DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

19 DEC 2009

CJTF-82-CG

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation into the Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. I have reviewed the AR 15-6 Investigation into the operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009. This investigation was a follow-up investigation to an initial investigation conducted by MAJ (b)(6), (b)(3) . I approve the Investigating Officers' (IOs') findings.

2. I add the following comments regarding the IOs' specific recommendations.

a. Regarding the presence of key leaders during operations, manning of key positions, and training of command post personnel (paras. 9.A, C, D, and L)—these are among the many responsibilities of a commander. It would be difficult, and likely counterproductive, to set a firm policy on these matters. A CJTF-level policy cannot appropriately dictate in all cases whether the assignment and experience level of a battle captain is more critical than a company commander, for example, or define a level of experience Soldiers must have to fill these positions. In addition, commanders are constrained by limited resources and are forced to make tough decisions. Instead, I expect commanders to use sound judgment in balancing the demands of the mission, the tactical situation, and the qualifications of their available personnel. While I do not intend to issue formal, written guidance on manning their command posts and key billets, I will remind leaders in CJTF-82 of the importance of these decisions and will use the lessons of the Ganjgal to illustrate them.

b. A review of the organization and use of fires assets (para. 9.B) was recently completed. I will consider the results of the review and this investigation in making recommendations on this issue to higher echelons of command.

c. Regarding the production of written orders for each tactical operation (para. 9.E), I concur and will direct implementation of this requirement.

d. Regarding the manning of ETTs and JTAC parties (paras. 9.J and K), I concur and will forward a recommendation to higher headquarters to authorize and fill these critical positions as a priority.

e. I refer this investigation to the CJTF-82 Deputy Commanding General-Operations and CJ3 to review and determine the feasibility of implementing the remaining recommendations (paras. 9.F-I). The CJ3 will report back to me by 15 January 2009 with a complete report regarding their review and plan they have developed to implement the recommendations.

3. Regarding the specific recommendations for adverse administrative action against LTC (b)(3), (b)(6), MAJ(b)(3), (b)(6), and CPT(b)(3), (b)(6), I will take appropriate action after considering these officers' responsibilities and actions on 8 September 2009, their past duty performance, and their potential for future service.

CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI
Major General, USA
Commanding