DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

APO AE 09310

AFZC-BCT-AD

18 September 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6— Meeting Notes with MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. I conducted a meeting with MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) the 1-17 CAV S-3, at the TF (b)(2)High TOC on FOB Fenty at 1400 hrs on 18 September 09 regarding the events in Ganjgal on 08 September 2009.

2. The purpose of my meeting with him was to gather information about the rotary wing aircraft planning and support for TF (b)(2)High on 08 September 09. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he was not physically present in the TF (b)(2)High TOC during Operation (b)(2)High and that no aircraft had been requested for the mission beforehand.

3. I inquired about the feasibility of the proposed (b)(2)High (b)(2)High minute dynamic retasking of Scout Weapon Team (SWT) (b)(2)High aircraft from TF (b)(2)High to TF (b)(2)High that CPT (b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(6) S-2) mentioned during the operation briefings with the ANA, ABP, ETTs, and BMTs on 06-07 September 2009. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) timeline was incorrect and that a more realistic scenario would require a minimum of (b)(2)High minutes from initial request, approval by TF (b)(2)High mission brief, travel and check-in with TF (b)(2)High The arriving aircraft time on station would be limited by existing fuel and ordnance. The optimum timeline would most likely require (b)(2)High minutes including the refueling and rearming at Asadabad prior to check-in with AO (b)(2)High

4. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) also stated that Quick Reaction Force (QRF) SWT typically requires (b)(2)High minutes from initial notification to arrival in AO Chosin and that for pre-planned missions requiring a faster response time, the aircraft may be pre-staged in Asadabad. This was not planned or scheduled for this mission.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at DSN (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MAJ, AD
Investigating Officer

Exhibit BK