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On March 27th at 1400L I was on guard duty in the tower at FB Robinson. Somewhere between 1400L - 1500L I was told that there was an ETT 80 vehicle convoy headed north on route 611, in a TIC somewhere south of the FB. I contacted Tombstone (Call sign, not the FB) over the SAT JARN net. They informed me that the convoy was closest to me without any qualified JTAC and that I should control all CAS assets that would be pushed to me. I relayed all info and updates through Renegade Roof Top (ETT compound co-located with FB Robinson). Tombstone informed me that I had x2 GR-7 (British Harriers) aircraft being pushed to my strike freq. I received a situation up-date from Rooftop of the current location of the convoy and where in the convoy the correction calls would come from. I instructed the convoy to start moving immediately to push through the TIC so they would not make themselves easy tgts.

Knife flight (GR-7) checked on with me and I passed the current grid of the convoy and talked him on to their location. I was told that the target location was 1400 meters from the convoy. I also instructed that this would be a type 3 control because I was not with the convoy. I gave a restricted attack heading to be made parallel to the convoy. I received target location talk on through rooftop and passed it on to the aircraft. Once both the pilot and I were sure we had the same mental picture I had him engage with rockets to ensure he was on target. The convoy passed back corrections, and I had the GR-7 engage with 2 separate runs dropping x 2 500lbs bombs. The convoy said that the impacts were just short so I gave more corrections and had him roll in with 1000lbs bombs with good results. During this time the convoy tried to mark the tgt with 203 HE. The convoy stood still during all of this and didn't move until after the 1000lbs bombs were employed. They started to continue north and the lead ANA vehicle hit an IED killing x 4 ANA. This brought the convoy to a stand still for at least 1-2 hours. The GR-7s were out of ordinance at this time so I requested a show of force up the route of the convoy with flares along the way.

They were replaced by another set of GR-7's. The convoy commander requested a danger close strike. I was not comfortable with this and neither was the pilot, so I did not employ. I also was not comfortable that the convoy commander knew the potential consequences of "Danger Close" employment.

The convoy finally started to move after the sun had set. The 2 GR-7's were replaced by 2 x A-10's and 2 x AH-64's, which provided escort the rest of the way to FB Robinson. The convoy was so long that when the first vehicle entered the compound, the last was still 3-4 kilometers out. I remained in the tower controlling all air assets during this time and passing info to Rooftop on the convoy's progress.

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The AH-64's checked off once the end of the convoy was close to entering the FB. While the convoy was moving into the base, a Predator (call sign Overlord) checked on. Also during all of this in the late afternoon I controlled 2 x CH-47's landing at the HLZ and off-load a Canadian QRF team. I was informed that we expected an attack on the FB that night in retaliation for CF actions during Operation Carpe-Diem, 3 days earlier. Once the last of the vehicles entered the wire, I had Overlord and the A-10's (which had been replaced by 2 new A-10's) fly up north to do some ISR on the location of our last TIC. This was early in the morning on the 28th.

During this time, the local freq (49.750/FM) was busy with all of the ETT convoy personnel trying to find each other. Not knowing the compound and arriving at night with so many vehicles compounded this. Various people were up and down the tower giving me water and filling me in on any pertinent info. While the aircraft were moving up north I advised them I would be back up freq with them in 5 minutes. I headed down the tower to relieve myself and to send back to my Special Tactics Operations Cell (STOC/ Capt. [REDACTED] 22 STS / 720 STG/ BAF) a quick sitrep via HPW located in my conex. My conex is situated alone near the middle of FB Robinson.

As I finished typing, all hell broke loose with incoming RPG, SAF, and mortar fire. I sprinted back to the tower, climbed up the ladder and dove in trying to make myself as flat as I could next to Capt. [REDACTED]. We had a circle of sand bags stacked 2 high for cover. Heavy RPG and SAF were flying next to and above us by inches. I contacted both the A-10's and the Predator that we were now TIC and had them return to my location. I peered over the sand bags to see where the fire was coming from. I could see rounds coming at us from the ruins northeast of us. I lazed it with my MARK 7, and requested a gun run on the tgt with a restricted attack heading of south to north. The A-10's informed me that they were BINGO Fuel (out of gas) and needed to hit the tanker. They were kind enough to make the gun run before departing. Another the predator gave me updates on ACM movements. After the A-10 strafing runs, the attack seemed to have ceased. I heard over the interteam freq that we had injured and needed a med-evac.

I passed this through the predator and called it in to Tombstone. At this point I grabbed my radio ruck and climbed off the tower to get a 9 line together to pass back. The Canadians gave me a 9 line and I passed it over SAT to Tombstone. I didn't realize it at the time, but this 9 line was only the injured Canadians and didn't include the U.S. inured/KIA. I climbed back up into the tower and worked the HLZ for the med-evac.

Skull 33 was insistent on me passing a 9 line to them. By this time I was getting tgt info from the predator, checking a B-52 on station, working the med-evac helicopter traffic and passing updates to the Team Leader. I advised Skull 33 that the med-evac was already on station that I was not able to pass the nine line at that time. I continued to engage tgt's until that afternoon. This ended more than 24 hrs of consistently controlling air assets and engaging ACM for me. My point of view was either facing south during the convoy movement, west and northwest during the attack on the FB, or watching where the nose of the attacking aircraft were pointing.

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