DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

CJTF-82 20 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) serves as the Night Battle Captain, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division (Task Force Mountain Warrior) and held this duty during the planning and execution of the subject operation.

2. The substance of CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) 16 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was the night Battle CPT on the day of the subject operation. He came off duty at (b)(2)High CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stayed in the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High until (b)(2)High and completed his battle hand-off with day Battle CPT, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

b. The first reports from the Ganjgal Valley indicated a routine contact with three to five enemy personnel. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was initially in contact via phone with the (b)(2)High CPT, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

c. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) remembered a vehicle rollover and the report for casualties happening simultaneously or almost simultaneously. He recalled during the shift change brief a (b)(2)High (b)(2)High message popped up that showed casualties had been sustained.

d. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) did not understand how large or serious the enemy contact was until he was leaving the shift change brief, at which time he became aware of the casualties.

e. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was not briefed about the operation or any of its details prior to execution.

f. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was not involved in any fires missions and did not recall a request for a Scout Weapons Team (SWT - (b)(2)High coming through the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he has never denied a request for support from a subordinate unit.

(b)(2)High

EXHIBIT III – 4 G.1

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h. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (b)(2)High He was not aware who authorized a SWT to respond to the contact in the Ganjgal Valley during the subject operation.

i. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) has been in the Army for three years, was promoted to CPT in June 2009, and has served as a platoon leader and fire support officer in Korea. He had been a Battle CPT for two months at the time of the subject operation.

j. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was not aware of a (b)(2)High standard operating procedures or battle drills book.

k. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that the TF Mountain Warrior Chief of Operations, S3, or Commander were not present at during his shift.

l. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) has never had communication issues with (b)(2)High before. It has always been timely and accurate.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC