DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 20 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, serves as Day Battle Captain for 1-32 Infantry Regiment, Task Force Chosin, and served in this position on the day of the subject operation.

2. The substance of CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) 17 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) has been a CPT for three and a half years and was a platoon leader for 36 months. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) has been to the CPT's career course and has been in charge of current operations at TF Chosin for 14 months.

b. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) assumed his duties as Day Battle CPT on 8 September 2009 from CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) at 0800. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he did not have a clear picture of enemy or friendly locations in Ganjgal, but he did know there were casualties who needed to be evacuated. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) knew there were communications between the ground element and TF Chosin and between TF Chosin and the Brigade (TF Mountain Warrior). Close combat aviation (CCA) was already present in Ganjgal when he arrived for his shift. An aerial medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) had already been requested. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) told CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) that there were issues with some requested fires missions because they were plotted too close to Ganjgal village.

c. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that the atmosphere in the TF Chosin Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was that things were not normal, but that they also were not very serious. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) said the TOC was definitely not acting like friendly forces had been overrun.

d. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) said he communicated with the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) at the TF Chosin TOC and was told close air support (CAS) would be available in (b)(2)High minutes.

e. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) personally spoke with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) the Afghan Border Police Mentor, at approximately 0845 and noted that he was "soured up" and very upset.

f. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) noted that 3rd platoon, Delta Company, was designated as a quick reaction force (QRF). The platoon leader requested to re-fit his platoon with M1151 HMMWVs but CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) felt this was premature. He passed the request up to the TF Chosin Acting Commander and S3 (LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) who denied the request.

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g. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) believed the platoon was taken out of the fight while trying to recover their rolled over (Armored Security Vehicle (ASV). He confirmed that the platoon asked for a wrecker from TF Chosin. TF Chosin denied the request and ordered them to self-recovery their ASV.

h. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) said LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the TOC at 0800 and remained there throughout the fight.

i. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) said the Distribution platoon and the battalion headquarters tactical command post (TAC) were available at FOB Joyce and could have been committed to the fight. However, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the BN TAC had never been activated before, was not on any sort of re-call or ready status, and typically was only used to escort the TF Chosin Commander, Executive Officer, and Command Sergeant Major around the battle space. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) said the TF Chosin TOC did not give consideration to taking the Battalion TAC to the mouth of the valley to improve situational awareness. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he never knew the full picture of what happened in the valley until the (b)(2)High returned to FOB Joyce later that day.

j. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated coalition forces will be attacked "eight out of nine" times they go into the Ganjgal valley.

k. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that (b)(2)High are briefed to the Brigade and an OPORD is briefed to the entire TF Chosin TOC.

l. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) remembers briefing this operation and recalls it not being as standard as many others they brief, that it was essentially a Key Leader Engagement, and they had a similar type mission that was very successful in Dam Darya just a few days before this mission.

m. No one expected 30-60 enemy fighters that were being aided by woman and children in the village.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) COL, USMC