running tree line that they were taking fire from and then I remember that
came up and said that there was a bomb crater just----

PRES: Okay, which run are you talking about now?

WIT: The very last.

PRES: Okay, I am talking about the first run. Do you recall the direction of the first run?

WIT: His first strafing run, sir?

PRES: Yes, his first.

WIT: I do not recall, but…uh…I just remember my LGB run in. The run he strafed on very well because I fell back on his tac wing and set it up and followed him.

PRES: Okay, the first run that you remember very vividly then, the one that you can describe as the buddy lased one?

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: Can you describe the buddy lased one?

WIT: Sir, we came in, he told me to select CCIP and get ready to drop. He was going to release his. So, I selected CCIP, I still had these coordinates designated, so it was in fact auto. As I came in he said--uh as I came in to do the run, he said, "Pickle…push the pickle." I realized I was in auto, so I told him that wasn't working and I needed to come back around. So, I came back around and asked if I could select manual since I knew it would come off then. I came around for another run and did the same thing again. I just got into a form, same cruise form and pickled when he said----

PRES: Describe the formation?

WIT: I was on the left side in a cruise formation just--not quite parade, just a little bit outside of parade position; followed him in got ready to push the nose over, I had just got into a--I don't remember exactly what the dive angle was because I was flying form off of him. I think it was a little bit greater than 5 degrees. I pickled and I started the count down 3, 2, 1, pickle. I did that. I came up and he said "good effects." That is when I--we were running from the west to the east I believe and that is when I came in and held over to the east. I got my FLIR back for a minute and started talking him in for the next strafing run.

PRES: Okay, so after the buddy lased bomb, you go off to the west and what does flight lead do?

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WIT: I am not sure exactly which direction; I believe he went off to the northeast. Also, I went and turned off to the right and came maybe east, southeast and then started back up this way. We were circling there maybe for maybe a minute. I am not sure exactly, I remember he went off this way as I had my FLIR working----

PRES: Hey, hold on just a second. When you say he went off this way, what direction would you mean?

WIT: I believe he went off to the northeast after that run. I am not sure exactly. I kind of had a basic SA to where he--what direction he was the whole time I was flying there but I wasn't sure exactly where he had turned off of.

PRES: So, was it a briefed split up for you to trouble shoot your system or did you lose sight?

WIT: No, sir. I just made a turn and started working the system out I thought that we could split up again since he said that when we get out to the area, we will hold at different altitudes, you don't have to keep sight of me. Just work on what they are talking about, to get contact the target. So, that is when I just went back to my altitude.

PRES: Back to your holding altitude, so you briefed that you were operating as independent singles?

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: Over the target area or mutually supporting singles?

WIT: Briefly, we just pulled to different altitudes; we would talk to each other on the back radio before we did anything.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: We would join back up again quickly, if my climb was dropping----

PRES: Okay, as far as on that buddy…buddy lased run that you just described, do you recall reverifying where friendlies were and where the targets were? Did you receive 9-Line?

WIT: Sir, we received a 9-Line, I don't recall. My SA was that they were to the southeast of the target. I thought that they were quite a distance aways, about a quarter of a mile is what I remember thinking, about 600 meters or so.

PRES: Okay. Do you know what type of CAS you were working?

WIT: Type I.

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PRES: Type I?

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: And you know that because what?

WIT: It came up at the beginning that it was going to be a Type I control.

PRES: Okay. After you dropped the bomb, what is the JTAC saying on the radio?

WIT: After it uhm uh, after released it, after it detonated, he came up and said "good effects."

PRES: Okay, then what happens after that?

WIT: Sir, then after that he said they were still taking fire from that area, from the tree line. That's when he…I can remember exactly looking at this point in my FLIR, seeing the tree line that he was talking about but I do remember r saying "is there a bomb crater there?" In my report, I said it was to the west but I was thinking about it later actually I am trying to remember exactly; obviously here it is to the west. I just remember him coming up and saying "yep, there is a bomb crater there, just west of the target" and that is when I was pretty sure when he called up, I was like okay----

PRES: Who is saying this?

WIT: aid it. He said, "Do you got the…he gave us the coordinates, here is the structure, see the structure…see the structure and the tree line, east-west running tree line," he said, "Is there a bomb crater just to the west of the structure?"

PRES: Is he saying that on Aux radio just to you or is he saying that on GRN 20?

WIT: It's on GRN.

PRES: It's on GRN?

WIT: Yes, sir. I remember when he came up and said, "Is there a bomb crater right there" and the guy is like "yup, that is your target or that's the area that I am talking about." I was pretty sure that what I was looking in my FLIR was what he was talking about, exactly on the same point that they are talking about. The FLIR lost its alignment again and slewed off so I',m…

PRES: Can you point to the where that tree line is?

WIT: [Pointing to the tree line on xhibit 1] this one right here.

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PRES: [Referencing Exhibit 1] can you put kind of a solid line around that tree line? [Did as directed.] Okay, can you label that "2" right beside it there? [Did as directed.] So, you actually will validate that with your FLIR when it comes up with a good alignment?

WIT: Yes, sir and that was on my FLIR for a little bit, I remember looking at that.

PRES: Were you--what kind of magnification were you in?

WIT: I think it was in narrow?

PRES: You think you were in narrow?

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: Okay and then uh…where was at and where were you?

WIT: Once my FLIR slewed off target, then I came back out and looked off to the northeast, saw him, I picked up a visual of him and then with like 10 to 15 seconds of looking out the cockpit, I decided I better join up a tac wing. As we came around from the north to start an easterly run in to this tree line, they were talking about, so I just decided to get into a tac wing so I could get eyes on exactly what it was that he was strafing. So I could correct from lead's hits. I wasn't--I was having trouble determining--I see this on the FLIR, it is exactly what I am looking at, I know exactly what I am looking at here. When I looked outside the cockpit, I was having trouble saying, okay, that is the exact point, so that is why I felt I better get behind him to follow him around for this. As we rolled in, that I recognized the building and the tree line as we got pointed. I was like, okay, I recognize the structure that I was looking on my FLIR a minute ago and I see the tree line.

PRES: So, your anchor point then was?

WIT: My anchor point was, in my mind, it was the structure and with the tree line just right beside it.

PRES: The structure or the tree line?

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: Okay and when JTAC talked to you about that last target, how did he reference it?

WIT: He gave us the coordinates to the structure and said there was an east-west running tree line. I remember coming up on aux and saying, ' I am looking at this tree line on the FLIR" and said, "it doesn't quite look like it is east-west." I was just looking at just a small section of the tree line here and he said, "Well, no, it is an east-west

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running tree line." So, I looked back down and said okay, this whole tree line is east-west running." Then he came up and was like, asked them about the crater and they said, "Yes, there is a crater right there" and that is when I was sure.

PRES: [Referencing Exhibit 1.] Okay, point to the crater that you were discussing, can you circle that crater and label it as "3". [Did as directed.]
So, in your mind then the thing that distinguished that as the target area was all three of those things?

WIT: Yes, sir, the east-west running tree line, the structure, and then the crater. I had forgotten exactly which direction it was...the crater was from the structure. But I remember when they called it up, I was...that was just something that made me feel comfortable when er came up and said he had a crater just to the west of the structure, I was like "Aw cool, I am looking at the exact same thing."

PRES: Okay, do you know where that strafe line was in relationship to the last target that you dropped a bomb on?

WIT: I thought that this is what I released on and then came back around and strafed this, close to the same thing.

PRES: Okay, after you had a buddy lase and there was good effects on that target, did you look outside, did you what--see any effects?

WIT: I saw the smoke and that was one of the things as we were coming around from the north, we were in a left turn, I was on his right side, as we rolled in, I could see the smoke coming up from that spot, he pointed his nose at it, I couldn't tell--I tried to look carefully to see exactly where his bullets--I mean I saw him point it right at it but I couldn't tell when he strafed exactly. I was looking right at it; I just never saw the flash. And so when I came back up on his rear-end, I said, "Did you shoot because I didn't see anything." I remember----

PRES: Okay.

WIT: I remember seeing smoke coming out of the point----

PRES: So, you were actually then in what formation on the last strafe run?

WIT: As we came in, sir, I was moved to the right side, kind of tac wing, so maybe 500 feet off his 45 degree bearing on his right side.

PRES: Okay, and are you looking at the FLIR?

WIT: No, sir.

PRES: You are looking all visually?

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WIT: Outside. I lost the FLIR and that is when I was like I better get into tac wing so I can follow him around, so I can get a little more SA.

PRES: Okay. At the point that you just--circle for me Number 2, that is, what you were looking at?

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: And your verification again was, let me know all those things that you were using to verify then.

WIT: When I looked at the FLIR, this is exactly what I saw. I remember the curve in the tree line, the structure, and the bomb crater was right next to the structure.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: The loss of the FLIR came out when we rolled in--when I picked it up visually, I remember seeing the structure on the left side, the tree line on the right side and it is like oh, that's--I could kind of just recognize, I could see the smoke coming out of that--that's, that's it.

PRES: Was the smoke going straight up or had the smoke moved off the target now or?

WIT: I think the smoke was moving--but I could see smoke at the target coming up and kind of billowing I think to the north, but I am----

PRES: Okay. Were there any other battlefield effects going on? Was that the only smoke that you saw on the battlefield at that point?

WIT: At that point? No, sir, that was only--from what I can recall, that was the only smoke that I could see out there. I am sure there was smoke elsewhere, I don't remember.

PRES: Okay, so you are in tac wing and you are padlocked on to what you circled as 2?

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: And you verified it through the smoke and then the other queues that you just described?

WIT: Yes, sir, I remembered----.

PRES: Why did you come up and ask r whether he has fired?

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WIT: I was looking at this point, I could have never--I didn't see, you know--I was scanning his nose and then I never saw the flash from his nose. I wasn't sure if he strafed or I didn't think that he had actually shot because I could never see--I can remember pointing right at it and then we started climbing up.

PRES: Were you looking at the ground at all?

WIT: Yes, sir, I would look back at the ground and looked back to where his nose was pointing.

PRES: Okay. Were you cleared hot on this pass?

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: Okay, and how…what was like the time that you were cleared hot and when you actually----

WIT: I felt like we had plenty of time. I didn't feel like he would have been rushed because he gave him the cleared hot as we were coming around.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: Right as we got pointed at the target we had a cleared hot, we still had--I don't remember how many seconds, but it seemed like some good time before he--I guess that he shot, maybe he started pulling off.

PRES: Okay and what happened after you pulled up? What was the comments or what was the discussion on the radios amongst JTAC and amongst yourselves?

WIT: We, uhm, pulled the nose up and I was like, "did you, did you fire or did you shoot the gun?" He is like--he said, "A-firm." Then in a couple of seconds, the JTAC came up and said "check-fire, check-fire." We waited a little bit and then----

PRES: Where did he say check fire?

WIT: He just----

PRES: What was your sense on when was that check fire call given? Was it before or after the strafe?

WIT: It was after the strafe.

PRES: After the strafe. How long after the strafe?

WIT: 20 seconds maybe, we pulled up and started the left turn and I had already talked with him, I asked "did you fire, I didn't see anything?" "I didn't see you fire at that

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point." He said, "A-firm, I did." Then, about 10 seconds later after that, I guess, that was about 10 seconds after we pulled up and then I said that and 10 seconds later after that that he said, "check-fire."

PRES: Okay, then what?

WIT: Then asked them again, "Say again?" and he said again, "check-fire, check-fire" I am not sure if he said that maybe a friendly position or that is a friendly position. I do not recall which one of those he said, I am sure he said one or two.

PRES: Okay, and then what?

WIT: I don't remember exactly what was said right after that. I left a couple minutes after that to go to the tanker. ıid that he would stay there; he was going to stay there and talk with them to try to see what was going on, go ahead and send me to the tanker so I can get some fuel to start heading back or come back.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: And I would come back, so I went to the tanker.

PRES: What did you do after tanking?

WIT: After tanking, I just kind of pulled up on the tanker and waited because I heard right as about I was to leave, I heard call and said that he was just a few miles away, so I decided I would just wait and head back with him as a section. So, I just waited until he pulled up and fueled and we started heading back.

PRES: Okay, you went back and then what happened?

WIT: I went back and checked back in and they started some A-10s came and checked in and I started talking to those guys about different targets. There were also some Helos that were talking on to different points and I was just following them through the different points they were talking on.

PRES: Did anyone release any more ordnance?

WIT: Yes.

PRES: No, anyone within the Flight?

WIT: No, sir.

PRES: Okay, anything else to add on to your recollection of the sequence of events for the sortie?

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WIT: Sir, that is about it. The thing that I remember when I got back, they put in ; tapes and started looking at those; I went and looked at his. I got to see them for just a brief minute there. I remember looking at his tapes that was the same thing that I saw that was on mine, I felt like that was the same thing. His FLIR imagery looked almost exactly like what I saw for a minute or two when I pulled them up.

PRES: His FLIR imagery did, is that what you are saying, was the same thing that you saw visually?

WIT: Yes, sir. Well, his FLIR imagery looked exactly like--look similar. I knew that we were both looking at the same spot. I felt when I looked at his tapes; I was like all right, I remember seeing that on my FLIR and then when we looked at his HUD tape----

PRES: What was it that set that apart?

WIT: Sir, for me it was the crater with the tree line that has this curve in it. I mainly remember the east-west tree line with the slight curve right next to the structures. It was something for me that was easy to remember since the bend in the tree line is right next to the structure and the crater is right there.

PRES: Okay. Your recollection of how the target was described to you was what?

WIT: That was just the structure with this tree line next it, and the crater that had pointed out.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: Then looking at his--when he rolled in on his HUD tape, I saw that he was pointing at the same tree line that I would have strafed myself if my FLIR and everything was working well.

PRES: Okay, any other comments about the general terrain here?

WIT: No, sir, it is just I can remember what this looks like. I remember the riverbed there, the highway and stuff.

PRES: Okay. What is your SA to where those friendlies are on that final pass?

WIT: [Referencing Exhibit 1] I thought--I believed that they were here. They could be further I thought it was--I am pretty sure it was this point is where I believe the friendlies were.

Maj When you say "this point" do you mean this area circled in blue?

WIT: Yes.

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PRES: Okay, that is all I have. What we are going to do now is there are probably some questions from around the room, I am going to give everybody a chance to just to ask one or two more questions, so we will start off over here. Okay,

: What was your impression, your initial impression with JTAC on the ground, did he sound competent?

WIT: He sounded fine, just like the other guys I have talked to in the past. This is the first time I talked to a JTAC that was under fire or being shot at and hear gunfire on the radio, so, as far as I know, he sounded good.

LCDR Okay, did the JTAC use any unfamiliar terminology?

WIT: No, I recognized--I had no problems understanding what he was saying.

LCDR : Okay, and was any of the information that he had passed to you, passed in an unfamiliar format?

WIT: No.

LCDR : No further questions, thank you.

PRES: Colonel?

Lt Col What was your CAS training, I mean your background, I know you are a wingman, but you do work ups for these types of things, my question is how much CAS training have you had where you are actually talking to a JTAC on the ground and, you know, who is controlling you and going through the standard CAS flow?

WIT: I cannot recall how many flights I have done, but in Fallon, Nevada, we had gone up there a couple of times and we'd do--stay there for a couple of weeks and go out every day. They would give us 9-Lines type it into the system and do runs, just going out practicing CAS. Whenever we didn't do much training where you are just holding right over head and they are talking you into a point right there. Which typically, they'd give you a point, give you a brief description, then you'd run in and you would get contact with of it and they would kind of talk you onto it as you are going in.

Lt Col More like a low altitude attack?

WIT: Things like that also we'd done high altitude attacks…and I'd…stuff, but we'd go out and do CAS stuff though, felt like I had done a good amount.

Lt Col Thank you, very much.

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Maj I just want to follow up on some stuff that you said earlier, you said that you had gotten your Level II training right before you guys came on cruise, when did you guys come on cruise? Approximately

WIT: We started in September.

Colonel: September '06?

WIT: Right at the end, sir. October 1st.

Maj Okay. Earlier you said you had a hard time maintaining friendly position when your FLIR was going out?

WIT: Well, its not--I was having a hard time keeping SA as to what is going on just because I would get a clear image of what is going on in my head and try to work out to where that is exactly outside of the cockpit and I would lose that sensor----

PRES: You would lose what sensor that you are talking about?

WIT: The FLIR.

PRES: The FLIR sensor?

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: So, are you using the FLIR sensor as the primary anchor then?

WIT: Sir that is what I was trying to. I gave up on that just for the last run. I tried to and decided to stop looking at that completely and just come eyes out and follow the lead around and see what a----

Commander Can I get a rehack on that item? What is your habit pattern, or do you know, what do you do normally to mark a friendly position? If you type a coordinate in, do you put it in as any kind of certain kind of waypoint or some number that you put in, do you put it as a visual point on a scope or?

WIT: When I pick a particular number, later, if I have the time, I would like to put it in as a Geo-Ref and leave that up and remember that is always where the Geo-Ref is the authenticate position and then they give me the coordinates so I could put that in and then scroll to and they're like…okay, that's exactly to the north or the south or whatever. Typically I would just try to get eyes on and be aware as I am going in like here is my target and there are the friendlies.

PRES: Did you do that in this case?

WIT: I thought that--I knew that the friendlies were--I was aware of what our target was and I thought that the friendlies were a good distance away to the southeast is what I recall. The last time that I lose the FLIR, okay, I think that's our target, what I am looking at right there before, you know, obviously I am not going to drop anything. I would just follow and see, once we got pointed, like okay I would recognize from looking at on my FLIR, so the friendlies would have to be in that direction. As we came in on that strafing run, my SA was [DEMONSTRATION] here is the point that we were looking at, obviously the friendlies are off in this direction, further to the right, that is what I thought.

PRES: Okay.

Maj : And that was Commander : asking the question. , you said earlier that when your FLIR was not working, you went to hold east. Is that east of the friendlies or east of the----

WIT: East of...the target.

Maj East of...the target. Earlier you said it was Type I CAS, who said it was Type I CAS?

WIT: The JTAC.

Maj : I think that is all I have, sir.

PRES: One more question and I think you answered but incase you didn't or I didn't ask it right, did you ever come up and tell the JTAC or your flight lead that you were tally the target, tally the friendlies, one or both?

WIT: It came up in code, contact the friendlies for the very first time when I called them out and got them on the FLIR. Okay, got that point, got that marked as a way point.

PRES: So, you marked it under Mark I?

WIT: No, sir, I don't remember exactly what waypoint, it was probably waypoint 6 or 7 trying to think of which waypoint I put it in. It was one of the higher waypoints...whenever I...for my targets, I always put those as either Mark I or Mark II, or Mark III or waypoints one, two, or...and I try to put the friendlies in at a higher way point.

PRES: Okay, do you have any more questions?

Negative response.

PRES: Okay, this is an official investigation, it is privileged and since that my report will be made to the appointing authority or higher authority for such use as deemed

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appropriate. Therefore you should not discuss these proceedings with anyone outside this board, except your counsel if you retained one, but you weren't read your rights, so, you have not obtained counsel. Do you understand what that means?

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: That means that what you said here before us stays here with us and what this board is going to do is take all of this information that you have provided and we're going to turn it over to the formal combined investigation board that will start to convene probably a couple days from now. Okay. That is all I have, the time is now 1951 and this interview is concluded. Thank you very much.

[END OF PAGE]

Statement

A-XIX

Case Ref No: 83187/06

MOD Form 266A/B
(Introduced 12/03)

SERVICE POLICE
WITNESS STATEMENT
(CJ Act 1967, S.9;MC Act 1980, SS.5A(3a) and 5B;MC Rules 1981, r70)

Statement of:	
Rank/Status: LMA	
Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert "over 18")	Occupation: HM Forces (RN)
This statement (consisting of 5 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.	
Signature:	Dated the 9th day of December 2006.

On Tue 5 Dec 06, I was on Garmsir, with Surgeon and the CMT (Combat Med Tech) whose name I can not recall. Surgeon and I are based at with the Medical facilities. If there any casualties they are brought to us by the CMT by ambulance and treated accordingly.

The same day I was informed that the LD had received a radio message that there were casualties. The CMT, his driver and commander, whose names I can not recall all went in the ambulance to collect the casualties. I was not informed of any other information on the casualties.

When the ambulance returned to the back doors were opened. Looking inside the ambulance I could see that the CMT was carrying out CPR on who I now know to be The other British solider in the ambulance who I later found out to be was taken out of the ambulance whilst was carried out of the ambulance on a stretcher. The CMT informed me that had been unresponsive for about 20 minutes.

I noticed that had his combat trousers and boots on, however, was naked from the waist up. I did not see Combat Body Armour (CBA), webbing or rifle. still had his Osprey on his person and was carrying his rifle.

I then re-triaged the casualties. I classified as T1 as he was lay on a stretcher and was unresponsive. I then classified as a T3 as he was still walking. I then took to one side of our vehicle and saw that he had a gun shot wound to his upper left arm that

(Continuation Sheet)

Sheet No	2	Case No: 83187/06
Continuation of statement of:		

I then carried out a secondary survey which includes the whole body being checked for other wounds, no other injuries were found.

About 1342 hrs the same day, I injected with Morphine into the top of his right leg. I then told a solider from LD to stay and to keep him talking.

I then went to help Surgeon who was treating Surgeon was carrying out his procedures and informed me that there was no pulse and no heartbeat. pupils were checked; however, they were fixed and dilated, which usually means there is no brain activity. After all checks were carried out, was pronounced dead by Surgeon had a fist size hole to the upper right of his back.

vas then wrapped up in blankets and placed back into the back of the ambulance and was in the back of the Spartan and both were taken to the awaiting Chinook.

I was in the back of the Spartan until we arrived at the Helicopter Landing Site (HLS). I then handed all my notes to a medic who was taking and to Camp Bastion (BSN). I believe that all my notes will be written up by the Medic whose name I can not recall and given to the A&E Team within the Hospital in BSN.

I would like to add that if my notes are available from the Hospital I consent for them to be recovered.

Signed:

Signed:

LCpl
AGC (RMP)

Statement

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Case Ref No: 83187/06

MOD Form 266A/B
(Introduced 12/03)

SERVICE POLICE
WITNESS STATEMENT
(CJ Act 1967, S.9;MC Act 1980, SS.5A(3a) and 5B;MC Rules 1981, r70)

Statement of.	
Rank/Status: LCpl	
Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert "over 18")	Occupation: HM Forces (RM)
This statement (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.	
Signature:	Dated the 8th day of December 2006

Whilst deployed, my job role is as With this job I am responsible for issue and receipt of equipment from Z Coy stores at Camp Bastion.

Today at 1004 hrs, within Z Coy stores, Camp Bastion, I handed to L r LA, RMP, the following item to which he attached an exhibit identification label marked as follows:

- Original G1033 issued to

I have signed and dated the exhibit identification label.

Exhibit L shows that on 13 Oct 06, was issued a full compliment of Osprey body armour, including front and back ballistic plates.

Signed:

Signed:
SSgt
RMP (SIB)

Statement

A-XXI

Case Ref No: 83187/06

MOD Form 266A/B
(Introduced 12/03)

SERVICE POLICE
WITNESS STATEMENT
(CJ Act 1967, S.9;MC Act 1980, SS.5A(3a) and 5B;MC Rules 1981, r70)

Statement of:	
Rank/Status: Sgt	
Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert "over 18")	Occupation: HM Forces (RN)
This statement (consisting of 4 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.	
Signature:	Dated the 11th day of December 2006.

Prior to deployment I can confirm that I completed the full OPTAG package and am current in all mandatory training objectives.

During this deployment I am employed as Tp Sgt with 1 Tp. In this appointment I am responsible for the day-to-day running of the Tp, particularly in the areas of administration and G4 issues, along with Tp discipline. As Tp Sgt, I am answerable to Capt the Tp Comd. In an operational capacity, whilst on the ground I am ultimately responsible for organising the evacuation of any casualties, the treatment of Prisoners of War (PoWs), resupply of ammunition of ordnance as required and providing command, should the Tp Comd become incapacitated. As well as my personal weapon, I also carry a 51 mm mortar system.

On 21 Nov 06, three Tps from Z Coy moved from Camp Bastion to MOG (South) in the Helmand Province. We arrived on or around 24 Nov 06, and commenced low level training and intelligence gathering. This continued into Dec 06, when we were joined by assets from the Light Dragoons (LD).

On 4 Dec 06, orders were given by the Coy Comd to the effect that the unit and attached assets were to move in a southerly direction at the Garmsir District Centre and disrupt or destroy enemy activity within designated areas. Whilst this was ongoing, intelligence was to be gathered to assist in future operations.

About 0430 hrs on 5 Dec 06, we moved from MOG (South) to the start line, located in the vicinity of an area called . The start line was named Arbroath and . was the initial location of the Fire Support Team (FST) led by . The FST would provide a gun line and air support as necessary.

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(Continuation Sheet)

Sheet No	2	Case No: 83187/06
Continuation of statement of:		

Throughout a ground move, I will move from Section to Section as and when I am required to do so. For example, on moving from point Arbroath, I was co-located with 2 Sect, acting as Tp reserve, whilst 1 and 3 Sect moved south. 2 Sect then moved through their position and I remained with 3 Sect as Tp reserve.

Usually during such moves I would have a runner located with me, however on this occasion I went without as he was on R and R out of theatre. Within my group were an attached medic, whose name I can not recall and Sgt as Engineer support.

Along the move, there were phase lines and for 1 Tp, they were named Taunton and Plymouth and were located to the southern most points of areas A2 and A4, which required clearance.

1 Tp arrived at phase line , looking into the area of location A3, the next to be cleared. 1 Tp was instructed to go firm at this location, pending the arrival of 4 Tp and 5 Tp.

About 1200 hrs that day, whilst at that location, 1 Tp encountered heavy fire from enemy located in area B3, south west in direction from 1 Tp location. The attack seemed to commence once the Apache helicopters had left the area. FST then called fast air (jet plane) to attack a tower compound in area B3.

A number of bombing runs were carried out with fast air coming in east to west. I was aware that fast air would then commence a further attack using guns.

I remember hearing the aircraft pass overhead and felt the impact of rounds striking the earth in front of me, to my left and between my legs. I heard a scream to my left, immediately grabbed the attention of the attached medic and moved left along the trench we were in.

We came across , of my unit, who appeared to have sustained an injury to his arm/shoulder. As the medic began to assess and treat this soldier, I was aware that further along the trench was lying on his back, also apparently injured. Whilst medical attention was being given to both soldiers, I had to ensure that the rest of the Tp were okay and obtain an exact grid reference of our location and the Zap numbers of the two casualties. I cannot remember those details now; however I can confirm that I passed them to Capt so that he could task casualty evacuation.

The ambulance arrived some thirty minutes later. Due to the nature of the terrain and our troops location, I was forced to physically walk the vehicle into place so that and could be extracted.

I can remember that before being loaded onto the ambulance, was conscious and able to walk, whilst was unresponsive, had had his kit and upper body clothing removed and was undergoing CPR.

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(Continuation Sheet)

Sheet No	3	Case No: 83187/06
Continuation of statement of:		

When the ambulance had left the scene, all troops withdrew from that area to an agreed rendezvous location in the District Centre.

Whilst at this area, I was informed that had passed away.

Signed:

Signed:

Sgt
RMP (SIB)

A - XXI

MAJ

Interview

A-XXII

Interview of Major

PRES: Major , my name is Captain , and I think I introduced myself to you earlier. I am here just to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the potential friendly fire incident that we had on 5 December 2006 down in , I am sorry and we are here because General Abizaid asked and tasked Lieutenant General North to perform a formal investigation and we are trying to establish the facts and to determine and understand the circumstances around this potential friendly fire incident. Do you have any questions about how I was tasked or what my authorities were?

WIT: No, I don't have a problem with that.

PRES: Do you have any problems if we ask you some questions today?

WIT: No.

PRES: Okay, the greatest question that we have for you is really what was the sequence of events on the battlefield on that day around the time of this incident when you took friendly casualties under your command? So, from a period of about maybe an hour, two hours prior to maybe an hour afterward we have a fairly good understanding of what the aircraft disposition was----

WIT: [Nonverbal yes.]

PRES: Who was going in and out to support this active TIC but if you could help us understand the ground force movement we would appreciate that.

WIT: If I run through my scheme of maneuver for the day and what we actually did.

PRES: Please do

WIT: This is Garmser DC [District Centre] here at the top with the main road that runs through east-west. This area is basically coalition force held, it is completely derelict and is subjected on a regular basis to harassing fire from firing points from 150 meters south all the way down to about 2 K south of that position.

A - XXII

This canal is effectively uncrossable on foot. It is deep and it is about, I suppose it must be 10 meters wide so, it is a significant obstacle and that is an obstacle all the way down to this point here just off the air fault which is the old southern checkpoint. For more information the banks of this are raised so the troops on this side are not subjected to any enemy arcs of fire from this side although the checkpoint here regularly receives harassing attacks from various firing points out in this area.

We moved in before first light or as it was becoming light and lined up with 1 Troop. Reference points, there is a prominent feature at approximately grid square known as which is on the western flank. The central checkpoint is at grid nd the eastern point of the DC is at grid H-Hour was on my call and when we had all the troops in position they started advancing with 1 Troop moving first skirting around the western side of and into the first objective which I had named 'Alpha 1'. They were sequentially named, so it was 'Alpha 1, 2, 3, 4' on the western flank and 'Bravo 1, 2, 3, 4' down the center and 'Charlie 1, 2, 3, 4' down on the right flank. Report line or the line of departure is known as which was the east-west road running through the DC between just about 200 meters north of and the eastern checkpoint. Report line is a prominent drainage ditch that runs from the following grids to and a line continued in the same direction out to the river. The drainage ditch goes through a few convoluted bits beyond that position that was effectively where the incident took place.

So, the sequence of events, 1 Troop moved into Alpha 1 and secured that when they had completed, 4 Troop in Center went into Bravo 1 and 5 Troop into Charlie 1. All 3 first boxes were probably secured by around 10 o'clock, 10 till half 10.

Capt 10. I am the

WIT: I grabbed him for my timeline, he was in my Company Main and took a list of all the timings which I wasn't taking on the ground so, my memory is better jogged by him. I can give rough times but it would be useful for me to use him to refer to, to back those timings up.

Then, we moved forward again with 1 Troop moving in to Alpha 2, this was after I had moved the , the intimate support into Ops Box Bravo 1 so, 4 Troop had cleared down to the bottom here and the Light Dragoons were effectively in this area firing into depth positions in order to support 1 Troop's move down into Ops Box Alpha 2. They moved forward and went firm on report line Taunton, centered around 4 Troop then moved down and secured to the approximate Grid of and around the compound, at again, on report line Then 5 Troop cleared down from Charlie 1 into Bravo 1--sorry Charlie 1 to Charlie 2, there are a number of quite complex compounds there and it took them longer than I had expected to to clear those, and they went firm just short of report line . It was at that point, probably getting on for half twelve, that the fire on to 1 Troops position incoming enemy fire began to get a lot more effective and coming from two and then three different directions.

A-8811

Initially it had been coming from the compound to the south-east of them, which is at Grid--centered around They also started getting incoming fire from a grid to their south-west which is approximately 200 meters away at

PRES: Can you point to that on the chart?

WIT: In here, so they are here, 1 Troop are here, centered around here and they started getting fire from this compound here. There were then reports of incoming fire on from a position approximately 150 meters to their front. There were reports that they were also receiving incoming fire from the north. I am not sure exactly where that position is, it could have been as far north as that or it could have been the compound directly to their north that they had cleared, which is approximately half way between the two, approximately at

PRES: So, the northern fire could come from, checked with A-1 that they had cleared through to go down to A-2?

WIT: That's right.

PRES: There was no other positioning of those forces by anybody else on the battlefield?

WIT: Of which troops, sir?

PRES: I am sorry, the enemy fire from the north?

WIT: That is right, they would have either been that they'd bypassed them or possibly they had been able to out flank them coming up this dominant track and getting in behind them. To give you an idea of what the ground is like here, there are a lot of cornfields; these ditches are up to 4 and 5 feet deep, 10 to 15 feet across the top. It is very difficult terrain and suits them and their life with an AK, carrying no kit and other than 4 magazines so, basically they have a lot of freedom of movement.

PRES: So, at this point, when the troops down in A-2 are receiving fire from 3 sides, what else is happening up at have friendly support from the Scimitars?

WIT: From they were not in a position to give any supporting fire other than to the position that they had received incoming fire from 150 meters to their front.

Capt We didn't fire at all, sir because we couldn't ID the enemy and so there is no fire unfortunately coming from my position up on

PRES: So, you were up on

Capt I was, sir, yes.

PRES: You knew there was an enemy that had now slipped in between----

A-XXII

Capt Yes.

PRES: Between----

WIT: There was effective enemy fire onto we knew the vicinity of the location of it which was the compounds just to my south which was to 1 Troops north from one compound there at

Capt We brought snipers up there tried to ID them and we couldn't ID them because--we couldn't ID so we didn't return any fire at all.

PRES: So, the enemy forces then were firing both north-west toward as well as south towards----

WIT: Yes, at the same time, 4 Troop in the center of the location that I had given already, also began to receive enemy fire from the compound directly to the--more or less to the south of them, which is the Grid that I have already given, approximately It is at that point, somewhere between 1230 and 1 o'clock that there were a couple of fire missions called in onto that compound that I just gave the grid for and by the JTAC, Captain who was located with 1 Troop, which were observed by both Company TAC and 4 Troop who were located in the center there... As I say that was brought in, by my understanding of it, although I personally cannot confirm that that it was from a F-18 aircraft that we had up at the time.

PRES: This is local time that you are referring?

WIT: Yes, yes. The next thing I was aware of was that there was a strafing fire from aircraft seen from my position here, I saw it coming in from my right hand flank and into the field in front of me, so by my estimation it would have been coming in from a north-westerly direction to south-east. And from where I was sitting, it seemed to fall short of the compound and by my estimation it would have been either close to or on top of 1-Troop's location.

PRES: What was your position?

WIT: I was at the southern edge of this compound just about--there is another prominent ditch that joins running north-south.

PRES: Could you give us that grid?

WIT: I will give you that which was where 4 Troop was centered around. The radio went quiet; I tried to get in touch with 1-0. I can't tell you exactly how long it was, it was longer than I had liked, it was probably something like 2-minutes, when the Troop Commander came up on the net to say that they had received, they had got two casualties, one P1 and one P3.

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PRES: Okay, getting back to what you saw, you saw strafing fire, bullets that were actually hitting the dirt, kicking up the dirt.

WIT: Yes.

PRES: Can you point to where the last bullet was----

WIT: By my estimation----

PRES: How far off the target was it?

WIT: it was probably a 100 meters short of the target. Do you want me to give you a grid for that?

PRES: If you could.

WIT: Probably,

PRES: Okay and how far back did you see the line of bullets?

WIT: Because of my position being obscured, with the hedge line, it was basically by my estimation, and by the sound of the rounds, it was directly to my west so, probably in line to where report line Taunton is.

PRES: Did you see the aircraft from your position?

WIT: I didn't, no. I didn't.

PRES: Because from your position you were looking west.

WIT: I should have been able to.

PRES: You would have been in a good position to see them from the west to the east-west run.

WIT: I sort of took cover at that point so, I didn't actually see the aircraft itself.

Capt And there is so much air up there, that, you know, it is very confusing about what is going on up there. So, to ID one, you know, just one aircraft up there is very difficult, it is not easy for me back on. but it is very difficult for those front line troops to know.

PRES: Sure, it is hard for me to conceive of since I am usually in the air, I am trying to understand, that is why I am asking you stupid questions from the Navy guy.

A-XXII

WIT: You can distinguish between the Helicopters and the fast air.

PRES: But as far as the sound, can you from that position on the ground, can you hear the sound of the aircraft going off.

WIT: Yes, yes.

PRES: And can you hear the sound of the gun firing? Can you describe to me what you heard?

WIT: Yes. What you hear when an aircraft is strafing is the rounds hitting the deck first and then the sound of them going through the air. It is a huge amount--basically the crack and thump that you get from a rifle but magnified a hundred times and then you hear what we call the 'fart' from the air which is obviously the bullets or the rounds being supersonic and then you hear them being released afterwards. Very distinctive. I have seen and heard a number of times before and that is exactly the sound that I heard.

PRES: Now, these rounds, what did they look like when they impacted the ground?

WIT: it just put up a stream of dust and dirt.

PRES: Did they leave any small craters or----

WIT: Not that I could see, I was probably----

PRES: Soft dirt, hard dirt?

WIT: The field to our front and in front of 1 Troops position was actually ploughed, it was one of the few fields that were ploughed so, you could actually see the rounds hitting the ground. And as I say all you really saw was all the dirt getting kicked up so, a line, a stream of dust and earth being kicked up.

PRES: So, as far as other supporting fighters, no other supporting fighters, Air and ground?

WIT: Only from the air. We had Apache in support earlier, they had gone off station, and it was therefore only the air. At that time we also therefore had no artillery fire obviously to deconflict. We had had artillery fire, at various points before that and after but during that period, where the aircraft window, there was none. The only other supporting fire were the intimate support from the CVRT, which, 2 of which , 2 of which were on 4 Troops and my left flank between 4 Troop and 5 Troop. They had been giving intimate support to 5 Troop as they assaulted the compounds here. Very rough grid obviously because they were relatively mobile but centered around the and to the east of that predominantly. As I recall, I think that I have been trying to maneuver or get support in for 1 Troop here, so there were two that were supposed to be going around the back, one of them had gotten stuck

in a ditch and therefore the other was staying with it to provide it intimate support, so they weren't firing and they were around this area here. I don't know exactly where but I can get the troop commander, I have got him standing by in case you want to talk to him later. But my understanding is that they were some where in the area give or take 200 or 300 meters of ' nd that was the only other supporting fire, sir that we had at that time.

PRES: So, all the weaponry that was on the battlefield that day, what kind of caliber did you have? You had 20 mm caliber from the F-18s, you had 30 mm from----

WIT: From the Rarden cannons on the Scimitar.

PRES: Okay, so the Scimitar has 30 mm?

WIT: 30 mil and a coax. Coaxity mounted GPMG, 7.62. The troops had 5.56 link as well as 5.56 rifles, the UGLs and GPMG in the lightt role and we had the--what else did we have, we had the guns, grenades, Javelin, IDOL.

PRES: Did we kill, capture any ACM, did we capture any weapons?

WIT: No. We killed a considerable number, BDA afterwards indicates it was a minimum of 15, our estimates were somewhere around 40 to 50 so, probably a line somewhere in the middle is the approximate number we killed, so it is something like 30.

PRES: Do you know where those KIAs were?

WIT: The majority of them were in the box Alpha 3, and we were just ready to go down and do some proper BDA and find out exactly how much damage we caused and that was basically the next box below report line, . The compound in the center that we were receiving fire from in the centre and 1 Troop is in Bravo 3 and the other compounds there was a lot of fire from; in particular the CVRT caused a huge number of enemy casualties, and KIAs. That was in the area down here, approximate

The following day, we stayed in the DC that night and the following day, and that evening we were able to identify a number of killed enemy forces through javelin thermal imagery and also a killed a few that night as well.

CDR ' Sir, did you hear or see any of the other strafing runs or bombing runs about that time either a few minutes before or.....?

WIT: There was that much going on. I did hear there were other strafing runs that day that I heard, definitely. Directly after the incident, there was no more strafing runs and I think the air went off station after that actually and we had artillery support then because it was at that point having we received, going on chronologically, it then took a significant amount of time to get the casualties removed. We got the Spartan vehicle, which is one of the Scimitars, one of the CVRT's without 30 mil cannon on as an

ambulance and one of the Viking to come down and collect the casualty. That whole evolution probably took about half an hour. At which point, I decided as they were getting more and more incoming fire from three sides that I needed to withdraw with the idea that the whole thing was never actually to hold ground, we were hoping to push all the way to the southern checkpoints and then withdraw before prior to last light, by this stage it was a quarter past 1. And I made the call that we had disrupted and killed enough of the enemy at that stage and that 1 Troop in particular were likely to take more casualties if we tried to press on. And my ability to bring my own intimate support in support of them would be extremely difficult because we weren't exactly sure how they had maneuvered their sections around to try and get out. So, basically I got them to withdraw to 4 Troop's location and then they moved directly north and as they were withdrawing 5 Troop withdrew up the eastern flank the same way they had come in along the eastern checkpoint. 4 Troop after 1 Troop had pulled from their position, then started getting more, very effective enemy fire as 1 Troop were followed up. So, it was 4 Troop and Company out there and then we withdrew North under the cover of a CVRT and a Viking traveling in that direction, still receiving incoming fire from this direction, from the bottom of west-northwest.

Maj Sir, do you know what caliber of enemy fire you were receiving?

WIT: That day we had everything from small arms, 7.62, RPG, mortars, petrol bombs. When they were in very close to 1 Troop here, they were probably no more than 30 meters away, and were throwing petrol bombs presumably to burn the crops that 1 Troop was withdrawing through. I can't think of anything else.

PRES: Can we fix a time where the western flank of the enemy penetrated the closest to 1 Troop?

WIT: That would have been after the strafing run.

PRES: I heard some statements where before the strafing runs, 1 Troop was receiving RPGs and I don't know a lot about the weapon system, but they would have to be a lot more closer.

WIT: RPG effective ranges--they can fire it our from and certainly here they have been firing from much further out, they will fire it from ıoping to lob it in because it gives quite a signature and because they are relatively vulnerable once they've identified their firing position. They tend to fire it from a reasonable depth and we'd pushed down far enough that I don't think it would have been particularly close but I am speculating and you would need to speak to Captain Clark, the 1 Troop Commander if you want how far the RPG was when they fired at his position.

PRES: Again, when you saw the strafing run, when you saw the bullets kicking up the dirt, your position was with 4 Troop?

WIT: In the center with 4 Troop.

PRES: What was your distance, would you say down to the compound that was being targeted, is it about 500 meters?

WIT: I would say 450. Well, on the map, it looks like 350 meters, which is probably about right.

PRES: So, you were actually kind of triangulated from 1 Company to the northwest of the target about 400, 500 meters. You may have actually been a little closer to that compound?

WIT: Yes.

PRES: And then 5 Troop was?

WIT: 5 Troop were out on the western flank, probably about 3 to .....at least 300 meters away from the center. Because of the closeness of the terrain I wasn't able to cover the frontage as well as I had hoped. It is probably a two to three Company frontage as opposed to one Company and that was part of the issue with them being able to outflank 1 Troop. We hadn't--up until then we had only seen the fighting in a very linear fashion. I hadn't expected them to try and outflank us.

PRES: Do you have any idea how many ACM may have been involved?

WIT: I think, initially as we were pushing down to until we got to I would say no more than 20. When we were getting counterattacked and outflanked, I would say probably round about 40. The information that we had got from the Intelligence Officer of the ANP in the district center, was that we were counterattacked with a force of 19 so, somewhere in the middle there.

Lt Col I gotta a few questions, I am the School, USAFE and I would like to take you back a little to your mission planning and see if I understand your concept for fire. What I have is that you would be supported by artillery until fixed wing or rotary wing arrived on station and do the majority of the support and while they were off station, you would get supported again by artillery, is that correct?

WIT: Artillery and the CVRT.

Lt Col CVRT

WIT: That was the main fire support, yes.

Lt Col What does a CVRT carry for support?

WIT: 30 mil and coax 7.62.

Lt Col So, it is a direct fire gun?

WIT: Yes.

Lt Col As far as the close air support, when was a decision made to call, request CAS? Did you do a preplanned request?

WIT: We did do a preplan request. I think we did for 6 o'clock

Lt Col Okay.

WIT: Was the AH?

Capt What we had asked for--what we were told we were going to get AH from 7 and then Air from 9.

Lt Col Okay.

Capt That is what we had been told, but as I said to a colleague, it all just merged into one and I think it pretty much was like that. We got AH, then we got some Air, then we got a bit more AH.

WIT:

Lt Col : In that case, when did you select to use CAS on those targets or was that part of your mission orders.

WIT: It was part of the mission orders and I attached the JTAC to the Troop that would be maneuvering at the time, so that is why they were with 1 Troop. The JTAC was initially on and for the assault of Alpha-1 and then collocated with 1 Troop Headquarters as they pushed forward. The idea was to have it very controlled and sequentially executed in order that I would have two feet on the ground and at any one time, have one unit maneuver moving forward so that we coordinate all supporting assets and direct fires.

Lt Col So, once 1 Troop would have secured their objective, was the JTAC supposed to move over to 4 Troop?

Capt He would have done that, yes. Depending, he could have stayed in the forward position in order to call support in for 4 Troop moving south or more he would have come across and gone forward with 4 Troop where he has got the best view to actually call in the air.

Lt Col Okay, did you have COMM links with the JTAC?

WIT: Not directly, it was always through one of my troop commanders.

LT Col Okay.

WIT: But I was able to speak to him indirectly. Sorry and there was one other link that we had. We had part of the FST which included artillery controllers and they had COMM so we were able to speak to them on VHF means, the two guys that were with the JTAC could speak to them directly as well.

LT Col Okay, so there was also, though the Fire Support Channel there was an individual there?

WIT: Yes.

Lt Col Okay and then as far as the timeline goes, do you recall did we say approximately what time the friendly casualties occurred?

WIT: I think it was round about 1230.

Lt Col Right about 1230?

Capt I feel it was round about 1300, 1310, in my mind I have got, when we sent a 9-Liner, because I sent it, I am pretty sure we wrote it down at about 1310, because we had that lull in the battle from 1200 and I wrote in my own diary, "1200-Everything is going well and then the air I was asked, you know, do you require any Air? From the Boss, you know, it was all going well so and they went off task to go and help someone else. So, I approximate that it is more around 1300 and 1310.

Lt Col Were the rotary wing fragged to come back for the CAS or were they coming in for the CASEVAC?

WIT: Well, both. As I understand it, we had the Apache came back to give us support as we withdrew but there was also--the CASEVAC was by Lynx?

Capt Sorry, do you mean how the casualty was picked up, are you asking that or was he providing fire support?

Lt Col Right, I was wondering if he went back to rearm to come back for fire support or if he came back as the CASEVAC escort or if that just kind of happened.

Capt I was asked if I needed Air after we had the casualty and I said it would be desired and that did help with the extraction.

Maj : Just for clarification for the record, you used the terms P-1 and P-3?

WIT: That's correct.

Maj What does they stand for?

WIT: It is to do with the severity of the injury. P-1 would be life threatening, needing immediate surgery or attention through to P-4, which confusingly means either dead or not requiring medical attention. Either way the person doesn't require medical attention, P-3 being a lesser injury but needed to be CAS evac'ed

Capt I believe it is the same system that you have – the T. It is just that we are now starting to transfer over to the Ts from the Ps.

Maj : What kind of vehicle is the Viking?

WIT: It is what we call an armored all terrain vehicle, protected. What used to be BV's they are articulated, they are rubber tracked, articulated in the center and can carry up to about they have a GPMG mounted on the front cab and sections in the back.

Maj : What is Scimitar?

WIT: A Scimitar is, is an armored Recce vehicle basically.

Flt Lt : If later on there is some CRT, we can go behind us, would you like to take a photograph of the VIKING right over by the Super Galley, if that is where you are having lunch, you will walk passed them.

Maj And CVRT stands for?

WIT: Combat Vehicle Rugged Track, Viking is an all terrain vehicle, protected, ATVP.

PRES: Major, thank you for being so open with us, I don't have any more questions.

CDR : Sir, one more very quickly. Everyone involved in this timeframe that we are speaking of is all UK? Would any other ISAF components involved?

WIT: Not that I can recall, it was all UK. I would just like to make one final point and that was that all the air support that we had all day was outstanding and we wouldn't be able to achieve what we did and we wouldn't have been able to extract if we hadn't had it.

PRES: That is all we have.

[END OF PAGE]

A - XII

Interview

A-XXVb

Interview of Sergeant

PRES: Sergeant good afternoon, I am , I am with the U.S. Navy. I have been asked by Lieutenant General North, who has been tasked by General Abizaid, the CENTCOM Commander, to investigate the potential friendly fire incident that took place on 5 December 2006, down in an area that you were on patrol in and what I would like to ask you to do is to answer some questions that we have for you. I know that the SIB already has met with a lot of the Marines that were out in the field that day and you have provided statements and we appreciate you allowing us to read those statements. Our questions today are going to be directed at one thing and one thing only and that is to understand more clearly what you experienced on that day and we might ask you to draw some pictures to try and give us greater situational awareness and be able to kind of pinpoint how your mates were arrayed on the ground at a certain time. So, I am going to ask you for is to kind of tell me more about your experiences and kind of let you describe them to us and I might ask you some questions in between but it shouldn't take too long. Again I appreciate you coming out here and talking to us.

Maj : Just hold on one second. Sergeant we are recording so, I just ask that you speak up just a little bit.

WIT: Yes, all right.

Maj Sorry.

WIT: That's fine.

Maj It is not the greatest recorder and sometimes it doesn't get everything.

PRES: The time period that I am interested in, we just had a discussion with Major , and he gave us a good understanding now of what they objectives were. Can you show for us on this chart, where in and around the time that and with a sticky, in and around the time that the casualty and the fatality occurred. Can you kind of pinpoint where your location was in--I believe you were along--this is the Taunton line right here.

WIT: Yes.

PRES: And this is the tree line. Could you--would you mind putting that exactly on the tree line where you were [*witness marked Exhibit I*]?

WIT: Was that the double story compound?

PRES: We believe that this was the targeted area.

WIT: Yes, right this area here.

A-XXVb

PRES: This is north, heading in this direction here and I think that you were viewing the targeted compound down here.

WIT: This was the tree line that we were in, sir and we spread out east to west along this.

PRES: What I am going to do is put this just like this.

WIT: Okay.

PRES: And if you could draw for me what the trench line looked like and how far the trench line came down along this tree line----

WIT: On this sticker here, sir?

PRES: On this sticky, yes and was the trench line directly on this north side of the tree line and you were sighting through the trees?

WIT: There is a trench line running east to west and there was also an adjacent one running north to south. It was in this area right here, sir, there was like an irrigation ditch or a holding area where they could block off the water [*witness marked Exhibit I*].

PRES: [Nonverbal yes.]

WIT: For a channel for them to use in these trenches and this is kind of like a square, deep, thick mud at the base of two pipes into there and then obviously a high, sort of a walkway over the back end of that and then it fell back into another trench line across there. The trees, sir were on this side, that side there with sort of thick grass and on this end, running north to south, all this area here, sir was open field with pipes running under ground.

PRES: Okay, so you are drawing this trench line----

WIT: Trench line----

PRES: Is the trench line directly underneath these trees?

WIT: Yes, directly.

PRES: And then it comes all the way around here?

WIT: It runs all the way up, sir.

PRES: So, if I laid this right over that tree line, the trench lines would be right underneath it?

WIT: Yes.

PRES: Is that correct?

WIT: Yes.

PRES: Okay and from that diagram, where were you at?

WIT: If I show you on there for now, I was just behind here. We were taking a lot of fire from this compound and also from this tree line here and we couldn't get eyes-on. The lads are not trained to fire directly over there and mainly into this tree since that is where we were taking a lot of fire from. I moved on to this crater there, well that crater dropped down a good 10 to 15 feet into the ground and it created a good bund of cover for myself. I moved onto the top of that.

PRES: Could you draw that on there?

WIT: Yes [*witness marked* *Exhibit I*]. While we were putting fire down, I moved to the top of that crater, onto there. Do you want me to just keep going?

PRES: Yes.

WIT: Bear in mind, just apologizes, I only met the team, the troop hours on and that I was on because I am a Royal Engineer; I am not a Light Dragoonie even though I have got this slide on. I was attached because Corporal t was the Section Commander with one of his guys and I was tasked to help him out, pack charges _ the compounds and the buildings and just assist in any explosive ordnance and stuff like that, sir. So, what I did from there, there was myself on the top putting fire down into that tree line, there was , who was the Troop Sergeant, at the time. Like I said, apologies, I don't know his name because I had only met him previously and then there was also the medic who was there at the time. started putting 51 mm mortar down onto this tree line and also into the compound where we were taking fire from.

In there, there was the the RO, something there on that corner and that is the corner of the big, sort of like water holder, that holding area. He was set there and then the boss was set there, he was a Captain. Like I said, my apologizes for not knowing his name.

MEM: Captain

WIT: Captain After him, I don't know who that was. Probably the FOO was probably sat on there and then there was Jim, who was one of the Section Commanders and then there is two more Marines up there. I think one of them was

PRES: Okay.

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WIT: And also, a bit further on there was .

PRES: Okay, so looking back again at this picture, how far along this tree line was the last Marine?

WIT: Basically, round about here. More than half way up

PRES: A little more than half way up. So, right about there?

WIT: There is about a 3 meter spread between each manhole

PRES: So, right along this field here?

WIT: Possibly, yes, yes.

PRES: So, that is about two-thirds of the way up?

WIT: Yes.

PRES: So, we have Marines all along this entire trench line?

WIT: Yes.

PRES: Okay, very good. Now, what do you remember when your position took the incoming rounds and your heads were down, where did the bullets beginning from and where did they end and what did you see?

WIT: Well, we started taking a lot of fire from this side as well so, for myself, and the medic, we dropped down from there because there was a lot of fire hitting the top of my crater.

PRES: So, you are inside the crater?

WIT: No, I was just at the top of the bund at the rear.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: On there, sir. We dropped down, a bit just on the edge of the big square culvert there and see I had move from there into that position between them two. had moved back, the medic had moved back so, we are all sort of the four of us sort of congregated on there because we were taking quite a bit of fire through the trees.

PRES: So, you are getting quite a bit of fire from here----

WIT: We are getting fire through this side there.

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PRES: You are still getting fire from here?

WIT: Yes, and from there as well.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: From what I remember sir, is I remember hearing the jet in the distance. I could see it because it was coming from this direction it sort of like banked around.

PRES: Right, right.

WIT: We heard , who was the FSG at the time; we had all ready given a fire mission what we were hoping for----

PRES: Where was

WIT: was just off to the rear here, sir.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: That was , and , sorry, apologies for not knowing his Sergeant, I am not sure--they were just at the rear there. I remember listening to the fire mission and what we were trying to do is to get him to get fire down on this trench here because we were taking a lot of incoming and along this direction there into this compound. The plane, it banked around, it came around, it just dropped quite sharply and then it started behind myself here.

PRES: Okay. Here, I am going to put another sticky here. I am going to put the sticky here and you can see the tree line and the trench line. Show me where the bullets were hitting?

WIT: We were in that little bit there. He came from about that direction [*witness marked Exhibit I.*].

PRES: Okay, so you were in the trench and you saw him bank?

WIT: Yes, we watched----

PRES: Did you see him nose on----

WIT: We watched him all the way through.

PRES: Okay and who is we?

WIT: Myself, well I was watching him come round.

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PRES: How many were there?

WIT: There was what?

PRES: Airplanes.

WIT: One.

PRES: One, okay.

WIT: One that I saw come around.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: And then, yes, the fire started before me because I saw the rounds and the dust coming off and the noise, I will never forget the noise, sir.

PRES: So, you said, "before you" so you were looking back so 'before you' you saw it here first?

WIT: Yes, it was behind myself because I was--when I was turning, watching the jet coming in.

PRES: So, you were in the trench, and you were crouched and you were turning?

WIT: Yes, this area there, sir. I was on there and it is quite open obviously you can see because there's no trees in this area there, I watched it just bank around and as it just came it, it just fired and it just went through.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: Straight through, just in between us.

PRES: So, it starts--it actually hit between you and the trench then?

WIT: It hit between--yes.

PRES: So, right around in here?

WIT: It sort of just strafed straight through, that direction.

PRES: Okay, and what was the sound like?

WIT: It wasn't rifle, it was loud, it was a lot louder than anything I had experienced.

PRES: So, you heard two--a couple of sounds that you heard the impacts of the bullets?

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WIT: Yes.

PRES: And did you also hear the gunfire?

WIT: No, no I didn't hear the guns, sir but I could just hear--we had been taking like small arms fire all day and that was just completely different.

PRES: Completely different.

WIT: Yes, it was faster, it was just more intense.

PRES: A very, very fast----

WIT: Yes, it was very quick, yes, like a cracking. I can't describe it, you know, because it is the first time I had experienced that but it was small arms fire we were getting all day but that was completely different it was just like a lot heavier, more concentrated noise of fire going through.

PRES: Okay, and then it stopped just forward of the trench line?

WIT: I couldn't tell you where it stopped, sir to be honest with you. I think it sort of went off into this field, but like I said where I was, it was all covered with trees. I just remember it went before me and it went a lot further past me as well.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: But it only lasted, I would say for a maximum of 3 to 5 seconds.

PRES: Okay. Now, you also mentioned that you were taking fire from this direction. You also said that you were taking some fire from the north?

WIT: From the rear, yes, that was afterwards.

PRES: It was afterwards?

WIT: Yes.

PRES: Okay, got it. You mentioned something about the pilot talking on the radio----

WIT: No that----

PRES: And stating that he thought he had hit something, can you elaborate on that?

WIT: Yes, what it was, sir, when we'd dealt—if is was before and after we dealt with the casualties, and we had got the casualties off, and I am pretty sure and the FST,

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he came over the net and he went, "The pilot just thinks he has just hit friendly. He just hit friendly" but whether that was after or before the causality, I can't really remember, sir.

PRES: Okay but that was second hand, so , it was something that he transmitted?

WIT: I didn't hear it personally on the net, because I didn't have any PRR or any radio with me.

MEM: But he was with you there?

WIT: He was on the corner there. Basically once the fire had gone through, everybody dropped because we thought he might come in again. Everybody dropped behind the wall, see where the two pipes are, we pushed into the--when it came through first, there was quite a big mound, berm of soil, we pushed as hard as we could into that corner and then we thought this might happen again, and then we dropped into that square box bit the A1, that was to attend to the casualties and there was a lot of screaming and we thought it would be best bit of cover if it comes straight through, we didn't want to be out there again if it came through again, that is what we dropped into.

PRES: Okay, okay. I don't have any other questions.

Maj Sergeant , since we are recording this and you did a lot of pointing, some of this is going to be getting you to re-say what you said.

When you said that you were taking fire in the trench from the compound, what direction was that fire coming from?

WIT: Which compound, sir? We were getting fire----

Maj Which is north, sir?

PRES: This is north

WIT: Yes, north is that way. We were taking fire from our south, the compound to our south, there is like a double story----

PRES: South and east

WIT: Yes. There is a double story area that we thought we might be getting sniper fire or something from--there was a lot of concentrated small arms fire from this tree line to the south of our position or south-south east.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: Which was coming through. We were also getting a lot of--not initially but it sort of directed again south-south east so then from our like western flank as well and that was hence the reason that we moved back from that big crater that we were and pushed further down from the crater and moved from that fire position.

Maj Okay. Then the trench, how deep is the trench?

WIT: The trench, to get good fire position into that compound and onto that tree line, it is a good meter and a half high. It is about that high. You didn't have to climb, clamber up it to get into a firing position, you could just lean into it.

Maj So, if you stood up it would be about to your chest level?

WIT: I would say about 160, about 160, 150.

Maj Centimeters?

WIT: Yes.

Maj The crater, how deep about was the crater?

WIT: No one went into the crater but the crater was a good, from berm side, you're talking about a good 12 foot down, 15 foot down, it was a big hole.

Maj Okay, I am going to stick this sticker, sticker 1 right next to the tree line again and you put a whole bunch of dots down there. In the trench line, from the 'L' corner here----

WIT: Yes.

Maj Where I am going to label a Number 1 to the last one that I labeled number 7, Number 1 was who?

WIT: Number 1 was Marine

Maj And Number 2?

WIT: Was the boss,

Maj Number 3?

WIT: I couldn't, I don't know, bear in mind that I didn't know all the lads names.

Maj Okay. Number 4?

WIT: I am sure Number 4 was

Maj Okay, Number 5?

WIT: I don't know, it could have been two Marines, I honestly couldn't tell you, sir, I don't know.

Maj . Okay and the last one?

WIT: I don't know.

Maj Okay, so there were seven folks there and then the two dots that you have up here, seems to go over the culvert, who was that?

WIT: That was who was the FST and who was a Sergeant and I only knew him as .

Maj Okay.

WIT: Marine was point man on that corner.

Maj Okay.

WIT: On there was the FOO, who was the Lance Corporal, Artillery.

Maj : Okay and right next to

WIT: Right, actually, sir, he was just right above him to be honest with you. Bear in mind where the square was, it dropped down a good meter and a half into the soft mud.

Maj Okay. But on your diagram, the dot is sort of diagonal from where Edwards would be and that would be the Lance Corporal that you would be talking about?

WIT: The FOO, yes.

Maj . The FOO. And on the circle that you drew, that is the crater?

WIT: There was only myself at the top.

Maj That is you.

WIT: Yes, that is me and was firing 51 mm mortars from below me to my left hand side and then the medic was just to his left hand side.

Maj I just wanted to make sure so that we had it for the diagram.

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WIT: Yes. On my statement to the SIB, I made, sir, I actually drew a big diagram as best I could as well, I don't know if you had seen that all ready, it is an exhibit and part of my statement.

PRES: You could have slipped in this morning if we would have gotten that.

Maj So, when the F-18 came around and started banking and it fired, it went through the trench that is the 'L' portion here?

WIT: Yes, yes.

Maj So, it came across this way?

WIT: It came straight across like that.

Maj It came straight across but on an angle though, right?

WIT: Yes, yes.

Maj Okay, so it----

PRES: If you had to guess, how many round? Were they just hitting all around you

WIT: It was so quick, yes, it was a good 3 second, 3 to 5 second burst it was.

PRES: Okay.

WIT: Of fire.

Maj And when it came across on your diagram, it would come across here at the corner where was?

WIT: Yes. It sort of came straight--it wasn't directly parallel to the trench but it wasn't far off if you know what I mean, it was at a slight angle but it just came straight--yes, yes, sort of like that, sir.

PRES: It was almost parallel.

WIT: It was almost parallel but it was just off, yes.

PRES: That is what I took from the statement.

Maj So, it was almost parallel but just came off a little bit?

WIT: Just slightly off, yes.

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Maj And then as it came through the trench, it started hitting into the trees?

WIT: Yes, everything, it hit all tree branches were dropping and the lot.

Maj Tree branches were falling down?

WIT: Yes, just a few, yes, it was quick.

Maj Okay, and when those tree branches started falling down, was that different from when the small arms fire was hitting that tree branch?

WIT: Yes, a lot different.

Maj There was a lot more coming down?

WIT: It was just the intensity of the rounds hitting and the force that they were hitting the ground on, the noise, the speed that they were coming in at, everything was completely different from rear fire.

Maj Okay.

PRES: First time you had ever heard that?

WIT: Yes, quite definitely.

PRES: Okay.

Maj Do you recall, were there any RPGs going off at that time, sir?

WIT: No, yes, there was an RPG--there was RPG fire coming from our western side, from in there, the reason that I say that because when we did the casualty extraction, and when the two Scimitars come up, and the ambulance came up, we pushed one of the Scimitars over to the western side because like I said, we were getting a lot of fire from there and we went through, kind of like crashed through the tree line to get his 30 mm cannon through and an RPG went winging through

Maj And when the F-18 came through were there any RPGs going off?

WIT: No.

Maj Okay. On that little culvert with that embankment that you were talking about earlier----

WIT: Yes.

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Maj You said there were some pipes?

WIT: Yes, there were two water pipes just coming through, pointing through that way.

Maj Do you recall when the F-18 came through, did it hit those pipes? Do you recall if a bullet hit those and cracked them?

WIT: No, I couldn't tell you because like I said, I was on to--where I am those pipes are down----

PRES: Pipes, you mean they connect two ditches together?

WIT: Just two ditches, it is a culvert, just a culvert.

PRES: Okay.

Maj : And you didn't notice if there was any damage from that?

WIT: No, no. I did not.

PRES: Okay. Any other questions?

Maj . No.

Pres: Let's shut it off

[END OF PAGE]

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Statement

A-XXIIIa

Case Ref No: 83187/06

MOD Form 266A/B
(Introduced 12/03)

SERVICE POLICE
WITNESS STATEMENT
(CJ Act 1967, S.9;MC Act 1980, SS.5A(3a) and 5B;MC Rules 1981, r70)

Statement of:	
Rank/Status: Marine	
Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert "over 18")	Occupation: HM Forces (RM)
This statement (consisting of 7 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.	
Signature:	Dated the 9th day of December 2006.

On 20 Nov 06, I departed from ((close to Camp Bastion) as one member of the FST (Fire Support Team) with ' and . We were tasked with going to MOG South (Mobile Operations Group) in the Garmasir District of Helmand, with the OMLT (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team) and the ANA (Afghan National Army).

For the task I was wearing my Osprey Body Armour, fitted with the large plates in the front and rear and I was also in possession of my Kevlar Helmet. Along with this I was responsible for carrying the ' terminal

and a Switt Scope (Spy Glass).

On 5 Dec 06 at first light, I do not recall the exact time, the FST took up a position on . I have been able to draw a diagram of the location of on a sketch plan. Sgt , RAF SIB has attached a service police exhibit label to this sketch plan and marked as follows; this I have signed and dated:

- Sketch Plan of Op Area for 5 Dec 06 – M

was the given name for the high ground used by the FST and the point where all the different sections used to form up, prior to commencing the operation.

The operation was for the marine units to sweep South, down the ground between and the Green Zone (Taliban Held Area), with the canal to the right.

The marine unit cleared the first compound area marked as "Compound 1" on the sketch plan and moved onto "Compound 2", also marked on the sketch plan.

(Continuation Sheet)

Sheet No	2	Case No: 83187/06
Continuation of statement of:		

The marine unit then cleared through the 2nd compound and in the area of the compound itself.

At this point, after a discussion between Captain and the Unit Cdr on the ground, we, the FST, left and moved down to link up with the marine unit holding at Compound 2.

On attaching ourselves to the marine unit, we moved South with them. We took a position in an irrigation ditch, just to the North and West of an unknown compound (as marked on the sketch plan). Captain called in air support, as we were taking incoming small arms fire (SAF) from the South of our position. We had Apache air cover and who were giving covering fire also.

The SAF was being taken from a compound further to our South and the air support called in was able to deliver a 500lb bomb. It was dropped by a fast jet, being either a US Navy F18 Hornet or a USAF A10 Thunderbolt. From our position I could see the dust cloud from the 500lb bomb. We then moved along the ditch to the West, still under SAF from the South. At this time our Apache air cover had to leave in order to refuel and re-arm.

At this time the rate of SAF increase on our position and SAF seemed to come in on us from the South, East and North. To our South was a tower position used to put a lot of SAF on us, so again air support was called in by Capt This time an F18 aircraft came in and did three runs.

On runs 1 and 2, the F18 hit the tower target with either its canons or another 500lb bomb. One run was with canon and the other was with the 500lb bomb. On the 3rd run the F18 seemed to come in over my right shoulder at an angel and strafe our position.

At this time we had moved further along the ditch and we were now at a junction in the ditch, where it starts to head Southwards. I was on the bend of the ditch, returning fire, however, the rifle I had went unserviceable and I needed to hard extract, after every two or three rounds.

To my right was a mound and over the mound was , of my unit and about 2 or 3 others. In the ditch against the rear wall was Just in front of him, to his left slightly was the marine radio operator, and in front of him against the front wall was myself. To my left was a Sgt from another unit and then the rest of the marine unit spread out along the ditch.

As the F18 came in on the 3rd run and started to strafe our position the ground around us was kicked up and the trees to the front of the ditch had been cut up by the gunfire. There was a few seconds of confusion as to what had happened and then I checked myself over to make sure I was okay. As we were still taking incoming SAF, I was still trying to hard extract my rifle in order to return fire. At the same time I could hear the radio operator shouting and screaming, that he had been hit and on looking round I saw that he was bleeding from his upper left arm. He was holding the area with his other hand and blood was seeping through his fingers. I could also hear shouts of "Medic" coming from further down the ditch, to my left. I then tore of the sleeve of his jacket and reassured him that he was okay and that he was not going to die. I then went back to my position in the bank and returned fire to the South.

Shortly after, the Scimitar or Spartan ambulance vehicle pitched up to the rear of the ditch. I then assisted out of the ditch and into the back of the ambulance vehicle. As my weapon was causing me problems, I threw my SA80 A2 into the back of the vehicle and grabbed "minimi" and returned to the ditch to engage the enemy.

The ambulance then left and we continued to return fire for a short while, before being given the order to move off along the ditch to our left and leave the area.

(Continuation Sheet)

Sheet No	3	Case No: 83187/06
Continuation of statement of:		

When [illegible] called in the air support, ([illegible] gave them our grid ref and confirmed it with the pilot. This he did 2 or 3 times. The F18 pilot had already made contact with the target in the first two runs and was aware of the enemy area and our area. [illegible] is able to speak directly to the air support using the [illegible] Radio System. After the fire came into our position [illegible] was able to get onto the radio to the aircraft and told him (pilot) to "Check Fire". This he did 2 or 3 times. Not long after this [illegible] left the ditch area and [illegible] and called in the Scimitars on the [illegible] Radio system. [illegible]

Signed: [illegible]

Signed:

Sgt
RAF SIB

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Email Statement

A-XXIIIb

AUDHQSQN01

From:
Sent: Saturday, December 23, 2006 4:27 AM
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: BOI

Sir

Signed print of this to follow.

I, [illegible] y, have served as Battery Commander to [illegible] Royal Marines since [illegible] As such I offer the following statement of his professional competence based upon my best military judgement as his superior. Since deploying to southern Afghanistan, [illegible] has worked as a [illegible] e an [illegible] (FV[illegible] terminal cont[illegible] esponsible for the (South) and was [illegible] by Regional Command [illegible] the Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) shortly afterwards.

To date [illegible] s excelled as an FST Commander and FAC. Due to his tenacity as a soldier and as a qualified [illegible] missions when under fire, and at times at danger close. Due to continued high standards, he will be [illegible] urn to UK, where he will be responsible for [illegible]

Maj RA

RITS: 92196 3118 (through Whitehall)

-----Original Message-----
From: [illegible]
Sent: [illegible] December 2006 08:17
To: [illegible]
Subject: RE: BOI

Thanks for coming back to me - the comms are crappy and CCIS/JOCS may well be the best way to work this. I would prefer a note from you personally because we've already got some stuff fom [illegible] Also, you are senior to [illegible] and that makes a difference when we are expressing what is basically a [illegible] as opposed to hard facts.

I want to make this as easy and painless as possible. Ideally, if you could write a short note using military judgement to state whether [illegible] performance in Theatre has been notable in any way. I don't want an OJAR. But we need to know whether reports of his work as a [illegible] any form have reached you to say that he was especially good, especially bad or just what we would reasonably expect. If there is something notable in there then it would require some kind of referencing ie 'he had a reputation for X because he often did Y when others might have done Z'. If it ends up as a one liner, I have no difficulty with that provided you aren't leaving anything important unsaid.

A handwritten note, witnessed by another officer, scanned and e mailed to me would be sufficient. If you don't have a scanner, write an e mail, follow up by printing a copy off, marking it with signatures and posting it to me at [illegible] Hopefully no more than 5 mins effort because I know you have far more pressing matters to attend to.

One more thing. I noticed the way you spell the [illegible] We re[illegible]ed evidence with 3 different permuattions of his name. We settled on [illegible] cause that's what his [illegible] aining records use. Were we correct?

Best Regards,

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Statement

A-XXIV

Case Ref No: 83187/06

MOD Form 266A/B
(Introduced 12/03)

SERVICE POLICE
WITNESS STATEMENT
(CJ Act 1967, S.9;MC Act 1980, SS.5A(3a) and 5B;MC Rules 1981, r70)

Statement of:	
Rank/Status:	
Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert "over 18")	Occupation: HM Forces (RM)
This statement (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.	
Signature:	Dated the 8th day of December 2006

I am , CSM, Z Coy, 45 Cdo RM, Camp Bastion (BSN), BFPO 792. I am currently deployed on Op HERRICK 5, which I deployed on 8 Oct 06 and I am due to return to my parent unit in about mid April 07. My parent unit is Z Coy, 45 Cdo, RM Condor, Arbroath, Angus, Scotland, DD11 3ST.

I am responsible for all admin and welfare of Z Coy. I have today at 1052 hrs within the SNCO accommodation, Z Coy, 45 Cdo RM, Camp Bastion, handed to LA, RMP, the following item, to which he attached an exhibit identification label and marked it as follows:

SCS/1 - Royal Navy identity card,

I have signed and dated the exhibit label.

I have also today at 1056 hrs within the SNCO accommodation, Z Coy, 45 Cdo RM, Camp Bastion handed to , RMP the following item, to which he attached an exhibit identification label and marked it as follows:

SCS/2 -

I have signed and dated the exhibit identification label.

I have also today at 1103 hrs within the SNCO accommodation, Z Coy, 45 Cdo RM, Camp Bastion, BFPO 792 handed to LA, RMP the following item, to which he attached an exhibit identification label and marked it as follows:

SCS/3 - 20mm Round.

I have signed and dated the exhibit identification label.

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(Continuation Sheet)

Sheet No	2	Case No: 83187/06
Continuation of statement of:	Steven Christopher SHEPHERD	

Exhibit ; a 20mm round which was handed to me by . who is J TAC (Joint Tactical Air Control) who is attached to Z Coy. was handed to me on the 6 Dec 06 afte: was KIA.

Signed:

Signed: I
LCpl
AGC (RMP)

Signature: Sig. Witnessed by:

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Statement

STAFF - INVESTIGATION
OFFICER ONLY

Case Ref No: 83187/06

MOD Form 266A/B
(Introduced 12/03)

SERVICE POLICE
WITNESS STATEMENT
(CJ Act 1967, S.9;MC Act 1980, SS.5A(3a) and 5B;MC Rules 1981, r70)

Statement of:	
Rank/Status: Sgt	
Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert "over 18")	Occupation: HM Forces (Army)
This statement (consisting of 3 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.	
Signature:	Dated the 9th day of December 2006.

On 30 Nov 06, I deployed on an operation with my unit and Z Coy, 45 Cdo RM. Prior to our departure we received verbal orders in relation to the operation, which consisted of moving through the predetermined objective lines securing and clearing buildings in order to show strength in numbers and firepower on the ground.

We were directed that we were to wear full equipment fighting order (CEFO - Webbing, Helmet and Body Armour). I was issued with Osprey body armour, which I wore in conjunction with both large size armour plates in the front and rear.

That same day, the LD met up with 45 Cdo RM at the gun line, seven hours South of BSN. We remained in this location for four days, where we conducted training with the Marines and checked the maintenance of our vehicles.

The Order of March was organised prior to our departure at 0500hrs on Tue 5 Dec 06. All callsigns moved to the start point of the operation, which was the East to West road through Garmsir District Centre. I was part of a foot patrol with 1 Tp, which consisted of the following personnel, however, as I had only met them earlier that morning I cannot be sure of the ranks or names. Those I do recall are the OC who is a Capt, but we referred to him as The Tp Sgt who I know as Radio Op named who I now know to be . who I now know to be named . and another Cpl named There were a couple of other Marines in the Tp, but I do not know their names.

We progressed through the series of objective boxes,

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(Continuation Sheet)

Sheet No	2	Case No: 83187/06
Continuation of statement of:		

As the Tp went from A2 to A3 we were joined by and a who were the FST (I do not know what FST stands for but they control Air Support to the ground troops).

The reason for the delay was due to the Attack Helicopter (AH) requiring refuelling and rearming. Upon completion of the AH attack on the compound (South of our trench position, North being to our rear) within Taunton they departed for replen, which is when from our trench position we started to take incoming from RPG, small arms fire and heavy arms fire. The incoming fire started about 1300hrs. All returned fire in the direction of the compound and the tree line to the right of the compound and the trench line from North to South

The troop was spread out through the trench, a culvert and a crater in an L shape formation, the trench being the longest part of the L. From left to right in the trench were as follows: unknown Marine, unknown Marine, unknown Marine and the OC. In the culvert in the corner were the following: Eddie and then the medic. Between the culvert and the crater were the Forward Observation Officer (FOO), whose name I do not know and . I was the only person in the crater. Behind the culvert area was the FST members.

The return suppressing fire consisted of 51mm Mortars, LAW, GPMG, UGL and SA80 A2.

During this fire fight we started taking incoming fire from the North and West, which pinned us in the trench. It was at this point I heard the FST request air support. He provided the enemy location as being the compound south of our position and in the tree line next to the compound. I believe he repeated this information.

Once we knew that fast jet was incoming, we stopped firing, however, we were still taking incoming from the South West and North.

Fast jet flew by the compound and dropped about three bombs; however, we still received incoming from the compound area. We saw the fast jet bank round and come back again and this time it appeared to come along the trench line, however, this time it opened fire with cannons.

As this happened, from my crater location, I saw take a hit which pushed him into the corner of the culvert. The fire continued along the trench. At first I could not believe what had happened, but then heard people screaming, so I ran from my position to the culvert area where I took over from the medic who was seeing to The FOO and the FST also moved to the culvert area. I then placed a First Field Dressing on and placed him on the floor as he was becoming erratic. I then knelt on the artery under his arm and stemmed the bleeding in his upper left area. As this happened I heard the FST cancelling any further fly bys. I could see the medic and some of the other Marines tending to they conducted CPR, but someone indicated that he was dead. I noticed that they had removed his webbing and body armour. The OC was sending a 9 liner report and requested additional callsign support. We were still being contacted during the aftermath of the incident.

About 10 minutes after the incident, and went to attract other callsigns attention. About 5 minutes later they returned. to indicate our location to the other callsign which arrived a further 5 minutes later. The following callsigns arrived at our location (both Scimitar) and the Ambulance, (Spartan).

Fire was returned by 1 Tp during the extraction process of and was stretchered to the Ambulance and I escorted . Once this had happened we went back into the trench and took up positions.

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(Continuation Sheet)

Sheet No	3	Case No: 83187/06
Continuation of statement of:		

In the attack the FOO's weapon failed and I gave him my weapon as I was tending to Upon my return to the trench I took Minimi weapon and used it. As Callsigns M30, 41 and 14B departed, they provided support for our retreat East along the trench line back to one of the other Tp objective boxes either As I retreated along the trench line, I did not see any military kit left behind. We then headed into another compound where we again got pinned down. I then blew the walls of the compound and we continued east to RV with 4 Tp, which we eventually did between 1400hrs and 1430hrs.

I wish to add that relayed some net chatter from the fast jet, in which the pilot had stated words to the effect of, "I think I have hit friendly" and, "I think it's the Pointsman."

About 1100hrs on Fri 8 Dec 06, at the Military Police Station, BSN, BFPO 792, I handed to , RMP (SIB), a document to which he attached an exhibit identification label marked as follows:

- Sketch plan of the contact area in Garmsir – Tue 5 Dec 06.

I have signed and dated the exhibit identification label.

Exhibit pertains to the area in Garmsir, where we were contacted by anti coalition militia and was fatally injured.

Signed:

Signed: R
SSgt
RMP (SIB)

A – XXV a

Scan of Exhibi – Sketch plan of the contact area in Garmser – Tue 5 Dec 06.



Witness Statement

Exhibit A - [illegible]

Statement

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Case Ref No: 83187/06

MOD Form 266A/B
(Introduced 12/03)

SERVICE POLICE
WITNESS STATEMENT
(CJ Act 1967, S.9;MC Act 1980, SS.5A(3a) and 5B;MC Rules 1981, r70)

Statement of:
Rank/Status: Cpl
Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert "over 18") Occupation: HM Forces (Army)
This statement (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.
Signature: Dated the 8th day of December 2006.

I am ; Dragons (LD), currently serving in Camp Bastion (BSN), BFPO 792, Afghanistan, and have been since One of my roles within the I.D is as a I am due to return to my parent unit,

About 1315 hrs on Tue 5 Dec 06, I was employed as an ambulance crew on top of , Garmsir near the Afghan National Police Station when , of my unit, informed the ambulance crew (and , and I) that a radio message had been received that a callsign has sustained two casualties and that we were tasked to deal. When the ambulance deploys callsigns deploy for fire support, therefore a escorted us to the location.

d been given a grid reference as he was the driver of the ambulance. vas in the front of the vehicle and I was in the back. For the time I was in the ambulance and the duration of the incident I was wearing my helmet and Combat Body Armour (CBA). My webbing and rifle had a secure place in the back of the ambulance and was easy to get if they were needed.

Whilst in the ambulance I heard over the radio that there were a T1 and a T3 casualty. Additionally I heard that the T1 Casualty had been without a pulse for about 5 minutes. I know that a T1 casualty means that they are seriously injured or dead and a T3 casualty is walking wounded.

We arrived at the location about 5 to 10 minutes later, due to the state of the ground we were travelling on.

When we arrived I opened the back of the ambulance and saw of my unit, who was standing alongside the T3 casualty. A medic whose name I can not recall was with the T1 casualty. I told Sgt Simpson to keep the T3 casualty out of the ambulance until we got the T1 casualty in first. The medic shouted that he needed a stretcher, so I got the stretcher out of the back of the ambulance

(Continuation Sheet)

Sheet No	2	Case No: 83178/06
Continuation of statement of:		

and myself and the medic, lifted the T1 casualty onto the stretcher and into the back of the ambulance with other members of that callsign. The medic explained to me that T1 casualty had not had a pulse for about 10 minutes and that he had a

The T3 casualty then got into the back of the ambulance and we started to make our way back to were the Doctor was. I could see that T3 casualty still had his body armour on and had an SA80 rifle in his hand. The T1 casualty was just wearing his combat trousers and his boots his top half was naked, he had been in this state when I first arrived at the scene. I did not see his body armour, webbing or rifle, however, cannot recall if anything had been placed on the floor of the ambulance.

I could see that the T1 casualty's colour was deteriorating from his body and he was turning blue, he also felt very cold as I was checking for other wounds apart from the one on his back. In my opinion the T1 casualty was dead, however, the T3 casualty kept shouting, "Don't let him die" or words to that effect, so I carried out CPR, however, there was no response. I continued to carry out CPR until we arrived back at the which was about 5 minutes later.

It was about 1355 hrs, when we arrived at There was the Doctor, who is a medic and from my unit. I handed the T1 casualty over to the Doctor and explained that he hadn't had a pulse for about 15 minutes and was not responding to CPR. I also informed him that he had a wound to the top of his back. The T1 casualty and T3 casualty were then separated.

About 1410 hrs, the T1 casualty was taken by stretcher to the awaiting Chinook for med Evacuation to BSN. That is the last point of my involvement in this incident.

Signed:

Signed:
LCpl
AGC (RMP)

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Statement

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Y

Case Ref No: 83187/06

MOD Form 266A/B
(Introduced 12/03)

SERVICE POLICE
WITNESS STATEMENT
(CJ Act 1967, S.9;MC Act 1980, SS.5A(3a) and 5B;MC Rules 1981, r70)

Statement of:	
Rank/Status:	
Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert "over 18")	Occupation: HM Forces (Army)
This statement (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.	
Signature:	Dated the 7th day of December 2006.

I am a Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon and my name appears on

My relevant medical qualifications are Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery (MB BS), University of London

About 1445 hrs on Tue 5 Dec 06, , 45 Cdo RM, was admitted to the R2E Field Hospital, Camp Bastion, BFPO 792. He was brought to the resuscitation department by ambulance from the HLS (Helicopter Landing Strip), off the IRT (Incident Response Team) helicopter. His only obvious injury was to his left upper arm.

He was thoroughly examined, which did not show any further injuries.

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(Continuation Sheet)

Sheet No	TWO	Case No: 83187/06
Continuation of statement of:		

The plan is to Aeromed to the UK, sometime soon after Sun 10 Dec 06.

Signed:

Signed:
Sgt
RAF SIB

LT COL

Statement

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Case Ref No: 83187/06

MOD Form 266A/B
(Introduced 12/03)

SERVICE POLICE
WITNESS STATEMENT
(CJ Act 1967, S.9;MC Act 1980, SS.5A(3a) and 5B;MC Rules 1981, r70)

Statement of:	
Rank/Status: Lieutenant Colonel	
Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert "over 18")	Occupation: HM Forces (Army)
This statement (consisting of 1 page signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.	
Signature:	Dated the 8th day of December 2006.

Further to my statement made earlier today, dated 8 Dec 06. I wish to add the following.

Today, Fri 8 Dec 06, at the R2E Field Hospital, BSN, I handed to AS, RAF SIB, a photocopy of the medical notes pertaining to , since his admittance to the R2E Field Hospital. The photocopy consists of 29 (twenty-nine) pages. A service police exhibit label was attached and marked as follows:

- Photocopy of Medical Notes (R2E) pertaining to Mne A
  RM – 29 Pages.

I have signed and dated the exhibit label.

Signed:

Signed:
Sgt
RAF SIB

OFFICER ONLY

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Royal Marine Interview Notes

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