18 Nov 09

FROM: Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: Sworn Statement

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), Lt Col, USMC (b)(3), (b)(6), as 2 BDE ETT OIC, attest to the following facts that occurred before and during the Ganjgal engagement on 8 Sep 2009.

This operation was one of several ongoing and routine Jirgas and Shuras, regularly conducted by ETTs and ANAs in accordance with COIN operations. The Col's staff and I believe LtCol(b)(3), (b)(6) 1st Kandak, briefed him.

The event was pre-briefed to myself and the 4-4th ICBT commander, during the Commander's Update Briefing, 2 nights before. There was an intelligence assessment included during the initial brief. I believed that all detailed information on the operation was briefed by the acting commander of the lead Task Force CHOSIN. It was briefed as a (b)(2)High

The duty RTO at our TOC informed me of the engagement shortly after contact was initiated. Shortly after initial notification, the commanders of the 4-4 IBCT, the 2-201st BDE and I traveled to 1st Kandak's HQ at FOB Joyce to provide on-site C2 support for the duration of the contact incident.

Throughout the engagement, my S3 and staff, worked side by side with the ANA BDE Battlestaff, exchanging and sharing the latest information as it came in.

I strongly believe that existing formal or informal task organizations and command relationships in no way played a role in the unfortunate outcome of this operation.

With regards to the COMISAF "Tactical Directive", I firmly believe that the directive inhibited the acting CO of CHOSIN. But that being said, it must be noted that the available ID assets to Chosin were dispersed throughout an extended battlespace, so only (b)(2)High were even in range of the action at Ganjigal. In addition, MW AO air support is, in my opinion, too sparse for the level of kinetics experienced in summer-fall 2009. In fact, I believe that the scout-weapons team intended to cover this operation were employed in a TIC in the (b)(2)High as this action commenced. Even when they arrived on station, it is evident that they, too, were inhibited from firing into the enviors of Ganjigal, presumably because of the Commanding General's intent as expressed in the directive. There is also the unresolved issue of TF CHOSIN's QRF allegedly refusing to go into the town iot respond to events that day.

(b)(3), (b)(6), Lt Col, USMC
2 BDE ETT, OIC

Witnessed by _____, on 18 Nov 09

EXHIBIT III – 6 B.2