DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 20 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, serves as (b)(2)High (b)(2)High and held this position on the day of the subject operation.

2. The substance of CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) 16 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was (b)(2)High on the morning of 8 September 2009 and was the Air Mission Commander (AMC) (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (b)(2)High

b. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted a battle handover with CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)High , in support of (b)(2)High When his (b)(2)High they were contacted by someone in the (b)(2)High (later identified as SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) and asked to move to Ganjgal to support the subject operation.

c. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) said he monitored the ground element's radio traffic. When he arrived in Ganjgal valley, his (b)(2)High attempted to help find the Marines missing in action and immediately realized the ground element was spread out across the valley.

d. When his (b)(2)High came on station things seemed relatively quiet. He knew (b)(3), (b)(6) the (b)(2)High , was trying to break contact with the enemy. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) did not observe fires from the villages or houses (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he was taking fire from.

e. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) noted that once the ground elements were able to bound back to the vehicle objective rally point (ORP), they were free from harassing fires and received no more contact.

f. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) characterized the enemy contact as medium amounts of small arms fire. He was not able to observe many muzzle flashes and was not able to engage many targets.

g. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated the ISAF Tactical Directive was not a factor and has not had much impact on operations since it was published. His squadron was trained on the Tactical Directive's requirements and has discussed it, and its impact on their ability to engage targets.

EXHIBIT III – 5 C.1

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h. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) understanding of (b)(2)High is that he must get direct orders from the (b)(2)High who must get direct permission from the (b)(2)High

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC