DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 19 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, serves as Battalion S2, 1-32 Infantry Regiment (Task Force Chosin), and held this position during the planning and execution of the subject operation.

2. The substance of CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) statement is summarized below:

a. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was present for some of the mission planning for the operation into Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009. However, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) states he was more involved in the planning for the 3 September 2009 Key Leader Engagement (KLE) mission into Dam Darya (a neighboring village). Much of the intelligence from the first mission was directly relevant to the Ganjgal village area of operations, and the enemy threat situation was assessed to be generally the same. He recalled participating in a coordination meeting on 5 September attended by the Marine ETT members, Afghan National Army (ANA) representatives, (b)(3), (b)(6) - the Afghan Border Police (ABP) Mentor, and CPT(b)(3), (b)(6) TF Chosin assistant S2. The goal of the mission into the Ganjgal village was to build on the success the ANA/ABP had experienced on the KLE in Dam Darya on 3 September 2009. During the meeting, ANA/ABP involvement, weather, close combat aviation (CCA), and available (b)(2)High (b)(2)High assets were discussed.

b. The mission planning noted the main effort in the area would be (b)(2)High located in the Shuryak valley north of FOB Joyce. Due to (b)(2)High priority of support requirements, this operation would have no dedicated air support. Although CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) is the intelligence officer, he tracked the availability of air assets (b)(2)High hours out for their (b)(2)High capabilities.

c. Because a large element of the battalion had been pulled to the Barge Matal mission (including several S3 planners) CPT(b)(3), (b)(6) S2A led TF Chosin planning. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) felt there was little new intelligence and planning to be done for the Ganjgal mission.

d. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) provided input to the planning sessions, including the assessment of the enemy Most Likely Course Of Action (MLCOA). It was expected the ANA/ABP might encounter a squad sized element with small arms and rocket propelled grenades (RPG) that would engage on their return from the Ganjgal Valley.

EXHIBIT III – 1 D.1

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e. On the morning of 8 September CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) walked into the TOC at 0900 and immediately started working the TF Chosin S2 Operations personnel to get situational awareness. When he entered the TOC he did not know about the missing Marines. He got the impression that they were in contact with a squad size element and there was no perception a large enemy force was involved.

f. After CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the TOC for about (b)(2)High minutes, four missing Marines were reported. At this point, the scope of the troops in contact (TIC) began to be understood in the TOC. LTC(b)(3), (b)(6) had left the TOC but came back. TF Chosin called the TF Mountain Warrior TOC and asked for all available assets and also retasked the TF Chosin platoon from their assignment to (b)(2)High

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC