DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN WARRIOR
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)
FORWARD OPERATING BASE FENTY, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFZC-BCT-AD 16 September 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6— Ganjgal AAR on 12 September 2009

1. The purpose of this meeting was to conduct an AAR of the events surrounding (b)(2)High (b)(2)High) in the town of Ganjgal on 08 Sep 09. This was conducted in the TF Chosin (1-32 IN) Conference Room on FOB Joyce at 1400 hrs on 12 Sep 09.

2. Key attendees at this meeting included:
   a. COL (b)(3), (b)(6) (Mountain Warrior 6)
   b. LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) (Cdr, 2nd Kandak, 2nd ANA BDE)
   c. LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) (Cdr, ETT 2-8)
   d. Cdr, 2nd ABP Kandak
   e. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) (XO, 1-32 IN)
   f. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (2nd & 3rd ABP Kandak BMT)
   g. 1stLt (b)(3), (b)(6) (On-scene ETT Cdr after Maj (b)(3), (b)(6) became WIA)

3. Threat Overview for (b)(2)High - CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) provided a historical analysis of the threat, which included the most likely enemy course of action for the mission on 08 Sep 09. The expected threat for that mission was for harassing enemy SAF on exfil from the village following the Key Leader Engagement (KLE) consisting of small AAF teams that would not pursue friendly forces. The contingency plan called for (b)(2)High (b)(2)High

4. Assumptions in Planning – CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed that no dedicated CAS or CCA would be available but the mission would have mortar support from FOB Joyce. Both ANA and ABP Commanders believed that this would present an acceptable level of risk. In addition, intelligence on 07 Sep 09 indicated that the enemy threat now consisted of up to 40 AAF in the vicinity of Ganjgal but this too was dismissed based on the invitation and promise of safety by the local elders.

5. Key Lessons Learned from the Operation

b. Lack of Secure ABP Communications. The ABP forces reported that their (b)(2)High radios

(b)(2)High

c. CCA Delays Affected Ground Planning. QRF CCA assets were prioritized for a higher level TIC in AO Lethal early in this mission. Ground tactical commanders (MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and 1stLt (b)(3), (b)(6) were repeatedly told that CCA assets were in route with an ETA of (b)(2)High minutes. This affected the ground tactical decision making process for CASEVAC and the retrograde of ANSF/U.S. forces that were in direct contact with enemy forces. These delays amounted to more than (b)(2)High minutes and leaders commented that had been informed of the actual estimated delay, they would made alternate plans for their personnel rather than staying in place and waiting for aviation support.

d. ANSF CONOP Process Assistance. ANSF need assistance with the request process for priority assets. Routinely they conduct mission planning within the (b)(2)High quest window which limits the availability of low density (b)(2)High asset support (CAS, CCA, ISR, etc). The CONOP approval process may also assist with the requisition of these assets. TTs at each level need to coach and mentor their partnered units with this process.

6. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at DSN (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MAJ, AD
Investigating Officer