DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 21 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) , USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. Chief Warrant Officer - 2 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High and participated in this capacity in the subject operation.

2. The substance of CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) statement is summarized below:

a. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) was the pilot in command of the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High during the subject operation. The Air Mission Commander (AMC) of his (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)High (b)(3), (b)(6)

b. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) flew on the morning of 8 September in support of (b)(2)High While he was refueling in (b)(2)High , he overheard a call from (b)(2)High that he described as "very desperate". He overheard (b)(2)High on the common air to ground net (b)(2)High described that ground elements in the Ganjgal valley were taking fire from three sides. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) tried to get to Ganjgal, but because they were dedicated to (b)(2)High (b)(2)High they could only be re-tasked by TF Mountain Warrior (b)(2)High

c. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) said they started to fly to Ganjgal but the (b)(2)High Tactical Operations Center (TOC) called them off and instructed them to continue to support (b)(2)High (b)(2)High was told they needed to coordinate with TF Mountain Warrior (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (b)(2)High and they could not directly re-task the (b)(2)High called back and said the (b)(2)High had approved the re-tasking. The (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)High (b)(2)High from the (b)(2)High that they were not to go to Ganjgal and should return to support (b)(2)High .

d. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) SWT was eventually re-tasked to the Ganjgal valley but they were not the first SWT on site (another (b)(2)High was first on site). They conducted a battle handoff with the other SWT and he was able to talk to an Embedded Training Team (ETT) member on the (b)(2)High . He recalls the call sign as (b)(2)High . CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) witnessed the (b)(2)High element making heroic efforts to drive into the battle and pick up wounded. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) provided cover for these efforts.

EXHIBIT III – 5 F.1

CJTF-82
SUBJECT: Interview with CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

e. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) could see Afghan people standing in the doors of the village houses. When he turned his tail they would shoot at his aircraft. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) says that his aircraft took a lot of fire from the village.

f. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) spotted the missing Marines and knew that two were dead. All four Marines were clustered together in a trench.

g. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) talked the (b)(2)High element onto the road and (b)(2)High vehicle "got the shit shot out of it". He repeatedly commented that the acts of the (b)(2)High element were exceptionally brave.

h. The Afghan National Army (ANA) elements drove into the valley and dismounted. They would get pinned down and were almost able to make it to a point parallel to the Marines.

i. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) heard a great deal of gunfire and saw dust kicking up from the rounds but he did not see many muzzle flashes. The enemy fighters would shoot at the wounded who would make any movements.

j. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) is clear that (b)(2)High was talking with a sense of urgency and it did not make sense to him why they could not go to support the Ganjgal valley. He stated they could have been in the Ganjgal valley within (b)(2)High if they had been given permission. The day QRF SWT that was launched would probably take (b)(2)High to get to Ganjgal. The decision not to re-task his SWT lost valuable time.

k. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) believes the impact on Shuryak valley and (b)(2)High would have been minimal if they were re-tasked to Ganjgal, although he admitted the fighting in (b)(2)High was intense and later in the day two pilots were shot and wounded.

l. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) is positive that there were enemy fighters firing from the village of Ganjgal. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) thinks that in the future two high risk missions should not be launched on the same day with only limited SWT coverage.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC