DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 19 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) USA, serves in the Fires Cell, 1-32 Infantry Regiment , Task Force Chosin, and held this duty at the time of the subject operation.

2. The substance of SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) 17 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Fire and Effects Coordination Cell non-commissioned officer in charge in the TF Chosin Tactical Operations Center (TOC) on 8 September 2009. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) worked the night shift from 7 September beginning at 2000 until 0800 on 8 September.

b. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) recalled fires missions requested from the Ganjgal valley from the (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High On 8 September 2009 TF Chosin kept only a computer log of fires mission; they now keep a written log as well.

c. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) remembered asking for corrections to the previously fired missions, but did not receive them. The ground Scout element leader was the only individual he had communications with from outside the TOC. He remembered CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) the Afghan Border Patrol Mentor, calling for the fires and reporting he was pinned down. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) made the decision not to shoot because only a field grade officer could approve a fire mission and at the time there was no field grade officer present in the TOC.

d. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) characterized the tactical situation at 0600 as "serious" and "bad", and that he knew some elements were "pinned down". He did not know how serious the battle was until he returned to his shift at 2000 on 8 September 2009.

e. The only thing he recalls the ground Scout element relaying to him to show the urgency of the situation was a radio transmission saying, "they are getting pretty fucked up" . He felt the Scout element was remaining calm.

f. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) used the call sign (b)(2)High and directly called a Scout Weapons Team (SWT) (b)(2)High (OH-58D helicopters) he knew was in the area on the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) made this decision on his own to initiative and also sent the SWT a (b)(2)High (b)(2)High The TF Chosin Battle CPT attempted to call the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High to request air assets. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) claimed he made contact with the (b)(2)High OC who gave him permission to re-task the SWT. He sent a (b)(2)High

EXHIBIT III – 1 J.1

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(b)(2)High to the SWT, who at the time were a five minute flight from the Ganjgal valley. He was later told by the pilots that he could not re-task them. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) later found out the TF (b)(2)High from (b)(2)High minute flight to Ganjgal, was being sent to support. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) made calls to the pilots and (b)(2)High (b)(2)High to an hour into the fight when he could tell it was becoming a serious situation that warranted (b)(2)High

g. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) did not recall having any interaction with LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) before he left the TOC. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) remembered being asked by the Battle CPT why he (SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) could not or would not clear the fire mission.

h. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) said that no one could give permission for any fire mission (b)(2)High in a position that close to the village and civilian structures.

i. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) opinion was that much of the problem during this operation was due to the sporadic and inconsistent ability to communicate with the ground element through the scout element in the over-watch position. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) thought (b)(2)High was only requested to obscure the ground forces exit, not because enemy fighters were close to friendly forces.

j. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) was not involved in mission planning. He said that if he had been involved, he would have recommended a (b)(2)High series Soldier be included in the ground element to assist with calling for fires.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC