Marines there, and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) saw them passing gouge and talking often.

9. On 9 April, the date of the FF Hellfire incident, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and his platoon were inside the patrol base. He didn't become aware of what had happened until after the incident, and they were notified to expect casualties inbound. He stated that the JTACs for their company were "shit hot," and explained how they had always provided him with exactly what he needed when he needed it. They were also meticulous with their employment of air support, and verified positions of ground units thoroughly. As much as he said it was terrible, the friendly fire incident was not too surprising. Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) routinely gave bad position reports, failed to give them at all, or sent some of his Marines off of the road and into the green zone without reporting up to Capt (b)(3), (b)(6). An example given, that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said happened more than once, was when Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) had gun trucks stretched down the road 200 meters apart, and when prompted for a position report he would simply give a grid coordinate for one of the trucks, despite the fact that another truck could have been 1 km away and he may have had some Marines off the road in the green zone. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said that Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) had the means to report accurately, via GPS and maps, but he lacked the proficiency. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) had told him more than once to update his posreps and that he needed to be more accurate.

10. Post-deployment, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) has put in a number of his Marines for awards, and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) supported him in all of them. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) did say that with one of the other platoons there were a few awards proposed by the platoon commander that Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) downgraded. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said he was familiar with those instances, and it seemed that the other platoon commander was putting Marines in for things like Bronze stars when their actions didn't quite meet the criteria.

11. In closing, Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) reiterated that he had always had a lot of respect for Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) and thinks he was a great company commander during their deployment. He said some of the other platoon commanders did not mesh as well with Capt (b)(3), (b)(6), and he attributes that mainly to their attitude and

background. For instance, he said that one of the platoon commanders had never deployed before or had a platoon, and came from an intel background. The mindset and background is different between an infantry officer and an intelligence officer, and it's important to have an open mind when in a situation like that. He didn't think that platoon commander did, and had more of an "I know what I'm doing" attitude, that rubbed him the wrong way. Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) said he didn't let things like that get to him though, and more or less ignored it as long as it didn't affect him or his platoon. His working relationship with the company was great.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Investigating Officer

Pages 22 through 23 redacted for the following reasons:

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Two pages totally denied:(b)(1)1,4a, (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5) and (b)(6) apply.



~~SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~

HEADQUARTER

REGIONAL COMMAND (SOUTH WEST)  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE  
CAMP LEATHERNECK, AFGHANISTAN  
FPO AE 96427-2513

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
5830  
IO/RPN  
27 Jul 11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: Investigating Officer, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) 0302 USMC  
To: Commander, United States Forces - Afghanistan  
Subj: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT ON 6 APRIL 2011 IN REGIONAL COMMAND-SOUTHWEST (RC-SW)  
Ref: (a) (U) JAGINST 5800.7E, Change Transmittal 2, Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN), 16 September 08  
(b) (U) Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan Appointment Memorandum dated 9 April 2011  
(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT ON 6 APRIL 2011 IN REGIONAL COMMAND-SOUTHWEST (RC-SW), 25 April, 2011  
Encl: (56) ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Sgt (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) from 6 April, 2011

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) In accordance with the references (a) and (b), the enclosed video is submitted as supplemental information to the command investigation into the friendly fire incident that occurred on April 6, 2011 in Regional Command-Southwest, reference (C). It should be added to the command investigation as enclosure (56).

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) during the combat patrol conducted on April 6, 2011. The video depicts the patrol from commencement until mid way through the evacuation of the casualties.

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) I reviewed the entire video and find that it does not change the findings of fact, opinions, or recommendations of the command investigation. It does confirm all the findings of fact related to the conduct of the patrol, hellfire strike, and casualty evacuation process. Since it confirms the findings of the investigation it should be formally included in order to ensure a full and accurate recording of the events surrounding this friendly fire incident but does not necessitate reopening of the investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

~~SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~

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Page 25 redacted for the following reason:

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One page totally denied:(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5) and (b)(6) applies.



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09356


23 AUG 2011

USFOR-A CDR

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: JAGMAN Command Investigation into the Friendly Fire Incident on 6 April 2011 in Regional Command-Southwest (RC-SW) – Decision to Reopen Investigation

1. I have considered whether to reopen the JAGMAN Command Investigation into the Friendly Fire Incident on 6 April 2011 in RC-SW in light of the additional evidence proffered by the investigating officer.
2. I have decided not to reopen the investigation as the evidence does not affect the original findings.
3. I wish to extend by heartfelt sorrow over the deaths of SSgt Jeremy Smith and HN Benjamin Rast. Their extraordinary sacrifice serves as a shining example of honor and selfless service and will never be forgotten.

  
JOHN R. ALLEN  
General, United States Marine Corps  
Commander,  
International Security Assistance Force/  
United States Forces-Afghanistan