



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-180
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-180-CG

03 AUG 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER USCENTCOM

SUBJECT: DA Form 1574, Section VIII; Action by Appointing Authority; Investigation Report of Civilian Casualties that Occurred in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, on 30 June – 1 July 2002 During Operation FULL THROTTLE, 1 August 2002

1. I have reviewed the Investigation Report, dated 1 August 2002, and legal review, dated 3 August 2002.
2. The findings and recommendations of the board are approved with the following exceptions/substitutions:
 - a. The fourth paragraph of commentary to Conclusion 4-C is deleted, and the following language is substituted: "Unfortunately, the actions of those who engaged U.S. aircraft with weapons intentionally deployed in a residential area willfully put at risk numerous innocent lives. While these actions do not absolve the U.S. of its responsibility to comply with the principle of proportionality during attacks, clearly these actions constituted a violation of the law of war and were a direct factor in the deaths and injuries of many innocent people."
 - b. The second paragraph of commentary to Conclusion 4-D is deleted.
 - c. The designation of Conclusion 4-D as (b)(5) is deleted.
 - d.

(b)(5)


DAN K. McNEILL
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

Document approved for release by
U.S. Central Command. See FOIA
Case #04-063.

1 August 2002

From: President, Combined Joint Task Force 180 Investigation Board
Thru: Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 180
To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command

Subj: Investigation Report of Civilian Casualties that Occurred in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, on 30 June-1 July 2002 During Operation Full Throttle

Ref: (a) Convening Order, USCINCCENT msg 041700Z Jul 02; subj: Civilian Casualties—Oruzgan Province
(b) Appointing Order, COMCJTF-180 ltr of 13 Jul 02; subj: Appointment as Board of Officers to Investigate Operation FULL THROTTLE
(c) DoD Instruction 6055.7, Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping
(d) AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers

- Encl: (1) CJTF-180 Investigation Board Proceedings of 14-29 Jul 02.
(2) FOB- [redacted] (b)(2)High, dtg 180900ZJUN02.
(3) FOB- [redacted] (b)(2)High, OFT [redacted] (b)(2)High
(4) [redacted] (b)(2)High dtd 26 JUN 02.
(5) [redacted] (b)(2)High dtg 251343ZJUN02.
(6) [redacted] (b)(2)High AAR for OFT dtd 2 JUL 02.
(7) Email from FOB- [redacted] (b)(2)High w/attached DD1972, dtd 27 JUN 02.
(8) FOB- [redacted] (b)(2)High
(9) [redacted] (b)(2)High
(10) [redacted] (b)(2)High, dtg 212315ZNOV02.
(11) [redacted] (b)(2)High, dtd 1 AUG 01.
(12) [redacted] (b)(2)High dtd 30 JUN02
(13) E-mail from DSJA USCENCOM to CJTF180-SJA; subj: Update, dtd 25 JUL 02.
(14) [redacted] (b)(2)High, dtg 290905ZJUN02.
(15) [redacted] (b)(2)High for Operation FULL THROTTLE, dtd 2 JUL 02.
(16) Email from [redacted] (b)(2)High to CJTF180-SJA-INVG, dtd 9 JUL 02.
(17) CJTF-180 Investigation Board Deh Rawod Site Visit AAR, dtd 24 JUL 02.
(18) AF Form 3827 ICO SRA Fanning, dtd 9 NOV 01.
(19) Certification Records ICO SRA Fanning
(20) Email from FOB-Kandahar-FSO to LTC [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6); subj: OFT Pre-Assault Fires, dtd 30 JUN 02.
(21) Joint Pub 3-05.5, p. IV-1, ¶ 2a.
(22) [redacted] (b)(2)High
(23) [redacted] (b)(2)High (Engaged Targets 01/02).
(24) AF TTP 3-1.31 (17 Aug 2001)(on CD).
(25) Email from [redacted] (b)(2)High; subj: Gunships in Tarin Kowt, dtd 9 JAN 02.
(26) Joint Pub 3.09.3, pp V-9 to V-10.
(27) Trip Report for Fact Finding Mission to Deh Rawod (2-6 JUL), dtd 10 JUL 02.
(28) [redacted] (b)(2)High Engaged Target List (30 JUN 02).
(29) [redacted] (b)(2)High dtg 010900ZJUL02.

- (30) [redacted] (b)(2)High, dtd 2 JUL 02.
- (31) [redacted] (b)(2)High dtg 040630ZJUL02.
- (32) FOB [redacted] (b)(2)High, dtd 5 JUL 02.
- (33) Kandahar Base C/O Report on OFT.
- (34) [redacted] (b)(2)High Kandahar report, dtg 031600ZJUL02.
- (35) Emails from KAF-3BCT-S1 (MAJ [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) TF Rakkasan Surgeon) to CJTF180-MED-OPS, dtd 2 JUL 02 and 3 JUL 02.
- (36) Afgan List of Dead and Injured from U.S. Bombing in Oruzgan Province, [Deh Rawod] District (translated by U.S. Embassy-Kabul Staff).
- (37) E-mail from LTC [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) to CJTF180-DCJS, Subj: Insights/Lessons Learned, dtd 6 JUL 02.
- (38) JTF-SWA J2 OEF SAFIRE Events for June; email from CPT [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) to CJTF180-SJA-INVG; Subj: SAFIRE Logs of 30 JUN/1 JUL, dtd 27 JUL 02.
- (39) [redacted] (b)(2)High dtd 18 JUN 02.
- (40) [redacted] (b)(2)High Pilot AAR undated.
- (41) Evidence List.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Reference (a) directed COMCJTF-180 to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding an operation conducted on 30 June 2002 near the village of Kakrak, Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, in which civilians may have been killed or injured by ordnance released from U.S. aircraft. The purpose of the investigation was to inquire into all facts and circumstances surrounding the incident, and obtain and preserve all available evidence, such as aircraft video and audio recordings, for use in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, or adverse administrative actions. Reference (a) also directed that the investigative report include findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations, to include the cause of the incident and resulting deaths, injuries and damage. The investigative report was required to include an assessment as to any fault or neglect and make recommendations concerning appropriate corrective measures or disciplinary actions.

2. As directed, in reference (b), COMCJTF-180 appointed a Board of Officers to investigate Operation FULL THROTTLE (OFT) using the formal board procedures contained in reference (d). Due to the multi-service nature of the operation, COMCJTF-180 appointed a multi-service and multi-disciplinary board. The Board was composed of a single board member supported by various non-voting advisory members, two legal advisors, and two court reporters. The composition of the Board of Officers was as follows:

Board Member
Brigadier General Anthony F. Przybyslawki, USAF

Advisory Members

Colonel [(b)(3), (b)(6)] USAF	ROE Advisor
Captain [(b)(3), (b)(6)] USNR	Medical Advisor
Lieutenant Colonel [(b)(3), (b)(6)] USAF	USAF Special Ops Advisor
Major [(b)(3), (b)(6)] USAR	Army Special Forces Advisor
Major [(b)(6), (b)(3)] USA	Joint Fires Advisor
Senior Master Sergeant [(b)(3), (b)(6)] USAF	Terminal Attack Advisor
Senior Master Sergeant [(b)(6), (b)(3)] USAF	Intelligence Advisor

Legal Advisors

Lieutenant Colonel [(b)(6), (b)(3)] USMC	USCENTCOM
Lieutenant Colonel [(b)(6), (b)(3)] USA	CJTF-180

Court Reporters

Legalman 1 st Class [(b)(6), (b)(3)] USN	USS JFK (CV 67)
Legalman 1 st Class [(b)(6), (b)(3)] USN	EURSWA, Rota, Spain

3. Board Methodology. The Board conducted its work in five phases: (1) evidence collection; (2) analysis of evidence; (3) preparation of findings of fact; (4) analysis of findings of fact; and (5) development of opinions, conclusions, and recommendations. The first two phases are discussed below. The remaining three phases were Board deliberations.

a. During the evidence collection phase, The Board members began by receiving briefings on Operation Full Throttle, Afghan Culture, and the results of a fact-finding visit to the site of the casualties conducted immediately after the incident. The Board believed such information was necessary to heighten their situational awareness and to better understand the circumstances surrounding the incident. Subsequently, the Board traveled to Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan ([(b)(2)High]), and Kandahar, Afghanistan (FOB [(b)(2)High]) to interview witnesses associated with the incident. The Board examined an [(b)(2)High] identical to the gunship involved in the incident, and received briefings from unrelated crewmembers regarding its equipment, operations, and maintenance. A critical piece of evidence, [(b)(2)High]
[(b)(2)High] The Board spent countless hours reviewing this tape and created a transcript of the voice-over. In addition to interviews of personnel involved in flight operations at the time of the incident; the Board interviewed ground unit personnel involved in the "call for fire;" personnel who responded to the site after the incident who cared for the injured; personnel involved in the planning of OFT; commanders in the chain-of-command of those involved; and other personnel believed to have knowledge of the event. Critical to the investigation was the visit to Deh Rawod (incident site). Board members viewed the targets associated with the loss of lives. During this visit the Board President attended a "shura" with the regional governor, district leaders and village elders. At the request of President Karzai, two Afghan major generals were assigned as observers who also acted as liaison with the local community. MG Karimi was extremely helpful and positive throughout the event and provided all translation. MG Haigari provided the local knowledge in dealing with the community

residents and officials. This site visit would have had a much different, possibly grave, outcome without their support.

b. During the analysis phase, Board members analyzed all available data and evidence to determine the cause of the incident. Evidence considered by the Board came from a variety of sources and media, both classified and unclassified. These included video recordings, photographs, doctrinal publications, statements of witnesses, and the observations of the Board. The Board also analyzed the planning, pre-mission briefings, preparation, and execution of the operation, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures pertaining to close-air support and (b)(2)High operations. In analyzing the evidence, the Board also relied on its expertise, experience, and sound judgment.

4. Challenges and Limitations. During the conduct of this investigation and the preparation of this investigation report, the Board was faced with several challenges. Although the Board does not believe that any of these challenges, either alone or in concert, impeded a full and fair investigation, it is important to consider them in evaluating the report. These challenges and limitations included the following:

a. The length of time between the incident (1 July) and the beginning of the investigation (13 July) limited the Board's ability to gather perishable evidence in Deh Rawod. The first fact-finding team was faced with this same challenge even though they were able to get to Deh Rawod by 3 July.

b. Force protection requirements for travel to, and while located in Deh Rawod limited the amount of time the Board could spend there. Geographic location and terrain also added to the challenge. This limited the Board's ability to gather evidence; however it is my opinion we were quite successful, given the timing, conducting the investigation in this area.

c. Due to ongoing mission requirements, the Board found it conducive to travel to the witnesses. The time involved traveling between Bagram (HQ CJTF-180), Karshi-Khanabad, Kandahar and Deh Rawod affected the time the Board had to devote to gathering and analyzing evidence.

d. Preparation of the investigation report in a combat zone under, what were at times, austere conditions presented its own unique challenges. Access to simple state of the art equipment such as computers, printers, and document publishing hardware was limited. The support provided by CJTF-180, however, was outstanding despite these challenges.

e. Two witnesses, after having been warned under Article 31b, UCMJ, invoked their right to remain silent. This prevented the Board from obtaining a complete understanding of the engagement of one of the targets. This limitation is addressed in the investigation report.

5. Report Organization

a. The Findings of Fact expressed in the report indicate the piece of evidence from which derived. The Opinions are reasonable inferences drawn from the indicated findings of fact. Opinions are bolded and italicized and are in close proximity to the findings of fact on which based. The Findings of Fact and Opinions are organized as follows:

Section 1—Planning for Operation FULL THROTTLE

- 1-100 Situation
- 1-200 Mission and Plan
- 1-300 ROE/Collateral Damage/Targeting
- 1-400 Command and Control

Section 2—Execution of Operation FULL THROTTLE

- 2-100 Deception, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
- 2-200 Close Air Support
- 2-300 Cordon and Search*
- 2-400 Casualties and Immediate Actions

Section 3—Post-Execution of Operation FULL THROTTLE

- 3-100-Fact-Finding Team Observations
- 3-200- Target Site Visit Observations

Section 4—Conclusions

Section 5—Recommendations

b. The Enclosures are listed in the order first referenced in the investigation report.

c. Standardization Note. The incident occurred between approximately 2000Z and 2300Z, 30 June 2002 (0030 and 0330 local, 1 July 2002). For standardization, all times in this report are reported in "Zulu" time.

6. The advisory board members are to be commended for their devotion to duty, professionalism, and unwavering integrity displayed throughout these proceedings. The counsel and organizational advice provided by the legal advisors remained thorough and complete throughout. This team, in a matter of hours, became a model of cooperation and relentless pursuit of fact. Also, this report is timely purely as a result of the Herculean effort of our two court reporters, in spite of the austere conditions. Regrettably, this team was formed as a result of a tragic incident in a war zone.

ANTHONY F. PRZYBYSLAWSKI
Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force

ACRONYMNS

ACRONYM	DEFINITION
AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAR	After Action Review
AMF	Afghan Military Forces
AO	Area of Operations
AOB	Advanced Operating Base
AQ/TB	Al Qaida/Taliban
ATO	Air Tasking Order
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
CAOC	Combined Air Operations Center
CAS	Close Air Support
CD	Collateral Damage
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CFACC	Combined Forces Air Component Command
CINCCENT	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command
CJTF-180	Coalition Joint Task Force 180
CJSOTF	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
DMPI	Desired Mean Point of Impact
DPI	Desired Point of Impact
DSHK	AAA piece manufacturer/AAA piece
FAC(A)	Forward Air Controller-Airborne
FCO	(b)(2)High Fire Control Officer
FEF	Flight Evaluation Folder
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FOB	(b)(2)High Forward Operating Base (b)(2)High
GFAC	Ground Forward Air Controller
GPS	Global Positioning System
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
HLZ	Helicopter Landing Zone
HVT	High Value Target
IADS	Integrated Air Defense Systems
IR	Infrared
	(b)(2)High
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
	(b)(2)High
JDAM	Joint Direct Attack Munitions
JSOA	Joint Special Operations Area
LIT	Likely and Identifiable Threat
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
NAI	Named Area of Interest
	(b)(2)High

NVD	Night Vision Device
OBJ	Objective
ODA	Operational Detachment Alpha
ODB	Operational Detachment Bravo
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OFT	Operation Full Throttle
OGA	Other Government Agency
OJT	On-the-Job Training
OP	Observation Post
OPCON	Operational Control
OPORD	Operations Order
PB	Patrol Base
PID	Positive Identification
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PUC	Personnel Under Control
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RP	Release Point
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
(b)(2)High	
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOLE	Special Operations Liaison Element
(b)(2)High	
SPINS	Special Instructions
SR	Special Reconnaissance
STS	Special Tactics Squadron or (singular) Special Tactics Specialist
TACON	Tactical Control
TAC-P	Tactical Air Control Party
TAD	Tactical Air Direction
TF	Task Force
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(b)(2)High	
US SOF	U.S. Special Operations Forces
UTM	Universal Transverse Mercator
Z	Greenwich Standard Time (Zulu Time)

GLOSSARY

Coalition Force. A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Close Air Support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (Joint Pub 3-09.3, GL-11)

Collateral Damage. The incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof. (Article 57(2), of the Geneva Protocol I (1977).

(b)(2)High

Compromise. The known or suspected exposure of clandestine personnel, installations, or other assets or of classified information or material, to an unauthorized person. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Concept of Operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in operation plans. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander's concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Direct Control. Direct control occurs when the terminal controller is able to observe and control the attack. The terminal controller transmits "cleared hot" when he sees the aircraft is attacking the correct target. There may be times when the terminal controller may not be able to see the attacking aircraft (due to high altitude, standoff weapons, night, or poor visibility). In these cases, clearance to drop will only be given if the terminal controller can use other means to confirm that the aircraft is attacking the correct target and has friendly positions in sight. These means include, but are not limited to, confirming with a verbal description that the aircraft has friendly positions in sight, the mark in sight, and the target in sight, as appropriate. (Joint Pub 3-09.3, V-9)

Exfiltration. The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Forward Operations Base. In special operations, a base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or longer duration operations and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a pier. A forward operations base may be the location of special operations component headquarters or a smaller unit that is controlled and/or supported by a main operations base. Also called FOB. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Helicopter Landing Zone. A specified ground area for landing assault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites. Also called HLZ. (Joint Pub 1-02)

High-Value Target. A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander's area of interest. Also called HVT. (Joint Pub 1-02.)

Indirect Control. Indirect control is used when the terminal controller cannot observe the attack, but is in contact with someone who can. The terminal controller can issue clearance or abort the attack based on information from the observer. This form of control must be authorized by the maneuver force commander. (Joint Pub 3-09.3, V-10)

Infiltration. The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made, either by small groups or by individuals, at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it infers that contact is avoided. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(b)(2)High
(b)(2)High (Joint Pub 3-09.3, GL-10)

Joint Special Operations Area-- A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures-- The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called JTTP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(b)(2)High

Objective Area. A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be captured or reached by military forces. This area is defined by competent authority for purposes of command and control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Operational Control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. Also called **OPCON**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Rules of Engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called **ROE**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Snake. Call by exception for the terminal controller to jiggle the IR beam on the target. This aids in confirming the friendly position and helps the aircrew maintain sight of the target during conditions when the IR beam/mark is difficult to see. (Joint Pub 3-09.3, V-14)

	(b)(2)High
(b)(2)High	(Joint Pub 1-02)

Special Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. (Joint Pub 3-05.5, GL-11)

Tactical Control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level also called **TACON**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Terminal Control. 1. The authority to direct the maneuver of aircraft which are delivering ordnance, passengers, or cargo to a specific location or target. Terminal control is a type of air control. 2. Any electronic, mechanical, or visual control given to aircraft to facilitate target acquisition and resolution. (Joint Pub 1-02)

OFT UNITS, INDIVIDUALS, AND AIRCRAFT

Units:

- (1) CJTF-180: Combined Joint Task Force-180; CJTF responsible for conducting operations in Afghanistan; subordinate to USCENTCOM.
- (2) CFACC: Combined Forces Air Component Command; exercises OPCON of non-SOF aircraft within the USCENTCOM AOR; subordinate to USCENTCOM.
- (3) JFSOCC: Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command; exercises OPCON of the JSOAC; subordinate to USCENTCOM.
- (4) CJSOTF-AFG: Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan; subordinate to CJTF-180; comprised of elements of (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High
- (5) JSOAC: Joint Special Operations Air Component; subordinate to JFSOCC; comprised of all fixed and rotary wing Special Operations Forces air assets (b)(2)High
- (6) FOB-(b)(2)High Forward Operating Base (b)(2)High subordinate to CJSOTF-AFG; provided command and control for OFT; comprised of elements of (b)(2)High
- (7) (b)(2)High Task Force assembled to conduct OFT; synonymous with FOB-(b)(2)High
- (8) (b)(2)High
- (9) (b)(2)High
- (10) (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

Individuals:

- (1) CJTF-180 CC: Commander, CJTF-180: LTG Dan K. McNeill, USA
- (2) CJSOTF-A CC: Commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan: COL (b)(3), (b)(6) USA
- (3) JSOACC: Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander: Col (b)(6), (b)(3) (b)(3), (b)(6) USAF
- (4) (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (b)(2)High FOB (b)(2)High Commander: LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) USA
- (5) FOB (b)(2)High (b)(2)High / FOB (b)(2)High Intelligence Officer: CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA
- (6) FOB (b)(2)High (b)(2)High FOB (b)(2)High Fire Support Officer: CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA
- (7) FOB (b)(2)High (b)(2)High / FOB (b)(2)High Judge Advocate: CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA
- (8) (b)(2)High (b)(2)High Commander: MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) USA
- (9) (b)(2)High Ground Forward Air Controller assigned to (b)(2)High during OFT: TSgt (b)(6), (b)(3) USAF
- (10) (b)(2)High (b)(2)High Commander: CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) USA
- (11) (b)(2)High (b)(2)High Commander (located at SR1): CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) (b)(3), (b)(6) USA (b)(2)High Executive Officer (located at SR2): CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6), (b)(3)
- (12) (b)(2)High Ground Forward Air Controller assigned to (b)(2)High during OFT (located at SR1): SRA (b)(6), (b)(3) USAF
- (13) (b)(2)High (b)(2)High Commander: CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) USA
- (14) (b)(2)High (b)(2)High Intelligence Sergeant: SFG (b)(3), (b)(6) USA

Aircraft:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

SECTION 1—PLANNING FOR OPERATION FULL THROTTLE

1-100 SITUATION

1-101. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-AFG) intelligence estimate for the enemy situation just prior to conducting Operation FULL THROTTLE (OFT) indicated an active enemy that recognized an opportunity to disrupt the results of the Loya Jirga. [Encl. 2, at p. B-1-1.]

1-102. Intelligence assessed that the enemy had returned to its historical safe haven in the high ground of the Oruzgan Province, the “birthplace” of the Taliban and several high value targets (HVTs). From this area it was expected that the enemy would reorganize and refit in order to conduct guerrilla operations against U.S./Coalition forces. [Encl. 2, at p. B-1-1.]

1-103. The enemy was concentrated in a triangle-shaped area, with the corners being the villages of Baghran and Deh Rawod, and the Celeberani Valley. Taliban were seen as continuing to use the Helmand River Valley as a key logistical support area for strongholds within the higher elevations of the Oruzgan Province. It was also deemed highly probable that Taliban leadership was massing forces in the southern region of Afghanistan, giving them an advantage to either reinforce other groups of Al Qaida/Taliban (AQ/TB) or begin a new campaign of terror in the Southern Provinces. [Encl. 2, at p. B-1-1.]

1-104. Responses to recent Coalition operations in the Deh Rawod area indicated a large concentration of Taliban forces, sympathizers, and leadership in and around the city. [Encl. 2, at p. B-1-1.]

1-105. Specifically, U.S./Coalition forays into the area prior to OFT yielded the following results:

1-105.a.

(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

[Encl. 1, at pp. 11-12; Encl. 38.]

1-105.b.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at p. 216.]

1-105.c.

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a The NAIs had the following activities associated with them:

1-105.c.1. NAI 32-101, Kohe Takak: JAN 02, reported AQ training camp; 22 MAY, Berader sighting; 13 JUN, fighting positions; 17 JUN, 5 persons with AK-47s; 15-17 JUN, small arms/heavy machine gun fire; 17 JUN, 81 mm mortar firing. [Encl. 3, at p. 3.]

1-105.c.2. NAI 32-110, Deh Rawod: 14.5 AAA; (b)(1)1.4c; HVT residences. [Encl. 3, at p. 5.]

1-105.c.3. NAI 32-107, Sartoghay Mtn: HVT residences; 23 mm AAA; bunkers; caves; (b)(1)1.4c [Encl. 3, at p. 12.]

1-105.c.4. NAI 32-111: 2 JUN, (b)(1)1.4c 10 JUN, AAA. [Encl. 3, at 17.]

1-105.c.5. NAI 32-109: 10 JUN, AAA; JUN, (b)(1)1.4c 15 JUN, small arms fire, compromise of (b)(2)High [Encl. 3, at p. 19.]

1-105.d. During the approximately one-hour span that it took for the (b)(2)High to infil into the Deh Rawod area on 10 JUN 02, (b)(2)High pilots reported three sightings of AAA, and (b)(2)High pilots reported five sightings of AAA. Five hundred rounds of tracer fire were observed, with the largest probable caliber of AAA estimated as 23mm. [Encl. 2, at pp. B-1-5-B-1-6; Encl. 1, at pp. 218-19; Encl. 38.]

1-105.e.

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

their surveillance, the teams saw and heard numerous mortar rounds and noted continuous, repetitive firing of weapons of many calibers, including 7.62mm and .50 caliber, throughout the river valley. There were no discernable targets associated with the firing. [Encl 1, at p. 219-20; Encl 2, at pp. B-1-6 to B-1-16.]

1-105.f. On 13 JUN 02, two men, who had observed their location, compromised (b)(2)High. An hour later, two trucks full of armed personnel arrived and began to set up 82mm mortars and a DShK. (b)(2)High (b)(2)High element reported that the armed personnel covered up the mortars with tarps, and a large grouping of civilians moved in around the weapons. [Encl. 1, at pp. 131, 220.]

1-106. As a result of the intelligence gathered on the Deh Rawod area, the (b)(2)High (b)(2)High Forward Operating Base (FOB) (b)(2)High at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan, to develop a plan to identify, isolate, destroy, and deny sanctuary and freedom of movement to AQ/TB personnel in the area of Deh Rawod in the Oruzgan Province. FOB (b)(2)High concept and plan for (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

of compounds in the Deh Rawod area. [Encl. 1, at pp. 130-31, 216-17, 340.]

1-100-A Enemy personnel (Al Qaida/Taliban) are confirmed within the area in and around Deh Rawod. [FF 1-101 to 1-106.]

1-100-B The Deh Rawod area is used as an enemy military training base. [FF 1-103, 1-105.]

1-100-C AAA and large caliber weapons had engaged aircraft within the vicinity of Deh Rawod. [FF 1-105a, 1-105d.]

1-100-D The Deh Rawod area is a legitimate site for U.S. military operations. [FF 1-101 to 1-106.]

1-200 MISSION AND PLAN

1-201. The intended mission of OFT was for (b)(1)1.4a to deploy forces near Deh Rawod (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 5, at p. 30; Encl. 4, at p. 3; Encl. 1, at p. 326.]

(b)(1)1.4a
vicinity of Deh Rawod (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a [FF 1-201.]

1-202. This would set the conditions for CJTF-180 to successfully conduct combat operations in the Oruzgan/Northern Helmand Provinces, to position forces to provide credible special operations options, to maintain constant pressure on AQ/TB forces, and to provide actionable tactical and operational information through the conduct of both Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Special Reconnaissance (SR) missions. [Encl. 5, at p. 29; Figure 1-1.]



Figure 1-1: OFT Area of Interest

1-203. To accomplish this mission, Commander, (b)(2)High intended to allow the enemy to re-establish their normal patterns of operations while engaging a wide range of (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High to refine and develop NAIs near Deh Rawod. (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a near Deh Rawod. (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a
selected areas near Deh Rawod. (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 5, at p. 30; Encl. 4, at p. 3.]



Figure 1-2: OFT Control Measures Graphic

1-204. To meet the CJSOTF-AFG Commander's Intent, (b)(2)High developed a four-phase operation. [Encl. 5, at p. 31; Encl. 4, at pp. 4-6.]

1-205. (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a Deh Rawod. The purpose
(b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 5, at pp. 30-31; see also Encl. 1, at pp. 211-212; Figure 1-2.]

1-206. Phase II required insertion of SOF (b)(2)High teams into (b)(2)High (which was within both AO Eagle and JSOA Banks). These SOF assets would then conduct (b)(2)High within the vicinity of Deh Rawod to identify Al Qaida and/or Taliban forces. [Encl. 5, at pp. 30-31; Encl. 4, at pp. 4-5; Figure 1-2.]

1-207. In addition, the (b)(2)High elements were to provide updates regarding enemy activity to ground maneuver elements preparing to conduct Phase III Cordon & Search operations. [Encl. 6, at p. 2, § 5.A.(2).]

1-208. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High of Deh Rawod); (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High of Deh Rawod); (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High of Deh Rawod); (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
Deh Rawod); (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High (generally the Deh Rawod area), and was to be covered by
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 5, at p. 32; Encl. 1, at pp. 214-215;
Figures 1-3, 1-4.]



Figure 1-3: OFT Phase II Graphic

(b)(1)1.4a

(Figure 1-4, Potential Targets for OFT (NAIs 32-101, 107, 109, 110, and 111))

1-209. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
Rawod [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a in the Deh Rawod [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
selected areas within the vicinity of Deh Rawod. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a Deh Rawod area. [Encl. 5, at pp. 30-31; Encl. 1, at p. 150; Encl. 4, at p. 5; Figures 1-5, 1-6.]

1-210. H-Hour for the commencement of [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 7, at request number N20621003, Block 8; Encl. 1, at p. 150.]

1-211. To accomplish its Phase III objectives, [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High soldiers from [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High and [redacted] (b)(2)High soldiers, via [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a Deh Rawod area. [Encl. 5, at pp. 33, 36; Figure 1-5.]




Figure 1-5: OFT Phase III Graphic (1 of 2)

1-212. A ground convoy, consisting of (b)(2)High (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High (b)(2)High respectively), would approach the Deh Rawod area generally from the east and establish a Release Point (RP) south of Deh Rawod. [Encl. 5, at pp. 33, 36; Figure 1-6.]

1-213. As (b)(2)High established an Advanced Operational Base (AOB) to provide command and control for Phase III operations, (b)(2)High (b)(2)High and a (b)(2)High were to continue generally north by ground vehicle to (b)(2)High (b)(2)High. Simultaneously, (b)(2)High (b)(2)High and a (b)(2)High were to continue generally west by ground vehicle, ford the Helmand River at a pre-designated point, and proceed north to (b)(2)High (b)(2)High. [Encl. 5, at pp. 33, 36; Figure 1-6.]

1-214. (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 5, at pp. 33, 36; Figure 1-6.]




Figure 1-6: OFT Phase III Graphic (2 of 2)

1-215. Detainees obtained on (b)(2)High were to be passed to (b)(2)High elements in the vicinity of the respective targets, while detainees obtained on (b)(2)High were to be passed to Blocking Position South. Upon completion of actions on the objective, both (b)(2)High elements (i.e., Blocking Positions North and South), SFODA-984, SEAL Platoon 1H, and all detainees were to be exfiltrated (b)(2)High (b)(2)High. The (b)(2)High elements (i.e., (b)(2)High (b)(2)High) were also to exfiltrate (b)(2)High [Encl. 5, at pp. 34, 36.]

1-216. Following these exfiltrations, (b)(2)High were to return by (b)(2)High to Tarin Kowt. (b)(2)High were to remain in the Deh Rawod area and establish a firebase. [Encl. 5, at pp. 33-34, 36.]

1-217. The ability for (b)(2)High to access on-call Close Air Support (CAS) assets to destroy enemy forces threatening the main effort was critical to the success of Phase III. [Encl. 39, at pp. 68-68.]

1-218. The JSOAC's mission planning consisted of analysis of potential target types and locations, as listed in the (b)(2)High, but they understood that their mission for Phase III would be "on-call CAS." Thus, participating JSOAC personnel reviewed the (b)(2)High and Revised CONOP in order to familiarize themselves with the AO, ground scheme of maneuver, and target types within the JSOA. [Encl. 1, at pp. 22-24.]

1-219. (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at p. 11.]

1-220. (b)(2)High intended to utilize available CAS assets through a controlling Ground Forward Air Controller (GFAC) (b)(2)High at the (b)(2)High level. All Phase II (b)(2)High elements were to have current and qualified GFACs attached to their elements. Phase III ground maneuver elements conducting the Cordon & Search operations on (b)(2)High (b)(2)High were also to have current and qualified GFACs attached to their elements. All GFACs were to monitor a common Tactical Air Direction (TAD) (i.e., (b)(2)High) for coordination purposes. (b)(2)High was responsible for airspace deconfliction and flowing supporting aircraft to the requesting GFAC. Any and all strikes were to be conducted under the positive control of a current and qualified GFAC. [Encl. 1, at p. 132, pp. 157-159.]

1-221. Pre-planned CAS requests (i.e., DD Form 1972s) for Phase III, the CAS Comm Plan Graphics, and a narrative of the fires plan were transmitted from (b)(2)High to (b)(2)High [Encl. 5, at p. 35; Encl. 7, request numbers N20622002, N20622007, N20622008, N20622005, N20622006, N20621003, and N20622004, at block 8; Encl. 8, at ¶¶ 2-3.]

1-222. (b)(2)High requested a total of (b)(2)High in order to provide CAS during the period 30 2000Z JUN 02 – 30 2330Z JUN 02 on (a) (b)(2)High (i.e., NAI 32-101), (b) “sub objective” East on (b)(2)High (i.e., NAI 32-110), and (c) “sub objective” West on OBJ Green (i.e., NAI 32-110). [Encl. 7, request numbers N20622008 and N20621003, at blocks 5, 8]

1-223. To meet this request, the JSOAC planned to provide (b)(2)High (i.e., (b)(2)High) in support of the two (2) objectives on NAI 32-110 and (b)(2)High (i.e., (b)(2)High) in support of (b)(2)High during the requested time block. JSOAC also planned to provide one (1) (b)(2)High (i.e., (b)(2)High) as a “spare.” [Encl. 9.]

1-224. (b)(2)High requested dedicated (i.e., “on-station”) CAS for the period 30 2000Z JUN 02 – 01 0400Z JUL 02. [Encl. 7, request number N20622006, at Blocks 5, 8.]

1-225. (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 9.]

1-226. (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl. 7, request numbers N20622002, N20622007, and N20622004, at Blocks 5, 8.]

1-227. (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 9.]

1-228. (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a of Deh Rawod. (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 1, at pp. 135, 218, and 327.]

(b)(2)High used the term "Pre-assault fires" on the DD Form 1972s it submitted to request air support for OFT. However, because there were no "pre-planned" (i.e., interdiction) targets other than the (b)(2)High a more accurate description of its request would have been "on call CAS" vice "Pre-assault fires." [FF 1-221 and 1-228.]

1-229. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 7, request number N20622005, at Blocks 5, 8.]

1-230. To meet this request, CFACC planned to provide one (1) (b)(2)High from 30 1845Z JUN 02 to 30 2045Z JUN 02. [Encl. 9.]

1-231. Phase IV was to involve multiple simultaneous efforts designed to stabilize the Deh Rawod area. PSYOP would subvert popular support for AQ/TB forces and disrupt the internal cohesion of these enemy elements. Civil Affairs forces would conduct operations in order to mitigate the anticipated negative sentiment resulting from the conduct of operations by U.S. forces in the Deh Rawod area. (b)(2)High would establish a firebase in Deh Rawod in order to deny the enemy both sanctuary and freedom of movement within (b)(2)High [Encl. 5, at pp. 30-31.]

1-232. In accordance with its higher Commander's Intent, (b)(2)High desired endstate for OFT was to have its forces postured to conduct follow-on operations in the vicinity of Baghran and the Char Chino valley. [Encl. 5, at p. 31.]

1-300 [redacted] (b)(2)High

1-301. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 2, Annex E, at ¶1.a.; and Encl. 10, at ¶2.]

1-302. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 2, Annex E, at ¶7.a.; and Encl. 10, at ¶3.c.]

1-303. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 2, Annex E, at ¶6.a.; and Encl. 10, at ¶2.]

1-304. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 2, Annex E, at ¶6.b.; Encl. 10, at ¶2.b.; and Encl. 11, at p. 1.]

1-305. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 2, Annex E, at ¶6.c.; and Encl. 10, at ¶2.c.]

1-306. There were no CINCCENT designated [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High Moreover, there were no special or supplemental ROE for this mission. [Encl. 1, at pp. 132-133, 176, 236, and 288.]

1-307. The presence of AAA in and around Deh Rawod was well documented prior to the execution of PH III of OFT. Moreover, operational planners knew that identified AAA sites were collocated within probable residential compounds prior to execution of Phase III of OFT. The planned infil/exfil routes for the air assault portion of the mission were known to pass inside the effective range of a number of documented AAA sightings. [Encl. 1, at pp. 131, 136, 143, 188-192, 239-240, and 289-290; and Encl. 3.]

1-308. Despite this knowledge, collateral damage was given only minimal consideration during the planning of OFT. As such, senior leadership was not given an opportunity to decide whether the military advantage of the operation outweighed the risk of collateral damage. However, certain operational constraints were in place that had the affect of limiting CD in the execution of OFT. [Encl. 1, at 14, 17, 28, 32, 46, 113, 139, 144-146, 239, 246, 255, 288-290, 328-330, 343, 347, and 348.]

1-308.a. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at pp. 240, 328, 336.]

1-308.b. To further limit CD and ensure positive identification of threats, FOB [redacted] (b)(2)High decided not to engage previously identified AAA sites that were not firing during Phase III of OFT. [Encl. 1 at pp. 137, 144, 196, 238-240.]

1-308.c. "CINCENT designated [redacted] (b)(2)High" which would have permitted [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High were not sought for OFT because everyone in the village of Deh Rawod [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1 at pp. 132-133.]

1-309. In addition to the [redacted] (b)(2)High the ROE allows [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 2, Annex E, at ¶7.a.1.; and Encl. 10, at ¶3.C.1.]

1-310. Although FOB [redacted] (b)(2)High planners considered strikes against AAA likely to ensure mission accomplishment, the intent of the operation was not to target AAA and, therefore, no attempt was made to pre-approve targets. [Encl. 1 at pp. 136, 144, and 241-244]

1-311. USCENTCOM targeting personnel are responsible to compile [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High Because no targets were nominated to USCINCENT for consideration as pre-approved targets, [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 11, at p. 8; Encl. 13.]

1-300-A Although AAA sites were known to be co-located within residential areas, collateral damage (CD) was given inadequate consideration during operational planning and the approval process for OFT. [FF 1-307 to 1-308.]

1-300-B Operational planners did, however, take measures that had the effect of mitigating collateral damage. [FF 1-308.]

1-300-C Moreover, it is possible that an adequate CD assessment would not have resulted in an alteration of the plan because the assessment would have considered the risk of civilian casualties in light of normal occupancy, not the extraordinary occupancy resulting from a social gathering. [FF 1-308.]

1-312. [Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High

Although CD restrictions do not apply in such cases, proportionality and necessity still apply. [Encl. 12, at §5.16.]

1-313. There was a misperception by some senior leadership that the GFAC in fact was saddled with the responsibility to select targets for engagement and to conduct a CD assessment. All targets engaged during OFT were selected by the [Redacted] (b)(2)High [Redacted] (b)(2)High and approved by the [Redacted] (b)(2)High FOB [Redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1 at pp. 135, 136, 349, and 352.]

1-314. [Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 11, at pp. 2 and 8.]

1-315. [Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 12, at §5.2.1.]

1-300-D [Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High [FF 1-312 to 1-313.]

1-300-E Responsibility for mitigating CD in a [Redacted] (b)(2)High **when troops are not engaged with hostile forces should not be placed on such a relatively junior decision maker, but rather this type of responsibility belongs at the** [Redacted] (b)(2)High **as required by USCENTCOM** [Redacted] (b)(2)High **and Policy.** [FF 1-314.]
[Redacted] (b)(2)High

1-400 COMMAND AND CONTROL

1-401. [Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl. 5, at p. 1; Encl. 14; Encl. 4, Annex A, at p. 12, Annex A (Task Organization).]

1-402. [Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 9; Encl. 5.]

1-403. [Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 9; Encl. 5.]

1-404. [Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 5.]

1-405. [Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at 343-344.]

1-406. [Redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 5; Figure 1-2.]

1-407. [Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at p. 135].

1-408. FOB- [Redacted] (b)(2)High
[Redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at p. 135; Encl. 8, at ¶ 2.]

1-409.	(b)(2)High
	(b)(2)High /as
(b)(2)High	[Encl. 1, at p. 135, p. 157; Encl. 4, at p. 12.]

SECTION 2—EXECUTION OF OPERATION FULL THROTTLE

2-100. [Redacted] (b)(2)High

2-101. [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 6, at p. 2.]

2-102. [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 15, at p. 1; and Encl. 1, at p.188, p.190, p. 251-252.]

2-103. [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at p.188-192, Encl. 15 at 1.]

2-104. [Redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a

[Redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 1, at p.303.]

2-105. [Redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a

[Redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 1, at p.304.]

2-106. [Redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a

[Redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a

[Redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a [Encl.16.]

2-100-A [Redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a

[FF 2-106.]

2-107. Between 28 -30 JUN 02, (b)(2)High observed and logged substantial amounts of AAA fire (55 separate firings) from 11 separate locations within the Deh Rawod area and reported the locations to FOB 32. Fires were noted coming from the same sites repeatedly. [Encl. 15, at pp. 3-16; Encl. 1, at 188-193; Figure 2-1.]

2-108. (b)(2)High location position provided a full view of the entire operation and the (b)(2)High had visual contact of the targets. [Encl. 17.]

2-100-B There was AAA fire on multiple occasions originating from multiple sites within the Deh Rawod Area for at least two weeks prior to the mission. [FF 1-105, 2-103 to 2-105, and 2-107 to 2-108.]

2-109. (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 1, at 188-193, p.251-252.]

2-110. Based on this confirmation process, the team recognized that the AAA apparently originated from residential compounds [Encl. 1, at 188-194, p.251-252; Encl. 15, at 2.]

2-111. The (b)(2)High remained in their (b)(2)High positions and passed information updates to both the (b)(2)High [Encl. 6, at p. 2.]

(b)(1)1.4a

Figure 2-1: (b)(2)High **Engaged Targets and Other Identified AAA Sightings**

2-200 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

2-201. The crew of (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High were current and qualified IAW appropriate U.S. Air Force Instructions and On-The-Job Training (OJT) requirements.

2-201.a. (b)(2)High was current and qualified instructor IAW USAF Instructions. His annual Mission Evaluation was performed and documented on 13 May 02 and expires 31 Oct 03. [AF Form 8 in FEF, at 16 SOS, Hurlburt Field, FL.]

2-201.b. (b)(2)High was current and qualified evaluator IAW USAF Instructions. His annual Mission Evaluation was performed and documented on 27 Mar 02 and expires 31 Aug 03. [AF Form 8 in FEF, at 16 SOS, Hurlburt Field, FL.]

2-201.c. (b)(2)High was current and qualified IAW USAF Instructions. His annual Mission Evaluation was performed and documented on 20 Sep 01 and expires 28 Feb 03. [AF Form 8 in FEF, at 16 SOS, Hurlburt Field, FL.]

2-201.d. (b)(2)High was current and qualified instructor IAW USAF Instructions. His annual Mission Evaluation was performed and documented on 13 May 02 and expires 31 Oct 03. [AF Form 8 in FEF, at 16 SOS, Hurlburt Field, FL.]

2-201.e. (b)(2)High was current and qualified IAW USAF Instructions. His annual Mission Evaluation was performed and documented on 22 Jun 01 and expires 30 Nov 02. [AF Form 8 in FEF, at 16 SOS, Hurlburt Field, FL.]

2-201.f. (b)(2)High evaluation was performed and documented on 10 NOV 01 and expires 09 NOV 02. [Encl. 18.]

2-202. OJT records indicate that (b)(2)High was fully qualified to control (b)(2)High (b)(2)High and had received a practical evaluation from a properly documented Task Certifier. [Encl. 19.]

2-203. Between 2008Z and 2138Z on 30 JUN 02, (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a Deh Rawod with (b)(1)1.4a At 1203Z, 29 JUN 02, the (b)(2)High team, identified the cave complex; however, the coordinates were not passed to the (b)(2)High until 1122Z, 30 JUN 02. Even though the cave site was pre-identified, the target was not nominated by the (b)(2)High. Instead, the (b)(2)High FOB- (b)(2)High When passed to the (b)(2)High via email, the target was called (b)(2)High for the (b)(2)High mission. [Encl. 1, at pp.137, 227-228, 241-244; Encl. 20, at p.1.]

2-200-A The CENTCOM target vetting/approval process was circumvented with regard to the (b)(2)High serviced cave complex. (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [FF 2-203.]

2-204. At approximately H-45 minutes, as ground maneuver elements were moving into their assault positions, (b)(2)High requested an (b)(2)High that had recently been active in the vicinity of (b)(2)High was "pushed" to (b)(2)High at approximately H-20 minutes. (b)(2)High requested clearance of fires through FOB-(b)(2)High and clearance was granted. [Encl. 1, at pp. 135, 196-197, 252-253; Encl. 15, at p. 2; Figure 2-2; Encl. 40, at pp. 1-2.]

(b)(1)1.4a

Figure 2-2: (b)(2)High Engaged Targets

Engaged Target 01

2-205. The first target engaged by (b)(2)High was in close proximity to (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High This target was deemed time-sensitive and required immediate suppression because the AAA would soon pose a substantial danger to friendly forces during infiltration. [Encl. 5, at p. 14; Encl. 21.]

2-206. The UTM coordinates for the first target engaged by (b)(2)High are (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High (See Figure 2-3.) [Encl. 22.]



Figure 2-3: Engaged Target 01

2-207. [redacted] (b)(2)High identified [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High During the target confirmation process, AAA fire emanated from this compound immediately prior to engagement. Multiple entities witnessed this fire, including [redacted] and [redacted] (b)(2)High. The [redacted] (b)(2)High confirmed that he received AAA fire from the compound that [redacted] (b)(2)High also testified that he observed AAA fire that reached his [redacted] (b)(2)High altitude on at least eight (8) occasions. [Encl. 1, at pp.12, 20, 44, 61, 81, 114, and 197-198; Encl. 22, at p. 253; Encl. 40, at pp.2-3.]

2-208. Final clearance to fire was transmitted from [redacted] (b)(2)High to [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High engaged the target compound with one (1) [redacted] (b)(2)High round. [redacted] (b)(2)High provided an initial correction to the first round and then transmitted "Fire for Effect" to [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at p.253; Encl. 15, at p. 2; Encl. 22; Encl. 23, at p. 12; Encl. 40, at p.2.]

2-209. During the engagement of the first target, [redacted] (b)(2)High observed several personnel running in the targeted compound, as well as personnel running from the compound. The [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at pp. 198-199, 253-254; Encl. 15, at p. 2; Encl. 22; Encl. 23, at p.14; Encl. 40, at p. 2.]

2-210. [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at pp. 33, 49, 57, 84, 85, and 89; Encl. 24, at ¶18.2.1.2; Encl 40, at p. 5.]

2-211. [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at pp. 201-202, 254; Encl. 40, p. 2.]

2-200-B [redacted] (b)(2)High and associated personnel was necessary to [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [FF 2-209 to 2-211.]

2-212. In JAN 02, the [redacted] (b)(2)High with the [redacted] (b)(2)High provided guidance on engagement of personnel fleeing target areas. This [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 25, at pp.1-2; Encl. 40, at p. 2.]

2-213. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at pp. 17-18, 33, 48, 81-82, 114-115.]

2-214. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at pp. 17-18, 39; Encl. 24, at ¶2.5.3.]

2-215. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at pp. 48, 53-54, 82, 89-90, 114-115.]

2-216. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at pp. 17-18, 47-48, 115; Encl. 25, at pp. 1-2.]

2-200-C [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [FF 2-214 to FF 2-216]

2-217. The [redacted] (b)(2)High exercised their right to remain silent and did not testify before the board. Therefore, the investigation board received no testimony from the aircrew members charged with the responsibility to [redacted] (b)(2)High

2-218. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 22.]

2-200-D [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [FF 2-218.]

2-200-E [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [FF 2-213, FF 2-215.]

2-200-F [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [FF 1-302, FF 2-213 to 2-215.]

2-219. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High over a small compound approximately 10
meters northeast of the targeted compound. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at pp. 99-100, 115-118, 122; Encl. 22.]

2-220. Under the OEF SPINS, [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 12, at ¶5.16.2.]

2-221. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 12, at
¶5.16.4.]

2-200 [redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a
[redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a
[redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a [FF
1-312, FF 2-204 to 2-214, and FF 2-218 to 2-221.]

2-222. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 22; Encl. 24, at ¶¶ 2.7.3, 4-1, 4.2.1.5-4.2.1.8, 4.2.2, 4.3-4.8, 5.16.2.3,
5.16.2.3; Encl. 24, at Fig. 4.15-4.16, 4.19, 4.21, 4.2.]

2-223. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 12, at ¶5.16.4.]

2-224. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High
[Encl. 1, at pp. 201-202, 254; FF 2-211.]

2-225. Regarding the proportionality of [redacted] (b)(2)High site and associated personnel
with [redacted] (b)(2)High the following facts are noted:

2-225.a. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 22.]

2-225.b. Personnel from Engaged Target 01 dispersed from the compound in all
directions, increasing the complexity and time associated with targeting those personnel.
[Encl 22.]

2-225.c. [redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4g

[redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4g

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(2)High [Encl

22.]

2-225.d. The [redacted] (b)(1)1.4g [redacted] (b)(2)High

[redacted] (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High [Encl 22; Encl. 23, at pp. 13 - 23; Encl. 24, at ¶¶5.16.2.2, 5.16.2.2.1 - 5.16.2.2.2, 5.16.5.1 - 5.16.5.2.]

2-225.e. [redacted] (b)(2)High

[redacted] (b)(2)High

[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 22; Encl 23, at p. 21; Encl. 24, at ¶5.16.5.2.]

2-225.f. During the engagement of Engaged Target 01, a cease-fire was called by

[redacted] (b)(2)High to ensure deconfliction with [redacted] (b)(2)High informed [redacted] (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High that they were shooting through [redacted] (b)(2)High altitude indicating a hazardous condition. Subsequent coordination determined that [redacted] (b)(2)High had moved 7 miles east of Engaged Target 01 and a hazardous condition did not exist. [redacted] (b)(2)High

[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 22; Encl. 23, at p. 19.]

2-200-H [redacted] (b)(2)High

[redacted] (b)(2)High

[redacted] (b)(2)High [FF 2-204 to 2-214; FF 2-218 to 2-225.]

2-226. There was an alleged gathering or celebration of some kind on the night of 30 JUN 02 - 01 JUL 02 at Engaged Target 01. [Encl. 1, at p. 266.]

2-227. [redacted] (b)(2)High and [redacted] (b)(2)High had no indications that some type of social gathering was taking place at Engaged Target 01. [redacted] (b)(2)High does not display large numbers of personnel at Engaged Target 01 (i.e. 150-200 as indicated post engagement by Afghan reports). [Encl. 1, at pp. 57-58, 85, 87, 202, and 262-263; Encl. 22.]

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 24, at ¶¶5.16.2.2, 5.16.2.2.1 - 5.16.2.2.2, 5.16.5.1 - 5.16.5.2.]

2-228. (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4g
(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4g
(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4g [Encl. 1, at pp.18, 37, 83, 107; Encl. 24, at ¶¶ 2.6, 2.6.1 - 2.6.2.]

2-200-I (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [FF 2-226 TO 2-228.]

Target Not Engaged

2-229. (b)(2)High directed (b)(2)High to another target shortly following the engagement of the first target. (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High identified (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl. 22, Encl. 23, at pp. 28-29, 104-105.]

Engaged Target 02

2-230. Shortly after (b)(2)High was informed, via the command net, that the (b)(2)High infiltrating Blocking Force North were inbound, the detachment directed engagement of an active AAA site that was in close proximity to the positions to be occupied. [Encl. 15, at p. 2; Encl. 22.]

2-231. This target was engaged by (b)(2)High after (b)(2)High determined it was active AAA and in-close proximity to the location designated for Blocking Position North (b)(2)High and Checkpoint North (b)(2)High). [Encl. 1, pp. 209-210, 248, 260-261; Encl. 5, at p. 33.]

2-232. The UTM coordinates for the second target engaged by (b)(2)High are (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (See Figure 2-4.) [Encl. 22.]

2-233. (b)(2)High was not able to see the second target engaged but had positive communications with the (b)(2)High elements occupying (b)(2)High who did have visual contact with the target and directed the targeting process using indirect control. [Encl. 1, pp. 209-210, 248, 260-261; Encl. 26 at pp. V-9 - V-10.]

2-234. (b)(2)High identified (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High Final clearance to fire was transmitted from (b)(2)High to (b)(2)High (b)(2)High engaged the target compound with (b)(2)High Upon confirming that the rounds were on target, (b)(2)High transmitted "Fire for Effect" to (b)(2)High Engaged Target 02 was engaged with an additional (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High (b)(2)High [Encl. 1, pp. 209-210, 248, 260-261; Encl. 22; Encl. 23, at pp. 33-34; Encl. 24, at ¶2.6.1.2.]

2-235. [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 12, p.71; Encl. 26, at pp. V-9 - V-10.]



Figure 2-4: Engaged Target 02

2-236. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [FF 2-210 - 211.]

2-237. [redacted] (b)(2)High was maintained on personnel fleeing Engaged Target 02. [Encl. 22; FF 2-213 - 2-215.]

2-238. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High [Encl. 24, at ¶¶ 2.7.2-2.7.3, 4-1, 4.2.1.3-4.2.1.4, 4.2.1.5-4.2.1.8, 4.2.2, 4.3-4.8, 5.16.2.3, 5.16.2.3.1, 5.16.2.3.3; Encl. 24, at Fig. 4.15-4.16, 4.19, 4.21, 4.2.]

2-239. [redacted] (b)(2)High exploded over an adjacent compound that was not part of the intended target compound. Review of the [redacted] (b)(2)High shows that this occurred when [redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a
This was the first [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High The adjacent compound was similar in size and characteristics to the target compound. However, the adjacent compound lacked a key distinguishing feature, a circular walled courtyard at the northeast corner. No personnel were observed at the adjacent compound. The following facts are noted concerning the target area. [Encl. 22.]

2-239.a. This target area was conducted on a [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High was the dominant feature, defined as Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) in TTP. [Encl. 24, at ¶15.3.3.]

2-239.b. The target area was in line with the TTP definitions of Dense Random Construction (Type A) within a village. [Encl. 24, at ¶¶15.4.1.1, 15.4.5.]

2-239.c. [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 24, at ¶15.4.5.]

2-240. The [redacted] (b)(2)High sensor operator exercised his right to remain silent and did not testify before the board. Therefore, there is no direct testimony from the [redacted] (b)(2)High

[redacted] (b)(2)High

2-200-J The [redacted] (b)(2)High *misidentified the target and mistakenly targeted a compound adjacent to Engaged Target 02 with a single* [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [FF 2-239 to 2-240.]

2-241. Interviews with Afghans at the Engaged Target 02 confirmed that there was no damage or injuries from the single [redacted] (b)(2)High that exploded over the adjacent compound. [Encl. 17, at p. 3.]

2-242. There was an alleged engagement party on the night of 30 JUN 02 – 01 JUL 02 at Engaged Target 02. [Encl. 17, at p. 4; Encl. 27, at p. 1.]

2-200-K [redacted] (b)(2)High *did not knowingly engage non-combatants while prosecuting Engaged Target 02.* [FF 2-230 to 2-242.]

Engaged Target 03

2-243. The third target engaged by (b)(2)High was active AAA that was in close proximity to both (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl. 5, at p. 20; Encl. 15, at p. 2; Encl. 21.]

2-244. The UTM coordinates for the third target engaged by (b)(2)High are (b)(2)High (b)(2)High. [Encl. 28.]

2-245. (b)(2)High identified (b)(2)High (b)(2)High [Encl. 22.]

2-246. At the time the third target was engaged by (b)(2)High was not aware that the ground element moving toward (b)(2)High was unable to ford the Helmand River. [Encl. 1, at p. 211.]

2-247. Engaged Target 03 was engaged with (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 22; Encl. 24, at ¶¶2.7.3, 4-1, 4.2.1.5-4.2.1.8, 4.2.2, 4.3-4.8, 5.16.2.3, 5.16.2.3; Encl. 24, at Fig. 4.15-4.16, 4.19, 4.21, 4.2.]

Engaged Target 04

2-248. The fourth target engaged by (b)(2)High (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High In addition, (b)(2)High aircraft had been engaged by AAA fire from this location multiple times over the past few weeks. [Encl. 1, at p. 52; Encl. 5, at p. 20; Encl. 21; Encl. 22.]

2-249. The UTM coordinates for the fourth target engaged by (b)(2)High are (b)(2)High (b)(2)High [Encl. 28, at 1.]

2-250. (b)(2)High identified (b)(2)High (b)(2)High [Encl. 22.]

2-251. Engaged Target 04 was engaged with (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 22; Encl. 24, at ¶¶2.7.2-2.7.3, 4-1, 4.2.1.3-4.2.1.4, 4.2.1.5-4.2.1.8, 4.2.2, 4.3-4.8, 5.16.2.3, 5.16.2.3.1, 5.16.2.3.3; Encl. 24, at Fig. 4.15-4.16, 4.19, 4.21, 4.2.]

Engaged Target 05

2-252. The fifth target engaged by (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl.5, at p. 20; Encl. 21.]

2-253. The UTM coordinates for the fifth target engaged by (b)(2)High are (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl. 28.]

2-254. (b)(2)High identified
(b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl 22.]

2-255. Engaged Target 05 was engaged with (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 22; Encl. 24, at ¶¶ 2.7.3, 4-1, 4.2.1.5-4.2.1.8, 4.2.2, 4.3-4.8, 5.16.2.3, 5.16.2.3; Encl. 24, at Fig. 4.15-4.16, 4.19, 4.21, 4.2.]

Engaged Target 06

2-256. The sixth target engaged by (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl 5, at p. 33; Encl. 15, at p. 3; Encl. 21.]

2-257. The UTM coordinates for the sixth target engaged by (b)(2)High are (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl. 22.]

2-258. (b)(2)High identified
(b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl 22.]

2-259. Engaged Target 06 was engaged with (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 22; Encl. 24, at ¶¶ 2.7.2-2.7.3, 4-1, 4.2.1.3-4.2.1.4, 4.2.1.5-4.2.1.8, 4.2.2, 4.3-4.8, 5.16.2.3, 5.16.2.3.1, 5.16.2.3.3; Encl. 24, at Fig. 4.15-4.16, 4.19, 4.21, 4.2.]

Engaged Target 07

2-260. The seventh target engaged by (b)(2)High was a cave complex to the northwest
(b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl.5, at p. 20; Encl. 21.]

2-261. The UTM coordinates for the seventh target engaged by (b)(2)High are (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl. 28.]

2-262. [redacted] (b)(2)High identified
[redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl 22.]

2-263. Engaged Target 07 was engaged with [redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a
[redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 22; Encl. 24, at ¶¶2.7.3, 4-1, 4.2.1.5-4.2.1.8, 4.2.2, 4.3-4.8, 5.16.2.3, 5.16.2.3; Encl. 24, at Fig. 4.15-4.16, 4.19, 4.21, 4.2.]

All Engaged Targets

2-264. Prior to the engagement of each target, [redacted] (b)(2)High requested clearance to fire from the FOB [redacted] (b)(2)High Commander through the co-located [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl 1. at pp. 135, 196-197, and 254; Encl. 15, at p.16.]

2-265. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 26.]

2-266. [redacted] (b)(2)High and [redacted] (b)(2)High maintained positive control, whether directly or indirectly, of all [redacted] (b)(2)High, including all calls for fire emanating from [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 1 at pp. 135, 196-197, and 260-261; Encl. 15, at p. 17.]

2-267. All [redacted] (b)(2)High initiated by [redacted] (b)(2)High were directed at AAA sites that were observed to be actively firing at U.S. aircraft shortly before and/or during the execution of Phase III. Some of these AAA pieces had also been observed being used against ground targets when not firing at aircraft. [Encl 1. at pp.196, 238, 248-249, and 253; Encl. 15, at pp. 7 and 16-17; Encl. 29, at p.2.]

2-268. The timing criteria used to determine the validity of the target was based on the presence of U.S./coalition [redacted] (b)(2)High at holding point Gulf located 15 nautical miles to the south of OBJ East. AAA sites that were observed firing after the infiltration forces arrived at the holding point were selected for engagement if they were a factor to the flight path of the [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl 1, at p. 238.]

2-269. [redacted] (b)(2)High sites firing large caliber weapons and not small arms. Afghans do not customarily load their AK-47s with a four-to-one ball-to-tracer mix as was observed. Tracer burnout was observed at a minimum elevation of 1,500 meters – a height well above the tracer burnout of small arms. The team described the firing patterns as being “coordinated,” and not “random celebratory” in nature. [Encl. 1, at pp. 138, 191, and 248-249; Encl. 15, at p.17.]

2-270. [redacted] (b)(2)High were planned/conducted within [redacted] (b)(2)High kilometers of all targets engaged by [redacted] (b)(2)High [Encl. 5, at pp. 33 and 36.]

2-271. OEF SPINS define Close Air Support as " air action by fixed and rotary wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. For OEF, (b)(2)High procedures will be followed when (b)(2)High friendly forces. [Encl. 12, at p.71.]

2-200-L (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [FF 2-267 to 2-271]

2-200-M (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [FF 2-204 to FF 2-215, FF 2-218, FF 2-220 to FF 2-239, FF 2-241 to FF 2-259, FF 2-267 to FF 2-271]

2-200-N (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High
[FF 2-204 to FF 2-215, FF 2-218, FF 2-220 to FF 2-239, FF 2-241 to FF 2-259, FF 2-267 to FF 2-271]

2-200-O (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [FF 2-207, FF 2-229, FF 2-234, FF 2-245, FF 2-250, FF 2-254, FF 2-258, FF 2-262]

2-272. After the subject (b)(2)High there was no further (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High
(b)(2)High [Encl. 1, at pp. 96, 112, and 250; Encl. 40, at p. 6.]

2-200-P *OFT was successful* (b)(2)High [FF 2-272.]

2-200-Q (b)(2)High *as a result of the enemy positioning of*
(b)(2)High *in residential areas.* [FF 2-207; FF 2-219; FF 2-239; FF 2-267.]

2-300 CORDON AND SEARCH

2-301. At 30 1530Z JUN 02, the ground Cordon & Search forces initiated (b)(2)High movement from their Patrol Base (located approximately (b)(2)High of Deh Rawod) and moved toward their Release Point (RP). These forces included (b)(2)High (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High. [Encl. 6, at p. 2, §5.A.(3); Encl. 1, at p. 156.]

2-302. While enroute to the RP, (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High secured an (b)(2)High checkpoint ((b)(2)High) to prevent any communications that could provide advanced warning of the ground force's arrival to Deh Rawod. [Encl. 6, at p. 4, §6.A.; Encl. 1, at p. 181.]

2-303. Upon reaching the RP ((b)(2)High), the Cordon & Search elements (b)(2)High and continued moving toward their respective objectives. [Encl. 6, at p. 2, §5.A.(3).]

2-304. The ground forces moving toward (b)(2)High (i.e., (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High) moved generally west and attempted to cross the Helmand River at both primary and alternate pre-surveyed fording sites. The element was unable to successfully ford the Helmand River and instead established a Patrol Base on the east side of the river and awaited further instructions. [Encl. 6, at p. 2, §5.A.(3); Encl. 1, at p. 139, p. 163.]

2-305. The ground forces moving toward (b)(2)High (i.e., (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High) moved generally north toward Deh Rawod. The element occupied an assault position approximately (b)(2)High of their objective and prepared to both receive the (b)(2)High personnel and to conduct a (b)(2)High (b)(2)High within (b)(2)High [Encl. 6, at p. 2, §5.A.(3); Encl. 1, at p. 156.]

2-306. (b)(2)High on 28 JUN 02 remained in their (b)(2)High positions and (b)(2)High to the (b)(2)High preparing to conduct the Cordon & Search. [Encl. 6, at p. 2, §A.(2); Encl. 1, at pp. 134 and 185-186.]

2-307. (b)(1)1.4d co-located with (b)(2)High in the vicinity of (b)(2)High, assisted

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High and accompanying (b)(2)High arrived via (b)(2)High reinforced the cordon, and expanded the search to adjacent compounds into which the (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 6, at p. 3, §5.A.(3); Encl. 30, at p. 16-17; Encl. 1, at p. 179, 255-256; Encl. 31, at p. 2.]

2-308. Proximate to the conduct of the Cordon & Search on (b)(2)High, elements of (b)(2)High and accompanying AMF were inserted by helicopter into both Blocking Position North (b)(2)High and Blocking Position South (b)(2)High (b)(2)High [Encl. 30, at p. 2; Encl. 6, at p. 3, §5.A.(3).]

2-309. The cordon forces on (b)(2)High (i.e., (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (b)(2)High [Encl. 32, at p. 6; Encl. 6, at p. 3, §5.A.(3); Encl. 31, at p. 2.]

2-310. (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (b)(2)High (b)(2)High Details are included in Section 2-400, below. [Encl. 6, at p. 3, § 5.A.(3); Encl. 30, at p. 16-17; Encl. 1, at 256.]

2-311. At approximately 01 1600Z JUL 02, the Cordon & Search elements in the vicinity of (b)(2)High (b)(2)High Kandahar. The aircraft returned to the Deh Rawod area and exfiltrated the (b)(2)High elements back to Kandahar. [Encl. 6, at p. 3, §5.A.(3); Encl. 30, at p. 3.]

2-400 CASUALTIES AND IMMEDIATE ACTION

2-401. There is no record of U.S. or AMF casualties during or as a consequence of OFT.

2-402. [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High At the first AAA site visited, rubble from the compound prevented an inspection. At the second site visited, the [redacted] (b)(2)High did not locate any AAA weapons or brass residue. During the initial field interrogations the local citizens refused to reveal any information related to AAA sites. Later several admitted that AAA was fired at U.S. aircraft. [Encl. 1, at pp. 139, 155, 159, and 270; Encl. 6, at p. 3; Encl. 30, at p. 6.]

2-403. Village elders admitted to [redacted] (b)(2)High that people within the village had regularly fired at aircraft using AK's, RPK's, DShK's but not with weapons larger than 23mm. In fact, village elders acknowledged holding a local Shura (town meeting) the day prior to the incident to discuss firing weapons into the air during weddings and firing at aircraft. At the Shura the elders agreed that they needed to stop personnel from firing at aircraft. [Encl. 1, at pp. 163 and 309.]

2-400-A Elements within the Deh Rawod village were routinely engaging U.S./Coalition aircraft when they saw or heard aircraft overhead. [FF 1-105a; FF 1-307; FF 2-269; FF 2-403.]

2-400-B AAA was fired at U.S. aircraft during OFT. [FF 2-104 to 2-105; FF 2-207; FF 2-230; FF 2-401 – 2-402; FF 3-208.]

2-404. [redacted] (b)(2)High encountered about 150 upset villagers claiming that a wedding party had been attacked resulting in a large number of non-combatant casualties. They claimed these casualties were mostly women and children and included 120 dead. They claimed that U.S. aircraft engaged the wedding party after they had fired traditional celebratory fire. [Encl. 1, at p. 267; Encl. 26, at pp. 3-4; Encl. 28, at p. 5.]

2-405. [redacted] (b)(2)High viewed casualties at [redacted] (b)(2)High. He stated that it appeared as if a celebration, such as a wedding, had been taking place at the location based on the festive attire the people were wearing. [Encl. 1, at pp. 266 and 269; Encl. 26, at pp. 2 and 4.]

2-406. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a
[Encl. 23, at pp.12-13 and 16-18.]

2-400-C [redacted] (b)(2)High struck a co-located social gathering of approximately 25 people, including women and children. [FF 2-226 to 227; FF 2-242; FF 2-404 to 405.]

2-407. [redacted] (b)(2)High [redacted] discovered that there were casualties, apparently from the earlier [redacted] (b)(2)High engagements, in the near vicinity. [redacted] (b)(2)High visited three separate sites and viewed a total of 34 dead persons. At the first site ([redacted] (b)(2)High), the team viewed 9 dead persons (4 adult women, 1 adult male, 2 female children, and 2 male children). At the second site ([redacted] (b)(2)High 163 – described as a cemetery), the team viewed 8 dead persons (four adult women, 3 female children, and 1 person of unknown gender/age). At the third site ([redacted] (b)(2)High), the team viewed 17 dead persons (16 women and children and 1 adult male. The U.S. forces in the vicinity immediately provided treatment to the Afghan wounded persons including life-saving medical treatment to 18 injured persons at Kakrak Village and requested MEDEVAC for four severely injured children. [Encl. 1, pp. 165, 167, 266, and 268; Encl. 6, at p. 3; Encl. 28, at pp.8 and 17; Encl. 30, at p. 6; Figure 2-5.]

2-408. Upon arrival at the village of Syahsang, [redacted] (b)(2)High established a checkpoint at Blocking Position North. Throughout the day, approximately 80-100 vehicles passed through the checkpoint. Many of the vehicles coming from the north carried injured persons. As more and more vehicles began to flow in to the checkpoint, [redacted] (b)(2)High allowed approximately 20 injured civilians in the beds of pickup trucks to pass through the established checkpoint to seek medical care at local medical facilities. Of the injured personnel, almost all were women and small children with serious shrapnel injuries. Only two were adult males with shrapnel wounds. All the injuries were believed to have been sustained at the village of Syahsang. [Encl. 28, at pp. 8-10.]

2-400-D Wounded individuals were not prevented from receiving necessary medical attention. However the North blocking position had a traffic backup as they inspected each vehicle passing through. This could have been perceived as U.S. forces "delaying" injured persons from going to the clinics. [FF 2-408.]

2-400-E The immediate action of the [redacted] (b)(2)High the opening of the Blocking Position North for movement of the injured, and the request for MEDEVAC for four injured children contributed to minimizing loss of life and limb. [FF 2-407.]

2-409. Kakraka Clinic No. 1 claims to have cared for 96 patients the night of the incident. Of these, the Clinic claims that 1 died, 3 were released after care, and 90 were referred to hospitals in the city of Kandahar. Kakraka Clinic/Pharmacy No. 2 claims to have treated 3 infants, 4 adult females, and 1 adult male for wounds of undetermined origin and intensity. These claims, however, cannot be verified due to the lack of detailed medical records maintained at the Clinics. [Encl. 26, at p. 3.]




Figure 2-5: Locations U.S. Force Encountered Dead/Injured

2-410. It is likely that those less severely injured or with minor injuries sought care at home or with relatives. [Encl. 1, at p. 324.]

2-411. U.S. forces engaged in OFT were only able to confirm at least 50 wounded. [Encl. 28, at pp. 9 and 17; Encl. 32, at p. 3.]

2-412. The Afghan Government and the U.S. military did not provide transportation to these injured individuals referred to hospitals in Kandahar. These individuals were transported by private means. Only thirty patients were evaluated at the Mirwais Hospital in Kandahar. Of these, three patients were noted to be dead on arrival to the hospital. Eighteen patients were admitted for care. [Encl. 33, at pp. 2-5.]

2-413. Initially, villagers claimed up to 250 dead and 600 injured in the U.S. air strikes. However, a village elder admitted that only 20-25% of the 250 claimed to be killed/injured were actually killed/injured. [Encl. 1, at pp. 271 and 279; Encl. 35, at p. 1.]

2-414. The Afghan government presented a report listing 48 dead and 117 wounded as a result of OFT. This report may contain names of individuals killed or injured prior to the incident. [Encl. 1, at p. 320; Encl. 34, at pp. 1-4]

2-415. The Oruzgan provincial governor, Jon Mohammed has stated the list is accurate and complete. [Encl. 17, at p. 4.]

2-416. The Afghani list dated 07 July 2002, includes 48 named dead individuals of whom there were 5 adult males, 13 adult females, and 30 children. The list includes 117 wounded individuals of whom there were 15 adult males, 15 adult females, and 87 children. (Children are defined as individuals below the age of 16 years of age.) The actual names of adult females and female children wounded or killed are not given. According to Afghan custom, they are referred to simply as "daughter of..." or "wife of..." etc. Tracking and verification of this list is impossible according to the U.S. Embassy. [Encl. 1; at pp. 320-22; Encl. 34, at pp. 1-4.]

2-417. Afghan custom is to bury their dead within 24 hours or before the next sunset. Priority for burial is males over the age of sixteen. [Encl. 1, at p. 322]

2-418. Afghan officials do not maintain birth, death or wedding records regarding Afghan citizens. [Encl. 1, at pp. 321-22.]

2-400-F Initial reports of mass casualties were greatly exaggerated. [FF 2-413 to 2-414.]

2-400-G Combining (b)(2)High and local medical clinics' accounting, there were 38 dead and 104 individuals injured. [FF 2-409; FF 2-416]

2-400-H It is likely there were additional individuals injured as a consequence of OFT and sustained injuries of a less severe nature not requiring advanced medical care. It is also reasonable to assume more dead than were observed based on Afghani culture and traditions. [FF 2-410; FF 2-417 to 2-418.]

2-400-I The Afghan government list cannot be verified by U.S. standards of proof, but is considered accurate and complete by regional government officials to include Governor Jon Mohammed. [FF 2-411; FF 2-415; FF 3-102 to 3-103.]

2-419. Because of cultural sensitivity, an (b)(2)High conducted any necessary searches of women. No women were physically abused or detained as a result of these searches. [Encl. 1, at p. 270.]

2-420. After a report of theft (pistol, money, and drugs), a thorough search of (b)(2)High personnel under the supervision of USSF personnel with the (b)(2)High present, failed to reveal any stolen items. A reported stolen pistol (Makarov) had been previously turned over to the District Commissioner and 3 bags of opium turned over to the District Chief. [Encl. 1, at pp. 270, 316-17; Encl. 28, at pp. 4, 6-7.]

2-400-J There is no evidence of abuse of women and children or theft of money, weapons or drugs. [FF 2-419 to 2-420.]

SECTION 3—POST-EXECUTION OF OPERATION FULL THROTTLE

3-100 FACT-FINDING TEAM OBSERVATIONS

3-101. Following the execution of OFT, the [redacted (b)(2)High] sent a fact-finding team to Deh Rawod to gather evidence. The team visited Deh Rawod from 3 to 4 JUL 02. The team attempted to visit each of the targeted sites, but was only able to visit [redacted (b)(2)High] the sites of the claimed civilian casualties. The fact-finding team also visited two local medical clinics. The team collected pieces of shrapnel and shell casings, and took photographs of the target sites visited. Through interpreters, the team spoke with area residents to hear their accounts of the events of 30 June/1 July. [Encl. 26, at pp. 2-3.]

3-102. A number of factors hindered evidence gathering by the fact-finding team; including, the lapse of time between the conclusion of OFT and their arrival in Deh Rawod; the failure of the villagers to preserve the scene; difficult terrain and the lack of helpful guides; and the local Islamic tradition of burying the dead within 24 hours. [Encl. 26, at p. 2.]

3-103. Because of these hindrances, the team was unable to confirm the total number of dead and wounded as a result of OFT. The team tried to find evidence to support the totals by looking for gravesites and by visiting clinics. In this regard, the team was shown five grave sites, all of which appeared to be older than the three days which had elapsed since the attack. [Encl. 26, at p. 6.]

3-104. The team asked to see where the wedding party was at the first house. The wedding party was supposedly in the courtyard. The courtyard was a small courtyard and the team was told there were up to three hundred people there. However, the courtyard was "starting to get cramped" when the fact-finding party of thirty-five entered the courtyard. [Encl. 1, at p. 271; Encl. 35, at p. 1.]

3-100-A The allegation that hundreds of people were present at [redacted (b)(2)High] [redacted (b)(2)High] may have been an exaggeration. [FF 2-226 to 2-228; FF 3-104.]

3-105. During its visit, the fact-finding team noted that the compounds struck showed no signs of being occupied as compared to the significant evidence of occupation in nearby compounds. For example, at the incident sites, there was nothing hanging on the walls and the ground had been recently raked. [Encl. 1, at pp. 274 and 318; Encl. 26, at p. 3; Encl. 35, at p. 1.]

3-106. At [redacted (b)(2)High] the team found two piles of belt-fed RPK rounds, which are larger than AK-47 rounds that are commonly used during celebratory fire. [Encl. 26, at p. 2]

3-100-B [(b)(2)High] *may have been "sterilized" after the air strikes to remove evidence of AAA fire.* [FF 3-105 to 3-106.]

3-107. At the Kakraka Clinic, the team found a six by thirty foot mural in reddish-purple ink that depicted ground personnel using AAA to shoot down helicopters and aircraft. Initially, the locals claimed that the mural was from the Soviet occupation. After further investigation revealed that the mural was freshly painted with berries, remnants of which were found beneath the painting, the locals stated that children had drawn the mural. However, the height of the mural exceeded six feet. [Encl. 1, at pp. 278 and 323-324.]

3-100-C *The mural depicted AAA fire at U.S. aircraft and was drawn after U.S. forces engaged targets in Deh Rawod during OFT.* [FF 3-107.]

3-108. The fact-finding team concluded that civilians were killed or injured as a result of OFT, but that the full scope of the incident could not be verified. The fact-finding team recommended a formal investigation be conducted as soon as possible. [Encl. 26, at p. 6.]

3-100-D *Non-combatants were killed or injured as a result of OFT.* [FF 2-226 to 227; FF 2-242; FF 3-108.]

3-200 TARGET SITE VISIT OBSERVATIONS

3-201. On 24 July 2002, selected members of the Investigation Board, along with representatives of the U.S. Embassy, Kabul, and Major Generals Karimi and Haigari, Afghan Observers selected by President Karzai, traveled to Deh Rawod to conduct a site visit. The site visit team visited (b)(2)High the same two sites that the CJTF180 fact-finding team had visited earlier in the month. After talking with local residents, examining the buildings, and taking photographs of the sites, the team was able to reach the following conclusions. [Encl. 17, at 1.]

(b)(2)High

3-202. The team confirmed that this was the targeted site (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 17, at 1.]

3-203. The team also positively identified battle damage consistent with (b)(2)High impacts within the courtyard portion of the (b)(2)High compound. [Encl. 17, at 1.]

3-204. Moreover, the team was able to confirm that the engaged target was the site of the claimed casualties, and that no casualties or damage were claimed to have resulted from the air strike to a smaller compound approximately 10 meters to the north/northeast. [Encl. 17, at 2.]

(b)(2)High

3-205. The team confirmed that this was the targeted site by matching (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a [Encl. 17, at 3.]

3-206. The team also positively identified battle damage consistent with (b)(2)High impacts within the courtyard portion of the (b)(2)High compound and the tree line to the southeast of the compound. [Encl. 17, at 3.]

3-207. The team was also able to confirm that the engaged target was the site of the claimed casualties, and that no casualties or damage were claimed to have resulted from the single round that impacted in an adjacent compounds. [Encl. 17, at 3.]

3-208. A resident of this compound claimed that there were no AQ/TB present and that a wedding celebration was being conducted at the time of the air strikes. This resident admitted that there was shooting (i.e., implying celebratory fire). Another resident of the area stated that the residents of the area were firing AK-47s while celebrating a wedding in the compound. The resident stated that five people died (2 women, 3 men) and 35 were injured as a result of the (b)(2)High engagement. All of the people who became casualties were inside the compound. [Encl. 17, at 4.]

3-209. The Board President and the two Afghan generals were separated from the team and attended a Shura with the Regional Governor, District leaders, and village elders. Little was discussed concerning the incident. Four areas were of their concern: (1) President Karzai's protection; (2) coordination of future operations with regional governors; (3) respect for Afghan culture when handling their people; and (4) and release of detainees they consider innocent. [Encl 17, at 4.]

SECTION 4—CONCLUSIONS

4-A (Causal) Active AAA (12.7-23mm) weapons at [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High **fired into the air in close proximity to helicopter landing zones and objective areas and while U.S. aircraft were overhead.**

[redacted] (b)(2)High

4-B (Causal) An [redacted] (b)(2)High engaged these surface-to-air fires [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High

The Board concludes that the use of force by the [redacted] (b)(2)High
[redacted] (b)(2)High

The Board further concludes that the use of force was proportionate to the threat posed by the multiple AAA sites and their associated personnel. Failure to engage these sites with such force would have put the infiltration of [redacted] (b)(2)High forces by [redacted] (b)(2)High and the follow-on Cordon & Search operation at risk.

4-C (Causal) Women and children were in close proximity to the active surface-to-air fires and were killed/injured by ordnance from the [redacted] (b)(2)High

The Board concludes that an indeterminate number of non-combatants were killed or injured during OFT. It cannot be determined how many of the dead and injured were in proximity to the target because they were actively involved in combatant activities or in direct support of combatant/terrorist activities as opposed to those who became casualties because of their innocent proximity to a legitimate military target. The presence of a significant number of women and children at locations from which AAA fire originated resulted in the unfortunate loss of life.

Although it is impossible to develop an accurate list of non-combatants killed or injured during OFT, the Board concludes that there were at least 38 persons killed and over 104 persons injured. It is likely there were additional individuals who sustained injuries of a less severe nature not requiring advanced medical care. It is also reasonable to assume more dead than were observed, based on Afghani culture and traditions. These reasonable assumptions could therefore support the Afghan government's claim that 48 persons were killed and 117 injured during OFT.

The immediate action of U.S. medical personnel and the MEDEVAC of four severely injured children contributed to minimizing the loss of life and limb.

Ultimately, however, the responsibility for all innocent casualties lies with those who willfully put non-combatants at risk by engaging U.S. aircraft with AAA weapons intentionally deployed in residential areas.

4-D

(b)(2)High, (b)(5)

(b)(2)High, (b)(5)

SECTION 5—RECOMMENDATIONS

Primary Recommendations

5-A USCENTCOM consider the Afghan list of dead and injured during this operation as accurate and complete. U.S. Forces on scene confirmed there were at least 34 dead and over 50 injured. It is impossible to develop a true and accurate list of non-combatants killed or injured. The Afghan government list cannot be verified by U.S. standards of proof such as birth, death, or wedding documentation, but is considered accurate and complete by the regional Afghani government officials.

5-B [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High, (b)(5)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High, (b)(5)

5-C The practice of firing weapons at aircraft, or at the sound of aircraft, will continue to be interpreted as a hostile act and military force to engage those fires will be warranted if the fires present a threat to U.S. aircraft or personnel. This fact must be promulgated to the Afghan populace by all means possible so that this type of incident can be avoided in the future. Nonetheless, even with an extensive collateral damage deliberation, non-combatants in and around active AAA pieces may become casualties.

Additional Recommendations

5-D The [redacted] (b)(2)High should be [redacted] (b)(2)High as follows:
• [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High, (b)(5)
• [redacted]

5-E The [redacted] (b)(2)High requires [redacted] (b)(2)High as follows:
• [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High, (b)(5)
• [redacted]

Page 65 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2)High, (b)(5)