(b)(3), (b)(6) **FOB Joyce, Afghanistan, wanted to make this statement under oath:**

We were up with the ANA and ABP moving up towards the village and taking increasing fire. We got pinned down by effective fire. The four marines were in the lead element, the heavy weapons element. They were the lead element that was going to push up to the ridgeline and provide overwatch as the ANA did search for search block one. There was a PKM that they were watching for. They were fine. The enemy didn't have acute fire on us but their spectrum of fire and our delayed action with artillery allowed the enemy to move into advantages positions where they had obtuse geometry of fire where they had fire on us from three sides. And because our (b)(2)High because we decided to break contact were completely unmasked because someone didn't want to fire near a village. An absolute bizanten clearance process. A lack of willingness to push down to the ground commander the ability to call fires where he feels they need to be. A politicized chain of command. The political and strategic no longer exist, now it's the political and tactical. I absolutely contribute that to the ability of the enemy to maneuver. I don't think they expected us to put up such little resistance. Quite frankly we met their fires effectively at first, but without those fires, our plan was to mitigate their ability to maneuver on our eastern flank with fires. Whether to block, disrupt or destroy, either way was an effect that would have kept them from maneuvering and we didn't get those fires on target fast enough to prevent them from maneuvering and when we needed to break contact because we were under effective fire we had to wait for the politics of the (b)(2)High to be shaken out before we realized we were going to get (b)(2)High and by then we were covered on three flanks. We called up (b)(2)High (b)(2)High so I could get it away from the village, even thought the village was engaging us. At least three fire missions were called up, I was calling targets all over the place. But the (b)(2)High called up for immediate suppression. It was a relay, I was going thru (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High . Depending on who had the best eyes on the target as well. As far as the other factors, air I am understanding, never a guarantee on air, any plan that is based on air is a bad plan. That's why were planning on the effects, the fires. But one of the problems was without the (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

casualties, at this time we had not taken casualties. I started asking for (b)(2)High immediately, I wanted to get (b)(2)High on station I understood it would take a few minutes but I figured they could de-conflict gunline and fire the (b)(2)High at least because the birds were in a roze above Asadabad so because with the (b)(2)High with the (b)(2)High depending on which (b)(2)High element it is in the TOC and the air coordination maybe you hit one of the birds maybe you don't, one of the big problems is we put this big massive radius around Afghanistan and even if your shooting in the north birds cant come into that roze, people get really spooked about the big sky little bullet

phenomenon, so I didn't want (b)(2)High I was just looking for the (b)(2)High I wanted the effects to at least hold the position until the birds arrived. I kept being told on (b)(2)High minutes, waiting on (b)(2)High minutes, waiting on (b)(2)High minutes and it was somewhere in those iterations of (b)(2)High minutes that we started taking heavy casualties, so I went from trying to call fires to simply patching people up and return fire. I treated initially I treated my NCO, gave a cursory look at (b)(3), (b)(6) who was fine, looked at a couple ANA, most of them were dead anyway. By large most of their wounds were small arms wounds, nothing particularly serious with the ones that weren't killed right off the bat. My NCO was the worse with an injury to the neck which I thought might have been corated so we had to treat that immediately, I have no idea how many people I ended up treating. I could monitor all the radio traffic. I had two radios, one on (b)(2)High and one that covered (b)(2)High and battalion fires, so I had three nets and I had pretty good coverage over all of them, so there wasn't anyone I couldn't talk to, the only person I had problems talking to was the (b)(2)High element that was eventually overrun, and I think that's because they were having difficulties even making a transmission once they started to be engaged, so I heard them unfortunately, there was really nobody that I didn't have comms with on the battlefield. The (b)(2)High element were the four marines in the lead element. So what happened was I was traveling with the ABP, they were traveling with trail moving up to the village. Once we received first contact, I pushed as far forward as I could. We were the (b)(2)High Those four marines that were pinned, they were fixed in their position. They couldn't bound back, most of the ANA bounded back by that point. I think the Marines took one causality and that's when the Corp Man was treating him. That fixed there position. I heard radio traffic; they had gone into a building. It was spermatic, that was the problem, I can only get spermatic contact with them. It wasn't because of comms it was because they were busy. They couldn't get our radio message because they had their hands full. They had taken causality, by that time the fires has covered them on three sides. They have covered us on three sides; when I started hear radio traffic. They were already fixed. This was somewhere within the first hour. End of the first hour begging of the second. They were absolutely fixed. Terrain was into our favor, because we would only present ourselves to enemy direct fire for a short period of time. Had we be able to fix them from maneuvering on us. That was really the problem, because it's a terracing step system going straight up into the village. Our biggest concern for security is the eastern flank. We owned the north, we owed the south. We were coming form west to east pushing in. it was a movement to contact. The problem was they were able to maneuver. They exploded our weakness, that's when they put us in a position of a disadvantage. The steps only provided coverage from fires form the east to the west. So once they got into a more admonitions position, they were shooting littery you were pick which way you were getting less fire from. Do you pick the sniper on this wall or do you pick PKM on this side, it's up to you. As for enemy, they were the most dangerous course of action that we received. Any mission with the ANSF is comprised. That is just an assumption that you make. We can't put them in isolation, we can't

take away their cell phones, we can't make them do a deliberate planning cycle 72 hours out of the operation to bring all the Soldiers brought together to do (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High We don't have that option, we are not soft. We are given there job, but we are not soft. We are screwed from the get go. We are just out there basing ourselves, putting ourselves on the good will of these guys don't want to get compromised either. That's the thing we have a mutual interest. The guys on the front line don't want to get comprised either, but one of there buddies can compromise them. I had phone calls coming from all reaches of Afghanistan, asking how the mission went. So its not was there a leak, its how much water poured through the Skive. I know the ANA are pointing fingers at two civilians that may have over heard their planning process. I mean really come on. It was an issue, we wanted to do the mission with the (b)(2)High That was on of the original intent was that we provide all coalition effects. Now with that said, any mission based on air is a bad mission. This mission was fully achievable with effective plotter. According to simple doctrine, (b)(2)High you read your handbooks its going to be right there. It was originally planned that we would not have air for this operation. However in the war fighting function, you will find your reserve and will also plan for (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High had (b)(2)High on station that day and there where (b)(2)High holding in Araz north of Asadabad. Now I am being told that there they were tied up in the TIC with (b)(2)High That's what really suppressed them from coming from our location. I know that JAF has a QRF for aviation assists. Which eventually got to us. Once those assist starting showing up it was good. We didn't need the (b)(2)High it would have been nice. It would have quitted things down, but so does (b)(2)High We brief the mission as a moving contact. (b)(2)High Or we determine weather we need to break contact. If we receive contact inside the village, well 95 percent of the causality is outside of the village. The enemy is safe because of Afghan architecture, you got wall this thick and most people don't want to fight in their back yard. We are basising this, we did the (b)(2)High based on the history of Gani Gal and Dam Dari. The last mission of the supreme successes, as well as all of the other Chosin operation. They always get hit on the way out because the fighters are not a stave fighting force. They just want to harass you, and build some legitimacy among the visitors. They don't want you to fight in there back yards. These are (b)(2)High fighters for the most part. What changed was that it wa (b)(2)High fighters and additional fighters coming in from (b)(2)High . I absolutely saw women and children. I could see them shuttling from building to building. It was no different then a Dam Dari mission where kids were running there fathers weapons to the field. We even had to turn back some AKs, AVP determined that AKs were fine. You don't have to go hind your AK in the field. In this intense we saw a surprising amount of the civilian populous indirect fire. Well at least semi direct fire, because we can't fire on the village. Moving ammunitions or other supplies, I can't exactly tell you exactly what it was. Quite frankly I was baffled, what am I looking at, what is this. I do not understand what I am seeing, I am seeing a guy telling me to surrender, but he is wearing Kpod and body armor. This is weird; I was seeing things that I wasn't expecting to see. You just don't expect to see,

things you don't expect to see from this village. Based on all of there (b)(2)High Especially the fact that we were only 2.5 clicks from two (b)(2)High and one battalion with aviation assets out of Asadabad. These guys want to hit you, hit you as hard as they can, for short as period of time as possible. Then they put down there weapons and go back to there goats and walk away. They don't want to compromise with body armor or PKM. They want to hide this stuff as quickly as possible before they get tore up by (b)(2)High It was really weird to see a stay in the fighting force. Of course based on what happened after the incident, with the cell phones showing up place, weapon systems being taken from the Marines. It just further indicated how close the fight actually was, we are talking about people 20 meters away from my position, being searched. Our friendlies being searched by the enemy for there equipment. That marine element was from me to the door. Based on terrain, based on what I saw, based on where they were, and what the area looked liked they got surprised. They were flanked. The reason why (b)(2)High had trouble finding them was because there was a small trail. On one side there was a 4 meter tall wall of rock and on the other side there was a meter and a half tall of piled rock. So you have two different walls and you have a pathway. It was a fortified trench. It had a wall on one side that they couldn't see over, then there was a small wall of rock that went around the corner on both sides. Essentially it was trench warfare. So we couldn't see them because they were behind the wall. The enemy could fix them because all they had to do is cut of there exit route. So the enemy simply maneuvers in on them along the trench wall. I think it just surprised them, before they had a chance to react. I didn't see any indication of out of the gun fight. I mean they were out of ammo, but that doesn't surprise me. They were (b)(2)High on ammo. Now of course all of there weapon system was taken by the enemy, so I don't know how much of that ammo was taken by the enemy. There were empty mags, which told me that they were out or very close to running out. Part of the problem was in the villages you couldn't see who was firing at you because they were using the building. They were staged back from the window so you couldn't see there muzzle flashes. Or they were using a supported position within a window; you couldn't see who exactly was firing on you. Contrast to a white building to a black interior with a blinding sun. You are not going to see who is shooting you. I think the only reason why woman and children were so easy to see is because they are the only people moving. All of the maneuvering enemies were out in the wood line or out in the terraces. So they had very effect command and control, they had there support by fire mission. They had somebody maneuvering those elements, coordinating direct fires, coordinating shifts and lifts, coordinating the direct and indirect assets that they were using. Plus they must have had optics. I know that they were close, but one guy with an AK 300 meters way. He is not going to see you prop your head up and promptly put a bullet right there. He isn't going to be able identify the intent of that easily to start shooting at you. They probably had optics as well. They were smart enough to use tracers as well. Occasionally you could identify somebody moving from one fighting position to the next. By and larger they were very effectively using terrain to

there advantage. They were using the buildings very effectively. The maneuvering elements were using the terraces and the washes that were to the north of us to maneuver to our position. I have been racing back and forth to the ORP with causalities, establishing HLZ, talking to air crew, talking to any useless (b)(2)High element showed up. Collecting as many people I could, accumulate combat power, I know now that (b)(3), (b)(6) was one of them. I only knew him as (b)(2)High (b)(2)High it was a little complicated, because we hac (b)(2)High . That was what I was driving and they were in the (b)(2)High They drive forward they provide suppressive fire. Pick your poisin because we were getting fire from three sides. Then we drive the stupid little ranger truck up there, throw some causalities in the back and drive on back. Stright back into the objective at least three times. A lot of the problem was that we get up there and realize that we can't stay because half of our combat power that we accumulated just left us back there. When I was back at the ORP, coordinating with the aircraft, I opted to do a (b)(2)High I told them that I need these vehicles to start positioning them selves to do a support by fire position. I was told by the battle captain that fine, roger got it. Then I know found out later that order was turned down, that they were told to stay in place. I don't know by whom. We were trying to accumulate combat power with ANA because they had (b)(2)High This would have been the better platform to go in there. At that point they seemed more happy to sit at the ORP or the intermediate ORP. Eventually we would get a package together of 3 or 4. We would push them as far forward as we could get, but then they find additional causality. I don't know if they would use it as an excuses or not but that's where they would stop. They didn't want to go back in there again. In total we recovered the 4 marines and recovered as much equipment as we could find. I load up about 4 ANA dead. My truck probably had about 5 ANA wounded, in my truck. We were also loading up other trucks as well and my NCO as well. We moved back (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) they were ambulatory, and the interpreter. We had 2 enemy KIA that we brought back as well. Vehicles were getting loaded up. The ANA were pushing there (b)(2)High as far as they could or would and we loaded them up as well. Very few of the KIA made it very far. That was all our effort to get them back. Some of the ANA and AVP causalities were ambulatory, so they made it back on their own power. A lot of them were stuck out there. I would say that is very accurate. It could be more; I would be surprised if it was less. We had 4 AVP causalities and got one of them back. AVP were acting with our intermediate support by fire as we were bound back from our first two battles. So we had AVP up there with us. Lessons learned, I am just a dumb little gun bunny, I like the biggest things I can get and that was the biggest thing I could get. I know this is a ridiculous recommendation. If you look on what's going on in this theater, we are doing mission and economy and thrift to personnel. So we do (b)(2)High on the road, I see (b)(2)High on the road all the time doing (b)(2)High We take the ANA and AVP to where the enemy are to do there job. We go and do what nobody else seem to be doing. So more personnel, better integration of Coalition forces, more inclusions of coalition forces. To include to getting out of there damn (b)(2)High and

not bringing those stupid things in the first place. What frustrates me is they could have been lobbing (b)(2)High As you are driving by that valley, you could look up the valley, and be like that's the house with the PKM, he there's that ridge that they were shooting us from. A dozen (b)(2)High patrol driving to go to do (b)(2)High somewhere. Every single day drive right by it, right in line of sight. What does that say to me, more (b)(2)High what they hell are (b)(2)High doing up there. We can drive a Humvee straight to the objective. We didn't because we were trying to mitigate the risk. My take way from this is this is a country of complex compartmentally terrain that sucks up man power, and if you don't have that man power why bother. If you don't commit the assists necessary why bother. Now 3 battalions right here, AVP, ANA, (b)(2)High how we cant mustard that combat power, shock. It wasn't complacency; in fact we doubled our efforts to be more connectedly focused. The operation in Dam Dari again the expectation same as Gani Gar that entire valley. We did the appropriate (b)(2)High we received (b)(2)High and we put that all together and made a plan that made sense. Tactically it made sense. Politically it made sense. So as long as they can see it they will try and control (b)(2)High from there little

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High . Complacency there was no complacency. I said there more complacency on the first operation because it was by police. The AVP are not exactly light infantry, they kind of are, there are paramilitary. They are somewhat equipped like it, they will play games with you all day long. If they need to respond to something immediately they are infantry, they can not go immediately they have to wait for the mission. If you want them to do something deliberate we are police, we are incapable. They are not the ANA they are the right tool for Dam Dar, they were the right tool for Dam Dar. What we learned on the way out of Dam Dar was the enemy was a lot more fermentable. The PKM fire that we received from Dam Dar, first which initiated there last attack on us, misfired three times. So it was really confusing on what was going on. They hide there weapons in the field, there weapons are dirty. It take s them tow to three hours to get to that high ground. It was (b)(2)High PKM Fire. They are (b)(2)High (b)(2)High there RPG. They are tactically sappy, they understand the ideas, the concepts how to use these weapons system. Then there is one RPG gunnery that was spot on. He had some talent. (b)(2)High on my because I had a (b)(2)High They tried to take out the (b)(2)High When we went in there we went in there with perspective that is a movement to contact. This a deliberate operation, this is a deliberate clearance, we are not going in to be nice, we are going in to establish nice. If we establish security, we feel comfortable; we can engage the leaders in dialogue, fantastic. We were not expecting to be welcomed in. I cant speak with the ANSF but I know AVP were hesitative because this is new terrain to them. So the AVP are always hesitate, they really don't like that stuff. They rather sit around al day and drink chiv waste there tax money. ANA, I can't tell you that they were being any less cautious then they normally are. We as ETT, definitely have a heighten sense of awareness. From our perspective, we did the insertion of the scouts three prior to (b)(2)High analysis. Fighting positions,

weather they did anything different then normal in Gani Gar. That was the only element that we had forward stage. Now if ANA wanted send in plain clothes, if they had that assets, if the resource, if I was fighting in my back yard. I would probably find someone that lived in Gani Gar or who some people who potentially hide out in Gani Gar in man Jams. I would send them up there and I would build a nice little (b)(2)High over them, that would be a nice little OPAP. We don't have that capability. Now if the ANA did that or not, I don't know. I would appreciate it if they did because they have that capability and we don't. I can't say anything about (b)(2)High I understand the situation, limited resource. You always want more. Quite frankly once we got our (b)(2)High on station, those guys are fantastic. I have nothing but complements for them. Once we started to get those air assets up in the sky, then I had 2 (b)(2)High I was talking to, (b)(2)High on station, and (b)(2)High flying over head. I was talking to all of them. Now it's not too hard because you keep two (b)(2)High on reserve, you use up one and go (b)(2)High (b)(2)High then they fly to ABAD. Then you pull the other ones down and pop them onto target and off they go, they do target hand over. The (b)(2)High of course is being done by the JTAC on up on the ridge by the scouts, so it's out of my hair. Then (b)(2)High the (b)(2)High guys, they push down to our push and we coordinate with them direct. Once the aviation assets came on station it was great. So you can always want more aviation assets. For effects, this is what it really came down to; this is what really unhinged us, the impendency of fires is imperative. We train in the army for fires, when you are doing your front lean analysis, what do you look at. Where are the artillery pieces, where are the Mortars, what's the response time, what's there weapon low down, can you call immediate suppression on (b)(2)High are you priority fire. This is simple doctrine, I mean what the fuck, isn't (b)(2)High a battalion assets. Why is it going through brigade. I have had a lot of problems with fires in this AO. This is not the first time, this is the first time it actually hit me. (b)(2)High foot print. I always get these crazy messages saying that hey brigade is say that you can't see the target from your OT. Brigade, your in Jalabad, fuck you, you know. I am staring at the target. I am (b)(2)High Its giving me a (b)(2)High elevation direction. (b)(2)High what more do you want. I can see the damn target. Pull that little fax head out of his ass and remind him that there things that they call smaller hills and higher hills. I can see the higher hill. I just get the craziest thing across the radio sometimes. Just people second guessing. If I am willing to put my initials on it I understand the importance of making sure the rounds hit where they are supposed to hit. I understand the consequence of civilian causalities, I also understand the consequence when happens when you don't get the effects you need. Just to throw one out there, during Election Day, I am staring at (b)(2)High in Gani Gar village from ANP OPAP just down the road. It took me (b)(2)High minutes to clear for fires, to hit that rocket team. It was too late. I think there was enough trained observer. Technically anybody out of basic training is a trained observer. I understand de-conflicting battle space, I understanding is front line tracing or (b)(2)High or what ever you call it. Again, the ground

commander is calling up a fire mission; his situation awareness is based on a multiple set of eyes. He is calling in that mission because he feels that he needs it. It's not JAG responsibility to interject to say hey we are concerned that you're going to hit a building, we are concerned we don't know were the ANA is. I can tell you that I am concerned with saving as many life's as I can, not necessary one. Unfortunately this is combat, I can't be perfect, but I can do what I feel what's right at the time. When I am being second guessed by higher or somebody that's sitting in an air conditioned TOC, well hell why am I even out there in the first place. Let's just do this by (b)(2)High let's sit back and play Nintendo. I am the ground commander let me put my initials, I want that fucker, and I will accept the consequences of that fucker. So the fires need to be streamlined, harmonized and push to the lowest level possible. I am not out to get (b)(2)High I am not out to get (b)(2)High I am just trying to illuminate a point. The political and strategically became the political and the tactical. In that there is a lot of indecisiveness, a lot of hesitation, and a lot of deliberation about things that do not have the time to be put through that scrutiny. Somebody on the ground is saying that they need something. They probably need it. I saw in the media, I honestly dropped of the net ever since this happened. I don't know anything famous is going on right now, but I don't want to. Prior to that I saw as much of a success of our new policy that we reduced (b)(2)High . That tells me that we are not looking at the ground fighter and why he is using these air assets. We are just looking at the overall, we reduced an asset that's political unpopular. I am sure there are a lot of people out there that are saying I would really like that asset. There are probably a lot of people who got killed as a result of not having that asset. I am sure there are a lot of Afghan civilians that are alive because we didn't have that asset. I am not a Politian, I am just the guy on the ground asking for that ammunition to be dropped because it's going to save lives. I have nothing for you.