Drill 4 (Traffic Control Point) to Appendix 1 (Operational Drills) to Annex C (G3 Operations) to Chapter 2 (Operations) to 3ID FSOP

Drill 4 – Traffic Control Point		
Search Area		
#	Item	
1	Select well-lit check point	
2	Standoff from neighborhood structures	
3	Enough area to accommodate number of search teams	
4	establish warning signs with sufficient distance to allow drivers to react 1 "SLOW, US CHECKPOINT" 2 "STOP, TAKE ORDERS FROM SOLDIERS"	
5	Use physical barriers to force vehicles to slow down	
6	Every TCP will have a warning area and alert area to provide maximum standoff for oncoming traffic	
7	Prepare barriers, such as tire poppers or a vehicle, to block movement of vehicles attempting to continue through search area	
8	Soldiers should fire into engine blocks before engaging driver	
Search Procedures		
#	Item	
1	establish Overwatch. Weapons system must be capable of stopping vehicle.	
2	establish blocking positions	
3	establish search area. Segregate passengers so that they cannot observe your search procedures.	
4	Each search team maintains 360 degree security	
5	Pre-printed instructions in Iraqi or have one translator for each search team	
6	Use flashlights and gloves	
Search Refusal		
#	Item	
1	Use graduated responses	
2	If necessary, separate, restrain, and detain	
Detainees		
#	Item	
1	Maintain separate area for detainees	
2	Plan for transport of detainees	
3	Secure detainee vehicles at the scene	
Iraqi Casualties		
#	Item	
1	Know location of nearest IZ hospital/clinic	
2	Know location of nearest police station	
3	Take statements and establish crime scene	
TCP Kit		
#	Item	
1	Warning signs, triangles, sawhorses, or traffic cones	
2	Flashlights (2 per search team)	
3	Body bags (5)	

4	Rubber Gloves (10 pair)	
5	Detainee Forms (20)	
6	Zip Ties (20)	
7	Tire Popper	
8	Laminated search instructions, curfew violation warnings, contraband list, weapon's policy guidelines, and female search instructions	
9	Search mirrors	
Minimum Leader Requirements		
#	Item	
1	Map Recon	
2	Mission Briefing	
3	Safety Briefing	
4	Backbrief to commander or designated representative	

TCP = "STRUCTURED ENGAGEMENT AREA"

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MEDICAL CARE

DATE	SYMPTOMS, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, TREATING ORGANIZATION (Sign each entry)
27 FEB 2005	OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM II
TIME 2057	♂ PRESENT W/ ABD WOUND. ARRIVE W/O
BP	PULSE. COMPRESSIONS STARTED W/ BVM
P	PT PRONOUNCED @ ~~2008~~ 2108.
R	Pt came to aid station c̄ lower left abdomen
T	GSW. noted to have J-tube in place left
SPO 2	no spontaneous respirations. DPV c̄ BVM was
ALL:	initiated c̄ good b/l breath sounds and
	symmetric chest rise. No pulse palpated,
MEDS:	Chest compressions started c̄ good resultant carotid
	pulse. Patient noted to have fixed and
PMHx:	dilated pupils, also c̄ blue gums noted
	Compressions stopped and no pulse appreciated.
	pt. was pronounced dead @ 2108 by
PSHx:	2057 this physician.
	P- Ø
TOB:	D- Ø
	R- Ø
LMP:	

PATIENT'S IDENTIFICATION (Use this space for Mechanical Imprint)

ANDERSON, SPC

[redacted]

Male

RECORDS MAINTAINED AT:

PATIENT'S NAME (Last, First, Middle initial)		SEX
RELATIONSHIP TO SPONSOR	STATUS	RANK/GRADE
SPONSOR'S NAME	ORGANIZATION	
DEPART./SERVICE	SSN/IDENTIFICATION NO.	DATE OF BIRTH

Entrance of
TOP
Vehicle was well within
the checkpoint when it
came to a stop

EXHIBIT DF



EXHIBIT AF


Civilian Vehicle
SPC Anderson
Direction in which SPC Anderson move to get out of the way

EXHIBIT A6

Exit wound according to PA's



EXHIBIT AH

Sketch drawn by the section on the night of
27 FEB 05



EXHIBIT A0

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6 January 2005

MEMORANDUM THRU

Commander, [redacted] Fort Stewart, Georgia 31314

Commander, [redacted], Fort Stewart, Georgia 31314

FOR CG, [redacted] Fort Stewart, GA 31314

SUBJECT: OIF III Task Certification

1. References:
   a. [redacted]
   b. [redacted]
   c. [redacted]
   d. [redacted]

2. The purpose of this memorandum is to certify that [redacted] has successfully completed training on all FORSCOM and [redacted] directed OIF III tasks. Soldiers in this unit have received instruction and conducted practical training on:

   a. All FORSCOM and 3d Infantry Division directed tasks IAW FORSCOM MESSAGE R 021135Z OCT 03, [redacted] OPORD 04-59, OIF Training Guidance (OTG), 211103R APR 04 with FRAGOs (U) [redacted] BDE OPORD 04-26 (Spartan Eagle), Annex D (Training Guidance) [redacted] OPORD 04-51 (FORSCOM Training).

   b. Detainee Procedures

   c. Law of Land Warfare and Code of Conduct

   d. Cultural Awareness and Arabic Language Training

   e. Dealing with Combat Stress

   f. Employing Non-Lethal Weapons

3. All Soldiers have read and been briefed on USCENTCOM General Order Number 1A.

4. I certify that [redacted] is ready to deploy in support of OIF III.

5. The Point of Contact for this memorandum is CPT Todd Smith, A / 1-9 FA at DSN 870-1785.

//ORIGINAL SIGNED//

[redacted]

Assassin BATTLE ROSTER

AS OF: 3/1/2005

NAME	SSN	RANK	BR NUMBER	SRC PACKET	DENTAL	HEARING	OPTICAL	MEDICAL	LEGAL	IND WPN	CREW SVD	GST PLT WPNS
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Complete	Clear	APT 8/26/04	has insert	Clear	Clear	Qual		2-8 SEP 04
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Complete	Clear	APT 8/26/04	vision good	Clear	Clear	M249	9-Nov-04	2-8 SEP 04
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Complete	Clear	APT 8/26/04	vision good	Clear	Clear	Qual		2-8 SEP 04
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Complete	Clear	APT 8/26/04	vision good	Clear	Clear	Qual	M2/MK19	2-8 SEP 04
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Complete	Clear	APT 8/26/04	needs insert	Clear	Clear	Qual	9-Nov-04	2-8 SEP 04
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Complete	Clear	APT 8/26/04	has insert	Clear	Clear	Qual	M2	2-8 SEP 04
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Complete	Clear	APT 8/26/04	has insert	Clear	Clear	Qual	MK19	2-8 SEP 04
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Complete	Clear	APT 8/26/04	needs insert	Clear	Clear	Qual		3-17 JAN 05
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Complete	Clear	APT 8/26/04	vision good	Clear	Clear	Qual		3-17 JAN 05

[illegible] DK

Collective Training

-TASKS COMPLETED IN KUWAIT (JAN 2005)

Training	Range	28-Jan	29-Jan	30-Jan	31-Jan	1-Feb	2-Feb	3-Feb	OIC	# Training
Small Arms	RNG 15									390
Crew Served	RNG 17									103
Calibration	PAA01									A8 + B8
Convoy LFX	RNG 2A									F82
MOUT	RNG 5									H24, A80, B80, F20
ECP LFX	RNG 8									H24, F20

KEEP THE FIRE!!

EXHIBIT AM

Individual and Collective Training for [redacted] 1 MAR 05

COMMANDER

[redacted]

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

[redacted]

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Collective Training

- TASKS COMPLETED AT FSGA (JAN-MAR 2004) OR NTC 04-05 (MAR-APR 2004)

TASK	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	# & %AT
COMMON TASK TRAINING			
[redacted]	[redacted]	IND	
[redacted]	[redacted]	IND	
[redacted]	[redacted]	IND	
[redacted]	[redacted]	IND	
COMBAT ARMS TASKS (TEAM/SQUAD)	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	# & %AT
[redacted]	[redacted]	SEC / PLT	
[redacted]	[redacted]	SEC / PLT	
[redacted]	[redacted]	LDR	
COMBAT ARMS TASKS (PLATOON)	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	# & %AT
[redacted]	[redacted]	PLT	
[redacted]	[redacted]	PLT	
COMBAT ARMS TASKS (BATTERY)	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	# & %AT
[redacted]	[redacted]	BAT	

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Collective Training

-TASKS COMPLETED AT FSGA DURING SMALL ARMS GUNNERY AND OIF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING (MAY-JUL 2004)

TASK	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	A BAT
QUALIFICATION WITH ASSIGNED WEAPON/ WEAPON SYSTEM WITHIN 6 MONTHS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT DATE		IND	
UNIT TASKS	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	A BAT
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TRAINING	TC 7-98-1, SASO LESSON 4: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPLICATION	BN	
WEAPONS QUALIFICATION, MEET THE TRAINING READINESS CONDITION STANDARDS AS PRESCRIBED BY DA PAM 350-38. ALL CS/CSS UNITS WILL CONDUCT COLLECTIVE LIVE-FIRE EXERCISES (LFX). E.G. CONVOY REACT TO AMBUSH, BASE DEFENSE, ETC. CSS LFXS WILL NORMALLY BE CONDUCT	DA PAM 350-38	IND	
PLAN AND CONDUCT URBAN OPERATIONS (UO)	FM 3-06.11: COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN	LDR	
SUPERVISE THE APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) AND USE THE GRADUATED RESPONSE MATRIX	TC 7-98-1, SASO LESSON 4: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPLICATION	LDR	

KEEP THE FIRE

Collective Training

-TASKS COMPLETED AT FSGA DURING SMALL ARMS GUNNERY AND OIF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING (MAY-JUL 2004)

TASK	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	A BAT
MOUT	[illegible]	SEC / PLT	
COMBAT ARMS TASKS (PLATOON)	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	A BAT
CONDUCT TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES	[illegible]	PLT	
ACTION ON CONTACT	[illegible]	PLT	
CONVOY OPERATIONS	[illegible]	PLT	
SASO / SOSO TASKS	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	A BAT
TRAFFIC CONTROL POINT OPERATIONS	TC 7-98-1, LESSON 16 CHECKPOINTS	IND	
CONDUCT A PERSONNEL SEARCH		IND	
CONDUCT A VEHICLE SEARCH		IND	
OBSERVATION POST OPERATIONS	FM 7-98, CHAPTER 4	IND	
CONVOY REACT TO CONTACT BATTLE DRILL		PLT	
RETURN FIRE IN ORDER TO IMMEDIATELY GAIN FIRE SUPERIORITY IN ORDER TO FIX THE ENEMY		PLT	

KEEP THE FIRE

Collective Training

-TASKS COMPLETED AT FSGA DURING SMALL ARMS GUNNERY AND OIF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING (MAY-JUL 2004)

TASK	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	A BAT
CALL FOR AND DELIVER OVERWHELMING COMBAT POWER		PLT	
UNIT NOT IN CONTACT, DISMOUNT AND MANEUVER IN ORDER TO DESTROY THE ENEMY		PLT	
TREAT AND EVACUATE CASUALTIES		PLT	
ALL SOLDIERS ARE FAMILIARIZED WITH EVERY WEAPON WITHIN THE UNIT		IND	
LOAD, FIRE, AND REDUCE STOPPAGE OF EVERY CREW SERVED WEAPON		IND	
TRANSMIT A 9-LINE MEDEVAC		IND	
PREPARE VEHICLES FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS		SEC/PLT	

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Collective Training

-TASKS COMPLETED AT FSGA DURING BN & BDE FOCUS (AUG 2004)

TASK	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	A BAT
[illegible]	FM 8-10-6, MEDICAL EVACUATION IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS	LDR	
[illegible]	FM 100-14	LDR	
[illegible]	TC 7-98-1, LESSON 16 CHECKPOINTS	LDR	
[illegible]		LDR	
[illegible]	(ST-3-1275, ST-3-1405, ST-3-2036, 7-3-1000)	SEC / PLT	
[illegible]	(ST-3-5036)	PLT	
[illegible]	(ST-3-1425)	PLT	
[illegible]	(ST-3-1225)	PLT	
[illegible]	TC 7-98-1, LESSON 7, CONVOY OPERATIONS	SEC/PLT	
[illegible]	UNIT SOP	SEC	

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Collective Training

-TASKS COMPLETED AT JRTC MRE (SEP 2004)

TASK	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	A BAT
[illegible]	[illegible]	SEC / PLT	
COMBAT ARMS TASKS (PLATOON)	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	A BAT
[illegible]	[illegible]	PLT	
[illegible]	[illegible]	PLT	
[illegible]	[illegible]	PLT	
ADDITIONAL BRIGADE MANDATORY TASKS	REFERENCE / TASK #	LEVEL	A BAT
[illegible]		PLT	
[illegible]		PLT	

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CDR's Verification Memo

[illegible]

KEEP THE FIRST

This page left out intentionally due to classification.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

[redacted]

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

AFZP-VBD-XO 1 March 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: After Action Review for TCP Operations 27 February 2005

1. **Purpose.** To provide observations made by the [redacted] during the Traffic Control Point Operation on 27 February 2005, and provide recommendations on how to improve the Battalion's future operations.

2. **General.**

a. [redacted] is conducting combat operations as part of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) III. The recent operation in the southern portion of our Area of Operation afforded an opportunity for the Battalion to exercise command and control tasks, QRF tasks, patrolling, and traffic control point operations that prove invaluable to continue improvement of our combat procedures during OIF III. The lessons learned and TTPs established during the TCP mission will be addressed at this time.

b. The changes in the structure and mission of [redacted] offer new challenges in performing a wide variety of missions. The Battalion continuously examines our SOPs and TTPs to ensure that we can perform the missions expected of a maneuver task force.

3. **Sustain:**

a. **Communications and Reporting:** Strength throughout the operation, and definitely a sustain. Communication was established throughout the depth of the operation utilizing FM, cell phones, and Iridium communications. At no time did the TOC, TAC, QRF, or [redacted] patrol assets lose the capability to communicate or command and control forces. Pushing a TAC forward with the BN CDR provided a critical leader on the ground to assist with the decision-making process forward.

b. **Soldier Knowledge of Force Escalation (ROE):** The soldiers manning the TCP acting in accordance with the MNB-I ROE and escalation of force requirements. Because of the speed in which the incident occurred, the leader on the scene did not have the time to articulate every command. The soldiers waved at the car, yelled halt in Arabic, utilized hand symbols, and fired a warning shot, prior to utilizing deadly force; all without having to be instructed.

4. **Observations.**

a. **ISSUE #1: TCP Layout**

Discussion: The setup of the TCP during operations on 27 Feb 05 had a coalition checkpoint sign and sawhorses with reflective strips. Cones followed this with chemlites stuffed into the top of them and then soldiers. Behind the 2 initial soldiers were 2 more traffic cones that directed traffic into a search area over watched by a M992 (tracked vehicle). Soldiers were counting on signaling and signs to notify Local Nationals of the upcoming checkpoint. While this worked for several other cars and had worked at the previous checkpoint, it still left soldiers vulnerable to a vehicle attempting to run the checkpoint at a high rate of speed.

Recommendation(s): As a standard TCP setup, place a barrier 30m-50m ahead of the checkpoint whether it be concertina wire or jersey barriers. This allows for standoff and forces vehicles to either slow down or hit barriers that will significantly destroy their vehicles prior to coming close to dismounted soldiers. Secondly, placing armor further forward would provide additional force protection for dismounted personnel conducting vehicle and personnel searches.

b. **ISSUE #2: Location of TCP**

Discussion: When setting up the TCP, the unit chose a "Y" intersection to emplace the soldiers in order to perform proper TCP procedures. When establishing the TCP the unit blocked one avenue of approach leaving a second avenue that opened beyond the search area.

Recommendation(s): In order to lessen the avenues of approach the unit could have set up the TCP further south of the "Y" intersection forcing both avenues traveling southbound to reach the checkpoint. By putting the TCP right at the intersection it created more avenues and additional ground to cover with one mechanized vehicle and several dismounted soldiers.

c. **ISSUE #3: Equipment available for the TCP**

Discussion: The TCP used chemlites, neon colored traffic cones, reflective sawhorses and individual flashlights. The rechargeable spotlights the unit owned had already run out of energy as they last for about one hour after charging. Currently, the battery owns only 21 SUREFIRE lights. When vehicles approached the checkpoint, the soldiers signaled vehicles by waving chemlites tied to sticks to assist in grabbing the attention of drivers approaching. While the vehicle lights and chemlites worked for several vehicles prior, it may not have been bright enough for an elderly man. The driver

was 75 years old and with very poor vision. It appears that the driver did not see the TCP in the dark of night and proceeded at high rates of speed acting as an insurgent.

Recommendation: Acquire 12V spotlights that have a longer battery life for operations that will last more than 6 hours. Continue to use the supply system to acquire SUREFIRE lights so that every person in the unit has one. The power of the light that these flashlights provide is unmistakable at ranges of over 300 meters.

d. ISSUE #4: AIF trends incorporated into [redacted] actions

Discussion: Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) are known to set up checkpoints in the Jisr Diyala district and stop vehicles acting as a normal Iraqi Army or American checkpoint. The AIF then uses deadly force to confiscate Iraqi national vehicles or to conduct other criminal activities. The checkpoint established by Alpha Battery was similar by the fact that it did not have many mechanized vehicles, no semi-permanent barrier, and several dismounted troops. The Iraqi driver may have thought that the TCP was an AIF checkpoint and was frightened for his life.

Recommendation: Although completely dependent on the security situation, that when performing a TCP more lighting from tracked vehicles be used to clearly identify US troops on the ground since the AIF do not use mechanized vehicles.

e. ISSUE #5: Utilization of Mechanized Vehicles.

Discussion: One M992A2, FAASV vehicle was used during the TCP operation. The FAASV was positioned in a manner to act as a roadblock and also provide cover for the soldiers on the ground. The dismounted soldiers were around the FAASV but still in the open.

Recommendation: More FAASVs or other mechanized vehicles be used in a serpentine formation in order to provide more cover and also act as a permanent structure that the insurgents know they cannot drive through. Also having more mechanized vehicles provides drivers to actually drive through a snake-like gauntlet in order to pass.

f. ISSUE #6: Combat Lifesaver Training

Discussion: All soldiers reacted quickly to the wounded US soldier. They followed the procedures outlined in the SMCT to evaluate and treat a casualty. What they realized during the treatment was that if the vehicle had not gone into a ditch (which ultimately stopped the car) there could have been more casualties. With only 1 medic available, the patrol leader realizes the importance of CLS training.

Execution

Key Tasks:

1. Secure JD TC (CP579) NLT1800FEB for a period of six hours
2. Interdict traffickers of black market gas vicinity JD TC (CP 579)
3. Establish random snap TCPs incorporating TPT on road leading to JD TC (CP 579) focusing on vehicles from BOLO list
4. Assess shops along RTE BISMARK east of JD TC and incorporate dogs and CAT-A
5. Detail a dedicated escort for all operations with dog teams

Tasks to Subordinate Units

1/A

- Secure JD TC NET 271800FEB for a period of six hours.
- Link up with TPT & THT to coordinate transportation for them into zone
- Secure TPT & THT while they develop intelligence on JD TC

2/A

- Assess shops on RTE BISMARK east of JD TC incorporating CAT-A
- Link up with CAT-A to coordinate transportation for them into zone
- Establish random TCPs on road leading to JD TC focusing on vehicles from BOLO list

3/A

- Establish random TCPs incorporating TPT on road leading to JD TC focusing on vehicles from BOLO list
- Link up with TPT to coordinate transportation for them into zone

4/A

- Insert 1 sniper team into the tower SW of the JD TC for early warning of mounted and dismounted traffic.
- Escort dog teams for all operations associated with this mission
- Link up with dog team NCOIC to coordinate transportation for them into zone

5/A

- Establish RETRANS on the Tuwaitha berm NLT 1730 to ensure constant communication with higher headquarters.
- Secure RETRANS site until mission complete.
- Recon RETRANS site NLT 271300FEB05.

Concept of the Operation

Initially, this will be a time driven event with our H-hour being 271800FEB05. Once that time hits, we are clear to move into th area. Once our flow begins into the circle, all events will be base on events and conditions being set prior to the next event's execution. [redacted] will infiltrate via RTE WILD to WALL ST to the JD TC and establish a TCP vicinity [redacted]. [redacted] follow immediately after [redacted] movement and infiltrates into JD TC via RTE PLUTO SOUTH and assesses shops along RTE BISMARK with CAT-A. [redacted] follows [redacted]s movement and secures the JD TC with THT and TPT to interdict and exploit black markets. [redacted] follows [redacted]s movement and is prepared to escort dog teams as necessary to exploit intelligence. Snipers occupy towers vicinity JD TC. [redacted] and [redacted] continue to move their TCPs and change their tactics to avoid targeting and credible collection by AIF forces.