DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 20 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, serves as Fire Support Officer for 1-32 Infantry Regiment, Task Force Chosin, and held this position during the planning and execution of the subject operation.

2. The substance of CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) 17 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was the fire support officer for TF Chosin on the morning of 8 September 2009.

b. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) is also the TF Chosin Commander's Emergency Relief Program (CERP) manager and admitted that this extra duty is very time consuming. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he will often be asked a fires question and will be right in the middle of completing/working on a statement of work (SOW) or building a governance slide. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) said that many of his peers are leaving the Army because they are frustrated by additional duties. He says the extra duties are manageable, but it stretches him and some TF Chosin officers extremely thin.

c. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) his non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), was the main fire support person in the TF Chosin Tactical Operations Center (TOC).

d. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that if he found out about a battle he typically would run to the TOC and stay in the TOC until the battle was complete.

e. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) said on the morning of 8 September 2009 he walked into the TOC at 0930 and stayed until 2230-2300 that night. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) did not know about the contact in the Ganjgal valley until 0900 and no one at any point came to get him or order him to report to the TOC. When CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) came into the TOC his NCOIC was not present, although he did come into the TOC at some point that morning. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) ranking officer in the TOC that morning was SSG (b)(3), (b)(6)

f. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) could not account for why the fire plan was not given to the TF Chosin mortar section prior to the mission. He started to explain that it could have been because it was a mission that was lead by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). He felt that more fire missions should have been authorized and had been willing to bring fires closer to the village and friendly Soldiers.

EXHIBIT III – 1 F.1

CJTF-82
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g. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) believed that CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) made the fires plan for the mission. The plan consisted of one powerpoint slide and he believed he saw it before the mission.

h. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) said the TF Chosin TOC "gave it their best" and that there probably were breakdowns in the planning and some products may not have been completed.

i. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) maintained that the fires cell keeps a fires log, that TF Chosin sends it to the Brigade on a weekly basis, and that he looks at it daily.

j. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that his understanding of the standard operating procedures (SOP) for clearing fire missions was that the approval must come from a field grade officer. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) was denying the fires missions on the day of the operation. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that they could not shoot into built up civilian areas.

k. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) did not know why a forward observer was not sent forward and doesn't remember if a (b)(2)High) was part of the mission. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and his NCOIC were not involved in the planning for the operation into Ganjgal.

l. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated his understanding of the TF Chosin and (b)(2)High (b)(2)High relationship is that the ETT operates on its own and TF Chosin communicates with them when they call TF Chosin. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was not sure if TF Chosin was involved in the (b)(2)High mission planning.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC