DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 19 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) serves as a Scout with 1-32 Infantry Regiment (b)(2)High nd held this duty on the day of the subject operation.

2. The substance of SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) 17 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. SGT(b)(3), (b)(6)was with the dismounted scout element that provided over-watch and radio relay duties for the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009. SGT(b)(3), (b)(6) feels that (b)(2)High is incompetent when it comes to making decisions.

b. SGT(b)(3), (b)(6)feels air assets are only assigned or requested for missions when someone "important is going (on the mission) or someone from the (b)(2)High Tactical Operations Center (TOC) is going to be on the mission."

c. SGT(b)(3), (b)(6)feels that fires in (b)(2)High and Afghanistan are very restricted. He feels scouts or ground elements cannot fire their own missions and must always and exclusively use pre-planned targets.

d. SGT(b)(3), (b)(6)said on 8 September 2009 the ground forces simply quit calling for fires, because they were denied too many times. He stated the fire missions that were initially approved were not effective.

e. SGT(b)(3), (b)(6) clearly observed women and children shuttling ammunition to enemy fighters within the village. SGT(b)(3), (b)(6)believed this was clearly communicated to the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High TOC through SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) FM radio relay on the (b)(2)High command net. (SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) was the lead Scout in the same over-watch position as SGT (b)(3), (b)(6)

f. SGT(b)(3), (b)(6) remembered being told by th (b)(2)High TOC that air assets were (b)(2)High away and relayed this information to the ground elements. He felt that raised the ground element's expectations and possibly affected the manner in which they fought.

g. SGT(b)(3), (b)(6)is on his fourth combat deployment. On all other deployments, SGT(b)(3), (b)(6) noted that the ground commander "gets what he asks for". He does not feel that is true in Afghanistan at this time.

EXHIBIT III – 2 D.1

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h. SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) heard 3rd Platoon, Delta Company request to enter the valley to support the ground element. He heard the TF Chosin TOC deny that request and instruct them to hold their position at the mouth of the valley.

i. SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) heard the TF Chosin Command Sergeant Major on the radio and ask for the location of CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC