DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 20 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with COL (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. (b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(6)
(Task Force Mountain Warrior) and served in this capacity during the planning and execution of the subject mission.

2. The substance of (b)(3), (b)(6) 16 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. (b)(3), (b)(6) referred the investigation team to the (b)(2)High chat associated with the subject operation and believed it accurately portrays the events that took place during the operation.

b. (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted an after action review (AAR) several days after the engagement in the Ganjgal Valley, and was aware of the events of 8 September 2009.

c. (b)(3), (b)(6) confirmed that (b)(2)High would have been the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High call sign.

d. (b)(3), (b)(6) was not informed about the contact in the Ganjgal Valley until he was asked to launch the (b)(2)High quick reaction force (QRF) consisting of a (b)(2)High (b)(2)High

e. (b)(3), (b)(6) decided to travel to FOB Joyce when he heard there were casualties in Ganjgal, and contacted the Afghan National Army (ANA) (b)(6)) to go with him. He arrived at approximately 1000 and spent most of the day at FOB Joyce, communicating with the CJTF-82 Commanding General from this location.

f. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he and his TF Mountain Warrior staff have a good relationship with the Embedded Training Teams (ETT) and the ANA.

g (b)(3), (b)(6) said he requires CONOPs briefed to him for Key Leader Engagement (KLE) type missions in certain areas. He does not believe Ganjgal was one of the areas he required a CONOPs briefing from.

h. (b)(3), (b)(6) was aware of the successful operation of a similar nature that was conducted in the Dam Darya village on 3 September 2009.

EXHIBIT III – 4 A.1

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i. (b)(3), (b)(6) noted that (b)(2)High main effort on 8 September 2009 was the operation at Barge Matal and that the (b)(2)High S3 was at Barge Matal. (b)(3), (b)(6) also noted that the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High battalion commander was on R&R leave. (b)(3), (b)(6) supplemented (b)(2)High with a senior major from his Brigade staff, (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, to help fill in for leaders who were not present. He felt there were capable individuals in the (b)(2)High on 8 September 2009.

j. (b)(3), (b)(6) did not believe the relationship between TF Mountain Warrior and the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or CJTF-82 had any impact or effect on the subject operation.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC