DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

CJTF-82 20 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) Task Force Palehorse, and held this position during the subject operation.

2. The substance of MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) 16 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) entered the (b)(2)High Tactical Operations Center (TOC) on 8 September 2009 after a decision was made to launch the (b)(2)High consisting of a (b)(2)High (b)(2)High .

b. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) stated only TF Mountain Warrior TOC had the authority to approve launch of the (b)(2)High from one engagement or one area of operations to another.

c. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that battle space owners could (b)(2)High (b)(2)High

d. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) agreed that (b)(2)High to get aircraft to a contact in their area of operations was too long and was unsure what had happened that contributed to the delay.

e. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) stated (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (b)(2)High On 8 September 2009 there was not an issue of not having enough helicopters to launch, rather, there was an issue of not knowing they were needed in a timely manner.

f. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) has flown in the Ganjgal valley and says it is a very confined airspace. He stated having more than (b)(2)High in the valley at once could be dangerous in regards to increasing the possibility of collisions.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

EXHIBIT III – 5 A.1

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC