DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN WARRIOR
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)
FORWARD OPERATING BASE FENTY, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFZC-BCT-AD 14 September 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6— Interpreter (b)(6) Interview Summary

1. I conducted an interview with (b)(6) an interpreter, at COP Monti on 14 September 2009. (b)(6) had been present with the four U.S. Marine ETT Heroes and Lance Corporal (b)(3), (b)(6) during the enemy attack on CF/ANSF forces in the town of Ganjgal on 08 September 2009.

2. In the early morning hours of 08 September 09, (b)(6) was co-located with GySgt Johnson and 1stLt Johnson in the forward element of the ANA with Ssgt Kenefick and PO3 Layton located about 50 meters behind with another ANA squad. At (b)(2)High hrs, the first enemy shots were fired from both the ridge lines and houses in the village and the lead ANA and Marine ETT elements began returning fire. 1LT Johnson, GySgt Johnson, the ANA soldiers, and (b)(6) moved behind an adjacent building for cover. He believes that Ssgt Kenefick and PO3 Layton took cover with their ANA in a trench just west of his location.

3. At approximately (b)(2)High hrs, 1stLt Johnson and GySgt Johnson decided to retrograde to the trench as the enemy fire continued to increase and join Ssgt Kenefick, PO3 Layton, and a squad of ANA. 1stLt and Ssgt Kenefick each tried to call for fire support with (b)(2)High but they were told that (b)(2)High wasn't available. AAF continue to maneuver on the ridge and engage with increasing accuracy. (b)(6) is shot in the arm while trying to exfil along with several ANA soldiers.

4. At about (b)(2)High hrs, 1stLt Johnson tells him and the ANA that the ETTs will provide covering fire while they start to leave the trench in an effort to evacuate the wounded. (b)(6) leaves the ETT and recalls they were okay at that time. He makes it back safely to the Casualty Collection Area (CCA) and begins assisting the ANA wounded.

5. At an unspecified time later, he states that he links up with CPI (b)(3), (b)(6) and Ssgt (b)(3), (b)(6) and they begin to recover casualties from the forward areas and he estimates that they CASEVAC 10-12x ANA WIA. (b)(6) mentions that CPI (b)(3), (b)(6) repeatedly tries to contact the Marine ETTs by radio but fails to establish contact.

6. CPI (b)(3), (b)(6) 1stLt (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) finally recover the Marine ETT KIA after a SWT (b)(2)High their location with (b)(2)High. He assisted CPI (b)(3), (b)(6) with the physical recovery of the remains and noted that their sensitive items were missing though their IBA was largely intact. He could not recall a time for any of these later events.

7. (b)(6) did mention some recommendations for future operations.

a. Utilize vehicle-mounted crew-served weapons to provide security for future missions. On 08 Sep 09, all of the vehicles were staged at the Vehicle ORP and all follow on movement was conducted dismounted. This prevented their utilization during the critical early stages of the ambush.

b. Ensure that CCA, CAS, and fire support is included in mission planning. This is critical especially when operating in known hostile areas.

7. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at DSN (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MAJ, AD
Investigating Officer