

hours. [redacted] had returned early morning from being in sector, and was "down" and did not provide any specific guidance or written orders to Gator [redacted] before departing (Exhibit 1, 12).

b. Gator [redacted] searched the cache site with NSTR. They had been in the area of [redacted] previously and believed the Iraqis were friendly toward the Coalition. They departed and while enroute in [redacted] received a radio call from [redacted] of a suspected IED emplacer. They proceeded to spend approximately 2 hours conducting hasty cordon & knocks, and detained one suspicious Iraqi male for follow-on tactical questioning. On/around 1800hrs, Gator [redacted] linked up with Gator [redacted] and relieved them of security of a booby trapped house vic (MB [redacted]), and ultimately secured that house throughout the night until 0630hrs on the 23<sup>rd</sup>, in order for the house to be destroyed by a JDAM. [redacted] and [redacted] departed with the 1 x detainee with Gator [redacted] at 2000hrs back to FOB Stryker in order to fill out sworn statements, leaving Gator [redacted] with only 10 Soldiers and 1 LN TERP for the duration of the mission (Exhibit 1,2,3).

c. At 0630hrs, the JDAM impacted the booby trapped house vic (MB [redacted]). Upon completion of a search to confirm the destroyed building, Gator [redacted] moved dismounted & mounted to clear the route to the future patrol base. They arrived at 0830hrs, vic (MB [redacted]) and began priorities of work to establish a permanent patrol base for future company operations (Exhibit 1,2,3,4,9,10). 90 minutes earlier (0700hrs) [redacted] leading Gator [redacted] departed FOB Stryker with the mission of returning 1 x detainee, and conducting a reconnaissance of zones [redacted] & [redacted] (newly assumed battlespace), and to identify crossing points along [redacted] (Exhibits 14, 15, 29).

d. 1200hrs, Gator [redacted] notified Gator [redacted] via radio that he was to conduct a search of a possible cache site vic (MB [redacted]) an expected cemetery (Exhibit 1, 12, 10, 2). This location was over 5.5kms away from the current Patrol base (Diagram 4). [redacted] conducted hasty planning then briefed his leaders and left a 5 point contingency plan with [redacted] the senior Soldier who would remain at the patrol base. Gator [redacted] departs on foot with 5 Soldiers, 1 TERP, 4 x M4s, 1 x M203, 1 x ASIP radio, 1 x Mine detector and at least 4 x NAVAID GPSs (Diagram 2, Exhibit 1, 2, 9, 10). On or about the same time, the Gator Patrol continues to move South and is having communications problems, and begins to relay SITREPs through [redacted] at the Patrol Base (Exhibit I, J, 14, 15).

e. 1320hrs, Gator [redacted] frontline trace is reported/logged at [redacted], which is just inside Zone304 but well to the North of Gator [redacted] (Exhibit I).

f. 1330hrs, Gator [redacted] identifies a suspected IED vic (MB [redacted]) on [redacted] the same vicinity of where a few days prior the IA had been hit with an IED. They fire 3-4 rounds from a M4 in an attempt to set the IED off, and then identify a local Iraqi to check the suspicious site. It turns out to be a space blanket and not an IED, so they continue mission towards the cemetery (Diagram 4) (Exhibit 1, 2, 3, 4).

g. 1430hrs: [redacted] (RTO) informs [redacted] they are no longer able to transmit, and receive effective communications. They have just passed West of some powerlines which are impacting their ability to communicate. [redacted] decides to continue mission, hoping as they get closer to the cemetery they may be able to relay through the [redacted] vic (MB [redacted]) (Exhibit 1, 2, 9, 10).

h. 1430hrs, frontline trace of Gator [redacted] is reported as (MB [redacted] inside of Zone 310 and approximately 2.5kms East of the Patrol Base. NSTR by Gator [redacted] Gator [redacted] has no situational awareness of Gator [redacted]'s movements as he no longer has communications or is near [redacted] (Exhibit I, 1, 2, 14, 15)

i. Gator 26 arrives at ORP and splits into two 3 man elements. [redacted] and [redacted] move forward and conduct a quick exploitation of the cemetery, but determine no cache to be found (did not dig due to sensitive nature of the site). The patrol rejoins 15 minutes later, and begins moving South towards [redacted] and arrives o [redacted] at 1600hrs, and begins movement East (Diagram 4) (Exhibit 1, 2, 3, 4). Gator [redacted] is now moving West and has crossed into Zone [redacted] in order to find crossing sites of the canal, to move through and get across and recon Zone [redacted]. Frontline trace is logged as ([redacted] which is West of the Patrol Base. [redacted] nor [redacted] are aware, Gator [redacted] is operating along [redacted]. His far West, not has the Company CP identified that Gator [redacted] is now operating in Gator [redacted] is assigned sector (Exhibit I, 9, 10, 14, 15, 18, 19, 29).

j. On/around 1600hrs [redacted] attempts to pay for a ride with an Iraqi family in a Bongo truck back to the patrol Base. He offers the Iraqi driver up to \$60 US dollars for a ride, as [redacted] is now pressed for time and realizes that nightfall is coming. The Iraqi declines and drives East, and moments later an AIF forces engages Gator [redacted] with Small Arms and Machinegun fire. Gator [redacted] was moving East split in a road march formation, but with Soldiers on both sides of the canal (that runs through [redacted] roads on north/South of canal). [redacted] element returns fire [redacted] and [redacted] return fire. [redacted] weapon is damaged, and [redacted] is inoperable due to [redacted] in the barrel where he dove into the ditch. [redacted] also spot AIF directly north and East of their position, and return fire. [redacted] recommends moving towards a house on the South of [redacted] to get to a rooftop to make communications. [redacted] moves, although wounded and the patrol breaks contact (Diagram 5) (Exhibit 1, 2, 3, 4).

k. [redacted] and several Soldiers of Gator [redacted] heard the firefight to their West. SPC [redacted] from the patrol base calls Gator [redacted] and asks if they hear the fire and are they in contact. Gator [redacted] responds no they are not. At no time is it clear to [redacted] that Gator [redacted] is dismantled and West along [redacted] decides to move along [redacted] and investigate the sounds of gunfire, and begins maneuvering around a road blockage, and then to the West. He does not advise the company nor relay he is changing mission or that he had heard a gunfight and is now going to investigate. [redacted] back at the Company CP is unaware of Gator [redacted] intentions, nor does his CP have the situational awareness that Gator [redacted] is dismantled and West (Exhibit I, 12, 9, 10, 14, 15, 19, 29).

l. 1615hrs, after clearing the house vic (MB [redacted] Gator [redacted] attempts to make communications to [redacted] at the patrol base, Gator [redacted] [redacted] believes [redacted] hears them initially but they are cut short due to suspected AIF movement to the North and poor communications. [redacted] fires a 40mm White Parachute Flare/Star Cluster in an attempt to single to friendly forces that they are in trouble (Exhibit 1). They engage AIF from the roof (300 meters), and [redacted] an [redacted] move outside to secure and hotwire a Bongo truck. They immediately load the [redacted] and depart the house moving North to cross the canal, and then speed to the East through suspected AIF and away from known AIF positions. [redacted] is driving at max speed (estimated 30mph +) with [redacted] in the TC side, while [redacted] the TERP [redacted] and

Ripka are in the back. periodically fires rounds out the back at suspected AIF as the vehicle moves Eastward (Diagram 5) (Exhibit 1, 2, 3, 4)

m. 1625hrs, Gator and (Gunner lead truck) observe a Bongo Truck moving at a rapid rate of speed on North headed East (approximately 800ft). It appears to slow, then speed up again and a weapon is observed by outside the TC's window. No friendly markings of the vehicle or US Soldiers can be seen, and believing the vehicle is a hostile force or is displaying hostile intent, orders to "Light them up". (Diagrams 5 & 6) (Exhibit 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25)

n. 1630hrs, Gator patrol engages Bongo truck to defeat the suspected AIF force. Truck 1: M2 Gunner fires; Truck 2 M240 Gunner and and re; and Truck 3 in M240 fires. Vehicle was engaged at an estimated 400ft from the Lead HMMWV, and then slows/rolls to a stop at 128ft where it hits a tree and stops. By examining the photos of the Bongo and the statements of all, I believe the Driver was killed first, and attempted to steer the vehicle and then was fatally wounded. the TERP and were all wounded and quickly exited the truck seeking cover, thinking they were under attack by an unforeseen AIF ambush. Gator and all ceasefire, and firing stops. leaves his HMMWV and moves forward and notices ACUs, and instantly calls for medics and Eagle First Responders to treat the wounded (Diagrams 5-7) (Exhibit 14, 15, 17-32).

o. From 1632-1650hrs, wounded are treated, a MEDEVAC PZ is setup and the wounded are evacuated. The initial report of Blue on Blue fratricide are sent quickly through battalion and to MND-B NLT 30 minutes after the incident (Exhibit I, 3, 4, 14, 15, 29).

### III. Contributing factors in the incident.

a. **Daytime/Nighttime Marking SOPs.** There exist no practiced or enforced SOP for Day/Night marking standards within the platoons/company, although all Soldiers interviewed understood that at night, 2 flashes followed by 3, either blinking lights or IR light was for friendly recognition. Any day linkups had occurred in HMMWVs and FM radio was the far recognition signal. Neither the leaders nor Soldiers had trained, rehearsed or discussed non-standard evacuation with a civilian vehicle on the battlefield, and when in a critical situation (Gator breaking contact) no one thought to mark the Bongo with a VS-17 panel, and commented he wanted the Bongo to move without being recognized by AIF. Every leader in Gator to include the RTO had either a VS-17 or portions of Orange VS-17 on them in their rack systems (Diagram 12). Had a visible VS-17 panel been placed on the dashboard and been observed by Gator night have made the decision to engage with warning shots vice lethal fire.

b. **Communications.** Every Alpha Company patrol has encountered constant communication challenges when operating in sector. The battalion has identified this and established a RETRANS at the RPC (MB) as well as the HHC forward Patrol Base vic (MB) to assist. Almost all patrols will relay through one another to pass SITREPs, as well as use. On the 23<sup>rd</sup>, Gator & Gator were operating on Frequency Hop ASIP Company net. base was transmitting off of vehicle power amp (a COM 201 antenna was not functioning properly), Gator was communicating through both FIPR messages and SINCGARs by relaying through

No vehicles in A Company have vic 3's or crew headsets, and due to the mission requirement of dismounts clearing routes ahead of vehicles, the Patrol leader is reduced to ICOM internal through the driver who is monitoring FM. FIPR messages can pass, and since they are largely point to point (Patrol to Company Opns), other platoons do not maintain the same situational awareness. This problem existed on the 23<sup>rd</sup>, and was fundamental to the conditions surrounding both patrol leaders, neither had accurate information to each other's position and mission on the battlefield, and thus neither could have foreseen the friendly fire fratricide with the Bongo truck. Every vehicle in 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon was equipped with a

addition, the Company is using the assigned frequency hop mode which is a proven fact; will not afford the same range for communications as that of single channel cipher text mode will afford. A LIMFAC in country is that there are not enough available Single Channel Cypher Text frequencies available for use by individual units down to company level.

c. **Battle Tracking, Command and Control and reporting.** I found through the interview process that the Company CP and CO CDR did not have the situational awareness of all patrols and their current locations and actions. Also, the CO CDR was out in sector and was not present to give direct guidance or receive a decent backbrief with overlays, on the Gator initial mission. Had the company formalized OPORDs, established additional operational graphic control measures, clear Task/Purposes with backbriefs been utilized, it is possible that the Company CP and outlying Platoons would have had better situational awareness of the actions ongoing in sector. The Company 1SG is new (previous 1SG was killed by an IED), and the Company XO is not the current operations officer as he is resourcing the fight, thus the Gator Watchkeeper (TOC) is manned by well meaning RTOs and SSGs. Due to the leaders in sector often dismounting, and above mentioned communications challenges, accurate reporting was substandard. Gator did not *effectively* relay to Gator X-Ray that they were conducting a dismounted patrol to accomplish the cache search (this was not expected by Gator, nor was made situationally aware that Gator might have been the unit in contact to the West. Although, there exist logged reports of Gator operating in Gator's assigned battlespace, this is an asymmetric fight, where canals, and numerous obstacles are not conducive to a linear battlespace alignment. Still, the Company Operations and CDR could have foreseen this by conducting a good route analysis and assigning additional graphic control measures. To overcome the challenges of operating in "shared" battlespace, patrols must cross talk more frequently when operating in mutual battlespace, and there are no indications that ever talked via radio on the 23<sup>rd</sup> while in operating in sector. Overall, there are several lessons learned in this area but ultimately no mission ever goes perfect, friction is everywhere and no one particular shortfall caused the fratricide incident to occur.

d. **AIF Activity.** Gator was engaged by a superior force that had the knowledge of terrain and possibly the size – composition of the Gator patrol. After the initial salvo of enemy fire, was wounded, his weapon failed to extract therefore was relegated to single shots, and M4 was inoperable due to him diving into the mud. All Gator patrol members recollect the enemy situation with slight variances, but I do believe there was a force directly to the North and East when the patrol was hit. In addition noticed that throughout their dismounted operation he clarified the area as very unfriendly, and it appeared that they may have been one of the first Coalition forces to ever operate dismounted in this

AO. [redacted] observed Bongo's to the North and believed the AIF could be mobile, and while on the roof, [redacted] and others engaged an AIF force at about 300-400 meters distance. While extracting using the Bongo, they also believed the threat to be real enough to speed dangerously on a dirt road, and continue to fire at suspected AIF ambush positions until they were well clear of the Ambush area. At the time of contact with the Gator element, Gator 26 was still effectively breaking contact.

e. **Unfamiliar Battlespace & Terrain.** Gator [redacted] was to operate in new battlespace on the 23<sup>rd</sup> and conduct a reconnaissance, and determine crossing points and make an assessment of the area (TPT was part of the patrol to help with the assessment). Due to failed attempts to cross a major obstacle (canal) and the request to use the Yusifivah crossing in 1-502<sup>nd</sup> Battlespace being denied, [redacted] elected to maneuver through [redacted] (Gator [redacted] sector) in order to seek crossing points into Zone [redacted]. Had Gator [redacted] been allowed to use the Yusifivah crossing, they would likely not have been in Zone [redacted] at 1630hrs, the time of the fratricide incident. It is important to note as well, due to the minimal planning time for the mission, time was not available to conduct either an air recon, or UAV recon or request imagery products for deliberate planning, prior to being assigned the mission.

[redacted] and 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon had conducted no true dismounted patrols away from vehicles in the previous 15 estimated patrols. He had established a 1700hrs return time and attempted a cross country movement, but due to the numerous obstacles in the terrain (irrigation canals etc), the route to the cache was circuitous and took over 3 hours. Again, operating in unfamiliar terrain proved a factor here, and due to limited time for the return movement, he designated a foot march movement (traveling three on each side of the canal) along [redacted] when his patrol was pushing East to return prior to losing daylight at the time they were ambushed. In my assessment [redacted] was not afforded sufficient planning time to prepare for the dismounted mission, nor was Gator [redacted] guidance clear. By his own admission, [redacted] did not backbrief Gator [redacted] with the details and composition of his patrol, which did not allow for accurate battle tracking by Alpha Company.

f. **Combat Power and Available Manpower.** Every combat unit is challenged to meet the demands and requirements of combat, with available combat power. But in the 2-502<sup>nd</sup> and Alpha Company Gators, they have additional challenges that they continue to overcome. Alpha Company has 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon detached, and portions of the headquarters platoon. In addition, they have lost their 1SG killed to an IED and several other Soldiers wounded or killed, thus reducing available manpower.

Gator [redacted] (Diagram 1) operates in 2 sections, and on 23 Nov 05, they departed the FOB with 4 x HMMWVs (1 a TPT vehicle) and 16 Soldiers and 1 TERP of 20 available seats. Gator 26 departed the FOB on 22 Nov with 13 Soldiers and 1 Terp and 3 x M1114s, but two Soldiers returned with Gator [redacted] and a detainee, leaving them 10 Soldiers and 1 Terp (basically a Squad) to conduct two simultaneous missions (Establish patrol base and Search for a Cache) (Diagram 2).

[redacted] had strong reservations on splitting his force, but decided to use what available combat power in the best way he could to accomplish both missions, thus he departed with 5 Soldiers and a Terp, but these were 5 experienced proven Soldiers. This is unfortunately, occurring in many maneuver units in Iraq, with subordinate leaders mitigating risk and hazards to the best of their ability, while conducting essential missions. Gator [redacted] had no reinforcements to augment Gator [redacted] in order to meet the steady requirement of missions in Sector. Over a 30 day period, Soldiers in 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon averaged 21 days in Sector and the

remaining days were not true off days but were either filled with maintenance, or routine taskings associated with FOR security, guard mounts, etc.

\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ are solicitous and continued to show incredible maturity in their risk mitigation efforts to accomplish all missions assigned or implied, and bring their Soldiers back safely. Each sought advice and recommendations from their Senior NCOs prior to executing tasks-missions, but on most days due to each rifle platoon operating in two sections, the Platoon leader and PSG are split, and time is not available to draw upon one another's experiences in zone. By operating as sections day in and out, we have accepted a degradation of the normal experienced level of a PL and PSG operating together and complimenting one another's capabilities.

g. **Equipment Shortfalls.** There are equipment shortfalls that may have had a bearing on this event. No vehicles were equipped with crew headsets, \_\_\_\_\_ this impacts the TCs ability to remain situationally aware when dismounted, and also internal crew communications consist of shouting while driving while listening to speaker boxes simultaneously. Both 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon are normally outfitted with 5 vehicles per platoon, but routinely 1-2 vehicles per platoon is in maintenance, and steady state patrols consist of 3 or 4 vehicles, which are always hotbedded between the two patrol elements within the platoon. On occasion, vehicles have to be cross-leveled across platoons in order to meet set missions. Not every gunner is equipped with an issued set of Binoculars, and some Soldiers have bought their own mini-binocs which are great for carrying while dismounted, but do not have adequate field of view for gunners in turrets. No M25 stabilized Binoculars are available to the platoon, yet the Army has them and some units have requested them through the Operational Needs Statement process. Soldiers were not familiar with the current TTP being used by other units (2<sup>nd</sup> BDE and 1-10 BCT) of utilizing overt Green Lasers, during escalation of force. This TTP has proven effective on occasion, but is not foolproof, and in prime daylight hours at extended distances will not work, however I have witnessed and used the laser and Iraqi's in Baghdad frequently stop when they observe it on their windshields.

h. **ROE & EOF.** Soldiers in 2<sup>nd</sup> & 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon understand ROE and EOF, have used EOF and fired warning shots on previous occasions. In all cases a M4 was used to fire a warning shot, and not a M2 or M240. ROE cards are carried, and ROE & EOF is reviewed prior during Patrol Orders, and soldiers understand how to apply EOF. As mentioned in the findings \_\_\_\_\_ deduced the Bongo truck was an immediate urgent threat, and ordered the vehicle to be defeated/fired upon and chose not to initiate with a warning shot. \_\_\_\_\_ responded and initiated with lethal M2 fire into the engine block of the Bongo, which caused others in the Gator patrol to fire as well. \_\_\_\_\_ the M240 Gunner in Truck 2 initially engaged with an M4 (due to his training in EOF), but it jammed, and he switched to the M240.

i. **Training.** The consensus of all Soldiers was they were trained for operations in Iraq. Many conducted a JRTC rotation in the spring, and several live fires and close quarters battle training prior to deploying. Alpha Company did not conduct M2 .50Cal training (live fire) prior to deploying, and little to no Up-Armored HMMWV training prior to deployment. IN Kuwait, each driver trained for 5-10 minutes on a M1114, due to the unavailability of M1114s for training. Current M2 Gunners are not qualified, as they have not been afforded the opportunity nor does OPTEMPO allow the time, but the CDR has mitigated risk by assigning the M240 gunners to M2 positions. Current M240 gunners are either former AG's or M249 gunners. Although not a direct factor in this incident, this is an example of how the CDR has had to

recognize a hazard, and use what methods available to overcome the associated risks with operating in combat. It was very apparent the Eagle First Responder (EFR) increased medical proficiency training was key in stabilizing the wounded, and quickly preparing them for movement to the MEDEVAC. Both Platoons have experienced OIF veterans, and are highly motivated and well led. However, the unit had never conducted any non-standard evacuation training with civilian vehicles at JRTC or prior to deploying and when asked, no Soldiers could recall every having trained on non-standard evacuation. This may be because of an overdependence on our MEDEVAC helicopter capability in theater, which is very responsive, but only if you have solid communications.

e. **IEDs, VBIEDs, and Bongo trucks.** Alpha Company had experienced several IEDs recently in sector, to include losing Soldiers and their 1SG to an IED. Leaders routinely received intelligence briefings on the VBIED threat, but had yet to experience any in zone. Leading up to the 23<sup>rd</sup>, the Company had found a IED factory (the chicken farm), and more importantly, it was reported that near almost every IED incident, Bongo trucks were observed moving suspiciously, with suspected AIF. It was also normal for Iraqi vehicles when approaching patrols to pull off to the side, turn on hazards, or to turn around select another route. A Bongo speeding up towards the Gator 36 element was out of the norm, thus when the weapon was observed outside (held by \_\_\_\_\_), indicators were there that this Bongo was a possible AIF vehicle with hostile intent.

#### IV. Recommendations.

a. \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ died heroically while serving their country in Iraq. They both received fatal wounds while conducting a combat patrol and while evading a determined AIF force in the process of attempting to evacuate their wounded platoon leader \_\_\_\_\_ while under hostile fire and threat. They should be recognized and remembered for the heroism while under fire, and for their actions in combat.

b. The Investigating Officer does not recommend any non-judicial or UCMJ punishment for any Soldiers involved in this incident.

c. Counseling with the CO CDR \_\_\_\_\_ by the BDE CDR. Counseling should focus on areas to improve in the Company on detailed orders, operational command and control, reporting procedures and operational maneuver considerations.

d. Counseling with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Plt Leader \_\_\_\_\_ and the Bn CDR. Counseling should focus on duties and responsibilities of a Platoon leader, and understanding reporting, and operational maneuver considerations.

e. Implement a Leader PD opportunity for lessons learned from this incident across the BDE. BDE Leadership can determine down to which level lessons learned should be taught (CO CDRs down through Patrol Leaders is recommended to include their counterpart NCOs).

f. Review and standardize a day/night recognition signal and marking system within the BDE. Develop a non-standard ground evacuation guideline and ensure that standard is known throughout the BDE.

g. Request MND-B and Strike Brigade assistance with regards to equipping the force for combat:

(1) Assign one single channel cipher text per company, per maneuver battalion in all BCT's operating in battlespace where Frequency HOP communications is substandard due to terrain and distance factors.

(2) Review the M1114 Up Armored HMMWV allocation across MND-B. The Baseline Standard should be each Maneuver Patrol Element is equipped with 4 x Level I Vehicle Mobility Platforms (M1 or M2 or M1114 Up Armored HMMWVs).

(3) Resource appropriate amount of Green Overt Lasers to BCT's in order to enable Soldiers another tool in the EOF procedures.

(4) Resource Integral vehicle Communication headsets (minimum of three per vehicle), with one set (TC) capable of dismount ability, and constant SA over FM communications.

(5) Acquire and resource M25 Stabilized Binocs (4 per Platoon BOIP).

(6) Continue to leverage emerging technology and warfighting capabilities such as dismounted FBCB2, Land Warrior spiral technology – Commander's Digital Assistant, or TACTICOM systems to assist in the decentralized fight in MND-B. Continue to leverage organizations like the IED Task Force and Rapid Equipping Force to provide solutions to the high priority emerging requirements found in each BCT area of operation.

V. Point of contact is the undersigned, at VOIP



LTC, Infantry  
Deputy BCT Commander

**Exhibit E. Detailed Event Timeline.** (All times are based on log entries or personal accounts are of those Soldiers involved. Some witness statements had conflicting times and this is to be expected for times to differ slightly, due to no synchronization of watches or accurate logging of key events other than any notes or logs or SIGACTs posted).

**Note:** Entries in Black Arial Font are Gator 26 Patrol  
 Entries in Blue Courier Font are Gator 6 Patrol

19 Nov 05

- 2200 2-502 FRAGO to OPORD Specific Task to A Co, Conduct S&A on 21 Nov 05 vic MB (cemetery) to locate destroy AIF caches and prevent AIF attacks

20 Nov 05

- Gator 6 Conducting Operations in Sector

21 Nov 05

- 0200 Gator 6 Patrol returns to FOB after successful mission
- 1300 [redacted] completes Debrief with Co XO
- 2000 [redacted] verbal WARNORD from C XO for mission on 22nd
- Note No initial backbrief (Gator 6 is forward in sector)
- 2200 [redacted] assembled NCOs and issues WARNORD for Mission
- 2200 Gator 6 returns from sector

22 Nov 05

- 0600-0800 PCCs/PCIs
- 0730 [redacted] Gives Patrol order to Section T1: Move to [redacted] P1: Search for Cache, T2: Est Patrol base vic [redacted] P2: Deny AIF IEDs on key intersection
- 0800 [redacted] receives short update from Bn BTL CPT, and Bn S3
- 1100 Patrol Departs FOB Liberty
- 1300-UTC Search for Cache vic [redacted] NSTR
- TBD Cordon & Knock suspect homes (with [redacted] assistance): 1 Detainee
- 1800est Gator 6 Patrol links up with Gator 6 Patrol, relieves 34 of security of area around building to be JDAM-ed in the morning
- 1900est Gator 6 Patrol Departs and returns to FOB (2 Pax from 26 escort one detainee)
- 2000-2100 Gator 6 Patrol Receives Verbal FRAGO-Passord from Gator 6 Patrol Company TOC
- 2100 Initial Verbal Backbrief to Gator 6 by [redacted]
- 2100-UTC [redacted] assembled NCOs and issues WARNORD for Mission
- 2200 [redacted] Gator 6 Patrol

23 Nov 05

- 0600 [redacted] Issues Patrol Order to Gator 6 Patrol  
 Gator 6 Patrol receives intel update, gets trip ticket
- 0630-0635 JDAM of Booby trapped House (MB)
- 0635-0715 2<sup>ND</sup> Plt Searches/Confirms House Destroyed
- 0715-0830 2<sup>ND</sup> Plt Clears Route and moves to Patrol Base
- 0700 est Gator 6 Patrol Departs FOB Stryker on Mission
- 0830 est Gator 6 Patrol Occupies Patrol Base [redacted] vic (MB)
- 0830-1200 Priorities of Work for 26 Element, establish Patrol Base
- 1200 [redacted] relays Gator 6 STTREP to Gator X-Ray
- 1200 est Gator 6 FRAGO to [redacted] Conduct Cache Search MB
- 1200-1230 Less than 30minutes of Planning time available for [redacted]
- 1230 Modified Patrol Brief & 5 Point Contingency given by [redacted]

- 1240 Gator Dismounted Patrol Departs
- 1320 Gator reports at NSTR
- 1330-1400 Suspected IED enroute (MB 2400 65532) Fire 3-4 rounds, false IED
- 1430-1500 Gator Loses FM Comz with Patrol Base and all others (Power Lines)
- 1430 Gator reports at NSTR
- 1530 Gator reports at NSTR
- 1530 est Patrol split to find bypass of obstacle on
- 1530 Arrive Cache Site, Patrols Splits
- 1600 Recon returns, begin movement to
- 1605-1610 stops Bongo attempts to pay for a ride to Patrol base, Bongo departs
- 1610 est Enemy Engages Dismounts (Far ambush) while Patrol is on walking East towards the 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon Patrol Base
- 1600-1610 Several Soldiers in 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon hear SA fire/explosions to the West
- 1610-1615 (Patrol Base) calls Gator asks if they here small arms fire and are in contact. \* Does not inform that is dismounted and West along
- 1610-1620 est Decision by to move West (does not relay through 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon) for to Co Ops his intent of moving to contact.
- 1610-1620 s patrol returns fire, breaks contact and moves to house and attempts Commo, then secure Bongo Truck (attempts to contact Viper element)
- 1620 Bongo loaded and departs, crosses canal and head East on N side of FATBOY
- 1620 est Gator moves west Along (south side) toward suspected AIF
- 1625 est Bongo Truck observed 200-300 meters to the West, on N side of (Bongo appears to slow, then speed up and Weapon is observed out of passenger window)
- 1625 est Bongo Truck accelerates and speeds East, Gator directs to "light them up" 30 element engages Bongo perceived as hostile Air element
- 1630-1632 Direct Fire Contact with 3rd Platoon on at
- 1635-1640 Initial report received by Gator that there are friendlies wounded, Medevac 9 line begins to extract casualties
- 1635- UTC Casualties treated, LZ secured, MEDEVAC begins.