DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 21 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)High In (b)(2)High and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)High Corps

1. On 18 November 2009 an interview was conducted with Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6), USMC, (b)(2)High and COL (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)High (b)(2)High at (b)(2)High. A translator was present to interpret for COL (b)(3), (b)(6)

2. Col (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted the interview. Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High was present. COL (b)(3), (b)(6) and Maj (b)(3), (b)(6) were not present for this interview.

3. The substance of Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) and COL (b)(3), (b)(6) statement is summarized below:

a. Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that approximately every three days he participates in the commanders update brief (b)(2)High and recalls on 6 September, 2009 the operation into Ganjgal valley was briefed from the TF Chosin location.

b. Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) reported the mission to conduct a Key Leader Engagement (KLE) in Ganjgal valley seemed like a sound idea and the atmospherics surrounding the planning seemed acceptable.

c. Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) was aware the operation into the Ganjgal valley should have been a (b)(2)High (b)(2)High

d. Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) said that had (b)(2)High on 8 September 2009 they would not (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (b)(2)High

e. Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) traveled to FOB Joyce with COL (b)(3), (b)(6) and COL (b)(3), (b)(6) (he believes they arrived at (b)(2)High on 8 September 2009. His first reaction when he arrived was to ask why more was not being done to support the troops in contact and observe that assets were spread too thin. He also commented the TF Chosin TOC was busy but well organized.

f. COL (b)(3), (b)(6) pointed out that pre-mission planning was challenged because the TF Chosin Commander was on R&R leave and despite good planning on paper it was poorly executed.

EXHIBIT III – 6 B.1

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Corps

g. COL (b)(3), (b)(6) said before the 8 September mission, one of the village elders came to FOB Joyce and asked for several things (a new water well, etc). They planned to conduct a survey of the village and determine what the village needed and how many people lived there.

h. COL (b)(3), (b)(6) said Ganjgal is very close to the Pakistani border and members of the same tribe live on both sides of the border and frequently travel back and forth between the two countries.

i. COL (b)(3), (b)(6) said the ambush was well planned and that enemy fighters were dug in and wearing helmets.

j. COL (b)(3), (b)(6) praised the Marine medic who was killed (HM3 Layton) and called him a champion for sacrificing his life for others. He also said one of his commanders was injured in the fight and one of his Soldiers is still in a coma from the fight – they are all champions.

k. COL (b)(3), (b)(6) said that everyone knows his Soldiers fought to the last bullet and they suffered many killed and wounded in action because they lacked support. His quick reaction force (QRF) element from many miles away made it to the fight and helped pull out wounded and dead Soldiers from the Ganjgal valley.

4. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)