

## Memorandum for Record

Subject: Informal Investigation at FOB Robinson 29 Mar-1 Apr 06

On 29 Mar 06 at approximately 0200 FOB Robinson (Wolf) came under attack by Anti Coalition Militia (ACM). The main attack came from a sector North West of the FOB. There were two KIA, one US ETT and one Canadian, and one US ETT and three Canadian WIAs.

We, the 205<sup>th</sup> RCAG, received a call that morning from TF PHX stating the US Casualty may be fratricide and to conduct an informal investigation, per OSC-A, at FOB Robinson and COL [REDACTED] Acting RCAG Senior Mentor, sent me. I arrived at FOB Robinson at 1530L, 29 Mar 06.

Once on the ground I talked with 1<sup>st</sup> Bde, 205<sup>th</sup> Mentors, mainly COL [REDACTED] and LTC [REDACTED], briefly about the early morning events as they knew them and then got a tour of where some of the evidence was located. I looked at the bullet holes in the Connexs, tent, generator, and south wall of the ETT mud complex and took pictures.

Next we went to the roof of the mud building inside the ETT mud complex where CPT [REDACTED] and SFC Stone were located during the firefight. I talked with CPT [REDACTED], CPT [REDACTED], and SPC [REDACTED] who were on the roof during the firefight and provided assistance to CPT [REDACTED] and SFC Stone.

At 1635 I talked with COL [REDACTED], 207<sup>th</sup> RCAG Senior Mentor, and gave him a DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, to complete. He also wanted to show me the bullet holes to confirm I knew about them and gave his opinion of what happened during the firefight that resulted in the casualties of the two ETTs. He said that after daylight that morning he saw the SF position and there was a M240 pointing to the north in the general direction of the ETT Compound. He said that he and MAJ [REDACTED] went to the SF Compound and took pictures and talked to the SF ODA Team Leader, CPT [REDACTED] but didn't get the answers he wanted.

COL [REDACTED] came to me again at 0700 on 30 Mar 06. We went back to the Connexs to look at exit holes in the Connexs, which I already knew about, and to give me bullet fragments MAJ [REDACTED] collected from the generator, Connexs, and mud complex southern wall. MAJ [REDACTED] gave me the bullet fragments and said he had pictures that he would email me and I took more pictures.

I called LTC [REDACTED], TF PHX JAG, at 0930 asking for additional assistance. Told him that I wasn't a professional investigator but from what I could see, one was needed at FOB Robinson. Everything seemed to point to the northeast corner of the Special Forces (SF) compound as the origin of gun fire in the direction of the ETT mud complex. The main focus was the angle of the entry holes and they appeared to point back to the north east corner of the SF compound which was an occupied fighting position (UAH with two M240 machine guns). He informed me to basically stop with my portion and they would send a team with experience in these matters. I could continue with what was started and ensure the pertinent sites remained intact until the investigative team arrived, within reasonable force protection measures. I had taken statement forms to the

Soldiers that were on the roof the morning of 29 Mar 06 and took more pictures.

I talked with CW2 [b(6); b(7)(c)] at 1150, 30 Mar 06. CW2 [b(6); b(7)(c)] was in an UAH on the east perimeter just north of the SF Compound. He stated that he was outside the vehicle at the rear with 1SG [b(6); b(7)(c)] (in turret) and SFC [b(6); b(7)(c)] (driver's seat) and were in position providing security to the east of the FOB. He stated the Canadians passed behind his position going north just outside the construction of Hesco walls. Some time after that he saw tracers from the northeast corner of the SF Compound off to his left (northern direction) and got into the UAH. He determined the gun fire was in the direction of the Canadians then there was another burst from the SF northeast position firing more toward the Canadian position and he could again see the tracers. After this there was additional gun fire from the SF northeast position in a more north westerly direction over the ETT compound. CW2 [b(6); b(7)(c)] then responded to the Canadian's call for assistance to help with the wounded.

I spend the remainder of the day compiling my notes and talking with the 205<sup>th</sup> RCAG in Kandahar.

On 31 Mar 06 I shot azimuths from the northeast corner of the SF compound to the dirt pile, hesco line, generator, ETT fighting position, and Citadel (suspected source of ACM activity) and measured the distance from ground and end of the Connexs and generator to the bullet holes. Collected statements from five individuals and took pictures of CPT [b(6); b(7)(c)] IBA.

The investigative team came to FOB Robinson on 1 Apr 06 headed by COL [b(6); b(7)(c)] and comprised of US and Canadian

personnel. I briefed them on what I knew and flew back with them to Kandahar Air Field arriving at 1815. That evening I provided the bullet fragments to Agent [REDACTED], CID. The next day I gave CID my pictures and the pictures I got from MAJ [REDACTED], 207<sup>th</sup> RCAG.

Conclusion: I requested assistance because in my opinion the evidence indicated this was a possible fratricide incident and required an investigation involving trained personnel, especially since it could also involve the Canadians.

[REDACTED]  
LTC, [REDACTED], USA  
205<sup>th</sup> RCAG, [REDACTED]