DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 19 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, serves in the Fire Cell in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) for 1-32 Infantry Regiment, Task Force Chosin, and served in this capacity on the day of the subject operation.

2. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) was interviewed telephonically because he was located at COP Monti on 17 November 2009.

3. The substance of SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) 17 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) works in the fire cell in the TF Chosin TOC. His non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) and supervisor is SSG (b)(3), (b)(6)

b. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) was operating under the call sign (b)(2)High for parts of the morning on 8 September 2009. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) officer in charge and the battalion fire support officer (FSO) were not present in the TOC on the morning of 9 November 2009.

c. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) remembered first contact with the enemy was reported from the Ganjgal Valley at 0530. The contact was reported by the Scout element that provided over-watch of the Ganjgal Valley. The Scout element was the only element in the valley SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) recalls hearing on the radio. The initial report consisted of sustaining gunfire and muzzle flashes. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) remembers the Scout element requesting fire missions. He recalls one fire mission could not be ranged, but that three fire missions were fired and the first two mission were repeated. When he received two different fire missions for two different locations he knew the situation on the ground was serious and different than routine contact.

d. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) remembered the Scout element requesting CCA and CAS and the TF Chosin TOC trying to get air assets to the Ganjgal Valley.

e. The senior man in the TOC at the time the contact started was CPT (b)(3), (b)(6). SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) could not recall if LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the TOC when the call for CCA and CAS was received.

f. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) remembered SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) calling the aircraft and attempting to get aviation assets into the Ganjgal valley. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) also remembered contacting the TF Chosin Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) and made sure he reported to the TOC.

EXHIBIT III – 1 M.1

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g. Normally the TOC would be briefed on a summarized operations order for any upcoming missions to make sure everyone understood and had situational awareness. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) did not remember an operations order of any sort for this mission.

h. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) recalled a fire mission for (b)(2)High plotted on top of a civilian house and knowing they could not clear that fire. He remembers the adjustment being 20 meters from the house and knowing it was still too close to clear the fire mission.

i. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) reported good communications with the Scout element and that everyone in the TOC could hear those transmissions.

j. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) only knew about (b)(2)High chat and (b)(2)High logs being kept. He did not know of any specific fires mission logs kept at the time but that TF Chosin started to do so after this incident.

4. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC