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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US NATIONAL COMMAND ELEMENT
REGIONAL COMMAND - SOUTH
KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09355

UNCLASSIFIED

NCE-IO

9 April 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview With Captain (b)(6); (7)(c) Company Commander, 205th
Afghan National Army Corps, 5 April 2006

1. I interviewed Captain (b)(6); [redacted] at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Robinson (vicinity Sangin, Helmand Province, Afghanistan) on 5 April 2006. The purpose of the interview was to collect information regarding the events surrounding the Taliban attack on the FOB on the night of 28-29 March 2006. The interview was conducted at Captain (b)(6); (7)(c) [redacted] headquarters within the FOB. Present were several members of his command, as well as L3 Communications translator Mr. (b)(6); (7)(c) [redacted] Mr. (b)(6); [redacted] translated for me.

2. Background. The 207th Corps (ANA) had been at FOB Robinson (aka Wolf) since February. They were reinforced with a unit from the 205th Corps (ANA) from Kandahar on the 28th of March. The soldiers present from the 207th had not yet been integrated into the fighting force at the FOB at the time of the attack.

a. The 207th company had two medium machine guns (PKs), three RPG launchers and one SPG-9 recoilless rifle. At the time of the engagement, only one PK was operational.

b. The 207th company had two operational Icom radios with which they kept in contact with the Special Forces team at the Eastern end of the FOB. The company commander kept one radio with him, and the second radio is generally carried/monitored by the watch OIC/NCOIC.

2. CPT (b)(6); [redacted] provided the following comments and observations:

a. The reinforcing unit from Kandahar had recently arrived and were still getting settled in their quarters at the time of the attack. Captain (b)(6); [redacted] company was standing guard from three fortified observation towers at their end of the firebase. One tower is on the southwest corner of the compound, one on the northwest corner, and one along the north perimeter between the ANA compound and the Embedded Training Team (ETT) compound (refer to enclosure 1).

b. The ANA and SF had gotten intelligence indicating that there would be an attack three days prior to this engagement. Security for the ANA was on the third day of a heightened state of readiness for this expected attack.

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c. The attack on the FOB was conducted by Taliban who engaged the FOB with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), PK medium machine guns, and mortars. The heaviest fire was originating from an area known as the 'castle ruins' north of the ANA area of the FOB.

d. Prior to the attack, CPT (b)(6); instructed the soldiers from the 205th to remain where they were, which was a structure known as the 'mosque' (not a real mosque). He believed he had sufficient men available from within his command to repel the attack, and did not want the newly arrived soldiers to have to try and fight from what was to them unfamiliar terrain and battle positions.

e. Captain (b)(6); notes that the enemy fire from the castle ruins was being concentrated at the West (ANA) side of the FOB, and into the East end of the FOB where the ETT and SF compounds are located. He observed little enemy fire impacting the FOB between the compounds. The enemy fire directed at his area of the compound was concentrated on the northwest ANA tower. His force responded from their battle positions with one operational PK, a number of AK rifles, at least a couple RPG-7s, and one round from the SPG-9 recoilless rifle.


f. There was one ANA soldier wounded during the attack, (b)(6); (rank unknown), from the 205th corps (ANA) group. (b)(6); is believed to have been in the vicinity of the mosque compound when he was injured. The injury was not life-threatening. Cause of the injury is unknown, but it is some form of shrapnel or possibly a portion of a ricocheted bullet.

g. Following the attack, (b)(6); was brought to the SF compound for first aid treatment and subsequently evacuated with other casualties from FOB Robinson back to Kandahar.

3. Captain (b)(6); closed the interview by expressing his concerns on equipment for his company. Primarily, this is the lack of ammunition, medium machine guns (PKs) and radio communications. He stressed that at the time of the attack, his company had only one operational PK, and implied that they were undergunned to face the better equipped enemy forces. Sergeant First Class (b)(6); an ETT member informed me that all shortages were being reported through both the ETT and the ANA channels, and that the issues are being addressed at higher levels.

4. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6); (7)(c)

(b)(6); (7)(c)

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MAJ, IO

4/10 (MTN) Information Operations

Encl

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Enclosure 1 (ANA Compound)

