DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82 19 November 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Technical Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) USAF, Regarding Operations in the Ganjgal Valley on 8 September 2009

1. Technical Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) USAF, serves as the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) for TF Chosin and has held this position since July 2009.

2. The substance of TSgt (b)(3), (b)(6) 17 November 2009 statement is summarized below:

a. On the morning of 8 September 2009, TSGT(b)(3), (b)(6)entered the TF Chosin Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at 0555 and became aware of an element taking small arms fire in TF Chosin's Area of Operations. The TF Chosin Battle Captain, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) asked TSGT(b)(3), (b)(6) to find out what air assets were available at the time. TSGT(b)(3), (b)(6)was not told that the TF Chosin Scout element over-watching the Ganjgal Valley had radioed the TF Chosin TOC requesting Close Air Support (CAS). TSGT(b)(3), (b)(6)offered to open up an Air Troops in Contact (TIC) but was directed not to by CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) CPT(b)(3), (b)(6) told him "not to worry about it for now" and that TF Chosin would support the TIC with indirect fire.

b. TSGT(b)(3), (b)(6)noted that there were no field grade officers in the TOC before 0600 and that the CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was authorized to request the JTAC to open an Air TIC.

c. TSGT(b)(3), (b)(6)said the Fires Effects Cell (FEC) NCOIC, SSG(b)(3), (b)(6)asked him if he had any air assets available. TSGT (b)(3), (b)(6)replied air assets could be made available if he could open an Air TIC. CPT(b)(3), (b)(6) again told TSGT(b)(3), (b)(6)not to open an Air TIC. TSGT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated a field grade officer had yet to arrive in the TOC at this time.

d. To the best of TSGT (b)(3), (b)(6) recollection, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) TF Chosin's Acting Commander, did not have a consistent presence in the TOC until the Marines were declared missing.

e. Only after the Marines were declared missing did TSGT(b)(3), (b)(6)open an Air TIC on his own initiative without being told by the CPT(b)(3), (b)(6) to do so. He opened the Air TIC at 0930. CAS was on scene at 0948.

f. TSGT(b)(3), (b)(6)stated throughout the entire length of the Ganjgal engagement he was absent from the TOC for only 30 minutes to get chow and to make a quick trip to his tent.

EXHIBIT III – 1 K.1

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g. TSGT(b)(3), (b)(6) reported that he felt a hesitance from the TF Chosin personnel to open an Air TIC. He believed there was a clear lack of understanding in the TOC of the extent and nature of the engagement in the Ganjgal valley.

h. TSGT(b)(3), (b)(6) reported that the engagement in the TOC went from "no urgency" to "importance" in a "snap".

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL, USMC