

TAB 49

Notes from telephone conversation with SPC (b)(6), (b)(3)

Call started at approximately 302115DAUG07

- I told SPC (b)(6), (b)(3) my name and why I was calling, and asked if he minded talking about 14 May. He said he did not mind at all.
- I asked about his current status, and how he's doing overall. He indicated that he's doing just fine, and that he is in the process of getting ready to return to Iraq. He indicated a desire to get back here as soon as possible, as he was very sick of being in the rear detachment.
- I asked him how well he remembered the events of 14 May. He said he remembered the following things very clearly (with explanation provided):
 - (b)(6), (b)(3) remembered exactly where he was standing when the shots started. He was 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) on the SW corner of the small building just west of PL Yellow. 1LT (b)(6), (b)(3) was to Route Croc and SPC (b)(6), (b)(3) was closer to the river.
 - He remembered hearing shots, but was unsure of exactly where they came from.
 - He assumed it came from the south.
 - He remembered his left leg going numb after he got down, and then remembers seeing blood when he finished his leg.
 - He saw SGT (b)(6), (b)(3) starting to come out from the building to get him, but SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) told SGT (b)(6), (b)(3) to stay put because he could make it okay.
 - (b)(6), (b)(3) figured out that getting to the door on the NW corner of the building was not a great idea so he ended up going through an open window.
 - As he was doing this, he remembers another round coming very close to him from a south direction.
- SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) then called PV2 (b)(6), (b)(3) into the building to treat SPC (b)(3), (b)(6)
- He had gunshot wounds to his left leg:
 - The first wound entered in the back of his left thigh/hamstring and exited his inner left thigh.
 - The second wound grazed his left quad.
- SPC (b)(6), (b)(3) agreed to mark the diagram / picture that I emailed to him with his location and the locations of anyone else around him that he could remember for sure.

TAB 50

Notes from telephone conversation with PFC (b)(6), (b)(3)

Call started at approximately 310940DAUG07

- I told PFC (b)(3), (b)(6) my name and why I had calling, and asked if he minded talking about 14 May. He said he had tried to forget that day, but that he was willing to talk about it.
- I asked about his current status, and how he's doing overall. He indicated that he's doing okay, and that he would like to return to Iraq. He said that sitting around in NC was not very fun.
- I asked him how well he remembered the events of 14 May. He said he remembered up until the shooting started (with explanation provided):
 - He remembered that his squad had finished clearing the small building just west of PL Yellow.
 - He remembered going back up to the intersection of PL Yellow and Route Croc to wait to make linkup with 2nd Platoon, but they never showed up.
 - His squad moved back down off the road into the area below the road, but north of the building.
 - He remembered hearing the shooting start, but did not have a good awareness of which direction it came from.
 - He got down in a prone position and fired 2 rounds, but he was not able to confirm what direction he fired.
 - The bullet that hit him went through his rifle near the selector switch (as it was up in the firing position – he is a right handed firer) and hit his cheek. He was told later that the bullet hit his vest after it hit his cheek. He said he did not know where that vest ended up.
 - Other than the painful sensations after getting shot, he said the only thing he remembered was thinking he was in some type of crossfire, but he couldn't say for sure on that.
- I asked about his recollections of the OPORD briefing or any measures briefed regarding preventing friendly fire but he said he didn't remember anything in that regard.
- He went as far as LRMC for the wounds suffered on 14 May and then returned to theater. He went back out in sector and then took an opportunity to go on EML back to CONUS. He extended his leave based on doing some follow up appointments for his cheek and jaw. Upon his return from leave he was at FOB Hammer sitting in his tent when incoming fire wounded him again.
- PFC (b)(6), (b)(3) agreed to mark the diagram / picture that I emailed to him with his location.

TAB 51

Notes from telephone conversation with PFC (b)(6), (b)(3)

Call started at approximately 022245DSEP07

- I told PFC (b)(6), (b)(3) my name and why I was calling, and asked if he minded talking about 14 May. Even though he said he did not remember much, he proceeded to lay out the events in pretty good detail.
- This is what he remembered about what was going on when the shooting began:
 - He remembered that his squad had finished clearing the buildings across from the Pepsi Factory, and then moving to and clearing the small building just west of PL Yellow.
 - He remembered moving up to the intersection of PL Yellow and Route Croc to wait to make linkup with 2nd Platoon, but they weren't there.
 - His squad moved back down out of the sun and took up a 360 security position.
 - From his position in the perimeter he was facing the river, lying in the prone.
 - He said the initial shots sounded like three or four quick "pops" but he did not know where they came from.
 - What seemed like only a few seconds later, he remembers what seemed like "thousands of rounds" knocking down the trees and bushes all around him. He definitely thought those rounds came from behind him (from the north) because it was during this time that he was hit in the bottom of the foot while he was still facing the river.
 - After getting hit, he remembers rolling / turning over in order to return fire north.
- He was able to give general locations of members of the squad as well:
 - SGT Dunkley was behind and left of (b)(6), (b)(3) by about 10 feet.
 - PFC (b)(6), (b)(3) was about 20 feet behind (b)(6), (b)(3) (he remembered that (b)(6), (b)(3) had just bum cigarette from (b)(6), (b)(3)).
 - (b)(6), (b)(3) was behind (b)(6), (b)(3) as well (unsure of which side), but was only about 5 feet from (b)(3), (b)(6).
- His whole period of gunfire did not seem like it lasted more than 15-20 seconds.
- PFC (b)(6), (b)(3) agreed to mark the diagram / picture that I emailed to him with his location.

TAB 52

Notes from telephone conversation with PFC (b)(6), (b)(3)


Call started at approximately 042100DSEP07

- I told PFC (b)(6), (b)(3) my name and why I was calling, and asked if he minded talking about 14 May. He said he did not mind and remembered the events in pretty good detail.
- This is what he remembered about what was going on when the shooting started:
 - He remembered having moved up to the intersection of PL Yellow and Route Croc to wait to make linkup with 2nd Platoon, but they didn't show up so SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) decided to move them back down off the road.
 - His squad moved back down and took up a 360 security position in some trees.
 - He was closest to Route Croc, and everyone was on a knee.
 - He said the first shots sounded like they came from across the river, but then he said it became very confusing because the next rounds sounded like they came from on or beyond Route Croc.
 - He remembered firing about 30 to 40 rounds across the river, and got hit while he was firing those rounds.
 - He got hit twice:
 - Once on the outside of his right thigh (in on the front, out on the back): healed well, no issues
 - Once on his right ring finger and pinkie: ring finger was amputated, significant nerve damage to his entire right hand; currently doing physical therapy for the hand
- He was able to give general locations of other members of the squad as well:
 - He was closest to road (12 on the clock face).
 - PFC (b)(6), (b)(3) was at the 6 o'clock position, with SGTs Dunkley and (b)(3), (b)(6) in the middle of the circle.
 - SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) and SSG (b)(6), (b)(3) were at about 4 o'clock, a little outside of the circle
 - PFC (b)(6), (b)(3) was at 9 o'clock (he remembered that (b)(3), (b)(6) had just bummed a cigarette from him)
 - PV2 (b)(6), (b)(3) was at 7 o'clock.
- PFC (b)(6), (b)(3) agreed to mark the diagram / picture that I emailed to him with his location.

TAB 53

Notes from discussion with COL (b)(6) Commander 1/1/1 NP Battalion, who was present on the ground during the 14 ing Operation Beach Yellow

Discussion took place at the Salman Pak Government Center, 011300DSEP07

- I was introduced to COI (b)(6) by LTC (b)(6), (b)(6), the 1/1 NPTT Chief.
- I told COL (b)(6) that I was from Division and that I was asking questions to better understand the working relationship between the National Police and American units.
- He immediately and without any reservation answered that the relationship was very good.
- He spoke of the positive effects that the partnership was producing, especially since more units arrived in the Salman Pak area.
- He specifically mentioned the June Dureya operation (Operation Bull Run; he referenced it by location and date) even before I asked about the May operation (Operation Beach Yellow) in the same location.
 - He stated that the June operation was very successful.
 - When I asked about the operation in May he stated that it was also very successful.
 - He never mentioned that 1/1 NP lost one Soldier and had another wounded that day, and I did not ask about them specifically.
-  (b)(2)high
- located.
 - He did not want to look at the picture of the area, and I did not push that piece very hard.
 - Using a previous comment that he had made to LTC (b)(6), (b)(6) in which he described insurgents baiting his checkpoints into firing upon e , I asked if it was possible that any friendly units had fired at each other on 14 May.
 - He stated very firmly that it was not possible because he and his fellow commanders gave all of their position locations to the Americans.
 - Another question on this point got the same answer, so I did not ask again.
- I asked him about the nature of the enemy threat in this area, and he said that the insurgents were very skilled.
 - He cited, without any prompting from me, that snipers were the biggest threat in the area.
 - He said that his units had found some with German sniper weapons designed to work out to distances of 600m.
 - When I asked more questions about the enemy, he repeated the same point about the snipers again.
- As I tried to close the line of questioning, he again repeated his requests for more and better equipment from the Americans. He believes that is the only way the NP will ever become truly effective.

- I thanked him for answering my questions and then allowed him to continue his conversation on other topics with LTC (b)(6), (b)(3)

Analysis:

- Based on conversations with LTC (b)(6), (b)(3) and the battalion level NPTT chiefs prior to my discussion with COL (b)(6) I do not believe that he would admit to any wrong doing on the part of his unit to any American officer. This is even more so with other Iraqi officers present in the room.
- The American NPTT interpreter (b)(6) who facilitated the conversation told me afterwards that he agreed with my assessment. He also said that COL (b)(6) saw me as someone who could serve as a messenger back to Division for his equipment requests.
- COL (b)(6) unsolicited mention of the sniper threat in the area does lend credence to the possibility of sniper fire from south of the river, which is well within a 600m range.
- COL (b)(6) belief that fratricide could not have occurred because the Iraqi and American leaders knew each other's locations is possibly true in the theoretical sense, but does not make as much sense when considering that he could not see all of his units from his position behind the wall on the west side of the Pepsi Factory.

TAB 54

AREA OVERVIEW

(b)(2)high

TAB 55

(b)(2)High

TAB 56

Enemy Fire:

- The first round of enemy fire originated from south of the river, followed by a 3-5 round burst of fire
- SGT Gonzalez (white icon) was hit after he assumed a prone position along Route Croc with his weapon oriented to the south, in the direction of the initial enemy fire
- The other five Soldiers (blue icons; SGT Dunckley outlined in red to indicate KIA) were in various positions south of Route Croc; it is very unlikely they were hit by enemy fire from the south side of the river

(b)(2)High

TAB 57

Sequencing –

Phase I:

- 0600: A/1-15 staged approximately 1.5 km west of Pepsi Factory waiting to link up with 1/1NP
- Time UNK (after 0645): 3/A/1-15 moves east on Route Croc, clears Pepsi Factory and cluster of buildings to the south of Route Croc
- 2/A still mounted in BFVs further west on Route Croc

(b)(2)High

Sequencing – Phase IIa:

- 3/A with HQ element moves east along Route Croc
- 2/3/A with 3/A PL moves along the north side of the road; after crossing PL Yellow
- 1/3/A moves with the HQ/A element on the south side of the road
- 2/3/A crosses to the south to clear east of PL Yellow; aware of the fact that they were ahead of the rest of 3/A; moves back up to road when complete
- 1/3/A takes up a security halt just south of Route Croc west of PL Yellow
- HQ/A moves into the building after it is clear; HR6 moves to roof to get SA

(b)(2)High

Sequencing –
Phase IIb:

- HR 6 calls 2/A to move forward (dismounted) due to vehicle congestion on Route Croc
- 2/A moves east, then turns north before Pepsi Factory, then northeast at the fork in the road
- HR 6 calls again to get 2/A location and to find out what's taking so long
- 2/A realizes they made a wrong turn and heads back to Croc

(b)(2)High

Sequencing – Phase

IIIa:

- 2/A moves along Route Croc to link up with 3/A “in front of lead Engineer vehicle” vicinity PL Yellow
- 0907: Single shot fired from south of river, followed by a 3-5 round burst
- 2/A gets in the prone, orients south and begins to return fire
- SGT Gonzalez (white icon) hit by shot in the left front/side of his head

(b)(2)High

Sequencing –
Phase IIIb:

- Reporting indicates return fire from both Iraqi and US units, oriented to the south
- SGT Dunckley (blue icon with red outline) hit by two shots in the right side of his back while in the prone facing south
- Four other blue icons indicate approximate positions of WIA Soldiers

(b)(2)High


Sequencing – Phase IV:

- HR 6 calls D6 on FM to ask for 1/1 NP units to “cease fire” from the north of Route Croc
- 1/3/A Squad Leader runs up to Route Croc at the PL Yellow intersection to signal 2/A to cease fire; 2/A stops firing almost immediately after
- A few minutes go by before 1/1 NP units stop firing
- A/1-15 continues to assess casualties: initially 1 KIA (SGT Dunckley) and 5x WIA; SGT Gonzalez later dies of wounds

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(b)(2)High


TAB 58

Unit and Key Vehicle Locations




TAB 59

Unit and Key Vehicle Locations When the Shooting Started




TAB 60

Key A/1-15 Personnel Locations When the Shooting Started



Key A/1-15 Personnel Locations When the Shooting Started



TAB 61





(3), (b)

(3), (b)

(3), (b)


(3), (b)



TAB 62

The following ten pictures were taken from an M2 Bradley (at a height of about 2.5m) from approximately the same position along Route Croc where 2/A/1-15 returned fire to the south.


The pictures were taken during
Operation Bull Run
(22-24 June 2007)






















TAB 63

The following five pictures were taken from a helicopter of the area around the Pepsi Factory.

The pictures were taken on 27 August 2007

(b) (2) High

(b)(2)high

(b)(2)high



(b)(2)high

(b)

(b) (2) high