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U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND ASSESSMENT TEAM (CAT)

REGIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL REPORTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES

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Commander, US Central Command
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CENTCOM ASSESSMENT TEAM (CAT)

The CAT was a USCENTCOM-sponsored assessment team which consisted of 220 members from across civilian and military agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, coalition partners, contractors and subject matter experts. Twenty organizations were represented within the team which worked over a 100-day period (November 2008 to February 2009).

The CAT conducted a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, reviewed existing strategies and plans across relevant departments and organizations, and produced findings and recommendations informed by interagency expertise, in order to frame USCENTCOM programs, activities, and initiatives in the context of broader U.S. Government and Coalition efforts.

The final CAT Report consisted of more than 3500 pages of assessments and recommendations for the Commander and his staff to assimilate into future USCENTCOM strategy and policy. It comprises a Regional Overview with Functional Annexes and separate Sub-regional reports.

REGIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL REPORTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ARABIAN PENINSULA

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) The Arabian Peninsula (AP) comprises seven states, including six Gulf states plus Yemen. The AP, excepting Yemen, is the sole area of relative economic prosperity and political stability in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility (USCENTCOM AOR). The sub-region has substantial potential to affect positively U.S. and allied interests. Conversely, it could also become an area of economic crisis, extremist infection, and political turmoil. This report will address three critical challenges facing the United States:

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CENTRAL ASIA STATES

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
LEVANT - EGYPT

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) The Levant and Egypt sub-region is the traditional political, social, and intellectual heart of the Arab world, and historically has been the primary battleground between rival ideologies. As such, this area has always influenced political developments in other parts of the region. Currently, it is both an importer of instability from other parts of the region and an exporter of instability to them. It is a key arena for Iran's attempts to spread its influence, for example, by manipulating the Arab-Israeli conflict to its advantage and weakening pro-Western governments. The historical record reveals that the United States is vulnerable to strategic surprise in the Levant and Egypt: events there can and will interfere with U.S. goals in the region if left unattended.

(U) Countering Iranian influence is a key U.S. interest in the sub-region. Other interests include reducing the influence of violent extremist organizations, preserving stable regimes in Jordan and Egypt capable of supporting U.S. initiatives, and ensuring continued access to the Suez Canal.

(U) Iran's ability to use proxies and allies such as Hizballah, Hamas, and Syria to further its interests in the sub-region is the primary challenge to U.S. interests in the Levant. Iran's growing influence in the sub-region has empowered violent extremist organizations while at the same time reducing the relative power of our traditional allies. Iran's rise has exacerbated pre-existing problems in the sub-region that threaten our interests – such as political instability in Egypt or Jordan, the stagnant Middle East Peace Process, the fragile nature of the Lebanese state, and the rise of violent radical Islamist sects.

(U) The sub-region includes Israel and its immediate neighbors. The perception of unfair and overwhelming U.S. support to Israel's policies – including Israel's treatment of the Palestinians – weakens popular support for the United States and its policies throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. The lack of a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict has given rise to troubling regional trends and presents governments of the sub-region with unique domestic challenges that have long-term effects on stability.

(U) Though Iran is an external player to the sub-region and must overcome suspicions of the breadth of its ambitions as a non-Arab and Shia power, Iranian influence in the sub-region will become even more difficult to counter if Iran succeeds in acquiring a nuclear weapon. While Hamas and especially Hizballah are dependent upon Iranian-supplied weapons and political support, both have managed to sink deep roots into their societies and are seen by most Lebanese and Palestinians as credible political and military organizations that play a legitimate role in providing social services, representing their political constituencies, and leading the "resistance" to Israel. They will not be undermined or neutralized easily.

(U) Syria presents an even more complicated case. While Damascus' alliance with Iran is in many ways unnatural, and Syrians chafe at Iran's economic domination of their country, the relationship is long-standing and provides the al-Asad regime with important benefits and a partnership to help mitigate the consequences of isolation. President Bashar al-Asad's main objective will remain the survival of his regime, and by maintaining and cultivating relationships with varied critical actors in the sub-region, he will retain the ability to choose those policy courses he

believes will best protect his hold on power. Our lack of a clear understanding of Syrian decision-making styles, motivations, and policy priorities precludes any confident assessment of how al-Asad would respond to an opportunity to distance Syria from Iran and move closer to the West – either for robust economic assistance or a possible return of the Golan Heights. So far, al-Asad has avoided the need to make hard choices, managing to maintain close cooperation with Tehran while alleviating the effects of Syria's post-Hariri assassination isolation by entering indirect peace talks with Israel and exploiting differences between the United States and its European partners. Any efforts to move Syria away from Iran require preventing the Syrians from playing the United States and its allies against each other.

(U) Unfortunately, the United States and its key allies – namely Egypt – enjoy less influence in the Levant and Egypt sub-region than we once did. Egypt is on the wane as a regional power-broker and at some point will face a potentially difficult transition to a post-Mubarak era. Growing economic hardship and the rise of politically influential Islamist groups in the country threaten the Egyptian government's ability to co-opt and manipulate its Islamist opposition. Additionally, the U.S. decision to condition some assistance on Cairo's movement towards a more democratic system and greater respect for human rights has damaged the bilateral relationship and failed to improve the government of Egypt's attitudes towards democratization.

(U) The key challenge facing the United States, though, is how to best reduce Iranian influence in the sub-region. This report recommends a strategy to limit Iran's ability to use the Levant as a battleground for increasing its influence to prevent the spread of instability to other parts of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)

Area of Operations (AOR). Our approach focuses on diluting Iran's importance to Syria over time in order to reduce Hizballah's influence within Lebanon and help to weaken Syria's support to other malignant allies in the sub-region. Focusing on quid pro quo engagement with Syria is a critical step toward bringing Syria into a constructive relationship and diversifying Syria's strategic alliances, particularly with Iran. Other priorities include continued support for the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) – to include an Israeli-Syrian dialogue – rebuilding our relationship with Egypt, continued support for Jordan's stability, and supporting the development of effective security forces in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

(U) Many of the Levant's problems – the stagnant MEPP (now given renewed attention through the appointment of Senator George Mitchell as special envoy), a dysfunctional political and security landscape in Lebanon, fears of political unrest in Egypt, and Jordan's socioeconomic vulnerabilities – have defied solutions for decades. Chances for success in two U.S. strategic goals – distancing Syria from Iran and reducing Iran's reach into the sub-region – are perhaps less than fifty percent. Nevertheless, the United States must be prepared to exploit opportunities when they arise.

(U) All efforts in the sub-region must be supported by two pillars of particular importance: coordinated information operations and the resources – primarily human – required to succeed in each subordinate task. With respect to the former, each initiative in the region must be backed by a strategic communications plan. With respect to the latter, we are particularly concerned that we continue to lack a sizable cadre of personnel who have an understanding of the Levant sub-region's

languages and cultural nuances and are capable of working within the sub-region.

(U) U.S. goals in the Levant and Egypt sub-region are mostly political – and USCENTCOM’s role in them will be largely supportive. USCENTCOM is best placed to assist other proposed efforts in the sub-region by concentrating on cultivating relationships with sub-regional militaries – many of whom play an influential domestic political role – so that they support (or at least do not obstruct) our efforts to achieve political objectives. The obvious exceptions to this rule are our continued support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, where USCENTCOM will play a primary role, and our substantial annual assistance to the Egyptian Armed Forces.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
IRAN

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
IRAQ

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) Situation Assessment: Significant progress has been made in Iraq. Political, security, economic and diplomatic trends continue to be positive. However, they remain fragile, reversible, and uneven because underlying conflicts remain unresolved. It is in United States' long-term interest to have a stable and secure Iraq that is a source of regional stability and a strategic partner.

(U) Long-term stability and security depend on the Government of Iraq's ability to resist malign internal and external influences, provide transparent and accountable governance, reintegrate regionally and internationally, sustain and build on security gains, improve provisions of essential services, and achieve legitimacy. U.S. forces in Iraq will draw down over the next three years in response to Iraqi sovereignty concerns, Afghanistan requirements, the economic crisis, U.S. policy imperatives, an increasingly capable Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and progress against security threats.

(U) Problem: To preserve security gains and influence inside Iraq as the Government of Iraq (GoI) exercises full sovereignty during and after the withdrawal of United States troops.

(U) United States Interests:

- Regional Stability
- Free Flow of Strategic Resources
- Pursuit of Common Interests (Defeat Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), counter Iran, and deter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD))

(U) Objectives: Specific major theater-strategic objectives and supporting ways and means that support a balanced strategy are summarized below.

Objective 1: A stable, legitimate, competent GoI which practices effective governance on behalf of all Iraqis.

Objective 2: Re-integration of Iraq into regional and international communities in ways that are not destabilizing.

Objective 3: Development and maintenance of a mutually beneficial, long-term relationship with Iraq that improves perceptions of United States policy in the region.

(U) Proposed Strategy: Securing a long-term strategic partnership with the GoI can best be achieved by maintaining a cooperative relationship during the draw-down. The United States should balance security needs with respect for Iraqi sovereignty in order to create the political conditions necessary to fully implement the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) should, in collaboration with MNF-I and U.S. Embassy Baghdad, support the design, development, and implementation of a post-2011, residual capability which consists of a combined civilian-military organization affiliated with United States consulates located in key geo-strategic locations (e.g., Mosul, Kirkuk, Ramadi, and Basra). As a component of the United States Mission – Iraq (USM-I), the residual capability should execute a full range of development and security tasks in accordance with the SFA and as required to preserve and protect United States interests.

participation should also be considered in this initiative.

(U) USCENTCOM Contributions:

- Support Multi-National Force-Iraq's (MNF-I) Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) execution by serving as a liaison, advocate, and facilitator between MNF-I and other Governmental agencies.
- Work with MNF-I to design and achieve interagency support for a residual capability. Manage the downsizing of the existing United States footprint in Iraq (MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I) to support the development and Iraqi acceptance of a residual presence. Each Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) currently supports a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). As forces drawdown, BCTs will transition to Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AABs) supporting multiple PRTs. Eventually, AABs will drawdown and military presence will be folded into structures, perhaps consulates, under Chief of Mission (CoM) authority.
- Work with MNF-I to expand ISF participation in bilateral/multilateral exercises, conferences, and symposia. Expand Iraqi attendance at resident professional military educational institutions in the United States. These programs will help build ISF capacity and encourage Iraq's reintegration into the region and collective security arrangements.
- Work with MNF-I to establish a dialogue on border security issues between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey, and Iraq. Expand current USCENTCOM efforts to establish a multilateral border security dialogue (including Iraq) to minimize movement of foreign fighters/terrorists and malign Iranian influence. Syrian

- Work with MNF-I to fully resource the SFA. USCENTCOM should strongly support the establishment of a Washington-based Coordinator for Iraq Assistance to ensure unity of effort in planning and budgeting across the SFA committees.

(U) What is different?

(U) The recommended strategy is focused on a post-SA end-state and treats the SFA as a vehicle for securing United States long-term interests. The emphasis in this strategy is on managing the tensions between near-term security needs and the drawdown while setting conditions that allow for a long-term relationship. Additionally, this strategy promotes a bilateral framework (the SFA) as the best method for avoiding a vacuum during the drawdown and sustaining an enduring relationship between Iraq and the United States in order to achieve objectives.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
AFGHANISTAN

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PAKISTAN


(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ *The Problem*


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANNEX A: INTELLIGENCE

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) The purpose of the Intelligence Annex is to provide a regional overview and to identify key cross-cutting issues, threats and challenges. Where relevant, it includes references to countries and areas outside the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), including Israel, the Palestinian-controlled territories, India, Russia, and China. Appendix 1 to the Intelligence Annex provides a detailed situation assessment of the AOR, while Appendix 2 examines intelligence process, procedures and architecture to address key U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), and USCENTCOM challenges.

(U) The region is host to a complex mix of evolving threats and challenges with many extending beyond the AOR. From Egypt to Pakistan, it comprises an arc of instability that, in broad terms, is rich in hydrocarbons, whose population is primarily Islamic, and is subject to “great game” competition between competing power centers both within the region (e.g., Iran versus Arab states) and beyond (e.g., Russian and Chinese influence particularly in the establishment of military and energy infrastructures). Many regional governments exhibit weak and ineffective governance while maintaining strong internal controls. Radicalization is fueled by the impact of globalization, poverty, increasing fundamentalism, a sense of victimization, injustice, and growing frustration among local populations. At times, irrational exceptionalism and a zero-sum mentality color attitudes towards the West among many policy elites and their wider respective populations in the region. Populations of the region are susceptible to conspiracy theories and propaganda because of a lack of education, the scarcity of credible

information, and cultural tendencies. In recent years, antipathy to the United States and the West has increased precipitously.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANNEX B: DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) One critical factor defines U.S. operations and relations in U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR): the United States has ceded the initiative. Across the AOR, U.S. forces react to events, whether base closures in Kyrgyzstan or missile tests in Iran. U.S. defensive efforts to secure supply lines, regain lost ground in Afghanistan, obtain Pakistani cooperation, and align Arab partners' interests with U.S. interests stand in stark contrast to our adversaries' increasingly confident actions. The global economic recession and declining price of oil exacerbate present challenges but also provide incentives for regional economic integration and help to create a favorable context for the United States to regain the diplomatic initiative and shape our interlocutors' strategic thinking.

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(U) The situation in Iraq is still tenuous and the United States must further develop the diplomatic tools to protect the fragile political progress there, to help contain threats to security, and to maintain U.S. ability to positively influence the Government of Iraq (GoI). The success of recent military efforts in Iraq demonstrated not only how rapidly

political change can be engineered in the region, but also the political value of effective military operations. While the recent provincial elections saw previously disenfranchised Sunnis join the political process, sustained progress will depend on the residual U.S. presence to set the conditions.

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incentives and personnel policies to keep regional experts working on the region should be implemented.

(U) A core function at every overseas base should be building links to the host country. U.S. installations, from temporary combat outpost to major installations, send signals to the local population simply by their location, appearance, employment practices, and engagement programs. Joint bases provide clear benefits in building the habits of cooperation. USCENTCOM can also strengthen mil-to-mil engagement efforts, such as professional exchange programs and security cooperation relationships. The synergies that could be derived from modifying the Unified Command Plan to bring combatant command boundaries into harmony with those used by the U.S. Department of State (DoS) are well-known, but the United States might also consider how USCENTCOM will interact with global actors outside its AOR, such as the European Union (EU), Russia, and China.

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(U) If the United States focuses on understanding the needs of the “street,” it can avoid becoming prisoners of the local leadership and elite. To accomplish this, the United States must accept greater risk as the price of greater influence, and it must adopt a new approach to “force protection.” It can no longer divide U.S. Government (USG) civilians into security providers and security consumers when a whole-of-government approach is required. The USG’s reservoir of language skills has proven inadequate for effective strategic communications, street-level engagement or effective diplomacy. A massive training effort is required and

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANNEX C: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“Our national security strategy depends upon securing the cooperation of other nations, which will depend heavily on the extent to which our efforts abroad are viewed as legitimate by their publics. The solution is not to be found in some slick PR campaign or by trying to out-propagandize al-Qaeda, but rather through the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.”

-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
July 15, 2008 remarks to U.S. Global
Leadership Campaign Tribute Dinner

(U) Strategic Communication (SC) is an instrument of statecraft that influences perceptions, attitudes, and behavior in support of U.S. policy goals and objectives.

However, it needs to be seen in the wider sense as an integral part of every policy and every action taken to advance policy. Our long-term goals in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Operations (AOR) require changes in regional attitudes and behavior and, although explanations of policy are important, actions send messages more clearly than words and have greater impact. Effective Strategic Communication is the combination of words with actions and requires integration at the point of policy formulation. As Edward R. Murrow said we “need to be in at the take off and not just the crash landing.”

(U) Dozens of reports have been written on SC and Public Diplomacy (PD) since 2001 without significant change or effect in our SC efforts. This plan represents an opportunity for USCENTCOM, as a key player in the AOR with the leading responsibility for counterinsurgency, to integrate the decisive SC line of effort with other operations. USCENTCOM is well placed to act as an

agent of change and, through its leadership, set the example for an improved whole of government approach to strategic communication.

While past reports were global, with some focus on the centrality of the Middle East, this report focuses exclusively on the unique challenges in the USCENTCOM AOR, provides an operational view of current activities and recommends a way ahead. This report does not cover specific countries or sub-regions as we have integrated their SC strategies as annexes to each CENTCOM Assessment Team (CAT) sub-regional plan.

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(U) America’s negative image overseas, and particularly in the USCENTCOM area, undermines our ability to realize U.S. national security interests in the region. A January 2009 Gallup poll shows the region’s median approval of the United States at 15%. The special U.S./Israel relationship coupled with a moribund Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), as well as the presence of our combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, fuels anti-American sentiment. Since the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians continues to be a central theme shaping public opinion towards the United States and creates a base of support for violent extremism, much of our

SC effort will not succeed without substantive engagement on the MEPP.

(U) Interagency coordination is weak and complicated by the fact that, while the Department of State (DoS) has the responsibility for leading government-wide SC, it lacks full authority and resources to direct SC activities. The Department of Defense (DoD) has become increasingly active in the SC arena and, with its mission to fight two wars in the AOR, has taken the lead in this part of the world. DoD's annual funding for SC activities in Iraq is greater than the State Department's global Public Affairs (PA)/Public Diplomacy (PD) budget, resulting in reversal of the traditional SC roles. As a result, the U.S. face in the region is dominated by our military presence with diminished diplomatic engagement and PD. Coordination of Strategic Communication with key allies also remains weak. Country level interagency cooperation and implementation is working well in the AOR, but it needs strengthening at the sub-regional level.

Current government SC activities focus too heavily on one way communications, rather than relationship and capacity building, often because the latter requires long-term commitments, are human-resource intensive and do not produce immediate results. This is a key failure in our strategy because without the long term relationships and consistent engagement with broad sectors of the local populations we will not succeed in overcoming the credibility and trust deficit we suffer from throughout the AOR.

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(U) SC Advisor to POTUS: To clearly articulate a strategic vision and improve overall integration of SC activities, we recommend the appointment of a SC advisor to POTUS. A senior figure of stature with name recognition, reporting to the National Security Advisor, would be effective in recommending strategy as policy is being made and able to provide the necessary oversight and coordination over the government's SC activities with cabinet members. Equally important will be to define DoS and DoD SC responsibilities and advocate for funding them accordingly.

(U) Long-Term Engagement: To increase long-term engagement with the populations at large in the region (and especially with the "youth bulge") the United States should support/fund/establish a NGO PD institution to complement USG efforts. The NGO should implement long-term engagement and relationship building programs, such as cultural and academic exchanges, English language instruction, access to the internet, and establish overseas Centers in key locations. The 'British Council' centers are a good model and would provide a venue outside of the Embassy compounds. This proposal is not meant to re-create USIA or replace DoS' PD programs. To the contrary, the State Department's PD effort should be increased in both programming and staffing so that the civilian/diplomatic arm can take the government lead in engaging with civilian foreign audiences in the AOR and worldwide.

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(U) NESACenter: CENTCOM should expand the Near East and South Asia Center to Tampa and to the region to build relationships and increase the cultural and regional expertise of U.S. military and civilian officials. Partnering with academic institutions in the Tampa area would provide academic exchange opportunities and the synergy between academia and practitioners. Satellite campuses in the AOR would provide CENTCOM with a regional soft power presence to engage with upcoming military personnel and other officials from key countries.

(U) Unity of Effort: USCENTCOM should assign flag level Military Advisors to the Assistant Secretaries of the Near East and South Asia bureaus at the Department of State. DoS should establish sub-regional SC coordination teams in partnership with CENTCOM throughout the AOR with some funding capability. These coordination teams would address SC/PD issues and coordinate SC actions in their sub-region. CENTCOM should assign Strategic Communications Officers to PA/PD sections of selected Embassies (e.g. Yemen, Pakistan) to increase influence capabilities and provide needed military expertise.

(U) Increase U.S. Voices: We need to actively encourage additional American voices in the region well beyond the government voice as they are often more effective. DoS, USAID and Department of Commerce should facilitate and reach out to the American NGO community, the private sector, academic and cultural organizations as well as commercial/business interests as they have a far more influential role in advancing American values that are truly universal. While many American non-governmental organizations are represented throughout the region, the lack of regional stability has, over

the years, significantly reduced the presence of non-official Americans and institutions.


(U) Support Regional Voices: Lastly, the USG should work with American NGOs (through USAID and DoS) and European allies to improve efforts to support indigenous strategic communication capacity and civil society programs and institutions, both governmental and non-governmental, throughout the region. Such efforts will not dramatically change perceptions or behavior in the short-term, but over the long-run these initiatives will bolster good governance, minimize extremism, strengthen the mainstream majority and foster economic development and civil society. In the end, each society must take the lead in charting its own course and our role should be that of facilitator and supporter but not the direct agent of change.

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANNEX D:
COUNTERTERRORISM**


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANNEX E: COUNTERING WMD

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) “Unless the world acts decisively and with great urgency it is more likely than not that a WMD [weapon of mass destruction] will be used in an attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.” This call to action is not meant to “instill fear but to break the cycle in which disaster strikes and a commission is formed to report on what our government should have done to prevent it.” When it comes to WMD, “we know the threat we face, we know our margin of safety is shrinking, we know what we must do to counter the risk . . . we need unity at all levels.”¹

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¹ “World at Risk,” *Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism*, December 2008. (U)

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(U) Most importantly, the USG, and by extension USCENTCOM, must be structured for success in CWMD activities. Current U.S. policy and practices in this regard are disjointed and unevenly prioritized across departments. Inter- and intra-departmental structures are not optimized for success, either as individual elements or when combined to provide coordinated efforts spanning all instruments of national power. This extends even to disparities in the terminology individual departments and agencies use to describe the same activities. U.S. policy must be properly and unequivocally communicated, then translated for effective departmental action in support of associated goals. The USG should adopt a common lexicon to promote more effective communication between departments. In conjunction with these broader USG initiatives, USCENTCOM could benefit from adoption of an inter-staff working group intended to combine the efforts of intelligence, operations, and plans/policy personnel working together, supported by a command-level Interagency Task Force (IATF), to support overall USG efforts.

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² The P5+1 nations are the five nuclear weapons states (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, United States) recognized in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, plus Germany. (U)

providing outreach, and optimizing funding for those activities.

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(U) Finally, the USG should expand efforts to ensure regional partners are postured for success in CWMD activities. DoS and DoD figure prominently in associated activities. USCENTCOM can provide key support to broader USG initiatives to expand regional outreach. Activities may include: coordinated, improved USG messaging through official and non-official government contacts and strategic communications; efforts to increase regional support for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), including sponsorship of regional nations to membership in the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG); and increased emphasis on integrated defensive and response capabilities. In order to most effectively support these activities, the USG should focus on both improving coordination between departments

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANNEX F: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMICS AND GOVERNANCE

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) The Problem. State fragility is one of the United State's most pressing security threats, brought about by a breakdown in the social contract between a government and its citizens. Consequently, a major challenge in the CENTCOM AOR is increasing instability due to a combination of weak governance, poverty and extremist group activity. Governments with low levels of legitimacy have lost credibility and their citizens consider them to be the problem, not the solution. Rifts between governments and citizens provide extremist groups the *casus bellum* they need to gain popular support to pursue violence and develop safe havens for terrorist activity. Addressing the drivers of instability and helping governments restore their legitimacy are key determinants to reducing state fragility.

(U) In the CENTCOM AOR there is a continuum of instability, which this report has categorized into six categories, taking into account U.S. strategic interests. At the unstable end of the spectrum are countries of where the levels of instability and security threat have prompted the U.S. and allies to resort to a significant military and civilian presence (Afghanistan, Iraq); followed by countries presenting potentially comparable levels of instability and threat (Pakistan, Yemen, Tajikistan). In the middle are countries that are fragile and remain vulnerable to rapid economic and political deterioration due to a weakness of state institutions, widespread poverty and significant extremist group activity, usually kept under control via security institutions. This includes countries where the U.S. has significant strategic ties (Egypt, Lebanon), and countries of importance to other U.S. strategic interests, including providing access

for military supplies (Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan). At the more stable end of the CENTCOM DEG spectrum are countries with significant wealth and stronger state institutions, which face economic vulnerabilities due to lack of diversification, and have some degree of extremist group activity. This includes all of the countries of the Arabian Peninsula apart from Yemen i.e. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain. Tailored DEG recommendations to reduce instability for countries in each of the six categories are included in this report.

(U) A coordinated approach integrating U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and the civilian development, economic and governance (DEG) agency efforts more tightly is required to address the growing problem of instability in the region. Recognition of respective agency limitations and management of expectations requires an assessment of what we can and cannot realistically do, and adjustments in the way foreign assistance is planned, programmed, and administered to overcome key constraints. A better understanding of local dynamics is needed. Designing interventions that are *adaptable* to the context, with the program and budgetary *flexibility* to follow through are absolutely necessary. If our objective is to improve governance at all levels, the space to allow these systems to mature in order to draw down our own forces must be supported. We must recognize that we may be able to foster the key social contract between people and their governments only indirectly.

(U) Constraints to Action. This report suggests we must not only reallocate existing development resources to improve performance, but also address a set of

underlying structural constraints inhibiting the allocation process are also present. Key among them are:

- (U) A broken strategic planning process within the Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other relevant civilian agencies, limits their ability to effectively coordinate with stronger more robust military planning capabilities
- (U) The misalignment of development plans with the realities on the ground and the failure to use existing assessment tools to resolve these differences
- (U) Inflexible development appropriations and delivery mechanisms that support interventions that, while important, often have little to do with resolving the drivers of instability
- (U) Overreliance on U.S. implementers rather than host government agencies undermines government legitimacy and weakens already limited capabilities
- (U) The limited capacity of U.S. structures and authorities to deal with transnational problems thus ignoring important opportunities to build regional cooperation that involve other bi- and multi-lateral donors in U.S. initiatives
- (U) The lack of a unified focus within USCENTCOM to deal with non-lethal problems thus weakening the interface with the civilian development agencies.

(U) Recommended Actions. The following are the key recommendations regarding U.S. civilian and military efforts. The report also proposes a number of changes in the current U.S. foreign assistance and USCENTCOM structures to improve overall performance. Recommendations address how both objectives and structures need to be adjusted.

(U) Recommendations: Objectives

1. **(U) A new understanding needs to be forged between civilian and military counterparts.** There is a constant tension between the military and civilian agencies that share the same battle space. Military commanders strive for immediate results that reduce the risk of violence to their personnel. Development specialists focus on repairing the structural faults in recipient country institutions, which have or could produce, a crisis in government legitimacy leading to the need for U.S. military involvement. These approaches are not necessarily compatible, and tension between the two often leads to disjointed programming and substandard results.

(U) Civilian development professionals need to accept that in certain highly unstable situations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, they will need to deploy interventions that produce quick results in support of military COIN operations. While these interventions may not progress directly toward longer term development objectives, they should at the very least not harm conditions for the attainment of these objectives. On the other hand, military commanders have to accept that all development resources cannot be allocated to achieving short-term results, but investments which seek to repair underlying structural faults are essential if short-term COIN gains are to be sustainable. Those longer term efforts need to begin at the same time as the short-term interventions if they are to be properly synched and sequenced. An understanding between the U.S. Military and the civilian foreign assistance agencies is needed to formalize the commitment on the part of the civilians that development approaches that

complement COIN operations are required and need to be staffed adequately to employ them successfully in short-term and kinetic situations; and military concurrence that more structural interventions with longer term payoff are needed to make COIN gains sustainable. To facilitate this understanding, it is helpful for civilian advisory elements to be assigned to relevant military units.

2. **(U) A new approach to working with governments in the AOR needs to be developed and implemented.** Many of the governments with which the U.S. interacts in the AOR are led by elitist regimes whose primary concern is the retention of power, not necessarily the welfare of their citizens. They also do not welcome outside advice on how to improve their governmental systems. Trying to leverage change in these governments by conditioning development assistance has not been effective, and often resulted in a negative reaction and missed opportunities to advance U.S. interests by decreasing instability (such as in Egypt), thus limiting future U.S. influence. Restructuring development relations with governments within the AOR that reflect a mutually agreed upon set of programs is required. These have to be grounded in the realities of the country's political economy, and reflect the challenges that the government faces rather than what the U.S. believes those challenges to be. Detailed information on local conditions, developed through the application of methodology shared with the government, such as the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) could establish a common understanding of the drivers of instability. U.S. assistance applied in support of the host country's approach to these problems, not the

U.S.'s, would assist in developing a realistic working partnership. Focusing on budget execution, which is a problem through out the AOR, can provide an initial entry point for action acceptable to many governments in the region. This approach is presented in more detail below.

(U) To establish this new working relation, three broad recommendations are suggested:

A. **(U) Improve government legitimacy.** A more pragmatic approach that presents a win-win situation rather than normatively loaded recommendations for change, such as improving democracy, is required. Focusing on increasing the capacity and effectiveness of governments to deliver public services and meet the needs and expectations of their citizens is a more palatable approach. A comprehensive approach involves three distinct stakeholders: government, civil society and the private sector. Efforts in the past that have not integrated the needs and obligations of each have proven ineffective. In order to have actual impact on government legitimacy, however, a change in donor funding structures is needed. A restructuring of foreign assistance funding so that more passes through the government budgeting system is recommended. A strategy worked out with governments to what is desired and expected, and then holding that government accountable for the results may be more effective. There will be a certain level of flaws in government execution and in use of resources that will need to be acceptable to achieve results.

B. **(U) Budget Focus and Fiscal Decentralization.** A renewed focus on the national budget may be seen as the

point of entry. The national budgeting process in each country in the region is more than a resource allocation process. It represents the social and political process that nations use to define and act on priority public problem sets. In all countries throughout the AOR, budget expenditure rates are far below acceptable levels. This shortcoming provides the U.S. with a window of opportunity to open discussions with governments on means to improve budget performance. This should also be pursued at the sub-national level, following a two-step sequenced approach. The first would focus on greater use of U.S. budget support and multi-donor trust funds targeted at the provision of block grants that sub-national jurisdictions can use to deal with locally defined problems. Involving local citizens in the identification, design, and oversight of block grants would spur debate on the sources and uses of government resources, improve government legitimacy and accountability, set forces in motion to reduce local corruption, and provide important “lessons learned” in progressing to phase two in the process, greater host country budget decentralization. Continued involvement of citizens in this process, either through their elected officials or advisory boards would expand the transparency of the budgeting process, more effectively link available resources to the needs and expectations of the population, and continue steps to improve government legitimacy and control corruption. Credible, publically-disclosed financial data will dramatically improve the ability to secure external financing from other bi-lateral donors and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs).

C. **(U) Catalyze private sector investment.** This would require a two-step *quid pro quo* process:

withdrawal of the government from overbearing rent seeking regulatory structures and the use of an all of U.S. government approach (U.S. backed loan guarantees and insurance) to buy down investor risk. To spur private investment and enterprise growth at the country level, actions to restructure and simplify government approval of business start-up and closures, access to credit, and the equitable enforcement of existing regulatory regimes is required. Complementing these efforts would be actions to improve the capacity of local government staff responsible for implementing new regulatory regimes. These capacity building efforts would need to be balanced against strengthening audit and oversight structures to monitor performance and reduce rent seeking; establish private sector and professional associations to advise regulators on impact and reduced corruption; and strengthen the ability to adjudicate contract disputes and enforce property rights over private and business assets. To reduce investor risk, better coordination between other U.S. agencies, such as the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative would be required.

(U) Recommendations: Institutional Changes

Implementing the changes suggested above will require adjustments in how civilian and military agencies plan and implement “soft power.” The following specific adjustments in the institutional structure that supports foreign assistance unit of effort and effects are being recommended:

1. Unity of Effort

A. (U) Strong and Effective Strategic Planning Process. The decline in strategic planning capabilities in USAID, the DoS and other relevant civilian agencies such as Treasury needs to be reversed and systemized throughout the foreign assistance delivery structure. Civilian organizations require robust planning capabilities with the professional staff and resources needed to drive the resource allocation process. Clarifying priorities, methods and instruments is key across the Civil-Military spectrum. Without these capabilities the USG will not be able to participate and effectively interface with USCENTCOM's large and well funded planning apparatus. This should be accompanied by robust training programs for both civilian and military personnel to be familiarized with systems and approaches of each other respective agencies. Substantive training to civil affairs units regarding the development of realistic expectations of what can be achieved and timelines would improve military understanding of development and ensure continuity of efforts and follow up.

B. (U) The lack of a unified focus within USCENTCOM to deal with non-lethal problems. The above recommendations deal primarily with the civilian agencies and the Congressional committees with which they interface in the formulation and implementation of the foreign assistance budgets and programs. A more limited set of adjustments are needed within USCENTCOM itself to more efficiently use interagency development inputs in their own strategic and operational planning processes. The report suggests for USCENTCOM consideration three actions; first, the establishment of a

Directorate responsible for non-lethal planning; second, the formation of a senior-level civilian staff group to advise the Commander on DEG related issues, and, third the deployment of USCENTCOM personnel to participate on country-level strategy formulation and oversight teams.

C. (U) Increased coordination with international community. The international community, especially the United States, coalition partners, the United Nations, and neighboring states, has to coordinate and cooperate to ensure that their collective efforts will be maintained and adequately resourced as long as needed. The United States should take the lead, through the U.S. Special Envoys in the region, to coordinate efforts, working with key international and multilateral organizations such as the U.N. and the World Bank. This coordination should lead to: 1) allocation of adequate resources for outreach programs to communicate the importance of the mission to domestic and international constituencies; 2) support development of a contact group of key international players to meet regularly to steer strategic planning of the international engagement; 3) demonstrate real commitment to coordination mechanisms as joint efforts; and 4) encourage mutual accountability and greater effectiveness of donors by using proper tools of auditing and evaluation.

(U) Close coordination is particularly needed to deal with issues that cross boundaries. Examples include water management, generation and distribution of electricity and energy resources, trade, and the support of the private sector in unstable business environments. In the last example, U.S. and other international

partners would introduce subsidized guarantee programs that provide inexpensive insurance against political risks and force majeure to encourage local business people to create jobs by investing in their countries, rather than sending their capital overseas. The insurance would cover all aspects of a business, e.g., property rights, moveable assets, and employees. Efforts can also expand coverage by the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and similar organizations in other countries to encourage U.S. and other foreign companies to joint venture with local businesses.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANNEX G: RULE OF LAW

(U) ROL is a principle “under which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles.”¹

(U) The Importance of ROL. Adherence to the ROL,² like military action, serves a larger purpose than itself in the U.S. struggle against transnational terrorism and other threats. The ROL is at once a fundamental principle for a government’s conduct, a measure for the stability and democratization of a nation and society, and when translated into an effective development program, a powerful enabler for stabilizing and reconstructing a nation suffering the wounds of conflict. It thus strengthens a government’s domestic, international, and global legitimacy. It creates political effects that bind and unite the people, their government, and the international order of nations. It also affects a nation’s reputation across the cultural, religious, and the global communities. Because of these effects, ROL cuts across multiple lines of effort in any effort aimed at a government and civil society, supporting each line in a way that promotes sustainability of development.

¹ This definition for ROL is commonly referred to as the “UN definition of ROL” and is officially cited by the State Department in Supplemental Reference: Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions, Program Area 2.1 “ROL and Human Rights,” US Department of State, October 15, 2007.

² We adopt the UN definition of ROL for this assessment.

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ROL is a powerful enabler and should be a critical component of our efforts in partner nation development, U.S. Government (USG) operations in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), and in the process of aligning USCENTCOM legal authorities with responsibilities.

(U) Key Findings. The United States and USCENTCOM have devoted significant effort to strengthening the ROL in many countries in the AOR, but we still face problems achieving beneficial effects from this investment.

- ROL is a critical, cross-cutting effort to strengthen domestic, international, and global legitimacy.
- USG efforts to develop partner nation ROL capacities lack unity of effort, face challenges with leadership, lack an accepted “interagency doctrine” for ROL³, and suffer from a Western-centric approach. This problem is especially critical because sharia, tribal, and Civil Code legal systems predominate in the AOR.⁴

³ An interagency doctrine is lacking because all existing guidance has an intra-agency focus. Existing guidance fails to consider all of the capabilities that parts of the USG could bring to a ROL effort. It also fails to address in a comprehensive manner all of the elements of government and society that a healthy democratic nation requires in order to develop its own system of legal governance, economic vitality, and popular democratic participation.

⁴ These kinds of legal systems rely on Islam, tribal codes like Pashtunwali, and formal justice systems from Europe and the Ottoman empire.

- USCENTCOM always seeks to comply with law in its operations, but it faces two challenges in doing so. First, isolated cases of misconduct and poor policy decisions have created a deficit in partner nation trust in the USG's commitment to the ROL. Second, USCENTCOM and the USG agencies could incorporate legal factors and employ law enforcement agencies more effectively in the regional counterinsurgency and the struggle against transnational terrorism and other threats.
- USCENTCOM and USG legal authorities are a limited patchwork that limits the command's ability to adequately deal with threats and conduct operations in the AOR now and in the future.

(U) USCENTCOM Role. USCENTCOM must work with interagency partners to accomplish some of these proposed tasks. USCENTCOM could clearly accomplish military tasks without interagency partner assistance under its own authority.

(U) Relationship to Other Studies. This assessment is built upon many existing studies and proposals. It also includes original research, field assessments, and interviews. Given the current national security circumstances, the economic challenges facing the international community, and the growing potential threats, immediate action is required to address ROL, law enforcement and legal authorities. This report is therefore a recommendation on how USCENTCOM should implement necessary changes and seek implementation assistance from its joint, interagency, international, and multinational partners.⁵

⁵ USCENTCOM operates in a joint, interagency, international, and multinational environment. USCENTCOM does not direct other partners' actions, but must seek concurrence and willing participation from a wide range of partners to best achieve the kinds

of change that this assessment proposes. This report has benefited greatly from the wide range of representatives across the U.S. Government and foreign and international communities who participated in Assessment Team work.


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANNEX H: BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY (BPC)

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANNEX I: COMMAND AND CONTROL / KNOWLEDGE MAGAGEMENT

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) Command and Control- Knowledge Management (C2-KM) – This report establishes a common understanding of C2-KM challenges within the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) and recommends actions designed to strengthen unified action while clarifying roles and responsibilities among U.S. Government (USG) agencies, key allies, international organizations and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). The report addresses Courses of Action (COAs) designed to optimize Political-Civilian-Military/Military Command and Control relationships within the USG and across the international community. Additionally, the report provides other C2-KM recommendations to improve synchronization, collaboration and information sharing throughout the USCENTCOM AOR.

(U) The Nature of the C2-KM Problem.

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most acutely revealed in C2-KM approaches to Afghanistan.

(U) C2-KM Key Findings.

(U) Following is a summary of key findings resulting from the C2 KM Assessment:

- (U) Strong U.S. leadership in the AOR must be applied in ways that simultaneously enhance U.S. unilateral performance and sustaining unity of effort among the international community.
- (U) Stronger ties are required between U.S. and multinational Political-Civilian-Military coordination efforts using traditional Military Command and Control processes to increase AOR unity of effort.
- (U) Afghanistan-Pakistan unity of effort is hampered by a lack of an integrated international community approach for political, civilian and military activity.
- (U) U.S. policies and strategies for Pakistan and India are not well coordinated with the existing policies and strategies for Afghanistan.
- (U) Unregulated competition between elements of the USG adversely affects the level of successful engagement with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
- (U) There are insufficient U.S. policy directives for:
 - (U) Effective transition of Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) related C2 structures under the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA).

- (U) Use of Afghanistan and Pakistan policies and strategies as an organizing principle for the development of approaches to Central Asian States (CAS).
- (U) Unification of USCENTCOM, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Government, NATO and international community efforts related to piracy, counter-proliferation and transnational terrorism seams.
- (U) Unification of USCENTCOM Building Partnership Capacity with U.S. counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and counternarcotic initiatives.

(U) After assessing the current C2-KM constructs within the USCENTCOM AOR, the following themes emerged as most significant: Strategic civilian and military leadership for the campaign in Afghanistan; Enhanced unity of command in C2 structures/relationships in Afghanistan; USG and DOD bilateral engagement with theater regional partners; and, USCENTCOM implementation of AOR-wide C2 knowledge management practices. These themes are discussed in detail throughout this report.

(U) C2-KM Strategic Goals.

(U) As stated in the Theater Strategy, USCENTCOM has an enduring interest to promote stability within the region by capitalizing on areas of common interest among stakeholders such as security, economic prosperity, personal opportunity, and the non-proliferation of WMD. Given this interest, the following were identified as key C2-KM goals for USCENTCOM:

- (U) Improve unity of effort through enhanced processes and structures for Political, Civilian and Military integration

and Military Command and Control in Afghanistan.

- (U) Unify U.S. military command structures for Afghanistan in order to ensure unity of command and provide for unified action with respect to other U.S. and international actors.
- (U) Improve the interoperability and integration of Political, Civilian and Military engagement and military support activities for U.S. whole of government approaches to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.
- (U) Apply the knowledge management best practices for bilateral approaches to USCENTCOM participation in enhanced communities of interest (COIs) for information sharing and collaboration focused on key security cooperation, political, social and economic programs in the AOR.

(U) C2-KM Integrated Concept. This report proposes a C2-KM Integrated Concept with three Lines of Effort: U.S. and international community support to Afghanistan is improved; USG engagement with GCC states is improved; and, C2-KM principles and concepts adapted to USCENTCOM Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). Objectives leading to these goals are recommended over a 5 years.

(U) This integrated concept for C2-KM differs from that published in the existing TCP by: proposing deliberate development of a C2-KM framework to maximize interagency, coalition, allies, and partnered state participation, inclusion and integration; developing strategic potential for communities of interest (COIs) and processes for addressing common issues within COIs; and, providing recommendations for methods that proactively leverage non-DOD and non-U.S. leadership.

(U) Specific Implementation Tasks. This report provides recommended tasks and other considerations for AOR-wide C2-KM in Paragraph 8. Selected key tasks include:

- (U) Select a U.S. Civilian Leadership approach for Afghanistan. This includes specific recommendations for refinement of U.S. political, civilian and military approaches within agreed constructs established in strategic agreements, compacts and strategies.
- (U) Identify the integrated strategic concept intended as the basis for U.S. policy for Afghanistan based upon the selected Civilian Leadership Approach. This includes recommendation for a Political-Civilian-Military Course of Action where the USG works within established U.N. and NATO processes to co-lead partners and the international community toward agreed ends. Multi-lateral agreements constitute the main organizing body of policy for multilateral action with the U.S. providing unilateral policies only for key gaps. U.S. policy is selectively integrated through those multilateral authorities as required. U.S. approaches are aggressively shared among and within the international community with enabling support provided by the U.S. within available resources.
- (U) Recommend the establishment of a high-level Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- (U) Recommend roles for the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- (U) Further unify U.S. Joint Forces under USFOR-A consistent with selected military command and control concepts. This includes recommendation for a Military C2 Course of Action for

Afghanistan where the U.S. forces lead allies and coalition partners under established NATO / ISAF constructs. USFOR-A headquarters and U.S. joint functional components are reinforced as key enablers for ISAF and the multinational forces.

- (U) Fully resource the USFOR-A Joint Manning Document (JMD) based upon the selected military command and control concept.
- (U) Establish a C2-KM Synchronization Office at USCENTCOM in order to enhance and streamline engagement with the GCC countries in support of Security Assistance and coalition interoperability (initially bilaterally).
- (U) Establish AOR-wide C2-KM concepts including TCP-based assessments that can improve coordination with U.S. agencies and partner nations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANNEX J: BASING, LOGISTICS AND FRAMEWORK OPERATIONS

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) Report functions. This annex outlines the current state of activities and environment affecting three enabling functions – Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations (BLFO) – and provides some findings and recommendations related to these functions.

- Basing (Appendices 2&3). Basing includes two elements - posture and access. Posture is defined as basing; forces with equipment; prepositioned equipment; infrastructure and facilities; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information (C4I); and sustainment. Access includes agreements and host nation (HN) support that provide required access and freedom of action.
- Logistics (Appendices 4-8). Logistics are those support functions, activities, resources, and requirements necessary to sustain current operations and prepare for future contingencies and operations.
- Framework Operations (Appendices 9-11). Framework operations includes the development and refinement of theater response forces, the expansion of capability and capacity of maritime force posture afloat, and improvements to military planning by expanding planner access to regional and functional experts in the coalition, regional countries, Service institutions, and other governmental and non-governmental organizations.

(U) Strategic interests. Many of our strategic interests are shared by partner nations based on their economic interests and desire to protect their citizens. Shared interests provide common ground for cooperation. The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Theater Strategy outlines the military strategy to advance U.S. strategic interests in the


USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). That Strategy outlines Overarching Strategic Principles and Objectives. Although basing, logistics, and framework operations support all of the Strategic Principles and Objectives listed in the Theater Strategy, these functions are primarily focused on support for:

- Strategic Principle - “Flexible Force Posture” - The United States will maintain sufficient presence in the region to protect vital national interests and provide support to regional allies.
- Primary Objective - Prepare United States and Partner Forces to Respond to Emerging Challenges.


(U) Challenges. There are several potential tension points identified in our analysis that effect Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations in the USCENTCOM AOR:

- Access denial (total, partial, temporary).
- U.S. Government (USG) global competition and/or demand for critical resources and enablers.
- Competing USG, partner nation, coalition, host nation interest/requirements and/or difference of opinions between USG departments.
- USG issuance of a negative finding on a host nation.
- Host nation fatigue from supporting a United States military presence.
- Resistance to change from U.S. organizations or institutions due to potential shifts in command relationships; authorities; responsibilities; and resources.
- Requirement for multilateral cooperation when most regional countries prefer a bilateral negotiation approach.

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(U) This approach will introduce new long term costs, force requirements, and may shift authorities and capacity to other organizations. As such, these recommendations may require approval from Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and Congress. Partner nation acceptance also is a critical factor. That said, the intent is to support U.S. Government (USG) policy objectives while improving the ability of DoD and the USG to project long term requirements, support all operations, and improve military planning and execution.

(U) Illustrative objectives. While all of our objectives are seen as essential to achieving the stated goals, a few examples illustrate where the use of DIME, partner and host nations, and other COCOMs and DoD agencies will prove useful.

- USG coordinated strategies for the engagement of key partners on enduring posture and access needs are approved and implemented.
- Existing agreements renewed to sustain existing required access.
- Establish/expand LOCs; requires diplomatic/other COCOM support.
- Shared partner nation or NATO logistics capabilities within Afghanistan.
- Availability/quality of HN supplies, services, transportation capabilities to support economic development and BPC.
- Programs to provide access to interagency/regional/functional experts required to support varied planning efforts.
- USCENTCOM staff integrated with coalition planners.

(U) Opportunities. Some potential opportunities exist to assist in achieving the stated goals, objectives and ultimately U.S. interest:

- Use posture and access obtained in support of current operations and HN awareness of increased threats by states and non state actors to pursue long term, enduring posture and access.
- Use the development of a coalition maritime force to meet long term military requirements in this critical region. This is a coalition success story and, if it can be sustained and expanded with the right Rules of Engagement (ROE), can be used to reduce United States force presence steady state in the region.
- Use expanded coalition coordination to develop formal long term military planning and coordination relationships with HNs to address shared and combined logistics opportunities and assets as well as basing opportunities.
- Use newly focused efforts on the development of Partner Security Forces to reduce United States force requirements. These efforts will need to be fully funded in the near-term to reduce U.S. Government (USG) force requirements and make up for Partner nation equipment shortfalls. If unfunded critical requirements may require USG resources.
- Logistics offers tremendous opportunity for HN economic stimulus and security cooperation engagement through use of local sources and infrastructure. The U.S. achieves a needed capability and the host nation obtains a revenue injection from procurement and our commerce passing through.
- Capitalize on lessons learned regarding joint logistics, contracting, and basing to support the development of more efficient methods for support within the AOR.

(U) The approach used in this annex identified strategic (10 years), intermediate (5 years), and near-term (18 months) goals with corresponding objectives, tasks and metrics. The appendices provide a matrix with tasks, identification of the lead responsible for implementation, the appropriate Line of Effort (LOE), and possible linkage to other goals, objectives, and/or tasks; the necessary resources and authorities; constraints to overcome in implementation; and risk with mitigations. We recognized and considered a whole-of- government approach instead of a military option only. We believe USCENTCOM must work with elements of the interagency (e.g. Department of State), supporting COCOMs, and DoD Agencies, and other partner nations. Recommendations and resultant action requirements of sub-regional and other functional teams were considered in the development of this annex. Finally, we used existing USCENTCOM planning products (Theater Strategy, Theater Campaign Plan, Sub Regional Actions Plans, and Global Defense Posture Plan) and planning efforts like the Regional Security Architecture to inform planning and provide avenues to achieve stated goals.

(U) Lines of effort. This report uses four lines of effort (LOE) to advance tasks under an objective and advance objectives towards successful achievement of subordinate goals. Objectives and supporting tasks required to achieve success for each of the 10 subordinate goals may use one or more of the four LOEs below. The specific LOE used to advance each task/objective are outlined in each of the subordinate goal appendices. The LOEs are:

- Diplomatic Support
- Strategy and Plan development/approval
- Sustaining existing capabilities and access
- Implementation of approved efforts/activities

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANNEX K: U.S. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES, PROCESSES AND AUTHORITIES


(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) Unity of effort is essential to addressing national security issues that are by nature complex and dynamic: there is no single agency solution, no single “right” answer as to what the challenge is, and no single strategy that will endure over time to solve it. Our current national security challenges – violent extremist organizations, Iran, Arab-Israeli conflict, the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, proliferation of WMD, the global financial crisis, weak and failing states – are *highly* dynamic and complex because of the number of actors involved and the speed at which the environment changes.


(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(5)

¹ “Whole-of-government” is phrase used to indicate an approach that includes the perspectives and capabilities of all of the relevant departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(5)

(U) A detailed list of recommendations is included at the end of this report. The structure, process, and authority issues specific to sub-regions such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Arabian Peninsula are explored in USCENTCOM Assessment Team (CAT) sub-regional reports and the Command and Control/Knowledge Management Annex.

² “Gold” personnel are the whole-of-government version of the “purple” joint officers in the Defense Department.



U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND ASSESSMENT TEAM (CAT)

REGIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL REPORTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES

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