DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 20 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (Task Force Mountain Warrior) and served in this capacity at the time of the subject operation.

2. The substance of MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) 16 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)High He was not involved in the planning or execution of the subject operation.

b. When MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) and TF Mountain Warrior deployed to Afghanistan in August he inherited an (b)(2)High requesting (b)(2)High in Afghanistan (Investigating officer comment; definition of (b)(2)High and is used by the military for (b)(2)High He said artillery units in Afghanistan currently only use (b)(2)High

c. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) opinion is (b)(2)High are equally effective.

d. When asked under what circumstances he believes the ground commander's calls for fire should be denied, MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) said he did not think they should ever be denied. He stated (b)(2)High supports ground commanders very well. He further stated he trusts what the ground commander tells the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), is his actual fire support requirements.

e. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) could not speak about the facts and circumstances surrounding the decision by the TF Chosin TOC to deny some fire missions during the subject operation.

f. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) commented the (b)(3), (b)(6) is extremely preoccupied with additional duties. When MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) sees CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) he is often at the TF Mountain Warrior headquarters working on Commander's Emergency Relief Program (CERP) projects. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) said he mostly interfaced with SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) for TF Chosin fire support issues.

g. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) said the Brigade FSO will monitor the fires net and keep track of all fires missions. Field grade officers have approval authority to clear fires missions.

EXHIBIT III – 4 C.1

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h. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) did not participate in the TF Mountain Warrior's pre-deployment training. He commented communications in Afghanistan are difficult and should be improved and that (b)(2)High does not work well.

i. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) made a final comment that he remembered an (b)(2)High (b)(2)High may have been in (b)(2)High surrounding Ganjgal during the subject operation and may have required additional time to clear the fires missions on that day.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) COL, USMC