DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

CJTF-82 20 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. (b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High (Task Force Mountain Warrior) and held that position during the planning and execution of the subject investigation.

2. The substance of CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) 16 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) has been with his current unit since July 2006 and served as a platoon leader in Iraq for 15 months. He has served in the (b)(2)High since October 2008. His training leading up to the deployment was two field problems and a rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) with his unit. He has been a CPT since July 2008 and has not yet been to his CPT's career course.

b. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he does have a standard operating procedure (SOP) that he follows that contains various battle drills that show him how to react to different situations he might encounter as a Battle CPT. He offered to provide a copy of the SOP. On the morning of 8 September 2009 his reactions were based mostly off of memory, not the SOP.

c. On the day of the subject operation, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) recalled being informed of an initial report of three to five enemy fighters who were in contact with an Embedded Training Team (ETT) and Afghan National Army (ANA) joint operation in the Ganjgal Valley. He came on shift at 0800 and became aware of a report that one ETT member and one ATT soldier were wounded in action. He also was aware that a quick reaction force (QRF) was en route and that a (b)(2)High (b)(2)High were on scene providing support to the ground element in contact.

d. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) believed the situation was serious based on the number of wounded, but that it was also typical of a small troops in contact (TIC) situation.

e. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) normally goes over all significant acts (SIGACTs) from the previous 12 hours during his shift change brief, evaluates upcoming operations, and determines what assets have been requested, what assets are dedicated to current operations, and assets still available.

f. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the most senior person on the (b)(2)High that morning was the (b)(2)High , both field grade offiers.

EXHIBIT III – 4 E.1

g. Individuals in the TOC knew the event was serious when the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High popped up an icon indicating there were six ANA soldiers killed in action and 15 ANA soldiers wounded in action. Using (b)(2)High to communicate between (b)(2)High various units and commands was common. He believed the icon came in about 0810.

h. Everything TF Mountain Warrior becomes aware of (b)(2)High will see simultaneously. TF Mountain Warrior relies on subordinate units to give constant updates and when they need additional or quicker information they call the subordinate unit.

i. TF Mountain Warrior has a (b)(2)High in the TOC but the primary means of (b)(2)High He thinks the tools and (b)(2)High available to him in the TOC are sufficient to communicate and gather information in a quick and accurate manner.

j. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he and (b)(2)High staff tried to push as many assets to TF Chosin as possible, but it was difficult because many assets were dedicated to (b)(2)High (b)(2)High in the Shuryak Valley. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated only the (b)(2)High or (b)(2)High were allowed to dynamically re-task aviation assets from one operation to another. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated it was an ongoing discussion on the day of the subject operation what assets to commit and when to commit them to the competing battles in Ganjgal and the Shuryak Valley.

k. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) remembered the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) situation for the subject operation was confusing because various elements on the ground evacuated their Soldiers to FOB Joyce through ground vehicles. The movement of casualties was not clearly recorded or communicated among the various elements involved in the process.

l. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) first became aware that the four Marines were missing at 0930. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) made multiple calls to CJTF-82 to provide updates.

m. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) did not remember who asked for an (b)(2)High (b)(2)High to be sent to the Ganjgal Valley. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) knew the Brigade sent close combat aviation (CCA), MEDEVAC, and (b)(2)High to TF Chosin to support.

n. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) believed that if air support and CCA had been re-tasked from Operation (b)(2)High to Ganjgal, the consequences could have been devastating to (b)(2)High (b)(2)High resulted in 15-20 enemy killed in action, mostly due to CCA support they received.

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o. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) did not communicate with his Afghan National Army (ANA) counterparts during the subject operation.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC