DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 19 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. First Lieutenant (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, serves as the (b)(2)High Delta Company, 1-32 Infantry Regiment, (TF Chosin), and held this position during the planning and execution of the subject operation.

2. The substance of 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) 17 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) was first involved in the planning for the subject operation on the evening of 7 September 2009. He was given a (b)(2)High briefing of his mission from the Delta Company Commander at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Fortress. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) typically receives missions from the (b)(2)High He was unaware that another Delta Company platoon had initially been tasked to provide support for the subject operation, and his platoon replaced it. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) did not attend a formal mission rehearsal, back brief, or sand table planning session in preparation for this operation.

b. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) original task was to provide over-watch for the back side of an Afghan National Army (ANA) Observation Post on the north side of the Ganjgal valley. That mission changed on 7 September 2009 at 2200. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) new mission was to set up a tactical check point (TCP) with the Afghan National Police (ANP) and to provide over-watch into the Ganjgal valley. His platoon was not directly tasked to be a Quick Reaction Force (QRF).

c. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) platoon consisted of (b)(2)High vehicles: (b)(2)High (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High His vehicles carried a (b)(2)High (b)(2)High

d. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) understanding of this mission was it was to be an ANA led and focused mission that would require minimal support and would end in a Key Leader Engagement (KLE) with the Gangjal village elders.

e. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) sent a request for information (RFI) through his chain of command to determine which radio net he should monitor. He was told to monitor the (b)(2)High command net. He was unaware the (b)(2)High

EXHIBIT III – 2 B.1

f. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) set up the TCP between (b)(2)High He could hear and see contact in the Ganjgal Valley at 0530. At approximately 0615 he was directed by the TF Chosin TOC to break down his TCP and prepare for a potential QRF mission. Moments later, he was directed to push into the valley by the TF Chosin Battle Captain. He was not given a grid coordinate location or a limit of advance. He was not given a specific instruction to support by fire or to conduct a link up with a ground element.

g. As 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) moved into the valley he made contact with the Scout element on the TF (b)(2)High and received a (b)(2)High . He noticed most of the friendly positions were scattered and there was effective enemy fire coming from three directions.

h. Between 0630-0730 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) believed that based on his observations and knowledge of what was unfolding, he would provide direct fire support and that the Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) would break contact. However, once he came around a corner in the valley and noticed ANA coming off the battlefield, he understood the situation was more serious.

i. On the way to the vehicle objective rally point (ORP) 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) platoon suffered a vehicle rollover (the ASV at 0750). He asked the TF Chosin TOC for recovery assets but was told to conduct a self-recovery. He estimated it took two hours to recover the vehicle and this was his primary focus during that time period.

j. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) then pushed his platoon to the ORP and does not believe his (b)(2)High could have made it further because of the restrictive terrain. He reports requesting from the TF Chosin TOC to be allowed to return to FOB Joyce and re-fit his platoon with (b)(2)High (b)(2)High in order to push deeper into the valley. He was told by the TF Chosin TOC to hold and secure his position.

k. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) states his platoon was not asked to provide direct support and from their position at the ORP, they never indentified an enemy position, were outside of direct fire distance, and never received locations of friendly and enemy locations.

l. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) remembers a conversation with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) but does not recall the specifics and did not overhear the conversation between CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and the TF Chosin TOC, though he acknowledged that the communication took place.

m. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) continued to ask to join the fight but was repeatedly told to stand fast and hold his position by the TF Chosin TOC. This did not make sense to him and he believed he should have been allowed to go back to FOB Joyce and re-fit with smaller vehicles.

n. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) did not know who the senior ground commander was in the valley. If CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) or Maj (b)(3), (b)(6) had given him an order he would have had to call the TC Chosin TOC for permission and guidance.

CJTF-82
SUBJECT: Interview with 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

o. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) had direct communications with the TF Chosin TOC.

p. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) recalls that 3rd Platoon, Alpha Company, 1-32 Infantry Regiment, arrived at the ORP at approximately 1100 hours.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) COL, USMC