

it over the bridge, as well as the Humvees, and had gone into a defensive position, trying to maintain disbursement. We started taking small arms fires and I believe indirect fire. The first time that I became aware of any type of aircraft was the first strafing run that hit right directly, like I said, my track was facing east looking over the road. The strafing run hit directly on the left-hand side of my track and came from west to east. Right before that strafing run I heard in the air, a sound that was like ***** like that. Real quick, like that. Soon after that, just kicked up right along side. That first run, I didn't see anyone hurt at all. I was up in the TC hatch, about right here. I was trying to see where my guys were aligned in the back. There were guys getting in and out of the tracks and no one was sure. They were loading them up to get the medevacs out of there and we were all loading up, but that's initially where I was stationed. At that point, this whole time I was trying to get the guys aligned as well as trying to get the medevac for Lt (b)(6) 'At that point, and I don't know who passed through on the air but someone said fire (b)(1)1.4a Now, (b)1.4a it was briefed to us before the whole campaign started, that's the 1st MEF signal for friendly fire. You have friendly forces out here. At that point, (b)1.4a , About two minutes later, three minutes later I hear the same thing. The ***** in the air, but this time Lt (b)(6) had come around to the left-hand side of my track with a bunch of Marines, either in his platoon or my platoon, they were mixed. Also a couple of casualties and they were loading them onto our track and the track to the very left of me. If I'm not mistaken, it was SSgt (b)(6) track, which is my platoon commander. He was in 203. At that time, when the next strafing run came down, the strafing run actually hit the track. It went right across the track, still coming from west to east and it started kicking up on the track. I ducked my head down like that and it just kicked right over us. To this day, I still don't know how I didn't get hit. At that point, I looked up, looked to my left I though I saw Lt (b)(6) I thought he might have gotten hit, but he

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got up. Then I looked a little bit closer down in my track and there was a Marine looking up at me and he had sustained major injuries to his lower back and to his legs too. He was trying to mouth to me, I can't walk. So I took the helmet off, jumped down, picked him up, walked him up. I went around to the back of my track which was, if I'm facing west, was on the east side, so away from the road. At that point it was pretty much the worst thing I'd ever seen in my life.

COL (b)(6) Do you know who this Marine was?

LT (b)(6) See, that's the thing...I don't know. I'd never seen him before. My background, I'd just checked into the company at the end of November from IOC so, even on ship and coming over here to Camp Shoop, I was still trying to learn everyone's names. I did pretty well, but this Marine, looking at him, I didn't know who he was. He had some blood on his face too, so that could have hindered it. But I went around in the back of my track there, I want to say three to four injured Marines, two of them really injured, and a couple of other Marines just trying to load, just (b)(6) into the track. At this point, we were loading the Marines in the track. I loaded that Marine I had helped over. I picked another Marine up, I thought he might have been (b)(6) but I realize now that he was probably (b)(6) He was just (b)(6) I picked him up and put him in there. There were other Marines loading them into the tracks. Once I, once we loaded all the Marines in, I got back in the TC hatch and the guy in the back told me that we were up. I had heard my other two tracks were up. I got from my platoon sergeant we were up in his track, and at that time we pushed back into the city. The only other thing of friendly fire I can say after that is back going through the city, we were strafed again. I'll tell you right now, I don't know if it was the A-10 or if it was some other sort of indirect fire we may have taken but I know that we were strafed from above. So it had to have been indirect

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fire or some kind of air asset. After that our tractor got hit with an RPG round. It got taken out. After that I didn't hear anything else about the A-10 until...when my tractor got taken out, a bunch of us jumped off that tractor and there was another one hauling back right next to us and they stopped and we tried to load as many on that tractor as possible. Once we got on that tractor we went back in, further south to the city and the tractor we were on at this point was just completely packed with casualties, and Marines from all platoons of the company. And the driver was stopping and starting cause we were being bracketed by mortars at the time. At that point we stopped off in the middle of the city. We got out. Myself and I think SSgt (b)(6) was in that track, and Sgt (b)(6) was with my section, my AAV section, he was in my track too, the one that got hit with RPG. We got out, we went over to another track to see if it was open so we could put some casualties on that so we could get them to the rear. We opened it up. There were a couple of trackers in one of the other tracks. There was also a number of tracks from Alpha Company and some tanks right in this part of the city where we had congregated. We got in there. As soon as we got into that track, I heard one of the tracks, one of the AV guys talking on the radio to PALE HORSE 3, which was Lt (b)(6) call sign and he was saying trying to give him the call sign for the air. This guy didn't know it, I had a CEOI in my left breast pocket and so I told him, hey I know it. At that point, I tried to get it across to...I said PALE HORSE 3, this is PALE HORSE 1, I'm trying to get with CEOI.

TAPE RUNS OUT.

COL (b)(6) OK, state your name again.

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LT (b)(6) 2nd Lt (b)(6) At that point just hearing from him listening to Lt (b)(6) on the radio, he was trying to talk to anyone to shut the air off at this point. A lot of other people were trying to get through, but his comm., it seemed to be the best. He was the one who eventually got through. I don't know how much else you want to hear, in terms of my involvement with the friendly air, but that's all I have on that. There's nothing else with the friendly air, but I can tell you at least my part, for the rest of the day.

COE (b)(6) I've got most of that stuff. I've been out here for three or four days. In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

LT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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12 April 2003, 20:30 L

Interview with First Sergeant [REDACTED] (b)(6)

COL [REDACTED] (b)(6) Would you please state your name, rank, social security number and your billet.

1st SGT [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6), my rank is... I'm a First Sergeant [REDACTED] (b)(6) I'm the company First Sergeant for Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines, my social security number is XXX-XX-XXXX.

COL [REDACTED] (b)(6) My name is Colonel [REDACTED] (b)(6) and under the direction of board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation which may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

1st SGT [REDACTED] (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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COL (b)(6) Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

1st SGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir, I do.

COL (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

1st SGT (b)(6) I do.

COL (b)(6) OK, First Sergeant would you please walk me through what transpired on the 23rd of March as your company began to cross the northern bridge in An Nasiriyah?

1st SGT (b)(6) OK, me, Sir, as First Sergeant for the company, I'm located in the last track, which is the end of the column for the company which is the track designated for medevac. I was the last track that crossed the bridge. Once we got on the other side of the bridge, north bridge that it...let me back up a little bit. Right before we crossed the bridge, two tracks in front of me that track got hit by RPG twice. The Marines managed to go ahead and keep pushing it the track all the way across the bridge to the north side of the ...and about 100 meters after that he stopped, they dropped their ramp and Marines they start to get out of there and the Marine that was driving the track, his name was Sgt (b)(6) He (b)(6) right then and there. He got out of the track, (b)(6) Right off the bat, we start getting hit by mortar rounds, which, I'm sorry 81 millimeter mortar rounds and the reason I

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know that is my background is a mortar man and my first 12 and a half years in the Marine Corps, I was a mortar man. So we start receiving mortar rounds 60s 81s and also seems to be artillery rounds, and two days later, I find out that actually there were artillery rounds landing in our pos. Also from the east side and west side, past the bridge we're receiving small arms fire and also RPGs. Once we cross the bridge, give or take, it was about 1230 and probably lasted about three hours give or take, maybe three and a half hours.

COL (b)(6) 12:30 local?

1st SGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. 12:30 local. What I remember is the Marines got out of the tracks and start getting hit with small arms and mortar rounds and the first thing I heard was Corpsman and First Sergeant and I just started running everywhere. Went to the east side of the bridge, which I, we had a Marine that was injured. Basically wound shots to the legs and one to the shoulder, and then right away I grab him and put him in the medevac trac and I hear my name called again, and I had to run across the street to the west side of the bridge where I got this other Marine, which was Lt (b)(6) and Cpl (b)(6), I grabbed those two Marines and took them across the street again to the east side of the bridge and put them in the medevac track. I then got inside the track, called back to the battalion and talked to TIMBERWOLF.

COL (b)(6) And TIMBERWOLF is?

1st SGT (b)(6) TIMBERWOLF is the battalion commander, but when I made that call, it was Capt (b)(6) which is the S3Alpha right now. I asked for a medevac request and I told him that it was urgent and I needed a helo. I also let him know about the LZ was hot so to be aware of

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that. He asked me for the grid coordinates, which at that time, I didn't have with me and I told him I would call him right back. I got off the track to look to my map and right away, we got hit, my medevac track got hit with an RPG. I don't know if you had a chance to look at that or not, but the track been repaired, but it has a hole where it got hit, and I also got hit by about two or three 60 mortar rounds. The track was disabled. A lot of Marines were, well one of the lieutenants... a lot of Marines were saying First Sergeant, get these Marines out of here and get them back across the bridge going south. I think at that time I know it was, it seemed kind of far, everyone was kind of nervous, I think I was a little nervous but I know I showed I was in control, so deep inside my mind I say I'm not doing that, that's suicidal cause you know what happened when we came through that and everyone shooting at the tracks so I said we're not doing that. What I did, was I got the Marines out of there cause we're receiving fire and you can see and you can hear when they fire the RPGs. The sound, the whistle and sound and you see them coming. I'm glad for I guess they can't shoot anyways but a lot of the RPGs they weren't detonating. They were just landing, and they were going by us. I saw one coming right straight to our track. It hit the back bounced off and landed about 40 yards away and never exploded. So I decided to get the Marines out, out of the track with one of my sergeants, who's a training NCO, so he's located in the same track with me, so he's like my right hand man for the medevacs. His name is Sgt (b)(6). So me and Sgt (b)(6) took the five casualties out of there and took them across the street to the west side of the bridge. Actually was to the east side of the bridge and set them down. At that time I grabbed SSgt (b)(6) | SSgt (b)(6) is the platoon sergeant for the mortar section. I grab him. Actually he was section leader at that time, he's platoon sergeant now. But I grabbed him so he could help me with the casualties cause everyone was calling my name, because there were more casualties everywhere. Also when I got those Marines out of their tracks and

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bringing them across the street that's when Lt (b)(6) got hit one more time and also Sgt (b)(6) got hit one more time. Second time they got hit.

COL (b)(6), What did they get hit with?

1st SGT (b)(6): They got hit with RPGs, Sir. Put him right there on the west side of the bridge, right by the ditch there. I put them all there with a corpsman and SSgt (b)(6) I looked to my right and started walking to my right where the, it was about 50 to 70 yards away going north on the west side of the bridge. One of the mortar pos, SSgt (b)(6), Cpl (b)(6) and LCpl (b)(6) And when I got there they were just pumping rounds out. I took a knee and this is exactly the words that came out of the SSgt's mouth, hey First Sergeant we're in a shit sandwich. I said, yes SSgt we are. And at that time I only spoke to him only about 30 seconds. I was kneeling down beside him and at that time SSgt (b)(6) who I left with the five casualties called me, First Sergeant, First Sergeant you need to get back over here, I don't think Sgt (b)(6) is going to make it. So I got up and start walking back towards the bridge, which was about 50 to 75 yards away. I walk probably half way there, about 40 yards already, I hear the A-10. The reason I know it's an A-10 is because I know the sound that he makes once he fires the gun and also I can see it.

COL (b)(6) You say you can see it. Where do you see it? Where was it moving from?

1st SGT (b)(6) It was moving from southwest past the bridge to northeast. So I have already walked about 40 yards towards Sgt (b)(6) with the five casualties, with SSgt (b)(6) because they had called me. They were thinking he wasn't going to make it so, I start walking down there.

That's when I hear the A-10 and I heard the sound of the guns and I look up. The first time I didn't see it, that's when SSgt (b)(6) had got hit. That's when I knew it was the plane cause you can hear it flying low, I don't know how low. I heard when the guns fired. All I did was put my head down with my head and hands facing away from SSgt (b)(6) You can hear the rounds hit the ground, exploding and give or take maybe 30 seconds after that. I'm not sure 30 seconds to a minute, probably 30 seconds. The second run which I believe probably his wingman. I'm not sure if they work in pairs or not. I'm not too familiar how they work, but maybe it was his wingman. At that time the second one, the second run went and the rounds exploded. Then I looked to my right again and I was just talking to him, and I looked over there and saw they were laying down on the ground.

COL (b)(6) How many? Who was laying down?

1st SGT (b)(6) There was three of them, but I think five of them got hit. The three Marines for sure, that I just talked to them a minute or so before, SSgt (b)(6), Cpl (b)(6) and LCpl

(b)(6) I look over there and I see them laying down so I walk there and one of the things that amazed me was that (b)(6) SSgt (b)(6) I look at him and (b)(6)

(b)(6)

I look at Cpl

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

And I know exactly who they were because I was just talking to them. I think I know every Marine in my company. I've been in the battalion 3 years 3 months now.

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COL (b)(6) You say there were two other Marines?

1st SGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. What I did, I (b)(6)

(b)(6) and I said somebody give me a poncho. My sergeant, was with me, Sgt (b)(6) he brought me three ponchos and I put them on top of the (b)(6) I turn around and about 15 yards away there was another Marine, his name was Cpl (b)(6) Cpl (b)(6) was also (b)(6) at the side of the road. I've never... a few minutes before that when I was talking to him I never saw Cpl (b)(6) He's also in that platoon but he's a machine gunner. He's not a mortar man so, I don't know where he was coming from because it was chaos. People running everywhere. We had tracks just pulling to the side of the road, Marines just got out and started running. So (b)(6) was the other one right beside the road. I put a poncho on him too. I'm not exactly sure if he got hit by the plane or not. What I know for sure, and there's no doubt in my mind at all, that those other three Marines were Sir, I know they got hit by the plane. Cause those were the only rounds that hit at that time. Everything happened so fast, and I just happened to be right there. When I looked, it was right there, it was them. The other Marine was, the fifth Marine, he was Lt (b)(6); Lt (b)(6) I was, say this is the bridge right here going this way, and this is the center of the road... this is east and this is west. Lt (b)(6) was (b)(6) centered in the road. A lot of people... cause I found the body and I tell how I find the body people saying yeah he got hit by an A-10. But I can't really say because I'm not an expert in ammunitions. The only thing I can say is how I find his body. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

(b)(6) The other thing that I can say about where I found his body is a lot of black round spots like powder, like something burned there but there was no damage to the floor, to the concrete. Just a big black spot, like powder. And that's the only thing I can say. Once again I can honestly say, I don't know if he got hit by the A-10 or not, but those' (b)(6)

(b)(6) about 15 yards, about 10 more yards to the center of the road was Lt

(b)(6)

COL (b)(6) Go back for one second. You mentioned that there were originally five Marines over by the tree that were killed.

1st SGT (b)(6) No, I was talking about five casualties.

COL (b)(6) 'So there were only three mortar men over there.

1st SGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. It was just three mortar men over there, which was SSgt (b)(6) Cpl

(b)(6) , and LCpl (b)(6) That was the only three. The other damage that happened right there was the mortar itself. I don't know if you got a chance to see it yet, but we got it in a box...if you want to look at it later on. It's from the rounds that got hit, all kind of damage to the...

COL (b)(6) You were still taking small arms, mortar, artillery, and RPG fire?

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1st SGT (b)(6) : Yes, Sir. Yes, I was, but not right there and then. Right there the only attack we were taking is the A-10, Sir. But as we...were walking from left to right at the side of the road, we kept receiving mortar rounds and artillery and all that. What else I was going to say? The other thing that, I don't know...with the three bodies that got hit...there were a bunch of rounds that I believe, once again, I don't know if they were shot by the A-10 but, when we show them to the other Marines, the CO, and the company Gunney and all that, they assure me that it was from a...it was the type of rounds that an A-10 fires. I still got a few that I kept with me in case you want one.

COL (b)(6) : I have one. Let me grab it.

1st SGT (b)(6) : That's the one. Yes.

COL (b)(6) : I've got round that somebody's given me. Is this the type of round that you found at the scene?

1st SGT (b)(6) : Yes, Sir. There were lots all over where the bodies were laying down there.

COL (b)(6) : This is the same type of round?

1st SGT (b)(6) : The same type of round. Yes, Sir. What else, Sir? Later on, well it seems liked everything happened in minutes, but now I realize about 3 – 3 1/2 hours. To be honest with you, I thought everything last about 15 minutes, but that's not the case. Later on we had more casualties, Cpl (b)(6) and Cpl (b)(6), which I brought in with the casualties, but somehow they

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end up...they got put up in a track, I believe by Lt (b)(6) which is his platoon commander, and those two Marines belonged to him. I remember saying, he was one of our Marines who came up to me and said First Sergeant, we need to put this Marine in a track and send him down south cross the bridge, and I said, I'm not doing that, Sir. I already called for a medevac. It's coming. Somebody's coming to get us. They're not going nowhere. So that was said and then later on I find out that he had grabbed his two Marines and put them in a track and went back. They made it. Three of the tracks happened to go back. I don't know who took the initiative to send those troops back, right now nobody knows how they got back. Maybe it was on the crewchief or whatever, initiative to go back and those tracks crossed the bridge heading down south and that's when they got hit. A lot of Marines ended up getting killed because two of those tracks belonged to the mortar men and was there a lot of mortar rounds, HE rounds, HP rounds and once the stuff caught on fire they were getting burned inside the tracks.

COL (b)(6) How many total? Eight, ten runs occurred, total?

1st SGT (b)(6) To my knowledge, Sir, that I remember, four. Four runs plus with the wingman, eight times. That's what I can recall.

COL (b)(6) Do you know of any other injuries or deaths, other than those you just spoke of, from the A-10s?

1st SGT (b)(6) No. That's probably the only ones that were caused by the A-10. And like I said, I mentioned the dead Marines before, but for sure of those I can say three of them were caused by one of the runs.

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COL (b)(6) Did you see any (b)(1)1.4a Anything that was (b)(1)1.4a in the zone to try to cease the fire from the A-10s?

1st SGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. At one time, my gunney sergeant, 1st Sgt (b)(6) he (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a which is supposed to mean friendlies, or cease fire. Also the police sergeant (b)(1)1.4a There were two other ones that I seen (b)(1)1.4a but I don't know who did that.

COL (b)(6) What were the winds like? Do you recall what the winds were like?

1st SGT (b)(6) Not really, Sir.

COL (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

1st SGT (b)(6) They went up, not straight up, but kind of angled up towards the...I know for a fact the one that my company gunney fired, fired towards the plane, when the plane was coming.

COL (b)(6) And how high will those (b)(1)1.4a

1st SGT (b)(6) They go pretty high, Sir. Give or take, (b)(1)1.4a

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COL

(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

ground?

Easily discernable by you on the

1st SGT

(b)(6)

I say, spread for about 30 or 50 yards maybe. Probably about that much. I don't know what else...

COL

(b)(6)

In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

1st SGT

(b)(6)

Yes, Sir. I understand.

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12 April 2003

Interview with GYSGT

(b)(6)

COL (b)(6) Please state your name, rank, social security number and your organization.

GYSGT (b)(6) My name is (b)(6) I'm a Gunnery Sergeant in Charlie Company 1/2. I'm the Company Gunnery Sergeant for Charlie Company. My social security number is XXX-XX-XXXX.

COL (b)(6) My name is Colonel (b)(6) and under the direction of board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate from any other investigation which may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public.

Additionally, the chain of command will review the report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

GYSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. I do.

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COL (b)(6) Finally, do you understand that you're being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire incident and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

GYSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. I do.

COL (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

GYSGT (b)(6) I do.

COL (b)(6) OK, Gunney. We'll pick it up when Charlie Company crossed over the north bridge. If you would relate to me, in your own words, what transpired once you began crossing the north bridge.

GYSGT (b)(6) OK. Coming up to the north bridge, we were receiving small arms fire the entire way through the town. Once we'd crossed over the bridge, I was in a Humvee following my company. There were 12 Amtracks in front of me. I had 3 Humvees. My Humvee was behind the rear Amtrack. I had a LAD attachment, stinger guys right behind me. I had my second company vehicle with my police sergeant. They were taking up the rear. As we roll across the bridge, things are starting to get pretty ugly down there. There's mortars going off, arty going off, and there's RPGs flying all over the place. There's still a heavy amount of small arms and machine gun fire. Once we cross over the bridge, as soon as I can get, I guess,

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200-300 meters from the bridge, our Amtracks start to peel off, into a herringbone. Some of them head off on the right side of the road, on the east side and some pull off on the west side of the road.

COL (b)(6) Do you know how many were on either side?

GYSGT (b)(6) I couldn't tell you. It happened so quick. I was assuming it was pretty much close to half and half. I couldn't tell you an actual number. As the last track peeled off, it peeled off to the right and I looked at the banks. The road was on both sides pretty steep and I decided it was too steep to try to pull the Humvees off the road, so I told my driver. We stopped our Humvees on the road. All three Humvees stopped and we jumped out of the vehicles and we slid down the berm.

COL (b)(6) And which side were you on?

GYSGT (b)(6) We were on the east side of the road.

COL (b)(6) And you were still taking fire at this time?

GYSGT (b)(6) We're still taking fire, still taking fire. We're on the east side of the road. There was a track up here on the road...I think it was a mortars track...I'm not sure which track it was. Later I found out it was a mortars track, cause it had a lot of HE mortars in it that would continue to go off while it was burning.

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COL (b)(6) Now where was that track again?

GYSGT (b)(6) It was up on the road.

COL (b)(6) Hadn't made the turn left or right?

GYSGT (b)(6) Hadn't made the turn. I don't know if it got off the road and came back then got hit...just eventually it was on the road burning...or beside the road. I can't tell you if it was on the road or beside the road. Mortar rounds just kept blowing up inside it. We were up along the bank here. Another track here that had been hit...I don't know what it was hit with but it started to burn.

COL (b)(6) That was on your side?

GYSGT (b)(6) That was on my side.

COL (b)(6) Eastern side.

GYSGT (b)(6) On the eastern side. I had, myself and all of my police sergeant and at least one of the marines from LAD and a few cats and dogs that had got out of tracks and ended up down there with me.

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COL (b)(6) About what time was this? Do you have any idea?

GYSGT (b)(6) I really couldn't tell you.

COL (b)(6) OK. You were taking fire continually all the way through, so I know you probably lost track of time as that was happening.

GYSGT (b)(6) We were up against a berm and we were trying to get up above the berm so we could establish some fires on some positions. Because from where we were at we couldn't see any muzzle flashes at all. Mortars were walking down to us, arty was blowing up everywhere, RPGs were flying over the tops of our heads. We peeked up over the road, and the road was just littered with small arms just bouncing off of the road, but we still couldn't see a muzzle flash anywhere. It was coming from all over. Fire was hitting on the backside of the berms.

COL (b)(6) From behind you?

GYSGT (b)(6) From behind us. The only place we could see was a building that was still a little bit south to us so we concentrated fires on that building. We don't know if that's where it was coming from. Later on we found out there was positions on up here, north of us. It was on up north but we really couldn't see those positions from where we were at and a lot of our observation of what was going on, was more toward the north was obscured by this burning track down here. I don't know how long we had been there before I seen an aircraft come in. I

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couldn't tell you how long it was. But the aircraft came from east to west and it was rolling pretty much perpendicular to the road, a little bit to the south. We could hear it let it's ordinance go, it's chain gun is what I call it. It went off, and the first thing we thought was, well there goes the bad guys. But that's not what happened. It rained down on top of us. I think they hit this track, and might have hit this track up here, I'm not sure. We were down here close when we got out of the hummers and the track was burning. So I moved all the Marines as far down as we could go, to the south from the vehicles, thinking that if I moved them away from the vehicles then of course the plane wouldn't hit us. After the plane comes by I don't know how long it was before it returns. I don't know if it was two, if it was one, whatever the case might be. But it wasn't too long after that when the plane returned. And the next time he came back he was down here towards the south, where we were at. So we had to turn and run back toward the burning vehicles to dodge him. I guess he made about four or five runs when I got my hands on

a

(b)(1)1.4a

We briefed all the Marines CENTCOM signals

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

I guess about on his

fifth run, I was up by the vehicles and he's coming in.

COL (b)(6) Were these all gun runs do you know?

GYSGT (b)(6) These were...I wasn't sure exactly what kind of ordinance he was firing till talking to people later. Based on the sound and the way that it would hit, it was a rockeye, explodes above the ground. What he would do is he would come in, and I guess, flares would come out the side of it, and I think that's his anti-aircraft system, defense mechanism.

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COL (b)(6) At about what altitude do you think he was at?

GYSGT (b)(6) Gosh...

COL (b)(6) I know, that's hard. How well could you see him?

GYSGT (b)(6) I could see him pretty good.

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a don't know, hard to say...

COL (b)(6) Three or four thousand or so?

GYSGT (b)(6) Or so...I can't be sure.

COL (b)(6) Understand, understand.

GYSGT (b)(6) But he made several runs by this time.

(b)1.4a

and we're sitting there watching him and we're by the burning vehicles and we're just watching to see if he's going to peel off of that and not hit us again. And we're waiting, and we're waiting, and we know he's getting ready to drop his load, so we take off again down back toward the bridge and he hits again. I don't know what came first, whether it was the chain gun or rocket, but we hear a loud sound that would hit and go "whumpf" and it'd just throw dirt and everything else up in the air. We'd hear machine gun rounds hitting the deck and we'd hear the chain gun itself. And then he'd go on over. I kept running back up to the vehicle, cause it was

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still on the road and it was still taking rounds, and I grabbed my radio out of there. I get on the radio and I'm screaming, "Cease the air strikes, cease the air strikes."

COL (b)(6) Do you know what channel, what frequency you were using?

GYSGT (b)(6) I was on Battalion TAC 1, and I'm calling for everyone on there. I can hear people talking on there but nobody answers me, nobody answers me. I'm screaming on there, "Cease the air strikes, cease the air strikes." I guess screamed on there for about a minute, a minute and a half and then I heard one voice come over, which was Lieutenant (b)(6); he's the track commander. He heard me on the radio. I guess he was on the west side of the road. His track was still going and he was still alive. At this time, I had no idea who was dead, who was alive, or what was going on. He tells me he also made that call, cease air strike.

COL (b)(6) Did he get any response?

GYSGT (b)(6) He couldn't tell me then, cause I had to throw the radio down because the A-10 was back again. I had to leave the radio and we had to run back here and duck again to avoid that.

COL (b)(6) And what happened to Lt (b)(6)

GYSGT (b)(6) (b)(6) s still here. I'm not sure if his track got hit by the A-10. But after the A-10 went by, I ran back and got on the radio again. I call for him and I finally get him

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on the mic and he says it's been ceased, the air strike has been ceased. During all of this the mortars, the artillery and the small arms and the machine guns and everything is still on us. I don't know. I guess seven, eight, nine runs he probably made over the top of us. Myself and all of my police sergeants and I think our photographer, he ended up getting there with me somehow, we were all pretty much trapped and about 100 yards to run back and forth. Crossing the road was pretty much out of the question. We'd have got chopped down as soon as we went up the road. _____ finding out where his nose was, and running away from it, trying to avoid the mortars and the small arms and everything going on. In between there, somewhere in between there...I don't know which run he had made, I looked down past this last track and I guess about 75 yards I could see one of my mortar tubes set up. I didn't even know the mortars were set up and that they were even shooting. But I could see one mortar set up, and as I looked down on it, I just glanced at it and then there was a big explosion. The mortar position and the _____ b(6) I don't know b(6) I just know it was a big explosion.

COL (b)(6) Were there people around the mortar when it got hit?

GYSGT (b)(6) There were people around the mortar when it got hit. Shortly after that there was smoke and everything, it was when Lt (b)(6) came walking out of the dust. He was just in a daze and he's walking...

COL (b)(6) Who is Lt (b)(6)

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GYSGT _____ (b)(6) Lt1 (b)(6) is the weapons platoon commander.

COL (b)(6) And where was he located?

GYSGT _____ (b)(6) He was with the FiST track. And at this time I think he was trying to work fires with his mortars.

COL (b)(6) So he was on the east side?

GYSGT (b)(6) So he probably would have been, well, I don't know. He ended up on the east side with me. I don't know where he was at during the ordeal, but he ended up on the east side. He walks past the track and he's walking ...I see him walking. The right side of his (b)(6) he's just black from smoke and stuff. He's just in a daze. I grab him and throw him on the berm and then we try to get a bandage out. So one of the Marines opens up a first aid kit and throws me a bandage. By the time I get it out to patch up his (b)(6) and try to stop some of the bleeding the A-10 comes in right on top of us again. Gotta grab him and run to avoid that. Somewhere throughout this we ended up getting him on one of the medevac tracks to get him out of there.

COL _____ (b)(6) Where was the medevac track?

GYSGT _____ (b)(6) I mean, there was a couple running. I think the first sergeant was on the other side trying to get people in medevac tracks and get them to move and stuff, and then

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one ended up on my side at one point. In between there there was two tracks I saw up on the road. They slowed down as they were going past us, they were medevacs...

COL (b)(6) Going south?

GYSGT (b)(6) Going south. Trying to get the Marines back to the battalion so we could get them out of there. I just looked up over and saw a track got hit somewhere near the bridge, and this was right after the A-10 went over. I heard a Marine screaming at me, gunney, we gotta get on a track...we gotta get out of here. I seen that track got hit, and I said no we ain't getting on a track. We're just going to have to maneuver, but we're not going to get on a track. I guess we were there 3 1/2-4 hours or so, before the first tank rolled across.

COL (b)(6) How many wounded did you have with you there? And how many dead, do you know?

GYSGT (b)(6) At this time, I was not sure because all the dead were on the other side of the burning track. First Sergeant was trying to gather those up and he was placing them in a line right beside the road, so we could gather them up. I had no idea how many people were dead, how many people were wounded. This was like our own little world, piece of area that we had. The other side of the track, we didn't have a clue what was going on. The only thing I knew that went on on the other side of the track was that one mortar position was set up and I seen it go away. Shortly after I saw Lt (b)(6) so I'm assuming that's where he got hit. I'm assuming that's where some of my mortar men got hit as well, including the weapons platoon

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sergeant, SSgt (b)(6) . He was killed right there too. But all in all we shot my police sergeants got a 203. | (b)1.4a

(b)1.4a

COL | (b)(6) And they were still making runs?

GYSGT | (b)(6) They were still making runs...still making runs. We just couldn't get them to shut it off. When the first tank rolled across, the firing was starting to die down now, the tank comes across. I don't even know if he shot when he came across the bridge or not. He may have. I really couldn't tell you. When he shows up on the road, I'm right down at the berm and I can see him when he pulls up. He's got three of my casualties on the back of the tank right there and I think a corpsman was working and he hollers at me he has three other casualties.

COL | (b)(6) Was the A-10 still making runs at this point?

GYSGT (b)(6) Negative. Negative. After Lt (b)(6) , the track commander had got back up with him on the radio he said the A-10, the air strike had been ceased. I didn't see them no more after that. So once that tank came by, he kept rolling on down and then the next company with tracks, I think it was Bravo Company, but I'm not sure. I just remember seeing the company gunney in his vehicle come by last. There's no fires going on at this time. It was pretty much quiet. We started trying to gather people up. Get head counts and stuff. That's when I walked down here with the First Sergeant and we started counting the bodies and loading

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them up in the back of the hummer. The platoon sergeants and platoon commanders are trying to pull all their Marines in and figure out who they're missing.

COL (b)(6) How long between the first time you crossed the northern bridge and when it became quiet and all the fire stopped? Do you know about how long that was?

GYSGT (b)(6) Somewhere between three and four hours. Which, I mean, I didn't know that at the time. Because it all went so quick. I didn't know we had been there that long. I was figuring it was twenty minutes. I think we started crossing the bridge 10:30, 10:40, somewhere along in there. It was 15-16:00, somewhere towards the evening when everybody got across there. I never looked down at my watch. I wasn't thinking about it...

COL (b)(6) No, no...understand, I understand. How many KIA did you see?

GYSGT (b)(6) From that point when we went down there to check on our dead, I think me and the First Sergeant, the CO and a couple of other Marines loaded, I think it was five that we loaded to the back of my hummer. Cleared the back of my hummer, had some gear in it and put it in the other hummer. Put five in the back of here, and drove them on down. The company was moving us, or the battalion was moving us north a little bit. We were consolidating. So we put them in the back of the hummer and we drove on down. Battalion Aid Station had set up a casualty point there and they were tending to the wounded.

COL (b)(6) Want to take a break?

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GYSGT (b)(6) No. Shortly after I get up there with my vehicle, Lt (b)(6) who is XO in one of the other companies, tells me that medevac birds are coming, and that we're going to put our KIAs in one of the birds. The birds land and we start putting the wounded in one bird and I drive the hummer around to the other bird where we're not putting any of the wounded in and get some Marines over there and we start unloading the dead and putting them into the helo. At the casualty collection point they had one that was KIA right there, not including the five that were in my hummer. There was one that was laid there, they hadn't covered up. We went ahead and grabbed him and carried him up to the bird. At about that time, when we were getting him up to the bird there was another berm back over here. We found another one of our Marines. Back to the east, there's another berm that we didn't see. I guess a Marine went over there to make a head call and seen LCpl (b)(6) over there. So, since a Marine's over there we grabbed him and put him on one of the birds. So, that day I saw seven of them.

COL (b)(6) In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and not to discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

GYSGT (b)(6) Yes, I do.

COL (b)(6) Thank you.

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12 April 2003

Interview with Gunney Sergeant

(b)(6)

COL (b)(6) Please state your full name, rank, social security number and billet, please.

GYSGT (b)(6) (b)(6) XXX-XX-XXXX. Platoon Sergeant, Alpha Company,
First Platoon.

COL (b)(6) OK, my name is Colonel (b)(6) and under the direction of board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation which may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have read to you?

GYSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Finally, do you also understand that you're being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

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GYSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

GYSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COL (b)(6) OK, Gunney, I pretty much know what happened when your folks crossed the bridge. What I'd like you to relate to me is your first knowledge that an aircraft was running on you and the ordinance that you think they expended on you, the KIA and wounded that happened because of that ordinance, the actions that you or anyone else took that you witnessed to abort or stop the air and get it off you and times and number of passes the aircraft made and run headings, and that would be about it, OK?

GYSGT (b)(6) My whole world is through a doggone periscope. The only time that I saw one is when I was on the ground. As soon as we crossed the bridge, 211 got hit by an RPG. I jumped out of my tractor, ran over there, started evacuating the crew, and grabbing weapons and throwing them off that vehicle that was on fire. I ran over with them behind a berm along the road and you could hear the sound of the Vulcan. A young Marine asked me what that was, and about that time we started taking mortar fire also. It was off in the distance, I was assuming it was probably going after mortar positions in the treeline. It had a very distinct sound. I said it was the sound of an A-10, from a Vulcan. It was reassuring that they were there. Then I ran

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around for awhile, got back in my vehicle, started trying to figure out where the hell fire was coming from. Mortars were coming in and then. I don't know how in the hell I ended up back on the ground again. After my vehicle got shot by an RPG, I was back on the ground again. That's when I realized that there was....that the A-10 was now shooting at us. I looked up at the sky, I wasn't in my vehicle anymore and I saw little...looked like stars. Then as soon as I saw stars, I started running across...trying to get to my vehicles.

COL (b)(6) What direction was the A-10 coming in from?

GYSGT (b)(6) At the time, I was on the west side of the road in my vehicle that's shot and disabled. They were taking out all the casualties that I had in the back of my vehicle. I went running down the west side of the road to get...and Sgt (b)(6) and his vehicle. His vehicle wasn't...he was on the ground. He came walking up and asked what the hell to do. I said we had to get the patients, all the casualties off my vehicle, to get them the **** out of there. I don't remember how many vehicles came up, they got the patients onto the vehicles, took off across the bridge, and as soon as they got...he had an American flag...he stuck in his smoke grenade launcher. Taking off across the road trying to get to the bridge. As soon as he got to the bridge, you saw the sparkles and one of the Amtracks got blown up. Then LIEUTENANT and I were, what the hell...we were...I still had an Amtrack when the mortars...I don't know, they...I remember seeing the little star clusters...two or three times...and running back and forth...

COL (b)(6) You said somebody had an American flag?

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GYSGT (b)(6) Right. That was Sgt (b)(6) He had it propped up in his smoke grenade launcher, and he's trying to cross the bridge. It got blown up...the tractor got cut in half.

COL (b)(6) Could you see it? Was it hanging off the smoke launcher?

GYSGT (b)(6) It wasn't a little flag. It was a regular post flag, American flag.

COL (b)(6) And it was out...

GYSGT (b)(6) As a matter of fact, (b)(6) took a picture of it and sold it and it was on the cover of Newsweek, or some damned magazine. He was the lead vehicle out of the three or four that went back and his vehicle was destroyed on the bridge by that damned bird. I just remember seeing that thing. I don't actually remember seeing the aircraft itself. I remember seeing the little star things and all the impacts and the distinct sound of the chain gun going off.

COL (b)(6) Do you know how many passes the A-10 made?

GYSGT (b)(6) I don't even remember seeing the...as I said, my whole world is through a periscope. It's a very small world. The only time I ever really have any vertical sight at all was when I was on the ground. There was probably three maybe four times.

COL (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

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(b)(1)1.4a

COL (b)(6) In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

GYSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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GYSBT

(b)(6)

29 MAR 03

ON 23 MAR 03 MY PLATOON PUSHED ACROSS THE NORTHERN BRIDGE OF AN NASARIAN. IMMEDIATELY WE CAME UNDER INDIRECT + RPG FIRE. ONE VEHICLE WAS HIT WITH AN RPG. CREW WAS EVAC. AND WEAPONS REMOVED. MORTARS AND ARTY BEGAN FALLING. WE ENGAGED THE BUILDINGS WE BELIEVED MORTARS WERE BEING FIRED FROM. ONCE THEY WERE NEUTRALIZED THE DISTINCT SOUND OF THE CHAIN GUN OF AN A-10 WAS HEARD. SUDDENLY ONE OF MY VEHICLES EXPLODED. WE BEGAN EVACUATING WHEN ~~HE~~ HE MADE ANOTHER PASS. THE MORTAR PLATOON WAS DESTROYED. ~~MY~~ MY VEHICLE GOT HIT BY 3 MORTARS WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MANEUVER TO A HIDE POSS. BEFORE IT WAS HIT BY AN RPG AND DISABLED. WE LOADED THE BODIES ONTO ANOTHER VEHICLE AND TOLD IT TO TAKE IT BACK SOUTH W/ THE CASUALTIES. THE A-10 HIT IT HARD ON THE BRIDGE

(b)(1)1.4a

MULTIPLE TIMES DURING THE DESTRUCTION OF MY PLATOON AND DISREGARDED BY THE A-10.

GYSBT

(b)(6)

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Interview with (b)(6)

12 April 03, 21:46 L

COL (b)(6) Go ahead and please state your name, rank and your social security number for the record and billet for the record.

SSGT (b)(6) Staff Sergeant, XXX-XX-XXXX, Mortar Section Leader, C Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

COL (b)(6) My name is Colonel (b)(6) Under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we are investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident, and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

SSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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COL (b)(6) Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

SSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir, I do.

COL (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

SSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COL (b)(6) OK, Sergeant, if you would please relay to me where you were in the column of Amtracks as you crossed over the north bridge and what you saw relative to the friendly fire incident.

SSGT (b)(6) I was in track 208. It was the third track, which is the CO's track then our track. We came over the north bridge, one of the 3rd Platoon's tracks got hit. Automatically we

b(2) Hi

COL (b)(6) What do you mean "herringboned?"

SSGT (b)(6) b(2) Hi

COL (b)(6) Which was the east side?

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SSGT (b)(6) Yes, the east side. As soon as that happened the doors came down on the track. I had one gun crew, from mortars with me, the other two were on the CO's track. We both came out, we got together. For the most part, we were firing mortars at the enemy for about anywhere from 30 to 45 minutes. We were in a fight with them. We got a volley fire of RPGs, about seven of them in on our position. We disbursed. As soon as that happened we looked up and A-10s were overhead.

COL (b)(6) You saw the A-10?

SSGT (b)(6) I saw the A-10.

COL (b)(6) What altitude do you think the A-10 was at?

SSGT (b)(6) I don't know. That's hard. About b(2) Hi feet, something like that.

COL (b)(6) It was up there a ways.

SSGT (b)(6) Yes, it was up there a ways.

COL (b)(6) Where was it in the sky relative to where you were?

SSGT (b)(6) It was coming in from the east.

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COL (b)(6) East to west?

SSGT (b)(6) East to west. It came in east to west. We picked up, me, Capt (b)(6) and some of the mortar men and the FiST, we all picked up and moved to the other side of the road. Some of the other guys, they got split up. SSgt (b)(6) who was my platoon sergeant at the time, Lt (b)(6) who was my platoon commander, Lt (b)(6) in charge of the track, went the other way with a couple of other mortar men. I was running, basically, I hesitated for a second, and I took off behind the other mortar men. As I was running that way, I saw flares, I heard a sound like *****, and I looked back to my left and I saw SSgt (b)(6), (b)(6) and PFC (b)(6) and they were all laying there. Pretty much, I knew what happened to them. So I continued to run across the road. As I was running across the road, I looked down to my left and saw Lt (b)(6) going across the road. Next thing I saw was (b)(6)

COL (b)(6) Now, did you hear anything before that? Do you know what hit him?

SSGT (b)(6) It looked like a, I know the nomenclature, a wart...

COL (b)(6) A warthog? An A-10?

SSGT (b)(6) An A-10.

COL (b)(6) Do you know what type of ordinance hit him? Did you hear anything before it hit him?

SSGT (b)(6) I saw some flares...and...

COIN (b)(6) From the aircraft?

SSGT (b)(6) ...and it looked like a missile came out. Some kind of missile.. b(6)

(b)(6) At first I thought it might have been a mortar round. A mortar round ain't going to

(b)(6) As soon as I saw that, I kept going across the road. We ended up getting into a ditch. I was looking up into the sky the whole time at the A-10 and it changed it's

direction. Changed which way it was coming from. Now it was coming from north to south

right over the top fo us. I saw flares, heard the ***** and CO, Capt (b)(6) said let's

move, so we started going back to the other side. As soon as that happened I looked around and

I say RTO's antenna sticking up in the air, and I yelled at them get the antennas down. As soon

as I yelled that I looked to my right and another rocket came in right beside us. I think that's

when Cpl (b)(6) caught shrapnel from that rocket. I couldn't really get what kind of

rocket it was, I just know it came from the direction of the A-10. As soon as that happened we

got back across the road to the east side. We were running back toward the south on the east side

and we stopped by SSgt (b)(6) Cpl (b)(6) and PFC (b)(6) had been shot, and it looked

like (b)(6)) It looked like something came down the road on all three of them. I stayed there

for a second. The rest of them kept running down south. Stayed there for a second, I looked

back up and I saw flares, I heard the ***** and I kept moving. This was about the fourth

pass. I moved to one side, and then he changes direction again. He comes from east to west

again. I looked up. I saw the flares, heard the ***** and I moved again. I just hoped I was

moving in the right direction. I finally end up making it down to where Gunney (b)(6) and

_____ were. Gunney (b)(6) was trying to get anyone on the radio. Also had someone

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from the.....Staff Sergeant from the Stinger, they fire Stingers, he was there. He was also trying to get someone on the radio to call the air off. It made another pass. In all, I think it made eight passes. Finally we got hold of them...someone got hold of the air and they called the A-10 off.

COL (b)(6) Got a hold of who?

SSGT (b)(6) : The FOC.

COL (b)(6) ; The FAC?

SSGT (b)(6) : Yeah, the FAC. Finally the A-10 bugged out. Pretty much you could see the damage, and what was done. I lost one mortar system to it, shot all to crap. Altogether, I can't say how many Marines I lost to it, but that day I lost 14 Marines. So...

COL (b)(6) | (b)(1)1.4a

SSGT (b)(6) | (b)(1)1.4a

and someone on top of his Amtrack with an American flag, waving it and the guy still shot. We were trying everything we could to call the air off of us. Until the A-10 showed up, basically on their own. As soon as he showed up, everything just went....downhill.

COL (b)(6) Is that all you have?

SSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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COL (b)(6) closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and not to discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

SSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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Interview with SSgt (b)(6)

12 April 2003, 22:34 L

COL (b)(6) Please state your name, rank and your social security number and your billet.

SSGT (b)(6) Staff Sergeant (b)(6) XXX-XX-XXXX, 1st Platoon Sergeant, Charlie Company, 1/2.

COL (b)(6) My name is Colonel (b)(6) Under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we are investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident, and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

SSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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COL (b)(6) , Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

SSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

SSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COL (b)(6) OK, Staff Sergeant, would you please relay to me where you were as you crossed over the northern bridge and what you witnessed relative to the friendly fire incident?

SSGT (b)(6) I was in the third Amtrack to cross the bridge. As we came across, crested over the bridge we pulled off to the side and we came to a halt. There was an Amtrack. We noticed the packs were on fire, so I tried to pull up behind him and we were getting a fire extinguisher but we started to get enemy small arms fire at that point. Everybody was getting out of the Amtrack and we heard there was more than packs on fire, there was actually fire inside. So we pulled off to provide security at the side of the road. At that time there was a lot of mortar fire starting to fall, and we noticed a building to the north probably 8 to 900 meters. We could see plumes of smoke, which we believed that's where the mortar fire was coming from. The crewchief on my track, we fired his 50 cal and I pretty much guided his rounds across. The plumes stopped. There was a lot of radio traffic but nobody could seem to get a hold of anybody.

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else. We then, basically, that's when the whole incident started. As far as the rounds, we could hear them hit the tank before we heard the gun fire. I heard the machine gun bursts and I knew right away what it was. The chain gun, I hate that. I grew up next to a National Guard base. As soon as the rounds were hitting the tank, I turned around to tell everyone they needed to utton up. Before they could grab the hatches, that's when all the bomblets pretty much hit. At that point, I didn't know. I didn't actually see the ordinance fall. We didn't know. It could have been some type of anti-personnel cartridge from artillery. Basically the bomblets hit right on top of our track. One Marine was (b)(6) Hit him just below his flak jacket.

COL (b)(6) Who was that?

SSGT (b)(6) Corporal (b)(6) Another Marine next to him...I didn't actually get to see him, but I was told that it (b)(6) He had a pretty (b)(6) at that point. That was LCpl (b)(6) Right after that happened, I tried calming everybody down. There was a lot of panic in the track. I got some Marines to pull the hatches closed. I was on the radio telling the other tracks that we needed to move, just because we were all in line...

COL (b)(6) , You said these were bomblets. What do you mean by bomblets?

SSGT (b)(6) Basically, I could see all the balls hitting. They hit the ground and went back up in the air and then exploded. The only thing going through my mind was it was some type artillery cartridge or I know that's what rockeye does. It's a lot of bomblets that are dropped. He made about three more passes after that. Well actually before that happened, where I was

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before, we got the stuff closed, I was yelling at all the other tractors that we needed to move out of there, cause we were all in line, he pretty much mad a run right through all the tracks. One of the tracks pulled up on the road. I was also calling him saying we needed a corpsman. Pulled up onto the road, when we got to the top of the road, we found out that the shots had taken our steering out. We didn't have any hydraulics. So I immediately told him we needed to back off the road and we pulled back there. There was another track there. I had a fire team that went out to try to get the corpsman, cause no one was answering the radio. I handed back my medic kit but everyone was looking at me saying this isn't going to do anything for him. At that point they said Cpl (b)(6) was dead. LCpl (b)(6) he was (b)(6) So the Marines went out there, they got LCpl (b)(6) out of the track cause he was still able to walk and I know the put him on another tractor. I can't confirm which one it was. Immediately after that run, it seemed like only seconds later we were hit again. The rounds again, and then the same thing.

COL (b)(6) The same thing?

SSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. I could hear the gun firing. It raised the hair on the back of your neck. The bomblets, this time, were more forward. They were hitting...I could hear them bouncing off the TC hatch, and I could see them exploding in the site galss that's around the TC. At that point I told them that they needed to drop the ramp, that we needed to get out of the track, that there was no way we took another run...I'm sure none of us would have been there. The ramp didn't go down. The crewchief went and opened the back hatch up and then I went down from the inside. Every Marine was out of the track except for Cpl (b)(6) There was no way we could get him out of there. It would have taken half of them to do. He was pretty bad at that point. We went across the track. I was the last one out. I was yelling at the Marines to cross the

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field cause I saw...It looked like there was built up ditches over there. We were in a wide open area. Marines started moving across. We started moving across. This time I heard the gun again and then the rocket hit. I was one of the last ones there and I got hit by one of the explosions and it threw me, but I didn't end up taking any shrapnel from it or anything. We moved into the ditches from there. I never really counted, but when I thought back on it that day I would say there were approximately seven runs.

COL (b)(6) Was there one aircraft or two?

SSGT (b)(6) : Honestly, Sir. There's no way to tell that.

COL (b)(6) Did you see the aircraft at any time?

SSGT (b)(6) I could see it up in the air, but it was so high, when I actually heard the gunfire and everytime he fired the gun, the rocket was soon to follow, so it's not like I wanted to sit there and watch him. I was in almost knee deep water. When I heard the gun open up I just told the Marines to get down, down in the water. I saw a couple of runs where the bomblets hit the road so I said I could see them bouncing up and all the flashes there. He'd hit one of the tracks...it was actually the one that was burning before it got hit and it just blew up. It just split the track in half almost.

COL (b)(6) At this same time you were taking the fire from the friendly aircraft, you were also taking RPG?

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SSGT (b)(6) I never saw any RPGs, by any means, Sir. Everybody was talking about it and I just couldn't believe those RPGs were flying...I never saw one. I never saw an RPG the whole time.

COL (b)(6) What about artillery and mortars?

SSGT (b)(6) They were walking artillery in before the aircraft hit, and I was stressing that over the radio that artillery was getting close. It was some sort of HE or HEDP. Just throwing up dirt in the air you could see that they were bracketing us. They seemed more ___ to want to hit the track on the road. It just kept getting hit over and over even though it was burning.

COL (b)(6) Was there a lot of small arms fire going on too?

SSGT (b)(6) I could hear it, Sir. But we were on the opposite side of the road. I guess one of the other platoons. They were taking small arms fire from I guess it would be the east side. After we fired that 50 cal at the building up there, we were kind of keeping an eye on that cause we thought there might be enemy to the north and never saw any more plumes or anything so either the enemy left or somebody got hit. Off to the west I thought, we thought we could hear rounds cracking over our heads. We couldn't really tell what direction they were coming, but we had a couple of marines setting in security just to make sure that there wasn't any positions _____ . After, I want to say the...probably about the fourth or fifth pass, (b)(1)1.4;

(b)(1)1.4a

COL (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

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SSGT (b)(6) No, I didn't, Sir. I never...besides just seeing him up there one time before when I heard the gun, when I heard the stuff hitting and the gun, I just happened to glance up real quick. Like I said everytime he passed the bombs would drop too, so, when I heard the gun, it was like, get down, especially after being hit when getting out of tractor. Didn't want to get _____ . We continued to push. We probably pushed...the ditches just continued inland so, I pushed the Marines a couple more and we got accountability of what Marines were there. It was kind of chaotic...some tracks out there were approximately three tracks in all that were there, different platoons and what-not...some of the Marines that were in my track, I know they got on other tracks. Some Marines that were on those tracks were there so it was kind of hectic seeing who we had. We had no communication. Had a little ISR radio, 100 meters if you're lucky...at that point we really didn't know what was going on...we knew the other tracks had left but from where we were we couldn't see how far away they were. I want to say the aircraft eventually stopped firing, it was approximately seven passes. It got pretty quiet. You could hear a lot of fighting going on around where the bridge was...mortar fire, but it wasn't anywhere near where we were so I'm not sure if that was friendly fire. The eastern positions were taking fire. I'm not sure. But it wasn't close to us...We were trying to reorganize. Probably, I'm guessing 30 - 35 minutes later a tank rolled up...it was a pretty good sight. As soon as he got there he said I'm low on fuel and he wanted us to walk him back to the bridge.

COL (b)(6) About how long after you crossed the bridge did you realize the A-10 was running on you?

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SSGT (b)(6) It was probably, I would guess about 9 minutes.

COL (b)(6) It was very shortly after you crossed over the bridge?

SSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. At least it seemed short at the time. Once we come across, track was on fire, pulled off to the road, maybe got a few hundred rounds out of the 50 cal downrange, we reloaded and as soon as we reloaded that's when the A-10 had hit us. I wouldn't think it had been more than 10 minutes. It may have only been 5 minutes, but...it was pretty quick.

COL (b)(6) Do you have anything else?

SSGT (b)(6) The only other thing we were talking about...I'm monitoring the radio by the TC hatch and I know that as we progressed along, Lieutenant he calls in the northings...that's pretty much his job...you hear the numbers what-not. I know there was something that was discussed earlier but they thought we were way south...4 or 5 clicks from where we were. So I know that the numbers were being passed off. You could always hear them. I wouldn't even want to tell you a number, because, I couldn't tell you without a shadow of a doubt what the numbers were but he calls it in and then he says 36 northing...roger 36...pretty much he says it and they answer back up. I wasn't really paying attention cause we were taking small arms fire at the same time so, I know the lead trace was done at least to the end of the bridge...I'd say radio traffic was pretty chaotic so from the bridge...couldn't have been more than 200 meters from the bridge at that point. There was no...I don't think there was really anything...just this is what we see kind of thing. It wasn't this is where we're at. The only other thing was the (b)(1)1.4a the Major asked me about.

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COL (b)(6) I've got that information, thank you. In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and not to discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

SSGT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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Interview with Cpl (b)(6)
12 April 03, 21:12 L

COL (b)(6) Go ahead and please state your name, rank and your social security number and billet.

CPL (b)(6) Corporal (b)(6) XXX-XX-XXXX, Squad Leader.

COL (b)(6) Cpl (b)(6) my name is Colonel (b)(6) Under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we are investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident, and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

CPL (b)(6) Yes.

COL (b)(6) Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

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CPL (b)(6) Yes.

COL (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

CPL (b)(6) Yes.

COL (b)(6) Would you please review for me what transpired and where you were in Charlie Company as you crossed the northern bridge? What transpired, to the best of your knowledge in regard to the friendly fire incident once you crossed the bridge?

CPL (b)(6) I was in the lead track, track 201 when we crossed the northern bridge. The first thing that I saw was actually artillery. Once we set out a short security _____, the first thing that came was artillery so we punched out the whole squad. I didn't actually see the A-10s till I looked up. They hadn't fired yet when I first saw them, I just saw them flying overhead from south to north. The first time I became aware of them firing was when, actually on my way back to the track. I told my squad when we were egressing back to the track, and right before I got to the door, I heard the buzzing of the cannon and right in front of my hatchway on my track it lit up the tractor. It didn't hit anybody at that time. I proceeded to jump on the track and I laid on my back so other people could jump in on top. I had a clear view of the...cause the small door was still open, I had a clear view of the outside. I saw them make another pass, heard it, and I saw it hit the ground. I saw it hit LCpl (b)(6) in the back, dropped him and somebody lifted him up and put him on the track. I did see, before I got on the tractor, a

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(b)(1)1.4a

From what I was later told, that was a cease air

mission. After that I was enclosed in the track and had no view of the outside.

COL (b)(6) Is that the extent of what you know? How many passes?

CPL (b)(6) I heard at least five to six buzzes of the cannon. I didn't see it. But after the first one that I did see, I heard about four or five more after that.

COL (b)(6) In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and not to discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

CPL (b)(6) : Yes.

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Interview with Cpl [redacted]
12 April 2003, 22:08 L

(b)(6)

COL [redacted] Please state your name, rank and your social security number and your billet.

CPL [redacted] Corporal [redacted] XXX-XX-XXXX, Machine Gun Squad Leader, Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

COL [redacted] Cpl [redacted] my name is Colonel [redacted] Under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we are investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident, and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

CPL [redacted] Yes.

COL [redacted] Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

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CPL (b)(6) Yes, I do.

COL (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

CPL (b)(6) Yes.

COL (b)(6) Cpl (b)(6) if you would you please relay to me where you were as you crossed over the north bridge and what you saw relative to the friendly fire incident?

CPL (b)(6) When my track came over the north bridge, and we got out...

COL (b)(6) , What track were you in?

CPL (b)(6) I was in track 211, which was hit by an RPG...

COL (b)(6) Which track of the formation was this?

CPL (b)(6) I can't even remember how far back we were. We weren't too far back...I would say 3 to 5 tracks back. After we got out, I went to the berm to the left. When I looked to the right and left I saw LCpl (b)(6) a sawgunner to the left and one of my gunners and ammo men to the right. During the chaos, with what was going on I heard airburst going on...and I looked up in the air to see what...try to catch a glimpse of what was going on. I see the A-10

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flying around. Looked like he was dropping flares. I didn't say anything to anybody, but I was thinking what is it doing? Well later on, after our Lieutenant comes over and gets us we get word to get back in the track. So as we were all running to get back in the tracks, we, I hear this sound, which I had heard three times beforehand. Somebody tells me it's an A-10.

COL (b)(6), Three times before this incident?

CPL (b)(6) Yes, three times before. First time I got to the berm, we heard the sound...I don't really know how to describe it.

COL (b)(6) Like a buzzsaw?

CPL (b)(6) Kinda like a buzzsaw, yes. I heard that like three times. I didn't know if it was arty or a plane or what. I just knew that everytime I heard it the Lieutenant said put your face in the dirt, get down. So I got my face in the dirt. Somebody gave the word to get back to the tracks. As we're running across the road, I hear that sound again, and I look to my left and all I see is dirt popping up from rounds hitting the deck. My only thought was oh shit. As I dived underneath the track, and by the time I came to my senses and got back up, I see Cpl (b)(6) laying there (b)(6) He got shot in the leg. I look over and I see LCpl (b)(6) and he said help me. I looked down at his lower back and it's just _____ from where he got shot. After that we got back in the tracks and went back to the city and as we were going through the city that track got hit, which I find out later on...I didn't find out it was actually friendly fire until everything cooled down which was probably that night or that evening. I talked to the tracker and I talked to some other friends who said it was friendly fire, it was the A-

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10. Said the A-10 had also caught that second track and stopped it from moving in the city. Stopped it dead in the city. That was the last thing anybody said about it.

COL (b)(6) In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and not to discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

COL (b)(6) I'm back with Cpl (b)(6) and there's some more information he's brought to my attention. My previous statements and your oath are still under effect, so will you please relay to me what you just said?

CPL (b)(6) I talked to some of the tractors beforehand. We went through the city.

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

One tractor said he

got hit but another track said he was never touched by the A-10.

COL (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

CPL (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

COL (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

CPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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COL (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

CPL (b)(6) There was (b)(1)1.4a

COL (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

CPL (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a ,yes, Sir.

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Interview with Lance Corporal (b)(6)
12 April 2003, 21:12 L

COL (b)(6) Go ahead and state your name, rank, social security number and your billet.

LCPL (b)(6) Lance Corporal (b)(6) XXX-XX-XXXX, rifleman, C Company,
1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

COL (b)(6) My name is Colonel (b)(6) and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

LCPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

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LCPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COI (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

LCPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COL (b)(6) OK, Lance Corporal would you please relate to me where you were when your company crossed the northern bridge, in An Nasiriyah on the 23rd of March and your knowledge relative to the friendly fire incident.

LCPL (b)(6) I don't know exactly when we crossed the bridge, because I was as far in the track as possible, Sir. I was right next to the radios underneath the TC hatch.

COL (b)(6) Which track?

LCPL (b)(6) I believe it was 211. I'm not sure of the number, Sir..if that's the right number. But my troop commander was Lt (b)(6)

COL (b)(6) First track, second track, third track?

LCPL (b)(6) I don't know, I couldn't tell you, Sir. When we crossed the bridge, like I said, I don't know where we were, cause I couldn't see. But when we got hit...our track got hit

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with an RPG and Marines doing air security, we took some casualties up there, so we pulled them down and I was punching the Marine under the TC hatch was _____ my platoon commander, Lt (b)(6) not knowing what happened...at that point our comm went out and that was keep going...so I believe it was going across the bridge. I think they wanted to get to the other side of the bridge. Once we got out...once we got out, we kept trying to...the track was covered in smoke, it was on fire trying to pull the emergency hatch, and we couldn't figure it out. So we ended up jumping out of the door as quickly as possible. At that point the only person I saw, because I was the last one out, everyone was grabbing the casualties bringing them wherever they brought em, I don't know...the only person I saw was my platoon commander, Lt (b)(6). We ran into this little ditch on the other side of the road. We started getting all aligned. The other Marines started catching up to us. At that point, Lt (b)(6) went across this little ditch, we jumped over some water and got behind this berm. Some mortars started hitting the road and near the track and indirect fire everywhere. I don't know the difference between arty and mortars and we were taking it from every direction...not every direction, impacts were in every direction. We didn't know which...just kept going back and forth across the water, left and right in the water, just going all over the place. I don't remember what exactly the A-10 hit first, but I remember I heard the sound from the gun, real distinct gun, the burp gun. I asked Lieutenant, I asked, what the *** is that, Sir? It was an A-10. I didn't think anything of it. I heard impacts on the road. I didn't think anything of it cause there were impacts all over the place. He was saying how...that that was too close...real **** close, he said. We were just sitting there and we couldn't figure out where we were taking small arms fire, but you could hear it. It was so far out we couldn't see muzzle flashes. I couldn't see anything. I, we had no idea where we were taking it from. We kept, as I said, we kept going left and right and back and forth across the river, trying to dodge indirect fire. You could hear, at the time we heard the burp gun, you could

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hear the little flashes on the track, that it kept hitting the track. Either it was the best indirect fire, or the most accurate indirect fire I've ever seen or it just zeroed in on that track. It must have passed us three times when we were down in that little ditch. As we were running and shifting right, indirect fire was walking on us. Somebody yelled, I was on the road, get in the tracks, get in the tracks. We saw other Marines hanging out the door. At that time, we started running out to get in the track, and you could hear the burp gun again, so we all got down. At that time I was right next to LCpl (b)(6) and I believe the Lieutenant was on the other side of him and that's when, after we heard the burp, we could hear... I can't describe the sound, it was a whizzing sound, and like I said, Sir, it's hard to explain, you hear the whizzing sound. I didn't know (b)(6) at the time had got hit. I felt burning, I got a piece of shrapnel (b)(6) at that time so did Lieutenant too. We both got up. I jumped in the track immediately. LCpl (b)(6) and Lt (b)(6) were picking up (b)(6) trying to get him in, and I was pulling him in. Once we finally got him in... we got hit once by the A-10. You could hear the burp gun and then dink, dink, dink, dink on top, like many mini-explosions on top of the track. That's while we were loading (b)(6) Once we got (b)(6) on, we started to move. We got hit by the A-10 the same thing, the little mini-explosions, you could hear the burp gun. You could hear it hitting the track. We must have got hit at least four times. Four times on our way out. I don't know where we were going. The guy driving the track just wanted to get the hell out of there. Got back on, guess we got hit a couple of times, at least four more times and we must have got hit with about four RPGs by the time we got out in front of this building. We got out of the track and we jumped over this wall. This was inside the city, at the time. There was no enemy there so we just set up security in every direction and we ended up clearing two houses to the right, and holding up like a defensive position in there. Until we saw tanks, we saw a tank and we signaled them that we had friendlies in there and then we had two Humvees come get us. That's when we come out, that's when I

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came up and I couldn't find anybody from my platoon. At that time, Lt (b)(6) and LCpl (b)(6) they did not get on that track after we loaded (b)(6) I came back and I was running out on the road. All the casualties that we loaded from inside the house went back on the tank. I found them cause one of my NCOs, one of my team leaders was there, and I wanted to make sure he was alright. He was put with the rest of the casualties, he was going to be alright. I was looking for the rest of my platoon. I kept going across the road, and I saw my Lieutenant on the radio and he said he had just called off...he was trying to find out...trying to call off the air. I don't know, I wasn't there for the actual transaction, but I know he was PANZER 5. I think that was the call sign for the tank that he was talking to. I don't know why he was talking to tanks, but that's who he said he was trying to get a hold of. He grabbed another RTO and set up the radio with a ten foot antenna. At that time, I thought it was just me, Lieutenant, and (b)(6) who was with him. We ended up finding out that the rest of our platoon, there was like fifteen of us up on the other side of the road. That's when we met up with the rest of the platoon, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Anything else you want to add?

LCPL (b)(6) No, Sir.

COL (b)(6) In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

LCPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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Interview with LCpl
12 April 2003, 21:30 L

(b)(6)

COL (b)(6) Please state your name, rank, social security number and your billet.

LCPL (b)(6) Lance Corporal (b)(6) Social XXX-XX-XXXX.

Billet, Assistant Sawgunner, C Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

COL (b)(6) 'My name is Colonel' (b)(6) and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

LCPL (b)(6) Yes, I do, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

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LCPL (b)(6) Yes, I do, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

LCPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COL (b)(6) OK, (b)(6) if you would please relay to me the events as you understand them, after you crossed over the bridge relative to the friendly fire incident.

LCPL (b)(6) According to mission we dismounted.

COL (b)(6) Where were you?

LCPL (b)(6) North of the bridge.

COL (b)(6) What vehicle were you in?

LCPL (b)(6) I was in the lead vehicle that had been hit by an RPG. The second vehicle in our movement then took the lead. Pushed across the bridge, pulled up onto the west side of the road. Our vehicle stopped on the road due to the fire and RPG. We had casualties. We had trouble getting off the AAV. I went through the top, set security on the other side. We got the casualties off to the east side of the road. The platoon commander, Lt (b)(6) ordered those capable, other than those helping the casualties to push to the west side of the road to cover the

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west and north, which was according to plan. So I went across the road, brought a squad, including two machine gun attachments to the west side. One machine gun attachment was pulled back to the east side of the road. We then received indirect fire from the enemy on to the track. I took charge of the squadron at that time. The squad leader got hit, team leader was one of the casualties. I took charge. We held position there until they started traversing onto our position. Moved about 100 meters to the north, waited there for Lt (b)(6) to come over and the others, which he did. And we held a security position there for, I don't know for how long...it was a while. We pushed north again, and they began traversing onto our position further. For some reason I, the indirect fire then cut off for some reason. We were beginning to load up on the tracks to get our wounded back to the casualty collection point. I heard something that I want to describe as a very, it almost sounded like a blender. I knew it was an A-10 cause I saw it flying around. It didn't hit us right away.

COL (b)(6) You saw it flying?

LCPL (b)(6) I saw the A-10s above us.

COL (b)(6) How many were there?

LCPL (b)(6) One that I saw. Came in on my pos and the track we were loading up the casualties on. After they...the casualties that we were loading up were from the A-10. They came in three times. I'm not sure what time it hit us, but it came in three times. With the gun three times, 30 millimeter. I hit the deck perpendicular to the strafing fire. I saw rounds walk up to Marines in my squad and then cross the track. I know one of them was hit right away. The

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other one I could tell cause he was moving his legs. Cpl (b)(6) called. As Cpl (b)(6) was laying on the deck, I wanted to make sure he was alright. I got up. After rounds had impacted to my left and to my right, I'd gotten up. Some other Marines were helping Cpl (b)(6) I saw blood coming from LCpl (b)(6) I went over to him and (b)(6) (b)(6) So we loaded up Cpl (b)(6) and as we were loading up LCpl (b)(6) he came in at least another one or two times. So it was three or four times it came in on us, with the gun. Finally got them loaded up and sent them back to the casualty collection point. The only one from my platoon, beside myself north of the bridge were Lt (b)(6) my platoon commander, and myself. We linked up with second platoon who was holding pos there, also holding security according to plan to the west and the north. We punched them out. Lt (b)(6) took command of the only radio unit out there, cause his had been, ours had been destroyed. He called off the air. But before that had happened, it came in on our pos at least two more times, two more times with the gun. I don't know if any casualties were taken, from those last two times, but there was a track left there, and I think that's what it was firing on, but there was nobody inside the track, except a KIA, Cpl (b)(6) I believe he was already dead at the time. After we called off the air, we called the support and a tank came up to support our pos. I had to run and gather a illumination, pyro to signal, to mark our pos. A tank rolled up. We secured the pos. We began picking up the...

COL (b)(6) In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

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LCPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir. Sir, I think there's one more thing I think you should know. I guess I was told there was an order that came down, while we were in the tracks, I don't know when it happened, but the order was (b)(1)1.4a I didn't know if you knew about that.

COL (b)(6) Yes. Thank you very much.

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Interview with LCpl (b)(6)
12 April 2003, 21:30 L

COL (b)(6) Please state your name, rank, social security number and your billet.

LCPL (b)(6) Lance Corporal (b)(6) XX-XX-XXXX, Machine Gunner,
C Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

COL (b)(6) My name is Colonel (b)(6) and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

LCPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

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LCPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

LCPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Would you please relay to me, as I spoke to you earlier, where you were relative to the friendly fire incident, when you crossed over the bridge in An Nasiriyah?

LCPL (b)(6) We got hit by an RPG. I was in track 211, Charlie 211. _____ through the city and got on the outside of it and we jumped out and got on the west side of the road. I could see, when we got to the berm on the side of the road, I saw the A-10 fly over going east to west. We had some contact with the enemy _____ and looked over again and my squad leader Cpl (b)(6) pulled me down and I looked up above him and I could see an A-10 that was dropping flares and stuff. We crossed over a ditch on the other side and bounded north towards first squad. Went back across the ditch. There's a track getting ready to go. Right before we got on the track, they told us to get down on the deck and I could hear the gun go off in the sky. I sounded like a _____ going off or a bad-ass blender. Everything just lit up all around me.

LCpl (b)(6) and LCpl (b)(6) got hit, to my direct right. They couldn't have been more than a foot away from me. The guy from my gun team got hit by shrapnel on my left. That was pretty much it, that was the extent that I had with the A-10.

COL

(b)(1)1.4a

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LCPL (b)(6) When we just got off the track and I couldn't see if there was a missile going off or if there were flares coming off the back of it.

COL (b)(6) In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

LCPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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Interview with (b)(6)
12 April 2003, 21:12 L

COL (b)(6) Go ahead and state your name, rank, social security number and your billet.

LCPL (b)(6) My name is Lance Corporal (b)(6) My social security number is XXX-XX-XXXX. I'm a Sawgunner for 1/2 Charlie, 3rd Platoon, 3rd Squad.

COL (b)(6) My name is Colonel (b)(6) and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation which may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

LCPL (b)(6) Yes, I do, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

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LCPL (b)(6) Yes, I do, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

LCPL (b)(6) Yes, I do, Sir.

COL (b)(6) Go ahead, and relate to me the events that happened, where you were as your company crossed the northern bridge, events that you saw relative to the friendly fire.

LCPL (b)(6) My track was hit, I believe by mortars.

COL (b)(6) Which track were you on?

LCPL (b)(6) I was on, I believe, the first track. Actually we had the problem....a lot of our tracks went down. There were two squads in our track. That only left us with two tracks going in. It was the first squad and third squad. After we were hit by an AT4 APG, our track caught on fire. The track split up and myself and about ten other Marines including Lt (b)(6) we went over on the other side of the road, on the left side of the road. Mortars kept hitting. Our track, completely destroyed our track and we all heard this buzzing sound. I'd never heard it before in my life. That's basically what it sounded like. And everyone was asking what the hell is that? Someone says, an aircraft. Once we had, those mortars started adjusting on us...we moved down the road, across the road to get in the track. It had the wounded in it, we heard that funny noise in the sky again and next thing you know there was sand, metal, (b)(6) ust

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spraying all over me. My buddy, LCpl (b)(6) got hit in the chest, (b)(6)

(b)(6) Another fire team leader Cpl (b)(6) ... There's a lot of rumors that he got shot three times, I don't think he's be able to withstand a shot like that three times in his leg. He probably got shrapnel. His leg was, (b)(6) I got shrapnel in my face, and almost got my two fingers knocked off. I had shrapnel all down my arm. When it came down and hit us, I don't know what happened. All I know is there was a lot of dust. The track was, ...you can hear all the metal being hit. And once we finally got into the track. We didn't know who all had been hit until the bodies were getting picked up. (b)(6) was dead, (b)(6) was pretty bad. I was alright. Once our track got hit again. We had got hit by a mortar, then we heard that noise in the sky. Apparently it was an A-10...that same noise that we heard when we got hit before. We heard that about twice. Once our track was hit twice by mortars, we got out, cleared out two buildings and from there we heard that noise in the sky four or five more times, while we were clearing out those buildings. We were in that building probably an hour and a half.

COL (b)(6) Where was the building located?

LCPL (b)(6) I don't know, Sir. I was in the back of the track. The back hatch was open but I can't remember which direction we were going. All I know is we were getting hit pretty hard. What appeared to be an A-10. All I know is our track was getting hit pretty hard by numerous types of weapons. As far as how many times I heard that buzzing sound in the air, eight times, nine times, that I can remember.

COL (b)(6) Do you know the direction that the aircraft was flying? Did you see the aircraft at all?

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LCPL (b)(6) I never got eyes-on. I believe, I don't know exactly which direction. We were heading north and I believe, once we crossed the road, right here. The A-10, when it had hit myself, LCpl (b)(6) and Cpl (b)(6) I had the impression it was coming in north at that time.

COL (b)(6) From the north?

LCPL (b)(6) It was heading north. Like I said, I never saw. I never got eyes-on. The direction my body flew. I felt the pressure...

COL (b)(6) You were outside when this happened?

LCPL (b)(6) That's right. I was getting ready to get in. My buddy, (b)(6) was going where I was, and he got hit before he was able to go in, and my body shifted in the north direction, that's why I'm saying....

COL (b)(6) And (b)(6) was killed?

LCPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir, he was. Hopefully he was killed instantly.

COL (b)(6) And Cpl (b)(6)

LCPL (b)(6) He got hit in the leg. There's a lot of rumors about how many times, and like that, (b)(6)

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COL (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

LCPL (b)(6): No. I know one of the Marines in the weapons platoon. He has an A-10 round.

COL (b)(6) I've got one.

LCPL (b)(6)able to tell....not audible

COL (b)(6) In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

LCPL (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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Phone Interview conducted with Sgt. (b)(6) JSMC on 7 April 03

On 7 April I contacted Sgt. (b)(6) JSMC to conduct a phone interview. Sgt. (b)(6) was wounded in An Nasiriyah Iraq on 23 March 03. He is presently at Bethesda Naval Hospital undergoing treatment for injuries received during the battle. After reading Sgt. (b)(6) the Boards opening statement and giving him the Oath Sgt. (b)(6) provided the following verbal testimony.

At 1000Z 23 March 03 Sgt. (b)(6) was in the back of the lead AAV crossing the northern bridge over the Saddam Canal in An Nasiriyah Iraq. His Platoon Commander was in the track with him. While crossing the bridge his AAV was struck by an RPG and 4 Marines inside the track were injured. Sgt. (b)(6) Cpl. (b)(6) Cpl. (b)(6), and Pvt. (b)(6) All of these Marines received wounds to their legs. Cpl. (b)(6) leg was bleeding profusely and Sgt. (b)(6) assisted Cpl. (b)(6) in applying a tourniquet. The AAV was filled with black smoke and Sgt. (b)(6) had difficulty seeing. The AAV came to a stop the back ramp came down and a corpsman assisted the 4 wounded Marines into 1st Sgt. (b)(6)'s AAV which was the MEDEVAC AAV. The Marines inside this AAV heard shrapnel hitting around them but were not aware of what they were being engaged by. The MEDEVAC AAV was subsequently disabled and the wounded Marines were moved to another AAV located nearby that was in a ditch off of the road to the south. The driver of this AAV could not get it started. Cpl. (b)(6) stated at this time that the track was being engaged by A-10 fire and that it looked like fireworks going off. Sgt. (b)(6) closed the door to the AAV and the Marines waited until the firing stopped. When the firing stopped another AAV pulled up and Cpl. (b)(6) and Cpl. (b)(6) jumped on it and it moved off. Sgt. (b)(6) yelled for them to stop but they did not hear him. The Companies Commander arrived at that time and directed Sgt. (b)(6) and Pvt. (b)(6) to follow him to the north side of the road against the berm. The Commander helped Pvt. (b)(6) across the road. There were 10-15 Marines laying against the berm on the north side of the road. Sgt. (b)(6) was approximately 5 feet away from the nearest Marine, the Company Commander. Pvt. (b)(6) yelled watch out, Sgt. (b)(6) turned to look up at the sky and saw an A-10 and a 30MM round coming right at him. Sgt. (b)(6) rolled and the round skipped off of him as it struck him. All of the other Marines were unhurt by this engagement. A corpsman immediately came to Sgt. (b)(6) assistance and applied 2 anti-coagulation packs to his wound. GvSgt. (b)(6) arrived and asked if anyone had a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a is the A-10 was about to make another pass, somebody said that the A-10 had diverted and was going away. The corpsman also had a (b)(1)1.4a that he was waving at the A-10. Sgt. (b)(6) did not see this because he was lying on his stomach at the time. During this a Marine behind him had gotten a hold of a radio and was yelling in to it to stop the air. Sgt. (b)(6) was then loaded into the back of an AAV with other wounded Marines. Marine Corps tanks arrived on scene and all firing stopped. Sgt. (b)(6) was moved to a casualty collection point and shortly after Marine Corps helicopters arrived to MEDEVAC the wounded.

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TAB K

Tab K

Other Interviews and Statements

Lt Col	(b)(6)	Commanding Officer, Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 269K-3
Maj	(b)(6)	K-15
Capt	(b)(6)	and Lt	(b)(6)K-17
Maj	(b)(6)	K-21
Capt	(b)(6)	K-25
2Lt	(b)(6)	K-33

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Interview with Lt Col

(b)(6)

COL (b)(6) My name is Col (b)(6) Under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we are investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident, and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

LT COL (b)(6) Yes, I do.

COL (b)(6) Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

LT COL (b)(6) Yes, Sir. I do.

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COL (b)(6) Please state your name, your social security number and your billet for the record.

LT COL (b)(6) Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6) commanding Officer, Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269, XXX-XX-XXXX.

COL (b)(6) Lt Col (b)(6); do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

LT COL (b)(6) I do, Sir.

COL (b)(6) if you could relate to me the incidents that transpired up in An Nasiriyah, Iraq on the 23rd of March? I understand that you made two or three sorties during the day in support of 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines?

LT COL (b)(6) That is correct, Sir. We took off from USS Saipan, I want to say, probably 0500 that morning. Had very little intelligence on where the fight was. We knew that the _____ was open. We made our way north. Hit the FARP for fuel. Got out on the MSR, found the nearest convoy, started heading north with the convoys till we found smoke and that smoke was coming from the vicinity of An Nasiriyah. At that point, it was probably Team Mech, since I saw mostly AAVs with a few tanks on the outskirts of the city.

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There was a fight at 3 267 Viper, Cobras working the target area engaging tanks, oil tanks on the south side of the road.

COL (b)(6) And the oil tanks were in the vicinity of ...

LT COL (b)(6) South of the south canal, where the road bends going into An Nasiriyah. AAVs were spread across here. The three 267 airplanes were working this side of the road. We held till they binged off. We came in...

COI (b)(6) And that's south of the railroad bridge about...?

LT COL (b)(6) About two kilometers. We engaged numerous targets on the MSR, _____ 50's, in this industrial complex, it was a treeline, multiple vehicles in there. We started engaging multiple vehicles in there. We started engaging vehicles in there. We're taking small arms fire, we took a manpad? Shot out of there. At that point we were Winchester and we binged back. A flight of F-18s had also previously 167 or was it 267 Cobras been dropping on this road.

COL (b)(6) And this is all in the vicinity of the railroad bridge?

LT COL (b)(6) Correct. I then went back to Jalibah, returned on station probably an hour and 15 to an hour and 20 minutes later, due to the volume of aircraft that were trying to be

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serviced there. We came back up and we had five total airplanes up there that day. I believe it was Capt (b)(6) and his wingman working up in this vicinity.

COL (b)(6) And that grid is around?

LT COL (b)(6) About the 225...25. And by this point 1/2 had pushed across the southern bridge and had a foothold in An Nasiriyah.

COL (b)(6) Did you see vehicles cross the southern bridge?

LT COL (b)(6) I never saw a vehicle across the bridge on Ambush Alley. We did a battlefield handover with him. He _____ it out of there. We took over for him and started pushing our way north across the southern canal. We noticed numerous...where would that be...right here. There was a battery of Z-20s right here, and there was a truck with a triple A piece in it.

COL (b)(6) And that's...?

LT COL (b)(6) Again, about 226 323. We reported that to the FAC. Asked for permission to engage. He said that he could not see us and he was north of the bridge, so he cleared us...actually he did not clear us for Type 3 control, that he'd have to work on getting us clearance to ____ those targets. So we flew up to the triple A pieces, there's a big date grove over here. I noticed that there were children playing on the Z-20s? so we made the decision that

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we weren't going to engage, one way or the other because of the kids were on the artillery pieces.

CAPT (b)(6) Sir, do you remember the Ground FAC's callsign?

LT COL (b)(6) I do not. Over here we were working with MOUTH, but when we got up here...

COL (b)(6) At the railroad bridge you were working with MOUTH?

LT COL (b)(6) Yes, Sir. Once they crossed the canal, he was real busy doing other things. It did not sound to me like he was engaging a lot of targets. Their primary concern at that point was they had pushed, probably, a company with at least four tanks onto this road and their intent was to bypass the eastern side of the town and grab the bridge. All those tanks and a couple of tracks got stuck right here...really this is a sewage treatment plant...and they got stuck in the sh...literally the shit right here.

COL (b)(6) 218 35...

LT COL (b)(6) 354. So he was obviously very concerned with the security of those vehicles. We pushed north of the south canal and basically for the next 45 minutes, we provided security for those vehicles. Several times made high speed runs over the top of them, just trying to keep anybody that might give them the bum's rush back with noise. Hauled out in this area

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where we kept receiving triple A fire and flak bursts, probably 37 millimeter and possibly 57 millimeter. They were pretty big bursts.

COL (b)(6) Could you see where they were coming from?

LT COL (b)(6) We never saw the origin of the fire. We kept our speed up. We kept bumping around and just about everywhere we went we got shot at.

COL (b)(6) And that was to the east of...about 3 clicks, 4 clicks to the east of the bogged down vehicles.

LT COL (b)(6) That is correct. About this time, and I can't be positive it was the second sortie or the third sortie, I could see smoke from up north and I heard the GYRATE flight on the TAD frequency. And he was reporting numerous armored vehicles and other targets north of the T, which is here. And I believe he was working...It looked to me like it was probably three or four miles up north...north of the north canal. But that's just, you know, we never stopped. I just saw the smoke and I heard him reporting, and I did hear the FAC reporting that he was cleared Type 3 control on those targets. And I heard him make numerous runs calling in with the direction of attack, coming off and reporting secondaries. At that point Capt (b)(6) showed back up. We did another relief in place with him. Kept reporting back into the FAC that his boys were OK over here, stuck in the mud. Told him where we were getting fire from. There were several buildings over here that we were taking small arms fire from. You could see

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them shooting out the windows. We chose not to address those targets because there were...I mean, they were civilian buildings and the small arms fire wasn't having a great effect..

COL (b)(6) And that's about the 244 350?

LT COL (b)(6) That's correct. Obviously the FAC...we reported that to the FAC. The FAC couldn't see us so he could not clear us hot. So we just decided, basically, to keep moving and keep away from the areas of known fire. Did a turnover with Capt (b)(6) I'm not sure if I came back up again, or not, quite honestly, but I logged ten hours of flight time that day, so I think there was time for me to come back out there again. Nothing else happened that I was aware of. They were just getting established on this side, north of the bridge. They were not...I did not hear any reports of them taking fire, or they had no work for us at that time, other than security on those stuck vehicles. At that point, I wanted all the squadron aircraft to return to Jalibah, and shut down, because it didn't seem like there was a big fight going on up there, and I was sure that some of our aircraft were probably battle damaged and I wanted to look them over, and the pilots were tired. I knew that Capt (b)(6) was coming back up. He did. We went back to Jalibah, shut down and he showed up about an hour and a half later, and told me at that point that 1/2 had been ambushed up here and lost three tracks and had a bunch of _____.

COL (b)(6) Can we go back to the A-10, the A-10 conversation that you heard? The A-10 conversation between MOUTH, or the FAC and the A-10?

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LT COL (b)(6) I cannot confirm that MOUTH was the FAC that was controlling them, the callsign. But yes, I heard GYRATE flight calling targets north of the north canal. He was describing the targets to the FAC. The FAC said Roger, that. We've got intel that there's targets up there, you're cleared Type 3 control.

COL (b)(6) Do you remember the types of descriptions he gave of the vehicles?

LT COL (b)(6) Armored vehicles along the MSR, and that's about the extent of it. And that's really all the FAC needed. He said I've got armored vehicles moving north of the north canal. I don't recall which way the vehicles were moving.

COL (b)(6) About how long...do you know about how long the A-10s engaged?

LT COL (b)(6) It seemed to me that it was a period of at least, probably 15 minutes. Possibly longer. Again, trying to recollect something over a month ago. But he was working those targets for quite a while and I saw at least three clouds of black smoke coming from the area he was working.

CAPT (b)(6) When you were taking the triple A fires, did you mention that to the Ground FAC?

LT COL (b)(6) Yes.

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CAPT (b)(6) Did you happen to hear if GYRATE flight was taking any triple A?

LT COL (b)(6) I did not. I don't recall him saying he was taking fire. I was looking for him. I never saw him. I never went out to the block he was working, but I don't think he was coming low.

COL (b)(6) Did you hear the FAC tell GYRATE flight to cease fire?

LT COL (b)(6) No. At no time did I ever hear anything that remotely sounded like he was engaging friendly forces. It was absolutely no Blue on Blue or cease fire or anything like that. In fact, I only found out about this about two weeks ago. That what happened up there was possible a Blue on Blue. Because none of us had any suspicion.

CAPT (b)(6) Sir, at any of the time you looked up in there, see (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

LT COL (b)(6) No. It was too far away and there was date groves in here. We were operating right on the treetops and there was no way. I couldn't even see up to this bridge. The furthest we got up was probably 36 northing here. We just, basically, kept jumping around all over in here, and about every 15 minutes, 10 minutes pop over these guys and make sure they were OK.

COI (b)(6) The...what running headings were the A-10s using that you observed?

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LT COL (b)(6) : Sir, I don't remember. I want to say...but I can't be sure...I want to say east to west.

CAPT (b)(6) And just for the record, could you clarify...you mentioned a T in the canal just to have on the record, where you were talking about...

LT COL (b)(6) The T, became known as the T, basically the where 225409.

CAPT (b)(6) The canal, being the northern canal.

LT COL (b)(6) Located generally at 223348 at the bridge, and it was all on this eastern MSR, was where all the action was.

COL (b)(6) When you reported that you were taking triple A, was that the same time that GYRATE flight was engaging? Was that prior...or...?

LT COL (b)(6) Multiple times. We got engaged multiple times out there, and each time we got lit up we'd call the FAC and tell him, and basically, tell him we're moving, because we were seeing air bursts, but we couldn't see where the source of the fire was coming, and I was obviously very concerned we were going to close on this guy and catch one. I don't remember time relation to the A-10 attack. I just don't remember. I also don't remember what TAD net it was.

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CAPT (b)(6) Sir, at any time did you happen to say that you were going to suppress some of the triple A?

LT COI (b)(6) No. If we could have found them, we would have suppressed. But we never saw the muzzle flash. All we saw were the air bursts, other than the small arms fire that I could see the muzzle flashes on those guys but again, it was a three story apartment complex. I was not going to engage those targets.

COL (b)(6) In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and not to discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

LT COL (b)(6) I do.

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STATEMENT BY MAJ.

(b)(6)

-IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON OF 23 MARCH, IN THE TOWN OF AN-NIZIRYAH, MYSELF AND MY CO-PILOT 1STLT (b)(6) WERE DASH-3 IN A FLIGHT OF 3 A-10'S PROVIDING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IN SUPPORT OF FRIENDLY GROUND FORCES, TASK FORCE TURWA. THE LIGHT DIVISION WAS LED BY THE SQUADRON CO, LTCOL (b)(6) DASH 2 WAS CAPT (b)(6). WE ARRIVED ON STATION AT APPROXIMATELY 1330-1400 LOCAL AND WERE INITIALLY ANCHORED IN THE SOUTHWESTERN PARTION OF THE CITY, BUT WORKED NORTHWARDS, STAYING IN THE SALT FLATS TO AVOID ENEMY FIRE. OUR FLIGHT WAS IN CONTACT WITH A SECTION OF COBRAS FROM WMLA 29 LED BY CAPT (b)(6) (b)(6) WAS LOW ON FUEL AND CONDUCTED A VERY THOROUGH BATTLEFIELD TUNNAGE WITH AIR DIVISION, BEFORE DEPARTING FOR JALIBTH TO RE-FUEL + RE-ARM. I BELIEVE THAT WHERE WE WERE CONDUCTING THE BATTLEFIELD TUNNAGE, THERE WERE A-10'S CONDUCTING ATTACKS ON TARGETS IN THE CITY. I DONT RECALL WHO THE FIC

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WAS WHO WAS CONTROLLING THE A-10'S FROM
MY POSITION IN THE FLIGHT (I WAS RE-
SPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING LOCAL SECURITY TO
THE CO'S AND SMOOR'S COBRAS) I DID NOT
WITNESS ANY OF THE A-10 ATTACKS.
HOWEVER, I DO REMEMBER HEARING A
COMMENT FROM THE CO OVER THE RADIO
SAYING, IN EFFECT, THAT A-10'S WERE ON
STATION AND ENGAGING TARGETS IN THE
CITY. OUR DIVISION STAYED ON THE
EASTERN PORTION OF THE CITY FOR THE
NEXT HOUR BEFORE BINGOING FOR FUEL.
WE DID NOT ENGAGE ANY TARGETS
DURING THE ENTIRE TIME ON STATION
FROM \approx 1330-1530.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

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Interview with Cobra pilots

Captain (b)(6)

1Lt (b)(6)

COL (b)(6) If you would please both state your name, rank, social security number, squadron.

CAPT (b)(6) Captain (b)(6) XXX-XX-XXXX, HMLA-269.

1LT (b)(6) First Lieutenan (b)(6) XXX-XX-XXXX, HMLA-269.

COL (b)(6) My name is Colonel (b)(6) and we're in the process of investigating a friendly fire incident that happened in the vicinity of An Nasiriyah, Iraq on 23 March 2003. The board president is Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins. The purpose of the investigation is determine facts and circumstances surrounding the incident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. It will be a public record. I want you both to understand that there is no confidentiality throughout this. Do you both swear to tell the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

CAPT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

LI (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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COL (b)(6) What I'd like you to do...when you were out in An Nasiriyah on the 23rd, relate to me the events during the second sortie that transpired...where you operated, what you saw, particularly focusing on the conversations you heard between the FAC, MOUTH and the A-10s.

CAPT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. The FAC said we got the call to push up just north of the river here. Set up overwatch position for the tanks, we were under the control of MOUTH at that time, and that was our main objective basically, to assure the security of the M-1s. We set up in this area, here in the brush area, keeping up speed. Basically a three-ship at that time, 24, CO, and myself. Myself being on the right flank, the skipper on the left flank and we had another Cobra in the back doing a lazy eight, to protect us, for general security. At that time, the times were hazy, I'm sure it was before noon. I saw the flack. I saw the triple A, were going up. I saw it on my right flank. So, I'm on the right flank, and I'm looking. It has to be somewhere north of where we're at. About here.

COL (b)(6) And you're someplace over here?

CAPT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. We just...we worked this area and we bumped across the river.

COL (b)(6) And the grid is about 220...

LT (b)(6) Grid 220 345.

COL (b)(6) 220 345?

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CAPT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. At that point I could hear basic pieces of the conversation between MOUTH and the A-10. I was really concentrating on ...obviously what was going on in our section. I heard A-10 doing his run, setting up. MOUTH was talking to him. I heard him abort. I looked over, I saw the black smoke that's characteristic of the triple A. At that point, I don't know if it was me or DASH 2 that came. And one aircraft dropped one bomb. I saw the smoke, the impacts. The FAC said great hits. Go ahead and re-attack. At that point, I saw three more hits in the general vicinity. He's passing the BDA to him. I don't recall what it was. At no time did I hear friendly fire, Blue on Blue or any visual signal for cease fire.

COL (b)(6) Did you hear the A-10 pilots call AAA fire?

CAPT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. I heard him say they're shooting and that was the reason why, the abort, from my understanding of the radio traffic. They were shooting up. I never saw them visually. I tried to acquire them as much as I could, but again, I was moving myself, just to keep airspeed on the aircraft.

COL (b)(6) Do you have anything to add that you saw from your perspective?

LT (b)(6) Well, Sir, I didn't actually see the A-10. I didn't see them work around the area. I can't really say. We were pretty busy within our section.

COL (b)(6) I understand.

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LT (b)(6) I personally recall there being some sort of friendly fire. I recall a call being put out that there was friendly fire or possible friendly fire and I believe that was by the FAC.

CAPT (b)(6) I heard that.

LT (b)(6) We had no visual on any of that. It was out of our area at the time.

COL (b)(6) Did you hear the conversations between the FAC and the A-10?

LT (b)(6) I don't really recall, Sir.

COL (b)(6) I know there was a lot going on. You guys _____. Do you have anything else then?

LT (b)(6) No, Sir.

COL (b)(6) In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and not to discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

CAPT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

LT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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Interview with Major (b)(6) USA

CAPT (b)(6) : Captain (b)(6) with Major (b)(6) and Major (b)(6)

concerning the 23rd March incident near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. My name is Capt (b)(6)

Under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we are investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident, and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public.

Additionally the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

MAJ (b)(6) Yes.

CAPT (b)(6) Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

MAJ (b)(6) Yes.

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CAPT (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MAJ (b)(6) Yes.

CAPT (b)(6) Alright, Sir, if you could, for the record, please state your name, rank, unit and current job here?

MAJ (b)(6) : Major (b)(6) United States Army, currently ground liaison officer to the 332nd AEW.

CAPT (b)(6) Your normal unit?

MAJ (b)(6) 411th Ground Liasion Attachment, Montana Army National Guard.

CAPT (b)(6) The purpose of calling you in, we're just trying to get some clarification on I guess the investigation into a potential, at that time, potential friendly fire incident from 23 March. We understand that you may have gotten a phone call from Maj (b)(6) at day.

MAJ (b)(6) I personally didn't. I've heard rumors about this, but it could have been another incident, entirely. I have nothing specific on this incident.

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CAPT (b)(6) OK. I guess we have no further questions for you.

MAJ (b)(6) Nothing in our records seems to indicate anything, either.

CAPT (b)(6) Had any of the pilots approached you at all? Did you have phone conversations?

MAJ (b)(6) I heard one conversation in Tallil which would have happened about a week and a half to two weeks after that, about a potential one. But it was referenced...originally it was called an A-10 one, but none of them had claimed to done it...and that was apparently a Navy pilot, and it was on a supply convoy. But again, that was rumor control, I have nothing to verify it.

MAJ (b)(6) Sir, do you know anybody else...this is Major (b)(6) anybody else who would have worked on the 23rd? Capt (b)(6)

MAJ (b)(6) (b)(6) Possibly SFC (b)(6) He is with us. Capt (b)(6) to _____ . They went north somewhere. I'm not really sure where. They should be back this evening. You can probably talk to them tomorrow.

MAJ (b)(6) Go ahead and spell that last name.

MAJ (b)(6) (b)(6) SFC, my NCO.

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MAJ (b)(6) : Thank you.

CAPT (b)(6) Those are all the questions we have.

MAJ (b)(6) Not a problem, I just, I know we got to make it quick.

CAPT (b)(6) Just a real quick closing. I want to remind you that this is an official interview and not to discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

MAJ (b)(6) OK.

CAPT (b)(6) Thank you, Sir.

MAJ (b)(6) No problem.

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Interview with Capt (b)(6), USA
25th Infantry Division
CFLCC C-3, 332 AEW, GLO

2 May 2003

Parties present:

MAJ (b)(6) USAF
CAPT (b)(6) TISAF
(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6) This is Capt (b)(6) with Maj (b)(6) the legal advisor to the board, Capt Duckworth being the pilot member of the board. We're with Capt (b)(6) the ground liaison officer here at Al Jaber Air Base. My name is Capt (b)(6) and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

CAPT (b)(6) I do.

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CAPT (b)(6) Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

CAPT (b)(6) Yes.

CAPT (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

CAPT (b)(6) I do.

CAPT (b)(6) I guess really the big thing, we're just trying to make sure we get on record the conversation the pilots had with you concerning the incident, or at the time, the Pop Go incident. And, I understand that they had already spoken with Major (b)(6) but then they followed up with you. Is that correct?

CAPT (b)(6) I don't know if they had talked with Maj (b)(6) or not. But, they did come to me during my shift, and this is like shortly after they had landed, but I can't tell you the time difference between when they landed and came to me. They came to me shortly after they landed asking about, "Hey, did you hear anything about some sort of friendly fire incident or anything like that?" At that time, I looked at all my sources, which is like...the chat rooms that I have opened, any kind of email traffic, and then also any kind of significant activity traffic

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that shows up also. I had not either gotten a phone call, not seen anything on email, not seen anything on chat, not seen anything on significant activities, and those are all CFLCC sources, not CENTAF or CFAC or anything. And, I had not seen anything until they asked me about it, "Hey, have you heard anything, have you seen anything?" I, at that time had not seen or heard anything. So, I went to check those sources again. I said, "No. There's nothing indicating that there'd been anything that was being reported." So I told them, "No. I haven't heard anything." And, they asked me, "Would you have heard anything?" And I said, "Well, if something had happened, you know...we, i.e. either us at the GLO or us as the wing would have heard something." And, I said, quote, unquote, "Before you would've landed, we would have heard something." And, because of that, also, I kept an eye out for anything over the next few days. You know, like on the SITREPs 24 hour SITREPS that came out, things like that, to see if anything showed up. But I never saw anything, any mention, any reference to any kind of fratricide incident, any kind of large one in that vicinity.

CAPT (b)(6) Had you heard about, like later on, had you heard about any other of the fratricide incidents?

CAPT (b)(6) Yeah.

CAPT (b)(6) How fast did that information get to you?

CAPT (b)(6) Oh, boy...

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CAPT (b)(6) That you can remember.

CAPT (b)(6) Yeah, yeah...A lot of them ended up coming through...first, I would hear about the other fratricides and it would be on the chat room, the mission director list we were reviewing. There would be something on there saying, you know, like: we have a report of this happening, and then shortly after that, and I would say within hours, not like a few, but within like maybe max a couple of hours, I would see something across my channels from the CFLCC mentioning a fratricide incident.

CAPT (b)(6) So, within two hours, the mission director maybe catching wind of it, you would hear something from the CFLCC channel?

CAPT (b)(6) Yeah. That would be fair to say, within two hours, sometimes shorter, sometimes maybe a little bit longer than that. So, I would get something through my channels, also shortly after the mission director, saying something to that effect also.

CAPT (b)(6) The pilots are on...in this case...did they come back to you after that to check up on it?

CAPT (b)(6) Yeah. After I told them that I hadn't seen anything. I did not hear from them. You know...it was...a...I didn't see anything else on it. So, it became a non-issue. Then after a...I'd say a couple of weeks, they came back to me asking specifically for the SITREPS that we were covering that day and then a couple of subsequent days, to find out if

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anything was going on because by that time, they were telling me that, "OK. Well people are looking into it again." The word was coming through, as far as I know, Air Force channels, because I had not heard anything through Army channels, about it being an issue, that people were considering it as if it were a Blue on Blue engagement. Like I said, they were coming back to me and they were asking me, "Hey, can we have...Do you have any kind of documentation that covers that time period, that we can use to look in to see if there's any reference to any kind of Blue on Blue engagement?" So, I gave that to them. I printed out the SITREPS starting on the day of and then several days after that. I gave that to Lt ...Intel, (b)(6) the Intel guy.

CAPT (b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6) (b)(6) ..There you go (b)(6) He did tell me he looked through them. I did know to what detail he read them or anything, like that, but that there was nothing in there. I personally did not review the SITREPS again, _____ provided to them, and that was the end of it.

CAPT (b)(6) OK. And that's the last you had heard about it until...?

CAPT (b)(6) Yeah, and that was it until, you know...you gentlemen came and asked me about it also, there was an actual getting into an investigation. That's the next thing I found out about it.

CAPT (b)(6) Maj (b)(6) do you have any follow up questions?

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MAJ (b)(6) I have a couple. I don't think we went on tape formally to... Would you state your name, rank, spell your last name so that we know how to spell.

CAPT (b)(6) OK, yeah. My name is (b)(6) Captain, Aviation, United States Army.

MAJ (b)(6) And what unit are you assigned with?

CAPT (b)(6) I'm currently assigned officially to the 25th Infantry Division in Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and I'm over here tasked out as an individual augmentee to the CFLCC C-3, and then given to the 332nd as a ground liaison officer.

MAJ (b)(6) And, you had also stated your shift. What was your shift on that day, when the pilots came in?

CAPT (b)(6) Oh boy, myself and two other GLOs rotated shifts as the need was made. Usually, I have to be like 6 o'clock in the morning to about 1 o'clock in the afternoon shift. So, it would have been like 5 or 6 o'clock in the morning to like around 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and _____. If I remember it correctly, and I...this is not 100% ...that came by in the morning. I know it was daytime when they stopped by. It was not during the nighttime shift.

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MAJ (b)(6) By they, you mean both the pilots showed up?

CAPT (b)(6) I don't know for sure, not 100% sure if it was both pilots or just one.

MAJ (b)(6) That's all I have.

CAPT (b)(6) Before closing remarks, we many come back with more questions at another time. In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

CAPT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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Interview with 2Lt (b)(6)
332 EFS, Sandy Intelligence.
2 May 2003

Parties present:

MAJ (b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6)

(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6) Members of this interview, Capt (b)(6) pilot advisor to the board, and Maj (b)(6) legal advisor to the board, and Lt (b)(6) one of the intelligence officers here on base. My name is Capt (b)(6) and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

2LT (b)(6) I do.

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CAPT (b)(6) Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

2LT (b)(6) Yes.

CAPT (b)(6) Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

2LT (b)(6) I do.

CAPT (b)(6) If you could, please, just state your name, rank, and your unit.

2LT (b)(6) 2Lt (b)(6) and deployed unit 332 EFS, Sandy Intel, original unit from the states is 172nd Fighter Squadron, Battle Creek, Michigan.

CAPT (b)(6) And what's your job here at Al Jaber?

2LT (b)(6) Intelligence Officer.

CAPT (b)(6) Working under the wing, or for the squadron?

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2LT (b)(6) Working for the squadron.

CAPT (b)(6) Real quick, could you just walk us through a typical pilot interview, and what...I've also brought the copy of the debrief form that you handed me the other day.

2LT (b)(6) Typically what we do is the pilot comes in after he's done flying...comes into the Air Field Management trailer where debrief is taking place, and they come into the building and we ask them to sit down or would you like water? And we start the debrief. I have a debrief form, and I ask them their call sign, mission number, mission type, and then standard questions...are the time you took off, the time you landed, engine shutdown, the time you were in the AOR, and the time you left the AOR. And then they go into more specifics, as far as, right down to the target location. Then, for each target location, I ask them the target name, if it was a building, vehicles, or troops. Then I ask them target coordinates and then ask them the TOTs of the time they dropped. Then, I ask them the heading, altitude, air-speed, slant range and dive angle that they used for each target. I ask if they were successful or not successful, if they saw any secondaries or smoke from the target area.

CAPT (b)(6) And you also ask what type of ordinance. Is that normally included in there?

2LT (b)(6) Yes.

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CAPT (b)(6) Once you're done with this, are there additional...after they're done talking about any type of weapons delivery, or different targets; is there any other pieces of information that you try to gather from them?

LT (b)(6) Yes, there is. After you're done with all the targets, info I ask them if they saw any Triple A, any SAFIRES, report any RWR indications, and then if that is the case, I may go through different aspects and ask them what happened, what's the range, what the target location was, what their SAFIRE was about, etc. Then after every target, we ask them their weather, how was the weather in that target area.

CAPT (b)(6) In the process of getting information on the attacks and that type of thing, do you normally watch tapes with the pilots?

2LT (b)(6) Usually...not always. It just depends. Some of the time, the pilots would go in and put the tape in the player, and we'd start asking them questions. I truly...I can't remember if we did that or not with this set of pilots. If I was then in there taking the debrief when they were reviewing or not. But that's what sometimes occurs, and then they're watching the tape and filling out the info for the debrief at the same time.

CAPT (b)(6) OK, and taking that directly from the tape, or having them review it?

2LT (b)(6) Right.

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CAPT (b)(6) Then, once you've gotten all this information, how long before you write the report?

2LT (b)(6) 5 minutes later. Right after, right when they leave the door, I'm starting to type.

CAPT (b)(6) Is there a time limit on that?

2LT (b)(6) We have a 2 hour time limit to get the report out.

CAPT (b)(6) And that starts when?

2LT (b)(6) From the time the engine shuts down.

CAPT (b)(6) Engine shutdown. If you have like follow up question for them later on, how do you go about doing that?

2LT (b)(6) We work them through Intrep, Intelligence Report, and put in any information we missed or that we wanted to change.

CAPT (b)(6) And that's something that can happen after that 2 hour period as long as the MISREP is filed within that 2 hours?

2LT (b)(6) Yes.

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CAPT (b)(6) | During this campaign, what typically were you doing, maybe not specifically in this case, but what do you typically do with tapes once they're done reviewing them, or once they're done looking at them?

2LT (b)(6) | Typically, we would put a label on them, put their target type, the mission number, the pilots, and what they expended, what the weapons system video guys should be looking for, and rubber band it, put a rubber band around the tape, and then submit it to the weapons systems video people at the end of the day...whenever we were available and could submit it to the wing.

CAPT (b)(6) | That's targets over at the EOC?

2LT (b)(6) | Yes, Sir.

CAPT (b)(6) | Did all pilots turn in tapes to you?

2LT (b)(6) | No, Sir.

CAPT (b)(6) | Do you remember on this specific day if anybody turned a tape into you? Either of the two pilots that were, that we're talking about.

2 LT (b)(6) | No, Sir. I don't remember.

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CAPT (b)(6) Do you happen to remember...you have a copy of the MISREP...Do you remember specifically them telling you about surface to air fire on that mission?

2LT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. It was a SAFIRE event. I think I put it in the MISREP report.

CAPT (b)(6) Are you remembering it from that MISREP or are you remembering it from the conversation with the pilots?

2LT (b)(6) I'm remembering it from the MISREP.

CAPT (b)(6) Once the tapes go to the targets, do you...how do they get them back, or what's the process that goes on once they get those tapes?

2LT (b)(6) They're supposed to review the tapes, and then after they review them, put them in the outbox, and the squadron will pick them up. We know which ones are ours because they still have the labels on them, and then we give them back to the pilots.

CAPT (b)(6) And you try to give them back to those specific pilots?

2LT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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CAPT (b)(6) Those labels you're talking about are the ones that are stuck to the side, or are they just...?

2LT (b)(6) They're just rubber banded onto the tape.

CAPT (b)(6) I think that's about all I...

MAJ (b)(6) Maj (b)(6) here. You said on the tape, I know you're from Battle Creek, the pilots are from Pennsylvania, Willow Grove. Would you have done the same thing in marking the tape for them, even though it wasn't your squadron?

2LT (b)(6) Yes, Sir. We did the same thing for all three squadrons we debriefed, _____ the squadrons.

MAJ (b)(6) You say...I also note on the piece of paper, which is your checklist for how you debrief...right now, it's got SECRET top and bottom. I assume that that's when it's filled out. Right now it's unclassified in its present form?

2LT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

CAPT (b)(6) And would you typically get mission tapes from other squadrons, and you would go ahead turn those in as well?

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2LT (b)(6) We would, Sir. But, we did not always get 100%. I'm not even truly saying 50% tapes back.

CAPT (b)(6) OK. Tapes back from the pilots.

2LT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

MAJ (b)(6) Do you know a reason for that?

2LT (b)(6) Several different reasons. Most of the time, the pilots wanted to review their tapes before they gave them to Intel. When that happened, we usually wouldn't get them. Intel wouldn't get them after that. And, so, we would request them...for that reason, we needed them before, and they could review them after. But, the pilots like to get their own tapes to review their missions too for the debriefs. Another possibility is that they're afraid, the pilots, were not going to get their tapes back. So, they were worried about that, and they wanted it for their history purposes.

CAPT (b)(6) With the... This is kind of a hypothetical...with the time frame that you're working under, was it ever possible to get several MISREPs and then go and type them...type several of them up at the same time?

2LT (b)(6) Very possible.

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CAPT (b)(6) Is it possible to transfer information from, let's say, one group of pilots would pass to you that they saw something and then another group of pilots did not, but then that ends up going two different MISREP? Could that be?

2LT (b)(6) It could have happened, Sir. But, everytime I get a pilot coming in...if I had 3 of them at the same time, 3 different mission that's happened, I would take a separate debrief form for each mission. And then, so after you had 3 different missions, 3 different MISREPs and then you're trying from the 1st MISREP to go and remember what happened, it is possible you could remember differently.

CAPT (b)(6) But, when you try to take notes...as far as taking notes, what was...I guess kind of your personal techniques as far as taking those notes?

2LT (b)(6) I would try to write everything down the pilot told me on the MISREP. So, therefore I could remember and write in a narrative form what happened.,

CAPT (b)(6) On page 4 of this one has all the information for the surface to air fire, and then also the weather. I just wanted to verify the other day when you and I spoke, you had mentioned something about not...in this case, you weren't sure if you'd used this page. Is that correct?

2LT (b)(6) That's correct. I don't think I used a fourth page.

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CAPT (b)(6) So, in that case you would have taken the notes on a different page?

2LT (b)(6) I would have just put it on the side of the sheet, yeah.

CAPT (b)(6) I think that was all the questions that I had.

MAJ (b)(6) The only question I have...After you're done with the notes to type up the MISREP report, what do you do with the notes?

2LT (b)(6) We kept them, just for a day, and then we shredded them, which was a big lesson learned.

MAJ (b)(6) Thank you. That's all I have.

CAPT (b)(6) Just a closing. In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

2LT (b)(6) Yes, Sir.

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CALLSIGN: _____ MSN: _____ MSN TYPE: _____

TOF TIME: _____ Z LAND TIME: _____ Z

CONFIG: _____ TGT COORDS: _____

#1 #2

TGT NAME: _____ TGT COORDS _____ TOT: _____ Z WPN: _____

HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

RESULT SUCCESSFUL OR UNSUCCESSFUL OR BDA:

#1 #2

TGT NAME: _____ TGT COORDS _____ TOT: _____ Z WPN: _____

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HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

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RESULT SUCCESSFUL OR UNSUCCESSFUL OR BDA:

#1 #2

TGT NAME: _____ TGT COORDS _____ TOT: _____ Z WPN: _____

30MM x 100rds 150rds 200rds _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

AGM-65 D/G _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

MK-82LD _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

LAU-131 2.75" FFAR RKTS _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

RESULT SUCCESSFUL OR UNSUCCESSFUL OR BDA: _____

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AGM-65 D/G _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

MK-82LD _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

LAU-131 2.75" FFAR RKTS _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

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30MM x 100rds 150rds 200rds _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

AGM-65 D/G _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

MK-82LD _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

LAU-131 2.75" FFAR RKTS _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

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AGM-65 D / G HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

MK-82LD HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

LAU-131 2.75" FFAR RKTS HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

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TGT NAME: _____ TGT COORDS _____ TOT: _____ Z WPN: _____

30MM x 100rds 150rds 200rds _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

AGM-65 D / G HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

MK-82LD HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

LAU-131 2.75" FFAR RKTS HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

RESULT SUCCESSFUL OR UNSUCCESSFUL OR BDA: _____

#1 #2

TGT NAME: _____ TGT COORDS _____ TOT: _____ Z WPN: _____

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MK-82LD HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

LAU-131 2.75" FFAR RKTS HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____


RESULT SUCCESSFUL OR UNSUCCESSFUL OR BDA: _____

EA/JAM

TARWI

ESM

RWR SYMBOL _____ ACFT LOCAL _____ TIME _____ Z DURATION _____
BEARING _____ INTCPT DIST _____ SIGNAL POS _____ ACFT ALT _____ HDG _____



SAFIRE

WPN TYPE _____ # _____ ACFT LOCAL _____ TIME _____ Z BEARING _____
ALT OF BURST _____ COLOR: WHT YELL BLUE GRN ORNG LNCH LOCAL _____
COUNTERTACTICS _____
ACFT ALT _____ HDG _____

SIGHTINGS/TGTS

TAB L

Tab L

Expanded Narrative of the Events of 23 Mar 03

Narrative..... L-3

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
FRIENDLY FIRE INVESTIGATION BOARD
APO AE 09888

9 May 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM F. HODGKINS

FROM: Marine Corps Advisor, Friendly Fire Investigation Board (FFIB)

SUBJECT: Detailed Sequence of Events

1. (U) Ground Picture.

a. (U) Early on 23 March 1st Battalion 2nd Marines launched out of their defensive positions in Jalabah and staged on the Main Supply Route (MSR), route 7/8, heading north towards An Nasiriyah, Iraq. Team Tank lead the way followed in trace by Team Mech, the Forward Command Post, Alpha Company, and Charlie Company. The plan was to approach the city in a column formation and attack to seize the eastern bridges in An Nasiriyah. The seizure of the eastern bridges was a "be prepared to" mission, until the evening of the 22nd of March when higher headquarters ordered the Battalion to execute.

b. (U) Approximately 10 kilometers south of An Nasiriyah the battalion came under artillery and mortar fire. They also began to take machine gun and small arms fire as they proceeded north. The Battalion stopped along the MSR to clear out buildings on either side from which they had been taking small arms fire. At approximately 0600Z the TF Tarawa Commander and the Commanding Officer of RCT 2 approached the Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion 2nd Marines and explained to him that he needed to bypass the small arms fire and seize the eastern bridges of An Nasiriyah in order to allow the two RCTs following in trace of his Battalion to pass over the bridges and proceed north towards Baghdad.

c. (U) The Battalion continued its movement north receiving sporadic indirect mortar and artillery fire and small arms fire. Prior to reaching the outskirts of the city, Team Tank (the lead element), came upon a small dwelling complex and received mortar and small arms fire. They returned fire with their machine guns and main tank guns. Shortly after this engagement a Humvee approached them and a US Army soldier came out of it yelling that they had been ambushed further north. Team Tank notified the command post (CP) that they had encountered seven US Army survivors from a convoy that had been ambushed by forces inside the city. Team Tank pushed the survivors to the rear of the column and when they reached the CP the Army soldiers notified the Battalion that there were an additional 5 wounded soldiers forward. The Battalion pushed Team Tank forward to find and rescue the additional US Army soldiers. The Battalion also pushed Team Mech and Alpha Company forward to handle the engagement to their immediate front. Team Tank located the 5 soldiers in the vicinity of the An Nasiriyah railroad bridge to the south of the city and evacuated them to the rear of the column.

d. (U) Team Tank, which had been racing back and forth in front of the lead column, was now critically low on fuel. Fuel was available however each tank could only take (b)(1)1.4a and could (b)(1)1.4a The

Commander of TF Tarawa and the RCT 2 Commander arrived on scene and relayed to the Battalion Commander that, according to higher headquarters, there were still 12 soldiers missing from the Army convoy. The Task Force Tarawa Commanders Intent, passed to 1st Battalion 2nd Marines Commander, was to rapidly seize the eastern bridges of An Nasiriyah and to find any of the survivors who may have still been along the MSR within the city of An Nasiriyah.¹

e. U The original mission called for Team Tank to establish a support by fire position south of the Euphrates river, so that Alpha Company could seize the bridge. At which point, Team Mech would pass through Alpha, continue north and establish a support by fire position and pass through objective 2, the Saddam Canal. Alternatively Team Mech would provide support by fire for Charlie Company to seize the Saddam Canal, and then Team Mech would push through and seize objective 3 at the T intersection north of the northern bridge.²

f. U All of the Battalion's tanks were now in the rear refueling. The Battalion rapidly advanced towards An Nasiriyah with Team Mech in the lead followed by Alpha Company on the right flank and Charlie Company on the left flank. Alpha and Charlie Companies were moving forward in a bounding over-watch in trace of Team Mech.

g. U As the Battalion approached the railroad bridge to the south of the city they received increasing direct fire and received reports of tanks to their front. Team Mech backed off and the Battalion Commander sent a Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) forward to engage the T-55 tanks observed to their front. There were a total of 9 T-55s engaged. Three tanks had finished refueling and re-joined Team Mech as they proceeded north towards the Euphrates River Bridge. The enemy fire slackened and the Battalion pressed ahead to take the southern most bridge over the Euphrates River.³

h. U After crossing the southern bridge Alpha Company remained by the bridge to secure it for the passage of Charlie Company and Team Tank while Team Mech proceeded approximately 1000 meters north into the city and turned to the east. The plan was for Team Mech to sweep north on the salt flats 2000 meters east of the urban area and bypass what was referred to as "Ambush Alley". Charlie Company was supposed to follow in trace of Team Mech and the Forward CP to the east, then pass through and seize the bridge. Team Mech and Team Tank were supposed to establish a support by fire position to support Charlie Company's seizure of the northern bridge.⁴

i. U Team Mech turned east and proceeded about 800 meters, muddy conditions stopped their advance. The Command AAV for Team Mech the C-7, and the alternate Command AAV, the P-7, two tanks, and a Humvee sunk into the mud. The Battalion Commander attempted to contact Charlie Company to tell them not to follow in trace but to push to seize the bridge over the Saddam Canal. Charlie Company had crossed the southern bridge and their Commander observed that Alpha Company had taken up positions to the west of the MSR and had spread out

¹ Tab J, Interview with 1st Battalion 2nd Marines Commanding Officer and Forward Air Controller for Team Tank.

² Tab J, Interview with Operations Officer, 1st Battalion 2nd Marines.

³ Tab J, Interview with 1st Battalion 2nd Marines Commanding Officer.

⁴ Tab J, Interview with Operations Officer, 1st Battalion 2nd Marines.

into the city. During this time both companies were engaged by small arms fire. The Charlie Company Commander tried to ascertain the location of Team Mech but was unable to communicate with them or the Forward CP. With Alpha company on his left flank he made the assumption that Team Mech had gone straight up the MSR through Ambush Alley with Tanks in the lead to seize the northern bridge over the Saddam Canal. Believing this to be one of the briefed options to the original plan he pushed his company north through "Ambush Alley". The Company began to take heavy fire from RPGs and small arms as it moved north.⁵

j. **U** As Charlie Company approached the bridge, the Commander still did not see Team Mech but assumed that they had pushed north of the bridge. He understood his mission to be to secure the southern and northern approaches to the bridge to allow Team Tank, and the rest of the Battalion, to push through. While crossing the bridge a RPG struck the right rear of the lead AAV of 3rd Platoon Charlie Company. The AAV immediately caught fire. The Platoon Commander who was on board identified that they had four casualties. He lost communications and ordered the driver to continue north and clear the bridge. The AAV halted 300-500 meters north of the bridge, the troops evacuated it, and it burst into flames. The Platoon Commander ordered his machine gun team to set up on the west side of the MSR and moved the remainder of his personnel to a berm on the east side of the MSR. Seven Marines moved the 4 casualties to the Charlie Company First Sergeants AAV, the designated medical evacuation AAV, which had just pulled up.⁶

k. **U** After crossing the bridge the Charlie Company Commander ordered his company to get on line and halted them 300-400 meters north of the bridge in tactical formation. Charlie Company had 11 AAVs and 3 - 4 Humvees north of the bridge. One AAV had broken down south of the northern bridge. Testimony indicates that approximately 3 AAVs were oriented north of the burning AAV with 4 or 5 on the western side of the MSR and 1 or 2 east of the MSR. The company was not receiving a lot of fire and troops began to dismount the AAVs to provide security and to deal with their medevacs. The Commander realized that Team Mech was not in front of him and that he was lead trace. He called the Battalion Commander and notified him that Charlie had seized the northern bridge, and had halted at the 39 northing with 4 medevacs. The Battalion Commander was surprised to hear that Charlie Company was on the northern bridge but elated that they had taken the objective. He immediately notified higher headquarters that both bridges were secure.

l. **U** North of the bridge Charlie Company began taking fire from both the north and south of their positions. Witnesses describe taking small arms, RPG, mortar and artillery fire. The artillery fire was described as variable timed (VT) and they believed that an observer was adjusting it on to their positions. The road that they were on was elevated and the Iraqis had built 15-20 meter high berms on either side. While this provided cover from small arms fire from the north, it prevented the Company from maneuvering to the north. Maneuvering north would require them to proceed in column formation up the MSR between the berms. Approximately 700-800 meters to their north was a 23rd Iraqi Infantry Division building from which they could see Iraqi troops engaging them. The elevated road and the berms also meant that the company was extremely vulnerable to enemy fire from their rear. Immediately south of the northern bridge

⁵ Tab J, Interview with 1st Battalion 2nd Marines Commanding Officer and Commanding Officer Charlie Company.

⁶ Tab J, Interview CO Charlie Company and CO 3rd Platoon, Charlie Company.

and west of the MSR was an area known as the Martyr's district. Both indirect and direct fires were coming from this location as well.⁷

2. (U) Forward Air Controller Picture.

a. (U) During the battle of An Nasiriyah the Battalion Air Officer was located with the Forward CP in a Command and Control variant of an AAV, the C-7. Additionally there were 3 Forward Air Controllers (FACs) located with 3 of the 4 maneuver companies, Alpha Company, Team Tank, and Team Mech. Charlie Company did not have a FAC during the battle. The Battalion Air Officer's UHF radio had been damaged and on the 23rd of March he was only able to communicate very briefly with his FACs and a single UH-1 aircraft early in the engagement. Throughout the rest of the day he did not have UHF communications, which meant that he could not talk to or receive communications with any aircraft nor could he listen as the FACs controlled air. The Battalion Air Officer also had intermittent communications with higher headquarters throughout the battle. As the Battalion's Fwd CP moved forward and crossed the railroad bridge the Battalion Air Officer lost all communication with higher headquarters. He made a call to the Team Mech FAC directing him to get on guard and contact any aircraft to get them some help, because he could not do anything for him right now. Shortly after that call he lost communications with all of his FACs.⁸

b. (U) The first attack aircraft to show up on the morning of the 23rd were two Cobra's who arrived at Team Tank's position as they were approached by the Army Humvee from the 507th Maintenance convoy south of the railroad bridge. Team Tank's FAC employed the Cobra's against a small housing complex and then deeper to his front into a tree line. He also employed the Cobra's and a section of AV-8 Harriers against T-55 tanks and 2 ZSU-23-4s located to his front. Team Tank moved to the south to rejoin the Battalion and refuel. Team Mech took the lead with their FAC "MOUTH" controlling the air in front of the Battalion. MOUTH directed a section of Cobra's north to screen the companies front for enemy troops. The Cobras found three Iraqi T-55 tanks and destroyed them with Hellfire missiles. When the Cobras ran low on fuel MOUTH asked them to re-arm, refuel and return with more assets. The Cobras complied. Cobra aircraft flew in support of the 1st Battalion 2nd Marines throughout the day and in to the evening of 23 March. From the time Team Mech moved from south of the railroad bridge until they became stuck in mud, MOUTH did not have contact with the Battalion Air Officer and controlled all air for the Battalion. When Team Mech became bogged down east of the MSR they were taking intense small arms and RPG fire, at this point the Battalion Air Officer was finally able to reach MOUTH by radio and directed him to call on guard to request air support.

c. (U) Almost immediately after making the call on guard numerous flights of fixed wing aircraft checked in with MOUTH and he stacked them overhead waiting for a FAC(A) capable F/A-18D or F-14 to check in. MOUTH's intent was to send them north of the bridge to find and destroy enemy reinforcements or enemy waiting to ambush them at the bridge. The incident flight of A-10s checked in shortly after and MOUTH sent them north of the Saddam Canal to find targets.⁹

⁷ Tab J, Interview with Marines from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

⁸ Tab J, Interview with Air Officer, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

⁹ Tab J, Interview with Team Tank FAC, 1st Battalion 2nd Marines, Tab H, Statement of Capt. (b)(6)

3. (U) Air Picture.

a. (U) GYRATE 73 flight took off from Al Jaber and proceeded to a tanker. Following air refueling, they heard a radio call on UHF "Guard frequency from a FAC asking for CAS in the vicinity of An Nasiriyah. GYRATE 73 flight was passing An Nasiriyah and answered the call. Upon check-in they spoke with the FAC for tasking.

b. (U) For approximately 15 minutes, GYRATE 73 attempted to ascertain MOUTH's position. In the process, GYRATE 74 believed that he had acquired the FAC's position and requested the tactical lead from GYRATE 73. Once he had the tactical lead, GYRATE 74 states that he asked MOUTH if he could employ rockets north of the suspected friendly position in order to verify MOUTH's position. He stated in his testimony that MOUTH cleared GYRATE 74 to employ rockets, which were high explosive and not white phosphorous and that MOUTH did not see the rocket impacts, and could not provide a verification of his position off of those impacts. When asked about whether or not GYRATE requested the use of rockets to verify his position MOUTH in his testimony had no recollection of this. The 332nd AEW weapons element logbook noted that GYRATE 74 employed 3 rockets.¹⁰

4. (U) Final Incident.

a. (U) North of the Saddam Canal, GYRATE 73 saw a large plume of black smoke that he determined was a burning vehicle in the center of the MSR. GYRATE 73 asked MOUTH if he could see the vehicle, to which MOUTH replied that he could see the smoke. GYRATE 73 also identified 8 to 10 vehicles located in the vicinity of the burning vehicle and dispersed on both sides of the MSR. Approximately 3 vehicles were on or beside the MSR near the burning vehicle. To the north of the burning vehicle were 4 or 5 vehicles on the western side of the road. To the east of the burning vehicle were an additional 1 or 2 vehicles. Flying at approximately (b)(1)1.4a to negate the briefed Iraqi threats, GYRATE flight attempted to identify the enemy vehicles using (b)(1)1.4a binoculars. In their testimony they described the vehicles as two small white pick-up trucks, other larger trucks.... "kind of cab over, no nose to the truck", and one or two dark colored Mitsubishi style flat bed trucks.

b. (U) GYRATE passed the target location to MOUTH, who asked him to standby while he checked on the location of the Battalions lead vehicles. MOUTH's Fire Support Team leader used the AAV internal communication system to query Team Mechs Company Commander for lead trace. Team Mechs Company Commander attempted to call the Battalion Command to determine lead trace, but he was unable to communicate with them due to the heavy volume of traffic on the net. Unable to communicate with the Battalion and confident that based on the scheme of maneuver Team Mech was the main effort and was lead trace, the Company Commander passed to MOUTH that Team Mech was lead trace. He also passed that he was on the 36 northing and that the northern bridge was at the 40 northing. MOUTH then referenced his gridded overhead photo of the city and compared the two locations. The targets were approximately 3000 meters north and on the other side of the Saddam Canal. MOUTH passed to GYRATE that no friendlies were north of the 38 Grid and no friendlies were north of the canal.

¹⁰ Tab G, Interviews with GYRATE 73/74, Tab H, Statement Capt (b)(6)

He also stated that he passed to GYRATE that he could not observe him or the target area and that he cleared him for Type 3 CAS and directed him to make his runs east to west so as not to endanger Marines or civilians in the town to the South. A Cobra pilot flying in the same area at the time confirmed that he heard MOUTH clear GYRATE flight for Type 3 CAS. GYRATE 73 stated in his testimony that the FAC did not tell him what type of CAS he was running and he believed that he was under positive control by the FAC. GYRATE 74 states that he did not recall any restrictions that MOUTH gave the flight other than that no friendly forces were north of the canal.¹¹

c. (U) GYRATE 74 was the first to engage, he made his first attack run on the vehicles to the east of the MSR and, according to his MISREP dropped 2 MK82LD bombs at 1040Z. (From this point on the pilot witness statements regarding sequence of engagements and ordnance expended are inconsistent with the filed MISREP. There are also inconsistencies with the MISREP but, because the witness statements were taken on 26 April 03 while the MISREP was taken immediately following the flight, the MISREP sequence of events will be utilized throughout the remainder of the final incident summary). GYRATE 73 then engaged the vehicles to the south of the burning vehicle west of the MSR dropping one MK82LD bomb at 1040Z. The aircraft were in a wheel over the vehicles at this time making their runs on multiple headings and releasing their ordnance between (b)(1)1.4a feet. At 1042Z GYRATE 74 engaged the vehicles with his 30MM gun expending (b)(1)1.4a and then re-engaged at 1044Z with another (b)(1)1.4a²

d. (U) From the witness statements obtained from Charlie Company Marines, the first time that anyone realized that A-10s were engaging them was when the A-10 used the 30MM gun. The board believes that Charlie Company Marines mistook the first 3 MK82LD bombs dropped by GYRATE flight as artillery fire. All witnesses remember hearing the very distinct sound that the 30MM gun makes and witnessing multiple weapons impacts. The impact of the 30MM rounds preceded the noise of the gun by a few seconds. Numerous witnesses stated that they saw Marines killed or struck by 30MM rounds and heard or saw AAVs struck by 30MM rounds. During the A-10 engagement numerous witnesses reported either seeing or firing doctrinal ordnance to cease the engagement. None of the signals worked and the A-10s continued to engage friendly forces. With the numbers of killed and injured mounting calls were made to the Fwd CP for MEDEVAC aircraft. Due to heavy fire in the area the decision was made to move the injured on AAVs back through the city to get them aid.¹³

e. (U) At approximately 1045Z MOUTH directed GYRATE flight to proceed to the companies 3rd objective the T intersection to investigate buildings in the vicinity. GYRATE flight moved north to the T intersection but did not see any vehicles or troop movement. Charlie Company Marines had, by this time loaded up 4 AAVs with wounded Marines and these vehicles began moving rapidly south towards the northern bridge. GYRATE flight saw the 4 vehicles moving south towards the bridge. They called MOUTH and told him that vehicles from the northern target sector were progressing into the city. GYRATE flight states that MOUTH said not to let those vehicles get across the bridge.¹⁴

¹¹ Tab H, Statement Capt (b)(6) Tab K, Interview LtCol (b)(6) Tab G, Interviews GYRATE 73/74.

¹² Tab G, Interviews with GYRATE 73/74, Tab H, Statement Capt (b)(6) Tab O, Pilot MISREP.

¹³ Tab J, Interviews with Marines from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

¹⁴ Tab G, Interviews; GYRATE 73/74, Tab J, Interviews Charlie Company Marines, Tab H, Statement Capt (b)(6)

f. (U) At approximately 1055Z GYRATE 74 engaged one of the vehicles as it reached the southern side of the bridge. He fired an AGM-65 Maverick missile at the vehicle; the Maverick missed the vehicle. GYRATE 73 then engaged a vehicle just as it was crossing over the bridge, the Maverick struck the vehicle approximately 100 meters south of the bridge and destroyed it, GYRATE 74 then re-engaged with his second Maverick missile and destroyed a vehicle approximately 200 meters south of the northern bridge. Two additional vehicles were seen moving south through the city. GYRATE flight did not pursue these vehicles because of their proximity to buildings within the city.¹⁵

h. (U) During the A-10 engagement, one of the Platoon Commanders was able to get on a radio and communicate with the Fwd CP telling them that they were under friendly fire. Subsequently MOUTH called "check fire" to the A-10s and told them that there may have been Marines north of the Saddam Canal. The A-10's were low on fuel and returned to base. Following the A-10 engagement on Charlie Company friendly tanks arrived and took up defensive positions to the north of Charlie Company. At that time all enemy fires stopped.¹⁶

b(6)

Marine Corps Advisor

Colonel, USMC

¹⁵ Tab G, Interviews with GYRATE 73/74.

¹⁶ Various interviews

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TAB M

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Excerpts of SPINS

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(b)(1)1.4a

... would be the second version within the listed day.

(U) SPINS change proposals must first be coordinated with the appropriate section OPR. If the proposed change is accepted by the section OPR it will be submitted by the OPR to the SPINS cell in C2 Plans in properly formatted electronic format. SPINS cell will staff proposed changes as appropriate and will post the change once it is approved. Change requests will be in MS Word format IAW the example below.

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¹ Due to the Board's late notification of the incident, this was the only version of the SPINS the Board could obtain. A review of the changes after 23 Mar 03 indicates none of the cited paragraphs were added or changed.

SECTION 5
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

(b)6

5.5.2.

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

5.7.3. (U) AIR-TO-GROUND ENGAGEMENT.

5.7.3.1

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

5.7.3.2

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

5.7.3.3.

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

5.7.3.4.

(b)(1)1.4a

5.7.3.5.

(b)(1)1.4a

5.7.3.6. (U) HARM/ALARM EMPLOYMENT. Every effort should be made to minimize collateral damage in the employment of HARM/ALARM. This includes utilizing Range Known mode to the extent possible and disabling Flex and Glide options when tactically feasible. See paragraph 6.14.6 for specific guidance.

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TAB S

Tab S

**Excerpt of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
Close Air Support Concept of Operations**

ExcerptS-3

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I. (U) KI/CAS Background

A. (U) *Definitions*

1. (U) *Air Interdiction*. Air interdiction is defined as, "air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required."

2. (U) *Armed Reconnaissance*. Armed reconnaissance is defined as "locating and attacking targets of opportunity, i.e., enemy material, personnel, and facilities, in assigned general areas or along assigned ground communication routes, and not for the purpose of attacking specific/located briefed targets." Armed reconnaissance offers the joint commander a capability to address mobile enemy force structure targets enroute to the battlefield.

3. (U) *Killbox Interdiction (KI)*. KI are missions that are flown against non-fixed targets, within killboxes. Due to the fluidity of the battlefield and unpredictable nature of warfare, the targets do not always arrive at the killbox in which they are expected. This requires reconnaissance to be performed to find the intended target sets. That being said, Killbox Interdiction is a combination of Air Interdiction and Armed Reconnaissance conducted within a killbox.

4. (U) *Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance*. SCAR is defined as "a mission flown for the purpose of acquiring and reporting targets and coordinating missions upon those targets." This term is the standard term for the USCENTCOM AOR, replacing such terms as "killer-scout".

5. (U) *Close Air Support*. Close Air Support is defined as "Air action by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces."

a. (U) Kinds of CAS.

(1) (U) Preplanned CAS are those CAS requirements foreseen early enough to be included in the ATO.

(2) (U) Immediate CAS are those CAS requirements that cannot be identified early enough to allow detailed coordination and planning.

b. (U) Types of CAS Control

(1) (U) Type 1 Control. Type 1 control is used when the risk assessment requires JTAC to visually acquire the attacking aircraft and the target under attack. Type 1 is the default method of control.

(2) (U) Type 2 Control. Type 2 is less restrictive than Type 1 control. Type 2 control will be used when the JTAC desire control of individual attacks but assesses that either visual acquisition of the attacking aircraft or target at weapons release is not possible or when attacking aircraft are not in a position to acquire the mark/target prior to weapons release/launch. Examples are night, adverse weather, high threat tactics, and high altitude and standoff weapons employment.

(3) (U) Type 3 Control. Type 3 control is the least restrictive of all measures. Type 3 control may be used when the tactical risk assessment indicates that CAS attacks impose low risk of fratricide. When commanders authorize type 3 control, JTACs grant a "blanket" weapons release clearance to an aircraft or flight attacking a target or targets, which meet the prescribed restrictions, set by the JTAC.

6. (U) *Ground Directed Interdiction*. Ground Directed Interdiction can be described as terminal guidance of interdiction strikes by any delivery system that are directed by ground forces which are not in close proximity to friendly forces and which do not require detailed integration of each mission with the fire and movement of those forces. These ground forces will normally include special operations forces (SOF) operating from isolated observation posts far from the forward line of troops (FLOT), usually outside of CFLCC boundaries. As these strikes are not in close proximity to concentrations of conventional maneuver forces, the risk of fratricide is mitigated and no requirement exists for the same level of detailed integration normally associated with Type 1 or 2 close air support (CAS).

7. (U) *Tactical C2 Platforms*. Defined as USAF E-3B/C(AWACS), E-8C(JSTARS), CRC, USN E-2C, USMC TAOC, DASC, DASC(A), TACC

TAB T





Diagram drawn by Mij. (b)(6)
(b)(6) in 28 APR
interview

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This is the diagram drawn by
Maj (b)(6) (Grate 74) during the
28 April Interview.

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TAB U

Tab U

Statement of Property Damages

Statement U-3

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
FRIENDLY FIRE INVESTIGATION BOARD
APO AE 09888

05 May 03

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM F. HODGKINS

FROM: CDR (b)(6) Administrative Assistant to the Board President, Friendly
Fire Investigation Board (FFIB)

SUBJECT: Property Damage

1. The following US Marine Corps equipment was destroyed or damaged during the time frame of this incident and also while the respective US Marine Corps personnel were engaged in a fierce firefight with Iraqi forces. The identification of the Assault Amphibian Vehicle (Personnel), and the location where the equipment was when it was hit by ordinance, is as follows:

<u>NOMEN</u>	<u>TAMCN</u>	<u>Serial #</u>	<u>Grid Loc</u>
AAV-P7	E0846	522748	223389
AAV-P7	E0846	522948	223385
AAV-P7	E0846	522812	222384
AAV-P7	E0846	522712	221383 vicinity
AAV-P7	E0846	522850	221383 vicinity

All of the above cited grid locations are in close proximity to the bridge, at the north end of the city of An Nasiriyah, Iraq, where the incident under investigation took place.

It is impossible to state with absolute assurance the number of vehicles destroyed, and/or the extent of damage to the vehicles, which was caused by the ordinance discharged by the two A-10 pilots involved in this incident investigation.

2. The above-cited vehicles have an approximate value of 2.2 million dollars each. A request has been made to US Marine Corps for a specific cost estimate of the above-discussed destruction or damaged equipment.

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(b)(6) CDR, USN
Administrative Assistant to the Board President, FFI

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TAB V

Tab V

Weather

AF Form 3803 (Reverse) V-3
Illuminations Table..... V-5

Illumination Table

Station : Saddam Intl, Baghdad
 Location : 31° 10' 00'' N 046° 15' 00'' E

Date : 23 March 2003

Time (Local)	Solar Position (deg)		Lunar Position (deg)		Lunar Percent Illum.	Ground Illumination (mlux)
	Elvation Angle	Azimuth Angle	Elvation Angle	Azimuth Angle		
1200	59.8	179.1	-31.5	260.3	69	94913280.0
1215	59.6	186.6	-34.5	261.8	69	94771912.0
1230	59.0	193.8	-37.5	263.4	69	94251760.0
1245	58.1	200.8	-40.6	264.9	68	93349160.0
1300	56.8	207.3	-43.6	266.6	68	92057904.0
1315	55.2	213.4	-46.7	268.3	68	90369688.0
1330	53.3	218.9	-49.8	270.0	68	88274512.0
1345	51.2	224.0	-52.8	271.9	68	85761600.0
1400	48.8	228.5	-55.9	273.9	68	82820464.0
1415	46.4	232.7	-58.9	276.2	68	79442496.0
1430	43.7	236.5	-61.9	278.6	68	75622840.0
1445	41.0	240.0	-64.9	281.5	68	71362816.0
1500	38.2	243.2	-67.9	284.9	67	66672516.0
1515	35.3	246.2	-70.8	289.0	67	61573764.0
1530	32.3	249.0	-73.6	294.3	67	56103008.0
1545	29.3	251.6	-76.3	301.3	67	50313868.0
1600	26.3	254.0	-78.8	311.2	67	44279020.0
1615	23.2	256.3	-80.9	325.6	67	38090952.0
1630	20.1	258.5	-82.2	346.0	67	31861146.0
1645	16.9	260.7	-82.3	10.1	67	25717394.0
1700	13.7	262.8	-81.2	31.7	67	19799142.0
1715	10.6	264.8	-79.3	47.3	66	14251234.0
1730	7.4	266.8	-76.9	58.0	66	9217388.0
1745	4.3	268.7	-74.2	65.6	66	4838948.5
1800	1.3	270.7	-71.4	71.1	66	1477293.3
1815	-2.3	272.6	-68.5	75.5	66	135881.3
1830	-5.5	274.6	-65.6	79.0	66	5629.4
1845	-8.7	276.5	-62.6	81.9	66	189.5
1900	-11.9	278.6	-59.6	84.5	66	11.0
1915	-15.1	280.6	-56.6	86.8	66	2.9
1930	-18.2	282.8	-53.6	88.9	65	1.6
1945	-21.3	285.0	-50.5	90.8	65	1.6
2000	-24.4	287.3	-47.5	92.6	65	1.6
2015	-27.4	289.8	-44.5	94.3	65	1.6
2030	-30.4	292.4	-41.5	96.0	65	1.6
2045	-33.4	295.1	-38.4	97.6	65	1.6
2100	-36.2	298.0	-35.4	99.1	65	1.6
2115	-39.0	301.2	-32.4	100.7	65	1.6
2130	-41.7	304.6	-29.4	102.2	65	1.6
2145	-44.3	308.4	-26.5	103.8	64	1.6
2200	-46.7	312.4	-23.5	105.3	64	1.6
2215	-49.0	316.9	-20.6	106.9	64	1.6
2230	-51.1	321.7	-17.7	108.5	64	1.6
2245	-53.0	327.0	-14.8	110.1	64	1.6
2300	-54.6	332.7	-11.9	111.7	64	1.6

TYPE	TIME (UTC)	WIND			VISIBILITY			WEATHER AND OBSTRUCTIONS TO VISION	SKY CONDITION	TEMP (°C)	DEW POINT (°C)	ALSTG (inches)	STA PRESSURE (inches)	OBS INIT
		DRCTN	SPEED	MAX WIND	VARIABILITY	METERS	SM							
(1)	(2)	(9A)	(10)	(11)	(9B)	(4A)	(4C)	(5)	(3)	(7)	(8)	(12)	(17)	(18)
SA	1055	360	12	17		9000		FU	SKC	25	00	2994		JC
(13) RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP167														
SA	1155	020	15			9999		SKC	SKC	26	00	2993	29.490	JC
(13) RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP158.56020														
SA	1255	010	12			9999		SKC	SKC	26	00	2991		JC
(13) RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP 158														
SA	1355	020	09			9999		SKC	SKC	24	00	2993		JC
(13) RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP158														
SA	1455	020	09			9999		SKC	SKC	22	00	2992	29.480	JC
(13) RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLPNO														
SA	1555	020	04			9999		SKC	SKC	21	01	2996		RH
(13) RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLPNO														
SA	1655	020	03			9999		SKC	SKC	20	02	2999		RH
(13) RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP178														
SA	1755	360	06			9999		SKC	SKC	20	02	3000	29.560	RH
(13) RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP182.52027														
SA	1855	300	07			9999		SKC	SKC	18	02	3002		RH
(13) RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP187														
SA	1955	300	07			9999		SKC	SKC	18	01	3001		RH
(13) RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP184														
SA	2055	340	05			9999		SCT250	SKC	17	01	2999		RH
(13) RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP176.8/008.9/003.58003														
(13) RMK														
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