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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB JOYCE	2009/10/08	2237L	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	03/CPT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHC 1-32 IN10th MTN DIV TF CHOSIN

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

The investigating officer requested me to "Address anything you mentioned about the enemy threat, aviation support, planned artillery, etc."

The adhoc planning session in which I participated, on or about the 5th of SEP09, included at a minimum: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) It was held on Old Joyce in a (b)(2)High common area. The planning session was adhoc because we were attempting to capitalize on the percieved succes of the 04 SEP09 (b)(2)High Reportedly the locals had told us that the 60x ABP and 30x ANA were professional and they were very impressed by the ANSF using the elders. We did not talk much about enemy threat but more about react to contact. On the 4th of SEP, we made contact as we were leaving and we wanted to show the people that were weren't scared away and that we would follow through on our commetment to the valley. From what I remember, we rebriefed the use of smoke to manuever back to the trucks or to retrograde. It was my idea to use smoke. I knew that the valley was littered with houses and my suggestion was to drop the rounds into the dashta and wadi's(dashta=flat ground and wadi=riverbed) to midigate CDE but facilitate our FOM. Everyone seemed to nod their head in agreement and a few verbally agreed to that coarse of action fo(b)(2)High It was not a point of arguement, anger, or contention. I was ignorant of any other type of (b)(2)High (b)(2)High That's why I said we should (b)(2)High We really didn't assess a large enemy at all. Historically, each time we went into the valley the enemy would be a squad size or less. Even the four direct fire attacks on FOB Joyce the previous month and a half were from squad sized AAF. The biggest threat coming from mortars. On three seperate ocassions, theGanjgal AAF mortar team fired a round 100m from our scouts while in overwatch of Ganjgal the day of the 3rd, killed PFC Wolverton on 20 AUG09, and killed an ABP soldier a week or two prior to losing PFC Wolverton. The deaths of both CF/ANSF soldiers and the constant threat of both IDF and direct fire from anjgal/Damdarya-ye made the AAF controlled valley unignorable. However, in order to build-on the 4th we decided we needed to go back into the lley sooner rather than later.

With (b)(2)High briefed/planned to start on the 8th of SEP09 and the retrograde of (b)(2)High about to suck up all the assests following (b)(2)High multi-day mission, we knew airborne assests would be hard to come by. I told the ETTs and CP(b)(3), (b)(6) at we were allocated to have scout weapons team on the 7th for an hour and a half in the morning. I did say that air would be in support of TF Lethal and roughly 5-10 mintues away and that we should be able to open an air tic to steal TF LETHAL's allocated assests relatively quickly. No one argued the fact that TF Lethal would be allocated the assest because we felt confident that we could pull the air craft to us, based off many of our previous TICs throughout the year in which we did pull assets from accross AO Mountain Warrior. CP(b)(3), (b)(6) addressed the fact that ABP were going to want helicopters and I said on the 7th if we timed it right, we could get the hour and a half of SWT to make the ANSF feel better about themselves but we wouldn't get anymore. Our time contraints as told (b)(3), (b)(6) was that the ABP wanted to postpone the mission 24 hours causing us to not get any coverage at all. The ANA were told we weren't getting any air coverage but they still were willing to conduct the mission based off feedabck from MA(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) We talked for 5-10 minutes as a group that Americans would not be in Afghanistan forever and that the ANSF needed to not be relient on Air support in order to do a mission because "what would they do when we leave?" All the ETTs, CP(b)(3), (b)(6) and myself agreed that the ANSF have to be able to do missions without air so when we leave this country that they could still operate. The group nor any individual said that without air the mission would reach(b)(2)Highcrriteria for execution. After the 'adhoc' planning session on the 5th, I did very little with the rest of (b)(2)High (b)(2)High planning or execution.

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10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES

DITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

HE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.