DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 20 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (TF Mountain Warrior), and served in this capacity during the planning and execution of the subject operation.

2. The substance of (b)(3), (b)(6) 16 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. (b)(3), (b)(6) was relatively certain that he was in the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High when the battle in the Ganjgal Valley began. At the time, he was monitoring the progress of (b)(2)High ongoing in the Shuryak Valley.

b. (b)(3), (b)(6) does not recall the request for Close Combat Aviation (CCA) being sent through the TOC. All requests for Close Air Support (CAS) (b)(2)High (b)(2)High

c. Initial reports indicated contact with three to five enemy fighters in the Gangjal Valley. Only after a report of one killed in action (KIA) and one wounded in action (WIA) did (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) realize the severity of the action in the Ganjgal Valley.

d. (b)(3), (b)(6) believes (b)(2)High requested CCA directly from (b)(2)High (b)(2)High and not through the (b)(2)High The (b)(2)High (b)(2)High is authorized to approve launching the quick reaction force (QRF) and dynamically re-tasking aviation assets.

e. (b)(3), (b)(6) authorized launch of the QRF and was aware the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets would need ORF escorts. He launched the QRF after receiving the initial report of one KIA and one WIA. (b)(3), (b)(6) also notified the TF Mountain Warrior Commander when he received reports of the initial casualties in the Gangjal Valley.

f. (b)(3), (b)(6) was relatively new to the job of TF Mountain Warrior Chief of Operations in September and admitted he did not have a comprehensive understanding regarding re-tasking assets from one battle to another.

g. (b)(3), (b)(6) recalls the (b)(2)High did not send clear reporting to the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High This was the biggest detriment to the ability to control the fight and provide

EXHIBIT III – 4 B.1

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support to the battle in Ganjgal. When aviation assets arrived on station in the Ganjgal Valley the flow of information and reporting improved.

h. (b)(3), (b)(6) had little knowledge of the subject operation. He received a call from the TF Chosin TOC the night prior stating that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) wanted to conduct the mission. (b)(3), (b)(6) told (b)(2)High that he had no assets that he could dedicate to the mission and that they were mostly committed to (b)(2)High MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) said this mission was not briefed as a (b)(2)High and the only planning he saw for the mission was contained in a one page Power Point slide, presented to him the day before the mission. The mission was based on a similar operation from 3 September 2009 in the same area that was successful. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) understood the subject operation, but felt uncomfortable because he had no assets to dedicate to the operation. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) acknowledged (b)(2)High

i. (b)(3), (b)(6) received the report that four Marines were missing at (b)(2)High Upon receipt of this report he re-tasked all available assets from (b)(2)High to Ganjgal Valley.

j. (b)(3), (b)(6) understanding of the relationship between the Embedded Training Team (ETT) and (b)(2)High was that it appeared the ETT had a different chain of command, but they are part of (b)(2)High because they operate in (b)(2)High battlespace.

k. (b)(3), (b)(6) did not know that calls for fires missions were being denied by the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (b)(3), (b)(6) would know if (b)(2)High was shooting but he would not know if they were denying missions.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

JAMES WERTH
(b)(3), (b)(6) COL, USMC