SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Joyce, Serkani, Afghanistan	2009/09/16	2200	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	O-3/CPT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
TF Phoenix

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Operation (b)(2)High was part of a multi-phased operation involving ANA and ABP to "Clear, Build, Hold" in the Ganjgal Valley. The mission was first proposed by COL (b)(6) commander of the 3rd Kandak ABP to work in conjunction with the ANA with an end state of establishing an ANA OP in the vicinity of Ganjgal Village. The first operation, (b)(2)High was ABP planned, led and executed with ANA in a supporting role. TF Chosin contributed ISR assets, CCA, Scouts and (b)(2)High in order to provide the ANSF with coalition effects. The objective of (b)(2)High was to clear the village of Dam Darye (2km to the south of Ganjgal) and conduct a KLE with the village leadership. The talking points were to center on this being an ANSF mission with the ABP taking the lead role in conducting a non-kinetically focused operation with the end state of a continued ANSF presence in the valley. The mission was successful though on exfil, the ANA and ABP were engaged by the enemy with SAF and IDF; an expected and regular response from the enemy for any ANSF or ISAF element entering and then exiting the valley.

The next operation, (b)(2)High was modeled on the success of the previous mission, only it was to be planned, led and executed by the ANA with the ABP in a supporting role. The next objective was the village of Ganjgal, a village that TF Chosin had conducted a KLE with several months prior, only to receive contact on exfil. The planning for (b)(2)High involved additional assets and capabilities, provided by TF Chosin that allowed for the ANSF and the GiROA to incorporate the political considerations into the planning process. A Shura was held at the local district center with the Sub-Governor, the Ganjgal Elders, ANSF, and hosted by the TF Chosin US State Department representative. The Ganjgal Elders voiced their interest in inviting the ANSF into their village to provide security with the eventual possibility of PRT projects and jobs on Camp Joyce. Ganjgal Elders went so far as to broadcast a radio message from the TF Chosin radio station of their commitment to working with the GiROA and ANSF, and disavowed support of the Taliban.

The tactical portion of the planning process was being conducted by the ANA in parallel to the political efforts of the GiROA, ANSF, US State Department, and TF Chosin. The mission template for (b)(2)High was based upon the previous mission, with some key changes to the operation that took into account the IPB as well as the assured ANSF and GiROA compromise of OPSEC. Having conducted a review of the enemy activity from (b)(2)High and the historical enemy SITTEMP, it was decided that seizing key terrain and denying the enemy the advantageous high ground was critical to the mission. The threat of IEDs was also factored into the plan as the enemy was assumed to be aware of our intentions to sustain operations in the Ganjgal Valley. The enemy composition was assumed to be a squad (+) armed with AK's, PKM's, RPG's with up to two 82mm mortar systems and a BM-1 recoilless rifle. Based on historical analysis, the enemy would attempt to conduct a far ambush (hasty or deliberate) from the high-ground to the east of town. The enemy had never shown an interest in fighting from their own village, but rather the surrounding high ground and fields. Weapons would be hidden in fields or in prepared fighting positions which the fighters would reach with the concealment of the forests, and the use of goats as a diversion (b)(2)High identified this pattern of activity of the enemy maneuvering into fighting positions during (b)(2)High (b)(2)High could not achieve PID and engage until the enemy had occupied their fortified positions. The enemy was expected to have a reserve to the east of the objective that could reinforce within fifteen minutes to an hour, depending upon whether the valley or the high ground was used.

(b)(2)High was a combined-joint operation involving the ANA, ABP and TF Chosin. The Composition of friendly forces for the mission was two platoons from the ANA with their ETT, one platoon from the ABP with their ETT, one platoon from TF Chosin, as well as the Chosin Scout (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High fire support was to be provided from Camp Joyce's (b)(2)High system, Camp Wright's (b)(2)High section, and COP Fortress's (b)(2)High section. CCA was briefed by TF Chosin as being in a ROZ north of Asadabad with a five minute response time. The ATO SPINS showed the availability of CAS if needed. For the reserve, one platoon of US was standing by at a nearby blocking position. MEDEVAC was to be conducted at Camp Joyce with (b)(2)High to Camp Joyce or Wright.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 2200 DATED 2009/09/16

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

The Concept of Operation, as planned, briefed and executed by the ANA, had TF Chosin establish an OP with the Scouts, (b)(2)High on the ridge (b)(2)High (b)(2)High in order to monitor patterns of life on the objective, watch for enemy activity and overwatch the assault element's movement from the ORP to the OBJ. The OP was compromised during (b)(2)High so the position was occupied only three hours before the assault. The TF Chosin platoon attached to the operation was emplaced its blocking position on RTE (b)(2)High where it could observe the objective and a possible enemy infiltration route in a valley to the northwest. The ABP led the GAC with their (b)(2)High with the ANA in trail. An ORP was established 2.5 kilometers from the objective. Over-watching the ORP was an ANP OP less than a kilometer to the south on the ridge that separates Camp Joyce from the Ganjgal Valley. From the ORP, also the release point for the support elements, security elements and assault element, the ANA moved dismounted in (b)(2)High ey Terrain to the north previously an enemy fighting position). The ABP with their (b)(2)High moved to their Attack By Fire position. A squad from the ANA moved with the ABP to the ABF POS and then moved dismounted (b)(2)High (b)(2)High z to the south, also an enemy position).

Indications of a compromised operation were seen first with the lights of the OBJ simultaneously turning off, and then a blocking obstacle on the road to the OBJ at the ABP's ABF POS. During this time, the Assault Element was moving east towards the OBJ using a river bed. ANA with their ETT's were at the lead of the column with ABP and my ETT following in trail. The lead ANA element reached the OBJ at first light, approximately 0530L. From the east, an enemy team or squad sized element engaged the ANA with RPG's and PKM fire. Additional enemy positions to the east, but higher in the hills began to engage both the Assault Element as well as ANA POS 2. The ANA started to react to contact as I maneuvered the ABP element forward to establish a SBF for the ANA. The enemy fire was heavy, but concentrated to the east, allowing all elements to use the terraces as cover and concealment from the direct fire. Moving forward to the TAC (M (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) ANA RTO), I began to call up immediate suppression fire missions on multiple KE series targets that closely coincided with the enemy fighting positions. The concept of fires was to disrupt the enemy and prevent their ability to mass fires and maneuver, providing time for the CCA to come on station.

The enemy were now maneuvering from the east and occupying fighting positions to the north and south of (b)(2)High th in the high and low ground. The enemy was also using the OBJ village to fight from, as well as numerous adjacent structures. The lack of immediacy of the fires as well as the inability to place them in close proximately to the populated areas lessened the effects and allowed (b)(2)High (b)(2)High he Marine ETT that was moving at the head of the column, approximately 100m to the east of (b)(2)High s under heavy suppressive fire and was being maneuvered upon. We in (b)(2)High re unwilling to perform a retrograde until the forward element had regrouped with our position. Numerous attempts were made for a fire mission to obscure the forward Marines and ANA from the suppressive fires they were receiving from three sides, to include the village of Ganjgal. Chosin , C (b)(3), (b)(6) empted to pass up seven differe (b)(2)High issions, but all were denied on the basis of proximately to civilian populace. The position of (b)(2)High s now receiving effective fire from three sides, as well as IDF. The position was untenable and had to be abandoned. The ABP were directed to fall back and establish an intermediate support by fire, but in the absence of obscuration, heavy casualties were sustained during our successive bounds. By this time, the ANA, ABP and (b)(2)High all taken casualties, to include M (b)(3), (b)(6) d (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) myself began to repel a maneuvering enemy calling for our surrender with SAF and grenades.

Our position had too many casualties to evacuate and we were forced to defend our position. CCA was "Another 15 minutes away", a time back that I recall hearing at least three times. My team NCOIC, SF (b)(3), (b)(6) as wounded by SAF as he engaged the maneuvering enemy. I could not move to his position as I was fixed by enemy 50m away. Three ANA soldiers were hit by SAF in the vicinity of my position repelling the enemy, with two being KIA. The WIA ANA soldier and I fell back to my NCOIC to evaluate his wounds. He had received a laceration to the face and neck and had an entrance wound at the base of his neck. He was conscious and partially ambulatory, but our position was still fixed. I applied QuickClot to SF (b)(3), (b)(6) neck wound and a pressure dressing as best possible. M (b)(3), (b)(6) using the same piece of cover as myself and SF (b)(3), (b)(6) also had a bullet wound to the forearm, but was stable and ambulatory and did not require further treatment. (b)(3), (b)(6) received a concussion but was ambulatory as well. A Marine UAH arrived 100 meters to the west of our position and began to suppress the enemy. The enemy fire was still effectively fixing our position from three sides including the village, preventing us from continuing our bounds. Women and children could be observed moving between buildings, presumably moving ammunition.

Eventually CCA came on station and began to effectively suppress enough of the enemy fighting positions that we could bound back—though still under effective fire—with the casualties to the CCP. After establishing a HLZ, the MEDEVA (b)(2)High nded and retrieved the first set of casualties, to include SF (b)(3), (b)(6) The aircrew informed me th (b)(2)High (b)(2)High were also on station to assist in the recovery of the four Marines still at the edge of the OBJ. Myself, I (b)(3), (b)(6) interpreters and a handful of ANSF were all the combat power we could muster to return to the OBJ to find the missing Marines. (b)(3), (b)(6) two other Marines drove th (b)(2)High k into the kill zone with myself (b)(3), (b)(6) an ABP (b)(2)High platform. Two ANA (b)(2)High followed us some of the way to the objective but stopped short to recover the first sets of casualties they encountered. My element moved up to the objective under heavy fire, recovered who we could, but could not identify the position of the missing Marines.

With each set of casualties recovered, our element would return to the ORP to link up with the MEDEVAC. At some point, the Marines were forced to replace the gun on their vehicle and we had to travel back to the ORP. In the ORP were numerous ABP, ANA and TF Chosin UAHs that were not pushing forward to assist in the CASEVAC. The TF Chosin platoon that was to act as our reserve had tolled an ASV and had prioritized the recovery of their vehicle over pushing farther into the valley to support. Using the radio in one of th (b)(2)High called directly to (b)(2)High o request that they authorize the PL to push farther into the valley to support the recovery of the casualties and to find the Marines. I was told by (b)(2)High that the PL would be authorized to move his element further in, but this authorization was later overturned and the platoon stayed in place.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 2200 DATED 2009/09/16

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(2)High identified the location of the missing Marines approximately 100 meters to the west of Ganjg (b)(2)High empted to land near the location of the Marines and conduct the recovery. Myself, (b)(3), (b)(6) and some ANSF moved back up to the village to provide cover (b)(2)High ue to the intensity of fi (b)(2)High could not land. (b)(3), (b)(6) NA, ABP and myself moved to the position indicated b (b)(2)High and found the Marines. They were laying in a trench with a 4 meter terrace on one side and a 1.5 meter wall on the other. The Corpsman had been performing medical treatment on one of the Marines when their position was overrun. The Marines had been searched and their weapons had been taken. The Marines were recovered and still under effective fire our element moved back to the ORP to transfer the Marines to a CASEVAC platform. By this time 2nd Kandak ABP and 1st Kandak ANA had send reinforcer (b)(2)High the ORP. After conducting a RIP with the elements at the ORP, I returned to base to refit and prepare for follow operations.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC TN ARNG Cmd Trainer

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 16 day of September '09 at FOB Joyce, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name)

(b)(3), (b)(6) CPT, MI
(Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT