DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN WARRIOR
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)
FORWARD OPERATING BASE FENTY, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFZC-BCT-AD 12 September 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6— CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) Statement Recommendations

1. I conducted an interview with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) on 10 Sep 09 at FOB Joyce regarding the enemy attack on U.S.Marine ETTs and ANSF in the town of Ganjgal on 08 Sep 09. He provided a sworn statement but did not include his recommendations for improvement or lessons learned from the incident. Based on my interview notes, here are the recommendations that he provided.

a. Redundant Communications: Ensure that communications plan allows for redundancy and retransmission sites are included in the plan. This ended up being a critical problem since the southern OP (b)(2)High ended up being the single conduit for information flow back to the Chosin TOC and quickly became saturated.

b. Preplanned Targets: A fire plan for the engagement preplanned targets (KEs) must be established and clearly understood by all. For this mission, no formal fire plan was briefed and it was assumed that each party understood that fires would be called in for KEs with follow on adjustments made to those locations depending on the threat

(b)(2)High

c. Dedicated CAS or CCA: Future missions should include the availability of dedicated air assets as Go/No-Go criteria during planning. This mission was hastily planned by the ANA/ABP and the lack of dedicated air assets was determined to still allow an acceptable level of risk despite the increased enemy threat assessment for the town.

d.

(b)(2)High

Exhibit AM

2. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at DSN (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MAJ, AD
Investigating Officer