DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN WARRIOR
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)
FORWARD OPERATING BASE FENTY, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFZC-BCT-AD 16 September 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6— Telephonic Interview with 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. I conducted a telephonic interview with 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) the Commander of 3rd Coy, 2nd Kandak, 2nd ANA Brigade, located at a hospital in Asadabad, Afghanistan at 1611 hrs on 16 Sep 09 regarding the enemy attack on U.S.Marine ETTs and ANSF in the town of Ganjgal on 08 Sep 09. He is currently located at the medical center recuperating from injuries sustained in this attack. The following is a summary of our discussion.

2. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) was in command of the lead element as it entered the village of Ganjgal on the morning of 08 Sep 09. We started the interview by discussing the planning for the mission. The briefing to the Coy Commanders was provided by the S-3 several days prior around an open sand table which was left unsecure for several days and likely compromised since local national workers were allowed access. He was briefed that dedicated CAS and CCA was going to be available for the duration of the mission like it was for the mission to Dam Darah during the week prior. They were briefed that increased Taliban activity in the town was highly likely but they didn't think much of it at the time since the village elders had promised that they wouldn't let any Taliban elements into the town.

3. As the mission commenced on 08 Sep 09, 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that 1stLt Johnson and GySgt Johnson were in the front squad with him. They were to establish an OP on the eastern outskirts of the town prior to the Key Leader Engagement (KLE). As they entered the town they were immediately engaged with small arms and RPG fire. Artillery was called in but was ineffective. He and 1stLt Johnson decided to withdraw from the town but as they started their retrograde, they started to suffer casualties. On several occasions AAF ordered him to surrender which he and his men continually refused. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) was shot during a close engagement in which he stated that the enemy was within 10 meters of his location. He stated that 1stLt (b)(3) carried him from the field and should be credited with saving the lives of several of his men. That day he lost ten men from his unit.

4. After his injury and subsequent evacuation by 1stLt (b)(3), (b)(6) 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) lost sight of 1stLt Johnson and the other Marines from his ETT. At (b)(2)High hrs, he had been told by 1stLt (b)(3), (b)(6) that they were still engaging the enemy closer to the town. That was the last he knew of their whereabouts until his evacuation to Asadabad.

5. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) did offer several recommendations from the events of 08 Sep 09.

a. Air support is crucial especially with the rugged terrain in which the enemy can easily hide. This is even more critical in areas in which vehicles with crew served weapons are incapable of operations

b. Further integration of ANA and ABP into operations. He stated that the ABP only brought half the number of personnel as planned into this operation. This limited their employment and potential support once enemy contact had been made.

6. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at DSN (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MAJ, AD
Investigating Officer