SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

UTHORITY:	Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES:	Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB Joyce	20090911	1547	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	E6

8. HHC 1-32

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

A. I am a Scout Squad Leader in HHC 1-32. On 8 SEP 2009 My Squad (b)(2)High and 2nd Squad (b)(2)High were assigned to infil 2 hours prior to mission kick off and overwatch the village of Ganjgal for any movement. We were in place and observing around (b)(2)High One team (b)(2)High was observing Dam Darya. My squad was observing Ganjgal.

B. (b)(3), (b)(6) ~~BETWEEN~~ When the main body came up into the ORP the lights in Ganjgal turned off. That was around 0430. At around 0520-0530 when the ETT's & ANA were moving into their designated OPs, they started taking fire. (b)(2)High was moving up the middle at that time too. I called up to Chasin they were in contact. (b)(2)High was trying to coordinate fires. Immediately upon contact I called for air support or shortly after. The enemy fire became increasingly more intense and from so many different positions. Our element was not able to observe the origin of most of it. (b)(2)High gave us (b)(2)High to fire on initially with little effects. I think and (b)(2)High were actually fired on. (b)(2)High was requested for and ETT element pinned down but only (b)(2)High was available. I'm not sure which ETT element that was. The intense fighting went on until around 1300 and stopped around 1400. Throughout, (b)(2)High sent us sitreps. He called up 2 wounded at one point in the morning around 0900 maybe. Everyone on the ground was in heavy contact. (b)(2)High The mission was for a group of ETT/ANA pinned inside a building I believe

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

HE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1547 DATED 20090911

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

When I called for CCA or CAS I was told it was all tied up in another operation. I kept requesting Air and finally they said (b)(2)High, still, there was no air. I kept requesting Air until it finally came over (b)(2)High after first requested. At that point wounded had already been called in. So it must have been (b)(2)High or so when air initially came. The size of the enemy force was well over 50 and they were inside Ganjgal, Dam Darya and the hills at the North, Northeast East, Southeast and South. Our force was (b)(2)High (b)(2)High scouts in overwatch. Then enemy was using PKM, RPGs and mayor recoiless also Before the mission everyone knew it was a stronghold area. Contact was imminent in my opinion. There is always contact in Ganjgal. No CCA or CAS was on for the mission. We knew that.

C. Our Mission was to overwatch Ganjgal and support main effort in a deliberate clear of Ganjgal. We ended up primarily being a relay for forces on the ground as (b)(2)High had a better grasp of the situation on the ground. On the ETT net all forces on the ground and Scouts. We also had a radio on (b)(2)High I'm not sure the coms could have been better. On the 3rd we did a similar operation where we were primarily (b)(2)High. It also turned into a relay. As for on the ground, there was only one way to do it and that was the way we did it. All ground forces on the ETT net so they could coordinate with eachother. Around 1000-1100 was when they realized they couldnt contact the (b)(2)High ETTs and a search for them was initiated. I have no idea when they lost comms with them. There was so much contact and each ETT was fighting their own battles. I cant say when it happened only that when they tried to get accountability and break out of there they couldn't contact them.

D. There was no up-to-date threat analysis. From the beginning to end (0530-1230) it was heavy fighting from every direction. It was a no brainer

E. Fire support & Air were requested immediately. Fires weren't able to hit key areas in the town because of ISAF. Also we weren't able to observe where exactly the fires were coming from. Fires had ill effects. Air took forever even after wounded was reported. It was like it was routine, whenever you get here, you get here. There was no urgency. Air finally got to them about (b)(2)High after contact was called in. They kept say (b)(2)High over & over.

F. The mission was definitely compromised. The elders/police could have easily tipped the enemy off. They knew what day we were coming. All I know is that they were already in position and waiting, and they had a ton of ammo. It was a complex ambush. There was no movement in the town or around it before the main force was engaged.

ITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1547 DATED 20090911

STATEMENT (Continued)

6. I recommend that we decentralize and give all calls to the commander on the ground. They ask for indirect and in return get 20 questions. The people in the TOC need to let the ground commander do his thing and trust what he is asking for. Also when (b)(2)High asked for help to retrieve bodies nobody helped. They called (b)(2)High why should you have to call (b)(2)High in a situation like that. It should be just go. There was U.S out there. It doesn't matter if its Chosin or Marine. Also we were being told to ask grid locations of the fallen, how many radios & what equipment was lost. All this during a fight when the commander on the ground was busy coordinating and fighting. That stuff can be done during the AAR debrief. He didnt have time to answer those questions. Also they wanted a plan of action for the missing marines. Well, they were looking for them. Thats all you can do. All in all just butt out and the information will get passed up when it does. So many times Chosin asked crazy questions. The fight was long and heavy and I assure anyone, he was doing everything he could. My feeling is that the Marines and (b)(2)High ANA, ABP were left out to dry. Its a horrible feeling but Thats how I feel about it. QRF?, Air? Nothing but endless questions. Also never do Ganigal/Dam Darra without air ever again. I also recommend having (b)(2)High and their (b)(2)High be primary planners for that valley. They bring unconventional thinking and assets that we don't have.

AFFIDAVIT

I, SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

HHC 1-32
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

HHC 1-32
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11 day of September 2009 at FOB Sharana

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Investigating officer
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
OPERATION ENDURUNG FREEDOM
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

15-6 Investigation Talking Points

1. Purpose: To capture the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the enemy attack that occurred in the vicinity of FOB Joyce, on 08 September 2009, resulting in the death of 4 USMC ETT members and the rollover incident of an ASV.

   a. What is duty position and what was it during the mission?

   b. What are the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack? (5 W's) Be specific as possible with regard to the terrain of the attack site, time of attack, size of the enemy force encountered, size of the U.S. / Coalition force, length of the attack, and types of weapons used by the enemy force. What were the pre-mission briefing concerning enemy forces??

   c. What was your mission, including task and purpose, for your element initially and as the time of the mission progressed? What was your role with communications during the mission? Who was on the net and was the comm plan sufficient for maintaining C2? Be specific as possible especially with the 4x Marine ETT members.

   d. Was an up-to-date threat analysis conducted for the mission? What threats were reported?

   e. What, if any, requests for tactical assistance were made prior to, during, or after the attack occurred? Describe the timeline and procedure of the requests and response of U.S. or Coalition forces.

   f. Was the mission compromised? Did anyone communicate the movement schedule / timeline to any local nationals (including ANSF, local police, local leaders, etc.)? If anyone did, describe what was communicated, to whom, and when prior to the mission?

   g. What recommendations concerning improvements, if any, to coalition force tactics, techniques, and procedures will help avoid this type of incident in the future? Be as specific as possible, keeping in mind mission and personnel constraints and limitations.

   h. Any other matters pertaining to this incident that you deem relevant?