A, C, L, K, I, G

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB JOYCE, KUNART PROVINCE AFGHANISTAN	~~2009/11/12~~ 2009-09-13	0809L	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	0-3, CPT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
TF CHOSIN, FOB JOYCE KUNAR PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN 09354

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

a. What is your duty position and what was it during the mission?

i. Night Battle Captain from the hours of 2000L to 0800L.

b. What are the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on the ETT and ANA Soldiers? (5Ws) Describe the nature of the attack and the response from the ETT and ANA forces. Was terrain a factor in the attack? What was the size of the enemy element?

i. At 0530L (b)(2)High reported that an ANA OP was in contact. The initial (b)(2)High stated the enemy size as 3-5 AAF. (b)(2)High initiated a call for fire on (b)(2)High responded that (b)(2)High could not range the TGT. FOB Wright was then called and (b)(2)High guns were laid on TGT (b)(2)High (b)(2)High then canceled the mission and called immediate suppression on (b)(2)High at 0538L. (b)(2)High once again could not range. FOB Wright shifted guns to (b)(2)High for an immediate suppression mission. (b)(2)High called again for immediate suppression with (b)(2)High at 0546L. At 0550L (b)(2)High with (b)(2)High engaged (b)(2)High with 4x HE rounds. (b)(2)High asks for CCA or CAS support. (b)(2)High responded that all available CCA and CAS is in support of (b)(2)High TIC and requests (b)(2)High to make corrections on current fire mission to effectively engage enemy positions. 155MM out of FOB Wright could not engage (b)(2)High until 0556L due to negative COMMS with (b)(2)High a. (b)(2)High fired (b)(2)High with 4x HE rounds immediate suppression, no corrections were made to these rounds. AT 0619L (b)(2)High calls end of mission on (b)(2)High At 0601L (b)(2)High called for immediate suppression on (b)(2)High At 0604L (b)(2)High rounds on the TGT. No corrections were made. End of mission at 0631L. At 0625L (b)(2)High reports that the ANA OP is taking contact from the north, south, and east. A revised (b)(2)High is sent to TF Chosin TOC stating there was now 30-60 AAF engaging CF and ANSF. At no time was a transmission received from any Marine ETT (b)(2)High element to TF Chosin TOC relaying friendly composition or disposition. At 0630L (b)(2)High to collapse TCP and move to (b)(2)High location as QRF (b)(2)High called again and order to stand by until rounds complete on (b)(2)High mission. When the (b)(2)High rounds were called for initially, at 0635L, TF Chosin TOC had not received any friendly OPCOs verifying positions of ANSF or CF. (b)(2)High reports that (b)(2)High is attempting to break contact from AAF and needs (b)(2)High for screen. Due to the close proximity of structures, the mission was denied twice before (b)(2)High in adjust (b)(2)High in effect at (b)(2)High notifies TF Chosin TOC of incoming MEDEVAC request. At 0709 D36 gave their LOA to the TOC at (b)(2)High At approximately 0715L (b)(2)High receives transmission from (b)(2)High asking SITREP and authorizes CCA QRF. At 0719 (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High are w/u JAF for QRF support. At 0738L, (b)(2)High relays nine line MEDEVAC to TF Chosin TOC from (b)(2)High element. At 075(b)(2)High reports they have 1x ASV rolled over with all sensitive items recovered and no casualties. At 0800L CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) transferred command of the TOC to (b)(3), (b)(6) day Battle Captain.

ii. The terrain of the valley negatively affected COMMS and observation by the overwatch element (b)(2)High. FM communication was relayed through (b)(2)High to TF Chosin TOC. No (b)(2)High or ANSF element had direct communication with the TOC during any of the operation. When (b)(2)High QRF element, was activated, they did have COMMS with the TOC and all ground elements.

c. What was the intended mission of this operation? What was the mission of the U.S. Marines specifically? Who had operational control of these Marines?

i. As current Ops, I was not involved in the planning of this operation. The intent of this mission was made know to me as the day unfolded after numerous RFIs. Planning was not initiated until the night prior to execution. The details of the mission were never briefed to me prior to execution of the mission.

ii. Operational control of the Marines was with MAJ (b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(6) the Ground commander and Senior ETT for the ANA. After (b)(2)High was wounded and taken out of the fight, command was assumed by CPT (b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(6) the senior Army ETT for the ABP.

iii. The mission for the Marine ETTs was to provide ANSF elements with combat enablers and facilitate the Ganjgal KLE with local elders.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 0809L DATED ~~2009/11/12~~ 2009-09-11

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

d. What type of support assets did the U.S. Marines request before the mission? During the mission (fire support, CCA, CAS, etc)? Be specific. Were there any problems with providing this support, if so, why?

i. I had no involvement of the planning of this operation.

ii. Indirect fires were available throughout the event. Air clearance only became an issue once for 155s of FOB Wright (b)(3), (b)(6) as in the vicinity and was negative on (b)(2)High

iii. During the mission requests were relayed through (b)(2)High CAS and CCA was provided as quickly as possible. Due to another ongoing (b)(2)High (b)(2)High was being utilized. CCA and ground QRF was activated following a more complete (b)(2)High describing a larger contact than was initially reported.

e. What, if any, medical treatment was provided to the injured U.S. Service members and any other individuals treated? Were the MEDEVAC procedures timely and appropriate under the circumstances? Provide a detailed timeline of the medical procedures and treatment provided to the U.S. Service members.

i. All ground medical treatment was internal to the ETTs.

ii. MEDEVAC request we processed immediately and Air MEDEVAC crew proceeded into a hot LZ to evacuate casualties.

1. 0707L (b)(2)High REPORTS THEY WILL BE SENDING A 9-LINE MEDEVAC (TF Chosin TOC contacted Mountain Warrior and Palehorse and informed them that we had casualties in Ganjgal and 9 line would follow.)

2. 0738L TF CHOSIN RECEIVES 9-LINE MEDEVAC(9 line immediately transmitted to BDE)

iii. After the MEDEVAC of the 2x ETT there was no further EVAC CF on my shift.

f. What was the reporting and information flow with the U.S. Marine ETT TOC? PACE plan?

i. Reporting from ground units in Ganjgal was via FM from (b)(2)High and relayed by ground units such as (b)(2)High or (b)(2)High (D/1-32 QRF platoon)

ii. Primary was FM directly to Hammer TOC, Alternate was relay through (b)(2)High or CCA to TF Chosin TOC, Contingent was (b)(2)High and Emergency was cell phone.

g. What factors attributed to the four U.S. Marines' status being listed as missing? How long were the U.S. Service members unaccounted for?

i. I had no knowledge of MIA US personal. Nothing suggesting this was passed to TF Chosin TOC during my shift.

h. Were any non-combatant Afghan Nationals killed or injured as a result of the engagement? If so, where were they located during the engagement, how were they injured or killed, and by whom? Any reports of women and children either firing on U.S. forces or ANSF or assisting the AAF?

i. None reported during the contact but debriefs from (b)(3), (b)(6) (AS-2/ 1-32) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (Marine ETT) stated that women were resupplying AAF and young boys were firing RPGs and AKs at U.S. forces and ANSF.

i. What were some of the problems that you experienced with providing fire support?

i. Observer: All call for fire missions were relayed via (b)(2)High their inability to make effective corrections to fire missions was due to their static position on the battlefield and COMMS issues. This caused delay and affected the outcome of the effects on target.

ii. Air clearance: There was only one incident involving air DECON that caused a delay to a fire mission. This was with (b)(2)High a manned FMV SOF asset flying for another operation.

j. What recommendations concerning improvement, if any, to coalition force tactics, techniques, and procedures will help avoid this type of incident in the future?

i. All TTPs were executed in accordance with unit SOPs.

k. Any other matters pertaining to this incident that you deem relevant.

i. NONE

18SEP09

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT OF _ (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 0809L DATED 13 SEP 09

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, _ (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREEL
THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFL

(b)(3), (b)(6) _____

WITNESSES:

CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) _____

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

HHC 1-3 LIN 3BCT 10th MTN

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) _____

(b)(3), (b)(6)

HHC / 4-4 (b)(3), (b)(6) MOUNTAIN WARRIOR

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

administer oaths, this 13 day of SEPTEMBER 2009 to

at FOB [illegible] KUNAR AF.

_____ (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ Oath)

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) _____

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Investigating Officer

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT _____ (b)(3), (b)(6)