DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN WARRIOR
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-82
FOB FENTY, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFZC-BCT-CDR

23 SEP 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-82, Bagram, Afghanistan APO AE 09354

SUBJECT: Recommendation, 15-6 Investigation regarding Fallen Heroes, 1stLt Michael E. Johnson, GySgt Edwin W. Johnson, SSgt Aaron M. Kenefick, and PO3 James R. Layton

1. I have thoroughly considered the subject investigation and (concur) ~~(non-concur) (concur with the following exceptions and substitutions)~~ with the findings.

2. I have thoroughly considered the subject investigation and (concur) ~~(non-concur) (concur with the following exceptions and substitutions)~~ with the recommendations.

3. I further recommend that --

a. It is clear from this investigation that some battle captains may not be fully aware of how they should properly request assets from Brigade and higher during dynamic situations. As a result, I will direct all Battalions to confirm that their battle captains, battle NCOs, and battle staffs know the proper procedures for requesting close combat aviation and close air support, for notifying the (b)(2)High when they have troops in contact ("opening an Air TIC"), and for requesting Brigade QRF support. Battalions will ensure that newly assigned battle captains are trained for their duties using the important references, such as: the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High and our Brigade battle drills guide. We will reinforce that Battalions may not request CCA directly from our aviation unit but instead must send all requests through the Brigade CHOPs.

b. While it is clear that (b)(2)High was fully aware of this operation and participated in the planning, it does not appear that the Battalion Commander was formally briefed on the CONOP for this operation. Even though the ETT was led by a senior Major, I want to ensure that all operations receive the appropriate level of attention for planning and resourcing. Thus, I

(b)(2)High

c. A factor that may have contributed to some of the confusion in the (b)(2)High was the difficulty in confirming the closure of a Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ) for a UAV. Although it did not cause any issues with clearing fires in this particular case, we need to ensure

in the future that all our Battalion TOCs have the proper contact information for any unit controlling an air asset in our AO. We will also ensure that all units operating in our AO are advised and retrained on the proper procedures for opening and closing ROZ and exclusion zones.

d. Although (b)(3), (b)(6) had poor situational awareness in his TOC, he appeared to become somewhat overwhelmed by the tasks. He made poor decisions, and his failure to notify his chain of command and higher headquarters is disconcerting. I have removed him from his position as battle captain. I recommend (b)(3), (b)(6) receive a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and (b)(5)

e. There are numerous lessons that can be learned from this tragedy. I intend to condense the information from this investigation into a training tool to be used by my Battalion Commanders. I will direct all of my Battalion Commanders to personally conduct AARs or discussions with their staffs and key leaders based on these unfortunate events. I will personally conduct a similar session with my Brigade Staff. I will expect my leaders to understand and use these lessons to refine TTPs and to fix the identified problems.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
COL
Commanding