DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

CJTF-82 21 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. Chief Warrant Officer – 2 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High and participated in this capacity in the subject operation.

2. The substance of CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) 16 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) was part of the (b)(2)High that was launched from (b)(2)High in support of the subject operation. His (b)(2)High at (b)(2)High and arrived in the Ganjgal valley at (b)(2)High

b. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) does not know when the initial call to launch the (b)(2)High came in, but he knows the standard for the (b)(2)High is to be prepared to launch in (b)(2)High when given orders. On the morning of 8 September they launched in approximately (b)(2)High

c. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) was told that troops were in contact at the Ganjgal Valley, at least one element had been cut off, and that all ground units were sustaining heavy fire. When he arrived in Ganjgal he was able to talk to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)High CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) was able to identify all friendly locations, but could not see them taking any direct fire. When they first arrived everything appeared quiet and routine. His (b)(2)High was there to assist the ground elements to allow them to withdraw to their vehicles and reconsolidate. His focus was on covering CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) securing the walking wounded, and to search for the cut off element.

d. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) said his (b)(2)High carried (b)(2)High and normally could stay on station for (b)(2)High without having to leave to (b)(2)High

e. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)High had to leave to (b)(2)High and was briefly replaced by an (b)(2)High (b)(2)High who were in the area in support of an ongoing aerial medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) marked suspected targets for the (b)(2)High and conducted a battle handover. He remembers leaving the Ganjgal valley at about 0900.

f. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) communicated with the troops on the ground, other aircraft in his (b)(2)High and the TF Chosin TOC. He remembers mass confusion and lots of (b)(2)High on (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High He remembers an additional mounted element move into the valley (3rd Platoon, Delta Company) and a great amount of (b)(2)High between the two ground elements, with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) trying to bring the platoon into the valley to assist with casualty evacuation.

EXHIBIT III – 5 E.1

g. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) knew the situation was serious when he heard "we have guys cut off".

h. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) did not think additional aircraft were needed. He said the Ganjgal valley was small and more aircraft would have congested the area and created confusion. He has never operated in the Ganjgal valley with more than (b)(2)High

i. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) saw the level of contact on the ground as "medium" throughout the engagement. He said (b)(3), (b)(6) definitely took fire while attempting to withdraw.

j. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) refueled two times and was in the Ganjgal Valley (b)(2)High separate times during the subject operation. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) said his support was suppressive fire and fired (b)(2)High but was unable to conduct a (b)(2)High other than the (b)(2)High

k. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) remembers talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) an Embedded Training Team (ETT) member, and observed him make multiple attempts to go back into the valley to collect wounded Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers and locate the missing Marines.

l. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) does not recall the ground element call for any fire missions.

m. The (b)(2)High that replaced CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) team located the missing Marines while CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) was refueling for the second time. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) learned they were located in a trench 600-700 meters from the village. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) observed the Marines but did not see any movement. He observed them approximately two and a half hours after arriving in the Ganjgal Valley.

n. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) does not think there were enough identifiable targets to warrant helicopters in the valley and that it would have been difficult and dangerous to have (b)(2)High stacked on top of his SWT in the valley.

o. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) did not observe any fires coming from the village. He noted that everyone was indoors, which is not normal as the villagers are most often in the fields.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC