



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US NATIONAL COMMAND ELEMENT
REGIONAL COMMAND - SOUTH
KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09355

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NCE-IO

14 April 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview With Captain (b)(6); (7)(c) 11 Apr 2006.

1. I interviewed Captain (7)(c) on 11 April, 2006, at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Robinson regarding the firefight which took place during the night of 28-29 March. Captain (b)(6) is the deputy commander of Third Company of the 207th ANA Corps.
2. Approximately one hundred Soldiers from the 205th ANA Corps from Kandahar arrived on 28 March, with the convoy that arrived at FOB Robinson earlier in the day. The 3d and 2d companies from the 207th ANA Corps based in Herat were already on location at FOB Robinson for approximately six weeks, with established positions and a defensive plan for their compound. The defensive positions at the ANA compound within the FOB (the Western end of the FOB) were integrated with the overall FOB defensive plan.
 - a. This plan provided for interlocking fields of fire between the northeast positions in the ANA compound and the western sector of the ETT compound. The 3d Company position (83 soldiers, with 14 attached engineers) is depicted in enclosure 1.
 - b. The 2d Company position (43 soldiers) is on the south-southwestern corner of the FOB. They cover a section of the FOB perimeter with the 3d Company on their right flank (SW corner tower) and the Afghan Security Guards (ASG) on their left flank. The 2d Company sector is the south wall between the ASG tents and the 3d Company positions.
3. At the onset of the firefight, the ANA identified enemy forces at two locations: adjacent to the castle ruins, and on the road west of the castle ruins (see enclosure 1). The enemy positions were in the 3d Company sector. As the engagement developed, 3d Company observed at least twenty RPGs being fired toward their positions from an area directly north, and to the northwest of their positions from amongst the buildings along the canal. (see enclosure 1).
4. CPT (7)(c) had been called out with some of his soldiers earlier in the day to assist in escorting the convoy into the FOB by setting up a checkpoint approximately seven kilometers from the FOB. Following the closure of the convoy inside the perimeter, CPT (b)(6) billeted the newly arrived ANA soldiers from Kandahar (205th Corps) in the

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'mosque' compound. He gave instructions to the 205th soldiers to remain in the mosque compound if there was enemy contact overnight. He gave these orders because the 205th soldiers had not seen the positions in the daylight, and did not have any assigned defensive sectors on the perimeter, and CPT (7)(c) felt that he had sufficient defenders on the perimeter to repulse any attack.

5. Approximately during the first half of the contact (guessed to be about 2150z) the 205th soldier named (b)(6); was injured in the leg. He had been sleeping in his truck which was located approximately forty meters to the southwest of the mosque compound. He left his truck to seek cover in the mosque compound, and suffered his injury while en route. CPT (b)(6); stated that there were multiple RPGs impacting inside the ANA end of the FOB, and impacting south of the FOB toward the poppy field/LZ area. It is highly likely that (b)(6); was injured by a fragment from one of these RPG bursts, or possibly a piece of a bullet from a ricochet, as the fragment had lost enough velocity to become lodged in his leg, rather than pass completely through.

6. None of the soldiers from 2d Company fired during the engagement, as there was no enemy south of the FOB position in their sector. CPT (7)(c) was very confident that none of the 2d Company soldiers fired across the inside of the ANA compound to engage the enemy to the North. He gave three reasons for justification:

a. The ANA units are habitually short of ammo, so strictly enforce positive target identification before firing so as to not waste ammunition.

b. He did not observe any fires originating from the South (2d Company positions) going past his position to the North.

c. The firing positions of the 2d Company could not engage the enemy positions due to intervening terrain masking the enemy weapons signatures.

5. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6); (7)(c)

(b)(6); (7)(c)

MAJ, IO

4/10 (MTN) Information Operations

Encl

Enclosure 1 (ANA Compound)

