SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

'ITHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.

INCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB Joyce, Afghanistan	2009/11/15		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	1LT/AD

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

D Co, 1-32 IN, Task Force Mountain Warrior, FOB Joyce, Afghanistan APO AE 09354

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 8 Sep 09 my platoon was assigned the mission of conducting a joint TCP with ANP, VIC the ANP Station on RTE (b)(2)High across from the Ganjgal Valley. Our secondary mission was to overwatch the avenues of approach from the north leading up to a friendly OP VIC (b)(2)High At the time of the mission my unit was comprised of (b)(2)High Soldiers arrayed in (b)(2)High My unit was armed with (b)(2)High

I received the mission from my company commander at approximately 1700L on 07 Sep 09. I was issued a FRAGO at approximately 2200L moving the location of my element north to the ANP station. At no point did I attend a formal orders brief.

A(b)(2)High n 8 Sep 09 my unit had established its TCP in front of the ANP station and was searching vehicles with the ANP as well as overwatching the Ganjgal Valley. Immediately after day break my position began to hear indirect rounds impacting in the valley and approximately 30 minutes later saw the rounds landing closer to the mouth of the valley. After reporting this to Chosin TOC we were ordered to break down the TCP and stand- by for further orders. No more than 30 minutes later my element had maneuvered to the mouth of the Ganjgal Valley and was ordered forward to support friendly units on the ground. It took my unit approximately (b)(2)High to maneuver half way up the valley. At that point we encountered approximately 20 ANSF rangers and scattered (b)(2)High. After another 50m the road narrowed to the point tha(b)(2)High were unable to maneuver any further. Once we reached this point we could already see large numbers of ANSF moving out of the valley, some injured, most without weapons. My PSG, SS(b)(3), (b)(6) and company senior line medic, SG(b)(3), (b)(6) began establishing a CCP and triage area to treat injured forces. I talked to an ny LTC, who stated he was with the ETT element, he was unable to give any information regarding friendly location, disposition or the situation on ground deeper in the valley. I had communication with a scout squad in an overwatch position on (b)(2)High s well as with Chosin TOC. The scout squad reported that they had eyes on the village of Ganjgal but could not determine friendly/ enemy location or PID where enemy fire was coming from. At this point a Marine ETT CPL approached me and said there were 11 US Soldiers pinned down in the village. At that point he took the lead in a (b)(2)High ushed up the road towards the village. About 1 km up the valley I lost comms with all friendly elements outside of the ASV I was with, the unit immediately began receiving effective direct and indirect fires from three sides. 2 kms from the (b)(2)High the edge of the road under the ASV gave out causing the vehicle to roll two complete times and landed up-right. My vehicle turned around to check on the status of the ASV. After checking to ensure all personnel were uninjured recovery efforts were made. At this point CCA came on station for about 45 minutes, during which much of the effective fire stopped. During this time the ASV was recovered back to the CCP and the personnel injured were examined by SG(b)(3), (b)(6) Having re-established comms with Chosin TOC I updated them and advised that in order to move a ground force into the valley (b)(2)High were needed. At that point I had one vehicle capable of reaching the village, and requested to return to FOB Joyce and cross load my unit into (b)(2)High reach the village. I was told to establish a blocking position at my current location and hold there. Shortly after x4 Marine ETTs made it to my location, x2 were wounded a LTC and a 1SG they were diagnosed with a GS wound to the forearm and a concussion injury/ perforated ear drum, respectively. My unit (b)(2)High MRAPs ground exfiled the WIA back to FOB Joyce and again asked to switch the (b)(2)High the request was denied and they returned to the blocking position. The next unit to arrive was 3rd PLT/ A CO they were arrayed in only MRAPs. After discussing the situation with the PL and PSG, SS(b)(3), (b)(6) and SS(b)(3), (b)(6) again requested for one of the two platoons to refit with HMMWVs while the other held the blocking position. This request was again denied by both Chosin TOC and (b)(2)High

The most specific instructions I was given throughout the operation was to establish a blocking position in the Ganjgal Valley to prevent AAF movement into or out of the Ganjgal Valley. This order came from Chosin TOC over (b)(2)High

At no point after my units vehicle recovery was I ordered to push back into the Ganjgal Valley. My attempts to refit my unit in a capacity to do so were denied multiple times. The statement that "I did not comply with orders to aid ANSF and ETT forces" are not accurate.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

DITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Joyce DATED 2009/11/15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

roughout the mission I was able to communicate directly with 1-32 IN TOC. I did not have any comms with the ETT element and was not given their (b)(2)High , I told that all operations were being conducted on (b)(2)High and did not know the ETTs were operating on a different frequency until after the initial push of ounded Marine ETTs made it to my location. Even after programming their frequency into our radios we were unable to establish reliable comms with the unit in the village. Nothing Follows.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUEN

(b)(3), (b)(6) ICT

ent)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 15 day of November, 2009 at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ith)

SGT (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 27-55 Chapter 3-1(b)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEME

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
OPERATION ENDURUNG FREEDOM
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

15-6 Investigation Talking Points-1LT(b)(3), (b)(6)

1. Purpose: To capture the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the enemy attack that occurred in the vicinity of FOB Joyce, on 08 September 2009, resulting in the death of 4 USMC ETT members and the rollover incident of an ASV.

    a. What are the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack? (5 W's) Be specific as possible with regard to the terrain of the attack site, time of attack, size of the enemy force encountered, size of the U.S. / Coalition force, length of the attack, and types of weapons used by the enemy force.

    b. What are the nature, extent, and cause of loss or damage of military equipment?

    c. What was the mission and purpose of your element during the mission and did it change? What were the pre-mission briefing concerning enemy forces?

    d. What personal protective equipment was worn by the U.S. Service members at the time of the incident?

    e. What, if any, medical treatment was provided to the U.S. Service members? What are the nature, extent, and cause of injuries to any U.S. service members

    f. Who were you communicating with and what was your initial PACE plan? What commo challenges did you experience?

    g. It appears that an ASV rollover occurred during the incident as well. Describe the facts and circumstances surrounding the rollover. (5 W's) Be specific as possible describing, the cause of the rollover (vehicle condition, road condition, threat level, etc.) and the mechanisms / procedures used by the personnel to avoid injury.

        i. Terrain and speed at time of accident
        ii. Crew members
        iii. Training and driver experience
        iv. Recovery timeline

    h. What recommendations concerning improvements, if any, to coalition force tactics, techniques, and procedures will help avoid this type of incident in the future? Be as specific as possible, keeping in mind mission and personnel constraints and limitations.

i. Did you observe any women or children either firing at CF/troops or providing support to Anti-Afghan Forces?

j. Any other matters pertaining to this incident that you deem relevant?