UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

FEB 6 2003

CCJA

MEMORANDUM FOR

Commander, U.S. Central Command Air Forces, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina 29152-5000
Commander, U.S. Army Forces Central Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330-5000
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, FPO AE 09501-6008
Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Central Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii 96861-5001
Commander, Special Operations Command Central, MacDill AFB, Florida 33621-5101
Commander, Combined/Joint Task Force 180, APO AE 09354

SUBJECT: Review of Report of Investigation into Friendly Fire JDAM Incident Near Mazar-E Sharif, 26 November 2001

REF: DoD Instruction 6055.7, Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Recordkeeping

1. The subject report of investigation was prepared in general compliance with the reference and is accepted, subject to the corrections and amendments contained in the endorsement from the Commander, NAVCENT. The ultimate conclusion of the investigation, as amended, is that pilots of the two FA-18s failed to properly identify the target and verify the JDAM target data and that both the air and ground elements failed to adhere to established joint close air support procedures. Recommendations for corrective actions are acknowledged and forwarded for evaluation and action.

2. The results of this investigation raise issues similar to those in the friendly fire incident that occurred just two weeks later on 5 December 2001, involving a JDAM dropped from a B-52. In both cases, the investigations uncovered deviations from established procedures. The use of a JDAM in a close air support role requires direct, manual, real-time digital reporting of locations and inputs into the weapons targeting system. At a minimum, two humans are independently involved in processing and relaying data. This human input often occurs at the time of highest stress, where troops are in contact and both GFAC and the weapons delivery platform may be in harms way. While human error is to some extent inevitable, the procedures governing this process need to ensure that errors are minimized while targets are still timely serviced. Deviations from those procedures come at great risk to our ground personnel.

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3. The report is forwarded to the addressees for actions as indicated below.

a. Commander, SOCCENT will ensure that soldiers injured as a result of this incident are briefed on the conclusions of this investigation.

b. Commander, CENTAF, shall coordinate with all addressees to conduct a joint review of the close air support procedures, particularly as they apply to the use of the JDAM, and ensure common understanding and agreement. Additionally, ensure that processes are established in theater so that all appropriate personnel understand the procedures and the requirement to comply with them. Report to the Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, no later than 45 days from the date of this memorandum certifying compliance with this direction.

c. All addressees are requested to review the recommendations of the investigating officer, as amended, and to take action thereon, as you deem appropriate.

4. USCENTCOM will post the unclassified Executive Summary of the report of investigation on the USCENTCOM Home Page. All requests concerning the report made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act and/or Privacy Act should be forwarded to USECENTCOM, attention FOIA officer.

TOMMY R. FRANKS
General, U.S. Army

Enclosure
as

Classified Executive Summary

Friendly Fire JDAM Incident Near Mazar-E Sharif, 26 November 2001

The ATO for 26 November 2001 assigned a two-plane flight of FA-18C aircraft on a close air support (XCAS) sortie to an area in Northern Afghanistan. The mission commander, call sign Shasta 21, was a highly experienced pilot with previous service in 1991-1992 as a Ground Forward Air Controller (GFAC). The wingman, Shasta 22, was a first tour combat pilot. Shasta 21 was configured with 3 GBU-12 and Shasta 22 with 1 GBU-31 V2 (JDAM).

After checking in with AWACS, Shasta 21 and 22 were directed to support Boxer 81, a GFAC, located in the vicinity of the Qaleh-Ye Jangi Garrison, a prison compound south of Mazar-E Sharif. Shasta 21 established communications with Boxer 81, providing the standard JCAS check-in. This check-in included delineating type of aircraft, location, ordnance type and quantity, and on-station time. Boxer 81 did not reply with the standard 5 or 9 line brief, but conveyed all the pertinent data. Both Shasta 21 and Shasta 22 misunderstood Boxer 81 and each mistakenly reversed Boxer 81's location coordinates with the target coordinates.

Boxer 81 requested a JDAM, vice GBU-12s. Shasta 21 questioned that choice given the proximity of friendly positions to the target. Boxer 81, however, affirmed his direction for a JDAM. Boxer 81 also advised that friendly forces were in contact with the enemy, under attack, and taking sporadic fire. Shasta 21 continued to work the target with Boxer 81. Shasta 21 eventually recognized that target and friendly coordinates had been reversed, verified the actual target and friendly coordinates with Boxer 81 and conducted cross-checks both visually and with the Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) pod. At this point, Shasta 21 realized the actual proximity of the friendly forces to the target, a situation he considered "danger-close", with the coordinates differing only in the hundredths of a minute. Shasta 21 continued to refine the target correlation.

While Shasta 21 worked the target issues with Boxer 81, Shasta 22 worked visual formation management, air-to-air radar discipline and threat lookout. Although he could hear the communications between Shasta 21 and Boxer 81, he was focused on wingman duties. As a consequence, he maintained the initial reversal error between target and friendly coordinates that Shasta 21 and Boxer 81 had since recognized and rectified.

Shasta 21 contacted Shasta 22 on a separate frequency to instruct Shasta 22 on the process for converting the coordinates into a format acceptable to the FA-18 and the JDAM, something Shasta 22 had not previously done. Having still not recognized the reversal in coordinates, Shasta 22 entered the friendly coordinates into the JDAM. Shasta 21 and 22 then conducted cross-checks. As Shasta 22 read aloud the target coordinates, Shasta 21 mistakenly displayed on his aircraft system the friendly coordinates and verified them as the target.

The flight made a standard approach and weapon release. The JDAM guided as programmed, impacting near the coordinates of the friendly forces. Five U.S. personnel were injured. All had ruptured eardrums and minor abrasions and contusions. Additionally, one soldier fractured his pelvis and one had minor facial burns, scratched corneas and skull bruises. All five fully recovered from their injuries.

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01
17 Jan 02

RET

m: CDR (b)(6), (b)(3) , USN, (b)(6) /1310
Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT

bj: INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251 ~~(S)~~

ef: (a) DODINST 6055.7 of 2 Oct 00
(b) Appointing ltr, 5800 Ser N02/327L of 11 Dec 01
(c) Extension request ltr of 17 Dec 01
(d) Extension request ltr of 30 Dec 01
(e) J/FIRE Multiservice Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower

Encl: (1) Statement from incident airborne mission commander, Shasta 21, of 13 Dec 01 ~~(S)~~
(2) Statement from incident wingman, Shasta 22, of 13 Dec 01 ~~(S)~~
(3) Shasta 21 kneeboard card, of 26 Nov 01 ~~(S)~~
(4) Shasta 22 kneeboard card (undated) ~~(S)~~
(5) Shasta 21 lesson learned document of 30 Nov 01 ~~(S)~~
(6) Everest 11 mission commander statement of 12 Dec 01 ~~(S)~~
(7) Everest 12 wingman statement of 12 Dec 01 ~~(S)~~
(8) Shasta 21 video camera recording system tape (VHS) (undated) ~~(S)~~
(9) Statement of Staff Sergeant (b)(6), (b)(3) , primary Ground Forward Air Controller (GFAC) of 8 Jan 02 ~~(S)~~
(10) TARPS Imagery IVO Mazar-E-Sharif (undated) ~~(S)~~
(11) Statement of Captain (b)(6), (b)(3) , USA, Ground Forward Air Controller team member, of 3 Jan 02 ~~(S)~~
(12) Statement of Captain (b)(6), (b)(3) , USA, Ground Forward Air Controller team member, of 28 Dec 01 ~~(S)~~
(13) Statement of First Sergeant (b)(6), (b)(3) , USA, Ground Forward Air Controller team member, of 28 Dec 01 ~~(S)~~
(14) Statement of Sergeant First Class (b)(6) , USA, Ground Forward Air Controller member, of 28 Dec 01 ~~(S)~~
(15) Medical Summary of Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6), (b)(3) , USA, of 28 Dec 01 (U)
(16) Satellite Imagery of Target Area and JDAM Impact Point (undated) ~~(S)~~
(17) Carrier Air Wing ONE MISREP msg of 26 Nov 01 ~~(S)~~

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251 ~~(S)~~

1. ~~(C)~~ Preliminary statement. The evidence and facts obtained in this investigation fully corroborate the events of subject incident. I have determined that the incident causal factors are undisputed. All component parties involved provided forthright, comprehensive and insightful documentation and were fully cooperative. Timely gathering of information from the ground component parties proved a significant obstacle, as documented in references (c) and (d). The difficulties encountered in establishing a dialogue were exacerbated by the fact that the incident ground FAC personnel were widely dispersed in theatre and INCONUS for medical treatment, operational tasking, convalescent and holiday leave. The elapsed time from the incident date of 26 November 2001, to the formal authoring of ground controller statements, dated 28 December 2001 and 8 January 2002, has impaired the GFAC members' recollection of specific events. The same can be said of the air component members, as their statements were produced two weeks after subject incident. The most relevant issue is the lack of comprehensive recall with respect to initial communications between the airborne and ground elements. As there is no recording of the encrypted communications, I can only draw conclusions based upon statements from both component participants. Shasta 21, the airborne mission commander, recalls requesting GFAC position, vice target location, on initial radio check-in. The GFAC team, Boxer 81, states that they do not recall the precise initial communications, but are confident that they immediately communicated target coordinates. All parties agree that target coordinates were transmitted during the initial dialogue; this fact is undisputed. The flight lead, Shasta 21, quickly gained awareness that the coordinates were of target location. The issue is only relevant in that the airborne wingman, Shasta 22(who employed the JDAM), never gained situational awareness that these first transmitted geo-coordinates were not the friendly location, but instead, the actual target location. The lack of exact recollection on the part of both the ground and air element members did not significantly impact the investigation in terms of determining the overall chronology of events, nor cloud the causal factors.

2. ~~(U)~~ Executive Summary.

a. ~~(S)~~ On 26 November 2001, a flight of 2 FA-18s, callsign Shasta 21, provided close air support to a ground element, callsign Boxer 81, at the QALEH -YE JANGI GARRISON, southwest of Mazar-E-Sharif, Afghanistan.

b. ~~(S)~~ During radio communications, Boxer 81 provided target and friendly position situational awareness for Shasta 21, the air element mission commander. Shasta 21 correctly distinguished friendly position and target location. Satisfied with the ground picture, Shasta 21 positioned his wingman for a single JDAM attack. Consumed

with the task of formation management, visual threat lookout and air radar discipline, Shasta 22 had not developed the same high situational awareness to the ground picture, but was confident he had the correct target geo-coordinates for the JDAM attack. Shasta 22 had actually entered the friendly position geo-coordinates into the JDAM weapon system. (b)(5) (b)(5) (b)(5) . Shasta 22 employed one JDAM, which guided to the entered coordinates and impacted in the vicinity of a friendly position.

c. (U) Five U.S. armed forces personnel were injured as a result of the JDAM impact. All sustained ruptured eardrums; one soldier underwent surgery to repair an eardrum, another is scheduled for surgery. One soldier fractured his pelvis in the incident. All five personnel received minor abrasions and contusions. One soldier also sustained facial burns, two scratched corneas, and skull bruises. All personnel are expected to fully recover from their injuries.

d. (U) Several factors, delineated in this investigation, contributed to Shasta 22's erroneous entry of friendly coordinates to the JDAM weapon. The fog of war exacerbated these factors. (b)(5) (b)(5) (b)(5) . I do not recommend disciplinary action against Shasta 21, Shasta 22, Boxer 81 GFAC personnel, or any other component party. Recommendations to help mitigate the risk of friendly-fire incidents of this nature are contained in section five of this investigation.

3. (U) Background.

a. ~~(S)~~ Operation Enduring Freedom ATO KC assigned a two-plane of FA-18C aircraft (Shasta 21/22) from Carrier Airwing ONE (CVW-1) on an XCAS sortie, mission number 2225, to OP-1 in Northern Afghanistan. The pilot of Shasta 21, the incident mission commander, was an O-5 Airborne Interdiction Mission Commander pilot with 2800 total flight hours (2400 FA-18) and 15 years of military flight experience. Shasta 21 had recently executed 15 OEF ATO missions, five to Northern Afghanistan, and among other weapons, had successfully employed five JDAM. Shasta 21 had also served 18 months as a ground forward air controller (GFAC) with 2D Anglico from 1991-1992. The pilot of Shasta 22 was an O-3 first-tour combat wingman with 524 total hours (239.2 FA-18). Shasta 21 aircraft was configured with 3 GBU-12 and Shasta 22 with 1 GBU-31 V2.

b. ~~(S)~~ After check-in with AWACS (callsign Spartan), Shasta 21 & 22 were directed to work with a GFAC (callsign Boxer 81) south of Mazar-E-Sharif. AWACS (Spartan) provided Shasta 21 with Boxer 81's general position as coordinates: N 36° 42′ / E 067° 30′ and a contact frequency of TAD 136.

c. ~~(S)~~ Shasta 21 established communications with Boxer 81 on TAD 136 encrypted UHF (KY-58) and provided a standard JCAS check-in, delineating type aircraft, location, ordnance type and quantity, and on-station time. Although Boxer 81 did not provide a standard CAS-formatted five- or nine-line brief, his ensuing dialogue with Shasta 21 provided all of the pertinent tactical data. During initial communications, Shasta 21 recalled that he requested Boxer 81's position, so as to remain within a reasonable communications radius. The controlling GFAC, Boxer 81, does not specifically recall a request for GFAC position, and, in standard preparation for an air strike, radioed the target location to Shasta 21 as the following geo-coordinates: N 36 40.006 E 066 59.0215. Thinking they identified the GFAC team's position, Shasta 21 copied the coordinates, labeled 1, onto his kneeboard card (KBC) and then entered the coordinates into the FA-18C navigation system, under WAYPOINT 1. Since the FA-18 cannot accept tens of thousandths of a minutes format, Shasta 21 rounded to a system acceptable thousandths of a minute format, and entered N 36 40.006, E 066 59.022. Shasta 22 copied the same geo-coordinates onto his KBC, labeled POS (for GFAC position) and then continued to provided visual mutual support for Shasta 21.

d. ~~(S)~~ Boxer 81 began a visual talk-on target description for Shasta flight. Boxer 81 described the target area (a prison compound) and the specific target DMPI, a building structure centered in the prison compound. Shasta 21 correlated the target area and what he thought was the friendly position (previously passed coordinates) in the middle of the target compound both visually and via the NITEHAWK Forward Looking Infra-Red Pod (FLIR) pod. Boxer 81 indicated that there were two friendly positions in close proximity (described as within 700 meters) of the target DMPI, and also indicated that the friendlies were in contact with the enemy, under attack, and taking sporadic fire.

e. ~~(S)~~ Shasta 21 recalled that Boxer 81 indicated he desired a JDAM on target, vice GBU 12s. Shasta 21 questioned Boxer's request, given the close proximity of friendlies. Boxer 81 again directed JDAM and queried as to Shasta flight's anticipated time on target (TOT). The request for a TOT was Shasta 21's first recognition that the previously passed geo-coordinates may not have actually been to the friendly position, but instead the target. Shasta 21 asked if Boxer

81 desired a JDAM on the previously passed coordinates, and, if so, to re-transmit both the friendly and target geo-coordinates. Boxer clarified that the coordinates passed correlated to the target, vice friendly position, and indicated that friendlies were located at N 36 40.099 E 066 59.169, and that the target was located at N 36 40.006 E 066 59.0215. Shasta 21, noting that the two geo-coordinates differed only in the decimal values, copied the friendly position, labeled 2 POS, for position, onto his KBC, and then entered the same coordinates into his navigation system under WAYPOINT 2. He then crosschecked, both visually and with the FLIR, the correlation between what he now knew to be the target DMPI and the friendly position. Both were within the narrow field of regard of the FLIR, from approximately 26,000 feet AGL and 3-5nm ground range. Shasta 21 stated that he then fully realized the proximity of friendlies and considered the situation a "danger-close" scenario. Shasta 21 continued his correlation by alternately selecting each of the two navigation system entered coordinates, one after the other, verifying the distinction between both the target location and the friendly position.

f. ~~(S)~~ Shasta 22 recalls hearing portions of the communications between his lead and Boxer 81, but he had not comprehensively focused on, nor processed, all of the content. Shasta 22 was task occupied with flying a mutually supportive wingman role, focused on visual formation management, air-to-air radar discipline and threat lookout. Thinking that the originally passed coordinates still correlated to the friendly position, Shasta 22 copied what he believed to be the target coordinates as N 36 40.099 E 066 59.169 (actual friendly position) onto his KBC, labeled TGT (for target location).

g. (U) Shasta 21 instructed Shasta 22 to begin entering the first coordinates communicated by Boxer 81 (the actual target geo-coordinates) into the JDAM system and the FA-18 navigation computer. After some discussion on the subject of the degrees, minutes and thousandths of a minute format, Shasta 21 ultimately coached Shasta 22 into the correct coordinate system entry procedures, using the decimal option associated with the FA-18 coordinate entry display. Shasta 21 and 22 conducted their radio coordination on a separate, unit discrete have-quick frequency. Of note, Shasta 22 had not previously used the decimal format, but had instead been accustomed to an FA-18 standard format of degrees, minutes, seconds, and hundredths of a second. Shasta 22 did not enter the first coordinates transmitted by the GFAC, still thinking they correlated to the friendly position, vice the target. Instead, he entered the GFAC position geo-coordinates into the JDAM system, which he had labeled as TGT on his KBC.

h. ~~(S)~~ In determining target elevation source, HAE or MSL, Shasta 21 conducted another target lat/long coordinate verification check with Boxer 81. Satisfied with the correct correlation, he led Shasta 22 to the pre-planned attack run-in position of 15-25nm east. Shasta 22 indicated that he had completed the target coordinate JDAM entry procedures, and was ready to conduct the intra-flight geo-coordinate crosscheck, as had become CVW-1 standard operating procedure. Shasta 21 toggled his navigation display to the sub-level display and to WAYPOINT 1 (target lat/long) for the verbal crosscheck, but post flight tape analysis revealed that WAYPOINT 2 (friendly lat/long) remained selected (despite the video evidence of 21's hand pushing the decrement tile). As directed, Shasta 22 read aloud his JDAM displayed coordinates in the decimal format as entered. Shasta 21 verified 22's displayed coordinates as N 36 49.099 E 066 59.169, 1332' (actual friendly position). Shasta 21 then re-selected the top-level navigation display, which accurately depicted the true target as WAYPOINT 1, and commenced the target attack profile. The FA-18 navigation display system is mechanized to revert to the previously selected navigation WAYPOINT selected when transitioning from the sub-level display, to the top-level display, regardless of increments or decrements selected while using the sub-level display. Of note, the sub-level display must be used to determine WAYPOINT lat/long information. Cockpit video and audio tape evidence corroborates the events of Shasta flight's crosscheck. Shasta 21 did not recognize he had reviewed the friendly position coordinates, vice the target coordinates, during the correlation check with Shasta 22. The crosscheck between the wingman and flight lead never revealed Shasta 22's JDAM coordinate discrepancy.

i. ~~(S)~~ Having established the proper JDAM weapons symbology, release parameters, and GFAC weapons release approval, Shasta 22 released one JDAM. The JDAM weapon guided properly to the entered lat/long coordinates, and impacted in close proximity to a friendly GFAC position, correlated to Boxer 81's position. Shasta 22 had no FLIR with which to conduct hit analysis, but Shasta 21 could plainly see the weapon had fallen short of the intended target DMPI. The weapon impact appeared in the bottom (foreground) portion of Shasta 21's FLIR display, correlating to a known friendly position. Review of cockpit video tape and satellite imagery revealed that Shasta 22's JDAM had impacted at N 36 40.099 E 066 59.169, 900 feet northeast of the intended target DMPI. The post-strike impact point precisely matches the friendly position geo-coordinates transmitted by the GFACs to Shasta 21 flight.

j. (U) Shortly after weapon impact, Shasta 21 requested a hit assessment, but heard no response from Boxer 81. Moments later, another GFAC, Boxer 85, communicated in the clear (non-encrypted UHF)

to abort all ordnance deliveries, and that the last JDAM was off target. He also advised that he had lost contact with Boxer 81, and was moving to assess damage. He later communicated that there were walking wounded, but not all members of Boxer 81's GFAC team had yet been accounted for.

k. ~~(S)~~ While conducting another intra-flight target coordinate verification check, Shasta 21 realized that Shasta 22 had entered the friendly position coordinates into his JDAM system. Due to a system malfunction, Shasta 22's cockpit video recording is unavailable. Shasta 21's video recorder indicates he had entered the target DMPI coordinates into WAYPOINT 1 and the friendly position into WAYPOINT 2, of his navigation system. Shasta 21's FLIR video indicates correct target and friendly position correlation and that Shasta 21 had designated and aimed his sensor on the actual target, vice the friendly position, for the attack run. Shasta 21's FLIR displayed aimpoint correlates to the GFAC described target DMPI.

l. (U) Five U.S. armed forces personnel were injured as a result of the JDAM impact. All sustained ruptured eardrums; one soldier underwent surgery to repair an eardrum, another is scheduled for surgery. One soldier fractured his pelvis in the incident. All five personnel received minor abrasions and contusions. One soldier also sustained facial burns, two scratched corneas, and skull bruises. All personnel are being followed by an ear, nose and throat specialist, and all are expected to fully recover from their injuries.

m. ~~(S)~~ Everest 11 and 12, a flight of 2 CVW-1 F-14B aircraft also arrived on station in the vicinity of Mazar-E-Sharif, about the time Shasta 21 conducted radio correlation of target and friendly position with Boxer 81 (subsequent to Shasta 21's initial communications with Boxer 81). Everest 11 and 12 orbited while Shasta flight conducted the JDAM attack delivery. Statements from the crews of both Everest 11 and 12 corroborate Shasta 21's and the GFAC team's chronology of incident events.

4. <u>Causal factors and analysis</u>.

a. (U) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

The JDAM guided correctly to the entered coordinates. I opine that Shasta 22 was significantly overwhelmed and task saturated. His was the job of a junior wingman, charged with position keeping, formation management, mutual support and threat lookout responsibilities. As briefed, however, he was also charged with the JDAM weapons employment responsibility. He had previously demonstrated his capacity to

fulfill these responsibilities as a qualified combat wingman. Many factors exacerbated Shasta 22's task saturation, not the least of which was his focus on formation management and mutual support, his confusion with the decimal coordinate entry procedures, the communications intensive KY-58 encrypted transmission/reception, his perception of the GFAC's urgency, and the lack of a functional FLIR to perform his own cockpit correlation (although the FLIR is not a required sensor for JDAM employment, its use provides increased target area situational awareness). The fog of war was very real, as there was an immediate requirement for close air support munitions effects. Shasta 22 entered the friendly position geo-coordinates, and trusted his flight lead's verification of those same coordinates as viable target coordinates. Shasta 22 never recognized that the first coordinates communicated by the GFAC were the target coordinates, vice the friendly position.

b. ~~(S)~~ Shasta 21, the mission commander, had exhausted all efforts for proper correlation of target DMPI and GFAC friendly location. He had achieved sufficient situational awareness to provide immediate firepower support, despite what he described as initial confusion as to target DMPI location and friendly position. Had Shasta 21 received a standard five- or nine-line briefing format, he may have avoided his initial confusion between the GFAC position and the target location. Using a CAS five- or nine-line format, the GFAC would likely have passed the friendly position as either a bearing and range from the target or a grid/geo-coordinate (line 2 for a five-line brief, line 8 for a nine-line brief), vice as a stand-alone, precise geo-coordinate. Although Shasta 21 had correctly entered the target and friendly coordinates into his navigation system, he too, was foiled by the fog of war: the sense of urgency (GFAC taking sporadic fire), the excessive radio communications in coaching Shasta 22's coordinate entry procedures, and the task saturation of geo-coordinate correlation. During the coordinate crosscheck process with Shasta 22, Shasta 21 erroneously verified the wrong geo-coordinates. Although Shasta 21 thought he was reviewing what he had labeled as WAYPOINT 1, the target location, in his navigation system, tape review confirms that he actually reviewed WAYPOINT 2, the friendly position. Tape review also revealed that Shasta 21 attempted to decrement to the correct system waypoint by commanding the decrement push-tile; the system did not decrement.

c. ~~(S)~~ Boxer 81, the GFAC controller, was immersed in ground combat with hostile ground forces. Boxer 81 does not recall Shasta 21 initially requesting the friendly position; he does recall immediately passing target coordinates and a target description during initial radio communications with Shasta 21. He further recalls clarifying both target and friendly geo-coordinates during subsequent radio

communications with Shasta 21. Boxer 81 had satisfactorily resolved the target and friendly correlation discrepancy with Shasta 21. Had Boxer 81 initially provided a CAS five- or nine- line brief, he may have eliminated much of the initial coordinate identification disparity perceived by Shasta 21, and ultimately not provided Shasta flight with a distracter coordinate (GFAC's position). Using a standard five- or nine-line joint CAS brief, Boxer 81 would likely have passed the friendly position as a bearing and range from the target or a grid/geo-coordinate (in line two or line eight), vice as actually communicated to Shasta flight, as a JDAM quality precise coordinate, not associated with a five- or nine-line format. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

d. (U) By the time Everest flight arrived on scene, the target and friendly position correlation had been resolved by Boxer 81 and Shasta 21. Everest flight had no contribution to the incident events. They could not have possibly been privy to Shasta 22's erroneous JDAM coordinate entry.

5. Conclusions/Recommendations.

a. (U) (b)(5)

(b)(5)

b. (U) A similar JDAM CAS friendly fire IVO Khandahar, Afghanistan, has generated considerable discussion with respect to close air support with autonomous, accurate weapons, such as JDAM and JSOW. There is no room for human error during weapons system geo-coordinate entry, correlation and verification. Aircrew and FACs must continue to implement a series of checks and balances so as to mitigate the risk of misguiding surface attack munitions. The revised OEF SPINS provide clear guidance with respect to CAS procedures, and effectively mitigate the risk of human error. Aircrew and FACs must incorporate these procedures as routine and doctrine. As weapons systems and combat scenarios continue to emerge, adjustments to the doctrine and standards may well be required. Subsequent to the incident flight, the pilot of Shasta 21 formalized a series of lessons learned for Carrier Air Wing ONE (enclosure 5). His points complement

the revised OEF SPINS for CAS procedures and form the basis of my recommendations as investigating officer:

(1) (U) FAC and Aircrew should incorporate the use of a JCAS standard five- or nine-line brief, in accordance with J/FIRE Multiservice Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower (reference e).

(2) ~~(S)~~ Friendly positions must be passed in a bearing and range format, or in no more precise than a degrees and minutes geo-coordinates format. Precise grid or geo-coordinates should never be used for identifying friendly positions.

(3) ~~(S)~~ If provided, aircrew should never enter friendly positions to their weapons or navigation systems as precise geo-coordinates. For geo-coordinates, enter only degrees and minutes.

(4) ~~(S)~~ Aircrew should always re-transmit FAC radioed geo-coordinates for FAC verification.

(5) ~~(S)~~ Aircrew must conduct an intra-flight geo-coordinate verification check of system/weapon entered geo-coordinates prior to weapons release. In the case of JDAM verification, the aircrew intending to employ JDAM should read geo-coordinates from the cockpit JDAM display, while another flight member verifies correct coordinates from those copied (and previously verified with the FAC) on the kneeboard card.

(6) ~~(S)~~ To the maximum extent practical, attack aircraft must use all means available (FLIR/RADAR/HUD/VISUAL) to determine correct weapons system and target correlation (b)(6), (b)(3)

(b)(6), (b)(3)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP EIGHT
FPO AE 09501-4308

5800
Ser N02/009L
19 Jan 02

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CDR (b)(6) USN, (b)(6)
(b)(6) /1310 ltr of 17 Jan 01

From: Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT
To: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command
Via: Commander, FIFTH Fleet

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251

Ref: (a) DODINST 6055.7 dtd 2 Oct 00

1. Readdressed and forwarded.

2. The findings of fact and recommendations of the investigating officer are hereby approved and forwarded.

3. The basic correspondence relating to this investigation has been reviewed in accordance with reference (a). A copy of the investigation will be retained at this command for a period of two years from the date of action. The summary of the subject incident is as follows:

a. On 26 Nov 01, Operation Enduring Freedom ATO KC assigned a detail consisting of an FA-18C aircraft crew (Shasta 21/22) from Carrier Airwing ONE (CVW-1) on an close air support sortie to Northern Afghanistan. Shasta 21 & 22 were directed to work with a GFAC (callsign Boxer 81) south of Mazar-E-Sharif. After initial check-in, a misunderstanding arose with regards to the coordinates passed from the GFAC as to whether they were for the target or friendly position.

b. During a request for a Time on Target, Shasta 21 recognized that the previously passed geo-coordinates may not have actually been to the friendly position as he initially thought, but rather the target. Shasta 21 resolved the disparity with Boxer 81 and regained situational awareness. This was accomplished through Boxer 81's description of the target area (a prison compound) and the specific target DMPI, a building structure centered in the prison compound. Shasta 21 correlated the target area and what he thought was the friendly position (previously passed coordinates)

in the middle of the target compound both visually and via the NITEHAWK Forward Looking InfraRed Pod (FLIR) pod. Boxer 81 indicated that there were two friendly positions in close proximity (described as within 700 meters) of the target DMPI, and also indicated that the friendlies were in contact with the enemy, under attack, and taking sporadic fire. Based on this information, Shasta 21, the flight lead resolved the ambiguity as to target/friendly coordinate position.

c. Shasta 22, the flight wingman, however, never made the distinction between the coordinates passed earlier and erroneously entered the friendly position as the target coordinates into the JDAM weapon system. The checks between the wingman and flight lead never revealed the discrepancy because of a switchology anomaly in Shasta 21's cockpit display. The JDAM weapon was released, guided properly to the erroneously entered latitude/longitude coordinates, and impacted in close proximity to the friendly GFAC position.

d. As a result of the weapon impact, five U.S. armed forces personnel were injured, all suffering ruptured eardrums. One soldier fractured his pelvis in the incident. All five personnel received minor abrasions and contusions. One soldier sustained facial burns, two scratched corneas, and skull bruises. All personnel are being followed for treatment by an otolarnygologist, and all are expected to fully recover from their injuries.

4. The enclosures utilized by the investigator in this case are not signed, as he had to rely primarily on email connectivity to accomplish the investigation. The sources of the statements provided by the members of the GFAC, however, are considered reliable. Also, the medical information provided, although not detailed, serves to address the extent of injuries only in general terms. They do not provide enough detail for line of duty/misconduct determinations, which is beyond the scope of this investigation. I recommend these matters be addressed in the respective servicemembers' health care records.

5. I agree with the investigating officer's recommendations and the steps taken to ensure that this incident will not be repeated. The following recommendations are particularly important and must be emphasized to all CAS aircrew and Ground Forward Air Controllers:

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251

a. Use of standard J/Fire five (or nine) line briefs is essential in every CAS mission, but particularly with troops in contact. Using ad hoc procedures only adds to the fog of war.

b. Friendly positions should never be given as precise geo-coordinates, particularly when using GPS weapons. The use of range/bearing from target or a general latitude and longitude in degrees/minutes/seconds provides adequate situational awareness for supporting aircraft.

c. JDAM verification procedures must be followed closely to ensure the aircrews intending to employ JDAM have fully confirmed target coordinates and optimize their situational awareness during stressful combat situations.

6. This is the first campaign where GPS weapons have been used to provide close air support to forces engaged in close combat. It is essential that the lessons learned from this incident are disseminated to all applicable joint and service training and doctrine commands to ensure standardized tactics, training and procedures are instituted which will prevent future mishaps during high-risk combat operations.

M. P. FITZGERALD

~~SECRET DECL ON: X1/X4~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
FPO AE 09501-6008

IN REPLY TO:

5800
Ser 013/010

~~SECRET~~

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CDR (b)(6), (b)(3) , USN, ltr of 17 Jan 02

From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
To: Commander In Chief, U.S. Central Command

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251 ~~(S)~~

Encl: (18) COMCARGRU EIGHT ltr dtd 11 Dec 01
(19) CDR , USN ltr dtd 17 Dec 01 w/ends
(20) CDR (b)(6), (b)(3) , USN ltr dtd 30 Dec 01 w/ends

1. (U) Readdressed and forwarded.

2. (U) Enclosures (18) through (20) are the appointing letter for subject investigation and requests for extensions of time for completion with attached endorsements and approvals.

3. (U) A summary of the incident that is the subject of this investigation is contained in paragraph 3 of the first endorsement.

4. (U) The following administrative correction is noted: References to "SHASTA 11" where they appear in enclosure (6) should correctly read "SHASTA 21."

5. (U) The investigating officer concludes that human error on the part of the wingman, Shasta 22, is the "undisputed causal factor" of this friendly fire incident and that it was not caused by "neglect . . . or lack of proper procedural measures." These conclusions are not supported by the facts in the investigation. The investigation is accordingly amended as follows:

~~SECRET DECL ON: X1/X4~~

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251 ~~(S)~~

a. ~~(S)~~ The next to last sentence of paragraph 2.b. is amended to read: "Shasta 22 performed a crosscheck of JDAM target data with Shasta 21 prior to commencing the attack, but Shasta 21 failed to recognize that Shasta 22 had entered the wrong target coordinates."

b. ~~(S)~~ The third and fourth sentences of paragraph 2.d. are amended to read: "Human error on the part of Shasta 21 and Shasta 22 was the primary causal factor of the incident. Failure of air and ground element participants to adhere to established joint close air support procedures (specifically, the 5 or 9 line briefing format) contributed to that human error.

c. (U) The first sentence of paragraph 4.a. is amended to read: "The undisputed causal factor of the subject friendly fire incident is human error on the part of both Shasta 21 and Shasta 22. Shasta 22 improperly entered the position of the GFAC, vice the intended target into the JDAM weapon system, and Shasta 21 failed to recognize that Shasta 22 had entered the wrong coordinates during the crosscheck process."

d. ~~(S)~~ Paragraph 4.b. is amended by adding the following language to the end: "As both an experienced pilot and FAC, Shasta 21 should have been more insistent with regard to receiving a 5 or 9 line brief from the GFAC, in accordance with joint CAS procedure, and with regard to employing a GBU-12 vice a JDAM. The excessive communications with the GFAC and between the aircraft section, and the attendant confusion they caused, would have been alleviated with a 5 or 9 line brief. The standard format would also have been familiar to his inexperienced wingman. Though questionable, once the decision was made to drop a JDAM, Shasta 21 should have passed the lead to Shasta 22 who was to deploy the weapon. By retaining the lead, and hence the communication with the GFAC, Shasta 21 prevented Shasta 22 from communicating directly with the GFAC to establish, in his own mind, situational awareness and the correct target coordinates. The distracting factors to Shasta 22 of formation and radar management, visual

threat lookout, mutual support, etc. would also have been eliminated had Shasta 21 simply passed the lead. Shasta 21 should have been more adamant in challenging the use of employing a JDAM at all. Although Shasta 21 initially questioned the use of JDAM for employment in what he felt to be a danger-close CAS situation, he failed to convey to the GFAC the distinct advantages and margin of safety to be gained by employing a GBU-12 vice JDAM. Further, clear weather conditions, pilot experience, and aircraft systems available on Shasta 21 were such as to make the GBU-12 the ideal weapon for the situation. There was no clear, valid, tactical reason to employ JDAM in the danger-close CAS situation present, and as an experienced flight lead and former FAC, Shasta 21 should have made this known to the GFAC."

e. ~~(S)~~ The last three sentences of paragraph 4.c. are amended to read: "For these reasons, Boxer 81 should have provided the standard joint CAS 5 or 9 line brief. The standard exists for clarity and brevity, and precisely to prevent the kind of confusion and excessive communications that contributed to the human error in this incident."

f. (U) I concur in the recommendation of the investigating officer contained in paragraph 5.a. However, the paragraph is amended to read: "The injuries sustained by friendly force GFAC personnel were caused by human error on the part of Shasta 21 and Shasta 22 in failing to properly identify the target and verify JDAM target data. The actions that primarily contributed to those errors were failure of both air and ground element participants to adhere to established joint close air support procedures. However, none of the acts or omissions of the pilots or involved GFAC personnel warrant disciplinary action.

6. (U) Subject to the foregoing comments, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the investigating officer are approved. As the lessons learned from this incident cut

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251 ~~(S)~~

across DoD service components, I specifically concur with the First Endorsement that the finally approved recommendations from this investigation should be disseminated to all applicable joint and service training and doctrine commands.

C. W. Moore, Jr.

C. W. MOORE, JR.

13 Dec 01

Subj: FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT NEAR MAZAR-E-SHARIF 26 NOV 01

1. Shasta 21 was the FA-18 Division lead on the ATO KC 2225 mission. He is an experienced flight instructor with 15 years flying, 2800 total hours, 2400 hours in the FA-18 Hornet, and combat experience during Desert Storm. He also served eighteen months as a ground Forward Air Controller (GFAC) with 2D ANGLICO during 1991-2. This was his 16th OEF mission, 5th into the Northern part of Afghanistan. By this date, he had successfully employed 5 JDAM. On this particular mission, he was loaded with 3 GBU-12 Laser Guided Bombs, which he did not expend.
2. Shasta 21 launched from USS Theodore Roosevelt loaded with 3xGBU-12 on dash-1 & 3 and 1xJDAM on dash-2 & 4 and tasked pre-launch to hold at OP-1 in the Northern part of Afghanistan. The flight had no pre-flight imagery or tactical scale (1:50K / 1:100K) maps of the eventual target area.
3. Launch, rendezvous, and pre-mission tanking were per the brief and uneventful. The flight proceeded from the Clint track to OP-1 as individual sections.
4. Bossman tasked the flight enroute to work with Boxer 81, who was located at N36-42 / E067-30, on TAD 136. Shasta 21 proceeded directly to that location but was unable to contact Boxer 81, so the flight proceeded to the Armstrong AR track for refueling. After refueling, Bossman indicated that Boxer was "on the move" and to continue to attempt communication on TAD 136 in the vicinity of the original coordinate.
5. Shasta 21 made contact with Boxer, using ciphered communication (i.e. GREEN), several miles West of the original coordinate. Shasta 21 checked-in with flight composition, location, ordnance load-out, and time-on-station. Shasta 21 requested Boxer's location so that the flight would not fly beyond Boxer's radio capability, which is generally limited to 15-20nm in even terrain.
6. Boxer responded with "JD N36-40.006 / E066-59.0215 / 1300". I'm still not sure what the "JD" indicated or if I even heard him correctly. In danger-close combat missions, the normal procedure is to include the ground commander's personal initials in order to signify that he is aware of the proximity of fires WRT to the friendly positions. I am not certain if this was Boxer's intent or not.
7. The FA-18 cannot accept the ".0215" coordinate to that level of precision so I rounded it to ".022" and entered the coordinate under waypoint 1 in my system. The ddd-mm.sss format is not the normal format with which we operate. During

the flight, my wingman attempted to multiply this coordinate format by 6 in order to acquire our normal ddd-mm-ss.ss fomat. I told him how to change coordinate formats on the HSI AC sublevel display. In other words, this is the first time he ever used this coordinate format. The target area was very easy to pickup visually. Boxer indicated that it was a prison complex, that there were two friendly positions in very close proximity to the target, the closest being only 700 meters away. He also indicated that they were taking some sporadic fire and that they were in contact with the enemy. I don't remember if he told me that an American (CIA agent) had been executed or if I learned that after the flight. Nevertheless, it was very obvious at the time that he was in immediate need of support.

8. Boxer indicated that he wanted the JDAM before the GBU-12s. I questioned the close proximity but he indicated that he wanted the JDAM first. I informed him that we were established at 28k' with a Bravo-15 IP (15nm East) using left hand turns and a Westerly run-in heading. He asked for our time-on-target (TOT). This confused me, and I asked for confirmation that he wanted us to bomb the coordinate that he had provided. He indicated that the coordinate he provided was the target and asked again for our TOT. I asked him to clarify his position, expecting him to provide it in a bearing/range format. He indicated that he was located at N36-40.099 / E066-59.169 / 1332'. (Note: with respect to the coordinate degrees and minutes, the target and GFAC's coordinates are identical.) I entered this coordinate into waypoint 2 in my system. I visually checked both coordinates on my FLIR, which were both within 1 FLIR-narrow-field-of-view (FOV). From my current slant range, this clearly indicated the close proximity of his position to the target. In my opinion, this was a danger-close close air support (CAS) request, however we never received anything that resembled a standard 9-line brief nor any verbal verification that this was indeed danger-close. (Note: This was not unusual. It was not until more than two weeks after this incident that I personally heard or received a 9-line brief from a GFAC in OEF.) Technically, 500' is the distance for danger-close using a Mk-84, but the JDAM is not listed in current publications that I have available. While the frag pattern will be essentially the same, the JDAM does not fly a ballistic profile, which is the basis for the 500' Mk-84 danger-close value. I am not trying to imply culpability here, just pointing out that the JDAM danger-close distance has not been determined or validated to my knowledge.
9. I instructed Shasta 22 to "start working on the first coordinate for [his] JDAM" and also enter it as a navigation waypoint. Shasta 22 did not have a

FLIR and could not visually check the coordinates from level flight. Theoretically, he could have done so by tipping in and placing the target in his HUD FOV. However, this was not briefed nor is it common practice.

10. Shasta 22 asked if the target elevation was MSL (mean sea level) or HAE (height above ellipsoid). I had Boxer clarify that it was MSL. I also had Boxer clarify the target coordinate once more. A different voice, which I now believe to be Boxer 85, transmitted on the TAD frequency. I believe that is was clarification on the relationship between the two friendly positions, but my recollection is vague on this point. I do not think that it is germane.
11. Shasta 22 indicated that he was ready for read-back per our squadron SOP regarding inflight coordinate re-tasking. I had been cycling between waypoints 1 (the target) and 2 (the GFAC's position) on my system in order to obtain situational awareness (SA) on the FLIR. I selected the HSI on my left display (in order to record it) and selected the data/waypoint sublevel. It initially displayed waypoint 2. I depressed pushtile 13 on the display, which should decrement the selected waypoint by 1. Upon post-flight videotape review, the waypoint clearly does not decrement to waypoint 1, but it does show the attempt. To date, I cannot explain why it did not decrement to waypoint 1. Regardless, I thought that I had the correct target coordinate displayed on my system as I prepared to verify Shasta 22's read-back. Shasta 22 read-back the coordinate, and I verified his read-back of N36-40.099 / E066-59.169 / 1332' with my displayed waypoint. I then selected the HSI top-level display, which showed waypoint 1 and NAV designated the target (that is, made it the primary navigation point for sensor placement and ordnance delivery). My FLIR accurately displayed the intended target in the center of my FLIR display.
12. On the inbound leg from the IP, I instructed Shasta 22 to verify that his system GPS horizontal and vertical errors (HERS/VERS) were within limits. I informed Boxer that we were IP inbound and asked for clearance to drop. He stated that we were "cleared hot" and to report weapon's release. I passed the lead to Shasta 22 and gave him permission to ARM the aircraft and expend ordnance once he had an IN ZONE solution.
13. Shasta 22 successful released the weapon. My FLIR indicated an impact at the extreme bottom of my FLIR display.
14. After 30 seconds (may have longer), having heard no response from Boxer, I asked him for an assessment. Moments later, Boxer 85 transmitted in the clear (i.e. RED) to abort all ordnance deliveries, that the last JDAM was "off target", that he had lost contact with the team that had been controlling us, and that he

was moving to assess the damage. He later indicated that there were walking-wounded but not all had yet been accounted for.

15. I asked Shasta 22 to confirm his target coordinates and crosschecked them against my kneeboard card. (The previous crosscheck had been against my system, which was per our SOP). It was clear to me that we had released the JDAM on the GFAC's position instead of the intended target.
16. Shasta 21 flight held overhead for approximately 20 minutes and released no more ordnance. Bossman extended our time-on-station thinking that Boxer was taking enemy fire. I passed a mission report (MISREP) indicating a suspected BLUE-ON-BLUE, that is JDAM-on-Friendly position.
17. Post-mission refueling and recovery were uneventful.
18. I believe that Shasta 22 made a simple human error. He mixed-up two pieces of information. In the heat of the moment, flying as a junior wingman with a senior flight lead, in combat, given the "fog of war" (which is real), on his first mission to that part of the country, the first time dropping JDAM (I think), with ground troops in-contact who were requesting immediate support, without receiving a standard 9 or 5-line CAS briefing, using ciphered communication, using a new coordinate format, without a FLIR for visual crosschecks, and having received positive confirmation from his flight lead, he made a mistake.
19. Shasta 21 was the last link in this chain of events to fail. I should have been the "safety net" for a junior wingman. Professional embarrassment and regret do not begin to describe the emotions that erupted after determining what had actually occurred.
20. On 30 November, I drafted a list of CAS Lessons Learned and after receiving approval from the CAG, transmitted them to all operational OEF CAS participants. My intent was not to place or even shift the blame. I was the senior flight lead airborne and accept full responsibility for the actions of my flight.

Excerpt of interview 10 January 2002, of CDR(b)(6), (b)(3) and Shasta 21 flight mission commander.

It was Boxer 81's request for a JDAM time on target that initially cued Shasta 21 to the fact that the originally passed geo-coordinates, N 36 40.006, E 66 59.0215, were not the friendly position, but instead the target location. Subsequent communications with Boxer 81 clarified the position of friendlies and the target location.

Sub: Shasta 22's account of the blue-on-blue incident near Mazar-E-Sharif, Afghanistan on 26 November 2001.

Preliminary Information: Shasta 22 was the wingman of a section F/A-18 Hornets involved in flights over Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Shasta 22 was a first tour Hornet pilot that had accumulated 239.2 hours in type, 524.0 hours total time (completed F/A-18 Hornet FRS training on 28 July 2001.) Shasta flight was part of ATO KC, mission number 2225.

The administrative portion of this mission prior to the event under investigation, and the return to the USS Theodore Roosevelt were normal and accomplished in accordance with the mission brief/SOP. As such, the details of that portion of the mission will be omitted from this account.

After the initial aerial refueling at Clint track, Shasta 21 (section lead) headed to OP 1 as per the tasking on the ATO. Spartan control then directed Shasta 21 to contact a Forward Air Control (FAC) team, call sign Boxer, in the vicinity of Mazar-e-Sharif (Spartan provided a rough set of coordinates), on TAD 136. Initial attempts to contact the FAC were unsuccessful. Shasta 21 reported this to Spartan, and Spartan replied that the FAC team was on the move at that time. Spartan then directed Shasta 21 and 22 to refuel at the Armstrong refueling track with Whistler 72 and then re-attempt contact with Boxer.

After the refueling at Armstrong, Shasta 21 attempted contact with Boxer on TAD 136, and was able to establish communication. Shasta 21 reported that he was a section of two F/A-18 Hornets with three GBU-12's and one JDAM (GBU-31 (V)2/B.) Shasta section then began a left-hand orbit at approximately 28,000' MSL above Boxer's position in Mazar-e-Sharif. Shasta 22 was flying a high cover/tac wing position off of Shasta 21. During this time the FAC team, Boxer, was talking to Shasta 21 to determine what ordinance he wanted delivered first. Boxer requested the JDAM. Shasta 21 then requested the FAC's position, which he (Boxer) transmitted in DD.MM.SSS format. Shasta 22 wrote these coordinates down on his kneeboard card, and labeled them POS for Boxer's position. These coordinates were written down while concentrating on flying formation, and maintaining lookout on both the air-to-air radar, and for possible ground fire.

After the initial set of coordinates had been passed, Shasta section continued to circle the target area. During this time Shasta 21 and Boxer were communicating on TAD 136 via the KY-58 (green/secure communications.) Boxer was "building" the ground the picture for Shasta 21. Shasta 22 continued to concentrate on maintaining a high cover, mutually supportive position off of Shasta 21. Shasta 22 was not following that conversation closely. However, Shasta 22 keyed in on the word "target" and copied the coordinates following that word in the conversation on his kneeboard card, believing that these were for the JDAM.

Shasta 21 then headed the section to the east for a 15-mile, east to west delivery run. Shasta 21 then directed Shasta 22 to begin entering the target coordinates into the JDAM display. Due to the format the coordinates were given in, coupled with Shasta 22's limited experience with the JDAM, and a sense of urgency (Boxer had reported that they were taking fire), Shasta 22 began to convert the DD.MM.SSS format to DD.MM.SS.SS by multiplying the last three digits of the DD.MM.SSS coordinates by 60. Prior to completing this process Shasta 21 requested the status of the JDAM, and Shasta 22 reported that he was converting the coordinates mathematically. Shasta 21 directed him to change the coordinate format on the ACFT sublevel of the H.S.I, enter the target coordinates in DD.MM.SSS, and report when ready to read them back to Shasta 21 as they appeared on the mission data sub-level of the JDAM display.

Upon completion of entering the coordinates into the JDAM display, Shasta 22 reported that he was ready to read back the coordinates and elevation. Shasta 22 then read back the north and east coordinates, and the elevation as they appeared on the mission data sublevel of the JDAM display to Shasta 21. Shasta 21 concurred with what was entered into Shasta 22's JDAM, and began a left-hand turn back to the target area.

Shasta flight rolled out on a westerly heading approximately 15 miles east of the target. Shasta 21 then inquired as to the alignment status of the JDAM, to which Shasta 22 reported that the JDAM display showed an alignment of 01 GOOD. Shasta 22 was passed the tactical lead, and directed to accelerate to .90

Enclosure (2)

IMN. Shasta 21 then granted Shasta 22 permission to place the Master Arm switch to Arm. Shasta 22 reported that the LAR displayed on the H.S.I. and the HUD indicated an IN ZONE indication had been achieved, and requested clearance to drop the JDAM. Shasta 21 gave 22 clearance to release the JDAM, and at that time Shasta 22 depressed and held the pickle button on the control stick. The weapon separated from the aircraft, and Shasta 21 directed a left-hand turn off target, and resumed the lead.

Shasta 22 returned to a position of high cover/tac wing on the right side of Shasta 21. Shasta 21 and 22 continued to circle the target area waiting for communications from Boxer. The next transmission over the radio on TAD 136 was that all aircraft in the vicinity of Mazar-E-Sharif were to hold fire and that the Boxer team was trying to account for all of it personnel. Shasta flight remained in the area for approximately another 20 minutes before returning to the USS Theodore Roosevelt.

Pages 28 through 29 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
Enclosure 3 (one page total)-withheld in its entirety (b)(1)1.4(a)
Enclosure 4 (one page total)-withhel in its entirety-(b)(1)1.4(a)

30 Nov 01

Subj: SOME THINGS I'VE LEARNED (AND RE-LEARNED) ABOUT CAS DURING THE LAST 48 HOURS:

Ref: J-FIRE (Multi-service procedures for the joint application of firepower) dtd Nov 1997

Purpose: This information is intended for all operational level Forward Air Controllers and Aircrew conducting Close Air Support. We came close to killing a friendly ground FAC team with an off-target JDAM on 26 November. By rights, they should be dead; we were extremely fortunate. Learn from our mistakes, of which many occurred, some on the ground – some in the air. I'm not trying to place or shift blame, just keep these mistakes from reoccurring…"*the smart man learns from the mistakes of others.*"

Opinions contained herein are my own based on 2400 hours in the FA-18 Hornet (1988-present) and 18 months as a ground Forward Air Controller (GFAC) with (b)(6) (1991-92):

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(b)(5)

SECRET

12 DEC 01

Memorandum

From: LCDR (b)(6), (b)(3) and LT(b)(6), (b)(3)
To: CDR(b)(6), (b)(3)

Subj: BOXER FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT ON 26 NOV 01

1. On 26 NOV we were fragged as EVEREST 11/12 to conduct an XRECCE mission and support follow on CAS in the Kunduz and Mazar-E-Sharif area in Northern Afghanistan.

2. Upon completion of our TARPS route, SPARTAN instructed us to proceed to Mazar-E-Sharif and contact a GFAC, call sign BOXER. When we checked in with BOXER he had a mission in progress with SHASTA 21/22. We were on frequency in time to hear the longitude and elevation passed for a location, but we missed the latitude and location description. The coordinates were read back by SHASTA 11 and he asked for the "target elevation" to be read back. BOXER confirmed a good coordinate read back and repeated the elevation. BOXER then read off another set of coordinates and elevation and referred to them as the target. SHASTA 11 read back the second set of coordinates and BOXER confirmed a good read back. A minute or so passed by and SHASTA 11 asked for BOXER to confirm the friendly location. BOXER read back the friendly location, which were the first set of coordinated passed.

3. SHASTA 11 then confirmed the type of ordnance BOXER wanted expended on the target. SHASTA 11 asked if BOXER wanted a GBU-12 first. BOXER responded that the friendlies were "danger close" and therefore wanted to use a JDAM. SHASTA 11 responded that he would comply and proceeded out bound for the mission. As SHASTA 11 proceeded inbound to the target, he continually updated his range and requested cleared hot. BOXER responded with a "cleared hot" call. SHASTA 11 then reported weapons release.

4. Upon weapon impact EVEREST 11 attempted to check in with BOXER but received no reply. After several minutes another voice came on the radio and identified himself as another member of BOXER. BOXER called for a check-fire and informed us that friendlies had been wounded. He asked for aircraft to remain overhead but not release any ordinance.

(b)(6), (b)(3)
Very Respectfully,

(b)(6), (b)(3)

(b)(6), (b)(3)CDR USN

(b)(6), (b)(3)

LT USNR

Enclosure (6)

SECRET

12 Dec 2001

Memorandum

From: LCDR (b)(6), (b)(3)
To: CDR (b)(6), (b)(3)

Subj: STATEMENT CONCERNING FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT 26 NOV IN VICINITY OF MAZAR-E-SHARIF

1. On the morning of November 26th, at 0710 local (0310z), my pilot, LT (b)(6), (b)(3) and I launched from USS ROOSEVELT as Everest 12, the wingman of a two-ship of F-14s to go into Afghanistan. Our mission was on-call close air support. After refueling enroute, we were assigned to go to the vicinity of Mazar-E-Sharif and contact a Ground Forward Air Controller (GFAC), callsign Boxer, for further tasking. By approximately 0930 local, we were approaching the city from the east at high altitude. We switched to Boxer's frequency when we were about 50nm out.

2. Upon switching over to Boxer's frequency, we could hear another flight of aircraft, Shasta 21 and 22, being passed a situation report and target brief by the GFAC. Listening in on the radio calls, I copied down the target brief by Boxer on my kneeboard card. Boxer first passed the target coordinates and elevation, emphasizing with verbal intonation that these were target coordinates, which the other section flight lead read back correctly. Boxer then passed his own position in latitude/longitude/ elevation, to the same degree of precision as he had passed the target coordinates- in other words, coordinates sufficiently accurate upon which to employ a GPS guided weapon. As before, he emphasized with intonation that these were friendly coordinates. Boxer requested one JDAM be employed on the target coordinates.

3. Shasta 21 rogered the request, and reported that he was proceeding outbound from the target area to set up for a run-in. A few minutes prior to release, he read off to Boxer the target coordinates, asking for confirmation. They were the same coordinates that I had copied down as the target earlier, and Boxer affirmed the same. Shasta 21 counted down each minute prior to release, and then reported one weapon away. From what I could hear on the radio, everything was proceeding properly.

4. At the same time, in our cockpit I was calculating the distance between the target and friendly coordinates. They appeared to be very close. I ended up concluding that the friendly position was about 900 feet to the northeast of the target coordinates. I recalled a day-old aircrew notice to confirm map datums in use in the vicinity of Mazar, because older and newer datums could vary in location by as much as a tenth of a mile, or roughly 600 feet. However, by the time I had reached that conclusion, the other flight had already released its weapon.

5. By this time I had our FLIR cued to the target coordinates, which appeared to be the northeast tower of a large nineteenth-century fort. When we were approximately 20 miles to the east, I saw in our FLIR field of view a weapon impact on what appeared to be the northeast corner of the fort. Due to the distance, however, I couldn't be sure whether the weapon hit the wall or tower, or landed inside the fort. The impact shot up a large vertical column of smoke, as well as a lateral jet of what seemed to be flame along the eastern wall of the fort.

6. Normally after weapon impact a GFAC gives immediate feedback on effectiveness, and any necessary shift in target coordinates. In this case we heard nothing. Shasta 21 called Boxer several times on the radio with no response. After a time, probably five or ten minutes, a new GFAC, whose voice was intense but measured and professional, came up on the radio, asking for any American aircraft to respond. The tone of his voice, and the call itself, implied that something was wrong. Shasta 21 responded, and the new GFAC ordered us two or three times to hold all our weapons. He said the weapon appeared to have hit a friendly position, and directed both flights to stay on station and stand by for further instructions.

Enclosure (7)

7. By this time our flight was overhead the fort, circling and studying it with binoculars and FLIR. We could see movement of people in and out of the fort, from both the northeast corner as well as a gate in the southeast corner. After another five minutes Shasta 21 said they were returning to base. We reminded them of the GFACs request that they stay on station, but the flight lead said they were leaving.

8. We stayed overhead the fort for another 30-45 minutes. We never heard again from the second GFAC, although we tried numerous times to contact him. We left when our fuel state got low. On the way back to the ship, I overheard the controlling AWACs ask Shasta 21 to repeat the target coordinates on which they had dropped. This time, unlike in the target area, he read back the friendly position. On a separate radio frequency I suggested Shasta 21 double-check the target coordinates he had just passed. He replied simply, "I did."

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6), (b)(3)
LCDR USN

SSgt (b)(6), (b)(3) USAF
(b)(6)
8 Jan 02

Incident Report

On 26 Nov, 2001, I, SSgt (b)(6), (b)(3) was part of an 11 man ODA team. Our instructions were to bring out, possibly killed, CIA agent Mike Spann. I was part of the team which was to provide Emergency Close Air Support in the event that it was necessary and also to provide an alternate means of communications for the team. Once we arrived at the fort my initial assessment of the surrounding area was I could tell there was a battle going on inside the walls of the fort. I could hear gunshots and what sounded like mortar rounds being fired.

As preplanned, our team split off into our respective elements and made our way onto the walls of the fort. Myself, SFC (b)(6), (b)(3), CPT (b)(6), (b)(3), CPT (b)(6), (b)(3), SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) and a British CAS qualified SAB team went to a position no the NW wall. MAJ (b)(6), (b)(3) along with his element moved to a position on the northern wall to gain vantage from another point. At my position we were taking small arms fire and mortar rounds around and near our position. Our elements intention was to maintain a position from there and wait for further instruction from MAJ (b)(6), (b)(3).

Northern Alliance troops, through our interpreter, told us this was a bad location and that we needed to move. They guided us on the fort wall approximately 300 yards to the NW corner of the fort. From our new location we were still receiving gunfire and mortar rounds were also still being fired. I turned on my radio and set out my VS-17 panel, the British team set up their Viper Range System and acquired enemy grid coordinates. SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) set up his SATCOM and also laid out his VS-17/ reflective panel.

MAJ (b)(6), (b)(3), along with his team, went forward to get a closer look at the situation. From his position and mine, it was evident that we needed Emergency Close Air Support. The request for air support, my understanding, was made by MAJ (b)(6), (b)(3) at the schoolhouse in Mazar-e-Sharif. Just after the teams departed for the fort of Quali Jengi, our element had communication with MAJ (b)(6), (b)(3) through a Saber radio. MAJ (b)(6), (b)(3) informed us that the aircraft was inbound and approximately 15 minutes out; with the aircraft callsign Shasta 21.

Upon initial call with Shasta 21, my radio was only able to receive and I could not transmit. SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) took over comms with Shasta 21 on his radio, while I troubleshooted my radio. I heard SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) pass the enemy grid coordinates, target elevation, brief description of the target, and also a brief description of our location.

At this point I had good comms with my radio and heard Shasta 21 verifying the enemy position. Shasta 21 transmitted to Boxer Quali Jengi, which was myself and SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) if what he was looking at was correct. I told him, "Roger, the middle wall divides the fort in half and there's a north and south side. The enemy is on the southside and a good visual mark is two large trees south of that middle wall." I believe he responded with a "Roger." I then went on to pass Shasta 21 friendly coordinates—and he verified those coordinates back to me.

At this time both myself and SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) were listening in on all communications. I would say approximately thirty seconds went by before another transmission was made. Shasta 21 came back and verified both coordinates again. Shasta 21 read target coordinates first and they were correct; he then read friendly coordinates and they were correct as well. I then turned to SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) and verified with him and he verified everything was OK.

Enclosure (9)

Our decision to clear Shasta 21 "HOT" when he called back was made with confidence. Shasta 21 called at the 1 Minute Mark and SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) transmitted, "Cleared Hot." We all waited for the "Bombs Away" transmission, but it was never passed.

The next thing I remember is seeing the bomb make it's way towards us. I think I made an effort to take cover, but all I recall is flying through the air and landing on the ground. I then made every effort I could to get myself up and gather accountability for the rest of the team.

MEDICAL ASSESSMENT

Both of my eardrums are ruptured; left eardrum is in worse condition. I sustained facial burns, scratches and bruises on my skull. Both eyes had scratches on the cornea.

Outlook—Left ear needs surgery to rebuild tympanic membrane. Approximately 6 weeks of recovery time once operation has been performed. All other injuries are healed.

(b)(6), (b)(3)
DSN: (b)(2)

In addition to my previous statement

SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) and I were standing by once we received word that Shasta 21 was inbound 15 minutes from Maj(b)(6), (b)(3). Approximately 15 minutes went by, myself and SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) received a transmission from Shasta 21 checking into our location. I heard Shasta 21 check in and I responded with " Shasta 21 this is Boxer Qual I Jengi, over". I repeated the check in two more times and it was obvious that he was unable to hear my transmissions. I immediately started to trouble shoot my radio and told SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) that I was unable to transmit any information--you will have to talk to Shasta 21 until my radio is fixed. SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) then transmitted initial call and was able to establish positive communications with Shasta 21. I'm not able to say accurately what Shasta 21's transmission was after initial call with SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) I do know SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) passed target coordinates, target elevation, a brief description of target, and also a brief description of friendly location. I estimate that I trouble shot my radio for about 45 seconds, although I can't accurately say I know what Shasta 21 transmitted in those 45 seconds. I do know what SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) provided for Shasta 21. I knew from listening to SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) that Shasta 21 had enemy coordinates, target elevation a brief description of target, and also a brief description of friendly location. As I stated earlier I can't honestly say what Shasta 21's transmission was or what SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) heard on his radio, standard procedure is to give target coordinates first whether its emergency close air support or close air support. With this in mind and my radio now able to transmit I heard Shasta 21 transmit "Boxer Qual I Jengi, the target is on the south side of wall marked by two trees." At this time I felt something wasn't clear so I transmitted on my radio that "The middle wall divides the fort in half from the north and south. On the south side of that middle wall there are two large trees, that is a good visual mark for the enemy position." Shasta 21 responded with a "Roger". At this time I felt he was getting better situational awareness and checking what he had as a target against what I transmitted to Shasta 21. The next transmission I passed friendly coordinates to Shasta 21. Shasta 21 repeated back to me the coordinates. I responded to him "affirmative that is correct." After I transmitted to Shasta 21 our friendly position there was radio silence for approximately thirty seconds. At this time, I felt Shasta 21 was digesting and checking the information. The thirty seconds passed and Shasta 21 made the next transmission. Shasta 21 transmitted that he wanted to verify coordinates. Shasta 21 transmitted target coordinates I checked them with what I had and SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) checked them with what he had written down and they were correct. Shasta 21 then went on to pass friendly coordinates. I checked them with what I had written down and SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) checked them with what he had written down and they were correct. I did ~~feel there was a little confusion because Shasta 21 repeated both coordinates again after~~ he already verified them in earlier transmissions. I know there was some confusion among Shasta 21 but he called and transmitted both coordinates again. From a FAC stand point I felt confident any confusion was clarified and I was confident when we cleared Shasta 21 hot.

My training involves AC-130 Gunship, MH-53, and MH-60, Calls for fire and Close Air Support in an emergency situation. I have made over fifty combined calls for fire involving AC-130, MH-53, and MH-60 assets. My level in close air support is limited to emergency close air (ECAS) support only. I have had instructional classes on ECAS taught here at Hurlburt field.


BOXER
GEO: 3640N / 06659E ALT: 20K
TOT: 261100Z NOV 01 SENSOR: KS-153
AIRCREW: (b)(6), (b)(3)
CLASSIFIED: SECRET
NORTH
IMPACT POINT
SECTION OF WALL MISSING

AOSO-SFA-TB-SA 03 JANUARY 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR Record

SUBJECT: Witness Statement for Bombing Incident, 26 November 2001.

1. On the evening of 25 November, 2001, I, (b)(6), (b)(3) (b)(6), (b)(3), received orders to participate in a military operation to enter the fortress at Quala-Jan Gi and lead an element that would establish a observation post and call for close air support on Taliban positions. On 26 November, at approximately 1000, I went by vehicle to the fortress with the rest of the task-organized team (approx. 20 men). We dismounted our vehicles, and moved inside the fortress, receiving some small arms fire in the process. Once inside, we asked the Northern Alliance soldiers what the situation was, and they said that the Taliban controlled the southern half of the fort. We moved to the top of the fortress wall and proceeded to a turret that had a decent view of he southern half of the fort, as planned. SFC(b)(6), (b)(3)began to set up his radio to call CAS, but the NA soldiers informed us that they were receiving mortar fire there earlier. Additionally, there was some small arms fire coming into the position, although I am not sure if it was aimed fire at us, or just rounds flying by. I decided to move to another spot on the NorthEast corner of the fort, which I knew (from earlier trips to the fort) had good vantage of most of the southern half of the fort. We picked up and moved along the top of the wall (which was about 30-40' above the ground) to the N/E corner, where there was a NA tank, about 30 troops, and a senior NA officer. I went up to the officer and told him what our plan was, he concurred, and SFC(b)(6), (b)(3)began to establish communications with some aircraft. The C2 aircraft handed over an F-14 fighter, who checked in and said that he had a JDAM and laser guided bomb. We passed along our position and the position of the first target, a building holding many Taliban. Their building was about 260 meters from us. We acquired the enemy targets by using a "Viper" system, laser range finder attached to a GPS, which provides a highly accurate location for the enemy. As SFC Beck talked to the aircraft, I coordinated with the other maneuver element, led by MAJ (b)(6), (b)(3), which was moving to a position on the NorthWest corner of the fort. I informed MAJ (b)(6), (b)(3) that we were calling in targets, and he approved. I additionally told him to remain in a covered position until the F-14's bomb hit its target. The fighter told SFC(b)(6), (b)(3)that it was approaching from the West, and then called

saying that time on target was in three minutes. We waited but the pilot never called saying that the bomb was away, or to give an update. We waited, and after three minutes called back to the F-14, but got no response. SFC(b)(6), (b)(3)and SSG (b)(6), (b)(3) continued to call, but still no response from the F-14. Out of nowhere the bomb went off, and as the wall collapsed, we fell and were thrown. I do not remember very much after the bomb fell. I know that 1SG(b)(6), (b)(3)helped me back up the wall, because I was having trouble walking. I asked about CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) and SFC (b)(6), (b)(3)said that he was laying at the base of the wall in a secure location. I walked over to ensure that it was secure, and it was. Soon the QRF arrived and began to treat us. Soon after we were told to move out to the vehicles. The Infantry squad went first, and broke contact with us, who were moving slower. The medics stayed with us. We made it to the trucks and got in, and all I know is that the doctor on the scene would not let me move after that. About three hours later a helicopter arrived and evacuated us to Uzbekistan.

2. I certify the above statement to be true to the best of my memory.

(b)(6), (b)(3)
CPT, SF
Battalion Adjutant

Enclosure (11)

28 December 2001

On 26 November 2001 I was assigned as a member of a security element for an eleven man team (5 US and 6 British) that would call close air support (CAS) on enemy positions within the fortress at Qual-Jang-Gi, Afghanistan. Upon arrival at the fortress, we moved to a position along the North wall of the fortress, another element was positioned along the west wall of the fortress to confirm any coordinates our element generated for CAS and observe the fire.

When our element arrived at our observation point, SSG (b)(6), (b)(3) and SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) both established communications with inbound strike aircraft. Myself and 1SG (b)(6), (b)(3) observed the target area searching for any enemy personnel moving around the area. The enemy location was approximately 300 meters from our location. The British personnel accompanying the CAS element used their laser range finder to acquire the grid coordinates of the enemy location and passed those grids to SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) and SSG (b)(6), (b)(3). CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) then confirmed the grid with Major (b)(6), (b)(3) who was located with the other element on the west wall. When (b)(6), (b)(3) had confirmed the grid of the enemy location, (b)(6), (b)(3) or (b)(6), (b)(3) relayed the grid to the inbound aircraft. Our position was marked with a VS-17 panel and it was daylight.

1SG (b)(6), (b)(3) and I continued to observe enemy activity on the target and were told that the aircraft would drop bombs in 1 minute. That is my last recollection of this event.

(b)(6), (b)(3)
CPT, SF

STATEMENT

28 DEC 01

On the 26th November, I was a member of an 11-man element that was sent to assess and assist the Northern Alliance Forces in combat operations at the fortress of Qula Jangi, Afghanistan. My mission was to provide security for a CST team consisting of (b)(6), (b)(3) and (b)(6), (b)(3) . Upon arrival at the fortress the elements began to move to their designated positions. Element One moved to the NW parapet of the fortress, Element Two (my Team) moved to the proposed position, but was told by the NA that the position was not favorable, because the Taliban fighters have zeroed in on that location with mortars. This was confirmed by several close mortar rounds landing close to our element. Element Three stayed near the parked vehicles and our exit route out of the fortress. Element Four was a British SBS team that would support our CST team in security and target designation.

My element moved to the NE parapet. At that location we continued to receive small arms gunfire and mortar fire. The CST team began to call in a air support mission, myself and (b)(6), (b)(3) was concerned with a gate into the Taliban controlled area of the fortress, we rotated observation of this area with our ACOG scopes while the CST team worked on their air mission. I observed the SBS team utilizing the Viper target designator and was told the target was about 290 meters from our location. The LAT/LONG was confirmed by element One in the NE parapet. I overheard (b)(6), (b)(3) talking to the A/C he repeated our location to the A/C twice, and confirmed with the A/C our location marking, which were two VS-17 panels and I over heard the target location being sent to the A/C twice. (b)(6), (b)(3) and myself positioned ourselves to be prepared to engage the Taliban if they exposed themselves after the bomb impact. I heard the announcement of bomb two minutes out, then one minute out.

I recall a flame in my face and flying through the air, I hit the ground in blackness. When the blackness cleared, I got up and heard people screaming, I found a M-4 and moved to the screaming, it was (b)(6), (b)(3) , he said he could not move, I also heard gunfire coming from the Taliban section where the could observe us. I grab (b)(6), (b)(3) and got him almost to the top of the wall, I collapse and was then assisted by a SBS member that drug us both over the top of the wall. I asked (b)(6), (b)(3) and the SBS team a status on personnel, they told me we were missing (b)(6), (b)(3) I instructed (b)(6), (b)(3) to get help and find him, while I

Enclosure (13)

treated (b)(6), (b)(3) and organized a perimeter along the wall. (b)(6), (b)(3)and (b)(6), (b)(3) and an SBS member found Leahy unconscious and covered with debris, I observed them moving him up the wall and into covered position. At this time SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) arrived on the site from Element Three, he took over the consolidation of personnel and equipment. He also told me that we needed to move out of the bombsite immediately, because some NA were very upset due their casualties. He then prepared our evacuation out of the bombsite. Then the QRF arrived and moved us to the vehicles, where we moved back to our base camp in Mazar-E-Sharif.

(b)(6), (b)(3)
1SG, USA

Enclosure (13)

I, (b)(6), (b)(3) , do affirm this 28th day of December 2001 that the following statement is a true statement based on my best recollection of the events that led up to and during the 26th of November 2001.

On the 25th of November I was part of an element that was sent to the fortress of Quala-Jangi, Afghanistan. I was to provide communications, and was selected to go because I had lived in the fortress for approximately ten days prior to moving to the Turkish school house, located in Mazar-E-Sharif and was familiar with the fortress. It was my understanding, there was an uprising of 500-600 Taliban prisoners within the southern portion of the fortress, and there were possible American casualties. Upon reaching the fortress, we dismounted our vehicles behind some cover and concealment located just beyond the front gate. We could see and hear an abundance of small arms, machine gun, mortar and RPG fires all around the fortress. Through an interpreter we verified that the forces gathered around the front gate were friendly forces, then we proceeded to the gate. We then gathered information from the Northern Alliance forces on the whereabouts of any friendly US forces. We were told at least one person (b)(6), (b)(3) OGA) was located around the northern section of the fortress, and they did not know the whereabouts of another (b)(6), (b)(3) OGA). I was directed to move to a location on top of the wall just above the front gate entrance and prepare to call in CAS in support of our sub-element that was to move to the northern side of the fortress to find and help (b)(6), (b)(3) Myself and some additional British SBS soldiers moved to the top of the wall and I set up my radio and made communications with call sign (CS) SOLAR initially and advised him we would be needing aircraft (A/C) support. I was directed to go to our internal strike frequency and talk to CS (b)(6), (b)(3), which I did. I was told A/C would be inbound in approximately 15 minutes. I was able to make communications with F18 A/C and began identifying targets to be destroyed within the fortress. The A/C informed us it would be dropping JDAM type munitions and request coordinates of the targets and our location. We were able to provide coordinates to our location but not the exact coordinates for the targets due to the lack of any type of laser range finder or Viper. I asked the pilots to request permission to drop down below 15,000 feet to engage targets. They were able to get permission to drop down to 12,000ft to drop munitions. I was able to talk the pilots onto the targets using a distance and direction from my location. The pilots were able to visually identify each requested target and identify our orange visual signal (VS-17) panel we had spread out on the ground at our location and the one our other element had set up at their location in the northern portion of the fortress. I ~~informed the pilots that my position was 150 to 300 meters from the target and that we~~ were danger close. I repeatedly informed him that we were receiving a great volume of effective small arms, machine gun, mortar and RPG fires around our position and needed support ASAP. We waited approximately 20 minutes before the pilots were given clearance to drop from their higher command at which time I confirmed the targets and called in the strikes. I called in eight strikes that evening. which seven of them hit their intended targets with pinpoint accuracy. The sixth round had landed approximately one kilometer north of the fortress. After each bomb explosion the rate of fire from the Taliban forces decreased significantly. After the eighth bomb had detonated, we had no more access to F18 A/C, but there was a B-52 in the area for our use. I made

Enclosure (14)

communications with the B-52 and started discussing target information. Upon confirming bursting radius of munitions to be dropped and the fact it was going to be a blind drop, the decision was made to cancel any drop by the B-52 A/C. At this point it was beginning to get dark and we were directed to depart the area before dark due to safety concerns of distinguishing friendly forces from enemy forces. We pulled our entire element back to the front gate area, moved to our vehicles and departed the area back to the schoolhouse. Upon returning back to the schoolhouse we found that (b)(6), (b)(3) had returned safely to this location. We were debriefed and started planning for the next day's events. After receiving information from (b)(6), (b)(3) our main mission was to locate and retrieve (b)(6), (b)(3) body from the fortress.

On the 26th of November, I was part of recovery force to retrieve (b)(6), (b)(3) body from the fortress of Quala-Jangi. Again, I was to provide communications, and was selected to go because I was in the fortress the day prior and was familiar with the situation. Upon reaching the fortress, we repeated the events of the day prior and dismounted our vehicles behind some cover and concealment located just beyond the front gate. We could see and hear a range of small arms, machine gun, mortar and RPG fires around the fortress. Through an interpreter we verified that the forces gathered around the front gate were friendly forces, and then proceeded to the gate. We received an update of the situation. Northern Alliance forces informed us the number of prisoners resisting was down to approximately one hundred. We began executing our plan. I, along with four other SF soldiers moved to the same position on the wall I was located the day prior. Once in position, we were informed by NA soldiers that our location had been targeted by Taliban mortar fires and we needed to move. They directed us to the northeast corner of the fortress. Myself and four SF soldiers, four British SBS soldiers and numerous NA soldiers moved to the new location. Upon arrival we established security and set up our VS-17 panel. We again were receiving small arms, mortar, and RPG fires. NA forces informed us they had taken heavy casualties throughout the night and the strength of the Taliban resistance came from mortars launched from two large trees in the southwest portion of the fortress. We identified these as targets and (b)(6), (b)(3) (b)(6), (b)(3) (AF STS) and myself began setting up our radios to contact the A/C. (b)(6), (b)(3) was unable to reach any A/C with his radio initially, so I turned my radio to the A/C frequency to contact the A/C. I made initial contact with CS (b)(6), (b)(3) and advised him we would need A/C support. I was directed to go to our TAD frequency and talk to the A/C, which I did. We were informed the A/C would be inbound in approximately 10 minutes. We were able to make communications with A/C. (b)(6), (b)(3) was now able to communicate with the A/C but was having trouble hearing the A/C. The A/C informed us it would be dropping JDAM type munitions. I began sending target information to the A/C. I gave the pilot a description of the target and informed him that we had a VS-17 panel at our location and at our other elements location on the northwest portion of the fortress. The pilot acknowledged the target and confirmed our VS-17 panel and requested coordinates of the target and our location. We were able to provide coordinates to our location but were not prepared to send target coordinates. I sent a distance and direction from our location to the target. The pilot insisted he needed coordinates of the target. The British SBS element utilized their Viper to obtain the coordinates to the two large trees approximately 300 meters to our south/southwest. The pilot was provided the target coordinates and elevation. The pilot notified us he was granted permission to

engage. He informed us he would be coming in from the west and was five minutes out. He gave us a 2-minute out warning and requested a cleared hot status from us, which was granted. He then gave us a 1½-minute warning. I don't remember hearing bombs away, but did hear the A/C as it approached. I then heard the bomb coming as I had the day prior, but this time with an awesome force I was thrown through the air towards the oncoming fires of the Taliban. With each tumble I realized I was still alive. Once I came to a stop, I stood there dazed and unsure of what had just happened. I then checked my body for all limbs and any blood. With a tremendous ringing in my ears I could still hear people yelling and screaming. I couldn't see due to the enormous amount of black smoke and brown dust. I looked around for my rifle and radio and couldn't find them. I was standing in a pile of rubble and knew I needed to get back to the top of the wall so I started climbing up the rubble. As I was climbing, the smoke and dust started clearing a little and I noticed (b)(6), (b)(3) climbing to my left. We stopped and asked each other if the other was ok. We both responded with, I think so, and then continued up the rubble. Once I reached the top of the rubble, I turned to look back down the rubble and saw 1SGT (b)(6), (b)(3) helping CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) up the rubble, but even further beyond that I saw a body dressed in DCU's laying lifeless at the bottom of the rubble. I took off down the hill to get him. Once I reached the body I realized it was CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) I shook him a couple of times to get a response and he only let out a very faint and short moan. He had a trickle of fluid running from the corner of his mouth. Realizing we were still in enemy fire I grabbed his LBV and started dragging him toward the top of the rubble. A British SBS soldier arrived and provided assistance dragging his body. As we climbed up the rubble it would fall out from under us making it difficult to climb, so (b)(6), (b)(3) and another SBS soldier provided us with more assistance. Once we had (b)(6), (b)(3) on the North side of the wall out of enemy fires the SBS medics provided medical care to him (b)(6), (b)(3) and I went to check on CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) and (b)(6), (b)(3) who were behind cover on the still standing portion of the wall. I gave water to (b)(6), (b)(3) to poor on his face, which sustained some burns from the explosion. CPT (b)(6), (b)(3) couldn't move without assistance due to a possible leg injury. At this point I pulled my pistol and without success started searching for my rifle and my radio. My attempt to dig through the rubble for my radio was ineffective. In my observance of the area, I saw that the part of the wall we were all located on was gone, to include our VS-17 panel, the tank that was 10-15 meters behind us, had the turret blown off and the hull was blown upside down, unfortunately on top of some NA soldiers. Approximately 15-20 minutes later our quick reaction forces arrived and escorted us back to the front gate, loaded us in vehicles and we departed back to the schoolhouse.

~~At this time this is my best recollection of what had happened. I have been~~ remembering and forget details as time passes.

In addition to my previous statement

SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) and I were standing by once we received word that Shasta 21 was inbound 15 minutes from Maj (b)(6), (b)(3). Approximately 15 minutes went by, myself and SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) received a transmission from Shasta 21 checking into our location. I heard Shasta 21 check in and I responded with " Shasta 21 this is Boxer Qual I Jengi, over". I repeated the check in two more times and it was obvious that he was unable to hear my transmissions. I immediately started to trouble shoot my radio and told SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) that I was unable to transmit any information–you will have to talk to Shasta 21 until my radio is fixed. SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) then transmitted initial call and was able to establish positive communications with Shasta 21. I'm not able to say accurately what Shasta 21's transmission was after initial call with SFC (b)(6), (b)(3). I do know SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) passed target coordinates, target elevation, a brief description of target, and also a brief description of friendly location. I estimate that I trouble shot my radio for about 45 seconds, although I can't accurately say I know what Shasta 21 transmitted in those 45 seconds. I do know what SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) provided for Shasta 21. I knew from listening to SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) that Shasta 21 had enemy coordinates, target elevation a brief description of target, and also a brief description of friendly location. As I stated earlier I can't honestly say what Shasta 21's transmission was or what SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) heard on his radio, standard procedure is to give target coordinates first whether its emergency close air support or close air support. With this in mind and my radio now able to transmit I heard Shasta 21 transmit "Boxer Qual I Jengi, the target is on the south side of wall marked by two trees." At this time I felt something wasn't clear so I transmitted on my radio that "The middle wall divides the fort in half from the north and south. On the south side of that middle wall there are two large trees, that is a good visual mark for the enemy position." Shasta 21 responded with a "Roger". At this time I felt he was getting better situational awareness and checking what he had as a target against what I transmitted to Shasta 21. The next transmission I passed friendly coordinates to Shasta 21. Shasta 21 repeated back to me the coordinates. I responded to him "affirmative that is correct." After I transmitted to Shasta 21 our friendly position there was radio silence for approximately thirty seconds. At this time, I felt Shasta 21 was digesting and checking the information. The thirty seconds passed and Shasta 21 made the next transmission. Shasta 21 transmitted that he wanted to verify coordinates. Shasta 21 transmitted target coordinates I checked them with what I had and SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) checked them with what he had written down and they were correct. Shasta 21 then went on to pass friendly coordinates. I checked them with what I had written down and SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) checked them with what he had written down and they were correct. I did feel there was a little confusion because Shasta 21 repeated both coordinates again after he already verified them in earlier transmissions. I know there was some confusion among Shasta 21 but he called and transmitted both coordinates again. From a FAC stand point I felt confident any confusion was clarified and I was confident when we cleared Shasta 21 hot.

My training involves AC-130 Gunship, MH-53, and MH-60, Calls for fire and Close Air Support in an emergency situation. I have made over fifty combined calls for fire involving AC-130, MH-53, and MH-60 assets. My level in close air support is limited to emergency close air (ECAS) support only. I have had instructional classes on ECAS taught (b)(6) at Hurlburt field.

Summary of phone interview 16 January 2002, of CDR(b)(6), (b)(3) and Sergeant First Class(b)(6), (b)(3) USA, ground forward air controller team member.

SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) conducted initial radio communications with Shasta 21, the air element mission commander, on 26 November 2001, in vicinity of Mazar-E-Sharif. SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) does not recall Shasta 21 initially requesting the friendly position. In clarification of his statement dated 28 December 2001, SFC(b)(6), (b)(3) recalls that he immediately passed target coordinates and a target description during initial radio communications with Shasta 21. He does recall clarifying both target and friendly geo-coordinates during subsequent radio communications with Shasta 21.

MEDICAL SUMMARY

Four soldiers from 3 BN /5th SFG received significant injuries in the incident. All four personnel sustained ruptured eardrum(s). One soldier ((b)(6), (b)(3)) underwent surgery 16Dec01 to repair his eardrum. The other three personnel are being followed by an ENT specialist and may require ear surgery at a later date. One soldier ((b)(6), (b)(3)) fractured his pelvis. He is now ambulatory. All soldiers received miscellaneous minor abrasions and contusions. Initial prognosis is that all soldiers will fully recover from their injuries.

Personnel injured:

(b)(6), (b)(3)

Please feel free to contact me if questions: com (b)(2)
Submitted 28Dec01.

LTC (b)(6), (b)(3)
2/19th SFG

Page 52 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Enclosure 16 (one page total)-Withheld in its entirety-(b)(1)1.4(a)

O 261150Z NOV 01
FM COMCARAIRWING ONE
TO CTF 50
TF 50
COMTRBATGRU
TRBATGRU
BT
~~S E C R E T REL USA/GBR~~/N03800//
OPER/ENDURING FREEDOM//
MSGID/MISREP/CVW-1/26NOV01/KC/003//
MSNID/MSN NUMBER/MISSION//
AMPN/USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT MISSION NUMBER//
FLDTAIL/CALLSIGN/ACFT SIDENUMBER/TYPE/LAUNCH/RECOVERY/ENGINE SHUTDOWN//
TIMESPEC/ON STATION/OFF STATION//
AMPN/ACFT TYPE/LOT/RADAR TYPE AND OFP VERSION/RWR/ECM//
TGTPOS/BE NUMBER/TARGET NAME/TARGET LOCATION/DMPI DESCRIPTION/TOT/DMPI NUMBER/NUMBER
WEAPONS/WEAPON TYPE/FUSE TYPE/FUSE DELAY/RELEASE HDG/ALT/SPEED/DIVE ANGLE//
RESULT/CALLSIGN/SIDE/DMPI/SUCCESS/REASON//
EA/CALLSIGN/SIGNAL JAMMED/BAND JAMMED/JAM ON TIME/JAM OFF TIME//
ESM/CALLSIGN/INTERCEPT TYPE/AIRCRAFT LOCATION/INTERCEPT
TIME/DURATION/BEARING/DISTANCE/SENSOR/AIRCRAFT HDG/ALT/SPEED//
SAFIRE/CALLSIGN/WEAPON TYPE/NUMBER/LOCATION/TIME/ALTITUDE/IDENTIFICATION
MEANS/COUNTERTACTICS//
ENINCEPT/CALLSIGN/INTERCEPT LOCATION/TIME/ALTITUDE/AIRCRAFT TYPE/NATIONALITY/NUMBER
SIGHTED/NUMBER ENGAGED/NUMBER DAMAGED/NUMBER DESTROYED/AIR-TO-AIR WEAPON TYPE//
ACLOSS/CALLSIGN/LOCATION/METHOD/TIME/CREW STATUS//

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY/A TOTAL OF 02 CVW-1 AIRCRAFT WERE SCHEDULED AND LAUNCHED TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE STRIKE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. SHASTA 21, 22 WERE SCHEDULED TO CONDUCT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IVO MAZAR-I-SHARIF UNDER THE DIRECTION OF BOXER 81. SHASTA 21, 22, EXPENDED 1X GBU-31 ON COMPOUND. WEAPON IMPACTED 900 FEET NORTHEAST OF INTENDED AIMPOINT. NO ESM OR SAFIRE NOTED.//

MSNID/2225/XCAS//
AMPN/6B1//
FLDTAIL/SHASTA 21, 22/206, 204/F-18C/0315Z/0915Z/0925Z//
TIMESPEC/0545Z/0645Z//
AMPN/FA-18C/LOT 16, 17/APG-65 OFP 13+/ALR-67 VERSION ECP 510/ALQ-126B/ALE-39//
TGTPOS/-/-/-/-/-/-/1/GBU-12/FMU-139/-/-/-/-/-//
RESULT/SHASTA 21/206/-/RTB/NO TASKING//
TGTPOS/-/-/-/-/-/-/1/GBU-12/FMU-139/-/-/-/-/-//
RESULT/SHASTA 21/206/-/RTB/NO TASKING//
TGTPOS/-/-/-/-/-/-/1/GBU-12/FMU-139/-/-/-/-/-//
RESULT/SHASTA 21/206/-/RTB/NO TASKING//
TGTPOS/-/QALEH-YE-JANGI GARRISON/3640.099N06659.169E/COMPOUND/0610Z/-/1/GBU-31/
FMU-139/INST/270/FL300/.9M/LEVEL//
RESULT/SHASTA 22/204/COMPOUND/UNASSESSABLE/WEAPON IMPACTED 900 FEET FROM INTENDED
AIMPOINT//
NARR/SHASTA 21, 22 WERE SCHEDULED TO CONDUCT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSION IVO MAZAR-I-SHARIF UNDER THE DIRECTION OF BOXER 81. AFTER REFUELING, SHASTA 21, 22 PROCEEDED NORTH TO ASSIGNED TARGET AREA. WEATHER IN THE TARGET AREA WAS CLEAR. SHASTA 21 WAS NOT TASKED TO RELEASE ORDNANCE. SHASTA 22 CONDUCTED ONE PASS, RELEASING 1X GBU-31. BOXER 81 PROVIDED GEOCOORDS FOR GBU-31 DELIVERY. SHASTA 21 PROVIDED BHA. SHASTA 21 FLIR FOOTAGE REVEALS GOOD TGT ACQ AND 1X IMPACT. ASSESS GBU-31 IMPACTED 900 FEET NORTHEAST OF INTENDED AIMPOINT. AFTER ATTACK RUN, SHASTA 21, 22 RTB. SHASTA 21 RTB WITH 3X GBU-12'S EACH UNEXPENDED. NO ESM OR SAFIRE NOTED.//

DECL/X4//
BT
#0001
NNNN

Enclosure (17)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP EIGHT
FPO AE 09501-4308

5800
Ser N02/327L
11 Dec 01

b(6)

From: Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT
To: CDR (b)(6), (b)(3) U.S. Navy, (b)(6) 1310

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASE BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251.

Ref: (a) DODINST 6055.7 dtd 3 October 2000.

1. This appoints you, per reference (a), to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject incident.

2. Investigate the circumstances surrounding the friendly fire incident in accordance with reference (a) paragraph E4.6. Your investigation should be limited to a specific examination of the cause and affect of the mishap from the time the air strike was called to when ordnance was released. Focus on determining why the mishap occurred. Inquire into all facts surrounding the incident, obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, or adverse administrative action. Report your findings of fact and recommendations to include the cause of the mishap and resulting injury and damage. Furthermore, make an assessment as to any fault or negligence and recommend corrective measures and disciplinary actions as appropriate.

3. You are to coordinate your investigation with component commands that were operationally involved, or had an interest in the incident. Your investigation will be submitted to USCENTCOM via COMFIFTHFLT by 18 December 2001, unless an extension of time is granted. If you have not previously done so, read reference (a) in its entirety before beginning your investigation.

b(6)

4. You may seek legal advice from Commander Carrier Group EIGHT Staff Judge Advocate, LCDR (b)(6), (b)(3) JAGC, USN, during the course of your investigation.

(b)(6), (b)(3)

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

CCJA

DEC 1 9 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, FPO AE 09501-6008
Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet, FPO AE 09501-6008
Commander, Carrier Group Eight, FPO AE 09501-4308
CDR (b)(6), (b)(3) U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, FPO AE 09501-6008

SUBJECT: Approval of Request for Extension of Time to Complete Investigation from 20 December 2001 to 2 January 2002

REF: CDR (b)(6), (b)(3) Memorandum, 17 Dec 01, Subject: Extension Request For Investigation Into Possible Friendly Fire Incident That Occurred On 26 November 2001 Ivo Mazir-E Sharif In Which U.S. Military Personnel Were Injured From Ordnance Released By Aircraft from VMFA-251

I have received and reviewed the request of the investigating officer of the friendly fire incident dated 26 November 2001 for an extension of time to submit the report of investigation from 20 December 2001 to 2 January 2002. Also, I have received and reviewed the endorsements of Commander, USNAVCENT/US Fifth Fleet and Commander, Carrier Group Eight recommending approval. Upon due consideration, I approve the request and grant the investigating officer an extension to 2 January 2002 to complete his investigation.

TOMMY R. FRANKS
General, USA

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
FPO AE 09501-6008

IN REPLY TO:
5800
Ser 013/080
17 Dec 01

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CDR (b)(6), (b)(3), USN, (b)(6) /1310
ltr of 17 Dec 01

From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
To: Commander, U.S. Central Command

Subj: EXTENSION REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251

1. Readdressed and forwarded recommending approval.

2. If extension is approved, basic investigation with first endorsement will be provided to this command on 2 January 2002. Request second endorsement be provided to U.S. Central Command no later than 9 January 2002.

C. W. Moore, Jr.
C. W. MOORE, JR.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP EIGHT
FPO AE 09501-4308

5800
Ser N02/330L
17 Dec 01

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CDR (b)(6), (b)(3), USN, (b)(6) /1310
ltr dtd 17 Dec 01

From: Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT
To: Commander, U.S. Navy Central Command
Via: Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet

Subj: EXTENSION REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251

1. Forwarded recommending approval.

L. J. QUILICI, III
By direction

17 Dec 01

From: CDR (b)(6), (b)(3), USN, (b)(6) /1310
To: Commander, U.S. Navy Central Command
Via: Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT
Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet

Subj: EXTENSION REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251

Ref: (a) Appointing ltr dtd 11 Dec 01
(b) Friendly Fire Incidents RMG 101403Z Dec 01

1. Per references (a) and (b), request an extension of time to complete subject investigation. All aspects of investigation with respect to CVW-1 participants have been concluded. Due to difficulties encountered in obtaining information from the ground components involved and related medical reports, more time is necessary for a complete investigation. To date, no connectivity has been established with incident ground forward air controller personnel. Likewise, medical reports have not yet been made available. Respectfully request an additional two weeks for a completion date of 2 January 2001.

(b)(6), (b)(3)

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

CCJA

JAN 1 1 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, FPO AE 09501-6008
Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet, FPO AE 09501-6008
Commander, Carrier Group Eight, FPO AE 09501-4308
CDR (b)(6), (b)(3), U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, FPO AE 09501-6008

SUBJECT: Approval of Request for Second Extension of Time to Complete Investigation to 31 January 2002.

REF: CDR (b)(6), (b)(3) Memorandum, 30 Dec 01, Subject: Extension Request For Investigation Into Possible Friendly Fire Incident That Occurred on 26 November 2001 Ivo Mazir-E Sharif In Which U.S. Military Personnel Were Injured From Ordnance Released By Aircraft from VMFA-251

The Commander, USNAVCENT/U.S. Fifth Fleet, is granted an extension of time to submit the completed investigation with endorsement to U.S. Central Command no later than 31 January 2002.

TOMMY R. FRANKS
General, USA

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
FPO AE 09501-6008

IN REPLY TO:
5800
Ser 013/083
31 Dec 01

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CDR (b)(6), (b)(3), USN, (b)(6) /1310
ltr of 30 Dec 01

From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
To: Commander, U.S. Central Command

Subj: EXTENSION REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251

1. Readdressed and forwarded recommending approval.

2. This is the Investigating Officer's second request for extension, and is justified on the basis of difficulties in obtaining documentation from ground FAC personnel. If extension is approved, basic investigation with first endorsement will be provided to this command on 30 January 2002. Request second endorsement be provided to U.S. Central Command no later than 10 February 2002.

C. W. MOORE, JR.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP EIGHT
FPO AE 09501-4308

5800
Ser N02/334L
30 Dec 01

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CDR (b)(6), (b)(3), USN, (b)(6) /1310
ltr dtd 30 Dec 01

From: Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT
To: Commander, U.S. Navy Central Command
Via: Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet

Subj: EXTENSION REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251

1. Forwarded recommending approval.

M. F. FITZGERALD

30 Dec 01

From: CDR (b)(6), (b)(3), USN, (b)(6) /1310
To: Commander, U.S. Navy Central Command
Via: Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT
Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet

Subj: EXTENSION REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E-SHARIF IN WHICH U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED BY AIRCRAFT FROM VMFA-251

Ref: (a) Extension Request dtd 17 Dec 01

1. Request an additional extension of time to complete subject investigation. On 17 Dec reference (a) was forwarded and approved for a completion date of 2 Jan 01. All aspects of investigation with respect to CVW-1 participants have been concluded. Due to difficulties encountered in obtaining information from the ground components involved and related medical reports, more time is necessary for a complete investigation.

2. Four of the five ground personnel involved in the incident have been contacted through Deputy Commander Fifth Special Forces Group, Quatar. Their statements are being sent as well as the medical summary for all injured personnel. The fifth incident servicemember, the controlling GFAC, is currently convalescing INCONUS and due to return to 23rd STS, Hurlburt Field, on 2 Jan 01. The difficulties encountered in obtaining the necessary documentation for this investigation have been compounded by the fact that ground FAC personnel have been dispersed in theater and INCONUS for medical treatment and operational tasking.

3. All commands involved in this incident have cooperated fully with this investigation. Respectfully request an extension for a completion date of 30 January 2001.
(b)(6), (b)(3)

(b)(6), (b)(3)

01 01 101607Z DEC 01 PP RR SSSS AT ZYUW

NO

USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCCD//

CJFMCC CENT//C3//

USCENTCOM CFACC//CC//

COMCFLCC DOHA KUWAIT KU//CC//

INFO COMJF SOCC EF

COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC

COMUSARCENT-CDRUSATHIRD FT MCHPHERSON GA

COMUSMARCENT CAMP H M SMITH HI

COMUSNAVCENT

CJTF-SWA//CC//

~~S E C R E T~~

SUBJ:FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENTS ~~(S)~~//

1. ~~(S)~~ IAW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 6055.7, THE CINC DIRECTS THE CJFACC TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED O/A 4 DECEMBER 2001 NORTH OF QANDAHAR IN WHICH THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE KILLED AND NUMEROUS U.S. MILITARY AND OPPOSITION GROUP PERSONNEL WERE INJURED BY USAF AIRCRAFT PROVIDING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. THE CINC ALSO DIRECTS, UNDER THE SAME AUTHORITY, THE CFMCC TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED O/A 26 NOVEMBER 2001 IVO MAZAR-E SHARAF IN WHICH FIVE U.S. MILITARY GROUND PERSONNEL WERE INJURED FROM ORDNANCE RELEASED FROM U.S. NAVAL AIRCRAFT. WHILE NOT REQUIRED BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 6055.7, CFMCC IS ALSO DIRECTED TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT INVOLVING MARINE AIRCRAFT DIRECTING FIRE AT SOF PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND IVO OBJECTIVE RHINO O/A 28 NOVEMBER 2001.

2. ~~(S)~~ THE INVESTIGATIONS WILL, IAW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 6055.7, PARAGRAPH E4.6, INQUIRE INTO ALL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENTS AND WILL OBTAIN AND PRESERVE ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE FOR USE IN LITIGATION, CLAIMS, DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, OR ADVERSE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS. THE INVESTIGATIONS WILL INCLUDE FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCLUDE THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT AND RESULTING DEATHS, INJURY AND DAMAGE. FURTHER, THE INVESTIGATIONS WILL MAKE AN ASSESSMENT AS TO ANY FAULT OR NEGLECT AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CORRECTIVE MEASURES AND DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, AS APPROPRIATE.

3. ~~(S)~~ EACH INVESTIGATION SHALL BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH COMPONENT COMMANDS, THAT WERE OPERATIONALLY INVOLVED IN OR HAD AN INTEREST IN THE INCIDENTS. INVESTIGATION REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO USCENTCOM NLT 20 DECEMBER 2001, WITH ANY REQUESTS FOR EXTENSION SUBMITTED TO ME IN WRITING, PRIOR TO THIS DATE.//

CLASSIFIED BY: M.P. DELONG, LTGEN, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF
REASON: 1.5(A)
DECLASSIFY ON: 9 DEC 2011