DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 20 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) , and had this duty on the day of the subject operation.

2. The substance of MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) 16 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) has been the (b)(2)High for 15 months.

b. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) was not in the (b)(2)High for most of the Ganjgal engagement. He was sleeping as he had just completed flying a mission in support of (b)(2)High early on the morning of 8 September.

c. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) said that the (b)(2)High usually has (b)(2)High minute "notice to arrival" time in support of troops encountering enemy contact.

d. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) said the (b)(2)High called the (b)(2)High on the morning of 8 September 2009 to request support. The (b)(2)High Battle CPT told the (b)(2)High they needed to re-direct their request to the (b)(2)High which was the approval authority to dynamically re-task committed air assets or launch the (b)(2)High

e. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) believed the initial reports on 8 September from (b)(2)High were unclear and "fuzzy" as to the situation in the Ganjgal valley.

f. When asked about the presence of (b)(2)High helicopters in the vicinity on the morning of 8 September, MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) agreed more aircraft could have been dedicated to Ganjgal. But he also expressed concern that more aircraft might have been dangerous in the confines of the Ganjgal Valley due to the increased possibility of aircraft collisions.

g. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) recommended that if there is a large and planned operation (like (b)(2)High (b)(2)High going on simultaneously in the area of operations, it might not be wise to conduct (b)(2)High a dismounted patrol into a village that is known well for its kinetic activity against Coalition Forces.

EXHIBIT III – 5 B.1

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h. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) also commented that (b)(2)High should have known standard operating procedures better, and should not have requested the (b)(2)High to provide air support without routing the request through (b)(2)High

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) COL, USMC